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[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19 //!
20
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37
38 use chain;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs;
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::onion_utils;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
61
62 use io;
63 use prelude::*;
64 use core::{cmp, mem};
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
72 use core::ops::Deref;
73
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
75 //
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
79 //
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
84 //
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
90
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
93         Forward {
94                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
96         },
97         Receive {
98                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
100         },
101         ReceiveKeysend {
102                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104         },
105 }
106
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109         routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110         incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112         pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
114 }
115
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
120 }
121
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
127 }
128
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
130         AddHTLC {
131                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
132
133                 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134                 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135                 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
136                 // HTLCs.
137                 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
138                 prev_htlc_id: u64,
139                 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140         },
141         FailHTLC {
142                 htlc_id: u64,
143                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144         },
145 }
146
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150         short_channel_id: u64,
151         htlc_id: u64,
152         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
153
154         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156         outpoint: OutPoint,
157 }
158
159 enum OnionPayload {
160         /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161         /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162         /// are part of the same payment.
163         Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
166 }
167
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
170         cltv_expiry: u32,
171         value: u64,
172         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
173 }
174
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
179
180 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
181         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
182                 self.0.write(w)
183         }
184 }
185
186 impl Readable for PaymentId {
187         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
189                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
190         }
191 }
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
195 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
196         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
197         OutboundRoute {
198                 path: Vec<RouteHop>,
199                 session_priv: SecretKey,
200                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
201                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
202                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
203                 payment_id: PaymentId,
204                 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
205                 payee: Option<Payee>,
206         },
207 }
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
210         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
211                 match self {
212                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
213                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
214                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
215                         },
216                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
217                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
218                                 path.hash(hasher);
219                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
220                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
221                                 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
222                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
223                                 payee.hash(hasher);
224                         },
225                 }
226         }
227 }
228 #[cfg(test)]
229 impl HTLCSource {
230         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
231                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
232                         path: Vec::new(),
233                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
234                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
235                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
236                         payment_secret: None,
237                         payee: None,
238                 }
239         }
240 }
241
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
244         LightningError {
245                 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246         },
247         Reason {
248                 failure_code: u16,
249                 data: Vec<u8>,
250         }
251 }
252
253 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
254 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
255         PrevHopForceClosed,
256         MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
257         Success(u64),
258         DuplicateClaim,
259 }
260
261 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
262
263 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
264 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
265 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
266 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
267 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
268
269 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
270         err: msgs::LightningError,
271         chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
272         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
273 }
274 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
275         #[inline]
276         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
277                 Self {
278                         err: LightningError {
279                                 err: err.clone(),
280                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
282                                                 channel_id,
283                                                 data: err
284                                         },
285                                 },
286                         },
287                         chan_id: None,
288                         shutdown_finish: None,
289                 }
290         }
291         #[inline]
292         fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
293                 Self {
294                         err: LightningError {
295                                 err,
296                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
297                         },
298                         chan_id: None,
299                         shutdown_finish: None,
300                 }
301         }
302         #[inline]
303         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
304                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
305         }
306         #[inline]
307         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
308                 Self {
309                         err: LightningError {
310                                 err: err.clone(),
311                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
312                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
313                                                 channel_id,
314                                                 data: err
315                                         },
316                                 },
317                         },
318                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
319                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
320                 }
321         }
322         #[inline]
323         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
324                 Self {
325                         err: match err {
326                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
327                                         err: msg,
328                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
329                                 },
330                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
331                                         err: msg,
332                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
333                                 },
334                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
335                                         err: msg.clone(),
336                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
338                                                         channel_id,
339                                                         data: msg
340                                                 },
341                                         },
342                                 },
343                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
344                                         err: msg.clone(),
345                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
346                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
347                                                         channel_id,
348                                                         data: msg
349                                                 },
350                                         },
351                                 },
352                         },
353                         chan_id: None,
354                         shutdown_finish: None,
355                 }
356         }
357 }
358
359 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
360 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
361 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
362 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
363 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
364
365 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
366 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
367 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
368 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
370 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
371         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
372         CommitmentFirst,
373         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
374         RevokeAndACKFirst,
375 }
376
377 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
378 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
379         pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
380         pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
381         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
382         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
383         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
384         /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
385         pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
386         /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
387         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
388         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
389         /// go to read them!
390         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
391         /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
392         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
393         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
394 }
395
396 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
397 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
398 /// quite some time lag.
399 enum BackgroundEvent {
400         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
401         /// commitment transaction.
402         ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
403 }
404
405 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
406 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
407 struct PeerState {
408         latest_features: InitFeatures,
409 }
410
411 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
412 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
413 ///
414 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
415 /// here.
416 struct PendingInboundPayment {
417         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
418         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
419         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
420         /// this payment being removed.
421         expiry_time: u64,
422         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
423         user_payment_id: u64,
424         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
425         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
426         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
427 }
428
429 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
430 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
431 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
432         Legacy {
433                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
434         },
435         Retryable {
436                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
437                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
438                 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
439                 pending_amt_msat: u64,
440                 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
441                 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
442                 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
443                 total_msat: u64,
444                 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
445                 starting_block_height: u32,
446         },
447         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
448         /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
449         /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
450         Fulfilled {
451                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
452         },
453 }
454
455 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
456         fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
457                 match self {
458                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
459                         _ => false,
460                 }
461         }
462         fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
463                 match self {
464                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
465                         _ => false,
466                 }
467         }
468         fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
469                 match self {
470                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
471                         _ => None,
472                 }
473         }
474
475         fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
476                 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
477                 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
478                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
479                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
480                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs }
481                                 => session_privs
482                 });
483                 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs };
484         }
485
486         /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
487         fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
488                 let remove_res = match self {
489                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
490                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
491                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
492                                 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
493                         }
494                 };
495                 if remove_res {
496                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
497                                 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
498                                 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
499                                 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
500                                 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
501                                         *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
502                                 }
503                         }
504                 }
505                 remove_res
506         }
507
508         fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
509                 let insert_res = match self {
510                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
511                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
512                                 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
513                         }
514                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
515                 };
516                 if insert_res {
517                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
518                                 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
519                                 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
520                                 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
521                                         *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
522                                 }
523                         }
524                 }
525                 insert_res
526         }
527
528         fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
529                 match self {
530                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
531                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
532                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs } => {
533                                 session_privs.len()
534                         }
535                 }
536         }
537 }
538
539 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
540 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
541 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
542 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
543 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
544 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
545 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
546 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
547
548 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
549 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
550 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
551 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
552 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
553 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
554 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
555 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
556 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
557
558 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
559 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
560 ///
561 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
562 /// to individual Channels.
563 ///
564 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
565 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
566 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
567 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
568 ///
569 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
570 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
571 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
572 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
573 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
574 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
575 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
576 ///
577 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
578 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
579 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
580 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
581 /// object!
582 ///
583 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
584 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
585 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
586 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
587 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
588 ///
589 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
590 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
591 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
592 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
593 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
594 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
595         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
596         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
597         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
598         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
599                                 L::Target: Logger,
600 {
601         default_configuration: UserConfig,
602         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
603         fee_estimator: F,
604         chain_monitor: M,
605         tx_broadcaster: T,
606
607         #[cfg(test)]
608         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
609         #[cfg(not(test))]
610         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
611         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
612
613         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
614         pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
615         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
616         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
617
618         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
619         /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
620         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
621         /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
622         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
623         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
624
625         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
626         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
627         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
628         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
629         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
630         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
631         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
632         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
633         ///
634         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
635         ///
636         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
637         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
638
639         our_network_key: SecretKey,
640         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
641
642         /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
643         /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
644         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
645
646         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
647         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
648         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
649         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
650
651         /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
652         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
653         /// are currently open with that peer.
654         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
655         /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
656         /// new channel.
657         ///
658         /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
659         per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
660
661         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
662         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
663         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
664         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
665         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
666         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
667         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
668         /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
669         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
670
671         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
672
673         keys_manager: K,
674
675         logger: L,
676 }
677
678 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
679 ///
680 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
681 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
682 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
683 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
684 pub struct ChainParameters {
685         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
686         pub network: Network,
687
688         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
689         ///
690         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
691         pub best_block: BestBlock,
692 }
693
694 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
695 enum NotifyOption {
696         DoPersist,
697         SkipPersist,
698 }
699
700 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
701 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
702 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
703 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
704 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
705 /// updates are ready for persistence).
706 ///
707 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
708 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
709 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
710 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
711         persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
712         should_persist: F,
713         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
714         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
715 }
716
717 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
718         fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
719                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
720         }
721
722         fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
723                 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
724
725                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
726                         persistence_notifier: notifier,
727                         should_persist: persist_check,
728                         _read_guard: read_guard,
729                 }
730         }
731 }
732
733 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
734         fn drop(&mut self) {
735                 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
736                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
737                 }
738         }
739 }
740
741 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
742 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
743 ///
744 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
745 ///
746 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
747 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
748 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
749 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
750 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
751
752 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
753 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
754 ///
755 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
756 ///
757 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
758 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
759 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
760 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
761 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
762 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
763 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
764
765 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
766 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
767 /// this value.
768 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
769 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
770 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
771 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
772
773 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
774 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
775 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
776 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
777 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
778 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
779 #[deny(const_err)]
780 #[allow(dead_code)]
781 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
782
783 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
784 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
785 #[deny(const_err)]
786 #[allow(dead_code)]
787 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
788
789 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
790 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
791 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
792         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
793         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
794         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
795         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
796         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
797         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
798         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
799         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
800 }
801
802 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
803 /// to better separate parameters.
804 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
805 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
806         /// The node_id of our counterparty
807         pub node_id: PublicKey,
808         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
809         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
810         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
811         pub features: InitFeatures,
812         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
813         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
814         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
815         ///
816         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
817         ///
818         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
819         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
820         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
821         /// payments to us through this channel.
822         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
823 }
824
825 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
826 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
827 pub struct ChannelDetails {
828         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
829         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
830         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
831         /// lifetime of the channel.
832         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
833         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
834         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
835         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
836         /// our counterparty already.
837         ///
838         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
839         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
840         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
841         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
842         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
843         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
844         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
845         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
846         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
847         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
848         /// this value on chain.
849         ///
850         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
851         ///
852         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
853         ///
854         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
855         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
856         /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
857         pub user_channel_id: u64,
858         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
859         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
860         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
861         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
862         ///
863         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
864         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
865         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
866         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
867         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
868         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
869         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
870         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
871         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
872         ///
873         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
874         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
875         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
876         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
877         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
878         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
879         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
880         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
881         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
882         ///
883         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
884         ///
885         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
886         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
887         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
888         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
889         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
890         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
891         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
892         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
893         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
894         ///
895         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
896         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
897         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
898         pub is_outbound: bool,
899         /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
900         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
901         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
902         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
903         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
904         ///
905         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
906         pub is_funding_locked: bool,
907         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
908         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
909         ///
910         /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
911         pub is_usable: bool,
912         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
913         pub is_public: bool,
914 }
915
916 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
917 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
918 /// states for more.
919 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
920 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
921         /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
922         /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
923         /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
924         ParameterError(APIError),
925         /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
926         /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
927         /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
928         /// payment in full.
929         ///
930         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
931         /// send_payment.
932         PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
933         /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
934         /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
935         /// paths than the ones selected).
936         AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
937         /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
938         /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
939         /// in over-/re-payment.
940         ///
941         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
942         /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
943         /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
944         ///
945         /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
946         /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
947         /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
948         /// with the latest update_id.
949         PartialFailure {
950                 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
951                 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
952                 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
953                 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
954                 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
955                 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
956                 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
957                 payment_id: PaymentId,
958         },
959 }
960
961 macro_rules! handle_error {
962         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
963                 match $internal {
964                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
965                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
966                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
967                                 {
968                                         // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
969                                         // entering the macro.
970                                         assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
971                                         assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
972                                 }
973
974                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
975
976                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
977                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
978                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
979                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
980                                                         msg: update
981                                                 });
982                                         }
983                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
984                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
985                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
986                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
987                                                 });
988                                         }
989                                 }
990
991                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
992                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
993                                 } else {
994                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
995                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
996                                                 action: err.action.clone()
997                                         });
998                                 }
999
1000                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1001                                         $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1002                                 }
1003
1004                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1005                                 Err(err)
1006                         },
1007                 }
1008         }
1009 }
1010
1011 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1012 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1013         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1014                 match $err {
1015                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1016                                 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1017                                 //peer here.
1018                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1019                         },
1020                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1021                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1022                         },
1023                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1024                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1025                                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1026                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1027                                 }
1028                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1029                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1030                                         shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1031                         },
1032                         ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1033                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1034                                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1035                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1036                                 }
1037                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1038                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1039                                         shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1040                         }
1041                 }
1042         }
1043 }
1044
1045 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1046         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1047                 match $res {
1048                         Ok(res) => res,
1049                         Err(e) => {
1050                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1051                                 if drop {
1052                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1053                                 }
1054                                 break Err(res);
1055                         }
1056                 }
1057         }
1058 }
1059
1060 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1061         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1062                 match $res {
1063                         Ok(res) => res,
1064                         Err(e) => {
1065                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1066                                 if drop {
1067                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1068                                 }
1069                                 return Err(res);
1070                         }
1071                 }
1072         }
1073 }
1074
1075 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1076         ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1077                 {
1078                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1079                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1080                                 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1081                         }
1082                         channel
1083                 }
1084         }
1085 }
1086
1087 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1088         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1089                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1090         };
1091         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1092                 match $err {
1093                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1094                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1095                                 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1096                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1097                                 }
1098                                 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1099                                 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1100                                 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1101                                 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1102                                 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1103                                 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1104                                 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1105                                 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1106                                 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1107                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1108                                                 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1109                                 (res, true)
1110                         },
1111                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1112                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1113                                                 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1114                                                 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1115                                                                 match $action_type {
1116                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1117                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1118                                                                 }
1119                                                         } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1120                                                         else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1121                                                         else { "nothing" },
1122                                                 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1123                                                 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1124                                                 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1125                                 if !$resend_commitment {
1126                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1127                                 }
1128                                 if !$resend_raa {
1129                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1130                                 }
1131                                 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1132                                 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1133                         },
1134                 }
1135         };
1136         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1137                 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1138                 if drop {
1139                         $entry.remove_entry();
1140                 }
1141                 res
1142         } };
1143         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1144                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new());
1145         }
1146 }
1147
1148 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1149         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1150                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1151         };
1152         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1153                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1154         }
1155 }
1156
1157 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1158 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1159         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1160                 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1161                         (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1162                                 break e;
1163                         },
1164                         (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1165                 }
1166         }
1167 }
1168
1169 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1170         ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1171          $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1172          $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1173                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1174                 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1175
1176                 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1177                 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1178                 let res = loop {
1179                         let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1180                         if !forwards.is_empty() {
1181                                 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1182                                         $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1183                         }
1184
1185                         if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1186                                 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1187                                 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1188                                 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1189                                 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1190                                 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1191                                 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1192                                 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1193                                 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1194                                 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1195                                 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1196                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1197                         }
1198
1199                         if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1200                                 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1201                                 // before it should be allowed to.
1202                                 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1203                                 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1204                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1205                                         msg,
1206                                 });
1207                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1208                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1209                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1210                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
1211                                         });
1212                                 }
1213                                 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1214                         }
1215
1216                         let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1217                         if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1218                                 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1219                                 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1220                                 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1221                                 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1222                                 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1223                                 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1224                                 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1225                                 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1226                                 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1227                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1228                                 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1229                                         // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1230                                         // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1231                                         // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1232                                         let mut order = $order;
1233                                         if $raa.is_none() {
1234                                                 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1235                                         }
1236                                         break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1237                                 }
1238                         }
1239
1240                         macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1241                                 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1242                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1243                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1244                                                 updates: update,
1245                                         });
1246                                 }
1247                         } }
1248                         macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1249                                 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1250                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1251                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1252                                                 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1253                                         });
1254                                 }
1255                         } }
1256                         match $order {
1257                                 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1258                                         handle_cs!();
1259                                         handle_raa!();
1260                                 },
1261                                 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1262                                         handle_raa!();
1263                                         handle_cs!();
1264                                 },
1265                         }
1266                         if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1267                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1268                                 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1269                         }
1270                         break Ok(());
1271                 };
1272
1273                 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1274                         // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1275                         // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1276                         // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1277                         assert!(res.is_ok());
1278                 }
1279
1280                 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1281         } }
1282 }
1283
1284 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1285         ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1286                 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1287
1288                 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1289
1290                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1291                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1292                 }
1293         } }
1294 }
1295
1296 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1297         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1298         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1299         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1300         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1301         L::Target: Logger,
1302 {
1303         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1304         ///
1305         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1306         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1307         ///
1308         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1309         ///
1310         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1311         ///
1312         /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1313         /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1314         /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1315         pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1316                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1317                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1318
1319                 ChannelManager {
1320                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
1321                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1322                         fee_estimator: fee_est,
1323                         chain_monitor,
1324                         tx_broadcaster,
1325
1326                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1327
1328                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1329                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1330                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1331                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1332                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1333                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1334                         }),
1335                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1336                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1337
1338                         our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1339                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1340                         secp_ctx,
1341
1342                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1343                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1344
1345                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1346
1347                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1348                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1349                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1350                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1351
1352                         keys_manager,
1353
1354                         logger,
1355                 }
1356         }
1357
1358         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels,  as
1359         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1360                 &self.default_configuration
1361         }
1362
1363         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1364         ///
1365         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1366         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1367         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1368         /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1369         /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1370         /// ignored.
1371         ///
1372         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1373         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1374         ///
1375         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1376         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1377         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1378         ///
1379         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1380         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1381         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1382         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1383         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1384         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1385         ///
1386         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1387         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1388         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1389         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1390                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1391                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1392                 }
1393
1394                 let channel = {
1395                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1396                         match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1397                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1398                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1399                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1400                                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1401                                         Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config)?
1402                                 },
1403                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1404                         }
1405                 };
1406                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1407
1408                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1409                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1410                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1411
1412                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1413                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1414                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1415                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1416                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1417                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1418                                 } else {
1419                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
1420                                 }
1421                         },
1422                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1423                 }
1424                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1425                         node_id: their_network_key,
1426                         msg: res,
1427                 });
1428                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1429         }
1430
1431         fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1432                 let mut res = Vec::new();
1433                 {
1434                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1435                         res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1436                         for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1437                                 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1438                                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1439                                         channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1440                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1441                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1442                                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1443                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1444                                                 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1445                                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1446                                                 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1447                                         },
1448                                         funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1449                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1450                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1451                                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1452                                         inbound_capacity_msat,
1453                                         outbound_capacity_msat,
1454                                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1455                                         confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1456                                         force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1457                                         is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1458                                         is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1459                                         is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1460                                         is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1461                                 });
1462                         }
1463                 }
1464                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1465                 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1466                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1467                                 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1468                         }
1469                 }
1470                 res
1471         }
1472
1473         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1474         /// more information.
1475         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1476                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1477         }
1478
1479         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1480         /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1481         ///
1482         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1483         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1484         /// are.
1485         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1486                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1487                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1488                 // really wanted anyway.
1489                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1490         }
1491
1492         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1493         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1494                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1495                 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1496                         Some(transaction) => {
1497                                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1498                         },
1499                         None => {},
1500                 }
1501                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1502                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1503                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1504                         reason: closure_reason
1505                 });
1506         }
1507
1508         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1509                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1510
1511                 let counterparty_node_id;
1512                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1513                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1514                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1515                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1516                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1517                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1518                                         counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1519                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1520                                         let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1521                                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1522                                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1523                                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1524                                                         chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1525                                                 },
1526                                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1527                                         };
1528                                         failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1529
1530                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1531                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1532                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1533                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
1534                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1535                                                         if is_permanent {
1536                                                                 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1537                                                                 break result;
1538                                                         }
1539                                                 }
1540                                         }
1541
1542                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1543                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1544                                                 msg: shutdown_msg
1545                                         });
1546
1547                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1548                                                 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1549                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1550                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1551                                                                 msg: channel_update
1552                                                         });
1553                                                 }
1554                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1555                                         }
1556                                         break Ok(());
1557                                 },
1558                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1559                         }
1560                 };
1561
1562                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1563                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1564                 }
1565
1566                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1567                 Ok(())
1568         }
1569
1570         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1571         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1572         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1573         ///
1574         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1575         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1576         ///    estimate.
1577         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1578         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1579         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1580         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1581         ///
1582         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1583         ///
1584         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1585         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1586         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1587         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1588                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1589         }
1590
1591         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1592         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1593         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1594         ///
1595         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1596         /// the channel being closed or not:
1597         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1598         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1599         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1600         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1601         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1602         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1603         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1604         ///
1605         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1606         ///
1607         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1608         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1609         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1610         pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1611                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1612         }
1613
1614         #[inline]
1615         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1616                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1617                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1618                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1619                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1620                 }
1621                 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1622                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1623                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1624                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1625                         // ignore the result here.
1626                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1627                 }
1628         }
1629
1630         /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1631         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1632         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1633                 let mut chan = {
1634                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1635                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1636                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1637                                 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1638                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1639                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1640                                         }
1641                                 }
1642                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1643                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1644                                 }
1645                                 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1646                                         if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1647                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1648                                         }
1649                                 } else {
1650                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1651                                 }
1652                                 chan.remove_entry().1
1653                         } else {
1654                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1655                         }
1656                 };
1657                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1658                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1659                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1660                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1661                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1662                                 msg: update
1663                         });
1664                 }
1665
1666                 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1667         }
1668
1669         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1670         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1671         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1672                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1673                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1674                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1675                                 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1676                                         events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1677                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1678                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1679                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1680                                                 },
1681                                         }
1682                                 );
1683                                 Ok(())
1684                         },
1685                         Err(e) => Err(e)
1686                 }
1687         }
1688
1689         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1690         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1691         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1692                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1693                         let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1694                 }
1695         }
1696
1697         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1698                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1699                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1700                                 {
1701                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1702                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1703                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1704                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1705                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1706                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
1707                                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1708                                 }
1709                         }
1710                 }
1711
1712                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1713                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1714                 }
1715
1716                 let shared_secret = {
1717                         let mut arr = [0; 32];
1718                         arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1719                         arr
1720                 };
1721                 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1722
1723                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1724                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1725                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1726                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1727                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1728                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1729                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1730                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1731                 }
1732
1733                 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1734                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1735                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1736                 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1737                         return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1738                 }
1739
1740                 let mut channel_state = None;
1741                 macro_rules! return_err {
1742                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1743                                 {
1744                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1745                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
1746                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1747                                         }
1748                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1749                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1750                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1751                                                 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1752                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
1753                                 }
1754                         }
1755                 }
1756
1757                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1758                 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1759                 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1760                         match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1761                                 Err(err) => {
1762                                         let error_code = match err {
1763                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1764                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1765                                                 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1766                                                 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1767                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1768                                         };
1769                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1770                                 },
1771                                 Ok(msg) => {
1772                                         let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1773                                         if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1774                                                 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1775                                         }
1776                                         (msg, hmac)
1777                                 },
1778                         }
1779                 };
1780
1781                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1782                         #[cfg(test)]
1783                         {
1784                                 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1785                                 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1786                                 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1787                                 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1788                                 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1789                                 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1790                                 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1791                                 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1792                                 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1793                                 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1794                                 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1795                                 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1796                         }
1797
1798                         // OUR PAYMENT!
1799                         // final_expiry_too_soon
1800                         // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1801                         // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1802                         // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1803                         // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1804                         // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1805                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1806                                 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1807                         }
1808                         // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1809                         if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1810                                 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1811                         }
1812                         // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1813                         if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1814                                 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1815                         }
1816
1817                         let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1818                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1819                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1820                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1821                                         if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1822                                                 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1823                                         } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1824                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1825                                                         payment_data: data,
1826                                                         incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1827                                                 }
1828                                         } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1829                                                 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1830                                                 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1831                                                 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1832                                                 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1833                                                 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1834                                                 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1835                                                 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1836                                                         return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1837                                                 }
1838
1839                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1840                                                         payment_preimage,
1841                                                         incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1842                                                 }
1843                                         } else {
1844                                                 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1845                                         }
1846                                 },
1847                         };
1848
1849                         // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1850                         // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1851                         // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1852                         // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1853
1854                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1855                                 routing,
1856                                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1857                                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1858                                 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1859                                 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1860                         })
1861                 } else {
1862                         let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1863                         let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1864                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1865                         {
1866                                 // Check two things:
1867                                 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1868                                 //    read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1869                                 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1870                                 let mut t = [0; 1];
1871                                 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1872                         }
1873                         // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1874                         // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1875                         chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1876
1877                         let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1878
1879                         let blinding_factor = {
1880                                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1881                                 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1882                                 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1883                                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1884                         };
1885
1886                         let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1887                                 Err(e)
1888                         } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1889
1890                         let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1891                                 version: 0,
1892                                 public_key,
1893                                 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1894                                 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1895                         };
1896
1897                         let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1898                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1899                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1900                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1901                                         return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1902                                 },
1903                         };
1904
1905                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1906                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1907                                         onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1908                                         short_channel_id,
1909                                 },
1910                                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1911                                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1912                                 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1913                                 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1914                         })
1915                 };
1916
1917                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1918                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1919                         // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1920                         // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1921                         // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1922                         if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1923                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1924                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1925                                         let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1926                                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1927                                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1928                                                 },
1929                                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1930                                         };
1931
1932                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1933
1934                                         if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1935                                                 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1936                                                 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1937                                                 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1938                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1939                                         }
1940
1941                                         // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1942                                         // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1943                                         // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1944                                         // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1945                                         // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1946                                         if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1947                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1948                                         }
1949                                         if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1950                                                 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1951                                         }
1952                                         let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1953                                                 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1954                                                 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1955                                         if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1956                                                 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1957                                         }
1958                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1959                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1960                                         }
1961                                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1962                                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1963                                         // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1964                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1965                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1966                                         }
1967                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1968                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1969                                         }
1970                                         // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1971                                         // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1972                                         if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1973                                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1974                                         }
1975
1976                                         break None;
1977                                 }
1978                                 {
1979                                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1980                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1981                                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1982                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1983                                                 }
1984                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1985                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1986                                                 }
1987                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1988                                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1989                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1990                                                 }
1991                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1992                                         }
1993                                         return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1994                                 }
1995                         }
1996                 }
1997
1998                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1999         }
2000
2001         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2002         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2003         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2004         ///
2005         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2006         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2007                 if !chan.should_announce() {
2008                         return Err(LightningError {
2009                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2010                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2011                         });
2012                 }
2013                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2014                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2015         }
2016
2017         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2018         /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2019         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2020         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2021         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2022         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2023                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2024                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2025                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2026                         Some(id) => id,
2027                 };
2028
2029                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2030
2031                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2032                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2033                         short_channel_id,
2034                         timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2035                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2036                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2037                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2038                         htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2039                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2040                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2041                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2042                 };
2043
2044                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2045                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2046
2047                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2048                         signature: sig,
2049                         contents: unsigned
2050                 })
2051         }
2052
2053         // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2054         pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2055                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2056                 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2057                 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2058                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2059
2060                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2061                         .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2062                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2063                 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2064                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2065                 }
2066                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2067
2068                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2069
2070                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2071                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2072
2073                         let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2074                         let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2075                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2076                                 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2077                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2078                                                 err: "Payment already completed"
2079                                         });
2080                                 }
2081                         }
2082
2083                         let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2084                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2085                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2086                         };
2087
2088                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2089                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2090                                 match {
2091                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2092                                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2093                                         }
2094                                         if !chan.get().is_live() {
2095                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2096                                         }
2097                                         let send_res = break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2098                                                 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2099                                                         path: path.clone(),
2100                                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2101                                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2102                                                         payment_id,
2103                                                         payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2104                                                         payee: payee.clone(),
2105                                                 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2106                                         channel_state, chan);
2107
2108                                         let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2109                                                 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2110                                                 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2111                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2112                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2113                                                 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2114                                                 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2115                                                 total_msat: total_value,
2116                                         });
2117                                         assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2118
2119                                         send_res
2120                                 } {
2121                                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2122                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2123                                                         maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2124                                                         // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2125                                                         // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2126                                                         // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2127                                                         // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2128                                                         // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2129                                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2130                                                 }
2131
2132                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2133                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2134                                                         node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2135                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2136                                                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2137                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2138                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2139                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2140                                                                 update_fee: None,
2141                                                                 commitment_signed,
2142                                                         },
2143                                                 });
2144                                         },
2145                                         None => {},
2146                                 }
2147                         } else { unreachable!(); }
2148                         return Ok(());
2149                 };
2150
2151                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2152                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2153                         Err(e) => {
2154                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2155                         },
2156                 }
2157         }
2158
2159         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2160         ///
2161         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2162         /// fields for more info.
2163         ///
2164         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2165         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2166         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2167         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2168         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2169         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2170         ///
2171         /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2172         ///
2173         /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2174         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2175         /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2176         ///
2177         /// In general, a path may raise:
2178         ///  * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2179         ///    node public key) is specified.
2180         ///  * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2181         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2182         ///    failure).
2183         ///  * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2184         ///    relevant updates.
2185         ///
2186         /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2187         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2188         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2189         ///
2190         /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2191         /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2192         /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2193         /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2194         /// payment_secret.
2195         /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2196         /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2197         /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2198         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2199                 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2200         }
2201
2202         fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2203                 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2204                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2205                 }
2206                 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2207                         // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2208                         // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2209                         // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2210                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2211                 }
2212                 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2213                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2214                 }
2215                 let mut total_value = 0;
2216                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2217                 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2218                 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2219                 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2220                         if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2221                                 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2222                                 continue 'path_check;
2223                         }
2224                         for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2225                                 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2226                                         path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2227                                         continue 'path_check;
2228                                 }
2229                         }
2230                         total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2231                         path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2232                 }
2233                 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2234                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2235                 }
2236                 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2237                         debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2238                         total_value = amt_msat;
2239                 }
2240
2241                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2242                 let mut results = Vec::new();
2243                 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2244                         results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2245                 }
2246                 let mut has_ok = false;
2247                 let mut has_err = false;
2248                 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2249                 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2250                 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2251                         if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2252                         if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2253                         if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2254                                 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2255                                 // PartialFailure.
2256                                 has_err = true;
2257                                 has_ok = true;
2258                         } else if res.is_err() {
2259                                 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2260                                 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2261                         }
2262                 }
2263                 if has_err && has_ok {
2264                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2265                                 results,
2266                                 payment_id,
2267                                 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2268                                         if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2269                                                 Some(RouteParameters {
2270                                                         payee: payee.clone(),
2271                                                         final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2272                                                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2273                                                 })
2274                                         } else { None }
2275                                 } else { None },
2276                         })
2277                 } else if has_err {
2278                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2279                 } else {
2280                         Ok(payment_id)
2281                 }
2282         }
2283
2284         /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2285         ///
2286         /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2287         /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2288         /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2289         /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2290         ///
2291         /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2292         pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2293                 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2294                 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2295                         if path.len() == 0 {
2296                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2297                                         err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2298                                 }))
2299                         }
2300                 }
2301
2302                 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2303                         let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2304                         if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2305                                 match payment {
2306                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2307                                                 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2308                                         } => {
2309                                                 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2310                                                 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2311                                                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2312                                                                 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2313                                                         }))
2314                                                 }
2315                                                 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2316                                         },
2317                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2318                                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2319                                                         err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2320                                                 }))
2321                                         },
2322                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2323                                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2324                                                         err: "Payment already completed"
2325                                                 }));
2326                                         },
2327                                 }
2328                         } else {
2329                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2330                                         err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2331                                 }))
2332                         }
2333                 };
2334                 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2335         }
2336
2337         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2338         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2339         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2340         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2341         /// never reach the recipient.
2342         ///
2343         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2344         ///
2345         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2346         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2347         ///
2348         /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2349         ///
2350         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2351         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2352                 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2353                         Some(p) => p,
2354                         None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2355                 };
2356                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2357                 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2358                         Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2359                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2360                 }
2361         }
2362
2363         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2364         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2365         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2366                         (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2367                 let (chan, msg) = {
2368                         let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2369                                 Some(mut chan) => {
2370                                         let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2371
2372                                         (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2373                                                 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2374                                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2375                                                 } else { unreachable!(); })
2376                                         , chan)
2377                                 },
2378                                 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2379                         };
2380                         match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2381                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2382                                         (chan, funding_msg)
2383                                 },
2384                                 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2385                                         err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2386                                 }) },
2387                         }
2388                 };
2389
2390                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2391                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2392                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2393                         msg,
2394                 });
2395                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2396                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2397                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2398                         },
2399                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2400                                 e.insert(chan);
2401                         }
2402                 }
2403                 Ok(())
2404         }
2405
2406         #[cfg(test)]
2407         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2408                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2409                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2410                 })
2411         }
2412
2413         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2414         ///
2415         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2416         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2417         ///
2418         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2419         ///
2420         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2421         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2422         /// keys per-channel).
2423         ///
2424         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2425         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2426         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2427         ///
2428         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2429         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2430         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2431         ///
2432         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2433         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2434                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2435
2436                 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2437                         if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2438                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2439                                         err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2440                                 });
2441                         }
2442                 }
2443                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2444                         let mut output_index = None;
2445                         let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2446                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2447                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2448                                         if output_index.is_some() {
2449                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2450                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2451                                                 });
2452                                         }
2453                                         if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2454                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2455                                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2456                                                 });
2457                                         }
2458                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2459                                 }
2460                         }
2461                         if output_index.is_none() {
2462                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2463                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2464                                 });
2465                         }
2466                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2467                 })
2468         }
2469
2470         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2471                 if !chan.should_announce() {
2472                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2473                         return None
2474                 }
2475
2476                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2477                         Ok(res) => res,
2478                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2479                 };
2480                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2481                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2482
2483                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2484                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2485                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2486                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
2487                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2488                 })
2489         }
2490
2491         #[allow(dead_code)]
2492         // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2493         // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2494         // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2495         // message...
2496         const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2497         #[deny(const_err)]
2498         #[allow(dead_code)]
2499         // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2500         // smaller than 500:
2501         const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2502
2503         /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2504         /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2505         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2506         /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2507         /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2508         /// our network addresses.
2509         ///
2510         /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2511         /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2512         ///
2513         /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2514         /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2515         /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2516         /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2517         ///
2518         /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2519         ///
2520         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2521         pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2522                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2523
2524                 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2525                         panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2526                 }
2527
2528                 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2529                 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2530                 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2531
2532                 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2533                         features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2534                         timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2535                         node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2536                         rgb, alias, addresses,
2537                         excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2538                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2539                 };
2540                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2541                 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2542
2543                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2544                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2545
2546                 let mut announced_chans = false;
2547                 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2548                         if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2549                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2550                                         msg,
2551                                         update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2552                                                 Ok(msg) => msg,
2553                                                 Err(_) => continue,
2554                                         },
2555                                 });
2556                                 announced_chans = true;
2557                         } else {
2558                                 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2559                                 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2560                                 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2561                         }
2562                 }
2563
2564                 if announced_chans {
2565                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2566                                 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2567                                         signature: node_announce_sig,
2568                                         contents: announcement
2569                                 },
2570                         });
2571                 }
2572         }
2573
2574         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2575         ///
2576         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2577         /// Will likely generate further events.
2578         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2579                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2580
2581                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2582                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2583                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2584                 {
2585                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2586                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2587
2588                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2589                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2590                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2591                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2592                                                 None => {
2593                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2594                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2595                                                                 match forward_info {
2596                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2597                                                                                                    prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2598                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2599                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2600                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2601                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2602                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2603                                                                                 });
2604                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2605                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2606                                                                                 ));
2607                                                                         },
2608                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2609                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2610                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2611                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2612                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
2613                                                                         }
2614                                                                 }
2615                                                         }
2616                                                         continue;
2617                                                 }
2618                                         };
2619                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2620                                                 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2621                                                 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2622                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2623                                                         match forward_info {
2624                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2625                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2626                                                                                         onion_packet, ..
2627                                                                                 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2628                                                                                 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2629                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2630                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2631                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2632                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2633                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2634                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2635                                                                         });
2636                                                                         match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2637                                                                                 Err(e) => {
2638                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2639                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2640                                                                                         } else {
2641                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2642                                                                                         }
2643                                                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2644                                                                                         failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2645                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2646                                                                                         ));
2647                                                                                         continue;
2648                                                                                 },
2649                                                                                 Ok(update_add) => {
2650                                                                                         match update_add {
2651                                                                                                 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2652                                                                                                 None => {
2653                                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2654                                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2655                                                                                                         // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2656                                                                                                         // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2657                                                                                                         // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2658                                                                                                         // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2659                                                                                                         // this channel currently :/.
2660                                                                                                 }
2661                                                                                         }
2662                                                                                 }
2663                                                                         }
2664                                                                 },
2665                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2666                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2667                                                                 },
2668                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2669                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2670                                                                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2671                                                                                 Err(e) => {
2672                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2673                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2674                                                                                         } else {
2675                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2676                                                                                         }
2677                                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2678                                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2679                                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2680                                                                                         continue;
2681                                                                                 },
2682                                                                                 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2683                                                                                 Ok(None) => {
2684                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2685                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2686                                                                                         // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2687                                                                                         // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2688                                                                                         // messages when we can.
2689                                                                                         // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2690                                                                                         // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2691                                                                                         // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2692                                                                                 }
2693                                                                         }
2694                                                                 },
2695                                                         }
2696                                                 }
2697
2698                                                 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2699                                                         let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2700                                                                 Ok(res) => res,
2701                                                                 Err(e) => {
2702                                                                         // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2703                                                                         // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2704                                                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2705                                                                         let err: Result<(), _>  = match e {
2706                                                                                 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2707                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2708                                                                                 }
2709                                                                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2710                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2711                                                                                         let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2712                                                                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2713                                                                                                 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2714                                                                                         }
2715                                                                                         // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2716                                                                                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2717                                                                                 },
2718                                                                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2719                                                                         };
2720                                                                         handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2721                                                                         continue;
2722                                                                 }
2723                                                         };
2724                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2725                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2726                                                                 continue;
2727                                                         }
2728                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2729                                                                 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2730                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2731                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2732                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2733                                                                         update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2734                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2735                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2736                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2737                                                                         update_fee: None,
2738                                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2739                                                                 },
2740                                                         });
2741                                                 }
2742                                         } else {
2743                                                 unreachable!();
2744                                         }
2745                                 } else {
2746                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2747                                                 match forward_info {
2748                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2749                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2750                                                                         prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2751                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2752                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2753                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2754                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2755                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2756                                                                         _ => {
2757                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2758                                                                         }
2759                                                                 };
2760                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2761                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2762                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2763                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2764                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2765                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2766                                                                         },
2767                                                                         value: amt_to_forward,
2768                                                                         cltv_expiry,
2769                                                                         onion_payload,
2770                                                                 };
2771
2772                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2773                                                                         ($htlc: expr) => {
2774                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2775                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2776                                                                                         &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2777                                                                                 );
2778                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2779                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2780                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2781                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2782                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2783                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
2784                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2785                                                                                 ));
2786                                                                         }
2787                                                                 }
2788
2789                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2790                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2791                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2792                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2793                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2794                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2795                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2796                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2797                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2798                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2799                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2800                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2801                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2802                                                                                         },
2803                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2804                                                                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2805                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2806                                                                                                                 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2807                                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2808                                                                                                                         payment_hash,
2809                                                                                                                         amt: amt_to_forward,
2810                                                                                                                         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2811                                                                                                                 });
2812                                                                                                         },
2813                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2814                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2815                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2816                                                                                                         }
2817                                                                                                 }
2818                                                                                         }
2819                                                                                 }
2820                                                                         },
2821                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2822                                                                                 let payment_data =
2823                                                                                         if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2824                                                                                                 data.clone()
2825                                                                                         } else {
2826                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2827                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2828                                                                                                 continue
2829                                                                                         };
2830                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2831                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2832                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2833                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2834                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2835                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2836                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2837                                                                                 } else {
2838                                                                                         let mut total_value = 0;
2839                                                                                         let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2840                                                                                                 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2841                                                                                         if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2842                                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2843                                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2844                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2845                                                                                                         continue
2846                                                                                                 }
2847                                                                                         }
2848                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2849                                                                                         for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2850                                                                                                 total_value += htlc.value;
2851                                                                                                 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2852                                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2853                                                                                                                 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2854                                                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2855                                                                                                                                                                  log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2856                                                                                                                         total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2857                                                                                                                 }
2858                                                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2859                                                                                                         },
2860                                                                                                         _ => unreachable!(),
2861                                                                                                 }
2862                                                                                         }
2863                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2864                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2865                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2866                                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2867                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(htlc);
2868                                                                                                 }
2869                                                                                         } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2870                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2871                                                                                                         payment_hash,
2872                                                                                                         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2873                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2874                                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2875                                                                                                                 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2876                                                                                                         },
2877                                                                                                         amt: total_value,
2878                                                                                                 });
2879                                                                                                 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2880                                                                                                 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2881                                                                                                 // claimed.
2882                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2883                                                                                         } else {
2884                                                                                                 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2885                                                                                                 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2886                                                                                                 // MPP parts.
2887                                                                                         }
2888                                                                                 }
2889                                                                         },
2890                                                                 };
2891                                                         },
2892                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2893                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2894                                                         }
2895                                                 }
2896                                         }
2897                                 }
2898                         }
2899                 }
2900
2901                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2902                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2903                 }
2904
2905                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2906                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2907                 }
2908
2909                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2910                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2911                 events.append(&mut new_events);
2912         }
2913
2914         /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2915         ///
2916         /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2917         /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2918         ///
2919         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2920         fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2921                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2922                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2923                 if background_events.is_empty() {
2924                         return false;
2925                 }
2926
2927                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2928                         match event {
2929                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2930                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2931                                         // monitor updating completing.
2932                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2933                                 },
2934                         }
2935                 }
2936                 true
2937         }
2938
2939         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2940         /// Process background events, for functional testing
2941         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2942                 self.process_background_events();
2943         }
2944
2945         fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2946                 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2947                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2948                 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2949                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2950                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2951                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2952                 }
2953                 if !chan.is_live() {
2954                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2955                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2956                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2957                 }
2958                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2959                         log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2960
2961                 let mut retain_channel = true;
2962                 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2963                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
2964                         Err(e) => {
2965                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2966                                 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2967                                 Err(res)
2968                         }
2969                 };
2970                 let ret_err = match res {
2971                         Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2972                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2973                                         let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2974                                         if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2975                                         res
2976                                 } else {
2977                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2978                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2979                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2980                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2981                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2982                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2983                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2984                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2985                                                         commitment_signed,
2986                                                 },
2987                                         });
2988                                         Ok(())
2989                                 }
2990                         },
2991                         Ok(None) => Ok(()),
2992                         Err(e) => Err(e),
2993                 };
2994                 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2995         }
2996
2997         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
2998         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2999         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3000         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3001         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3002         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3003                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3004                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3005
3006                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3007
3008                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3009                         {
3010                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3011                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3012                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3013                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3014                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3015                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3016                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3017                                         if err.is_err() {
3018                                                 handle_errors.push(err);
3019                                         }
3020                                         retain_channel
3021                                 });
3022                         }
3023
3024                         should_persist
3025                 });
3026         }
3027
3028         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3029         ///
3030         /// This currently includes:
3031         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3032         ///  * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3033         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3034         ///    the channel.
3035         ///
3036         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3037         /// estimate fetches.
3038         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3039                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3040                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3041                         if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3042
3043                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3044
3045                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3046                         {
3047                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3048                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3049                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3050                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3051                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3052                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3053                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3054                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3055                                         if err.is_err() {
3056                                                 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3057                                         }
3058                                         if !retain_channel { return false; }
3059
3060                                         if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3061                                                 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3062                                                 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3063                                                 if needs_close { return false; }
3064                                         }
3065
3066                                         match chan.channel_update_status() {
3067                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3068                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3069                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3070                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3071                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3072                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3073                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3074                                                                         msg: update
3075                                                                 });
3076                                                         }
3077                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3078                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3079                                                 },
3080                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3081                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3082                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3083                                                                         msg: update
3084                                                                 });
3085                                                         }
3086                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3087                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3088                                                 },
3089                                                 _ => {},
3090                                         }
3091
3092                                         true
3093                                 });
3094                         }
3095
3096                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3097                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3098                         }
3099                         should_persist
3100                 });
3101         }
3102
3103         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3104         /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3105         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3106         /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3107         /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3108         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3109                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3110
3111                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3112                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3113                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3114                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3115                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3116                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3117                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3118                                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3119                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3120                                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3121                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3122                         }
3123                         true
3124                 } else { false }
3125         }
3126
3127         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3128         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3129         // be surfaced to the user.
3130         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3131                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3132                         match htlc_src {
3133                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3134                                         let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3135                                                 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3136                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3137                                                                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3138                                                                         (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3139                                                                 } else {
3140                                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3141                                                                 }
3142                                                         },
3143                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3144                                                 };
3145                                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3146                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3147                                                 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3148                                 },
3149                                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3150                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3151                                         session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3152                                         let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3153                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3154                                                 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3155                                                         let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3156                                                                 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3157                                                                 Some(RouteParameters {
3158                                                                         payee: payee_data,
3159                                                                         final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3160                                                                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3161                                                                 })
3162                                                         } else { None };
3163                                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3164                                                                 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3165                                                                         payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3166                                                                         payment_hash,
3167                                                                         rejected_by_dest: false,
3168                                                                         network_update: None,
3169                                                                         all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3170                                                                         path: path.clone(),
3171                                                                         short_channel_id: None,
3172                                                                         retry,
3173                                                                         #[cfg(test)]
3174                                                                         error_code: None,
3175                                                                         #[cfg(test)]
3176                                                                         error_data: None,
3177                                                                 }
3178                                                         );
3179                                                 }
3180                                         } else {
3181                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3182                                         }
3183                                 },
3184                         };
3185                 }
3186         }
3187
3188         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3189         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3190         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3191         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3192         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3193         /// still-available channels.
3194         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3195                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3196                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3197                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3198                 //timer handling.
3199
3200                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3201                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3202                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3203                 match source {
3204                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3205                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3206                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3207                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3208                                 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3209                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3210                                         if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3211                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3212                                                 return;
3213                                         }
3214                                         if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3215                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3216                                                 return;
3217                                         }
3218                                         if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3219                                                 all_paths_failed = true;
3220                                         }
3221                                 } else {
3222                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3223                                         return;
3224                                 }
3225                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3226                                 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3227                                         let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3228                                         Some(RouteParameters {
3229                                                 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3230                                                 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3231                                                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3232                                         })
3233                                 } else { None };
3234                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3235                                 match &onion_error {
3236                                         &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3237 #[cfg(test)]
3238                                                 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3239 #[cfg(not(test))]
3240                                                 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3241                                                 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3242                                                 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3243                                                 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3244                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3245                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3246                                                                 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3247                                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3248                                                                 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3249                                                                 network_update,
3250                                                                 all_paths_failed,
3251                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3252                                                                 short_channel_id,
3253                                                                 retry,
3254 #[cfg(test)]
3255                                                                 error_code: onion_error_code,
3256 #[cfg(test)]
3257                                                                 error_data: onion_error_data
3258                                                         }
3259                                                 );
3260                                         },
3261                                         &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3262 #[cfg(test)]
3263                                                         ref failure_code,
3264 #[cfg(test)]
3265                                                         ref data,
3266                                                         .. } => {
3267                                                 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3268                                                 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3269                                                 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3270                                                 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3271                                                 // ChannelDetails.
3272                                                 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3273                                                 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3274                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3275                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3276                                                                 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3277                                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3278                                                                 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3279                                                                 network_update: None,
3280                                                                 all_paths_failed,
3281                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3282                                                                 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3283                                                                 retry,
3284 #[cfg(test)]
3285                                                                 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3286 #[cfg(test)]
3287                                                                 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3288                                                         }
3289                                                 );
3290                                         }
3291                                 }
3292                         },
3293                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3294                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3295                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3296                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3297                                                 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3298                                                 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3299                                         },
3300                                         HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3301                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3302                                                 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3303                                         }
3304                                 };
3305
3306                                 let mut forward_event = None;
3307                                 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3308                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3309                                 }
3310                                 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3311                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3312                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3313                                         },
3314                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3315                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3316                                         }
3317                                 }
3318                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3319                                 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3320                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3321                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3322                                                 time_forwardable: time
3323                                         });
3324                                 }
3325                         },
3326                 }
3327         }
3328
3329         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3330         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3331         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3332         ///
3333         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3334         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3335         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3336         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3337         ///
3338         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3339         ///
3340         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3341         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3342         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3343                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3344
3345                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3346
3347                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3348                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3349                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3350                         assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3351
3352                         // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3353                         // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3354                         // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3355                         // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3356                         //
3357                         // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3358                         // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3359                         // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3360                         // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3361                         // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3362                         // it.
3363                         let mut valid_mpp = true;
3364                         for htlc in sources.iter() {
3365                                 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3366                                         valid_mpp = false;
3367                                         break;
3368                                 }
3369                         }
3370
3371                         let mut errs = Vec::new();
3372                         let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3373                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3374                                 if !valid_mpp {
3375                                         if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3376                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3377                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3378                                                         self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3379                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3380                                                                          HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3381                                                                          HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3382                                 } else {
3383                                         match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3384                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3385                                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3386                                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3387                                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3388                                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3389                                                                 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3390                                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3391                                                 },
3392                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3393                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3394                                                         // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3395                                                         // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3396                                                         // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3397                                                         // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3398                                                 },
3399                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3400                                         }
3401                                 }
3402                         }
3403
3404                         // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3405                         // which were generated.
3406                         channel_state.take();
3407
3408                         for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3409                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3410                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3411                         }
3412
3413                         claimed_any_htlcs
3414                 } else { false }
3415         }
3416
3417         fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3418                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3419                 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3420                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3421                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3422                         None => {
3423                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3424                         }
3425                 };
3426
3427                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3428                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3429                                 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3430                                         if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3431                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3432                                                         log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3433                                                                 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3434                                                                 payment_preimage, e);
3435                                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3436                                                                 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3437                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3438                                                                 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3439                                                         );
3440                                                 }
3441                                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3442                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3443                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3444                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3445                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3446                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3447                                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3448                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3449                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3450                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3451                                                                         update_fee: None,
3452                                                                         commitment_signed,
3453                                                                 }
3454                                                         });
3455                                                 }
3456                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3457                                         } else {
3458                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3459                                         }
3460                                 },
3461                                 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3462                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3463                                                 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3464                                                         "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3465                                                         payment_preimage, e);
3466                                         }
3467                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3468                                         let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3469                                         if drop {
3470                                                 chan.remove_entry();
3471                                         }
3472                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3473                                 },
3474                         }
3475                 } else { unreachable!(); }
3476         }
3477
3478         fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3479                 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3480                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, .. } = source {
3481                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3482                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3483                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3484                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3485                                         assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3486                                         payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None);
3487                                         if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3488                                                 payment.remove();
3489                                         }
3490                                 }
3491                         }
3492                 }
3493         }
3494
3495         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3496                 match source {
3497                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3498                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3499                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3500                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3501                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3502                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3503                                         let found_payment = !payment.get().is_fulfilled();
3504                                         let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3505                                         payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3506                                         if from_onchain {
3507                                                 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3508                                                 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3509                                                 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3510                                                 // restart.
3511                                                 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3512                                                 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3513                                                 payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path));
3514                                                 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3515                                                         payment.remove();
3516                                                 }
3517                                         }
3518                                         if found_payment {
3519                                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3520                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3521                                                         events::Event::PaymentSent {
3522                                                                 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3523                                                                 payment_preimage,
3524                                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3525                                                                 fee_paid_msat,
3526                                                         }
3527                                                 );
3528                                         }
3529                                 } else {
3530                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3531                                 }
3532                         },
3533                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3534                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3535                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3536                                 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3537                                 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3538                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3539                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3540                                         _ => None,
3541                                 };
3542                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3543                                         let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3544                                                 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3545                                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3546                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3547                                                 }],
3548                                         };
3549                                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3550                                         // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3551                                         // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3552                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3553                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3554                                                                                          payment_preimage, e);
3555                                         }
3556                                         // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3557                                         // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3558                                         // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3559                                         // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3560                                         // can happen.
3561                                 }
3562                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3563                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3564                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3565                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3566                                 }
3567
3568                                 if claimed_htlc {
3569                                         if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3570                                                 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3571                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3572                                                 } else { None };
3573
3574                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3575                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3576                                                         fee_earned_msat,
3577                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3578                                                 });
3579                                         }
3580                                 }
3581                         },
3582                 }
3583         }
3584
3585         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3586         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3587                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3588         }
3589
3590         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3591                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3592
3593                 let chan_restoration_res;
3594                 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3595                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3596                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3597                         let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3598                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3599                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3600                         };
3601                         if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3602                                 return;
3603                         }
3604
3605                         let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3606                         let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3607                                 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3608                                 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3609                                 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3610                                 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3611                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3612                                         node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3613                                         msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3614                                 })
3615                         } else { None };
3616                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3617                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3618                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3619                         }
3620                         (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3621                 };
3622                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3623                 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3624                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3625                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3626                 }
3627         }
3628
3629         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3630                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3631                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3632                 }
3633
3634                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3635                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3636                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3637                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3638                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3639                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3640                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3641                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3642                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3643                                         msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3644                                 });
3645                                 entry.insert(channel);
3646                         }
3647                 }
3648                 Ok(())
3649         }
3650
3651         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3652                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3653                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3654                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3655                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3656                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3657                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3658                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3659                                         }
3660                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3661                                         (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3662                                 },
3663                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3664                         }
3665                 };
3666                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3667                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3668                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3669                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
3670                         output_script,
3671                         user_channel_id: user_id,
3672                 });
3673                 Ok(())
3674         }
3675
3676         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3677                 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3678                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3679                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3680                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3681                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3682                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3683                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3684                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3685                                         }
3686                                         (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3687                                 },
3688                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3689                         }
3690                 };
3691                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3692                 // lock before watch_channel
3693                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3694                         match e {
3695                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3696                                         // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3697                                         // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3698                                         // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3699                                         // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3700                                         // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3701                                         // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3702                                         // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3703                                         let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3704                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3705                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3706                                 },
3707                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3708                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3709                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3710                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3711                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
3712                                         chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3713                                 },
3714                         }
3715                 }
3716                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3717                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3718                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3719                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3720                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3721                         },
3722                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3723                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3724                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3725                                         msg: funding_msg,
3726                                 });
3727                                 e.insert(chan);
3728                         }
3729                 }
3730                 Ok(())
3731         }
3732
3733         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3734                 let funding_tx = {
3735                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3736                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3737                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3738                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3739                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3740                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3741                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3742                                         }
3743                                         let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3744                                                 Ok(update) => update,
3745                                                 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3746                                         };
3747                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3748                                                 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3749                                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3750                                                         // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3751                                                         // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3752                                                         // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3753                                                         if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3754                                                                 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3755                                                         }
3756                                                 }
3757                                                 return res
3758                                         }
3759                                         funding_tx
3760                                 },
3761                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3762                         }
3763                 };
3764                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3765                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3766                 Ok(())
3767         }
3768
3769         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3770                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3771                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3772                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3773                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3774                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3775                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3776                                 }
3777                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3778                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3779                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3780                                         // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3781                                         // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3782                                         // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3783                                         // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3784                                         // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3785                                         // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3786                                         // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3787                                         // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3788                                         // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3789                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3790                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3791                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
3792                                         });
3793                                 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3794                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3795                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3796                                                 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3797                                         });
3798                                 }
3799                                 Ok(())
3800                         },
3801                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3802                 }
3803         }
3804
3805         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3806                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3807                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3808                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3809                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3810
3811                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3812                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3813                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3814                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3815                                         }
3816
3817                                         if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3818                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3819                                                         log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3820                                                         if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3821                                         }
3822
3823                                         let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3824                                         dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3825
3826                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3827                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3828                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3829                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
3830                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3831                                                         if is_permanent {
3832                                                                 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3833                                                                 break result;
3834                                                         }
3835                                                 }
3836                                         }
3837
3838                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3839                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3840                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3841                                                         msg,
3842                                                 });
3843                                         }
3844
3845                                         break Ok(());
3846                                 },
3847                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3848                         }
3849                 };
3850                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3851                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3852                 }
3853
3854                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3855                 Ok(())
3856         }
3857
3858         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3859                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3860                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3861                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3862                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3863                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3864                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3865                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3866                                         }
3867                                         let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3868                                         if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3869                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3870                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3871                                                         msg,
3872                                                 });
3873                                         }
3874                                         if tx.is_some() {
3875                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3876                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3877                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3878                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3879                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3880                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3881                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3882                                                 }
3883                                                 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3884                                         } else { (tx, None) }
3885                                 },
3886                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3887                         }
3888                 };
3889                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3890                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3891                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3892                 }
3893                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3894                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3895                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3896                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3897                                         msg: update
3898                                 });
3899                         }
3900                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3901                 }
3902                 Ok(())
3903         }
3904
3905         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3906                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3907                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3908                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3909                 //
3910                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3911                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3912                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3913                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3914
3915                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3916                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3917
3918                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3919                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3920                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3921                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3922                                 }
3923
3924                                 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3925                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3926                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3927                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3928                                         match pending_forward_info {
3929                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3930                                                         let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3931                                                                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3932                                                                         onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3933                                                                                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3934                                                                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3935                                                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3936                                                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3937                                                                                 res
3938                                                                         }[..])
3939                                                                 } else {
3940                                                                         // The only case where we'd be unable to
3941                                                                         // successfully get a channel update is if the
3942                                                                         // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3943                                                                         // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3944                                                                         // payments over the channel back to themselves
3945                                                                         // (because no one else should know the short_id
3946                                                                         // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3947                                                                         // no problem just calling this
3948                                                                         // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3949                                                                         onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3950                                                                 }
3951                                                         } else {
3952                                                                 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3953                                                         };
3954                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3955                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3956                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3957                                                                 reason
3958                                                         };
3959                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3960                                                 },
3961                                                 _ => pending_forward_info
3962                                         }
3963                                 };
3964                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3965                         },
3966                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3967                 }
3968                 Ok(())
3969         }
3970
3971         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3972                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3973                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3974                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3975                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3976                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3977                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3978                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3979                                         }
3980                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3981                                 },
3982                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3983                         }
3984                 };
3985                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3986                 Ok(())
3987         }
3988
3989         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3990                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3991                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3992                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3993                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3994                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3995                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3996                                 }
3997                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3998                         },
3999                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4000                 }
4001                 Ok(())
4002         }
4003
4004         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4005                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4006                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4007                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4008                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4009                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4010                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4011                                 }
4012                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4013                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4014                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4015                                 }
4016                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4017                                 Ok(())
4018                         },
4019                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4020                 }
4021         }
4022
4023         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4024                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4025                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4026                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4027                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4028                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4029                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4030                                 }
4031                                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4032                                         match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4033                                                 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4034                                                 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4035                                                         assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4036                                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4037                                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4038                                                         unreachable!();
4039                                                 },
4040                                                 Ok(res) => res
4041                                         };
4042                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4043                                         return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4044                                 }
4045                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4046                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4047                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
4048                                 });
4049                                 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4050                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4051                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4052                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4053                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4054                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4055                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4056                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4057                                                         update_fee: None,
4058                                                         commitment_signed: msg,
4059                                                 },
4060                                         });
4061                                 }
4062                                 Ok(())
4063                         },
4064                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4065                 }
4066         }
4067
4068         #[inline]
4069         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4070                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4071                         let mut forward_event = None;
4072                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4073                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4074                                 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4075                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4076                                 }
4077                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4078                                         match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4079                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4080                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4081                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4082                                         }) {
4083                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4084                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4085                                                                                                         prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4086                                                 },
4087                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4088                                                         entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4089                                                                                                      prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4090                                                 }
4091                                         }
4092                                 }
4093                         }
4094                         match forward_event {
4095                                 Some(time) => {
4096                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4097                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4098                                                 time_forwardable: time
4099                                         });
4100                                 }
4101                                 None => {},
4102                         }
4103                 }
4104         }
4105
4106         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4107                 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4108                 let res = loop {
4109                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4110                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4111                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4112                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4113                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4114                                                 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4115                                         }
4116                                         let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4117                                         let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4118                                                 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4119                                         htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4120                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4121                                                 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4122                                                         assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4123                                                         assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4124                                                         assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4125                                                         assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4126                                                         break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4127                                                 } else {
4128                                                         if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4129                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4130                                                                         raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4131                                                                         raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4132                                                                         raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4133                                                                 break Err(e);
4134                                                         } else { unreachable!(); }
4135                                                 }
4136                                         }
4137                                         if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4138                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4139                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4140                                                         updates,
4141                                                 });
4142                                         }
4143                                         break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4144                                                         raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4145                                                         chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4146                                                                 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4147                                                         chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4148                                 },
4149                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4150                         }
4151                 };
4152                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4153                 match res {
4154                         Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4155                                 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4156                         {
4157                                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4158                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4159                                 }
4160                                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4161                                 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4162                                 Ok(())
4163                         },
4164                         Err(e) => Err(e)
4165                 }
4166         }
4167
4168         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4169                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4170                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4171                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4172                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4173                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4174                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4175                                 }
4176                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4177                         },
4178                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4179                 }
4180                 Ok(())
4181         }
4182
4183         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4184                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4185                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4186
4187                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4188                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4189                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4190                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4191                                 }
4192                                 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4193                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4194                                 }
4195
4196                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4197                                         msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4198                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4199                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4200                                         update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4201                                 });
4202                         },
4203                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4204                 }
4205                 Ok(())
4206         }
4207
4208         /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4209         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4210                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4211                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4212                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4213                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4214                         None => {
4215                                 // It's not a local channel
4216                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4217                         }
4218                 };
4219                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4220                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4221                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4222                                         if chan.get().should_announce() {
4223                                                 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4224                                                 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4225                                                 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4226                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4227                                         }
4228                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4229                                 }
4230                                 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4231                                 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4232                                 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4233                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4234                                 } else {
4235                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4236                                 }
4237                         },
4238                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4239                 }
4240                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4241         }
4242
4243         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4244                 let chan_restoration_res;
4245                 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4246                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4247                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4248
4249                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4250                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4251                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4252                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4253                                         }
4254                                         // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4255                                         // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4256                                         // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4257                                         // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4258                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4259                                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4260                                         let mut channel_update = None;
4261                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4262                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4263                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4264                                                         msg,
4265                                                 });
4266                                         } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4267                                                 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4268                                                 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4269                                                 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4270                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4271                                                         node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4272                                                         msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4273                                                 });
4274                                         }
4275                                         let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4276                                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4277                                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4278                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4279                                         }
4280                                         (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4281                                 },
4282                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4283                         }
4284                 };
4285                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4286                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4287
4288                 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4289                         self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4290                 }
4291                 Ok(())
4292         }
4293
4294         /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4295         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4296                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4297                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4298                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4299                 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4300                         match monitor_event {
4301                                 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4302                                         if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4303                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4304                                                 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4305                                         } else {
4306                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4307                                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4308                                         }
4309                                 },
4310                                 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4311                                 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4312                                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4313                                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4314                                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4315                                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4316                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4317                                         if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4318                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4319                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4320                                                 }
4321                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4322                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4323                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4324                                                                 msg: update
4325                                                         });
4326                                                 }
4327                                                 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4328                                                         ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4329                                                 } else {
4330                                                         ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4331                                                 };
4332                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4333                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4334                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4335                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4336                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4337                                                         },
4338                                                 });
4339                                         }
4340                                 },
4341                                 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4342                                         self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4343                                 },
4344                         }
4345                 }
4346
4347                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4348                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4349                 }
4350
4351                 has_pending_monitor_events
4352         }
4353
4354         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4355         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4356         /// update events as a separate process method here.
4357         #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4358         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4359                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4360         }
4361
4362         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4363         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4364         /// update was applied.
4365         ///
4366         /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4367         /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4368         /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4369         /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4370         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4371                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4372                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4373                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4374                 {
4375                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4376                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4377                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4378                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4379                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4380
4381                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4382                                 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4383                                         Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4384                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4385                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4386                                                 }
4387                                                 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4388                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4389                                                                 has_monitor_update = true;
4390                                                                 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4391                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4392                                                                 if close_channel { return false; }
4393                                                         } else {
4394                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4395                                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4396                                                                         updates: commitment_update,
4397                                                                 });
4398                                                         }
4399                                                 }
4400                                                 true
4401                                         },
4402                                         Err(e) => {
4403                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4404                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4405                                                 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4406                                                 !close_channel
4407                                         }
4408                                 }
4409                         });
4410                 }
4411
4412                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4413                 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4414                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4415                 }
4416
4417                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4418                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4419                 }
4420
4421                 has_update
4422         }
4423
4424         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4425         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4426         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4427         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4428                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4429                 let mut has_update = false;
4430                 {
4431                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4432                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4433                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4434                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4435                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4436
4437                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4438                                 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4439                                         Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4440                                                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4441                                                         has_update = true;
4442                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4443                                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4444                                                         });
4445                                                 }
4446                                                 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4447                                                         // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4448                                                         // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4449                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4450                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4451                                                         }
4452
4453                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4454                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4455                                                                         msg: update
4456                                                                 });
4457                                                         }
4458
4459                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4460
4461                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4462                                                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4463                                                         false
4464                                                 } else { true }
4465                                         },
4466                                         Err(e) => {
4467                                                 has_update = true;
4468                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4469                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4470                                                 !close_channel
4471                                         }
4472                                 }
4473                         });
4474                 }
4475
4476                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4477                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4478                 }
4479
4480                 has_update
4481         }
4482
4483         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4484         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4485         /// Channel object.
4486         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4487                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4488                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4489                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4490                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
4491                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4492                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4493                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4494                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4495                         if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4496                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4497                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4498                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
4499                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
4500                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4501                         }
4502                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4503                 }
4504         }
4505
4506         fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4507                 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4508
4509                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4510
4511                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4512                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4513                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4514                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4515                                 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4516                                         payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4517                                         // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4518                                         // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4519                                         // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4520                                         // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4521                                         // never fail a payment too early.
4522                                         // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4523                                         // timestamps.
4524                                         expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4525                                 });
4526                         },
4527                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4528                 }
4529                 Ok(payment_secret)
4530         }
4531
4532         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4533         /// to pay us.
4534         ///
4535         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4536         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4537         ///
4538         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4539         /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4540         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4541         ///
4542         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4543         ///
4544         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4545         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4546         /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4547         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4548         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4549                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4550                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4551
4552                 (payment_hash,
4553                         self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4554                                 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4555         }
4556
4557         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4558         /// stored external to LDK.
4559         ///
4560         /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4561         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4562         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4563         ///
4564         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4565         /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4566         ///
4567         /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4568         /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4569         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4570         /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4571         /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4572         ///
4573         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4574         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4575         /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4576         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4577         ///
4578         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4579         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4580         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4581         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4582         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4583         ///
4584         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4585         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4586         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4587         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4588         /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4589         ///
4590         /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4591         /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4592         /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4593         ///
4594         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4595         ///
4596         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4597         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4598         ///
4599         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4600         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4601         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4602         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4603                 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4604         }
4605
4606         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4607         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4608                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4609                 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4610                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4611                 events.into_inner()
4612         }
4613
4614         #[cfg(test)]
4615         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4616                 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4617         }
4618 }
4619
4620 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4621         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4622         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4623         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4624         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4625                                 L::Target: Logger,
4626 {
4627         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4628                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4629                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4630                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4631
4632                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4633                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4634                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4635                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4636                         }
4637
4638                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4639                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4640                         }
4641                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4642                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4643                         }
4644
4645                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4646                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4647                         mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4648
4649                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4650                                 events.replace(pending_events);
4651                         }
4652
4653                         result
4654                 });
4655                 events.into_inner()
4656         }
4657 }
4658
4659 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4660 where
4661         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4662         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4663         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4664         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4665         L::Target: Logger,
4666 {
4667         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4668         ///
4669         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4670         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4671         ///
4672         /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4673         /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4674         /// restarting from an old state.
4675         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4676                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4677                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4678
4679                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4680                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4681                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4682                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4683                         }
4684
4685                         let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4686                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4687                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4688                         }
4689
4690                         for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4691                                 handler.handle_event(&event);
4692                         }
4693
4694                         result
4695                 });
4696         }
4697 }
4698
4699 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4700 where
4701         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4702         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4703         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4704         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4705         L::Target: Logger,
4706 {
4707         fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4708                 {
4709                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4710                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4711                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4712                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4713                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4714                 }
4715
4716                 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4717                 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4718                 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4719         }
4720
4721         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4722                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4723                 let new_height = height - 1;
4724                 {
4725                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4726                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4727                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4728                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4729                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4730                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4731                 }
4732
4733                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4734         }
4735 }
4736
4737 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4738 where
4739         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4740         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4741         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4742         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4743         L::Target: Logger,
4744 {
4745         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4746                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4747                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4748                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4749
4750                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4751                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4752
4753                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4754                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4755         }
4756
4757         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4758                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4759                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4760                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4761
4762                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4763                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4764
4765                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4766
4767                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4768
4769                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4770
4771                 macro_rules! max_time {
4772                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
4773                                 loop {
4774                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4775                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4776                                         // having an explicit local time source.
4777                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4778                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4779                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4780                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4781                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4782                                                 break;
4783                                         }
4784                                 }
4785                         }
4786                 }
4787                 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4788                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4789                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4790                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4791                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4792                 });
4793
4794                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4795                 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4796                         const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4797                         if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4798                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4799                                 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4800                         }
4801                         true
4802                 });
4803         }
4804
4805         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4806                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4807                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4808                 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4809                         if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4810                                 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4811                         }
4812                 }
4813                 res
4814         }
4815
4816         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4817                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4818                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4819                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4820                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4821                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4822                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4823                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4824                 });
4825         }
4826 }
4827
4828 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4829 where
4830         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4831         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4832         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4833         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4834         L::Target: Logger,
4835 {
4836         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4837         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4838         /// the function.
4839         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4840                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4841                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4842                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4843                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4844
4845                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4846                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4847                 {
4848                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4849                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4850                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4851                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4852                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4853                                 let res = f(channel);
4854                                 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4855                                         for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4856                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4857                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash,  HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4858                                                         failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4859                                                         data: chan_update,
4860                                                 }));
4861                                         }
4862                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4863                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4864                                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4865                                                         msg: funding_locked,
4866                                                 });
4867                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4868                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4869                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4870                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4871                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
4872                                                         });
4873                                                 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4874                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4875                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4876                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4877                                                                 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4878                                                         });
4879                                                 } else {
4880                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4881                                                 }
4882                                                 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4883                                         }
4884                                 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4885                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4886                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4887                                         }
4888                                         // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4889                                         // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4890                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4891                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4892                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4893                                                         msg: update
4894                                                 });
4895                                         }
4896                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4897                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4898                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4899                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4900                                         });
4901                                         return false;
4902                                 }
4903                                 true
4904                         });
4905
4906                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4907                                 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4908                                         htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4909                                                 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4910                                                 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4911                                                 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4912                                                 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4913                                                 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4914                                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4915                                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4916                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4917                                                                 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4918                                                                 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4919                                                         }));
4920                                                         false
4921                                                 } else { true }
4922                                         });
4923                                         !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4924                                 });
4925                         }
4926                 }
4927
4928                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4929
4930                 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4931                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4932                 }
4933         }
4934
4935         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4936         /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4937         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4938         /// up.
4939         /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4940         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4941         pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4942                 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4943         }
4944
4945         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4946         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4947         /// up.
4948         pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4949                 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4950         }
4951
4952         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4953         pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4954                 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4955                 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4956                 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4957                 *guard
4958         }
4959
4960         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4961         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4962         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4963                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4964         }
4965 }
4966
4967 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4968         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4969         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4970         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4971         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4972         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4973         L::Target: Logger,
4974 {
4975         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4976                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4977                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4978         }
4979
4980         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4981                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4982                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4983         }
4984
4985         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4986                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4987                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4988         }
4989
4990         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4991                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4992                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4993         }
4994
4995         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4996                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4997                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4998         }
4999
5000         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5001                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5002                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5003         }
5004
5005         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5006                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5007                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5008         }
5009
5010         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5011                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5012                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5013         }
5014
5015         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5016                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5017                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5018         }
5019
5020         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5021                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5022                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5023         }
5024
5025         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5026                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5027                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5028         }
5029
5030         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5031                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5032                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5033         }
5034
5035         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5036                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5037                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5038         }
5039
5040         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5041                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5042                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5043         }
5044
5045         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5046                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5047                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5048         }
5049
5050         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5051                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5052                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5053                                 persist
5054                         } else {
5055                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5056                         }
5057                 });
5058         }
5059
5060         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5061                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5062                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5063         }
5064
5065         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5066                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5067                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5068                 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5069                 {
5070                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5071                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5072                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5073                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5074                         if no_connection_possible {
5075                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5076                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5077                                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5078                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5079                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5080                                                 }
5081                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5082                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5083                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5084                                                                 msg: update
5085                                                         });
5086                                                 }
5087                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5088                                                 false
5089                                         } else {
5090                                                 true
5091                                         }
5092                                 });
5093                         } else {
5094                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5095                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5096                                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5097                                                 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5098                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5099                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5100                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5101                                                         }
5102                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5103                                                         return false;
5104                                                 } else {
5105                                                         no_channels_remain = false;
5106                                                 }
5107                                         }
5108                                         true
5109                                 })
5110                         }
5111                         pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5112                                 match msg {
5113                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5114                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5115                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5116                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5117                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5118                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5119                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5120                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5121                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5122                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5123                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5124                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5125                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5126                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5127                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5128                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5129                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5130                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5131                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5132                                 }
5133                         });
5134                 }
5135                 if no_channels_remain {
5136                         self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5137                 }
5138
5139                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5140                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5141                 }
5142         }
5143
5144         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5145                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5146
5147                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5148
5149                 {
5150                         let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5151                         match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5152                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5153                                         e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5154                                                 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5155                                         }));
5156                                 },
5157                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5158                                         e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5159                                 },
5160                         }
5161                 }
5162
5163                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5164                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5165                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5166                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5167                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5168                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5169                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5170                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5171                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5172                                         // drop it.
5173                                         false
5174                                 } else {
5175                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5176                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5177                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5178                                         });
5179                                         true
5180                                 }
5181                         } else { true }
5182                 });
5183                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5184         }
5185
5186         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5187                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5188
5189                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5190                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
5191                                 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5192                                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5193                                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5194                                 }
5195                         }
5196                 } else {
5197                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5198                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5199                 }
5200         }
5201 }
5202
5203 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5204 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5205 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5206         /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5207         /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5208         persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5209 }
5210
5211 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5212         fn new() -> Self {
5213                 Self {
5214                         persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5215                 }
5216         }
5217
5218         fn wait(&self) {
5219                 loop {
5220                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5221                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5222                         if *guard {
5223                                 *guard = false;
5224                                 return;
5225                         }
5226                         guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5227                         let result = *guard;
5228                         if result {
5229                                 *guard = false;
5230                                 return
5231                         }
5232                 }
5233         }
5234
5235         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5236         fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5237                 let current_time = Instant::now();
5238                 loop {
5239                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5240                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5241                         if *guard {
5242                                 *guard = false;
5243                                 return true;
5244                         }
5245                         guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5246                         // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5247                         // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5248                         // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5249                         // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5250                         // 1.42.0.
5251                         let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5252                         let result = *guard;
5253                         if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5254                                 *guard = false;
5255                                 return result;
5256                         }
5257                         match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5258                                 None => return result,
5259                                 Some(_) => continue
5260                         }
5261                 }
5262         }
5263
5264         // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5265         fn notify(&self) {
5266                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5267                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5268                 *persistence_lock = true;
5269                 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5270                 cnd.notify_all();
5271         }
5272 }
5273
5274 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5275 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5276
5277 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5278         (0, Forward) => {
5279                 (0, onion_packet, required),
5280                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5281         },
5282         (1, Receive) => {
5283                 (0, payment_data, required),
5284                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5285         },
5286         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5287                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5288                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5289         },
5290 ;);
5291
5292 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5293         (0, routing, required),
5294         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5295         (4, payment_hash, required),
5296         (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5297         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5298 });
5299
5300
5301 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5302         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5303                 match self {
5304                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5305                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
5306                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5307                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5308                                 reason.write(writer)?;
5309                         },
5310                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5311                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5312                         }) => {
5313                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
5314                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5315                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5316                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5317                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5318                         },
5319                 }
5320                 Ok(())
5321         }
5322 }
5323
5324 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5325         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5326                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5327                 match id {
5328                         0 => {
5329                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5330                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5331                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5332                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5333                                 }))
5334                         },
5335                         1 => {
5336                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5337                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5338                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5339                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5340                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5341                                 }))
5342                         },
5343                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5344                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5345                         // messages contained in the variants.
5346                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5347                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5348                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5349                         2 => {
5350                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5351                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5352                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5353                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5354                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5355                         },
5356                         3 => {
5357                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5358                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5359                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5360                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5361                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5362                         },
5363                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5364                 }
5365         }
5366 }
5367
5368 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5369         (0, Forward),
5370         (1, Fail),
5371 );
5372
5373 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5374         (0, short_channel_id, required),
5375         (2, outpoint, required),
5376         (4, htlc_id, required),
5377         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5378 });
5379
5380 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5381         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5382                 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5383                         OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5384                         _ => None,
5385                 };
5386                 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5387                         OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5388                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5389                 };
5390                 write_tlv_fields!
5391                 (writer,
5392                  {
5393                    (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5394                    (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5395                          (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5396                  });
5397                 Ok(())
5398         }
5399 }
5400
5401 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5402         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5403                 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5404                 let mut value = 0;
5405                 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5406                 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5407                 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5408                 read_tlv_fields!
5409                 (reader,
5410                  {
5411                    (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5412                    (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5413                          (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5414                  });
5415                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5416                         Some(p) => {
5417                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
5418                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5419                                 }
5420                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5421                         },
5422                         None => {
5423                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
5424                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5425                                 }
5426                                 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5427                         },
5428                 };
5429                 Ok(Self {
5430                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5431                         value,
5432                         onion_payload,
5433                         cltv_expiry,
5434                 })
5435         }
5436 }
5437
5438 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5439         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5440                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5441                 match id {
5442                         0 => {
5443                                 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5444                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5445                                 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5446                                 let mut payment_id = None;
5447                                 let mut payment_secret = None;
5448                                 let mut payee = None;
5449                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5450                                         (0, session_priv, required),
5451                                         (1, payment_id, option),
5452                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5453                                         (3, payment_secret, option),
5454                                         (4, path, vec_type),
5455                                         (5, payee, option),
5456                                 });
5457                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
5458                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5459                                         // instead.
5460                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5461                                 }
5462                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5463                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5464                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5465                                         path: path.unwrap(),
5466                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5467                                         payment_secret,
5468                                         payee,
5469                                 })
5470                         }
5471                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5472                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5473                 }
5474         }
5475 }
5476
5477 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5478         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5479                 match self {
5480                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5481                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
5482                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5483                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5484                                         (0, session_priv, required),
5485                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5486                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5487                                         (3, payment_secret, option),
5488                                         (4, path, vec_type),
5489                                         (5, payee, option),
5490                                  });
5491                         }
5492                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5493                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
5494                                 field.write(writer)?;
5495                         }
5496                 }
5497                 Ok(())
5498         }
5499 }
5500
5501 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5502         (0, LightningError) => {
5503                 (0, err, required),
5504         },
5505         (1, Reason) => {
5506                 (0, failure_code, required),
5507                 (2, data, vec_type),
5508         },
5509 ;);
5510
5511 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5512         (0, AddHTLC) => {
5513                 (0, forward_info, required),
5514                 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5515                 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5516                 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5517         },
5518         (1, FailHTLC) => {
5519                 (0, htlc_id, required),
5520                 (2, err_packet, required),
5521         },
5522 ;);
5523
5524 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5525         (0, payment_secret, required),
5526         (2, expiry_time, required),
5527         (4, user_payment_id, required),
5528         (6, payment_preimage, required),
5529         (8, min_value_msat, required),
5530 });
5531
5532 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5533         (0, Legacy) => {
5534                 (0, session_privs, required),
5535         },
5536         (1, Fulfilled) => {
5537                 (0, session_privs, required),
5538         },
5539         (2, Retryable) => {
5540                 (0, session_privs, required),
5541                 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5542                 (2, payment_hash, required),
5543                 (4, payment_secret, option),
5544                 (6, total_msat, required),
5545                 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5546                 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5547         },
5548 );
5549
5550 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5551         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5552         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5553         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5554         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5555         L::Target: Logger,
5556 {
5557         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5558                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5559
5560                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5561
5562                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5563                 {
5564                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5565                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5566                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5567                 }
5568
5569                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5570                 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5571                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5572                         if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5573                                 unfunded_channels += 1;
5574                         }
5575                 }
5576                 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5577                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5578                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5579                                 channel.write(writer)?;
5580                         }
5581                 }
5582
5583                 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5584                 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5585                         short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5586                         (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5587                         for forward in pending_forwards {
5588                                 forward.write(writer)?;
5589                         }
5590                 }
5591
5592                 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5593                 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5594                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5595                         (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5596                         for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5597                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
5598                         }
5599                 }
5600
5601                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5602                 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5603                 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5604                         peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5605                         let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5606                         peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5607                 }
5608
5609                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5610                 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5611                 for event in events.iter() {
5612                         event.write(writer)?;
5613                 }
5614
5615                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5616                 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5617                 for event in background_events.iter() {
5618                         match event {
5619                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5620                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
5621                                         funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5622                                         monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5623                                 },
5624                         }
5625                 }
5626
5627                 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5628                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5629
5630                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5631                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5632                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5633                         hash.write(writer)?;
5634                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5635                 }
5636
5637                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5638                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5639                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5640                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5641                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5642                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5643                         }
5644                 }
5645                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5646                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5647                         match outbound {
5648                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5649                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5650                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5651                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5652                                         }
5653                                 }
5654                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5655                         }
5656                 }
5657
5658                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5659                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5660                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5661                         match outbound {
5662                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5663                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5664                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5665                                 },
5666                                 _ => {},
5667                         }
5668                 }
5669                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5670                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5671                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5672                 });
5673
5674                 Ok(())
5675         }
5676 }
5677
5678 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5679 ///
5680 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5681 /// is:
5682 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5683 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5684 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5685 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5686 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5687 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5688 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5689 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5690 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5691 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5692 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5693 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5694 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5695 ///    the next step.
5696 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5697 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5698 ///
5699 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5700 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5701 ///
5702 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5703 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5704 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5705 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5706 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5707 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5708 ///
5709 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5710 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5711         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5712         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5713         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5714         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5715         L::Target: Logger,
5716 {
5717         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5718         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5719         /// signing data.
5720         pub keys_manager: K,
5721
5722         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5723         ///
5724         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5725         pub fee_estimator: F,
5726         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5727         ///
5728         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5729         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5730         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5731         pub chain_monitor: M,
5732
5733         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5734         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5735         /// force-closed during deserialization.
5736         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5737         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5738         /// deserialization.
5739         pub logger: L,
5740         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5741         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5742         pub default_config: UserConfig,
5743
5744         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5745         /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5746         ///
5747         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5748         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5749         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5750         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5751         ///
5752         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5753         /// this struct.
5754         ///
5755         /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5756         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5757 }
5758
5759 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5760                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5761         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5762                 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5763                 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5764                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5765                 L::Target: Logger,
5766         {
5767         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5768         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5769         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5770         pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5771                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5772                 Self {
5773                         keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5774                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5775                 }
5776         }
5777 }
5778
5779 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5780 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5781 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5782         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5783         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5784         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5785         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5786         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5787         L::Target: Logger,
5788 {
5789         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5790                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5791                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5792         }
5793 }
5794
5795 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5796         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5797         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5798         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5799         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5800         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5801         L::Target: Logger,
5802 {
5803         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5804                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5805
5806                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5807                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5808                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5809
5810                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5811
5812                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5813                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5814                 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5815                 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5816                 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5817                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5818                         let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5819                         let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5820                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5821                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5822                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5823                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5824                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5825                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5826                                         // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5827                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5828                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5829                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5830                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5831                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5832                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5833                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5834                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5835                                 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5836                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5837                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5838                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5839                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5840                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5841                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5842                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5843                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5844                                         let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5845                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5846                                         monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5847                                         channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5848                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5849                                                 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5850                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5851                                         });
5852                                 } else {
5853                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5854                                                 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5855                                         }
5856                                         by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5857                                 }
5858                         } else {
5859                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5860                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5861                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5862                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5863                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5864                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5865                         }
5866                 }
5867
5868                 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5869                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5870                                 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5871                         }
5872                 }
5873
5874                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5875                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5876                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5877                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5878                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5879                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5880                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5881                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5882                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5883                         }
5884                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5885                 }
5886
5887                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5888                 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5889                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5890                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5891                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5892                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5893                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5894                                 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5895                         }
5896                         claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5897                 }
5898
5899                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5900                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5901                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5902                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5903                         let peer_state = PeerState {
5904                                 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5905                         };
5906                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5907                 }
5908
5909                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5910                 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5911                 for _ in 0..event_count {
5912                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5913                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5914                                 None => continue,
5915                         }
5916                 }
5917                 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5918                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5919                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5920                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5921                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5922                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5923                         pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5924                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5925                         });
5926                 }
5927
5928                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5929                 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5930                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5931                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5932                                 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5933                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5934                         }
5935                 }
5936
5937                 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5938                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5939
5940                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5941                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5942                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5943                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5944                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5945                         }
5946                 }
5947
5948                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5949                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5950                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5951                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5952                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5953                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5954                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5955                         };
5956                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5957                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5958                         };
5959                 }
5960
5961                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5962                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5963                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5964                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5965                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5966                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5967                 });
5968                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5969                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5970                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5971                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5972                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5973                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5974                         }
5975                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5976                 } else {
5977                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
5978                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
5979                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
5980                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
5981                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
5982                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
5983                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
5984                         // 0.0.102+
5985                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
5986                                 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
5987                                         for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
5988                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
5989                                                         if path.is_empty() {
5990                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
5991                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5992                                                         }
5993                                                         let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
5994                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
5995                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
5996                                                         match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
5997                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5998                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
5999                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6000                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6001                                                                 },
6002                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6003                                                                         let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6004                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6005                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6006                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6007                                                                                 payment_secret,
6008                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6009                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6010                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
6011                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6012                                                                         });
6013                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6014                                                                                 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0),  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6015                                                                 }
6016                                                         }
6017                                                 }
6018                                         }
6019                                 }
6020                         }
6021                 }
6022
6023                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6024                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6025
6026                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6027                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6028                 }
6029
6030                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6031                         genesis_hash,
6032                         fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6033                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6034                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6035
6036                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6037
6038                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6039                                 by_id,
6040                                 short_to_id,
6041                                 forward_htlcs,
6042                                 claimable_htlcs,
6043                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6044                         }),
6045                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6046                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6047
6048                         our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6049                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6050                         secp_ctx,
6051
6052                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6053                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6054
6055                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6056
6057                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6058                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6059                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6060                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6061
6062                         keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6063                         logger: args.logger,
6064                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
6065                 };
6066
6067                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6068                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6069                 }
6070
6071                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6072                 //connection or two.
6073
6074                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6075         }
6076 }
6077
6078 #[cfg(test)]
6079 mod tests {
6080         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6081         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6082         use core::time::Duration;
6083         use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6084         use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6085         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6086         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6087         use ln::msgs;
6088         use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6089         use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6090         use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6091         use util::errors::APIError;
6092         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6093
6094         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6095         #[test]
6096         fn test_wait_timeout() {
6097                 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6098                 use sync::Arc;
6099                 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6100                 use std::thread;
6101
6102                 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6103                 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6104
6105                 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6106                 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6107                 thread::spawn(move || {
6108                         loop {
6109                                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6110                                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6111                                 *persistence_lock = true;
6112                                 cnd.notify_all();
6113
6114                                 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6115                                         break
6116                                 }
6117                         }
6118                 });
6119
6120                 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6121                 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6122
6123                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6124                 // available.
6125                 loop {
6126                         if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6127                                 break
6128                         }
6129                 }
6130
6131                 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6132
6133                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6134                 // are available.
6135                 loop {
6136                         if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6137                                 break
6138                         }
6139                 }
6140         }
6141
6142         #[test]
6143         fn test_notify_limits() {
6144                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6145                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6146                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6147                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6148                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6149                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6150
6151                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6152                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6153                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6154                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6155                 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6156
6157                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6158
6159                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6160                 // to connect messages with new values
6161                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6162                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6163                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6164                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6165
6166                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6167                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6168                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6169                 // ... but the last node should not.
6170                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6171                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6172                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6173                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6174
6175                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6176                 // about the channel.
6177                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6178                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6179                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6180
6181                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6182                 // parties.
6183                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6184                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6185                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6186                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6187                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6188                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6189
6190                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6191                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6192                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6193
6194                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6195                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6196                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6197                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6198                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6199                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6200
6201                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6202                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6203                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6204                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6205                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6206                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6207                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6208                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6209
6210                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6211                 // the channel info has updated.
6212                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6213                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6214                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6215                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6216                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6217                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6218         }
6219
6220         #[test]
6221         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6222                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6223                 // expected.
6224                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6225                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6226                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6227                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6228                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6229
6230                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6231                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6232                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6233                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6234                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6235                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6236                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6237                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6238                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6239                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6240                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6241
6242                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6243                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6244                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6245                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6246                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6247                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6248                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6249                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6250                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6251                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6252                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6253                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6254                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6255                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6256                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6257                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6258                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6259                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6260                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6261                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6262                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6263                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6264
6265                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6266                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6267                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6268                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6269                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6270                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6271
6272                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6273                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6274                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6275                 // lightning messages manually.
6276                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6277                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6278                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6279                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6280                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6281                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6282                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6283                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6284                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6285                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6286                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6287                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6288                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6289                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6290                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6291                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6292                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6293                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6294                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6295                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6296                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6297                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6298                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6299                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6300                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6301                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6302                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6303
6304                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
6305                 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
6306                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6307                 match events[0] {
6308                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6309                                 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6310                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6311                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6312                         },
6313                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6314                 }
6315         }
6316
6317         #[test]
6318         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6319                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6320                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6321                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6322                 //      fails as expected.
6323                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6324                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6325                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6326                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6327                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6328                 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6329
6330                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6331                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6332                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6333
6334                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6335                 let params = RouteParameters {
6336                         payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6337                         final_value_msat: 100_000,
6338                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6339                 };
6340                 let route = find_route(
6341                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6342                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6343                 ).unwrap();
6344                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6345                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6346                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6347                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6348                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6349                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6350                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6351                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6352                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6353                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6354                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6355                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6356                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6357                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6358                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6359                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6360                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6361                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6362                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6363                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6364                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6365
6366                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6367                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6368
6369                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6370                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6371                 let route = find_route(
6372                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6373                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6374                 ).unwrap();
6375                 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6376                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6377                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6378                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6379                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6380                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6381                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6382
6383                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6384                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6385                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6386                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6387                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6388                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6389                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6390                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6391                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6392                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6393                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6394                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6395                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6396                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6397                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6398                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6399                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6400                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6401                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6402                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6403                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6404                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6405                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6406
6407                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6408                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6409         }
6410
6411         #[test]
6412         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6413                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6414                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6415                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6416                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6417                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6418                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6419
6420                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6421                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6422                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6423                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6424
6425                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6426                 let params = RouteParameters {
6427                         payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6428                         final_value_msat: 10000,
6429                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6430                 };
6431                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6432                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6433                 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6434                 let route = find_route(
6435                         &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6436                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6437                 ).unwrap();
6438
6439                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6440                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6441                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6442                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6443
6444                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6445                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6446                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6447                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6448                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6449                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6450                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6451
6452                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6453         }
6454
6455         #[test]
6456         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6457                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6458                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6459                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6460                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6461                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6462
6463                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6464                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6465                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6466                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6467
6468                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6469                 let params = RouteParameters {
6470                         payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6471                         final_value_msat: 10000,
6472                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6473                 };
6474                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6475                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6476                 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6477                 let route = find_route(
6478                         &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6479                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6480                 ).unwrap();
6481
6482                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6483                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6484                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6485                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6486                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6487
6488                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6489                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6490                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6491                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6492                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6493                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6494                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6495
6496                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6497         }
6498
6499         #[test]
6500         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6501                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6502                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6503                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6504                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6505
6506                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6507                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6508                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6509                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6510
6511                 // Marshall an MPP route.
6512                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6513                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6514                 route.paths.push(path);
6515                 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6516                 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6517                 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6518                 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6519                 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6520                 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6521
6522                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6523                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6524                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))                        },
6525                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6526                 }
6527         }
6528 }
6529
6530 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6531 pub mod bench {
6532         use chain::Listen;
6533         use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6534         use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6535         use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6536         use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6537         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6538         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6539         use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6540         use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6541         use routing::scorer::Scorer;
6542         use util::test_utils;
6543         use util::config::UserConfig;
6544         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6545
6546         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6547         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6548         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6549
6550         use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6551
6552         use test::Bencher;
6553
6554         struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6555                 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6556                         &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6557                                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6558                                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6559                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6560                         &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6561         }
6562
6563         #[cfg(test)]
6564         #[bench]
6565         fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6566                 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6567         }
6568
6569         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6570                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6571                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6572                 // calls per node.
6573                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6574                 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6575
6576                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6577                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6578
6579                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6580                 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6581
6582                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6583                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6584                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6585                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6586                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6587                         network,
6588                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6589                 });
6590                 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6591
6592                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6593                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6594                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6595                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6596                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6597                         network,
6598                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6599                 });
6600                 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6601
6602                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6603                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6604                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6605                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6606                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6607
6608                 let tx;
6609                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6610                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6611                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6612                         }]};
6613                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6614                 } else { panic!(); }
6615
6616                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6617                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6618
6619                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6620
6621                 let block = Block {
6622                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6623                         txdata: vec![tx],
6624                 };
6625                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6626                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6627
6628                 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6629                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6630                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6631                 match msg_events[0] {
6632                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6633                                 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6634                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6635                         },
6636                         _ => panic!(),
6637                 }
6638                 match msg_events[1] {
6639                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6640                         _ => panic!(),
6641                 }
6642
6643                 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6644
6645                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6646                 macro_rules! send_payment {
6647                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6648                                 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6649                                 let payee = Payee::new($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6650                                         .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6651                                 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6652                                 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6653                                         Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6654
6655                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6656                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6657                                 payment_count += 1;
6658                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6659                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6660
6661                                 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6662                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6663                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6664                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6665                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6666                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6667                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6668                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6669
6670                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6671                                 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6672                                 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6673
6674                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6675                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6676                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6677                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6678                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6679                                         },
6680                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6681                                 }
6682
6683                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6684                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6685                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6686                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6687
6688                                 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6689                         }
6690                 }
6691
6692                 bench.iter(|| {
6693                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6694                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
6695                 });
6696         }
6697 }