Ensure ChannelManager methods are idempotent
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19 //!
20
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
37
38 use chain;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Payee, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
49 use ln::msgs;
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
51 use ln::onion_utils;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
61
62 use io;
63 use prelude::*;
64 use core::{cmp, mem};
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
72 use core::ops::Deref;
73
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
75 //
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
79 //
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
84 //
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
90
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
93         Forward {
94                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
96         },
97         Receive {
98                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
100         },
101         ReceiveKeysend {
102                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
104         },
105 }
106
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109         routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110         incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112         pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113         pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
114 }
115
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
120 }
121
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
127 }
128
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
130         AddHTLC {
131                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
132
133                 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134                 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135                 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
136                 // HTLCs.
137                 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
138                 prev_htlc_id: u64,
139                 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
140         },
141         FailHTLC {
142                 htlc_id: u64,
143                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
144         },
145 }
146
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150         short_channel_id: u64,
151         htlc_id: u64,
152         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
153
154         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
156         outpoint: OutPoint,
157 }
158
159 enum OnionPayload {
160         /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161         /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162         /// are part of the same payment.
163         Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
166 }
167
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
170         cltv_expiry: u32,
171         value: u64,
172         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
173 }
174
175 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
176 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
177 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
178 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
179
180 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
181         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
182                 self.0.write(w)
183         }
184 }
185
186 impl Readable for PaymentId {
187         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
188                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
189                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
190         }
191 }
192 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
193 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
194 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
195 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
196         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
197         OutboundRoute {
198                 path: Vec<RouteHop>,
199                 session_priv: SecretKey,
200                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
201                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
202                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
203                 payment_id: PaymentId,
204                 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
205                 payee: Option<Payee>,
206         },
207 }
208 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
209 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
210         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
211                 match self {
212                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
213                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
214                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
215                         },
216                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payee } => {
217                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
218                                 path.hash(hasher);
219                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
220                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
221                                 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
222                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
223                                 payee.hash(hasher);
224                         },
225                 }
226         }
227 }
228 #[cfg(test)]
229 impl HTLCSource {
230         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
231                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
232                         path: Vec::new(),
233                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
234                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
235                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
236                         payment_secret: None,
237                         payee: None,
238                 }
239         }
240 }
241
242 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
243 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
244         LightningError {
245                 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
246         },
247         Reason {
248                 failure_code: u16,
249                 data: Vec<u8>,
250         }
251 }
252
253 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
254 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
255         PrevHopForceClosed,
256         MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
257         Success(u64),
258         DuplicateClaim,
259 }
260
261 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
262
263 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
264 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
265 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
266 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
267 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
268
269 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
270         err: msgs::LightningError,
271         chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
272         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
273 }
274 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
275         #[inline]
276         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
277                 Self {
278                         err: LightningError {
279                                 err: err.clone(),
280                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
281                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
282                                                 channel_id,
283                                                 data: err
284                                         },
285                                 },
286                         },
287                         chan_id: None,
288                         shutdown_finish: None,
289                 }
290         }
291         #[inline]
292         fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
293                 Self {
294                         err: LightningError {
295                                 err,
296                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
297                         },
298                         chan_id: None,
299                         shutdown_finish: None,
300                 }
301         }
302         #[inline]
303         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
304                 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
305         }
306         #[inline]
307         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
308                 Self {
309                         err: LightningError {
310                                 err: err.clone(),
311                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
312                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
313                                                 channel_id,
314                                                 data: err
315                                         },
316                                 },
317                         },
318                         chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
319                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
320                 }
321         }
322         #[inline]
323         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
324                 Self {
325                         err: match err {
326                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
327                                         err: msg,
328                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
329                                 },
330                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
331                                         err: msg,
332                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
333                                 },
334                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
335                                         err: msg.clone(),
336                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
337                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
338                                                         channel_id,
339                                                         data: msg
340                                                 },
341                                         },
342                                 },
343                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
344                                         err: msg.clone(),
345                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
346                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
347                                                         channel_id,
348                                                         data: msg
349                                                 },
350                                         },
351                                 },
352                         },
353                         chan_id: None,
354                         shutdown_finish: None,
355                 }
356         }
357 }
358
359 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
360 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
361 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
362 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
363 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
364
365 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
366 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
367 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
368 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
369 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
370 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
371         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
372         CommitmentFirst,
373         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
374         RevokeAndACKFirst,
375 }
376
377 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
378 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
379         pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
380         pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
381         /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
382         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
383         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
384         /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
385         pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
386         /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
387         /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
388         /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
389         /// go to read them!
390         claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
391         /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
392         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
393         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
394 }
395
396 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
397 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
398 /// quite some time lag.
399 enum BackgroundEvent {
400         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
401         /// commitment transaction.
402         ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
403 }
404
405 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
406 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
407 struct PeerState {
408         latest_features: InitFeatures,
409 }
410
411 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
412 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
413 ///
414 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
415 /// here.
416 ///
417 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
418 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
419 struct PendingInboundPayment {
420         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
421         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
422         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
423         /// this payment being removed.
424         expiry_time: u64,
425         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
426         user_payment_id: u64,
427         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
428         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
429         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
430 }
431
432 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
433 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
434 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
435         Legacy {
436                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
437         },
438         Retryable {
439                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
440                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
441                 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
442                 pending_amt_msat: u64,
443                 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
444                 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
445                 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
446                 total_msat: u64,
447                 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
448                 starting_block_height: u32,
449         },
450         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
451         /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
452         /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
453         Fulfilled {
454                 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
455                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
456         },
457 }
458
459 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
460         fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
461                 match self {
462                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
463                         _ => false,
464                 }
465         }
466         fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
467                 match self {
468                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
469                         _ => false,
470                 }
471         }
472         fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
473                 match self {
474                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
475                         _ => None,
476                 }
477         }
478
479         fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
480                 match self {
481                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
482                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
483                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
484                 }
485         }
486
487         fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
488                 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
489                 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
490                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
491                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
492                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. }
493                                 => session_privs
494                 });
495                 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
496                 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
497         }
498
499         /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
500         fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
501                 let remove_res = match self {
502                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
503                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
504                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } => {
505                                 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
506                         }
507                 };
508                 if remove_res {
509                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
510                                 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
511                                 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
512                                 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
513                                 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
514                                         *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
515                                 }
516                         }
517                 }
518                 remove_res
519         }
520
521         fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
522                 let insert_res = match self {
523                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
524                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
525                                 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
526                         }
527                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false
528                 };
529                 if insert_res {
530                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
531                                 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
532                                 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
533                                 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
534                                         *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
535                                 }
536                         }
537                 }
538                 insert_res
539         }
540
541         fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
542                 match self {
543                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
544                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
545                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } => {
546                                 session_privs.len()
547                         }
548                 }
549         }
550 }
551
552 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
553 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
554 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
555 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
556 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
557 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
558 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
559 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
560
561 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
562 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
563 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
564 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
565 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
566 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
567 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
568 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
569 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
570
571 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
572 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
573 ///
574 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
575 /// to individual Channels.
576 ///
577 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
578 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
579 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
580 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
581 ///
582 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
583 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
584 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
585 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
586 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
587 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
588 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
589 ///
590 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
591 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
592 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
593 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
594 /// object!
595 ///
596 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
597 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
598 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
599 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
600 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
601 ///
602 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
603 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
604 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
605 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
606 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
607 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
608         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
609         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
610         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
611         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
612                                 L::Target: Logger,
613 {
614         default_configuration: UserConfig,
615         genesis_hash: BlockHash,
616         fee_estimator: F,
617         chain_monitor: M,
618         tx_broadcaster: T,
619
620         #[cfg(test)]
621         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
622         #[cfg(not(test))]
623         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
624         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
625
626         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
627         pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
628         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
629         channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
630
631         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
632         /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
633         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
634         /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
635         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
636         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
637
638         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
639         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
640         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
641         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
642         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
643         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
644         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
645         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
646         ///
647         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
648         ///
649         /// Locked *after* channel_state.
650         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
651
652         our_network_key: SecretKey,
653         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
654
655         /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
656         /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
657         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
658
659         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
660         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
661         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
662         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
663
664         /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
665         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
666         /// are currently open with that peer.
667         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
668         /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
669         /// new channel.
670         ///
671         /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
672         per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
673
674         pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
675         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
676         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
677         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
678         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
679         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
680         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
681         /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
682         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
683
684         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
685
686         keys_manager: K,
687
688         logger: L,
689 }
690
691 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
692 ///
693 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
694 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
695 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
696 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
697 pub struct ChainParameters {
698         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
699         pub network: Network,
700
701         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
702         ///
703         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
704         pub best_block: BestBlock,
705 }
706
707 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
708 enum NotifyOption {
709         DoPersist,
710         SkipPersist,
711 }
712
713 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
714 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
715 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
716 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
717 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
718 /// updates are ready for persistence).
719 ///
720 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
721 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
722 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
723 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
724         persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
725         should_persist: F,
726         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
727         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
728 }
729
730 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
731         fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
732                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
733         }
734
735         fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
736                 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
737
738                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
739                         persistence_notifier: notifier,
740                         should_persist: persist_check,
741                         _read_guard: read_guard,
742                 }
743         }
744 }
745
746 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
747         fn drop(&mut self) {
748                 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
749                         self.persistence_notifier.notify();
750                 }
751         }
752 }
753
754 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
755 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
756 ///
757 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
758 ///
759 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
760 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
761 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
762 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
763 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
764
765 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
766 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
767 ///
768 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
769 ///
770 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
771 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
772 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
773 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
774 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
775 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
776 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
777
778 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
779 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
780 /// this value.
781 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
782 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
783 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
784 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
785
786 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
787 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
788 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
789 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
790 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
791 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
792 #[deny(const_err)]
793 #[allow(dead_code)]
794 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
795
796 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
797 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
798 #[deny(const_err)]
799 #[allow(dead_code)]
800 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
801
802 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
803 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
804 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
805         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
806         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
807         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
808         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
809         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
810         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
811         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
812         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
813 }
814
815 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
816 /// to better separate parameters.
817 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
818 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
819         /// The node_id of our counterparty
820         pub node_id: PublicKey,
821         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
822         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
823         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
824         pub features: InitFeatures,
825         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
826         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
827         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
828         ///
829         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
830         ///
831         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
832         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
833         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
834         /// payments to us through this channel.
835         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
836 }
837
838 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
839 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
840 pub struct ChannelDetails {
841         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
842         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
843         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
844         /// lifetime of the channel.
845         pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
846         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
847         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
848         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
849         /// our counterparty already.
850         ///
851         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
852         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
853         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
854         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
855         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
856         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
857         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
858         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
859         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
860         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
861         /// this value on chain.
862         ///
863         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
864         ///
865         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
866         ///
867         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
868         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
869         /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
870         pub user_channel_id: u64,
871         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
872         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
873         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
874         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
875         ///
876         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
877         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
878         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
879         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
880         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
881         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
882         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
883         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
884         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
885         ///
886         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
887         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
888         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
889         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
890         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
891         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
892         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
893         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
894         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
895         ///
896         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
897         ///
898         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
899         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
900         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
901         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
902         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
903         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
904         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
905         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
906         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
907         ///
908         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
909         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
910         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
911         pub is_outbound: bool,
912         /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
913         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
914         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
915         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
916         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
917         ///
918         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
919         pub is_funding_locked: bool,
920         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
921         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
922         ///
923         /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
924         pub is_usable: bool,
925         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
926         pub is_public: bool,
927 }
928
929 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
930 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
931 /// states for more.
932 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
933 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
934         /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
935         /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
936         /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
937         ParameterError(APIError),
938         /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
939         /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
940         /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
941         /// payment in full.
942         ///
943         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
944         /// send_payment.
945         PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
946         /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
947         /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
948         /// paths than the ones selected).
949         AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
950         /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
951         /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
952         /// in over-/re-payment.
953         ///
954         /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
955         /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
956         /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
957         ///
958         /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
959         /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
960         /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
961         /// with the latest update_id.
962         PartialFailure {
963                 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
964                 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
965                 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
966                 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
967                 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
968                 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
969                 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
970                 payment_id: PaymentId,
971         },
972 }
973
974 macro_rules! handle_error {
975         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
976                 match $internal {
977                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
978                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
979                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
980                                 {
981                                         // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
982                                         // entering the macro.
983                                         assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
984                                         assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
985                                 }
986
987                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
988
989                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
990                                         $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
991                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
992                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
993                                                         msg: update
994                                                 });
995                                         }
996                                         if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
997                                                 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
998                                                         channel_id, user_channel_id,
999                                                         reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1000                                                 });
1001                                         }
1002                                 }
1003
1004                                 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1005                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1006                                 } else {
1007                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1008                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1009                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1010                                         });
1011                                 }
1012
1013                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1014                                         $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1015                                 }
1016
1017                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1018                                 Err(err)
1019                         },
1020                 }
1021         }
1022 }
1023
1024 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1025 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1026         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1027                 match $err {
1028                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1029                                 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
1030                                 //peer here.
1031                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1032                         },
1033                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1034                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1035                         },
1036                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1037                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1038                                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1039                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1040                                 }
1041                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1042                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1043                                         shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1044                         },
1045                         ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1046                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1047                                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1048                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1049                                 }
1050                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1051                                 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1052                                         shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1053                         }
1054                 }
1055         }
1056 }
1057
1058 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1059         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1060                 match $res {
1061                         Ok(res) => res,
1062                         Err(e) => {
1063                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1064                                 if drop {
1065                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1066                                 }
1067                                 break Err(res);
1068                         }
1069                 }
1070         }
1071 }
1072
1073 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1074         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1075                 match $res {
1076                         Ok(res) => res,
1077                         Err(e) => {
1078                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1079                                 if drop {
1080                                         $entry.remove_entry();
1081                                 }
1082                                 return Err(res);
1083                         }
1084                 }
1085         }
1086 }
1087
1088 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1089         ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1090                 {
1091                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1092                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1093                                 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1094                         }
1095                         channel
1096                 }
1097         }
1098 }
1099
1100 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1101         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1102                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1103         };
1104         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1105                 match $err {
1106                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1107                                 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1108                                 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1109                                         $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1110                                 }
1111                                 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1112                                 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1113                                 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1114                                 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1115                                 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1116                                 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1117                                 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1118                                 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1119                                 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1120                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1121                                                 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1122                                 (res, true)
1123                         },
1124                         ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1125                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1126                                                 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1127                                                 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1128                                                                 match $action_type {
1129                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1130                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1131                                                                 }
1132                                                         } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1133                                                         else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1134                                                         else { "nothing" },
1135                                                 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1136                                                 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1137                                                 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1138                                 if !$resend_commitment {
1139                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1140                                 }
1141                                 if !$resend_raa {
1142                                         debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1143                                 }
1144                                 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1145                                 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1146                         },
1147                 }
1148         };
1149         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1150                 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1151                 if drop {
1152                         $entry.remove_entry();
1153                 }
1154                 res
1155         } };
1156         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1157                 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1158         }
1159 }
1160
1161 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1162         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1163                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1164         };
1165         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1166                 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1167         }
1168 }
1169
1170 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1171 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1172         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1173                 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1174                         (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1175                                 break e;
1176                         },
1177                         (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1178                 }
1179         }
1180 }
1181
1182 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1183         ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1184          $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1185          $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1186                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1187                 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1188
1189                 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1190                 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1191                 let res = loop {
1192                         let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1193                         if !forwards.is_empty() {
1194                                 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1195                                         $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1196                         }
1197
1198                         if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1199                                 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1200                                 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1201                                 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1202                                 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1203                                 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1204                                 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1205                                 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1206                                 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1207                                 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1208                                 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1209                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1210                         }
1211
1212                         if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1213                                 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1214                                 // before it should be allowed to.
1215                                 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1216                                 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1217                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1218                                         msg,
1219                                 });
1220                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1221                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1222                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1223                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
1224                                         });
1225                                 }
1226                                 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1227                         }
1228
1229                         let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1230                         if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1231                                 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1232                                 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1233                                 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1234                                 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1235                                 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1236                                 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1237                                 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1238                                 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1239                                 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1240                                 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1241                                 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1242                                         // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1243                                         // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1244                                         // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1245                                         let mut order = $order;
1246                                         if $raa.is_none() {
1247                                                 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1248                                         }
1249                                         break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1250                                 }
1251                         }
1252
1253                         macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1254                                 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1255                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1256                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1257                                                 updates: update,
1258                                         });
1259                                 }
1260                         } }
1261                         macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1262                                 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1263                                         $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1264                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1265                                                 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1266                                         });
1267                                 }
1268                         } }
1269                         match $order {
1270                                 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1271                                         handle_cs!();
1272                                         handle_raa!();
1273                                 },
1274                                 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1275                                         handle_raa!();
1276                                         handle_cs!();
1277                                 },
1278                         }
1279                         if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1280                                 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1281                                 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1282                         }
1283                         break Ok(());
1284                 };
1285
1286                 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1287                         // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1288                         // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1289                         // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1290                         assert!(res.is_ok());
1291                 }
1292
1293                 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1294         } }
1295 }
1296
1297 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1298         ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1299                 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1300
1301                 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1302
1303                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1304                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1305                 }
1306         } }
1307 }
1308
1309 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1310         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1311         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1312         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1313         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1314         L::Target: Logger,
1315 {
1316         /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1317         ///
1318         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1319         /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1320         ///
1321         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1322         ///
1323         /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1324         ///
1325         /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1326         /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1327         /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1328         pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1329                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1330                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1331
1332                 ChannelManager {
1333                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
1334                         genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1335                         fee_estimator: fee_est,
1336                         chain_monitor,
1337                         tx_broadcaster,
1338
1339                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1340
1341                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1342                                 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1343                                 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1344                                 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1345                                 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1346                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1347                         }),
1348                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1349                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1350
1351                         our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1352                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1353                         secp_ctx,
1354
1355                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1356                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1357
1358                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1359
1360                         pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1361                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1362                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1363                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1364
1365                         keys_manager,
1366
1367                         logger,
1368                 }
1369         }
1370
1371         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels,  as
1372         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1373                 &self.default_configuration
1374         }
1375
1376         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1377         ///
1378         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1379         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1380         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1381         /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1382         /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1383         /// ignored.
1384         ///
1385         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1386         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1387         ///
1388         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1389         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1390         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1391         ///
1392         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1393         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1394         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1395         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1396         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1397         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1398         ///
1399         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1400         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1401         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1402         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1403                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1404                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1405                 }
1406
1407                 let channel = {
1408                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1409                         match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1410                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1411                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1412                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1413                                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1414                                         Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1415                                                 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1416                                 },
1417                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1418                         }
1419                 };
1420                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1421
1422                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1423                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1424                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1425
1426                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1427                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1428                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1429                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1430                                 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1431                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1432                                 } else {
1433                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
1434                                 }
1435                         },
1436                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1437                 }
1438                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1439                         node_id: their_network_key,
1440                         msg: res,
1441                 });
1442                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1443         }
1444
1445         fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1446                 let mut res = Vec::new();
1447                 {
1448                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1449                         res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1450                         for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1451                                 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1452                                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1453                                         channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1454                                 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1455                                         channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1456                                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1457                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1458                                                 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1459                                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1460                                                 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1461                                         },
1462                                         funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1463                                         short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1464                                         channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1465                                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1466                                         inbound_capacity_msat,
1467                                         outbound_capacity_msat,
1468                                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1469                                         confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1470                                         force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1471                                         is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1472                                         is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1473                                         is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1474                                         is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1475                                 });
1476                         }
1477                 }
1478                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1479                 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1480                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1481                                 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1482                         }
1483                 }
1484                 res
1485         }
1486
1487         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1488         /// more information.
1489         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1490                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1491         }
1492
1493         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1494         /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1495         ///
1496         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1497         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1498         /// are.
1499         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1500                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1501                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1502                 // really wanted anyway.
1503                 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1504         }
1505
1506         /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1507         fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1508                 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1509                 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1510                         Some(transaction) => {
1511                                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1512                         },
1513                         None => {},
1514                 }
1515                 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1516                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1517                         user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1518                         reason: closure_reason
1519                 });
1520         }
1521
1522         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1523                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1524
1525                 let counterparty_node_id;
1526                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1527                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1528                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1529                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1530                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1531                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1532                                         counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1533                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1534                                         let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1535                                                 Some(peer_state) => {
1536                                                         let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1537                                                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1538                                                         chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1539                                                 },
1540                                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1541                                         };
1542                                         failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1543
1544                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1545                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1546                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1547                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
1548                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1549                                                         if is_permanent {
1550                                                                 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1551                                                                 break result;
1552                                                         }
1553                                                 }
1554                                         }
1555
1556                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1557                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1558                                                 msg: shutdown_msg
1559                                         });
1560
1561                                         if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1562                                                 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1563                                                 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1564                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1565                                                                 msg: channel_update
1566                                                         });
1567                                                 }
1568                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1569                                         }
1570                                         break Ok(());
1571                                 },
1572                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1573                         }
1574                 };
1575
1576                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1577                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1578                 }
1579
1580                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1581                 Ok(())
1582         }
1583
1584         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1585         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1586         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1587         ///
1588         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1589         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1590         ///    estimate.
1591         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1592         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1593         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1594         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1595         ///
1596         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1597         ///
1598         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1599         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1600         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1601         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1602                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1603         }
1604
1605         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1606         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1607         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1608         ///
1609         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1610         /// the channel being closed or not:
1611         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1612         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1613         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1614         ///    estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1615         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1616         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1617         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1618         ///
1619         /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1620         ///
1621         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1622         /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1623         /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1624         pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1625                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1626         }
1627
1628         #[inline]
1629         fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1630                 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1631                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1632                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1633                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1634                 }
1635                 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1636                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1637                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1638                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1639                         // ignore the result here.
1640                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1641                 }
1642         }
1643
1644         /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1645         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1646         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1647                 let mut chan = {
1648                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1649                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1650                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1651                                 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1652                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1653                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1654                                         }
1655                                 }
1656                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1657                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1658                                 }
1659                                 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
1660                                         if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
1661                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
1662                                         }
1663                                 } else {
1664                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1665                                 }
1666                                 chan.remove_entry().1
1667                         } else {
1668                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1669                         }
1670                 };
1671                 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1672                 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1673                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1674                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1675                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1676                                 msg: update
1677                         });
1678                 }
1679
1680                 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1681         }
1682
1683         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1684         /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1685         pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1686                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1687                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
1688                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1689                                 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1690                                         events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1691                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1692                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1693                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1694                                                 },
1695                                         }
1696                                 );
1697                                 Ok(())
1698                         },
1699                         Err(e) => Err(e)
1700                 }
1701         }
1702
1703         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1704         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1705         pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1706                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1707                         let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1708                 }
1709         }
1710
1711         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1712                 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1713                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1714                                 {
1715                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1716                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1717                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1718                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1719                                                 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1720                                                 failure_code: $err_code,
1721                                         })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1722                                 }
1723                         }
1724                 }
1725
1726                 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1727                         return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1728                 }
1729
1730                 let shared_secret = {
1731                         let mut arr = [0; 32];
1732                         arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1733                         arr
1734                 };
1735                 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1736
1737                 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1738                         //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1739                         //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1740                         //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1741                         //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1742                         //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1743                         //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1744                         return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1745                 }
1746
1747                 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1748                 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1749                 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1750                 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1751                         return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1752                 }
1753
1754                 let mut channel_state = None;
1755                 macro_rules! return_err {
1756                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1757                                 {
1758                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1759                                         if channel_state.is_none() {
1760                                                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1761                                         }
1762                                         return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1763                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1764                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1765                                                 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1766                                         })), channel_state.unwrap());
1767                                 }
1768                         }
1769                 }
1770
1771                 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1772                 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1773                 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1774                         match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1775                                 Err(err) => {
1776                                         let error_code = match err {
1777                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1778                                                 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1779                                                 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1780                                                 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1781                                                 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1782                                         };
1783                                         return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1784                                 },
1785                                 Ok(msg) => {
1786                                         let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1787                                         if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1788                                                 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1789                                         }
1790                                         (msg, hmac)
1791                                 },
1792                         }
1793                 };
1794
1795                 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1796                         #[cfg(test)]
1797                         {
1798                                 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1799                                 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1800                                 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1801                                 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1802                                 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1803                                 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1804                                 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1805                                 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1806                                 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1807                                 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1808                                 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1809                                 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1810                         }
1811
1812                         // OUR PAYMENT!
1813                         // final_expiry_too_soon
1814                         // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1815                         // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1816                         // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1817                         // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1818                         // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1819                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1820                                 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1821                         }
1822                         // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1823                         if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1824                                 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1825                         }
1826                         // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1827                         if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1828                                 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1829                         }
1830
1831                         let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1832                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1833                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1834                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1835                                         if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1836                                                 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1837                                         } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1838                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1839                                                         payment_data: data,
1840                                                         incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1841                                                 }
1842                                         } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1843                                                 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1844                                                 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1845                                                 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1846                                                 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1847                                                 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1848                                                 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1849                                                 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1850                                                         return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1851                                                 }
1852
1853                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1854                                                         payment_preimage,
1855                                                         incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1856                                                 }
1857                                         } else {
1858                                                 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1859                                         }
1860                                 },
1861                         };
1862
1863                         // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1864                         // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1865                         // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1866                         // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1867
1868                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1869                                 routing,
1870                                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1871                                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1872                                 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1873                                 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1874                         })
1875                 } else {
1876                         let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1877                         let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1878                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1879                         {
1880                                 // Check two things:
1881                                 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1882                                 //    read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1883                                 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1884                                 let mut t = [0; 1];
1885                                 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1886                         }
1887                         // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1888                         // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1889                         chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1890
1891                         let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1892
1893                         let blinding_factor = {
1894                                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1895                                 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1896                                 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1897                                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1898                         };
1899
1900                         let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1901                                 Err(e)
1902                         } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1903
1904                         let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1905                                 version: 0,
1906                                 public_key,
1907                                 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1908                                 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1909                         };
1910
1911                         let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1912                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1913                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1914                                 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1915                                         return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1916                                 },
1917                         };
1918
1919                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1920                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1921                                         onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1922                                         short_channel_id,
1923                                 },
1924                                 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1925                                 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1926                                 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1927                                 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1928                         })
1929                 };
1930
1931                 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1932                 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1933                         // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1934                         // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1935                         // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1936                         if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1937                                 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1938                                 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1939                                         let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1940                                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1941                                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1942                                                 },
1943                                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1944                                         };
1945
1946                                         let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1947
1948                                         if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1949                                                 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1950                                                 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1951                                                 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1952                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1953                                         }
1954
1955                                         // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1956                                         // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1957                                         // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1958                                         // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1959                                         // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1960                                         if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1961                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1962                                         }
1963                                         if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1964                                                 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1965                                         }
1966                                         let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1967                                                 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1968                                                 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1969                                         if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1970                                                 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1971                                         }
1972                                         if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1973                                                 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1974                                         }
1975                                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1976                                         // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
1977                                         // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
1978                                         // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1979                                         if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1980                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1981                                         }
1982                                         if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1983                                                 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1984                                         }
1985                                         // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
1986                                         // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
1987                                         // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
1988                                         // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
1989                                         // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
1990                                         // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
1991                                         // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
1992                                         // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
1993                                         if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
1994                                                 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1995                                         }
1996
1997                                         break None;
1998                                 }
1999                                 {
2000                                         let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2001                                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2002                                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2003                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2004                                                 }
2005                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2006                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2007                                                 }
2008                                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2009                                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2010                                                         res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2011                                                 }
2012                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2013                                         }
2014                                         return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2015                                 }
2016                         }
2017                 }
2018
2019                 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2020         }
2021
2022         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2023         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2024         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2025         ///
2026         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2027         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2028                 if !chan.should_announce() {
2029                         return Err(LightningError {
2030                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2031                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2032                         });
2033                 }
2034                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2035                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2036         }
2037
2038         /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2039         /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2040         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2041         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2042         /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2043         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2044                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2045                 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2046                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2047                         Some(id) => id,
2048                 };
2049
2050                 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2051
2052                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2053                         chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2054                         short_channel_id,
2055                         timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2056                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2057                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2058                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2059                         htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2060                         fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2061                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2062                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2063                 };
2064
2065                 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2066                 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2067
2068                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2069                         signature: sig,
2070                         contents: unsigned
2071                 })
2072         }
2073
2074         // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2075         pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payee: &Option<Payee>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2076                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2077                 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2078                 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2079                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2080
2081                 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2082                         .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2083                 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2084                 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2085                         return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2086                 }
2087                 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2088
2089                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2090
2091                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2092                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2093
2094                         let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2095                         let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2096                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2097                                 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2098                                         return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2099                                                 err: "Payment already completed"
2100                                         });
2101                                 }
2102                         }
2103
2104                         let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2105                                 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2106                                 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2107                         };
2108
2109                         macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2110                                 () => {
2111                                         let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2112                                                 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2113                                                 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2114                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2115                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2116                                                 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2117                                                 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2118                                                 total_msat: total_value,
2119                                         });
2120                                         assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2121                                 }
2122                         }
2123
2124                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2125                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2126                                 match {
2127                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2128                                                 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2129                                         }
2130                                         if !chan.get().is_live() {
2131                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2132                                         }
2133                                         break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2134                                                 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2135                                                         path: path.clone(),
2136                                                         session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2137                                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2138                                                         payment_id,
2139                                                         payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2140                                                         payee: payee.clone(),
2141                                                 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2142                                         channel_state, chan)
2143                                 } {
2144                                         Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2145                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2146                                                         maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2147                                                         // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2148                                                         // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2149                                                         // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2150                                                         // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2151                                                         // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2152                                                         insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2153                                                         return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2154                                                 }
2155                                                 insert_outbound_payment!();
2156
2157                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2158                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2159                                                         node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2160                                                         updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2161                                                                 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2162                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2163                                                                 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2164                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2165                                                                 update_fee: None,
2166                                                                 commitment_signed,
2167                                                         },
2168                                                 });
2169                                         },
2170                                         None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2171                                 }
2172                         } else { unreachable!(); }
2173                         return Ok(());
2174                 };
2175
2176                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2177                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2178                         Err(e) => {
2179                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2180                         },
2181                 }
2182         }
2183
2184         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2185         ///
2186         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2187         /// fields for more info.
2188         ///
2189         /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2190         /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2191         /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2192         /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2193         /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2194         /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2195         ///
2196         /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2197         ///
2198         /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2199         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2200         /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2201         ///
2202         /// In general, a path may raise:
2203         ///  * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2204         ///    node public key) is specified.
2205         ///  * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2206         ///    (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2207         ///    failure).
2208         ///  * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2209         ///    relevant updates.
2210         ///
2211         /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2212         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2213         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2214         ///
2215         /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2216         /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2217         /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2218         /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2219         /// payment_secret.
2220         /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2221         /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2222         /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2223         pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2224                 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2225         }
2226
2227         fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2228                 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2229                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2230                 }
2231                 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2232                         // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2233                         // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2234                         // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2235                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2236                 }
2237                 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2238                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2239                 }
2240                 let mut total_value = 0;
2241                 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2242                 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2243                 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2244                 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2245                         if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2246                                 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2247                                 continue 'path_check;
2248                         }
2249                         for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2250                                 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2251                                         path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2252                                         continue 'path_check;
2253                                 }
2254                         }
2255                         total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2256                         path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2257                 }
2258                 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2259                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2260                 }
2261                 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2262                         debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2263                         total_value = amt_msat;
2264                 }
2265
2266                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2267                 let mut results = Vec::new();
2268                 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2269                         results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payee, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2270                 }
2271                 let mut has_ok = false;
2272                 let mut has_err = false;
2273                 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2274                 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2275                 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2276                         if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2277                         if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2278                         if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2279                                 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2280                                 // PartialFailure.
2281                                 has_err = true;
2282                                 has_ok = true;
2283                         } else if res.is_err() {
2284                                 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2285                                 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2286                         }
2287                 }
2288                 if has_err && has_ok {
2289                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2290                                 results,
2291                                 payment_id,
2292                                 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2293                                         if let Some(payee) = &route.payee {
2294                                                 Some(RouteParameters {
2295                                                         payee: payee.clone(),
2296                                                         final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2297                                                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2298                                                 })
2299                                         } else { None }
2300                                 } else { None },
2301                         })
2302                 } else if has_err {
2303                         // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2304                         // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2305                         debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2306                         Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2307                 } else {
2308                         Ok(payment_id)
2309                 }
2310         }
2311
2312         /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2313         ///
2314         /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2315         /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2316         /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, or if the payment
2317         /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success).
2318         ///
2319         /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2320         pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2321                 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2322                 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2323                         if path.len() == 0 {
2324                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2325                                         err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2326                                 }))
2327                         }
2328                 }
2329
2330                 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2331                         let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2332                         if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2333                                 match payment {
2334                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2335                                                 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2336                                         } => {
2337                                                 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2338                                                 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2339                                                         return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2340                                                                 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2341                                                         }))
2342                                                 }
2343                                                 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2344                                         },
2345                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2346                                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2347                                                         err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2348                                                 }))
2349                                         },
2350                                         PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2351                                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError {
2352                                                         err: "Payment already completed"
2353                                                 }));
2354                                         },
2355                                 }
2356                         } else {
2357                                 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2358                                         err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2359                                 }))
2360                         }
2361                 };
2362                 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2363         }
2364
2365         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2366         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2367         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2368         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2369         /// never reach the recipient.
2370         ///
2371         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2372         ///
2373         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2374         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2375         ///
2376         /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2377         ///
2378         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2379         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2380                 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2381                         Some(p) => p,
2382                         None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2383                 };
2384                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2385                 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2386                         Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2387                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2388                 }
2389         }
2390
2391         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2392         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2393         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2394                         (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2395                 let (chan, msg) = {
2396                         let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2397                                 Some(mut chan) => {
2398                                         let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2399
2400                                         (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2401                                                 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2402                                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2403                                                 } else { unreachable!(); })
2404                                         , chan)
2405                                 },
2406                                 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2407                         };
2408                         match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2409                                 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2410                                         (chan, funding_msg)
2411                                 },
2412                                 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2413                                         err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2414                                 }) },
2415                         }
2416                 };
2417
2418                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2419                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2420                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2421                         msg,
2422                 });
2423                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2424                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2425                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2426                         },
2427                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2428                                 e.insert(chan);
2429                         }
2430                 }
2431                 Ok(())
2432         }
2433
2434         #[cfg(test)]
2435         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2436                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2437                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2438                 })
2439         }
2440
2441         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2442         ///
2443         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2444         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2445         ///
2446         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2447         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2448         ///
2449         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2450         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2451         /// keys per-channel).
2452         ///
2453         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2454         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2455         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2456         ///
2457         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2458         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2459         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2460         ///
2461         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2462         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2463         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2464                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2465
2466                 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2467                         if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2468                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2469                                         err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2470                                 });
2471                         }
2472                 }
2473                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2474                         let mut output_index = None;
2475                         let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2476                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2477                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2478                                         if output_index.is_some() {
2479                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2480                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2481                                                 });
2482                                         }
2483                                         if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2484                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2485                                                         err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2486                                                 });
2487                                         }
2488                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2489                                 }
2490                         }
2491                         if output_index.is_none() {
2492                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2493                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2494                                 });
2495                         }
2496                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2497                 })
2498         }
2499
2500         fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2501                 if !chan.should_announce() {
2502                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2503                         return None
2504                 }
2505
2506                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2507                         Ok(res) => res,
2508                         Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2509                 };
2510                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2511                 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2512
2513                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2514                         channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2515                         short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2516                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
2517                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2518                 })
2519         }
2520
2521         #[allow(dead_code)]
2522         // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2523         // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2524         // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2525         // message...
2526         const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2527         #[deny(const_err)]
2528         #[allow(dead_code)]
2529         // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2530         // smaller than 500:
2531         const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2532
2533         /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2534         /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2535         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2536         /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2537         /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2538         /// our network addresses.
2539         ///
2540         /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2541         /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2542         ///
2543         /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2544         /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2545         /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2546         /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2547         ///
2548         /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2549         ///
2550         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2551         pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2552                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2553
2554                 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2555                         panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2556                 }
2557
2558                 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2559                 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2560                 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2561
2562                 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2563                         features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2564                         timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2565                         node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2566                         rgb, alias, addresses,
2567                         excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2568                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
2569                 };
2570                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2571                 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2572
2573                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2574                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2575
2576                 let mut announced_chans = false;
2577                 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2578                         if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2579                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2580                                         msg,
2581                                         update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2582                                                 Ok(msg) => msg,
2583                                                 Err(_) => continue,
2584                                         },
2585                                 });
2586                                 announced_chans = true;
2587                         } else {
2588                                 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2589                                 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2590                                 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2591                         }
2592                 }
2593
2594                 if announced_chans {
2595                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2596                                 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2597                                         signature: node_announce_sig,
2598                                         contents: announcement
2599                                 },
2600                         });
2601                 }
2602         }
2603
2604         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2605         ///
2606         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2607         /// Will likely generate further events.
2608         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2609                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2610
2611                 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2612                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2613                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2614                 {
2615                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2616                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2617
2618                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2619                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2620                                         let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2621                                                 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2622                                                 None => {
2623                                                         failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2624                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2625                                                                 match forward_info {
2626                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2627                                                                                                    prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2628                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2629                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2630                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2631                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2632                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2633                                                                                 });
2634                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2635                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2636                                                                                 ));
2637                                                                         },
2638                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2639                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2640                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2641                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2642                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
2643                                                                         }
2644                                                                 }
2645                                                         }
2646                                                         continue;
2647                                                 }
2648                                         };
2649                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2650                                                 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2651                                                 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2652                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2653                                                         match forward_info {
2654                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2655                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2656                                                                                         onion_packet, ..
2657                                                                                 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2658                                                                                 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2659                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2660                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2661                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2662                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2663                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2664                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2665                                                                         });
2666                                                                         match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
2667                                                                                 Err(e) => {
2668                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2669                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2670                                                                                         } else {
2671                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2672                                                                                         }
2673                                                                                         let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2674                                                                                         failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2675                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2676                                                                                         ));
2677                                                                                         continue;
2678                                                                                 },
2679                                                                                 Ok(update_add) => {
2680                                                                                         match update_add {
2681                                                                                                 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2682                                                                                                 None => {
2683                                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2684                                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2685                                                                                                         // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2686                                                                                                         // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2687                                                                                                         // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2688                                                                                                         // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2689                                                                                                         // this channel currently :/.
2690                                                                                                 }
2691                                                                                         }
2692                                                                                 }
2693                                                                         }
2694                                                                 },
2695                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2696                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2697                                                                 },
2698                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2699                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2700                                                                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2701                                                                                 Err(e) => {
2702                                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2703                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2704                                                                                         } else {
2705                                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2706                                                                                         }
2707                                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2708                                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2709                                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2710                                                                                         continue;
2711                                                                                 },
2712                                                                                 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2713                                                                                 Ok(None) => {
2714                                                                                         // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2715                                                                                         // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2716                                                                                         // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2717                                                                                         // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2718                                                                                         // messages when we can.
2719                                                                                         // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2720                                                                                         // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2721                                                                                         // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2722                                                                                 }
2723                                                                         }
2724                                                                 },
2725                                                         }
2726                                                 }
2727
2728                                                 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2729                                                         let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2730                                                                 Ok(res) => res,
2731                                                                 Err(e) => {
2732                                                                         // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2733                                                                         // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2734                                                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2735                                                                         let err: Result<(), _>  = match e {
2736                                                                                 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2737                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2738                                                                                 }
2739                                                                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2740                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2741                                                                                         let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2742                                                                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2743                                                                                                 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2744                                                                                         }
2745                                                                                         // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
2746                                                                                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2747                                                                                 },
2748                                                                                 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2749                                                                         };
2750                                                                         handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2751                                                                         continue;
2752                                                                 }
2753                                                         };
2754                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2755                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2756                                                                 continue;
2757                                                         }
2758                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2759                                                                 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2760                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2761                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2762                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2763                                                                         update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2764                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2765                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2766                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2767                                                                         update_fee: None,
2768                                                                         commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2769                                                                 },
2770                                                         });
2771                                                 }
2772                                         } else {
2773                                                 unreachable!();
2774                                         }
2775                                 } else {
2776                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2777                                                 match forward_info {
2778                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2779                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2780                                                                         prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2781                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2782                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2783                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2784                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2785                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2786                                                                         _ => {
2787                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2788                                                                         }
2789                                                                 };
2790                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2791                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2792                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2793                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2794                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2795                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2796                                                                         },
2797                                                                         value: amt_to_forward,
2798                                                                         cltv_expiry,
2799                                                                         onion_payload,
2800                                                                 };
2801
2802                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2803                                                                         ($htlc: expr) => {
2804                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2805                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2806                                                                                         &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2807                                                                                 );
2808                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2809                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2810                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2811                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2812                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2813                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
2814                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2815                                                                                 ));
2816                                                                         }
2817                                                                 }
2818
2819                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2820                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2821                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2822                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2823                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2824                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2825                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2826                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2827                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2828                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2829                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2830                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2831                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2832                                                                                         },
2833                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2834                                                                                                 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2835                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2836                                                                                                                 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2837                                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2838                                                                                                                         payment_hash,
2839                                                                                                                         amt: amt_to_forward,
2840                                                                                                                         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2841                                                                                                                 });
2842                                                                                                         },
2843                                                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2844                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2845                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2846                                                                                                         }
2847                                                                                                 }
2848                                                                                         }
2849                                                                                 }
2850                                                                         },
2851                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2852                                                                                 let payment_data =
2853                                                                                         if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2854                                                                                                 data.clone()
2855                                                                                         } else {
2856                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2857                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2858                                                                                                 continue
2859                                                                                         };
2860                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2861                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2862                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2863                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2864                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2865                                                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2866                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2867                                                                                 } else {
2868                                                                                         let mut total_value = 0;
2869                                                                                         let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2870                                                                                                 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2871                                                                                         if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2872                                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2873                                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2874                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2875                                                                                                         continue
2876                                                                                                 }
2877                                                                                         }
2878                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2879                                                                                         for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2880                                                                                                 total_value += htlc.value;
2881                                                                                                 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2882                                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2883                                                                                                                 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2884                                                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2885                                                                                                                                                                  log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2886                                                                                                                         total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2887                                                                                                                 }
2888                                                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2889                                                                                                         },
2890                                                                                                         _ => unreachable!(),
2891                                                                                                 }
2892                                                                                         }
2893                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2894                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2895                                                                                                         log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2896                                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2897                                                                                                         fail_htlc!(htlc);
2898                                                                                                 }
2899                                                                                         } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2900                                                                                                 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2901                                                                                                         payment_hash,
2902                                                                                                         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2903                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2904                                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2905                                                                                                         },
2906                                                                                                         amt: total_value,
2907                                                                                                 });
2908                                                                                                 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2909                                                                                                 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2910                                                                                                 // claimed.
2911                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2912                                                                                         } else {
2913                                                                                                 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2914                                                                                                 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2915                                                                                                 // MPP parts.
2916                                                                                         }
2917                                                                                 }
2918                                                                         },
2919                                                                 };
2920                                                         },
2921                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2922                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2923                                                         }
2924                                                 }
2925                                         }
2926                                 }
2927                         }
2928                 }
2929
2930                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2931                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2932                 }
2933
2934                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2935                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2936                 }
2937
2938                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2939                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2940                 events.append(&mut new_events);
2941         }
2942
2943         /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2944         ///
2945         /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2946         /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2947         ///
2948         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2949         fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2950                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2951                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2952                 if background_events.is_empty() {
2953                         return false;
2954                 }
2955
2956                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2957                         match event {
2958                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2959                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2960                                         // monitor updating completing.
2961                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2962                                 },
2963                         }
2964                 }
2965                 true
2966         }
2967
2968         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2969         /// Process background events, for functional testing
2970         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2971                 self.process_background_events();
2972         }
2973
2974         fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2975                 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2976                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2977                 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2978                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2979                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2980                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2981                 }
2982                 if !chan.is_live() {
2983                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2984                                 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2985                         return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2986                 }
2987                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2988                         log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2989
2990                 let mut retain_channel = true;
2991                 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2992                         Ok(res) => Ok(res),
2993                         Err(e) => {
2994                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2995                                 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2996                                 Err(res)
2997                         }
2998                 };
2999                 let ret_err = match res {
3000                         Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3001                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3002                                         let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3003                                         if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3004                                         res
3005                                 } else {
3006                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3007                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3008                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3009                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3010                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3011                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3012                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3013                                                         update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3014                                                         commitment_signed,
3015                                                 },
3016                                         });
3017                                         Ok(())
3018                                 }
3019                         },
3020                         Ok(None) => Ok(()),
3021                         Err(e) => Err(e),
3022                 };
3023                 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3024         }
3025
3026         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
3027         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3028         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3029         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3030         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3031         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3032                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3033                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3034
3035                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3036
3037                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3038                         {
3039                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3040                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3041                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3042                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3043                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3044                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3045                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3046                                         if err.is_err() {
3047                                                 handle_errors.push(err);
3048                                         }
3049                                         retain_channel
3050                                 });
3051                         }
3052
3053                         should_persist
3054                 });
3055         }
3056
3057         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3058         ///
3059         /// This currently includes:
3060         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3061         ///  * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3062         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3063         ///    the channel.
3064         ///
3065         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3066         /// estimate fetches.
3067         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3068                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3069                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3070                         if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3071
3072                         let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3073
3074                         let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3075                         {
3076                                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3077                                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3078                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3079                                 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3080                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3081                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3082                                         let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3083                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3084                                         if err.is_err() {
3085                                                 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3086                                         }
3087                                         if !retain_channel { return false; }
3088
3089                                         if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3090                                                 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3091                                                 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3092                                                 if needs_close { return false; }
3093                                         }
3094
3095                                         match chan.channel_update_status() {
3096                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3097                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3098                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3099                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3100                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3101                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3102                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3103                                                                         msg: update
3104                                                                 });
3105                                                         }
3106                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3107                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3108                                                 },
3109                                                 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3110                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3111                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3112                                                                         msg: update
3113                                                                 });
3114                                                         }
3115                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3116                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3117                                                 },
3118                                                 _ => {},
3119                                         }
3120
3121                                         true
3122                                 });
3123                         }
3124
3125                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3126                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3127                         }
3128                         should_persist
3129                 });
3130         }
3131
3132         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3133         /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3134         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3135         /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3136         /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3137         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3138                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3139
3140                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3141                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3142                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3143                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3144                                 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3145                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3146                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3147                                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3148                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3149                                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3150                                                 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3151                         }
3152                         true
3153                 } else { false }
3154         }
3155
3156         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3157         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3158         // be surfaced to the user.
3159         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3160                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3161                         match htlc_src {
3162                                 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3163                                         let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3164                                                 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3165                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3166                                                                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3167                                                                         (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3168                                                                 } else {
3169                                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3170                                                                 }
3171                                                         },
3172                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3173                                                 };
3174                                         let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3175                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3176                                                 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3177                                 },
3178                                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payee, .. } => {
3179                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3180                                         session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3181                                         let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3182                                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3183                                                 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3184                                                         let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3185                                                                 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3186                                                                 Some(RouteParameters {
3187                                                                         payee: payee_data,
3188                                                                         final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3189                                                                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3190                                                                 })
3191                                                         } else { None };
3192                                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3193                                                                 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3194                                                                         payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3195                                                                         payment_hash,
3196                                                                         rejected_by_dest: false,
3197                                                                         network_update: None,
3198                                                                         all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3199                                                                         path: path.clone(),
3200                                                                         short_channel_id: None,
3201                                                                         retry,
3202                                                                         #[cfg(test)]
3203                                                                         error_code: None,
3204                                                                         #[cfg(test)]
3205                                                                         error_data: None,
3206                                                                 }
3207                                                         );
3208                                                 }
3209                                         } else {
3210                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3211                                         }
3212                                 },
3213                         };
3214                 }
3215         }
3216
3217         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3218         /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3219         /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3220         /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3221         /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3222         /// still-available channels.
3223         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3224                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3225                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3226                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3227                 //timer handling.
3228
3229                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3230                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3231                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3232                 match source {
3233                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payee, .. } => {
3234                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3235                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3236                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3237                                 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3238                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3239                                         if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3240                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3241                                                 return;
3242                                         }
3243                                         if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3244                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3245                                                 return;
3246                                         }
3247                                         if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3248                                                 all_paths_failed = true;
3249                                         }
3250                                 } else {
3251                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3252                                         return;
3253                                 }
3254                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3255                                 let retry = if let Some(payee_data) = payee {
3256                                         let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3257                                         Some(RouteParameters {
3258                                                 payee: payee_data.clone(),
3259                                                 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3260                                                 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3261                                         })
3262                                 } else { None };
3263                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3264                                 match &onion_error {
3265                                         &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3266 #[cfg(test)]
3267                                                 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3268 #[cfg(not(test))]
3269                                                 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3270                                                 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3271                                                 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3272                                                 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3273                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3274                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3275                                                                 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3276                                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3277                                                                 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3278                                                                 network_update,
3279                                                                 all_paths_failed,
3280                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3281                                                                 short_channel_id,
3282                                                                 retry,
3283 #[cfg(test)]
3284                                                                 error_code: onion_error_code,
3285 #[cfg(test)]
3286                                                                 error_data: onion_error_data
3287                                                         }
3288                                                 );
3289                                         },
3290                                         &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3291 #[cfg(test)]
3292                                                         ref failure_code,
3293 #[cfg(test)]
3294                                                         ref data,
3295                                                         .. } => {
3296                                                 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3297                                                 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3298                                                 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3299                                                 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3300                                                 // ChannelDetails.
3301                                                 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3302                                                 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3303                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3304                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3305                                                                 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3306                                                                 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3307                                                                 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3308                                                                 network_update: None,
3309                                                                 all_paths_failed,
3310                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3311                                                                 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3312                                                                 retry,
3313 #[cfg(test)]
3314                                                                 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3315 #[cfg(test)]
3316                                                                 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3317                                                         }
3318                                                 );
3319                                         }
3320                                 }
3321                         },
3322                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3323                                 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3324                                         HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3325                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3326                                                 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3327                                                 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3328                                         },
3329                                         HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3330                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3331                                                 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3332                                         }
3333                                 };
3334
3335                                 let mut forward_event = None;
3336                                 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3337                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3338                                 }
3339                                 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3340                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3341                                                 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3342                                         },
3343                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3344                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3345                                         }
3346                                 }
3347                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3348                                 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3349                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3350                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3351                                                 time_forwardable: time
3352                                         });
3353                                 }
3354                         },
3355                 }
3356         }
3357
3358         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3359         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3360         ///
3361         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3362         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3363         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3364         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3365         ///
3366         /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3367         /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3368         ///
3369         /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3370         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3371         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3372         /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3373         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3374                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3375
3376                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3377
3378                 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3379                 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3380                 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3381                         assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3382
3383                         // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3384                         // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3385                         // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3386                         // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3387                         //
3388                         // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3389                         // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3390                         // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3391                         // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3392                         // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3393                         // it.
3394                         let mut valid_mpp = true;
3395                         for htlc in sources.iter() {
3396                                 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3397                                         valid_mpp = false;
3398                                         break;
3399                                 }
3400                         }
3401
3402                         let mut errs = Vec::new();
3403                         let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3404                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3405                                 if !valid_mpp {
3406                                         if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3407                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3408                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3409                                                         self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3410                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3411                                                                          HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3412                                                                          HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3413                                 } else {
3414                                         match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3415                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3416                                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3417                                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3418                                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3419                                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3420                                                                 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3421                                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3422                                                 },
3423                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3424                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3425                                                         // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3426                                                         // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3427                                                         // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3428                                                         // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3429                                                 },
3430                                                 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3431                                         }
3432                                 }
3433                         }
3434
3435                         // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3436                         // which were generated.
3437                         channel_state.take();
3438
3439                         for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3440                                 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3441                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3442                         }
3443
3444                         claimed_any_htlcs
3445                 } else { false }
3446         }
3447
3448         fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3449                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3450                 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3451                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3452                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3453                         None => {
3454                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3455                         }
3456                 };
3457
3458                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3459                         match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3460                                 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3461                                         if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3462                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3463                                                         log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3464                                                                 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3465                                                                 payment_preimage, e);
3466                                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3467                                                                 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3468                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3469                                                                 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3470                                                         );
3471                                                 }
3472                                                 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3473                                                         log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3474                                                                 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3475                                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3476                                                                 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3477                                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3478                                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3479                                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3480                                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3481                                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3482                                                                         update_fee: None,
3483                                                                         commitment_signed,
3484                                                                 }
3485                                                         });
3486                                                 }
3487                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3488                                         } else {
3489                                                 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3490                                         }
3491                                 },
3492                                 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3493                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3494                                                 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3495                                                         "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3496                                                         payment_preimage, e);
3497                                         }
3498                                         let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3499                                         let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3500                                         if drop {
3501                                                 chan.remove_entry();
3502                                         }
3503                                         return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3504                                 },
3505                         }
3506                 } else { unreachable!(); }
3507         }
3508
3509         fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3510                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3511                 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3512                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3513                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3514                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3515                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3516                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3517                                         assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3518                                         if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3519                                                 pending_events.push(
3520                                                         events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3521                                                                 payment_id,
3522                                                                 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3523                                                                 path,
3524                                                         }
3525                                                 );
3526                                         }
3527                                         if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3528                                                 payment.remove();
3529                                         }
3530                                 }
3531                         }
3532                 }
3533         }
3534
3535         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3536                 match source {
3537                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3538                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3539                                 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3540                                 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3541                                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3542                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3543                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3544                                         if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3545                                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3546                                                 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3547                                                 pending_events.push(
3548                                                         events::Event::PaymentSent {
3549                                                                 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3550                                                                 payment_preimage,
3551                                                                 payment_hash,
3552                                                                 fee_paid_msat,
3553                                                         }
3554                                                 );
3555                                                 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3556                                         }
3557
3558                                         if from_onchain {
3559                                                 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3560                                                 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3561                                                 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3562                                                 // restart.
3563                                                 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3564                                                 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3565                                                 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3566                                                         let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3567                                                         pending_events.push(
3568                                                                 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3569                                                                         payment_id,
3570                                                                         payment_hash,
3571                                                                         path,
3572                                                                 }
3573                                                         );
3574                                                 }
3575
3576                                                 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3577                                                         payment.remove();
3578                                                 }
3579                                         }
3580                                 } else {
3581                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3582                                 }
3583                         },
3584                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3585                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3586                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3587                                 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3588                                 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3589                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3590                                         ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3591                                         _ => None,
3592                                 };
3593                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3594                                         let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3595                                                 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3596                                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3597                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3598                                                 }],
3599                                         };
3600                                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3601                                         // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3602                                         // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3603                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3604                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3605                                                                                          payment_preimage, e);
3606                                         }
3607                                         // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3608                                         // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3609                                         // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3610                                         // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3611                                         // can happen.
3612                                 }
3613                                 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3614                                 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3615                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3616                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3617                                 }
3618
3619                                 if claimed_htlc {
3620                                         if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3621                                                 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3622                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3623                                                 } else { None };
3624
3625                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3626                                                 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3627                                                         fee_earned_msat,
3628                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3629                                                 });
3630                                         }
3631                                 }
3632                         },
3633                 }
3634         }
3635
3636         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3637         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3638                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3639         }
3640
3641         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3642                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3643
3644                 let chan_restoration_res;
3645                 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
3646                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3647                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3648                         let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3649                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3650                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3651                         };
3652                         if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3653                                 return;
3654                         }
3655
3656                         let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3657                         let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3658                                 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3659                                 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3660                                 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3661                                 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3662                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3663                                         node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3664                                         msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3665                                 })
3666                         } else { None };
3667                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
3668                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3669                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3670                         }
3671                         (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
3672                 };
3673                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3674                 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
3675                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3676                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3677                 }
3678         }
3679
3680         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3681                 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3682                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3683                 }
3684
3685                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
3686                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3687                 }
3688
3689                 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3690                                 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
3691                         .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3692                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3693                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3694                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3695                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3696                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3697                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3698                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3699                                         msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3700                                 });
3701                                 entry.insert(channel);
3702                         }
3703                 }
3704                 Ok(())
3705         }
3706
3707         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3708                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3709                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3710                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3711                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3712                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3713                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3714                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3715                                         }
3716                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3717                                         (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3718                                 },
3719                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3720                         }
3721                 };
3722                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3723                 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3724                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3725                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
3726                         output_script,
3727                         user_channel_id: user_id,
3728                 });
3729                 Ok(())
3730         }
3731
3732         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3733                 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3734                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3735                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3736                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3737                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3738                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3739                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3740                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3741                                         }
3742                                         (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3743                                 },
3744                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3745                         }
3746                 };
3747                 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3748                 // lock before watch_channel
3749                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3750                         match e {
3751                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3752                                         // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3753                                         // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3754                                         // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3755                                         // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3756                                         // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3757                                         // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3758                                         // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3759                                         let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3760                                         assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3761                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3762                                 },
3763                                 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3764                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3765                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3766                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3767                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
3768                                         chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3769                                 },
3770                         }
3771                 }
3772                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3773                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3774                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3775                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3776                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3777                         },
3778                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3779                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3780                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3781                                         msg: funding_msg,
3782                                 });
3783                                 e.insert(chan);
3784                         }
3785                 }
3786                 Ok(())
3787         }
3788
3789         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3790                 let funding_tx = {
3791                         let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3792                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3793                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3794                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3795                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3796                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3797                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3798                                         }
3799                                         let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3800                                                 Ok(update) => update,
3801                                                 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3802                                         };
3803                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3804                                                 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3805                                                 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
3806                                                         // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
3807                                                         // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
3808                                                         // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
3809                                                         if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
3810                                                                 shutdown_finish.0.take();
3811                                                         }
3812                                                 }
3813                                                 return res
3814                                         }
3815                                         funding_tx
3816                                 },
3817                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3818                         }
3819                 };
3820                 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3821                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3822                 Ok(())
3823         }
3824
3825         fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3826                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3827                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3828                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3829                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3830                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3831                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3832                                 }
3833                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3834                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3835                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3836                                         // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3837                                         // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3838                                         // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3839                                         // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3840                                         // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3841                                         // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3842                                         // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3843                                         // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3844                                         // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3845                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3846                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3847                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
3848                                         });
3849                                 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3850                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3851                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3852                                                 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3853                                         });
3854                                 }
3855                                 Ok(())
3856                         },
3857                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3858                 }
3859         }
3860
3861         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3862                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3863                 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3864                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3865                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3866
3867                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3868                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3869                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3870                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3871                                         }
3872
3873                                         if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3874                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3875                                                         log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3876                                                         if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3877                                         }
3878
3879                                         let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3880                                         dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3881
3882                                         // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3883                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3884                                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3885                                                         let (result, is_permanent) =
3886                                                                 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3887                                                         if is_permanent {
3888                                                                 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3889                                                                 break result;
3890                                                         }
3891                                                 }
3892                                         }
3893
3894                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3895                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3896                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3897                                                         msg,
3898                                                 });
3899                                         }
3900
3901                                         break Ok(());
3902                                 },
3903                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3904                         }
3905                 };
3906                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3907                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3908                 }
3909
3910                 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3911                 Ok(())
3912         }
3913
3914         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3915                 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3916                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3917                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3918                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3919                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3920                                         if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3921                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3922                                         }
3923                                         let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3924                                         if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3925                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3926                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3927                                                         msg,
3928                                                 });
3929                                         }
3930                                         if tx.is_some() {
3931                                                 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3932                                                 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3933                                                 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3934                                                 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3935                                                 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3936                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3937                                                         channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3938                                                 }
3939                                                 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3940                                         } else { (tx, None) }
3941                                 },
3942                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3943                         }
3944                 };
3945                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3946                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3947                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3948                 }
3949                 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3950                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3951                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3952                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3953                                         msg: update
3954                                 });
3955                         }
3956                         self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
3957                 }
3958                 Ok(())
3959         }
3960
3961         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3962                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3963                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3964                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3965                 //
3966                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3967                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3968                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3969                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3970
3971                 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3972                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3973
3974                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3975                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3976                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3977                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3978                                 }
3979
3980                                 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3981                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3982                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3983                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3984                                         match pending_forward_info {
3985                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3986                                                         let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3987                                                                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3988                                                                         onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3989                                                                                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3990                                                                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3991                                                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3992                                                                                 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3993                                                                                 res
3994                                                                         }[..])
3995                                                                 } else {
3996                                                                         // The only case where we'd be unable to
3997                                                                         // successfully get a channel update is if the
3998                                                                         // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3999                                                                         // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4000                                                                         // payments over the channel back to themselves
4001                                                                         // (because no one else should know the short_id
4002                                                                         // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4003                                                                         // no problem just calling this
4004                                                                         // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4005                                                                         onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4006                                                                 }
4007                                                         } else {
4008                                                                 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4009                                                         };
4010                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4011                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4012                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4013                                                                 reason
4014                                                         };
4015                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4016                                                 },
4017                                                 _ => pending_forward_info
4018                                         }
4019                                 };
4020                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4021                         },
4022                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4023                 }
4024                 Ok(())
4025         }
4026
4027         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4028                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4029                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4030                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4031                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4032                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4033                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4034                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4035                                         }
4036                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4037                                 },
4038                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4039                         }
4040                 };
4041                 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4042                 Ok(())
4043         }
4044
4045         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4046                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4047                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4048                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4049                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4050                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4051                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4052                                 }
4053                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4054                         },
4055                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4056                 }
4057                 Ok(())
4058         }
4059
4060         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4061                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4062                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4063                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4064                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4065                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4066                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4067                                 }
4068                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4069                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4070                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4071                                 }
4072                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4073                                 Ok(())
4074                         },
4075                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4076                 }
4077         }
4078
4079         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4080                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4081                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4082                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4083                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4084                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4085                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4086                                 }
4087                                 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4088                                         match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4089                                                 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4090                                                 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4091                                                         assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4092                                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4093                                                         try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4094                                                         unreachable!();
4095                                                 },
4096                                                 Ok(res) => res
4097                                         };
4098                                 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4099                                         return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4100                                 }
4101                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4102                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4103                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
4104                                 });
4105                                 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4106                                         channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4107                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4108                                                 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4109                                                         update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4110                                                         update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4111                                                         update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4112                                                         update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4113                                                         update_fee: None,
4114                                                         commitment_signed: msg,
4115                                                 },
4116                                         });
4117                                 }
4118                                 Ok(())
4119                         },
4120                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4121                 }
4122         }
4123
4124         #[inline]
4125         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4126                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4127                         let mut forward_event = None;
4128                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4129                                 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4130                                 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4131                                         forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4132                                 }
4133                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4134                                         match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4135                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4136                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4137                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4138                                         }) {
4139                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4140                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4141                                                                                                         prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4142                                                 },
4143                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4144                                                         entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4145                                                                                                      prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4146                                                 }
4147                                         }
4148                                 }
4149                         }
4150                         match forward_event {
4151                                 Some(time) => {
4152                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4153                                         pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4154                                                 time_forwardable: time
4155                                         });
4156                                 }
4157                                 None => {},
4158                         }
4159                 }
4160         }
4161
4162         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4163                 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4164                 let res = loop {
4165                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4166                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4167                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4168                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4169                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4170                                                 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4171                                         }
4172                                         let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4173                                         let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4174                                                 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4175                                         htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4176                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4177                                                 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4178                                                         assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4179                                                         assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4180                                                         assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4181                                                         assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4182                                                         break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4183                                                 } else {
4184                                                         if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4185                                                                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4186                                                                         raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4187                                                                         raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4188                                                                         raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4189                                                                 break Err(e);
4190                                                         } else { unreachable!(); }
4191                                                 }
4192                                         }
4193                                         if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4194                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4195                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4196                                                         updates,
4197                                                 });
4198                                         }
4199                                         break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4200                                                         raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4201                                                         chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4202                                                                 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4203                                                         chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4204                                 },
4205                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4206                         }
4207                 };
4208                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4209                 match res {
4210                         Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4211                                 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4212                         {
4213                                 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4214                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4215                                 }
4216                                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4217                                 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4218                                 Ok(())
4219                         },
4220                         Err(e) => Err(e)
4221                 }
4222         }
4223
4224         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4225                 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4226                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4227                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4228                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4229                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4230                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4231                                 }
4232                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4233                         },
4234                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4235                 }
4236                 Ok(())
4237         }
4238
4239         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4240                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4241                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4242
4243                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4244                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4245                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4246                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4247                                 }
4248                                 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4249                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4250                                 }
4251
4252                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4253                                         msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4254                                         // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4255                                         // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4256                                         update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4257                                 });
4258                         },
4259                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4260                 }
4261                 Ok(())
4262         }
4263
4264         /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4265         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4266                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4267                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4268                 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4269                         Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4270                         None => {
4271                                 // It's not a local channel
4272                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4273                         }
4274                 };
4275                 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4276                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4277                                 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4278                                         if chan.get().should_announce() {
4279                                                 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4280                                                 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4281                                                 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4282                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4283                                         }
4284                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4285                                 }
4286                                 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4287                                 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4288                                 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4289                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4290                                 } else {
4291                                         try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4292                                 }
4293                         },
4294                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4295                 }
4296                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4297         }
4298
4299         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4300                 let chan_restoration_res;
4301                 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4302                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4303                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4304
4305                         match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4306                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4307                                         if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4308                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4309                                         }
4310                                         // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4311                                         // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4312                                         // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4313                                         // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4314                                         let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4315                                                 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4316                                         let mut channel_update = None;
4317                                         if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4318                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4319                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4320                                                         msg,
4321                                                 });
4322                                         } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4323                                                 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4324                                                 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4325                                                 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4326                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4327                                                         node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4328                                                         msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4329                                                 });
4330                                         }
4331                                         let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4332                                         chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4333                                         if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4334                                                 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4335                                         }
4336                                         (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4337                                 },
4338                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4339                         }
4340                 };
4341                 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4342                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4343
4344                 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4345                         self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4346                 }
4347                 Ok(())
4348         }
4349
4350         /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4351         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4352                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4353                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4354                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4355                 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4356                         match monitor_event {
4357                                 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4358                                         if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4359                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4360                                                 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4361                                         } else {
4362                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4363                                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4364                                         }
4365                                 },
4366                                 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4367                                 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4368                                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4369                                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4370                                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4371                                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4372                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4373                                         if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4374                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4375                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4376                                                 }
4377                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4378                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4379                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4380                                                                 msg: update
4381                                                         });
4382                                                 }
4383                                                 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4384                                                         ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4385                                                 } else {
4386                                                         ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4387                                                 };
4388                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4389                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4390                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4391                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4392                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4393                                                         },
4394                                                 });
4395                                         }
4396                                 },
4397                                 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4398                                         self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4399                                 },
4400                         }
4401                 }
4402
4403                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4404                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4405                 }
4406
4407                 has_pending_monitor_events
4408         }
4409
4410         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4411         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4412         /// update events as a separate process method here.
4413         #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4414         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4415                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4416         }
4417
4418         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4419         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4420         /// update was applied.
4421         ///
4422         /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4423         /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4424         /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4425         /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4426         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4427                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4428                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4429                 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4430                 {
4431                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4432                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4433                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4434                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4435                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4436
4437                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4438                                 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4439                                         Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4440                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4441                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4442                                                 }
4443                                                 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4444                                                         if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4445                                                                 has_monitor_update = true;
4446                                                                 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4447                                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4448                                                                 if close_channel { return false; }
4449                                                         } else {
4450                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4451                                                                         node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4452                                                                         updates: commitment_update,
4453                                                                 });
4454                                                         }
4455                                                 }
4456                                                 true
4457                                         },
4458                                         Err(e) => {
4459                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4460                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4461                                                 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4462                                                 !close_channel
4463                                         }
4464                                 }
4465                         });
4466                 }
4467
4468                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4469                 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4470                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4471                 }
4472
4473                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4474                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4475                 }
4476
4477                 has_update
4478         }
4479
4480         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4481         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4482         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4483         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4484                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4485                 let mut has_update = false;
4486                 {
4487                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4488                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4489                         let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4490                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4491                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4492
4493                         by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4494                                 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4495                                         Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4496                                                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4497                                                         has_update = true;
4498                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4499                                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4500                                                         });
4501                                                 }
4502                                                 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4503                                                         // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4504                                                         // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4505                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4506                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4507                                                         }
4508
4509                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4510                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4511                                                                         msg: update
4512                                                                 });
4513                                                         }
4514
4515                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4516
4517                                                         log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4518                                                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4519                                                         false
4520                                                 } else { true }
4521                                         },
4522                                         Err(e) => {
4523                                                 has_update = true;
4524                                                 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4525                                                 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4526                                                 !close_channel
4527                                         }
4528                                 }
4529                         });
4530                 }
4531
4532                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4533                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4534                 }
4535
4536                 has_update
4537         }
4538
4539         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4540         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4541         /// Channel object.
4542         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4543                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4544                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4545                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4546                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
4547                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4548                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4549                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4550                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4551                         if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4552                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4553                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4554                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
4555                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
4556                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4557                         }
4558                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4559                 }
4560         }
4561
4562         fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4563                 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4564
4565                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4566
4567                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4568                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4569                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4570                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4571                                 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4572                                         payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
4573                                         user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
4574                                         // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4575                                         // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4576                                         // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4577                                         // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4578                                         // never fail a payment too early.
4579                                         // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4580                                         // timestamps.
4581                                         expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4582                                 });
4583                         },
4584                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4585                 }
4586                 Ok(payment_secret)
4587         }
4588
4589         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4590         /// to pay us.
4591         ///
4592         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4593         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4594         ///
4595         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4596         /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4597         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4598         ///
4599         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4600         ///
4601         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4602         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4603         /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4604         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4605         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4606                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4607                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4608
4609                 (payment_hash,
4610                         self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4611                                 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4612         }
4613
4614         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4615         /// stored external to LDK.
4616         ///
4617         /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4618         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4619         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4620         ///
4621         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4622         /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4623         ///
4624         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4625         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4626         /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4627         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4628         ///
4629         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4630         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4631         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4632         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4633         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4634         ///
4635         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4636         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4637         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4638         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4639         /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4640         ///
4641         /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4642         /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4643         /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4644         ///
4645         /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4646         ///
4647         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4648         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4649         ///
4650         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4651         /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4652         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4653                 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
4654         }
4655
4656         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4657         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4658                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4659                 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4660                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4661                 events.into_inner()
4662         }
4663
4664         #[cfg(test)]
4665         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
4666                 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
4667         }
4668
4669         #[cfg(test)]
4670         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
4671                 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
4672         }
4673 }
4674
4675 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4676         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4677         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4678         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4679         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4680                                 L::Target: Logger,
4681 {
4682         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4683                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4684                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4685                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4686
4687                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4688                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4689                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4690                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4691                         }
4692
4693                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4694                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4695                         }
4696                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4697                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4698                         }
4699
4700                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4701                         let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4702                         mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4703
4704                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4705                                 events.replace(pending_events);
4706                         }
4707
4708                         result
4709                 });
4710                 events.into_inner()
4711         }
4712 }
4713
4714 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4715 where
4716         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4717         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4718         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4719         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4720         L::Target: Logger,
4721 {
4722         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4723         ///
4724         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4725         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4726         ///
4727         /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4728         /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4729         /// restarting from an old state.
4730         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4731                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4732                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4733
4734                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4735                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4736                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4737                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4738                         }
4739
4740                         let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4741                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4742                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4743                         }
4744
4745                         for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4746                                 handler.handle_event(&event);
4747                         }
4748
4749                         result
4750                 });
4751         }
4752 }
4753
4754 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4755 where
4756         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4757         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4758         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4759         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4760         L::Target: Logger,
4761 {
4762         fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4763                 {
4764                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4765                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4766                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4767                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4768                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4769                 }
4770
4771                 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4772                 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4773                 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4774         }
4775
4776         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4777                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4778                 let new_height = height - 1;
4779                 {
4780                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4781                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4782                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4783                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4784                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4785                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4786                 }
4787
4788                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4789         }
4790 }
4791
4792 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4793 where
4794         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4795         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4796         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4797         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4798         L::Target: Logger,
4799 {
4800         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4801                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4802                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4803                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4804
4805                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4806                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4807
4808                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4809                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4810         }
4811
4812         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4813                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4814                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4815                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4816
4817                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4818                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4819
4820                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4821
4822                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4823
4824                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4825
4826                 macro_rules! max_time {
4827                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
4828                                 loop {
4829                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4830                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4831                                         // having an explicit local time source.
4832                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4833                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4834                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4835                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4836                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4837                                                 break;
4838                                         }
4839                                 }
4840                         }
4841                 }
4842                 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4843                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4844                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4845                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4846                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4847                 });
4848
4849                 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4850                 outbounds.retain(|_, payment| {
4851                         const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
4852                         if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
4853                         if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, .. } = payment {
4854                                 return *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS > height
4855                         }
4856                         true
4857                 });
4858         }
4859
4860         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4861                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4862                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4863                 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4864                         if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4865                                 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4866                         }
4867                 }
4868                 res
4869         }
4870
4871         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4872                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4873                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4874                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4875                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4876                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4877                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4878                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4879                 });
4880         }
4881 }
4882
4883 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4884 where
4885         M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4886         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4887         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4888         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4889         L::Target: Logger,
4890 {
4891         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4892         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4893         /// the function.
4894         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
4895                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4896                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4897                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4898                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4899
4900                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4901                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4902                 {
4903                         let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4904                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4905                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4906                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4907                         channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4908                                 let res = f(channel);
4909                                 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4910                                         for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4911                                                 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4912                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash,  HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4913                                                         failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4914                                                         data: chan_update,
4915                                                 }));
4916                                         }
4917                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4918                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4919                                                         node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4920                                                         msg: funding_locked,
4921                                                 });
4922                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4923                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4924                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4925                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4926                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
4927                                                         });
4928                                                 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4929                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4930                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4931                                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4932                                                                 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4933                                                         });
4934                                                 } else {
4935                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4936                                                 }
4937                                                 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4938                                         }
4939                                 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
4940                                         if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4941                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4942                                         }
4943                                         // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4944                                         // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4945                                         failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4946                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4947                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4948                                                         msg: update
4949                                                 });
4950                                         }
4951                                         let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
4952                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
4953                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4954                                                 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4955                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4956                                                         channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
4957                                                         data: reason_message,
4958                                                 } },
4959                                         });
4960                                         return false;
4961                                 }
4962                                 true
4963                         });
4964
4965                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4966                                 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4967                                         htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4968                                                 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4969                                                 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4970                                                 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4971                                                 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4972                                                 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4973                                                         let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4974                                                         htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4975                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4976                                                                 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4977                                                                 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4978                                                         }));
4979                                                         false
4980                                                 } else { true }
4981                                         });
4982                                         !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4983                                 });
4984                         }
4985                 }
4986
4987                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4988
4989                 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4990                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4991                 }
4992         }
4993
4994         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4995         /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4996         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4997         /// up.
4998         /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4999         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5000         pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5001                 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5002         }
5003
5004         /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5005         /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5006         /// up.
5007         pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5008                 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5009         }
5010
5011         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5012         pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5013                 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5014                 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5015                 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5016                 *guard
5017         }
5018
5019         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5020         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5021         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5022                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5023         }
5024 }
5025
5026 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5027         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5028         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5029         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5030         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5031         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5032         L::Target: Logger,
5033 {
5034         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5035                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5036                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5037         }
5038
5039         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5040                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5041                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5042         }
5043
5044         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5045                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5046                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5047         }
5048
5049         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5050                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5051                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5052         }
5053
5054         fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5055                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5056                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5057         }
5058
5059         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5060                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5061                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5062         }
5063
5064         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5065                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5066                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5067         }
5068
5069         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5070                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5071                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5072         }
5073
5074         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5075                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5076                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5077         }
5078
5079         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5080                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5081                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5082         }
5083
5084         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5085                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5086                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5087         }
5088
5089         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5090                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5091                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5092         }
5093
5094         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5095                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5096                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5097         }
5098
5099         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5100                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5101                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5102         }
5103
5104         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5105                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5106                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5107         }
5108
5109         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5110                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5111                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5112                                 persist
5113                         } else {
5114                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5115                         }
5116                 });
5117         }
5118
5119         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5120                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5121                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5122         }
5123
5124         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5125                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5126                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5127                 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5128                 {
5129                         let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5130                         let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5131                         let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5132                         let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5133                         if no_connection_possible {
5134                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5135                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5136                                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5137                                                 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5138                                                         short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5139                                                 }
5140                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5141                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5142                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5143                                                                 msg: update
5144                                                         });
5145                                                 }
5146                                                 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5147                                                 false
5148                                         } else {
5149                                                 true
5150                                         }
5151                                 });
5152                         } else {
5153                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5154                                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5155                                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5156                                                 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5157                                                 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5158                                                         if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5159                                                                 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5160                                                         }
5161                                                         self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5162                                                         return false;
5163                                                 } else {
5164                                                         no_channels_remain = false;
5165                                                 }
5166                                         }
5167                                         true
5168                                 })
5169                         }
5170                         pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5171                                 match msg {
5172                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5173                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5174                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5175                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5176                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5177                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5178                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5179                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5180                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5181                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5182                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5183                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5184                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5185                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5186                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5187                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5188                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5189                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5190                                         &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5191                                 }
5192                         });
5193                 }
5194                 if no_channels_remain {
5195                         self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5196                 }
5197
5198                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5199                         self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5200                 }
5201         }
5202
5203         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5204                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5205
5206                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5207
5208                 {
5209                         let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5210                         match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5211                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5212                                         e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5213                                                 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5214                                         }));
5215                                 },
5216                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5217                                         e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5218                                 },
5219                         }
5220                 }
5221
5222                 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5223                 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5224                 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5225                 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5226                         if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5227                                 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5228                                         // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5229                                         // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5230                                         // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5231                                         // drop it.
5232                                         false
5233                                 } else {
5234                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5235                                                 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5236                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5237                                         });
5238                                         true
5239                                 }
5240                         } else { true }
5241                 });
5242                 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5243         }
5244
5245         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5246                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5247
5248                 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5249                         for chan in self.list_channels() {
5250                                 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5251                                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5252                                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5253                                 }
5254                         }
5255                 } else {
5256                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5257                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5258                 }
5259         }
5260 }
5261
5262 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5263 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5264 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5265         /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5266         /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5267         persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5268 }
5269
5270 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5271         fn new() -> Self {
5272                 Self {
5273                         persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5274                 }
5275         }
5276
5277         fn wait(&self) {
5278                 loop {
5279                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5280                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5281                         if *guard {
5282                                 *guard = false;
5283                                 return;
5284                         }
5285                         guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5286                         let result = *guard;
5287                         if result {
5288                                 *guard = false;
5289                                 return
5290                         }
5291                 }
5292         }
5293
5294         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
5295         fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5296                 let current_time = Instant::now();
5297                 loop {
5298                         let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5299                         let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5300                         if *guard {
5301                                 *guard = false;
5302                                 return true;
5303                         }
5304                         guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5305                         // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5306                         // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5307                         // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5308                         // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5309                         // 1.42.0.
5310                         let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5311                         let result = *guard;
5312                         if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5313                                 *guard = false;
5314                                 return result;
5315                         }
5316                         match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5317                                 None => return result,
5318                                 Some(_) => continue
5319                         }
5320                 }
5321         }
5322
5323         // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5324         fn notify(&self) {
5325                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5326                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5327                 *persistence_lock = true;
5328                 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5329                 cnd.notify_all();
5330         }
5331 }
5332
5333 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5334 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5335
5336 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5337         (0, Forward) => {
5338                 (0, onion_packet, required),
5339                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5340         },
5341         (1, Receive) => {
5342                 (0, payment_data, required),
5343                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5344         },
5345         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5346                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5347                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5348         },
5349 ;);
5350
5351 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5352         (0, routing, required),
5353         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5354         (4, payment_hash, required),
5355         (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5356         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5357 });
5358
5359
5360 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5361         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5362                 match self {
5363                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5364                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
5365                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5366                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5367                                 reason.write(writer)?;
5368                         },
5369                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5370                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5371                         }) => {
5372                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
5373                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5374                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5375                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5376                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5377                         },
5378                 }
5379                 Ok(())
5380         }
5381 }
5382
5383 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5384         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5385                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5386                 match id {
5387                         0 => {
5388                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5389                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5390                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5391                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5392                                 }))
5393                         },
5394                         1 => {
5395                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5396                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5397                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5398                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5399                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5400                                 }))
5401                         },
5402                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5403                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5404                         // messages contained in the variants.
5405                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5406                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5407                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5408                         2 => {
5409                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5410                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5411                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5412                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5413                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5414                         },
5415                         3 => {
5416                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5417                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5418                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5419                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5420                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5421                         },
5422                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5423                 }
5424         }
5425 }
5426
5427 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5428         (0, Forward),
5429         (1, Fail),
5430 );
5431
5432 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5433         (0, short_channel_id, required),
5434         (2, outpoint, required),
5435         (4, htlc_id, required),
5436         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5437 });
5438
5439 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5440         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5441                 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5442                         OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
5443                         _ => None,
5444                 };
5445                 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5446                         OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
5447                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5448                 };
5449                 write_tlv_fields!
5450                 (writer,
5451                  {
5452                    (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
5453                    (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5454                          (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5455                  });
5456                 Ok(())
5457         }
5458 }
5459
5460 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5461         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5462                 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5463                 let mut value = 0;
5464                 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5465                 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5466                 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5467                 read_tlv_fields!
5468                 (reader,
5469                  {
5470                    (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
5471                    (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5472                          (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5473                  });
5474                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5475                         Some(p) => {
5476                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
5477                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5478                                 }
5479                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5480                         },
5481                         None => {
5482                                 if payment_data.is_none() {
5483                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5484                                 }
5485                                 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
5486                         },
5487                 };
5488                 Ok(Self {
5489                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5490                         value,
5491                         onion_payload,
5492                         cltv_expiry,
5493                 })
5494         }
5495 }
5496
5497 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5498         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5499                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5500                 match id {
5501                         0 => {
5502                                 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5503                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
5504                                 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
5505                                 let mut payment_id = None;
5506                                 let mut payment_secret = None;
5507                                 let mut payee = None;
5508                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5509                                         (0, session_priv, required),
5510                                         (1, payment_id, option),
5511                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5512                                         (3, payment_secret, option),
5513                                         (4, path, vec_type),
5514                                         (5, payee, option),
5515                                 });
5516                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
5517                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5518                                         // instead.
5519                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5520                                 }
5521                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5522                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5523                                         first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5524                                         path: path.unwrap(),
5525                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
5526                                         payment_secret,
5527                                         payee,
5528                                 })
5529                         }
5530                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5531                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5532                 }
5533         }
5534 }
5535
5536 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5537         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5538                 match self {
5539                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payee } => {
5540                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
5541                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
5542                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5543                                         (0, session_priv, required),
5544                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
5545                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5546                                         (3, payment_secret, option),
5547                                         (4, path, vec_type),
5548                                         (5, payee, option),
5549                                  });
5550                         }
5551                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5552                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
5553                                 field.write(writer)?;
5554                         }
5555                 }
5556                 Ok(())
5557         }
5558 }
5559
5560 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5561         (0, LightningError) => {
5562                 (0, err, required),
5563         },
5564         (1, Reason) => {
5565                 (0, failure_code, required),
5566                 (2, data, vec_type),
5567         },
5568 ;);
5569
5570 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5571         (0, AddHTLC) => {
5572                 (0, forward_info, required),
5573                 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5574                 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5575                 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5576         },
5577         (1, FailHTLC) => {
5578                 (0, htlc_id, required),
5579                 (2, err_packet, required),
5580         },
5581 ;);
5582
5583 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5584         (0, payment_secret, required),
5585         (2, expiry_time, required),
5586         (4, user_payment_id, required),
5587         (6, payment_preimage, required),
5588         (8, min_value_msat, required),
5589 });
5590
5591 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
5592         (0, Legacy) => {
5593                 (0, session_privs, required),
5594         },
5595         (1, Fulfilled) => {
5596                 (0, session_privs, required),
5597                 (1, payment_hash, option),
5598         },
5599         (2, Retryable) => {
5600                 (0, session_privs, required),
5601                 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
5602                 (2, payment_hash, required),
5603                 (4, payment_secret, option),
5604                 (6, total_msat, required),
5605                 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
5606                 (10, starting_block_height, required),
5607         },
5608 );
5609
5610 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5611         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5612         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5613         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5614         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5615         L::Target: Logger,
5616 {
5617         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5618                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5619
5620                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5621
5622                 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5623                 {
5624                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5625                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5626                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5627                 }
5628
5629                 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5630                 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5631                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5632                         if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5633                                 unfunded_channels += 1;
5634                         }
5635                 }
5636                 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5637                 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5638                         if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5639                                 channel.write(writer)?;
5640                         }
5641                 }
5642
5643                 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5644                 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5645                         short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5646                         (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5647                         for forward in pending_forwards {
5648                                 forward.write(writer)?;
5649                         }
5650                 }
5651
5652                 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5653                 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5654                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5655                         (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5656                         for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5657                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
5658                         }
5659                 }
5660
5661                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5662                 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5663                 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5664                         peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5665                         let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5666                         peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5667                 }
5668
5669                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5670                 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5671                 for event in events.iter() {
5672                         event.write(writer)?;
5673                 }
5674
5675                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5676                 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5677                 for event in background_events.iter() {
5678                         match event {
5679                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5680                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
5681                                         funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5682                                         monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5683                                 },
5684                         }
5685                 }
5686
5687                 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5688                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5689
5690                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5691                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5692                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5693                         hash.write(writer)?;
5694                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5695                 }
5696
5697                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5698                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5699                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5700                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5701                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() {
5702                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
5703                         }
5704                 }
5705                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5706                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5707                         match outbound {
5708                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5709                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5710                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
5711                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
5712                                         }
5713                                 }
5714                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
5715                         }
5716                 }
5717
5718                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
5719                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
5720                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5721                         match outbound {
5722                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
5723                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
5724                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
5725                                 },
5726                                 _ => {},
5727                         }
5728                 }
5729                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5730                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
5731                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5732                 });
5733
5734                 Ok(())
5735         }
5736 }
5737
5738 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5739 ///
5740 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5741 /// is:
5742 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5743 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
5744 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
5745 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
5746 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5747 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
5748 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
5749 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
5750 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
5751 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
5752 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
5753 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
5754 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
5755 ///    the next step.
5756 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
5757 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
5758 ///
5759 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
5760 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
5761 ///
5762 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5763 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5764 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5765 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5766 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5767 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5768 ///
5769 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
5770 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5771         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5772         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5773         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5774         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5775         L::Target: Logger,
5776 {
5777         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5778         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5779         /// signing data.
5780         pub keys_manager: K,
5781
5782         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5783         ///
5784         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5785         pub fee_estimator: F,
5786         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5787         ///
5788         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5789         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5790         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5791         pub chain_monitor: M,
5792
5793         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5794         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5795         /// force-closed during deserialization.
5796         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5797         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5798         /// deserialization.
5799         pub logger: L,
5800         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5801         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5802         pub default_config: UserConfig,
5803
5804         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5805         /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5806         ///
5807         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5808         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5809         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5810         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5811         ///
5812         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5813         /// this struct.
5814         ///
5815         /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5816         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5817 }
5818
5819 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5820                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5821         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5822                 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5823                 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5824                 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5825                 L::Target: Logger,
5826         {
5827         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5828         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5829         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5830         pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5831                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5832                 Self {
5833                         keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5834                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5835                 }
5836         }
5837 }
5838
5839 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5840 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5841 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5842         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5843         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5844         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5845         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5846         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5847         L::Target: Logger,
5848 {
5849         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5850                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5851                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5852         }
5853 }
5854
5855 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5856         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5857         where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5858         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5859         K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5860         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5861         L::Target: Logger,
5862 {
5863         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5864                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5865
5866                 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5867                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5868                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5869
5870                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5871
5872                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5873                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5874                 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5875                 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5876                 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
5877                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5878                         let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
5879                         let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5880                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5881                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5882                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5883                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5884                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5885                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5886                                         // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5887                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5888                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5889                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5890                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5891                                         log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5892                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5893                                         log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5894                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5895                                 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5896                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5897                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5898                                                 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5899                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5900                                         log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5901                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5902                                         log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5903                                                 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5904                                         let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5905                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5906                                         monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5907                                         channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
5908                                                 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5909                                                 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
5910                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
5911                                         });
5912                                 } else {
5913                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5914                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5915                                                 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5916                                         }
5917                                         by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5918                                 }
5919                         } else {
5920                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5921                                 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5922                                 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5923                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5924                                 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5925                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5926                         }
5927                 }
5928
5929                 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5930                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5931                                 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
5932                                 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5933                         }
5934                 }
5935
5936                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5937                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5938                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5939                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5940                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5941                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5942                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5943                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5944                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5945                         }
5946                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5947                 }
5948
5949                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5950                 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5951                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5952                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5953                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5954                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5955                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5956                                 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5957                         }
5958                         claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5959                 }
5960
5961                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5962                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5963                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5964                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5965                         let peer_state = PeerState {
5966                                 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5967                         };
5968                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5969                 }
5970
5971                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5972                 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5973                 for _ in 0..event_count {
5974                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5975                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5976                                 None => continue,
5977                         }
5978                 }
5979                 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
5980                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
5981                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
5982                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
5983                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
5984                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
5985                         pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5986                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
5987                         });
5988                 }
5989
5990                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5991                 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5992                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5993                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5994                                 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5995                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5996                         }
5997                 }
5998
5999                 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6000                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6001
6002                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6003                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6004                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6005                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6006                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6007                         }
6008                 }
6009
6010                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6011                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6012                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6013                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6014                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6015                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6016                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6017                         };
6018                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6019                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6020                         };
6021                 }
6022
6023                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6024                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6025                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6026                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6027                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6028                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6029                 });
6030                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6031                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6032                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6033                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6034                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6035                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6036                         }
6037                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6038                 } else {
6039                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6040                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6041                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6042                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6043                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6044                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6045                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6046                         // 0.0.102+
6047                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6048                                 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6049                                         for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6050                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6051                                                         if path.is_empty() {
6052                                                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6053                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6054                                                         }
6055                                                         let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6056                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6057                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6058                                                         match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6059                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6060                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6061                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6062                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6063                                                                 },
6064                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6065                                                                         let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6066                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6067                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6068                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6069                                                                                 payment_secret,
6070                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6071                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6072                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
6073                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6074                                                                         });
6075                                                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6076                                                                                 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0),  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6077                                                                 }
6078                                                         }
6079                                                 }
6080                                         }
6081                                 }
6082                         }
6083                 }
6084
6085                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6086                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6087
6088                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6089                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6090                 }
6091
6092                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6093                         genesis_hash,
6094                         fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6095                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6096                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6097
6098                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6099
6100                         channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6101                                 by_id,
6102                                 short_to_id,
6103                                 forward_htlcs,
6104                                 claimable_htlcs,
6105                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6106                         }),
6107                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6108                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6109
6110                         our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6111                         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
6112                         secp_ctx,
6113
6114                         last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6115                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6116
6117                         per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6118
6119                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6120                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6121                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6122                         persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6123
6124                         keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6125                         logger: args.logger,
6126                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
6127                 };
6128
6129                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6130                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6131                 }
6132
6133                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6134                 //connection or two.
6135
6136                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6137         }
6138 }
6139
6140 #[cfg(test)]
6141 mod tests {
6142         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6143         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6144         use core::time::Duration;
6145         use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6146         use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6147         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6148         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6149         use ln::msgs;
6150         use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6151         use routing::router::{Payee, RouteParameters, find_route};
6152         use util::errors::APIError;
6153         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6154         use util::test_utils;
6155
6156         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6157         #[test]
6158         fn test_wait_timeout() {
6159                 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6160                 use sync::Arc;
6161                 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
6162                 use std::thread;
6163
6164                 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6165                 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6166
6167                 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6168                 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6169                 thread::spawn(move || {
6170                         loop {
6171                                 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6172                                 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6173                                 *persistence_lock = true;
6174                                 cnd.notify_all();
6175
6176                                 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6177                                         break
6178                                 }
6179                         }
6180                 });
6181
6182                 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6183                 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6184
6185                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6186                 // available.
6187                 loop {
6188                         if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6189                                 break
6190                         }
6191                 }
6192
6193                 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6194
6195                 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6196                 // are available.
6197                 loop {
6198                         if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6199                                 break
6200                         }
6201                 }
6202         }
6203
6204         #[test]
6205         fn test_notify_limits() {
6206                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6207                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6208                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6209                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6210                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6211                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6212
6213                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6214                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6215                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6216                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6217                 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6218
6219                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6220
6221                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6222                 // to connect messages with new values
6223                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6224                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6225                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6226                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6227
6228                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6229                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6230                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6231                 // ... but the last node should not.
6232                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6233                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6234                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6235                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6236
6237                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6238                 // about the channel.
6239                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6240                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6241                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6242
6243                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6244                 // parties.
6245                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6246                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6247                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6248                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6249                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6250                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6251
6252                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6253                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6254                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6255
6256                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6257                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6258                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6259                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6260                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6261                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6262
6263                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6264                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6265                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6266                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6267                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6268                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6269                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6270                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6271
6272                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6273                 // the channel info has updated.
6274                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6275                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6276                 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6277                 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6278                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6279                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6280         }
6281
6282         #[test]
6283         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6284                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6285                 // expected.
6286                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6287                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6288                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6289                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6290                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6291
6292                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6293                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6294                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6295                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6296                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6297                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6298                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6299                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6300                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6301                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6302                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6303
6304                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6305                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6306                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6307                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6308                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6309                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6310                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6311                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6312                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6313                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6314                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6315                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6316                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6317                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6318                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6319                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6320                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6321                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6322                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6323                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6324                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6325                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6326
6327                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6328                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payee, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6329                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6330                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6331                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6332                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6333
6334                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6335                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6336                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6337                 // lightning messages manually.
6338                 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6339                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6340                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6341                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6342                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6343                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6344                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6345                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6346                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6347                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6348                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6349                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6350                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6351                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6352                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6353                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6354                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6355                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6356                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6357                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6358                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6359                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6360                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6361                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6362                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6363                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6364                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6365
6366                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6367                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6368                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6369                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6370                 match events[0] {
6371                         Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6372                                 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6373                                 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6374                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6375                         },
6376                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6377                 }
6378                 match events[1] {
6379                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6380                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6381                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6382                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6383                         },
6384                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6385                 }
6386                 match events[2] {
6387                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6388                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6389                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6390                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6391                         },
6392                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6393                 }
6394         }
6395
6396         #[test]
6397         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6398                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6399                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6400                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6401                 //      fails as expected.
6402                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6403                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6404                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6405                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6406                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6407                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6408
6409                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6410                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6411                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6412
6413                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6414                 let params = RouteParameters {
6415                         payee: Payee::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6416                         final_value_msat: 100_000,
6417                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6418                 };
6419                 let route = find_route(
6420                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6421                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6422                 ).unwrap();
6423                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6424                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6425                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6426                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6427                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6428                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6429                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6430                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6431                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6432                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6433                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6434                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6435                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6436                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6437                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6438                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6439                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6440                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6441                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6442                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6443                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6444
6445                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6446                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6447
6448                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6449                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6450                 let route = find_route(
6451                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6452                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6453                 ).unwrap();
6454                 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6455                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6456                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6457                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6458                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6459                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6460                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6461
6462                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6463                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6464                 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6465                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6466                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6467                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6468                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6469                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6470                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6471                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6472                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6473                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6474                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6475                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6476                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6477                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6478                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6479                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6480                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6481                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6482                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6483                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6484                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6485
6486                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
6487                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6488         }
6489
6490         #[test]
6491         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
6492                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
6493                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
6494                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6495                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6496                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6497                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6498
6499                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6500                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6501                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6502                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6503
6504                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6505                 let params = RouteParameters {
6506                         payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6507                         final_value_msat: 10000,
6508                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6509                 };
6510                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6511                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6512                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6513                 let route = find_route(
6514                         &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6515                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6516                 ).unwrap();
6517
6518                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6519                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
6520                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6521                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6522
6523                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6524                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6525                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6526                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6527                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6528                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6529                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6530
6531                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
6532         }
6533
6534         #[test]
6535         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
6536                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
6537                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6538                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6539                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6540                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6541
6542                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
6543                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6544                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6545                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6546
6547                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6548                 let params = RouteParameters {
6549                         payee: Payee::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
6550                         final_value_msat: 10000,
6551                         final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
6552                 };
6553                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
6554                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
6555                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6556                 let route = find_route(
6557                         &payer_pubkey, &params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
6558                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6559                 ).unwrap();
6560
6561                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6562                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6563                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
6564                 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
6565                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6566
6567                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6568                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
6569                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6570                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
6571                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6572                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6573                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
6574
6575                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
6576         }
6577
6578         #[test]
6579         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
6580                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
6581                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
6582                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
6583                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6584
6585                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6586                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6587                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6588                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
6589
6590                 // Marshall an MPP route.
6591                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
6592                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
6593                 route.paths.push(path);
6594                 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
6595                 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
6596                 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
6597                 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
6598                 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
6599                 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
6600
6601                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
6602                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
6603                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))                        },
6604                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
6605                 }
6606         }
6607 }
6608
6609 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
6610 pub mod bench {
6611         use chain::Listen;
6612         use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
6613         use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
6614         use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
6615         use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
6616         use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6617         use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
6618         use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
6619         use routing::router::{Payee, get_route};
6620         use routing::scoring::Scorer;
6621         use util::test_utils;
6622         use util::config::UserConfig;
6623         use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
6624
6625         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6626         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6627         use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
6628
6629         use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
6630
6631         use test::Bencher;
6632
6633         struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
6634                 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
6635                         &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
6636                                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
6637                                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
6638                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
6639                         &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
6640         }
6641
6642         #[cfg(test)]
6643         #[bench]
6644         fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
6645                 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
6646         }
6647
6648         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
6649                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
6650                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
6651                 // calls per node.
6652                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
6653                 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
6654
6655                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
6656                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
6657
6658                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
6659                 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
6660
6661                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6662                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
6663                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
6664                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
6665                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6666                         network,
6667                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6668                 });
6669                 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
6670
6671                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
6672                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
6673                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
6674                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6675                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6676                         network,
6677                         best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6678                 });
6679                 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6680
6681                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6682                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6683                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6684                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6685                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6686
6687                 let tx;
6688                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6689                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6690                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6691                         }]};
6692                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6693                 } else { panic!(); }
6694
6695                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6696                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6697
6698                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6699
6700                 let block = Block {
6701                         header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6702                         txdata: vec![tx],
6703                 };
6704                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6705                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6706
6707                 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6708                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6709                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6710                 match msg_events[0] {
6711                         MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6712                                 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6713                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6714                         },
6715                         _ => panic!(),
6716                 }
6717                 match msg_events[1] {
6718                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6719                         _ => panic!(),
6720                 }
6721
6722                 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6723
6724                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6725                 macro_rules! send_payment {
6726                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6727                                 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6728                                 let payee = Payee::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
6729                                         .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
6730                                 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6731                                 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payee, &dummy_graph,
6732                                         Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
6733
6734                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6735                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6736                                 payment_count += 1;
6737                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6738                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
6739
6740                                 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6741                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6742                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6743                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6744                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6745                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6746                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6747                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6748
6749                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6750                                 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6751                                 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6752
6753                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6754                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6755                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6756                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6757                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6758                                         },
6759                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6760                                 }
6761
6762                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6763                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6764                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6765                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6766
6767                                 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6768                         }
6769                 }
6770
6771                 bench.iter(|| {
6772                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6773                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
6774                 });
6775         }
6776 }