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Don't remove failed payments when all paths fail
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19 //!
20
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37
38 use chain;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
49 use ln::msgs;
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::onion_utils;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
61
62 use io;
63 use prelude::*;
64 use core::{cmp, mem};
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
72 use core::ops::Deref;
73
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
75 //
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
79 //
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
84 //
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
90
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
93         Forward {
94                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
96         },
97         Receive {
98                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
100         },
101         ReceiveKeysend {
102                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104         },
105 }
106
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109         routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110         incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112         pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
114 }
115
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
120 }
121
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
127 }
128
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
130         AddHTLC {
131                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
132
133                 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134                 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135                 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
136                 // HTLCs.
137                 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
138                 prev_htlc_id: u64,
139                 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140         },
141         FailHTLC {
142                 htlc_id: u64,
143                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144         },
145 }
146
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150         short_channel_id: u64,
151         htlc_id: u64,
152         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
153
154         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156         outpoint: OutPoint,
157 }
158
159 enum OnionPayload {
160         /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161         /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162         /// are part of the same payment.
163         Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
166 }
167
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
170         cltv_expiry: u32,
171         value: u64,
172         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
173 }
174
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
178
179 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
180         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
181                 self.0.write(w)
182         }
183 }
184
185 impl Readable for PaymentId {
186         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
188                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
189         }
190 }
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
193 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
194         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
195         OutboundRoute {
196                 path: Vec<RouteHop>,
197                 session_priv: SecretKey,
198                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
199                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
200                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
201                 payment_id: PaymentId,
202         },
203 }
204 #[cfg(test)]
205 impl HTLCSource {
206         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
207                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
208                         path: Vec::new(),
209                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
210                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
211                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
212                 }
213         }
214 }
215
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
218         LightningError {
219                 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
220         },
221         Reason {
222                 failure_code: u16,
223                 data: Vec<u8>,
224         }
225 }
226
227 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
228 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
229         PrevHopForceClosed,
230         MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
231         Success(u64),
232         DuplicateClaim,
233 }
234
235 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
236
237 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
238 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
239 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
240 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
241 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
242
243 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
244         err: msgs::LightningError,
245         chan_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
246         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
247 }
248 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
249         #[inline]
250         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
251                 Self {
252                         err: LightningError {
253                                 err: err.clone(),
254                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
256                                                 channel_id,
257                                                 data: err
258                                         },
259                                 },
260                         },
261                         chan_id: None,
262                         shutdown_finish: None,
263                 }
264         }
265         #[inline]
266         fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
267                 Self {
268                         err: LightningError {
269                                 err,
270                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
271                         },
272                         chan_id: None,
273                         shutdown_finish: None,
274                 }
275         }
276         #[inline]
277         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
278                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
279         }
280         #[inline]
281         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
282                 Self {
283                         err: LightningError {
284                                 err: err.clone(),
285                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
287                                                 channel_id,
288                                                 data: err
289                                         },
290                                 },
291                         },
292                         chan_id: Some(channel_id),
293                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
294                 }
295         }
296         #[inline]
297         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
298                 Self {
299                         err: match err {
300                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
301                                         err: msg,
302                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
303                                 },
304                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
305                                         err: msg,
306                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
307                                 },
308                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
309                                         err: msg.clone(),
310                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
311                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
312                                                         channel_id,
313                                                         data: msg
314                                                 },
315                                         },
316                                 },
317                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
318                                         err: msg.clone(),
319                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
320                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
321                                                         channel_id,
322                                                         data: msg
323                                                 },
324                                         },
325                                 },
326                         },
327                         chan_id: None,
328                         shutdown_finish: None,
329                 }
330         }
331 }
332
333 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
334 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
335 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
336 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
337 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
338
339 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
340 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
341 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
342 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
343 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
344 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
345         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
346         CommitmentFirst,
347         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
348         RevokeAndACKFirst,
349 }
350
351 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
352 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
353         pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
354         pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
355         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
356         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
357         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
358         /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
359         pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
360         /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
361         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
362         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
363         /// go to read them!
364         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
365         /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
366         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
367         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
368 }
369
370 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
371 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
372 /// quite some time lag.
373 enum BackgroundEvent {
374         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
375         /// commitment transaction.
376         ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
377 }
378
379 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
380 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
381 struct PeerState {
382         latest_features: InitFeatures,
383 }
384
385 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
386 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
387 ///
388 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
389 /// here.
390 struct PendingInboundPayment {
391         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
392         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
393         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
394         /// this payment being removed.
395         expiry_time: u64,
396         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
397         user_payment_id: u64,
398         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
399         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
400         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
401 }
402
403 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
404 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
405 enum PendingOutboundPayment {
406         Legacy {
407                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
408         },
409         Retryable {
410                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
411                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
412                 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
413                 pending_amt_msat: u64,
414                 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
415                 total_msat: u64,
416         },
417 }
418
419 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
420         fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
421                 let remove_res = match self {
422                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
423                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
424                                 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
425                         }
426                 };
427                 if remove_res {
428                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
429                                 *pending_amt_msat -= part_amt_msat;
430                         }
431                 }
432                 remove_res
433         }
434
435         fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], part_amt_msat: u64) -> bool {
436                 let insert_res = match self {
437                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
438                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
439                                 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
440                         }
441                 };
442                 if insert_res {
443                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, .. } = self {
444                                 *pending_amt_msat += part_amt_msat;
445                         }
446                 }
447                 insert_res
448         }
449
450         fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
451                 match self {
452                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
453                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
454                                 session_privs.len()
455                         }
456                 }
457         }
458 }
459
460 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
461 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
462 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
463 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
464 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
465 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
466 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
467 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
468
469 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
470 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
471 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
472 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
473 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
474 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
475 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
476 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
477 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
478
479 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
480 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
481 ///
482 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
483 /// to individual Channels.
484 ///
485 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
486 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
487 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
488 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
489 ///
490 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
491 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
492 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
493 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
494 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
495 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
496 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
497 ///
498 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
499 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
500 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
501 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
502 /// object!
503 ///
504 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
505 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
506 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
507 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
508 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
509 ///
510 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
511 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
512 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
513 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
514 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
515 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
516         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
517         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
518         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
519         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
520                                 L::Target: Logger,
521 {
522         default_configuration: UserConfig,
523         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
524         fee_estimator: F,
525         chain_monitor: M,
526         tx_broadcaster: T,
527
528         #[cfg(test)]
529         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
530         #[cfg(not(test))]
531         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
532         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
533
534         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
535         pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
536         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
537         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
538
539         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
540         /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
541         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
542         /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
543         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
544         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
545
546         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
547         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
548         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
549         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
550         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
551         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
552         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
553         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
554         ///
555         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
556         ///
557         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
558         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
559
560         our_network_key: SecretKey,
561         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
562
563         /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
564         /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
565         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
566
567         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
568         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
569         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
570         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
571
572         /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
573         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
574         /// are currently open with that peer.
575         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
576         /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
577         /// new channel.
578         ///
579         /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
580         per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
581
582         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
583         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
584         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
585         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
586         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
587         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
588         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
589         /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
590         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
591
592         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
593
594         keys_manager: K,
595
596         logger: L,
597 }
598
599 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
600 ///
601 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
602 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
603 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
604 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
605 pub struct ChainParameters {
606         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
607         pub network: Network,
608
609         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
610         ///
611         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
612         pub best_block: BestBlock,
613 }
614
615 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
616 enum NotifyOption {
617         DoPersist,
618         SkipPersist,
619 }
620
621 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
622 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
623 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
624 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
625 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
626 /// updates are ready for persistence).
627 ///
628 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
629 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
630 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
631 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
632         persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
633         should_persist: F,
634         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
635         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
636 }
637
638 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
639         fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
640                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
641         }
642
643         fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
644                 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
645
646                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
647                         persistence_notifier: notifier,
648                         should_persist: persist_check,
649                         _read_guard: read_guard,
650                 }
651         }
652 }
653
654 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
655         fn drop(&mut self) {
656                 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
657                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
658                 }
659         }
660 }
661
662 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
663 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
664 ///
665 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
666 ///
667 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
668 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
669 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
670 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
671 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
672
673 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
674 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
675 ///
676 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
677 ///
678 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
679 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
680 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
681 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
682 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
683 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
684 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
685
686 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
687 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
688 /// this value.
689 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
690 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
691 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
692 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
693
694 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
695 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
696 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
697 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
698 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
699 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
700 #[deny(const_err)]
701 #[allow(dead_code)]
702 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
703
704 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
705 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
706 #[deny(const_err)]
707 #[allow(dead_code)]
708 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
709
710 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
711 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
712 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
713         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
714         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
715         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
716         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
717         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
718         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
719         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
720         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
721 }
722
723 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
724 /// to better separate parameters.
725 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
726 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
727         /// The node_id of our counterparty
728         pub node_id: PublicKey,
729         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
730         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
731         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
732         pub features: InitFeatures,
733         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
734         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
735         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
736         ///
737         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
738         ///
739         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
740         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
741         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
742         /// payments to us through this channel.
743         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
744 }
745
746 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
747 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
748 pub struct ChannelDetails {
749         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
750         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
751         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
752         /// lifetime of the channel.
753         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
754         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
755         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
756         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
757         /// our counterparty already.
758         ///
759         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
760         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
761         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
762         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
763         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
764         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
765         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
766         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
767         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
768         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
769         /// this value on chain.
770         ///
771         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
772         ///
773         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
774         ///
775         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
776         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
777         /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
778         pub user_id: u64,
779         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
780         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
781         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
782         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
783         ///
784         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
785         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
786         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
787         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
788         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
789         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
790         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
791         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
792         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
793         ///
794         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
795         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
796         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
797         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
798         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
799         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
800         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
801         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
802         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
803         ///
804         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
805         ///
806         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
807         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
808         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
809         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
810         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
811         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
812         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
813         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
814         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
815         ///
816         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
817         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
818         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
819         pub is_outbound: bool,
820         /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
821         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
822         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
823         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
824         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
825         ///
826         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
827         pub is_funding_locked: bool,
828         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
829         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
830         ///
831         /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
832         pub is_usable: bool,
833         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
834         pub is_public: bool,
835 }
836
837 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
838 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
839 /// states for more.
840 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
841 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
842         /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
843         /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
844         /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
845         ParameterError(APIError),
846         /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
847         /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
848         /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
849         /// payment in full.
850         ///
851         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
852         /// send_payment.
853         PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
854         /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
855         /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
856         /// paths than the ones selected).
857         AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
858         /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
859         /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
860         /// in over-/re-payment.
861         ///
862         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
863         /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
864         /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
865         ///
866         /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
867         /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
868         /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
869         /// with the latest update_id.
870         PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
871 }
872
873 macro_rules! handle_error {
874         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
875                 match $internal {
876                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
877                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
878                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
879                                 {
880                                         // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
881                                         // entering the macro.
882                                         assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
883                                         assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
884                                 }
885
886                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
887
888                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
889                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
890                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
891                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
892                                                         msg: update
893                                                 });
894                                         }
895                                         if let Some(channel_id) = chan_id {
896                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id,  reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() } });
897                                         }
898                                 }
899
900                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
901                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
902                                 } else {
903                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
904                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
905                                                 action: err.action.clone()
906                                         });
907                                 }
908
909                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
910                                         $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
911                                 }
912
913                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
914                                 Err(err)
915                         },
916                 }
917         }
918 }
919
920 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
921 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
922         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
923                 match $err {
924                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
925                                 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
926                                 //peer here.
927                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
928                         },
929                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
930                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
931                         },
932                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
933                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
934                                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
935                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
936                                 }
937                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
938                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
939                         },
940                         ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
941                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
942                                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
943                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
944                                 }
945                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
946                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
947                         }
948                 }
949         }
950 }
951
952 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
953         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
954                 match $res {
955                         Ok(res) => res,
956                         Err(e) => {
957                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
958                                 if drop {
959                                         $entry.remove_entry();
960                                 }
961                                 break Err(res);
962                         }
963                 }
964         }
965 }
966
967 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
968         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
969                 match $res {
970                         Ok(res) => res,
971                         Err(e) => {
972                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
973                                 if drop {
974                                         $entry.remove_entry();
975                                 }
976                                 return Err(res);
977                         }
978                 }
979         }
980 }
981
982 macro_rules! remove_channel {
983         ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
984                 {
985                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
986                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
987                                 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
988                         }
989                         channel
990                 }
991         }
992 }
993
994 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
995         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
996                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
997         };
998         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
999                 match $err {
1000                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1001                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1002                                 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1003                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1004                                 }
1005                                 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1006                                 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1007                                 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1008                                 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1009                                 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1010                                 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1011                                 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1012                                 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1013                                 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1014                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
1015                                                 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1016                                 (res, true)
1017                         },
1018                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1019                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
1020                                                 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1021                                                 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1022                                                                 match $action_type {
1023                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1024                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1025                                                                 }
1026                                                         } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1027                                                         else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1028                                                         else { "nothing" },
1029                                                 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1030                                                 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
1031                                 if !$resend_commitment {
1032                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1033                                 }
1034                                 if !$resend_raa {
1035                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1036                                 }
1037                                 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1038                                 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1039                         },
1040                 }
1041         };
1042         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
1043                 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
1044                 if drop {
1045                         $entry.remove_entry();
1046                 }
1047                 res
1048         } };
1049 }
1050
1051 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1052         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1053                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1054         };
1055         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1056                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1057         }
1058 }
1059
1060 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1061 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1062         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1063                 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1064                         (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1065                                 break e;
1066                         },
1067                         (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1068                 }
1069         }
1070 }
1071
1072 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1073         ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1074          $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1075          $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1076                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1077                 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1078
1079                 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1080                 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1081                 let res = loop {
1082                         let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1083                         if !forwards.is_empty() {
1084                                 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1085                                         $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1086                         }
1087
1088                         if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1089                                 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1090                                 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1091                                 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1092                                 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1093                                 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1094                                 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1095                                 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1096                                 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1097                                 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1098                                 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1099                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1100                         }
1101
1102                         if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1103                                 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1104                                 // before it should be allowed to.
1105                                 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1106                                 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1107                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1108                                         msg,
1109                                 });
1110                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1111                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1112                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1113                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
1114                                         });
1115                                 }
1116                                 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1117                         }
1118
1119                         let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1120                         if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1121                                 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1122                                 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1123                                 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1124                                 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1125                                 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1126                                 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1127                                 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1128                                 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1129                                 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1130                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1131                                 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1132                                         // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1133                                         // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1134                                         // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1135                                         let mut order = $order;
1136                                         if $raa.is_none() {
1137                                                 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1138                                         }
1139                                         break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1140                                 }
1141                         }
1142
1143                         macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1144                                 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1145                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1146                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1147                                                 updates: update,
1148                                         });
1149                                 }
1150                         } }
1151                         macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1152                                 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1153                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1154                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1155                                                 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1156                                         });
1157                                 }
1158                         } }
1159                         match $order {
1160                                 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1161                                         handle_cs!();
1162                                         handle_raa!();
1163                                 },
1164                                 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1165                                         handle_raa!();
1166                                         handle_cs!();
1167                                 },
1168                         }
1169                         if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1170                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1171                                 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1172                         }
1173                         break Ok(());
1174                 };
1175
1176                 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1177                         // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1178                         // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1179                         // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1180                         assert!(res.is_ok());
1181                 }
1182
1183                 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1184         } }
1185 }
1186
1187 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1188         ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1189                 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1190
1191                 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1192
1193                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1194                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1195                 }
1196         } }
1197 }
1198
1199 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1200         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1201         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1202         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1203         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1204         L::Target: Logger,
1205 {
1206         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1207         ///
1208         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1209         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1210         ///
1211         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1212         ///
1213         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1214         ///
1215         /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1216         /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1217         /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1218         pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1219                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1220                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1221
1222                 ChannelManager {
1223                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
1224                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1225                         fee_estimator: fee_est,
1226                         chain_monitor,
1227                         tx_broadcaster,
1228
1229                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1230
1231                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1232                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1233                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1234                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1235                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1236                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1237                         }),
1238                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1239                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1240
1241                         our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1242                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1243                         secp_ctx,
1244
1245                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1246                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1247
1248                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1249
1250                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1251                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1252                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1253                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1254
1255                         keys_manager,
1256
1257                         logger,
1258                 }
1259         }
1260
1261         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels,  as
1262         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1263                 &self.default_configuration
1264         }
1265
1266         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1267         ///
1268         /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1269         /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1270         /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1271         /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1272         /// otherwise ignored.
1273         ///
1274         /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1275         /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1276         ///
1277         /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1278         /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1279         ///
1280         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1281         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1282         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1283         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1284                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1285                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1286                 }
1287
1288                 let channel = {
1289                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1290                         match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1291                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1292                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1293                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1294                                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1295                                         Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1296                                 },
1297                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1298                         }
1299                 };
1300                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1301
1302                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1303                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1304                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1305
1306                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1307                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1308                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1309                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1310                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1311                                 } else {
1312                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
1313                                 }
1314                         },
1315                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1316                 }
1317                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1318                         node_id: their_network_key,
1319                         msg: res,
1320                 });
1321                 Ok(())
1322         }
1323
1324         fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1325                 let mut res = Vec::new();
1326                 {
1327                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1328                         res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1329                         for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1330                                 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1331                                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1332                                         channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1333                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1334                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1335                                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1336                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1337                                                 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1338                                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1339                                                 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1340                                         },
1341                                         funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1342                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1343                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1344                                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1345                                         inbound_capacity_msat,
1346                                         outbound_capacity_msat,
1347                                         user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1348                                         confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1349                                         force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1350                                         is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1351                                         is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1352                                         is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1353                                         is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1354                                 });
1355                         }
1356                 }
1357                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1358                 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1359                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1360                                 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1361                         }
1362                 }
1363                 res
1364         }
1365
1366         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1367         /// more information.
1368         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1369                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1370         }
1371
1372         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1373         /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1374         ///
1375         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1376         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1377         /// are.
1378         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1379                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1380                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1381                 // really wanted anyway.
1382                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1383         }
1384
1385         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1386                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1387
1388                 let counterparty_node_id;
1389                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1390                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1391                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1392                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1393                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1394                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1395                                         counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1396                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1397                                         let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1398                                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1399                                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1400                                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1401                                                         chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1402                                                 },
1403                                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1404                                         };
1405                                         failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1406
1407                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1408                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1409                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1410                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
1411                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1412                                                         if is_permanent {
1413                                                                 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1414                                                                 break result;
1415                                                         }
1416                                                 }
1417                                         }
1418
1419                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1420                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1421                                                 msg: shutdown_msg
1422                                         });
1423
1424                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1425                                                 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1426                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1427                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1428                                                                 msg: channel_update
1429                                                         });
1430                                                 }
1431                                                 if let Ok(mut pending_events_lock) = self.pending_events.lock() {
1432                                                         pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1433                                                                 channel_id: *channel_id,
1434                                                                 reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
1435                                                         });
1436                                                 }
1437                                         }
1438                                         break Ok(());
1439                                 },
1440                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1441                         }
1442                 };
1443
1444                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1445                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1446                 }
1447
1448                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1449                 Ok(())
1450         }
1451
1452         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1453         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1454         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1455         ///
1456         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1457         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1458         ///    estimate.
1459         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1460         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1461         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1462         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1463         ///
1464         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1465         ///
1466         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1467         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1468         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1469         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1470                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1471         }
1472
1473         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1474         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1475         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1476         ///
1477         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1478         /// the channel being closed or not:
1479         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1480         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1481         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1482         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1483         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1484         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1485         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1486         ///
1487         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1488         ///
1489         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1490         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1491         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1492         pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1493                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1494         }
1495
1496         #[inline]
1497         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1498                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1499                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1500                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1501                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1502                 }
1503                 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1504                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1505                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1506                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1507                         // ignore the result here.
1508                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1509                 }
1510         }
1511
1512         /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1513         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1514         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1515                 let mut chan = {
1516                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1517                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1518                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1519                                 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1520                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1521                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1522                                         }
1523                                 }
1524                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1525                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1526                                 }
1527                                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1528                                 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1529                                         if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1530                                                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: *channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() } });
1531                                         }
1532                                 } else {
1533                                         pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: *channel_id, reason: ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed });
1534                                 }
1535                                 chan.remove_entry().1
1536                         } else {
1537                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1538                         }
1539                 };
1540                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1541                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1542                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1543                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1544                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1545                                 msg: update
1546                         });
1547                 }
1548
1549                 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1550         }
1551
1552         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1553         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1554         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1555                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1556                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1557                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1558                                 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1559                                         events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1560                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1561                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1562                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1563                                                 },
1564                                         }
1565                                 );
1566                                 Ok(())
1567                         },
1568                         Err(e) => Err(e)
1569                 }
1570         }
1571
1572         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1573         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1574         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1575                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1576                         let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1577                 }
1578         }
1579
1580         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1581                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1582                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1583                                 {
1584                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1585                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1586                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1587                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1588                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1589                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
1590                                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1591                                 }
1592                         }
1593                 }
1594
1595                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1596                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1597                 }
1598
1599                 let shared_secret = {
1600                         let mut arr = [0; 32];
1601                         arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1602                         arr
1603                 };
1604                 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1605
1606                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1607                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1608                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1609                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1610                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1611                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1612                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1613                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1614                 }
1615
1616                 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1617                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1618                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1619                 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1620                         return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1621                 }
1622
1623                 let mut channel_state = None;
1624                 macro_rules! return_err {
1625                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1626                                 {
1627                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1628                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
1629                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1630                                         }
1631                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1632                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1633                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1634                                                 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1635                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
1636                                 }
1637                         }
1638                 }
1639
1640                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1641                 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1642                 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1643                         match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1644                                 Err(err) => {
1645                                         let error_code = match err {
1646                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1647                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1648                                                 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1649                                                 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1650                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1651                                         };
1652                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1653                                 },
1654                                 Ok(msg) => {
1655                                         let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1656                                         if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1657                                                 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1658                                         }
1659                                         (msg, hmac)
1660                                 },
1661                         }
1662                 };
1663
1664                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1665                         #[cfg(test)]
1666                         {
1667                                 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1668                                 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1669                                 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1670                                 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1671                                 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1672                                 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1673                                 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1674                                 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1675                                 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1676                                 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1677                                 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1678                                 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1679                         }
1680
1681                         // OUR PAYMENT!
1682                         // final_expiry_too_soon
1683                         // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1684                         // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1685                         // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1686                         // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1687                         // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1688                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1689                                 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1690                         }
1691                         // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1692                         if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1693                                 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1694                         }
1695                         // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1696                         if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1697                                 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1698                         }
1699
1700                         let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1701                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1702                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1703                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1704                                         if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1705                                                 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1706                                         } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1707                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1708                                                         payment_data: data,
1709                                                         incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1710                                                 }
1711                                         } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1712                                                 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1713                                                 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1714                                                 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1715                                                 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1716                                                 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1717                                                 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1718                                                 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1719                                                         return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1720                                                 }
1721
1722                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1723                                                         payment_preimage,
1724                                                         incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1725                                                 }
1726                                         } else {
1727                                                 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1728                                         }
1729                                 },
1730                         };
1731
1732                         // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1733                         // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1734                         // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1735                         // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1736
1737                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1738                                 routing,
1739                                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1740                                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1741                                 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1742                                 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1743                         })
1744                 } else {
1745                         let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1746                         let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1747                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1748                         {
1749                                 // Check two things:
1750                                 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1751                                 //    read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1752                                 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1753                                 let mut t = [0; 1];
1754                                 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1755                         }
1756                         // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1757                         // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1758                         chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1759
1760                         let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1761
1762                         let blinding_factor = {
1763                                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1764                                 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1765                                 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1766                                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1767                         };
1768
1769                         let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1770                                 Err(e)
1771                         } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1772
1773                         let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1774                                 version: 0,
1775                                 public_key,
1776                                 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1777                                 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1778                         };
1779
1780                         let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1781                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1782                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1783                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1784                                         return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1785                                 },
1786                         };
1787
1788                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1789                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1790                                         onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1791                                         short_channel_id,
1792                                 },
1793                                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1794                                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1795                                 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1796                                 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1797                         })
1798                 };
1799
1800                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1801                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1802                         // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1803                         // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1804                         // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1805                         if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1806                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1807                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1808                                         let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1809                                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1810                                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1811                                                 },
1812                                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1813                                         };
1814
1815                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1816
1817                                         if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1818                                                 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1819                                                 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1820                                                 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1821                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1822                                         }
1823
1824                                         // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1825                                         // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1826                                         // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1827                                         // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1828                                         // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1829                                         if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1830                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1831                                         }
1832                                         if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1833                                                 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1834                                         }
1835                                         let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1836                                                 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1837                                                 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1838                                         if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1839                                                 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1840                                         }
1841                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1842                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1843                                         }
1844                                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1845                                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1846                                         // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1847                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1848                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1849                                         }
1850                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1851                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1852                                         }
1853                                         // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1854                                         // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1855                                         if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1856                                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1857                                         }
1858
1859                                         break None;
1860                                 }
1861                                 {
1862                                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1863                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1864                                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1865                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1866                                                 }
1867                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1868                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1869                                                 }
1870                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1871                                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1872                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1873                                                 }
1874                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1875                                         }
1876                                         return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1877                                 }
1878                         }
1879                 }
1880
1881                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1882         }
1883
1884         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1885         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1886         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1887         ///
1888         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1889         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1890                 if !chan.should_announce() {
1891                         return Err(LightningError {
1892                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1893                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1894                         });
1895                 }
1896                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1897                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1898         }
1899
1900         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1901         /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1902         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1903         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1904         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1905         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1906                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1907                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1908                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1909                         Some(id) => id,
1910                 };
1911
1912                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1913
1914                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1915                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1916                         short_channel_id,
1917                         timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1918                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1919                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1920                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1921                         htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1922                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1923                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1924                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
1925                 };
1926
1927                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1928                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1929
1930                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1931                         signature: sig,
1932                         contents: unsigned
1933                 })
1934         }
1935
1936         // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1937         pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1938                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1939                 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1940                 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1941                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1942
1943                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1944                         .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1945                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1946                 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1947                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1948                 }
1949                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1950
1951                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1952                 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
1953                 let payment = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id).or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
1954                         session_privs: HashSet::new(),
1955                         pending_amt_msat: 0,
1956                         payment_hash: *payment_hash,
1957                         payment_secret: *payment_secret,
1958                         total_msat: total_value,
1959                 });
1960                 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat));
1961
1962                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1963                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1964                         let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1965                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1966                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1967                         };
1968
1969                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1970                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1971                                 match {
1972                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1973                                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1974                                         }
1975                                         if !chan.get().is_live() {
1976                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1977                                         }
1978                                         break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1979                                                 path: path.clone(),
1980                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1981                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1982                                                 payment_id,
1983                                         }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1984                                 } {
1985                                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1986                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1987                                                         maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1988                                                         // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1989                                                         // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1990                                                         // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1991                                                         // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1992                                                         // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1993                                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1994                                                 }
1995
1996                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1997                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1998                                                         node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1999                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2000                                                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2001                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2002                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2003                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2004                                                                 update_fee: None,
2005                                                                 commitment_signed,
2006                                                         },
2007                                                 });
2008                                         },
2009                                         None => {},
2010                                 }
2011                         } else { unreachable!(); }
2012                         return Ok(());
2013                 };
2014
2015                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2016                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2017                         Err(e) => {
2018                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2019                         },
2020                 }
2021         }
2022
2023         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2024         ///
2025         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2026         /// fields for more info.
2027         ///
2028         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2029         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2030         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2031         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2032         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2033         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2034         ///
2035         /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2036         ///
2037         /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2038         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2039         /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2040         ///
2041         /// In general, a path may raise:
2042         ///  * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2043         ///    node public key) is specified.
2044         ///  * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2045         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2046         ///    failure).
2047         ///  * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2048         ///    relevant updates.
2049         ///
2050         /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2051         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2052         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2053         ///
2054         /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2055         /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2056         /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2057         /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2058         /// payment_secret.
2059         /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2060         /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2061         /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2062         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2063                 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2064         }
2065
2066         fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2067                 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2068                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2069                 }
2070                 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2071                         // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2072                         // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2073                         // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2074                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2075                 }
2076                 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2077                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2078                 }
2079                 let mut total_value = 0;
2080                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2081                 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2082                 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2083                 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2084                         if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2085                                 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2086                                 continue 'path_check;
2087                         }
2088                         for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2089                                 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2090                                         path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2091                                         continue 'path_check;
2092                                 }
2093                         }
2094                         total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2095                         path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2096                 }
2097                 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2098                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2099                 }
2100                 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2101                         debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2102                         total_value = amt_msat;
2103                 }
2104
2105                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2106                 let mut results = Vec::new();
2107                 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2108                         results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2109                 }
2110                 let mut has_ok = false;
2111                 let mut has_err = false;
2112                 for res in results.iter() {
2113                         if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2114                         if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2115                         if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2116                                 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2117                                 // PartialFailure.
2118                                 has_err = true;
2119                                 has_ok = true;
2120                                 break;
2121                         }
2122                 }
2123                 if has_err && has_ok {
2124                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2125                 } else if has_err {
2126                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2127                 } else {
2128                         Ok(payment_id)
2129                 }
2130         }
2131
2132         /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2133         ///
2134         /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2135         /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2136         /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2137         /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2138         ///
2139         /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2140         pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2141                 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2142                 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2143                         if path.len() == 0 {
2144                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2145                                         err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2146                                 }))
2147                         }
2148                 }
2149
2150                 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2151                         let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2152                         if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2153                                 match payment {
2154                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2155                                                 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2156                                         } => {
2157                                                 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2158                                                 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2159                                                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2160                                                                 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2161                                                         }))
2162                                                 }
2163                                                 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2164                                         },
2165                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2166                                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2167                                                         err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2168                                                 }))
2169                                         }
2170                                 }
2171                         } else {
2172                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2173                                         err: "Payment with ID {} not found".to_string()
2174                                 }))
2175                         }
2176                 };
2177                 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2178         }
2179
2180         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2181         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2182         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2183         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2184         /// never reach the recipient.
2185         ///
2186         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2187         ///
2188         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2189         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2190         ///
2191         /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2192         ///
2193         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2194         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2195                 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2196                         Some(p) => p,
2197                         None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2198                 };
2199                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2200                 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2201                         Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2202                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2203                 }
2204         }
2205
2206         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2207         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2208         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2209                         (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2210                 let (chan, msg) = {
2211                         let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2212                                 Some(mut chan) => {
2213                                         let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2214
2215                                         (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2216                                                 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2217                                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2218                                                 } else { unreachable!(); })
2219                                         , chan)
2220                                 },
2221                                 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2222                         };
2223                         match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2224                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2225                                         (chan, funding_msg)
2226                                 },
2227                                 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2228                                         err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2229                                 }) },
2230                         }
2231                 };
2232
2233                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2234                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2235                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2236                         msg,
2237                 });
2238                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2239                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2240                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2241                         },
2242                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2243                                 e.insert(chan);
2244                         }
2245                 }
2246                 Ok(())
2247         }
2248
2249         #[cfg(test)]
2250         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2251                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2252                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2253                 })
2254         }
2255
2256         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2257         ///
2258         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2259         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2260         ///
2261         /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2262         ///
2263         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2264         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2265         /// keys per-channel).
2266         ///
2267         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2268         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2269         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2270         ///
2271         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2272         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2273         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2274         ///
2275         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2276         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2277                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2278
2279                 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2280                         if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2281                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2282                                         err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2283                                 });
2284                         }
2285                 }
2286                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2287                         let mut output_index = None;
2288                         let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2289                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2290                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2291                                         if output_index.is_some() {
2292                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2293                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2294                                                 });
2295                                         }
2296                                         if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2297                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2298                                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2299                                                 });
2300                                         }
2301                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2302                                 }
2303                         }
2304                         if output_index.is_none() {
2305                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2306                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2307                                 });
2308                         }
2309                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2310                 })
2311         }
2312
2313         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2314                 if !chan.should_announce() {
2315                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2316                         return None
2317                 }
2318
2319                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2320                         Ok(res) => res,
2321                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2322                 };
2323                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2324                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2325
2326                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2327                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2328                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2329                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
2330                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2331                 })
2332         }
2333
2334         #[allow(dead_code)]
2335         // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2336         // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2337         // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2338         // message...
2339         const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2340         #[deny(const_err)]
2341         #[allow(dead_code)]
2342         // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2343         // smaller than 500:
2344         const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2345
2346         /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2347         /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2348         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2349         /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2350         /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2351         /// our network addresses.
2352         ///
2353         /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2354         /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2355         ///
2356         /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2357         /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2358         /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2359         /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2360         ///
2361         /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2362         ///
2363         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2364         pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2365                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2366
2367                 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2368                         panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2369                 }
2370
2371                 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2372                 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2373                 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2374
2375                 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2376                         features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2377                         timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2378                         node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2379                         rgb, alias, addresses,
2380                         excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2381                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2382                 };
2383                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2384                 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2385
2386                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2387                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2388
2389                 let mut announced_chans = false;
2390                 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2391                         if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2392                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2393                                         msg,
2394                                         update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2395                                                 Ok(msg) => msg,
2396                                                 Err(_) => continue,
2397                                         },
2398                                 });
2399                                 announced_chans = true;
2400                         } else {
2401                                 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2402                                 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2403                                 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2404                         }
2405                 }
2406
2407                 if announced_chans {
2408                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2409                                 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2410                                         signature: node_announce_sig,
2411                                         contents: announcement
2412                                 },
2413                         });
2414                 }
2415         }
2416
2417         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2418         ///
2419         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2420         /// Will likely generate further events.
2421         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2422                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2423
2424                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2425                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2426                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2427                 {
2428                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2429                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2430
2431                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2432                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2433                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2434                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2435                                                 None => {
2436                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2437                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2438                                                                 match forward_info {
2439                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2440                                                                                                    prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2441                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2442                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2443                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2444                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2445                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2446                                                                                 });
2447                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2448                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2449                                                                                 ));
2450                                                                         },
2451                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2452                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2453                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2454                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2455                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
2456                                                                         }
2457                                                                 }
2458                                                         }
2459                                                         continue;
2460                                                 }
2461                                         };
2462                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2463                                                 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2464                                                 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2465                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2466                                                         match forward_info {
2467                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2468                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2469                                                                                         onion_packet, ..
2470                                                                                 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2471                                                                                 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2472                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2473                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2474                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2475                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2476                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2477                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2478                                                                         });
2479                                                                         match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2480                                                                                 Err(e) => {
2481                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2482                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2483                                                                                         } else {
2484                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2485                                                                                         }
2486                                                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2487                                                                                         failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2488                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2489                                                                                         ));
2490                                                                                         continue;
2491                                                                                 },
2492                                                                                 Ok(update_add) => {
2493                                                                                         match update_add {
2494                                                                                                 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2495                                                                                                 None => {
2496                                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2497                                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2498                                                                                                         // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2499                                                                                                         // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2500                                                                                                         // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2501                                                                                                         // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2502                                                                                                         // this channel currently :/.
2503                                                                                                 }
2504                                                                                         }
2505                                                                                 }
2506                                                                         }
2507                                                                 },
2508                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2509                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2510                                                                 },
2511                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2512                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2513                                                                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2514                                                                                 Err(e) => {
2515                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2516                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2517                                                                                         } else {
2518                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2519                                                                                         }
2520                                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2521                                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2522                                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2523                                                                                         continue;
2524                                                                                 },
2525                                                                                 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2526                                                                                 Ok(None) => {
2527                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2528                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2529                                                                                         // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2530                                                                                         // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2531                                                                                         // messages when we can.
2532                                                                                         // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2533                                                                                         // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2534                                                                                         // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2535                                                                                 }
2536                                                                         }
2537                                                                 },
2538                                                         }
2539                                                 }
2540
2541                                                 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2542                                                         let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2543                                                                 Ok(res) => res,
2544                                                                 Err(e) => {
2545                                                                         // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2546                                                                         // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2547                                                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2548                                                                         let err: Result<(), _>  = match e {
2549                                                                                 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2550                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2551                                                                                 }
2552                                                                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2553                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2554                                                                                         let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2555                                                                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2556                                                                                                 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2557                                                                                         }
2558                                                                                         // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2559                                                                                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2560                                                                                 },
2561                                                                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2562                                                                         };
2563                                                                         handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2564                                                                         continue;
2565                                                                 }
2566                                                         };
2567                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2568                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2569                                                                 continue;
2570                                                         }
2571                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2572                                                                 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2573                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2574                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2575                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2576                                                                         update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2577                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2578                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2579                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2580                                                                         update_fee: None,
2581                                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2582                                                                 },
2583                                                         });
2584                                                 }
2585                                         } else {
2586                                                 unreachable!();
2587                                         }
2588                                 } else {
2589                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2590                                                 match forward_info {
2591                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2592                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2593                                                                         prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2594                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2595                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2596                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2597                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2598                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2599                                                                         _ => {
2600                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2601                                                                         }
2602                                                                 };
2603                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2604                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2605                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2606                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2607                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2608                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2609                                                                         },
2610                                                                         value: amt_to_forward,
2611                                                                         cltv_expiry,
2612                                                                         onion_payload,
2613                                                                 };
2614
2615                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2616                                                                         ($htlc: expr) => {
2617                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2618                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2619                                                                                         &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2620                                                                                 );
2621                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2622                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2623                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2624                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2625                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2626                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
2627                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2628                                                                                 ));
2629                                                                         }
2630                                                                 }
2631
2632                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2633                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2634                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2635                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2636                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2637                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2638                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2639                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2640                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2641                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2642                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2643                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2644                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2645                                                                                         },
2646                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2647                                                                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2648                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2649                                                                                                                 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2650                                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2651                                                                                                                         payment_hash,
2652                                                                                                                         amt: amt_to_forward,
2653                                                                                                                         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2654                                                                                                                 });
2655                                                                                                         },
2656                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2657                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2658                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2659                                                                                                         }
2660                                                                                                 }
2661                                                                                         }
2662                                                                                 }
2663                                                                         },
2664                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2665                                                                                 let payment_data =
2666                                                                                         if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2667                                                                                                 data.clone()
2668                                                                                         } else {
2669                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2670                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2671                                                                                                 continue
2672                                                                                         };
2673                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2674                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2675                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2676                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2677                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2678                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2679                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2680                                                                                 } else {
2681                                                                                         let mut total_value = 0;
2682                                                                                         let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2683                                                                                                 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2684                                                                                         if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2685                                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2686                                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2687                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2688                                                                                                         continue
2689                                                                                                 }
2690                                                                                         }
2691                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2692                                                                                         for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2693                                                                                                 total_value += htlc.value;
2694                                                                                                 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2695                                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2696                                                                                                                 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2697                                                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2698                                                                                                                                                                  log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2699                                                                                                                         total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2700                                                                                                                 }
2701                                                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2702                                                                                                         },
2703                                                                                                         _ => unreachable!(),
2704                                                                                                 }
2705                                                                                         }
2706                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2707                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2708                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2709                                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2710                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(htlc);
2711                                                                                                 }
2712                                                                                         } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2713                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2714                                                                                                         payment_hash,
2715                                                                                                         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2716                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2717                                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2718                                                                                                                 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2719                                                                                                         },
2720                                                                                                         amt: total_value,
2721                                                                                                 });
2722                                                                                                 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2723                                                                                                 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2724                                                                                                 // claimed.
2725                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2726                                                                                         } else {
2727                                                                                                 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2728                                                                                                 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2729                                                                                                 // MPP parts.
2730                                                                                         }
2731                                                                                 }
2732                                                                         },
2733                                                                 };
2734                                                         },
2735                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2736                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2737                                                         }
2738                                                 }
2739                                         }
2740                                 }
2741                         }
2742                 }
2743
2744                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2745                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2746                 }
2747
2748                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2749                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2750                 }
2751
2752                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2753                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2754                 events.append(&mut new_events);
2755         }
2756
2757         /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2758         ///
2759         /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2760         /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2761         ///
2762         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2763         fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2764                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2765                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2766                 if background_events.is_empty() {
2767                         return false;
2768                 }
2769
2770                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2771                         match event {
2772                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2773                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2774                                         // monitor updating completing.
2775                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2776                                 },
2777                         }
2778                 }
2779                 true
2780         }
2781
2782         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2783         /// Process background events, for functional testing
2784         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2785                 self.process_background_events();
2786         }
2787
2788         fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2789                 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2790                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2791                 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2792                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2793                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2794                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2795                 }
2796                 if !chan.is_live() {
2797                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2798                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2799                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2800                 }
2801                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2802                         log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2803
2804                 let mut retain_channel = true;
2805                 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2806                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
2807                         Err(e) => {
2808                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2809                                 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2810                                 Err(res)
2811                         }
2812                 };
2813                 let ret_err = match res {
2814                         Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2815                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2816                                         let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2817                                         if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2818                                         res
2819                                 } else {
2820                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2821                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2822                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2823                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2824                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2825                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2826                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2827                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2828                                                         commitment_signed,
2829                                                 },
2830                                         });
2831                                         Ok(())
2832                                 }
2833                         },
2834                         Ok(None) => Ok(()),
2835                         Err(e) => Err(e),
2836                 };
2837                 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2838         }
2839
2840         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
2841         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2842         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2843         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2844         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2845         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2846                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2847                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2848
2849                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2850
2851                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2852                         {
2853                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2854                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2855                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2856                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2857                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2858                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2859                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2860                                         if err.is_err() {
2861                                                 handle_errors.push(err);
2862                                         }
2863                                         retain_channel
2864                                 });
2865                         }
2866
2867                         should_persist
2868                 });
2869         }
2870
2871         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2872         ///
2873         /// This currently includes:
2874         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2875         ///  * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2876         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2877         ///    the channel.
2878         ///
2879         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2880         /// estimate fetches.
2881         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2882                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2883                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2884                         if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2885
2886                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2887
2888                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2889                         {
2890                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2891                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2892                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2893                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2894                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2895                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2896                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2897                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2898                                         if err.is_err() {
2899                                                 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2900                                         }
2901                                         if !retain_channel { return false; }
2902
2903                                         if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2904                                                 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2905                                                 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2906                                                 if needs_close { return false; }
2907                                         }
2908
2909                                         match chan.channel_update_status() {
2910                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2911                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2912                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2913                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2914                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2915                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2916                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2917                                                                         msg: update
2918                                                                 });
2919                                                         }
2920                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2921                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2922                                                 },
2923                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2924                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2925                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2926                                                                         msg: update
2927                                                                 });
2928                                                         }
2929                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2930                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2931                                                 },
2932                                                 _ => {},
2933                                         }
2934
2935                                         true
2936                                 });
2937                         }
2938
2939                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2940                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2941                         }
2942                         should_persist
2943                 });
2944         }
2945
2946         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2947         /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2948         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2949         /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2950         /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2951         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2952                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2953
2954                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2955                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2956                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2957                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2958                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2959                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2960                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2961                                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2962                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2963                                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2964                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2965                         }
2966                         true
2967                 } else { false }
2968         }
2969
2970         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2971         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2972         // be surfaced to the user.
2973         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2974                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2975                         match htlc_src {
2976                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2977                                         let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2978                                                 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2979                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2980                                                                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2981                                                                         (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2982                                                                 } else {
2983                                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2984                                                                 }
2985                                                         },
2986                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2987                                                 };
2988                                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2989                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2990                                                 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2991                                 },
2992                                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
2993                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2994                                         session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2995                                         let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2996                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2997                                                 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat) {
2998                                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2999                                                                 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3000                                                                         payment_hash,
3001                                                                         rejected_by_dest: false,
3002                                                                         network_update: None,
3003                                                                         all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3004                                                                         path: path.clone(),
3005                                                                         #[cfg(test)]
3006                                                                         error_code: None,
3007                                                                         #[cfg(test)]
3008                                                                         error_data: None,
3009                                                                 }
3010                                                         );
3011                                                 }
3012                                         } else {
3013                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3014                                         }
3015                                 },
3016                         };
3017                 }
3018         }
3019
3020         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3021         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3022         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3023         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3024         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3025         /// still-available channels.
3026         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3027                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3028                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3029                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3030                 //timer handling.
3031
3032                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3033                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3034                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3035                 match source {
3036                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, .. } => {
3037                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3038                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3039                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3040                                 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3041                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3042                                         if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat) {
3043                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3044                                                 return;
3045                                         }
3046                                         if sessions.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3047                                                 all_paths_failed = true;
3048                                         }
3049                                 } else {
3050                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3051                                         return;
3052                                 }
3053                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3054                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3055                                 match &onion_error {
3056                                         &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3057 #[cfg(test)]
3058                                                 let (network_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3059 #[cfg(not(test))]
3060                                                 let (network_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3061                                                 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3062                                                 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3063                                                 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3064                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3065                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3066                                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3067                                                                 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3068                                                                 network_update,
3069                                                                 all_paths_failed,
3070                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3071 #[cfg(test)]
3072                                                                 error_code: onion_error_code,
3073 #[cfg(test)]
3074                                                                 error_data: onion_error_data
3075                                                         }
3076                                                 );
3077                                         },
3078                                         &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3079 #[cfg(test)]
3080                                                         ref failure_code,
3081 #[cfg(test)]
3082                                                         ref data,
3083                                                         .. } => {
3084                                                 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3085                                                 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3086                                                 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3087                                                 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3088                                                 // ChannelDetails.
3089                                                 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3090                                                 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3091                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3092                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3093                                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3094                                                                 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3095                                                                 network_update: None,
3096                                                                 all_paths_failed,
3097                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3098 #[cfg(test)]
3099                                                                 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3100 #[cfg(test)]
3101                                                                 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3102                                                         }
3103                                                 );
3104                                         }
3105                                 }
3106                         },
3107                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3108                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3109                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3110                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3111                                                 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3112                                                 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3113                                         },
3114                                         HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3115                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3116                                                 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3117                                         }
3118                                 };
3119
3120                                 let mut forward_event = None;
3121                                 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3122                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3123                                 }
3124                                 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3125                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3126                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3127                                         },
3128                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3129                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3130                                         }
3131                                 }
3132                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3133                                 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3134                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3135                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3136                                                 time_forwardable: time
3137                                         });
3138                                 }
3139                         },
3140                 }
3141         }
3142
3143         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3144         /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3145         /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3146         ///
3147         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3148         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3149         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3150         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3151         ///
3152         /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3153         ///
3154         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3155         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3156         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3157                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3158
3159                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3160
3161                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3162                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3163                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3164                         assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3165
3166                         // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3167                         // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3168                         // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3169                         // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3170                         //
3171                         // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3172                         // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3173                         // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3174                         // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3175                         // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3176                         // it.
3177                         let mut valid_mpp = true;
3178                         for htlc in sources.iter() {
3179                                 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3180                                         valid_mpp = false;
3181                                         break;
3182                                 }
3183                         }
3184
3185                         let mut errs = Vec::new();
3186                         let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3187                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3188                                 if !valid_mpp {
3189                                         if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3190                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3191                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3192                                                         self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3193                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3194                                                                          HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3195                                                                          HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3196                                 } else {
3197                                         match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3198                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3199                                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3200                                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3201                                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3202                                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3203                                                                 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3204                                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3205                                                 },
3206                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3207                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3208                                                         // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3209                                                         // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3210                                                         // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3211                                                         // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3212                                                 },
3213                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3214                                         }
3215                                 }
3216                         }
3217
3218                         // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3219                         // which were generated.
3220                         channel_state.take();
3221
3222                         for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3223                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3224                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3225                         }
3226
3227                         claimed_any_htlcs
3228                 } else { false }
3229         }
3230
3231         fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3232                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3233                 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3234                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3235                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3236                         None => {
3237                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3238                         }
3239                 };
3240
3241                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3242                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3243                                 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3244                                         if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3245                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3246                                                         log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3247                                                                 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3248                                                                 payment_preimage, e);
3249                                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3250                                                                 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3251                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3252                                                                 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3253                                                         );
3254                                                 }
3255                                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3256                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3257                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3258                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3259                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3260                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3261                                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3262                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3263                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3264                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3265                                                                         update_fee: None,
3266                                                                         commitment_signed,
3267                                                                 }
3268                                                         });
3269                                                 }
3270                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3271                                         } else {
3272                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3273                                         }
3274                                 },
3275                                 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3276                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3277                                                 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3278                                                         "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3279                                                         payment_preimage, e);
3280                                         }
3281                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3282                                         let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3283                                         if drop {
3284                                                 chan.remove_entry();
3285                                         }
3286                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3287                                 },
3288                         }
3289                 } else { unreachable!(); }
3290         }
3291
3292         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3293                 match source {
3294                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3295                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3296                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3297                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3298                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3299                                 let found_payment = if let Some(mut sessions) = outbounds.remove(&payment_id) {
3300                                         sessions.remove(&session_priv_bytes, path.last().unwrap().fee_msat)
3301                                 } else { false };
3302                                 if found_payment {
3303                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3304                                                 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage }
3305                                         );
3306                                 } else {
3307                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3308                                 }
3309                         },
3310                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3311                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3312                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3313                                 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3314                                 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3315                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3316                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3317                                         _ => None,
3318                                 };
3319                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3320                                         let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3321                                                 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3322                                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3323                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3324                                                 }],
3325                                         };
3326                                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3327                                         // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3328                                         // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3329                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3330                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3331                                                                                          payment_preimage, e);
3332                                         }
3333                                         // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3334                                         // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3335                                         // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3336                                         // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3337                                         // can happen.
3338                                 }
3339                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3340                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3341                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3342                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3343                                 }
3344
3345                                 if claimed_htlc {
3346                                         if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3347                                                 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3348                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3349                                                 } else { None };
3350
3351                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3352                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3353                                                         fee_earned_msat,
3354                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3355                                                 });
3356                                         }
3357                                 }
3358                         },
3359                 }
3360         }
3361
3362         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3363         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3364                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3365         }
3366
3367         /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3368         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3369         /// operation.
3370         ///
3371         /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3372         /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3373         ///
3374         /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3375         /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3376         /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3377         /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3378         ///
3379         /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3380         ///  1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3381         ///  2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3382         ///     said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3383         ///     any time it cannot do so instantly,
3384         ///  3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3385         ///  4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3386         ///     completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3387         pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3388                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3389
3390                 let chan_restoration_res;
3391                 let mut pending_failures = {
3392                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3393                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3394                         let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3395                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3396                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3397                         };
3398                         if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3399                                 return;
3400                         }
3401
3402                         let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3403                         let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3404                                 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3405                                 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3406                                 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3407                                 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3408                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3409                                         node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3410                                         msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3411                                 })
3412                         } else { None };
3413                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3414                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3415                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3416                         }
3417                         pending_failures
3418                 };
3419                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3420                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3421                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3422                 }
3423         }
3424
3425         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3426                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3427                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3428                 }
3429
3430                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3431                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3432                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3433                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3434                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3435                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3436                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3437                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3438                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3439                                         msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3440                                 });
3441                                 entry.insert(channel);
3442                         }
3443                 }
3444                 Ok(())
3445         }
3446
3447         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3448                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3449                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3450                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3451                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3452                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3453                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3454                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3455                                         }
3456                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3457                                         (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3458                                 },
3459                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3460                         }
3461                 };
3462                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3463                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3464                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3465                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
3466                         output_script,
3467                         user_channel_id: user_id,
3468                 });
3469                 Ok(())
3470         }
3471
3472         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3473                 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3474                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3475                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3476                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3477                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3478                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3479                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3480                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3481                                         }
3482                                         (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3483                                 },
3484                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3485                         }
3486                 };
3487                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3488                 // lock before watch_channel
3489                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3490                         match e {
3491                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3492                                         // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3493                                         // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3494                                         // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3495                                         // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3496                                         // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3497                                         // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3498                                         // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3499                                         let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3500                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3501                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3502                                 },
3503                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3504                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3505                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3506                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3507                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
3508                                         chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3509                                 },
3510                         }
3511                 }
3512                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3513                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3514                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3515                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3516                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3517                         },
3518                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3519                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3520                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3521                                         msg: funding_msg,
3522                                 });
3523                                 e.insert(chan);
3524                         }
3525                 }
3526                 Ok(())
3527         }
3528
3529         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3530                 let funding_tx = {
3531                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3532                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3533                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3534                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3535                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3536                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3537                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3538                                         }
3539                                         let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3540                                                 Ok(update) => update,
3541                                                 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3542                                         };
3543                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3544                                                 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3545                                         }
3546                                         funding_tx
3547                                 },
3548                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3549                         }
3550                 };
3551                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3552                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3553                 Ok(())
3554         }
3555
3556         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3557                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3558                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3559                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3560                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3561                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3562                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3563                                 }
3564                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3565                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3566                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3567                                         // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3568                                         // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3569                                         // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3570                                         // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3571                                         // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3572                                         // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3573                                         // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3574                                         // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3575                                         // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3576                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3577                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3578                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
3579                                         });
3580                                 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3581                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3582                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3583                                                 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3584                                         });
3585                                 }
3586                                 Ok(())
3587                         },
3588                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3589                 }
3590         }
3591
3592         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3593                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3594                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3595                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3596                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3597
3598                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3599                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3600                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3601                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3602                                         }
3603
3604                                         if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3605                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3606                                                         log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3607                                                         if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3608                                         }
3609
3610                                         let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3611                                         dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3612
3613                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3614                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3615                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3616                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
3617                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3618                                                         if is_permanent {
3619                                                                 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3620                                                                 break result;
3621                                                         }
3622                                                 }
3623                                         }
3624
3625                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3626                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3627                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3628                                                         msg,
3629                                                 });
3630                                         }
3631
3632                                         break Ok(());
3633                                 },
3634                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3635                         }
3636                 };
3637                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3638                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3639                 }
3640
3641                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3642                 Ok(())
3643         }
3644
3645         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3646                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3647                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3648                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3649                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3650                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3651                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3652                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3653                                         }
3654                                         let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3655                                         if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3656                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3657                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3658                                                         msg,
3659                                                 });
3660                                         }
3661                                         if tx.is_some() {
3662                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3663                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3664                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3665                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3666                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3667                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3668                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3669                                                 }
3670                                                 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3671                                         } else { (tx, None) }
3672                                 },
3673                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3674                         }
3675                 };
3676                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3677                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3678                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3679                 }
3680                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3681                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3682                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3683                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3684                                         msg: update
3685                                 });
3686                         }
3687                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: msg.channel_id,  reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure });
3688                 }
3689                 Ok(())
3690         }
3691
3692         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3693                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3694                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3695                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3696                 //
3697                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3698                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3699                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3700                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3701
3702                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3703                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3704
3705                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3706                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3707                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3708                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3709                                 }
3710
3711                                 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3712                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3713                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3714                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3715                                         match pending_forward_info {
3716                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3717                                                         let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3718                                                                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3719                                                                         onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3720                                                                                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3721                                                                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3722                                                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3723                                                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3724                                                                                 res
3725                                                                         }[..])
3726                                                                 } else {
3727                                                                         // The only case where we'd be unable to
3728                                                                         // successfully get a channel update is if the
3729                                                                         // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3730                                                                         // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3731                                                                         // payments over the channel back to themselves
3732                                                                         // (because no one else should know the short_id
3733                                                                         // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3734                                                                         // no problem just calling this
3735                                                                         // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3736                                                                         onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3737                                                                 }
3738                                                         } else {
3739                                                                 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3740                                                         };
3741                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3742                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3743                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3744                                                                 reason
3745                                                         };
3746                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3747                                                 },
3748                                                 _ => pending_forward_info
3749                                         }
3750                                 };
3751                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3752                         },
3753                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3754                 }
3755                 Ok(())
3756         }
3757
3758         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3759                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3760                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3761                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3762                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3763                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3764                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3765                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3766                                         }
3767                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3768                                 },
3769                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3770                         }
3771                 };
3772                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3773                 Ok(())
3774         }
3775
3776         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3777                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3778                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3779                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3780                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3781                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3782                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3783                                 }
3784                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3785                         },
3786                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3787                 }
3788                 Ok(())
3789         }
3790
3791         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3792                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3793                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3794                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3795                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3796                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3797                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3798                                 }
3799                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3800                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3801                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3802                                 }
3803                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3804                                 Ok(())
3805                         },
3806                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3807                 }
3808         }
3809
3810         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3811                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3812                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3813                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3814                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3815                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3816                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3817                                 }
3818                                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3819                                         match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3820                                                 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3821                                                 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3822                                                         assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3823                                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3824                                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3825                                                         unreachable!();
3826                                                 },
3827                                                 Ok(res) => res
3828                                         };
3829                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3830                                         return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3831                                 }
3832                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3833                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3834                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
3835                                 });
3836                                 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3837                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3838                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3839                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3840                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3841                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3842                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3843                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3844                                                         update_fee: None,
3845                                                         commitment_signed: msg,
3846                                                 },
3847                                         });
3848                                 }
3849                                 Ok(())
3850                         },
3851                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3852                 }
3853         }
3854
3855         #[inline]
3856         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3857                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3858                         let mut forward_event = None;
3859                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3860                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3861                                 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3862                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3863                                 }
3864                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3865                                         match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3866                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3867                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3868                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3869                                         }) {
3870                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3871                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3872                                                                                                         prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3873                                                 },
3874                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3875                                                         entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3876                                                                                                      prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3877                                                 }
3878                                         }
3879                                 }
3880                         }
3881                         match forward_event {
3882                                 Some(time) => {
3883                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3884                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3885                                                 time_forwardable: time
3886                                         });
3887                                 }
3888                                 None => {},
3889                         }
3890                 }
3891         }
3892
3893         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3894                 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3895                 let res = loop {
3896                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3897                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3898                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3899                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3900                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3901                                                 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3902                                         }
3903                                         let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3904                                         let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3905                                                 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3906                                         htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3907                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3908                                                 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3909                                                         assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3910                                                         break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3911                                                 } else {
3912                                                         if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3913                                                                 break Err(e);
3914                                                         } else { unreachable!(); }
3915                                                 }
3916                                         }
3917                                         if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3918                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3919                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3920                                                         updates,
3921                                                 });
3922                                         }
3923                                         break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3924                                 },
3925                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3926                         }
3927                 };
3928                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3929                 match res {
3930                         Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3931                                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3932                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3933                                 }
3934                                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3935                                 Ok(())
3936                         },
3937                         Err(e) => Err(e)
3938                 }
3939         }
3940
3941         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3942                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3943                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3944                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3945                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3946                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3947                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3948                                 }
3949                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3950                         },
3951                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3952                 }
3953                 Ok(())
3954         }
3955
3956         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3957                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3958                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3959
3960                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3961                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3962                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3963                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3964                                 }
3965                                 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3966                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3967                                 }
3968
3969                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3970                                         msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3971                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3972                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3973                                         update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3974                                 });
3975                         },
3976                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3977                 }
3978                 Ok(())
3979         }
3980
3981         /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3982         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3983                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3984                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3985                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3986                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3987                         None => {
3988                                 // It's not a local channel
3989                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3990                         }
3991                 };
3992                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3993                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3994                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3995                                         if chan.get().should_announce() {
3996                                                 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3997                                                 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3998                                                 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3999                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4000                                         }
4001                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4002                                 }
4003                                 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4004                                 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4005                                 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4006                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4007                                 } else {
4008                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4009                                 }
4010                         },
4011                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4012                 }
4013                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4014         }
4015
4016         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4017                 let chan_restoration_res;
4018                 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4019                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4020                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4021
4022                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4023                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4024                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4025                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4026                                         }
4027                                         // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4028                                         // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4029                                         // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4030                                         // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4031                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4032                                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4033                                         let mut channel_update = None;
4034                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4035                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4036                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4037                                                         msg,
4038                                                 });
4039                                         } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4040                                                 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4041                                                 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4042                                                 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4043                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4044                                                         node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4045                                                         msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4046                                                 });
4047                                         }
4048                                         let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4049                                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4050                                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4051                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4052                                         }
4053                                         (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4054                                 },
4055                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4056                         }
4057                 };
4058                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4059                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4060
4061                 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4062                         self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4063                 }
4064                 Ok(())
4065         }
4066
4067         /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4068         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4069                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4070                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4071                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4072                 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4073                         match monitor_event {
4074                                 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4075                                         if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4076                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4077                                                 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4078                                         } else {
4079                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4080                                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4081                                         }
4082                                 },
4083                                 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) => {
4084                                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4085                                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4086                                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4087                                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4088                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4089                                         if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4090                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4091                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4092                                                 }
4093                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4094                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4095                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4096                                                                 msg: update
4097                                                         });
4098                                                 }
4099                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(),  reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed });
4100                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4101                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4102                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4103                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4104                                                         },
4105                                                 });
4106                                         }
4107                                 },
4108                         }
4109                 }
4110
4111                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4112                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4113                 }
4114
4115                 has_pending_monitor_events
4116         }
4117
4118         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4119         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4120         /// update was applied.
4121         ///
4122         /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4123         /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4124         /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4125         /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4126         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4127                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4128                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4129                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4130                 {
4131                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4132                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4133                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4134                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4135                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4136
4137                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4138                                 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4139                                         Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4140                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4141                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4142                                                 }
4143                                                 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4144                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4145                                                                 has_monitor_update = true;
4146                                                                 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4147                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4148                                                                 if close_channel { return false; }
4149                                                         } else {
4150                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4151                                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4152                                                                         updates: commitment_update,
4153                                                                 });
4154                                                         }
4155                                                 }
4156                                                 true
4157                                         },
4158                                         Err(e) => {
4159                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4160                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4161                                                 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4162                                                 !close_channel
4163                                         }
4164                                 }
4165                         });
4166                 }
4167
4168                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4169                 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4170                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4171                 }
4172
4173                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4174                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4175                 }
4176
4177                 has_update
4178         }
4179
4180         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4181         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4182         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4183         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4184                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4185                 let mut has_update = false;
4186                 {
4187                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4188                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4189                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4190                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4191                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4192
4193                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4194                                 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4195                                         Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4196                                                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4197                                                         has_update = true;
4198                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4199                                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4200                                                         });
4201                                                 }
4202                                                 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4203                                                         // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4204                                                         // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4205                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4206                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4207                                                         }
4208
4209                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4210                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4211                                                                         msg: update
4212                                                                 });
4213                                                         }
4214
4215                                                         if let Ok(mut pending_events_lock) = self.pending_events.lock() {
4216                                                                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
4217                                                                         channel_id: *channel_id,
4218                                                                         reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure
4219                                                                 });
4220                                                         }
4221
4222                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4223                                                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4224                                                         false
4225                                                 } else { true }
4226                                         },
4227                                         Err(e) => {
4228                                                 has_update = true;
4229                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4230                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4231                                                 !close_channel
4232                                         }
4233                                 }
4234                         });
4235                 }
4236
4237                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4238                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4239                 }
4240
4241                 has_update
4242         }
4243
4244         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4245         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4246         /// Channel object.
4247         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4248                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4249                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4250                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4251                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
4252                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4253                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4254                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4255                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4256                         if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4257                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4258                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4259                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
4260                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
4261                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4262                         }
4263                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4264                 }
4265         }
4266
4267         fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4268                 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4269
4270                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4271
4272                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4273                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4274                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4275                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4276                                 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4277                                         payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4278                                         // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4279                                         // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4280                                         // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4281                                         // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4282                                         // never fail a payment too early.
4283                                         // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4284                                         // timestamps.
4285                                         expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4286                                 });
4287                         },
4288                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4289                 }
4290                 Ok(payment_secret)
4291         }
4292
4293         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4294         /// to pay us.
4295         ///
4296         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4297         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4298         ///
4299         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4300         /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4301         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4302         ///
4303         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4304         ///
4305         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4306         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4307         /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4308         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4309         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4310                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4311                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4312
4313                 (payment_hash,
4314                         self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4315                                 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4316         }
4317
4318         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4319         /// stored external to LDK.
4320         ///
4321         /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4322         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4323         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4324         ///
4325         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4326         /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4327         ///
4328         /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4329         /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4330         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4331         /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4332         /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4333         ///
4334         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4335         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4336         /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4337         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4338         ///
4339         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4340         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4341         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4342         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4343         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4344         ///
4345         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4346         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4347         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4348         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4349         /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4350         ///
4351         /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4352         /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4353         /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4354         ///
4355         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4356         ///
4357         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4358         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4359         ///
4360         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4361         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4362         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4363         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4364                 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4365         }
4366
4367         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4368         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4369                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4370                 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4371                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4372                 events.into_inner()
4373         }
4374 }
4375
4376 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4377         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4378         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4379         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4380         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4381                                 L::Target: Logger,
4382 {
4383         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4384                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4385                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4386                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4387
4388                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4389                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4390                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4391                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4392                         }
4393
4394                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4395                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4396                         }
4397                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4398                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4399                         }
4400
4401                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4402                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4403                         mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4404
4405                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4406                                 events.replace(pending_events);
4407                         }
4408
4409                         result
4410                 });
4411                 events.into_inner()
4412         }
4413 }
4414
4415 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4416 where
4417         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4418         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4419         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4420         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4421         L::Target: Logger,
4422 {
4423         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4424         ///
4425         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4426         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4427         ///
4428         /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4429         /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4430         /// restarting from an old state.
4431         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4432                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4433                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4434
4435                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4436                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4437                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4438                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4439                         }
4440
4441                         let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4442                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4443                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4444                         }
4445
4446                         for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4447                                 handler.handle_event(&event);
4448                         }
4449
4450                         result
4451                 });
4452         }
4453 }
4454
4455 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4456 where
4457         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4458         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4459         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4460         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4461         L::Target: Logger,
4462 {
4463         fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4464                 {
4465                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4466                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4467                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4468                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4469                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4470                 }
4471
4472                 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4473                 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4474                 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4475         }
4476
4477         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4478                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4479                 let new_height = height - 1;
4480                 {
4481                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4482                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4483                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4484                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4485                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4486                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4487                 }
4488
4489                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4490         }
4491 }
4492
4493 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4494 where
4495         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4496         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4497         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4498         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4499         L::Target: Logger,
4500 {
4501         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4502                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4503                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4504                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4505
4506                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4507                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4508
4509                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4510                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4511         }
4512
4513         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4514                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4515                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4516                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4517
4518                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4519                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4520
4521                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4522
4523                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4524
4525                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4526
4527                 macro_rules! max_time {
4528                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
4529                                 loop {
4530                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4531                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4532                                         // having an explicit local time source.
4533                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4534                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4535                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4536                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4537                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4538                                                 break;
4539                                         }
4540                                 }
4541                         }
4542                 }
4543                 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4544                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4545                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4546                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4547                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4548                 });
4549         }
4550
4551         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4552                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4553                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4554                 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4555                         if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4556                                 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4557                         }
4558                 }
4559                 res
4560         }
4561
4562         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4563                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4564                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4565                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4566                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4567                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4568                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4569                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4570                 });
4571         }
4572 }
4573
4574 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4575 where
4576         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4577         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4578         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4579         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4580         L::Target: Logger,
4581 {
4582         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4583         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4584         /// the function.
4585         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4586                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4587                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4588                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4589                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4590
4591                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4592                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4593                 {
4594                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4595                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4596                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4597                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4598                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4599                                 let res = f(channel);
4600                                 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4601                                         for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4602                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4603                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash,  HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4604                                                         failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4605                                                         data: chan_update,
4606                                                 }));
4607                                         }
4608                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4609                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4610                                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4611                                                         msg: funding_locked,
4612                                                 });
4613                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4614                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4615                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4616                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4617                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
4618                                                         });
4619                                                 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4620                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4621                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4622                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4623                                                                 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4624                                                         });
4625                                                 } else {
4626                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4627                                                 }
4628                                                 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4629                                         }
4630                                 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4631                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4632                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4633                                         }
4634                                         // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4635                                         // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4636                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4637                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4638                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4639                                                         msg: update
4640                                                 });
4641                                         }
4642                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: channel.channel_id(),  reason: ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed });
4643                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4644                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4645                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4646                                         });
4647                                         return false;
4648                                 }
4649                                 true
4650                         });
4651
4652                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4653                                 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4654                                         htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4655                                                 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4656                                                 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4657                                                 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4658                                                 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4659                                                 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4660                                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4661                                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4662                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4663                                                                 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4664                                                                 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4665                                                         }));
4666                                                         false
4667                                                 } else { true }
4668                                         });
4669                                         !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4670                                 });
4671                         }
4672                 }
4673
4674                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4675
4676                 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4677                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4678                 }
4679         }
4680
4681         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4682         /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4683         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4684         /// up.
4685         /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4686         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4687         pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4688                 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4689         }
4690
4691         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4692         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4693         /// up.
4694         pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4695                 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4696         }
4697
4698         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4699         pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4700                 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4701                 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4702                 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4703                 *guard
4704         }
4705
4706         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4707         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4708         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4709                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4710         }
4711 }
4712
4713 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4714         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4715         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4716         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4717         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4718         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4719         L::Target: Logger,
4720 {
4721         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4722                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4723                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4724         }
4725
4726         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4727                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4728                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4729         }
4730
4731         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4732                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4733                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4734         }
4735
4736         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4737                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4738                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4739         }
4740
4741         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4742                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4743                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4744         }
4745
4746         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4747                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4748                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4749         }
4750
4751         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4752                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4753                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4754         }
4755
4756         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4757                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4758                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4759         }
4760
4761         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4762                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4763                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4764         }
4765
4766         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4767                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4768                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4769         }
4770
4771         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4772                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4773                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4774         }
4775
4776         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4777                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4778                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4779         }
4780
4781         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4782                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4783                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4784         }
4785
4786         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4787                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4788                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4789         }
4790
4791         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4792                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4793                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4794         }
4795
4796         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4797                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4798                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4799                                 persist
4800                         } else {
4801                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4802                         }
4803                 });
4804         }
4805
4806         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4807                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4808                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4809         }
4810
4811         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4812                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4813                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4814                 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4815                 {
4816                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4817                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4818                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4819                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4820                         if no_connection_possible {
4821                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4822                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4823                                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4824                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4825                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4826                                                 }
4827                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4828                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4829                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4830                                                                 msg: update
4831                                                         });
4832                                                 }
4833                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(),  reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer });
4834                                                 false
4835                                         } else {
4836                                                 true
4837                                         }
4838                                 });
4839                         } else {
4840                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4841                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4842                                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4843                                                 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4844                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4845                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4846                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4847                                                         }
4848                                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(),  reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer });
4849                                                         return false;
4850                                                 } else {
4851                                                         no_channels_remain = false;
4852                                                 }
4853                                         }
4854                                         true
4855                                 })
4856                         }
4857                         pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4858                                 match msg {
4859                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4860                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4861                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4862                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4863                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4864                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4865                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4866                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4867                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4868                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4869                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4870                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4871                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4872                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4873                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4874                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4875                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4876                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4877                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4878                                 }
4879                         });
4880                 }
4881                 if no_channels_remain {
4882                         self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4883                 }
4884
4885                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4886                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4887                 }
4888         }
4889
4890         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4891                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4892
4893                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4894
4895                 {
4896                         let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4897                         match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4898                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4899                                         e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4900                                                 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4901                                         }));
4902                                 },
4903                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4904                                         e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4905                                 },
4906                         }
4907                 }
4908
4909                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4910                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4911                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4912                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4913                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4914                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4915                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4916                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4917                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4918                                         // drop it.
4919                                         false
4920                                 } else {
4921                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4922                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4923                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4924                                         });
4925                                         true
4926                                 }
4927                         } else { true }
4928                 });
4929                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4930         }
4931
4932         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4933                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4934
4935                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4936                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
4937                                 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4938                                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4939                                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
4940                                 }
4941                         }
4942                 } else {
4943                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4944                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
4945                 }
4946         }
4947 }
4948
4949 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4950 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4951 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4952         /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4953         /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4954         persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4955 }
4956
4957 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4958         fn new() -> Self {
4959                 Self {
4960                         persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4961                 }
4962         }
4963
4964         fn wait(&self) {
4965                 loop {
4966                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4967                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4968                         if *guard {
4969                                 *guard = false;
4970                                 return;
4971                         }
4972                         guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4973                         let result = *guard;
4974                         if result {
4975                                 *guard = false;
4976                                 return
4977                         }
4978                 }
4979         }
4980
4981         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4982         fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4983                 let current_time = Instant::now();
4984                 loop {
4985                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4986                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4987                         if *guard {
4988                                 *guard = false;
4989                                 return true;
4990                         }
4991                         guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4992                         // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4993                         // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4994                         // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4995                         // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4996                         // 1.42.0.
4997                         let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4998                         let result = *guard;
4999                         if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5000                                 *guard = false;
5001                                 return result;
5002                         }
5003                         match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5004                                 None => return result,
5005                                 Some(_) => continue
5006                         }
5007                 }
5008         }
5009
5010         // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5011         fn notify(&self) {
5012                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5013                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5014                 *persistence_lock = true;
5015                 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5016                 cnd.notify_all();
5017         }
5018 }
5019
5020 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5021 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5022
5023 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5024         (0, Forward) => {
5025                 (0, onion_packet, required),
5026                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5027         },
5028         (1, Receive) => {
5029                 (0, payment_data, required),
5030                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5031         },
5032         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5033                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5034                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5035         },
5036 ;);
5037
5038 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5039         (0, routing, required),
5040         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5041         (4, payment_hash, required),
5042         (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5043         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5044 });
5045
5046
5047 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5048         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5049                 match self {
5050                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5051                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
5052                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5053                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5054                                 reason.write(writer)?;
5055                         },
5056                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5057                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5058                         }) => {
5059                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
5060                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5061                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5062                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5063                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5064                         },
5065                 }
5066                 Ok(())
5067         }
5068 }
5069
5070 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5071         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5072                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5073                 match id {
5074                         0 => {
5075                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5076                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5077                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5078                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5079                                 }))
5080                         },
5081                         1 => {
5082                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5083                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5084                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5085                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5086                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5087                                 }))
5088                         },
5089                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5090                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5091                         // messages contained in the variants.
5092                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5093                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5094                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5095                         2 => {
5096                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5097                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5098                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5099                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5100                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5101                         },
5102                         3 => {
5103                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5104                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5105                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5106                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5107                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5108                         },
5109                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5110                 }
5111         }
5112 }
5113
5114 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5115         (0, Forward),
5116         (1, Fail),
5117 );
5118
5119 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5120         (0, short_channel_id, required),
5121         (2, outpoint, required),
5122         (4, htlc_id, required),
5123         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5124 });
5125
5126 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5127         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5128                 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5129                         OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5130                         _ => None,
5131                 };
5132                 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5133                         OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5134                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5135                 };
5136                 write_tlv_fields!
5137                 (writer,
5138                  {
5139                    (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5140                    (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5141                          (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5142                  });
5143                 Ok(())
5144         }
5145 }
5146
5147 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5148         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5149                 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5150                 let mut value = 0;
5151                 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5152                 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5153                 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5154                 read_tlv_fields!
5155                 (reader,
5156                  {
5157                    (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5158                    (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5159                          (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5160                  });
5161                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5162                         Some(p) => {
5163                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
5164                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5165                                 }
5166                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5167                         },
5168                         None => {
5169                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
5170                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5171                                 }
5172                                 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5173                         },
5174                 };
5175                 Ok(Self {
5176                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5177                         value,
5178                         onion_payload,
5179                         cltv_expiry,
5180                 })
5181         }
5182 }
5183
5184 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5185         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5186                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5187                 match id {
5188                         0 => {
5189                                 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5190                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5191                                 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5192                                 let mut payment_id = None;
5193                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5194                                         (0, session_priv, required),
5195                                         (1, payment_id, option),
5196                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5197                                         (4, path, vec_type),
5198                                 });
5199                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
5200                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5201                                         // instead.
5202                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5203                                 }
5204                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5205                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5206                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5207                                         path: path.unwrap(),
5208                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5209                                 })
5210                         }
5211                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5212                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5213                 }
5214         }
5215 }
5216
5217 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5218         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5219                 match self {
5220                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
5221                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
5222                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5223                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5224                                         (0, session_priv, required),
5225                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5226                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5227                                         (4, path, vec_type),
5228                                  });
5229                         }
5230                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5231                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
5232                                 field.write(writer)?;
5233                         }
5234                 }
5235                 Ok(())
5236         }
5237 }
5238
5239 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5240         (0, LightningError) => {
5241                 (0, err, required),
5242         },
5243         (1, Reason) => {
5244                 (0, failure_code, required),
5245                 (2, data, vec_type),
5246         },
5247 ;);
5248
5249 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5250         (0, AddHTLC) => {
5251                 (0, forward_info, required),
5252                 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5253                 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5254                 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5255         },
5256         (1, FailHTLC) => {
5257                 (0, htlc_id, required),
5258                 (2, err_packet, required),
5259         },
5260 ;);
5261
5262 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5263         (0, payment_secret, required),
5264         (2, expiry_time, required),
5265         (4, user_payment_id, required),
5266         (6, payment_preimage, required),
5267         (8, min_value_msat, required),
5268 });
5269
5270 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5271         (0, Legacy) => {
5272                 (0, session_privs, required),
5273         },
5274         (2, Retryable) => {
5275                 (0, session_privs, required),
5276                 (2, payment_hash, required),
5277                 (4, payment_secret, option),
5278                 (6, total_msat, required),
5279                 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5280         },
5281 ;);
5282
5283 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5284         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5285         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5286         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5287         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5288         L::Target: Logger,
5289 {
5290         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5291                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5292
5293                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5294
5295                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5296                 {
5297                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5298                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5299                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5300                 }
5301
5302                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5303                 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5304                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5305                         if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5306                                 unfunded_channels += 1;
5307                         }
5308                 }
5309                 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5310                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5311                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5312                                 channel.write(writer)?;
5313                         }
5314                 }
5315
5316                 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5317                 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5318                         short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5319                         (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5320                         for forward in pending_forwards {
5321                                 forward.write(writer)?;
5322                         }
5323                 }
5324
5325                 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5326                 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5327                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5328                         (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5329                         for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5330                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
5331                         }
5332                 }
5333
5334                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5335                 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5336                 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5337                         peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5338                         let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5339                         peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5340                 }
5341
5342                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5343                 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5344                 for event in events.iter() {
5345                         event.write(writer)?;
5346                 }
5347
5348                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5349                 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5350                 for event in background_events.iter() {
5351                         match event {
5352                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5353                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
5354                                         funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5355                                         monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5356                                 },
5357                         }
5358                 }
5359
5360                 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5361                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5362
5363                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5364                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5365                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5366                         hash.write(writer)?;
5367                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5368                 }
5369
5370                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5371                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5372                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5373                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5374                         num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5375                 }
5376                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5377                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5378                         match outbound {
5379                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5380                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5381                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5382                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5383                                         }
5384                                 }
5385                         }
5386                 }
5387
5388                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5389                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5390                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5391                         match outbound {
5392                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5393                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5394                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5395                                 }
5396                         }
5397                 }
5398                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5399                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5400                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5401                 });
5402
5403                 Ok(())
5404         }
5405 }
5406
5407 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5408 ///
5409 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5410 /// is:
5411 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
5412 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
5413 ///    <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
5414 ///    This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
5415 ///    ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5416 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
5417 ///    way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
5418 ///    ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
5419 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
5420 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
5421 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
5422 ///
5423 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
5424 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
5425 ///
5426 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5427 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5428 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5429 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5430 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5431 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5432 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5433         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5434         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5435         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5436         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5437         L::Target: Logger,
5438 {
5439         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5440         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5441         /// signing data.
5442         pub keys_manager: K,
5443
5444         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5445         ///
5446         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5447         pub fee_estimator: F,
5448         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5449         ///
5450         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5451         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5452         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5453         pub chain_monitor: M,
5454
5455         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5456         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5457         /// force-closed during deserialization.
5458         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5459         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5460         /// deserialization.
5461         pub logger: L,
5462         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5463         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5464         pub default_config: UserConfig,
5465
5466         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5467         /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5468         ///
5469         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5470         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5471         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5472         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5473         ///
5474         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5475         /// this struct.
5476         ///
5477         /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5478         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5479 }
5480
5481 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5482                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5483         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5484                 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5485                 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5486                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5487                 L::Target: Logger,
5488         {
5489         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5490         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5491         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5492         pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5493                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5494                 Self {
5495                         keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5496                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5497                 }
5498         }
5499 }
5500
5501 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5502 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5503 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5504         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5505         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5506         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5507         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5508         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5509         L::Target: Logger,
5510 {
5511         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5512                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5513                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5514         }
5515 }
5516
5517 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5518         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5519         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5520         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5521         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5522         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5523         L::Target: Logger,
5524 {
5525         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5526                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5527
5528                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5529                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5530                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5531
5532                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5533
5534                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5535                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5536                 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5537                 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5538                 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5539                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5540                         let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5541                         let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5542                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5543                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5544                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5545                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5546                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5547                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5548                                         // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5549                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5550                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5551                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5552                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5553                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5554                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5555                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5556                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5557                                 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5558                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5559                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5560                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5561                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5562                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5563                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5564                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5565                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5566                                         let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5567                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5568                                         monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5569                                         channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5570                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5571                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5572                                         });
5573                                 } else {
5574                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5575                                                 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5576                                         }
5577                                         by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5578                                 }
5579                         } else {
5580                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5581                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5582                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5583                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5584                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5585                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5586                         }
5587                 }
5588
5589                 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5590                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5591                                 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5592                         }
5593                 }
5594
5595                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5596                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5597                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5598                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5599                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5600                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5601                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5602                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5603                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5604                         }
5605                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5606                 }
5607
5608                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5609                 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5610                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5611                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5612                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5613                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5614                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5615                                 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5616                         }
5617                         claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5618                 }
5619
5620                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5621                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5622                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5623                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5624                         let peer_state = PeerState {
5625                                 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5626                         };
5627                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5628                 }
5629
5630                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5631                 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5632                 for _ in 0..event_count {
5633                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5634                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5635                                 None => continue,
5636                         }
5637                 }
5638
5639                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5640                 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5641                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5642                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5643                                 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5644                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5645                         }
5646                 }
5647
5648                 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5649                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5650
5651                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5652                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5653                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5654                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5655                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5656                         }
5657                 }
5658
5659                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5660                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
5661                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5662                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5663                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5664                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
5665                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
5666                         };
5667                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
5668                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5669                         };
5670                 }
5671
5672                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
5673                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
5674                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5675                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5676                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
5677                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5678                 });
5679                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
5680                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5681                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5682                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
5683                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
5684                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
5685                         }
5686                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
5687                 }
5688
5689                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5690                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5691
5692                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
5693                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
5694                 }
5695
5696                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5697                         genesis_hash,
5698                         fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5699                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5700                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5701
5702                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5703
5704                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5705                                 by_id,
5706                                 short_to_id,
5707                                 forward_htlcs,
5708                                 claimable_htlcs,
5709                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5710                         }),
5711                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5712                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5713
5714                         our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5715                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5716                         secp_ctx,
5717
5718                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5719                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5720
5721                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5722
5723                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5724                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5725                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5726                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5727
5728                         keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5729                         logger: args.logger,
5730                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
5731                 };
5732
5733                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5734                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5735                 }
5736
5737                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5738                 //connection or two.
5739
5740                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5741         }
5742 }
5743
5744 #[cfg(test)]
5745 mod tests {
5746         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5747         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5748         use core::time::Duration;
5749         use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5750         use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
5751         use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5752         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5753         use ln::msgs;
5754         use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5755         use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5756         use util::errors::APIError;
5757         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5758         use util::test_utils;
5759
5760         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5761         #[test]
5762         fn test_wait_timeout() {
5763                 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5764                 use sync::Arc;
5765                 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5766                 use std::thread;
5767
5768                 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5769                 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5770
5771                 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5772                 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5773                 thread::spawn(move || {
5774                         loop {
5775                                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5776                                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5777                                 *persistence_lock = true;
5778                                 cnd.notify_all();
5779
5780                                 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5781                                         break
5782                                 }
5783                         }
5784                 });
5785
5786                 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5787                 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5788
5789                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5790                 // available.
5791                 loop {
5792                         if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5793                                 break
5794                         }
5795                 }
5796
5797                 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5798
5799                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5800                 // are available.
5801                 loop {
5802                         if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5803                                 break
5804                         }
5805                 }
5806         }
5807
5808         #[test]
5809         fn test_notify_limits() {
5810                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5811                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5812                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5813                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5814                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5815                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5816
5817                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5818                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5819                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5820                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5821                 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5822
5823                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5824
5825                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5826                 // to connect messages with new values
5827                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5828                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5829                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5830                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5831
5832                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5833                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5834                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5835                 // ... but the last node should not.
5836                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5837                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5838                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5839                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5840
5841                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5842                 // about the channel.
5843                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5844                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5845                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5846
5847                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5848                 // parties.
5849                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5850                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5851                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5852                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5853                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5854                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5855
5856                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5857                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5858                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5859
5860                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5861                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5862                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5863                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5864                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5865                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5866
5867                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5868                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5869                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5870                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5871                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5872                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5873                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5874                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5875
5876                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5877                 // the channel info has updated.
5878                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5879                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5880                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5881                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5882                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5883                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5884         }
5885
5886         #[test]
5887         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5888                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5889                 // expected.
5890                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5891                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5892                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5893                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5894                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5895                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5896
5897                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5898                 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5899                 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5900                 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5901                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
5902                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5903                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5904                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5905                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
5906                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5907                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5908                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5909                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5910
5911                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5912                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5913                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5914                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5915                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5916                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5917                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5918                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5919                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5920                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5921                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5922                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
5923                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5924                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5925                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5926                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5927                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5928                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5929                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5930                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5931                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5932                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
5933
5934                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5935                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
5936                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5937                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5938                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5939                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5940
5941                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5942                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5943                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5944                 // lightning messages manually.
5945                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5946                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5947                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5948                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5949                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5950                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5951                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5952                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5953                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5954                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5955                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5956                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5957                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5958                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5959                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5960                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5961                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5962                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5963                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5964                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5965                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5966                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5967                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5968                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5969                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5970                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5971                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5972
5973                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
5974                 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
5975                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5976                 match events[0] {
5977                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5978                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5979                         },
5980                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5981                 }
5982         }
5983
5984         #[test]
5985         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5986                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5987                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5988                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5989                 //      fails as expected.
5990                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5991                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5992                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5993                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5994                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5995                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5996
5997                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5998                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5999                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6000
6001                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6002                 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6003                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6004                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6005                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6006                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6007                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6008                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6009                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6010                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6011                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6012                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6013                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6014                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6015                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6016                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6017                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6018                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6019                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6020                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6021                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6022                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6023                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6024
6025                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6026                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6027
6028                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6029                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6030                 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6031                 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6032                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6033                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6034                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6035                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6036                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6037                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6038
6039                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6040                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6041                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6042                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6043                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6044                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6045                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6046                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6047                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6048                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6049                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6050                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6051                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6052                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6053                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6054                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6055                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6056                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6057                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6058                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6059                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6060                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6061                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6062
6063                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6064                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6065         }
6066
6067         #[test]
6068         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6069                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6070                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6071                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6072                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6073                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6074                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6075
6076                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6077                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6078                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6079                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6080
6081                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6082                 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6083                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6084                 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6085                                   Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6086                                   nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
6087
6088                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6089                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6090                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6091                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6092
6093                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6094                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6095                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6096                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6097                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6098                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6099                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6100
6101                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6102         }
6103
6104         #[test]
6105         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6106                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6107                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6108                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6109                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6110                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6111
6112                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6113                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6114                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6115                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6116
6117                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6118                 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
6119                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6120                 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
6121                                   Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
6122                                   nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
6123
6124                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6125                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6126                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6127                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6128                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6129
6130                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6131                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6132                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6133                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6134                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6135                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6136                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6137
6138                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6139         }
6140
6141         #[test]
6142         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6143                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6144                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6145                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6146                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6147
6148                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6149                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6150                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6151                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6152                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6153
6154                 // Marshall an MPP route.
6155                 let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
6156                 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
6157                 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
6158                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6159                 route.paths.push(path);
6160                 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6161                 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6162                 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6163                 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6164                 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6165                 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6166
6167                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6168                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6169                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))                        },
6170                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6171                 }
6172         }
6173 }
6174
6175 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6176 pub mod bench {
6177         use chain::Listen;
6178         use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
6179         use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
6180         use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6181         use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6182         use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6183         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6184         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6185         use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6186         use routing::router::get_route;
6187         use util::test_utils;
6188         use util::config::UserConfig;
6189         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6190
6191         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6192         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6193         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6194
6195         use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6196
6197         use test::Bencher;
6198
6199         struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6200                 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6201                         &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6202                                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6203                                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6204                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6205                         &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6206         }
6207
6208         #[cfg(test)]
6209         #[bench]
6210         fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6211                 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6212         }
6213
6214         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6215                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6216                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6217                 // calls per node.
6218                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6219                 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6220
6221                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6222                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6223
6224                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6225                 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6226
6227                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6228                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6229                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6230                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6231                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6232                         network,
6233                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6234                 });
6235                 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6236
6237                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6238                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6239                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6240                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6241                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6242                         network,
6243                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6244                 });
6245                 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6246
6247                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6248                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6249                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6250                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6251                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6252
6253                 let tx;
6254                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6255                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6256                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6257                         }]};
6258                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6259                 } else { panic!(); }
6260
6261                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6262                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6263
6264                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6265
6266                 let block = Block {
6267                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6268                         txdata: vec![tx],
6269                 };
6270                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6271                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6272
6273                 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6274                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6275                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6276                 match msg_events[0] {
6277                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6278                                 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6279                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6280                         },
6281                         _ => panic!(),
6282                 }
6283                 match msg_events[1] {
6284                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6285                         _ => panic!(),
6286                 }
6287
6288                 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6289
6290                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6291                 macro_rules! send_payment {
6292                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6293                                 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6294                                 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
6295                                         Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
6296
6297                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6298                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6299                                 payment_count += 1;
6300                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6301                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6302
6303                                 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6304                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6305                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6306                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6307                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6308                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6309                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6310                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6311
6312                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6313                                 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6314                                 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6315
6316                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6317                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6318                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6319                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6320                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6321                                         },
6322                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6323                                 }
6324
6325                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6326                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6327                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6328                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6329
6330                                 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6331                         }
6332                 }
6333
6334                 bench.iter(|| {
6335                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6336                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
6337                 });
6338         }
6339 }