1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
33 use ln::router::{Route, RouteHop};
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
74 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
75 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
78 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
82 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
83 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
84 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
85 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
86 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
87 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
88 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
93 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
94 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
97 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
98 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
99 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
100 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
101 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
104 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
106 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
108 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
112 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
116 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
117 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
118 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
119 short_channel_id: u64,
121 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
124 struct ClaimableHTLC {
125 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
127 /// Filled in when the HTLC was received with a payment_secret packet, which contains a
128 /// total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
129 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
130 /// are part of the same payment.
131 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
134 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
135 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
136 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
137 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
140 session_priv: SecretKey,
141 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
142 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
143 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
148 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
149 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
151 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
152 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
157 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
158 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
160 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
168 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
169 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
170 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
171 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
172 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
173 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
174 /// payment_secret type, use to authenticate sender to the receiver and tie MPP HTLCs together
175 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
176 pub struct PaymentSecret(pub [u8;32]);
178 type ShutdownResult = (Option<OutPoint>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
180 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
181 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
182 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
183 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
184 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
186 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
187 err: msgs::LightningError,
188 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
190 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
192 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
194 err: LightningError {
196 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
197 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
199 data: err.to_string()
203 shutdown_finish: None,
207 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
209 err: LightningError {
211 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
213 shutdown_finish: None,
217 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
218 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
221 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
223 err: LightningError {
225 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
226 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
228 data: err.to_string()
232 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
236 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
239 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
241 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
243 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
245 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
246 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
248 data: msg.to_string()
252 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
257 data: msg.to_string()
262 shutdown_finish: None,
267 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
268 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
269 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
270 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
271 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
273 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
274 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
275 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
276 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
277 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
278 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
279 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
281 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
285 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
286 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
287 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
288 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
289 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
290 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
291 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
292 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
293 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
294 /// (payment_hash, payment_secret) -> Vec<HTLCs> for tracking HTLCs that
295 /// were to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
296 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
297 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
299 /// TODO: We need to time out HTLCs sitting here which are waiting on other AMP HTLCs to
301 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<(PaymentHash, Option<PaymentSecret>), Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
302 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
303 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
304 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
307 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
308 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
310 latest_features: InitFeatures,
313 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
314 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
316 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
317 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
318 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
319 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
320 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
321 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
322 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
323 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>>>;
325 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
326 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
327 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
328 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
329 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
330 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
331 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
332 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
333 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, M, T, F> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F>;
335 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
336 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
338 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
339 /// to individual Channels.
341 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
342 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
343 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
344 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
346 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
347 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
348 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
349 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
350 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
351 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
352 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
354 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
355 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
356 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
357 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
360 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
361 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
362 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
363 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
364 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
366 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
367 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
368 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
369 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
370 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
371 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
372 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
373 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
374 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
375 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
377 default_configuration: UserConfig,
378 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
384 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
386 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
387 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
388 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
391 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
393 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
394 our_network_key: SecretKey,
396 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
397 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
398 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
400 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
401 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
402 /// are currently open with that peer.
403 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
404 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
406 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
408 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
409 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
410 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
411 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
412 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
419 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
420 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
421 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
422 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
423 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
425 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
426 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
427 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
428 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
429 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
430 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
431 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
433 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
434 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
435 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
436 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
437 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
438 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
441 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
443 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
444 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
447 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
449 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
450 pub struct ChannelDetails {
451 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
452 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
453 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
454 /// lifetime of the channel.
455 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
456 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
457 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
458 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
459 /// The node_id of our counterparty
460 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
461 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
462 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
463 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
464 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
465 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
466 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
467 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
469 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
470 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
471 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
472 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
473 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
474 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
475 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
476 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
477 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
478 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
479 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
480 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
481 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
485 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
486 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
489 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
490 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
491 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
492 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
493 ParameterError(APIError),
494 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
495 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
496 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
499 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
501 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
502 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
503 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
504 /// paths than the ones selected).
505 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
506 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
507 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
508 /// in over-/re-payment.
510 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
511 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
512 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
514 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
515 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
516 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
517 /// with the latest update_id.
518 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
521 macro_rules! handle_error {
522 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr) => {
525 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
526 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
528 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
529 // entering the macro.
530 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
533 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
535 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
536 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
537 if let Some(update) = update_option {
538 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
544 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
545 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
547 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
548 node_id: $their_node_id,
549 action: err.action.clone()
553 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
554 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
557 // Return error in case higher-API need one
564 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
565 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
568 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
569 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
571 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
572 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
573 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
574 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
575 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
577 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok())) },
578 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
583 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
584 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
587 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
588 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
590 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
591 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
592 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
593 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
594 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
596 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
598 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
599 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
600 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
601 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
602 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
604 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
606 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
607 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
608 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
609 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
610 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
611 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
614 let shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown(false);
615 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
621 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
622 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
623 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
625 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
627 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
628 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
629 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
630 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
631 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
633 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
634 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
635 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
636 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
637 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
638 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
639 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
640 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
641 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
642 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
645 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
646 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
647 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
648 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
650 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
651 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
653 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
654 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
656 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
657 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
658 if !$resend_commitment {
659 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
662 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
664 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
665 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
671 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
672 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
673 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
675 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
676 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
680 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
681 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
682 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
683 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
684 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
687 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
692 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
693 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
694 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
695 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
696 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
698 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
700 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
701 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
703 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
705 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
707 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
708 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
710 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
711 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
712 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
713 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
714 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
716 pub fn new(network: Network, fee_est: F, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>, secp256k1::Error> {
717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
719 let res = ChannelManager {
720 default_configuration: config.clone(),
721 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
722 fee_estimator: fee_est,
726 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
727 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
730 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
731 by_id: HashMap::new(),
732 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
733 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
734 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
735 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
737 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
739 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
741 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
743 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
744 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
754 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
756 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
757 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
758 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
759 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
761 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
762 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
764 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
765 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
766 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
767 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
768 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
771 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
772 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), config)?;
773 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
775 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
776 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
777 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
778 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
779 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
780 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
782 panic!("RNG is bad???");
785 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
787 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
788 node_id: their_network_key,
794 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
795 let mut res = Vec::new();
797 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
798 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
799 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
800 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
801 res.push(ChannelDetails {
802 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
803 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
804 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
805 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
806 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
807 inbound_capacity_msat,
808 outbound_capacity_msat,
809 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
810 is_live: channel.is_live(),
814 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
815 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
816 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
817 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
823 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
824 /// more information.
825 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
826 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
829 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
830 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
832 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
833 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
834 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
835 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
836 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
837 // really wanted anyway.
838 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
841 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
842 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
843 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
845 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
846 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
847 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
849 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
851 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
852 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
853 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
854 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
855 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
856 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
859 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
860 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
861 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
863 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
864 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
866 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
869 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
870 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
872 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
873 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
878 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
879 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
880 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
889 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
890 let (funding_txo_option, monitor_update, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
891 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
892 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
893 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
895 if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_option {
896 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
897 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
898 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
899 // ignore the result here.
900 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(funding_txo, monitor_update);
904 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
905 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
906 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
907 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
910 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
911 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
912 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
913 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
914 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
921 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
922 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
923 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
924 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
925 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
931 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
932 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
933 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
934 for chan in self.list_channels() {
935 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
939 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
940 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
941 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
943 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
944 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
945 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
946 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
947 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
948 failure_code: $err_code,
949 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
954 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
955 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
958 let shared_secret = {
959 let mut arr = [0; 32];
960 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
963 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
965 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
966 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
967 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
968 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
969 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
970 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
971 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
972 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
975 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
976 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
977 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
978 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
979 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
982 let mut channel_state = None;
983 macro_rules! return_err {
984 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
986 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
987 if channel_state.is_none() {
988 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
990 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
991 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
992 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
993 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
994 })), channel_state.unwrap());
999 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1000 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1001 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
1002 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1004 let error_code = match err {
1005 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1006 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1007 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1008 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1009 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1011 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1014 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1015 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1016 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1023 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1026 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1027 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1028 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1029 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1030 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1031 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1032 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1033 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1034 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1035 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1036 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1037 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1041 // final_expiry_too_soon
1042 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1043 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1045 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1046 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1047 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1049 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1050 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1051 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1054 let payment_data = match next_hop_data.format {
1055 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => None,
1056 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1057 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data } => payment_data,
1060 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1061 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1062 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1063 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1065 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1066 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data },
1067 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1068 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1069 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1070 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1073 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1074 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1075 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1077 // Check two things:
1078 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1079 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1080 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1082 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1084 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1085 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1086 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1088 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1090 let blinding_factor = {
1091 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1092 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1093 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1094 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1097 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1099 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1101 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1104 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1105 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1108 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1109 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1110 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1111 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1112 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1116 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1117 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1118 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1119 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1121 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1122 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1123 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1124 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1128 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1129 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1130 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1131 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1132 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1133 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1134 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1135 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1136 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1137 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1139 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1141 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1142 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1144 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1145 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1146 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1147 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1148 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1149 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1150 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1152 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1153 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1155 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1156 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1157 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1159 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1160 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1162 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1163 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1164 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1165 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1167 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1168 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1173 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1174 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1175 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1176 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1178 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1179 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1181 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1182 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1184 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1186 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1191 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1194 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1195 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1196 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1197 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1198 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1202 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1204 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1205 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1206 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1207 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1208 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1209 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1210 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1211 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&self.fee_estimator),
1212 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1213 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1216 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1217 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1219 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1225 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1227 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1228 /// fields for more info.
1230 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1231 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1232 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1233 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1234 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1235 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1237 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1239 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1240 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1241 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1243 /// In general, a path may raise:
1244 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1245 /// node public key) is specified.
1246 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1247 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1249 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1250 /// relevant updates.
1252 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1253 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1254 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1256 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1257 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1258 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1259 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1261 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1262 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1263 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1264 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1265 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1266 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1268 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1269 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1270 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1271 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1272 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1274 let mut total_value = 0;
1275 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1276 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
1277 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1278 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
1279 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
1280 continue 'path_check;
1282 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
1283 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1284 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
1285 continue 'path_check;
1288 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
1289 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
1291 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
1292 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
1295 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1296 let mut results = Vec::new();
1297 'path_loop: for path in route.paths.iter() {
1298 macro_rules! check_res_push {
1299 ($res: expr) => { match $res {
1302 results.push(Err(e));
1303 continue 'path_loop;
1309 log_trace!(self, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1310 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1312 let onion_keys = check_res_push!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1313 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"}));
1314 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = check_res_push!(onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height));
1315 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1316 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"}));
1318 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1320 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1322 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1323 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1324 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1325 None => check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"})),
1326 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1329 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1330 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1332 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1333 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"}));
1335 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1336 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"}));
1338 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1340 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1341 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1342 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1344 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1345 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1346 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1347 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1348 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1349 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1350 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1351 // next check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1352 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed));
1355 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1356 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1357 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1358 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1359 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1360 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1361 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1369 } else { unreachable!(); }
1370 results.push(Ok(()));
1371 continue 'path_loop;
1374 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1375 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1377 check_res_push!(Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }));
1381 let mut has_ok = false;
1382 let mut has_err = false;
1383 for res in results.iter() {
1384 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
1385 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
1386 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
1387 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
1394 if has_err && has_ok {
1395 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
1397 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
1403 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1405 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1406 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1408 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1410 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1411 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1412 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1413 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1415 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1416 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1418 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1419 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1420 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
1421 } else { unreachable!(); })
1426 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1427 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1428 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1430 Err(_) => { return; }
1433 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1434 // lock before add_monitor
1435 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1437 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1438 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None)), chan.get_their_node_id()) {
1439 Err(_) => { return; },
1440 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1443 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1444 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1445 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1446 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1448 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1453 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1454 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1455 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1458 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1459 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1460 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1462 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1468 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1469 if !chan.should_announce() {
1470 log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1474 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1476 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1478 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1479 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1481 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1482 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1483 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1484 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1485 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1490 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
1491 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
1492 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
1494 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::std::u16::MAX as u32 / (msgs::NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
1497 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
1498 // smaller than 500:
1499 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
1501 /// Generates a signed node_announcement from the given arguments and creates a
1502 /// BroadcastNodeAnnouncement event. Note that such messages will be ignored unless peers have
1503 /// seen a channel_announcement from us (ie unless we have public channels open).
1505 /// RGB is a node "color" and alias is a printable human-readable string to describe this node
1506 /// to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
1508 /// addresses represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node accepts
1509 /// incoming connections. These will be broadcast to the network, publicly tying these
1510 /// addresses together. If you wish to preserve user privacy, addresses should likely contain
1511 /// only Tor Onion addresses.
1513 /// Panics if addresses is absurdly large (more than 500).
1514 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], addresses: Vec<msgs::NetAddress>) {
1515 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1517 if addresses.len() > 500 {
1518 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
1521 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
1522 features: NodeFeatures::supported(),
1523 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
1524 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
1525 rgb, alias, addresses,
1526 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
1527 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1529 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1531 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1532 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
1533 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
1534 signature: self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key),
1535 contents: announcement
1540 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1542 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1543 /// Will likely generate further events.
1544 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1545 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1547 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1548 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1549 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1551 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1552 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1554 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1555 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1556 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1557 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1559 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1560 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1561 match forward_info {
1562 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1563 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1564 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1565 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1566 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1568 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
1569 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
1572 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1573 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1574 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1575 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1576 // problem, not ours.
1583 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1584 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1585 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1586 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1587 match forward_info {
1588 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1589 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1591 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value }, } => {
1592 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1593 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1594 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1595 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1596 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1598 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
1600 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1601 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1603 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1605 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1606 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
1607 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
1613 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1615 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1616 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1617 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1618 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1619 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1620 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1621 // this channel currently :/.
1627 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1628 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
1630 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1631 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1632 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1634 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1635 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1637 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1639 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1640 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1641 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1644 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1646 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1647 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1648 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1649 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1650 // messages when we can.
1651 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1652 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1653 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1660 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1661 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1664 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1665 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1666 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1667 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1668 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1669 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1671 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1672 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1673 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1674 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1675 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1677 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1679 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1681 handle_errors.push((their_node_id, err));
1685 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1686 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1689 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1690 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1691 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1692 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1693 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1694 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1695 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1697 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1705 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1706 match forward_info {
1707 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
1708 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data },
1709 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. }, } => {
1710 let prev_hop = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1711 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1712 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1713 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
1716 let mut total_value = 0;
1717 let payment_secret_opt =
1718 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data { Some(data.payment_secret.clone()) } else { None };
1719 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry((payment_hash, payment_secret_opt))
1720 .or_insert(Vec::new());
1721 htlcs.push(ClaimableHTLC {
1723 value: amt_to_forward,
1724 payment_data: payment_data.clone(),
1726 if let &Some(ref data) = &payment_data {
1727 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1728 total_value += htlc.value;
1729 if htlc.payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat != data.total_msat {
1730 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
1732 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
1734 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > data.total_msat {
1735 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
1736 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1737 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
1738 htlc_id: htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
1739 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
1741 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() }
1744 } else if total_value == data.total_msat {
1745 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1746 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1747 payment_secret: Some(data.payment_secret),
1752 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1753 payment_hash: payment_hash,
1754 payment_secret: None,
1755 amt: amt_to_forward,
1759 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
1760 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
1762 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1763 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1771 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1772 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
1775 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1776 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id);
1779 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1780 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1781 events.append(&mut new_events);
1784 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1785 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1786 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1788 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1789 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1790 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1791 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1792 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1793 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1794 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1795 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1796 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1801 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1803 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1804 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1809 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1810 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1811 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1812 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1813 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1814 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> bool {
1815 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1817 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1818 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(*payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1819 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1820 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1821 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1822 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1823 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
1824 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec() });
1830 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1831 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1832 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1833 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1834 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1835 /// still-available channels.
1836 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1837 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1838 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1839 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1842 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, .. } => {
1843 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1844 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1845 match &onion_error {
1846 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1848 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1850 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1851 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1852 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1853 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1854 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1855 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1856 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1861 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1862 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1863 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1864 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1866 error_code: onion_error_code
1870 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1874 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1875 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1876 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1877 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1879 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1880 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1881 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1882 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1883 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1884 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
1886 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1892 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1893 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1894 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1895 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1896 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1897 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1899 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1900 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1901 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1905 let mut forward_event = None;
1906 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1907 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1909 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1911 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1913 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1914 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1917 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1918 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1919 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1920 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1921 time_forwardable: time
1928 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1929 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1930 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1932 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1933 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1934 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1935 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1936 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1937 /// motivated attackers.
1939 /// Note that the privacy concerns in (b) are not relevant in payments with a payment_secret
1940 /// set. Thus, for such payments we will claim any payments which do not under-pay.
1942 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1943 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1944 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1946 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1948 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1949 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&(payment_hash, *payment_secret));
1950 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1951 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
1953 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
1954 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
1955 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
1956 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
1958 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
1959 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
1960 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
1961 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
1962 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
1965 let (is_mpp, mut valid_mpp) = if let &Some(ref data) = &sources[0].payment_data {
1966 assert!(payment_secret.is_some());
1967 (true, data.total_msat >= expected_amount)
1969 assert!(payment_secret.is_none());
1973 for htlc in sources.iter() {
1974 if !is_mpp || !valid_mpp { break; }
1975 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
1980 let mut errs = Vec::new();
1981 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
1982 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
1983 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1984 if (is_mpp && !valid_mpp) || (!is_mpp && (htlc.value < expected_amount || htlc.value > expected_amount * 2)) {
1985 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
1986 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1987 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1988 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1989 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
1990 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1992 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
1994 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = e.1.err.action {
1995 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
1996 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
1997 log_error!(self, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", e.1.err.err);
1998 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
1999 } else { errs.push(e); }
2001 Err(None) if is_mpp => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
2003 log_warn!(self, "Channel we expected to claim an HTLC from was closed.");
2005 Ok(()) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
2010 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
2011 // which were generated.
2012 channel_state.take();
2014 for (their_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
2015 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2016 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2023 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(), Option<(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)>> {
2024 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
2025 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
2026 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
2027 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2033 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
2034 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2035 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
2036 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
2037 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
2038 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2039 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2040 assert!(msgs.is_none());
2042 return Err(Some((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err())));
2046 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
2047 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2048 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2049 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2050 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2051 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
2052 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2053 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2062 // TODO: Do something with e?
2063 // This should only occur if we are claiming an HTLC at the same time as the
2064 // HTLC is being failed (eg because a block is being connected and this caused
2065 // an HTLC to time out). This should, of course, only occur if the user is the
2066 // one doing the claiming (as it being a part of a peer claim would imply we're
2067 // about to lose funds) and only if the lock in claim_funds was dropped as a
2068 // previous HTLC was failed (thus not for an MPP payment).
2069 debug_assert!(false, "This shouldn't be reachable except in absurdly rare cases between monitor updates and HTLC timeouts: {:?}", e);
2073 } else { unreachable!(); }
2076 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
2078 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
2079 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2080 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2081 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
2085 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
2086 if let Err((their_node_id, err)) = match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage) {
2089 // TODO: There is probably a channel monitor somewhere that needs to
2090 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
2091 // why it's missing.
2094 Err(Some(res)) => Err(res),
2096 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2097 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
2098 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, their_node_id);
2104 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
2105 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2106 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
2109 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
2110 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
2113 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
2114 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
2116 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
2117 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
2118 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
2119 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
2121 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
2122 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
2123 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
2124 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
2125 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
2126 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
2127 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
2128 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
2129 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
2130 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2132 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
2133 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
2134 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
2135 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
2138 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2139 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2140 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2141 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2142 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
2146 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
2150 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
2151 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2152 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
2154 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
2156 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
2157 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
2158 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2159 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2164 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
2165 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
2166 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2167 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2168 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2173 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2177 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2182 if needs_broadcast_safe {
2183 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2184 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
2185 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2188 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2189 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2190 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2193 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2194 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2195 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2196 msg: announcement_sigs,
2199 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2203 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
2205 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
2206 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2208 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
2210 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
2211 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
2215 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2216 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
2217 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
2220 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
2221 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
2222 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2223 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2224 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
2225 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
2226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2227 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
2228 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2229 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
2231 entry.insert(channel);
2237 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2238 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
2239 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2240 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2241 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
2242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2243 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2244 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2246 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
2247 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2249 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2252 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2253 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
2254 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2255 channel_value_satoshis: value,
2256 output_script: output_script,
2257 user_channel_id: user_id,
2262 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2263 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
2264 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2265 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2266 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
2267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2268 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2269 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
2271 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
2273 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
2276 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
2277 // lock before add_monitor
2278 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2280 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
2281 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
2282 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
2283 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
2284 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
2285 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(true), None));
2287 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
2288 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
2289 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
2290 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
2291 // until we have persisted our monitor.
2292 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2296 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2297 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2298 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
2299 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2300 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
2302 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2303 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
2304 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2313 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2314 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
2315 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2316 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2317 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2318 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2319 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2320 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2322 let monitor_update = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
2323 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2324 Err((Some(monitor_update), e)) => {
2325 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2326 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2327 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2330 Ok(update) => update,
2332 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2333 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2335 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2337 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2340 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2341 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2342 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2343 user_channel_id: user_id,
2348 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2349 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2350 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2351 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2352 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2353 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2354 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2356 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2357 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2358 log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2359 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2360 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2361 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2362 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2363 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2364 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2365 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2366 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2367 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2368 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2369 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2370 msg: announcement_sigs,
2375 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2379 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2380 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2381 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2382 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2384 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2385 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2386 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2387 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2389 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2390 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2391 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2392 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2396 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2397 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2398 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2402 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2403 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2404 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2406 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2407 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2409 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2412 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2413 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2415 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2416 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2417 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2418 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2426 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2427 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2428 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2429 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2430 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2432 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2433 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2435 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2436 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2437 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2438 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2443 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2444 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2445 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2446 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2447 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2448 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2449 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2451 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2452 } else { (tx, None) }
2454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2457 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2458 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2459 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2461 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2462 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2463 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2464 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2472 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2473 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2474 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2475 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2477 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2478 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2479 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2480 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2482 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2483 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2485 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2486 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2487 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2488 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2490 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2491 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2492 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2493 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2494 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2495 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2496 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2497 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2498 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2499 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2500 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2501 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2502 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2503 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2505 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2506 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2507 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2508 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2512 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2513 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2514 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2515 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2516 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2517 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2522 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2524 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2529 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2530 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2532 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2533 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2534 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2535 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2536 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2538 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2540 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2543 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2547 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2548 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2549 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2550 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2551 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2552 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2553 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2555 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2562 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2563 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2564 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2565 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2567 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2568 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2570 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2571 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
2572 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2574 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2577 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2581 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2582 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2583 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2584 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2585 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2586 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2587 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2589 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2590 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.fee_estimator) {
2591 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2592 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2593 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2594 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2595 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2600 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2601 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2602 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2604 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2605 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2606 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2608 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2609 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2610 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2611 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2612 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2613 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2614 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2615 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2617 commitment_signed: msg,
2621 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2622 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2623 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2634 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2635 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2636 let mut forward_event = None;
2637 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2638 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2639 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2640 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2642 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2643 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
2644 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
2645 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
2647 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2648 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2651 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2656 match forward_event {
2658 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2659 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2660 time_forwardable: time
2668 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2669 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2670 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2671 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2672 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2673 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2674 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2675 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2677 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2678 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2679 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2680 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2681 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2682 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2683 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2685 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2688 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2689 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2690 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2694 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2695 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2696 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2700 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2705 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2706 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2708 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2713 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2714 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2715 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2716 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2717 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2718 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2719 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2721 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2723 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2728 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2729 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2730 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2732 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2733 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2734 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2735 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2737 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2738 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2741 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2742 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2743 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2745 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2746 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2747 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2748 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2749 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
2750 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2753 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2755 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2756 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2757 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2758 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2759 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2760 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2761 contents: announcement,
2763 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2766 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2771 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2772 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2773 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2775 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2777 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2778 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2780 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2781 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2782 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2783 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2784 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2785 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2786 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2787 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2788 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2790 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2791 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2793 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2794 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2797 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2798 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2799 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2803 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2804 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2805 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2806 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2811 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2812 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2813 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2814 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2820 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2824 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2829 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2830 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2831 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2841 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2842 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2843 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2844 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2846 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2847 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2849 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2850 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2851 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2853 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2855 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2856 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2857 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2859 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2860 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2862 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2863 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2865 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2866 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2867 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2869 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2872 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2873 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2874 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2875 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2876 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2877 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2878 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2879 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2889 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id) {
2890 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2891 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2896 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2897 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2898 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2899 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2900 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2902 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2903 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2904 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2905 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2907 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2908 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2909 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2910 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2911 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2913 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2914 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2919 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2920 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2921 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2926 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2927 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2928 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2929 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2930 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2932 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2933 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2934 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2935 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2937 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2938 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2939 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2940 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2941 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2943 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2944 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2949 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2950 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2951 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2956 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
2957 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
2958 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2959 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2960 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2961 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2963 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2964 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2965 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2966 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2967 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2969 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2970 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2971 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2972 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2973 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2974 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2975 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2976 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2977 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2978 msg: funding_locked,
2980 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2981 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2982 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2983 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2984 msg: announcement_sigs,
2987 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2989 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2990 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2991 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2992 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2993 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2997 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2998 for tx in txn_matched {
2999 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3000 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3001 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
3002 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3003 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3005 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
3006 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
3007 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
3008 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
3009 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3010 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3019 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
3020 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3021 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3023 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
3024 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
3025 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
3026 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(false));
3027 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
3028 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3037 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3038 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3040 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
3041 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
3043 // Update last_node_announcement_serial to be the max of its current value and the
3044 // block timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
3045 // having an explicit local time source.
3046 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully update
3047 // last_node_announcement_serial or decide we don't need to.
3048 let old_serial = self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire);
3049 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
3050 if self.last_node_announcement_serial.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
3056 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
3057 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
3058 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3059 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3061 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3062 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3063 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3064 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3065 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
3066 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
3067 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
3068 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3070 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown(true));
3071 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
3072 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3082 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3083 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3085 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
3086 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
3090 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send, F: Deref + Sync + Send>
3091 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
3092 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3094 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3095 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3097 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
3098 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3099 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3102 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
3103 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3104 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg), *their_node_id);
3107 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
3108 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3109 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3112 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
3113 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3114 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3117 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
3118 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3119 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3122 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
3123 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3124 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3127 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
3128 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3129 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3132 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
3133 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3134 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3137 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
3138 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3139 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3142 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
3143 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3144 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3147 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
3148 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3149 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3152 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
3153 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3154 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3157 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
3158 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3159 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3162 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
3163 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3164 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3167 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
3168 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3169 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3172 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
3173 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3174 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg), *their_node_id);
3177 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
3178 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3179 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3180 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
3181 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
3183 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3184 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3185 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3186 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3187 if no_connection_possible {
3188 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3189 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3190 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3191 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3192 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3194 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
3195 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
3196 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3206 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3207 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3208 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3209 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
3210 chan.to_disabled_marked();
3211 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
3212 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
3213 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
3215 if chan.is_shutdown() {
3216 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3217 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3221 no_channels_remain = false;
3227 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
3229 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3230 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3231 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3232 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3233 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3234 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3235 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3236 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3237 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3238 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3239 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3240 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3241 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
3242 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
3243 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
3244 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
3248 if no_channels_remain {
3249 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
3252 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3253 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3255 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
3256 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
3257 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
3262 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
3263 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
3265 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3268 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3269 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
3270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3271 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
3272 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
3275 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3276 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3281 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3282 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3283 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3284 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3285 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3286 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3287 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3288 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3289 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3293 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3294 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3295 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3301 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3304 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3305 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3307 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3308 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3309 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3310 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3314 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3319 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3320 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3322 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3323 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3324 match &self.routing {
3325 &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id } => {
3327 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3328 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3330 &PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { ref payment_data } => {
3332 payment_data.write(writer)?;
3335 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3336 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3337 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3338 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3343 impl Readable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3344 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3345 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3346 routing: match Readable::read(reader)? {
3347 0u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3348 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3349 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3351 1u8 => PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3352 payment_data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3354 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3356 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3357 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3358 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3359 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3364 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3365 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3367 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3369 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3371 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3373 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3380 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3381 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3382 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3383 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3384 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3385 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3390 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3391 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3393 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3395 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3397 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3399 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3406 impl Readable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3407 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3408 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3409 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3410 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3411 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3416 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3419 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3422 impl_writeable!(ClaimableHTLC, 0, {
3428 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3429 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3431 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3433 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3435 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3437 path.write(writer)?;
3438 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3439 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3446 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
3447 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3448 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3449 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3450 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3451 path: Readable::read(reader)?,
3452 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3453 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3455 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3460 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3461 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3463 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3467 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3469 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3470 data.write(writer)?;
3477 impl Readable for HTLCFailReason {
3478 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3479 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3480 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3481 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3482 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3483 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3485 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3490 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3491 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3493 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3495 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3496 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3497 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3499 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3501 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3502 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3509 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3510 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3511 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
3512 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3513 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3514 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3515 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3517 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3518 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3519 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3521 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3526 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>
3527 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3528 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3529 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3530 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3532 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3533 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3535 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3536 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3538 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3539 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3540 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3542 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3543 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3544 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3545 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3546 unfunded_channels += 1;
3549 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3550 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3551 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3552 channel.write(writer)?;
3556 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3557 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3558 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3559 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3560 for forward in pending_forwards {
3561 forward.write(writer)?;
3565 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3566 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3567 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3568 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3569 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
3570 htlc.write(writer)?;
3574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3575 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3576 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3577 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3578 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3579 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3582 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3588 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3590 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3592 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3593 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3594 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3595 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3596 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3597 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3598 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3599 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3600 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3601 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3602 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3603 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3604 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3605 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3606 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3607 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3610 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3611 /// deserialization.
3612 pub keys_manager: K,
3614 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3616 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3617 pub fee_estimator: F,
3618 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3620 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3621 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3622 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3625 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3626 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3627 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3628 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3629 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3630 /// deserialization.
3631 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3632 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3633 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3634 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3636 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3637 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3639 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3640 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3641 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3642 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3644 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3646 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3649 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
3650 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
3651 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3652 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, Arc<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>>)
3653 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3654 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3655 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3656 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3658 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3659 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)>::read(reader, args)?;
3660 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
3664 impl<'a, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref>
3665 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>)
3666 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3667 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3668 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3669 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3671 fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K, F>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3672 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3673 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3674 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3675 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3678 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3679 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3680 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3682 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3684 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3685 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3686 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3687 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3688 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3689 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3690 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3691 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3694 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3695 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3696 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3697 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3698 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3699 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3700 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3701 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
3702 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3703 } else if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3704 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3705 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3706 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3707 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
3708 let (_, _, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
3709 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
3710 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
3712 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3713 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3715 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3718 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3722 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3723 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3724 monitor.broadcast_latest_local_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster);
3728 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3729 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3730 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3731 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3732 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3733 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3734 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3735 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3737 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3740 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3741 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3742 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3743 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3744 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3745 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3746 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3747 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3749 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3752 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3753 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3754 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3755 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3756 let peer_state = PeerState {
3757 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3759 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3762 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3764 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3766 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3767 monitor: args.monitor,
3768 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3770 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3771 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3772 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3774 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3779 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3781 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3783 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
3785 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3787 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3788 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3789 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3790 logger: args.logger,
3791 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3794 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3795 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3798 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3799 //connection or two.
3801 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))