1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::events;
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
96 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
148 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
149 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
157 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
159 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
160 short_channel_id: u64,
162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
166 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
171 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
173 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
174 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
175 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
178 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
181 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
182 struct ClaimableHTLC {
183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
185 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
187 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
189 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
193 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
194 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
195 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
196 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
198 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
204 impl Readable for PaymentId {
205 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
206 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
211 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
212 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for InterceptId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
228 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
229 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
231 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
232 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
235 session_priv: SecretKey,
236 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
237 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
238 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
239 payment_id: PaymentId,
240 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
241 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
244 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
245 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
246 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
248 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
250 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
252 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
255 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
256 payment_id.hash(hasher);
257 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
258 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
259 payment_params.hash(hasher);
264 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
267 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
268 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
270 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
271 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
272 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
273 payment_secret: None,
274 payment_params: None,
279 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
280 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
282 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
290 impl HTLCFailReason {
291 pub(super) fn reason(failure_code: u16, data: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
292 Self::Reason { failure_code, data }
295 pub(super) fn from_failure_code(failure_code: u16) -> Self {
296 Self::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }
300 struct ReceiveError {
306 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
308 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
309 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
310 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
311 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
312 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
314 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
315 err: msgs::LightningError,
316 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
317 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
319 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
321 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
323 err: LightningError {
325 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
326 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
333 shutdown_finish: None,
337 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
339 err: LightningError {
341 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
344 shutdown_finish: None,
348 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
349 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
352 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
354 err: LightningError {
356 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
357 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
363 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
364 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
368 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
371 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
373 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
374 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
378 log_level: Level::Warn,
381 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
383 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
385 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
387 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
388 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
396 shutdown_finish: None,
401 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
402 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
403 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
404 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
405 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
407 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
408 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
409 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
410 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
411 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
412 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
413 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
415 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
419 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
420 struct ClaimingPayment {
422 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
423 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
425 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
426 (0, amount_msat, required),
427 (2, payment_purpose, required),
428 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
431 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
432 struct ClaimablePayments {
433 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
434 /// failed/claimed by the user.
436 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
437 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
439 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
440 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
441 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>,
443 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
444 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
445 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
446 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
449 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
450 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
451 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
452 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
453 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
454 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
457 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
458 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
459 /// quite some time lag.
460 enum BackgroundEvent {
461 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
462 /// commitment transaction.
463 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
466 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
467 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
468 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
469 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
470 /// event can be generated.
471 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
472 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
473 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
476 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
477 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
479 latest_features: InitFeatures,
482 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
483 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
485 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
488 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
489 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
490 struct PendingInboundPayment {
491 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
492 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
493 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
494 /// this payment being removed.
496 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
497 user_payment_id: u64,
498 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
499 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
500 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
503 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
504 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
505 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
507 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
510 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
511 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
512 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
513 pending_amt_msat: u64,
514 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
515 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
516 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
518 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
519 starting_block_height: u32,
521 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
522 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
523 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
525 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
526 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
527 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
529 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
530 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
531 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
532 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
533 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
535 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
537 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
538 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
542 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
543 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
545 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
549 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
551 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
555 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
557 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
562 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
566 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
567 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
571 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
572 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
573 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
574 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
575 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
576 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
577 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
580 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
581 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
584 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
585 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
586 let our_payment_hash;
587 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
588 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
589 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
591 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
592 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
593 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
597 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
601 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
602 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
603 let remove_res = match self {
604 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
605 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
606 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
607 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
608 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
612 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
613 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
614 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
615 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
616 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
617 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
624 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
625 let insert_res = match self {
626 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
627 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
628 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
630 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
631 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
634 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
635 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
636 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
637 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
638 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
645 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
647 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
648 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
649 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
650 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
657 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
658 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
659 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
660 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
661 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
662 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
663 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
665 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
666 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
668 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
669 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
670 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
671 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
672 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
673 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
674 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
675 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
677 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
678 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
680 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
681 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
683 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
684 /// to individual Channels.
686 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
687 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
688 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
689 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
691 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
692 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
693 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
694 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
695 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
696 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
697 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
699 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
700 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
701 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
702 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
705 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
706 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
707 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
708 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
709 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
711 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
712 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
713 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
714 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
715 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
718 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
719 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
720 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
721 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
722 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
726 // `total_consistency_lock`
728 // |__`forward_htlcs`
730 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
732 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
734 // | |__`claimable_payments`
736 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
738 // | |__`channel_state`
742 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
744 // | |__`per_peer_state`
746 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
750 // | |__`pending_events`
752 // | |__`pending_background_events`
754 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
755 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
756 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
757 K::Target: KeysInterface,
758 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
761 default_configuration: UserConfig,
762 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
763 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
767 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
769 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
771 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
772 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
774 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
775 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
776 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
777 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
778 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
780 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
781 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
782 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
783 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
785 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
786 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
788 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
789 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
790 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
791 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
792 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
793 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
794 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
795 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
797 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
799 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
800 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
802 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
804 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
805 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
806 /// and via the classic SCID.
808 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
809 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
811 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
813 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
815 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
816 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
817 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
819 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
820 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
822 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
823 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
825 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
826 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
828 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
829 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
830 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
831 /// active channel list on load.
833 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
834 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
836 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
838 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
839 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
840 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
842 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
843 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
844 /// the handling of the events.
847 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
848 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
849 /// would break backwards compatability.
850 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
851 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
852 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
854 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
855 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
857 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
859 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
860 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
861 /// confirmation depth.
863 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
864 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
865 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
867 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
869 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
871 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
873 our_network_key: SecretKey,
874 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
876 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
878 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
879 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
880 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
882 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
883 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
885 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
886 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
887 /// keeping additional state.
888 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
890 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
891 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
892 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
893 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
895 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
896 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
897 /// are currently open with that peer.
898 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
899 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
902 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
903 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
905 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
906 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
907 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
908 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
909 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
910 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
911 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
912 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
913 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
914 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
915 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
917 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
924 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
926 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
927 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
928 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
929 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
930 pub struct ChainParameters {
931 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
932 pub network: Network,
934 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
936 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
937 pub best_block: BestBlock,
940 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
946 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
947 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
948 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
949 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
950 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
951 /// updates are ready for persistence).
953 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
954 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
955 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
956 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
957 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
959 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
960 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
963 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
964 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
965 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
968 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
969 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
971 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
972 persistence_notifier: notifier,
973 should_persist: persist_check,
974 _read_guard: read_guard,
979 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
981 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
982 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
987 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
988 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
990 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
992 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
993 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
994 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
995 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
996 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
998 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
999 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1001 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1003 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1004 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1005 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1006 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1007 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1008 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1009 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1010 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1011 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1012 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1013 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1014 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1015 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1017 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1018 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1020 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1021 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1022 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1023 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1025 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1026 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1027 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1028 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1029 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1030 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1033 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1035 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1036 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1039 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1041 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1042 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1044 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1045 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1046 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1047 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1049 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1050 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1051 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1052 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1053 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1054 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1055 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1056 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1057 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1058 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1059 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1062 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1063 /// to better separate parameters.
1064 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1065 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1066 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1067 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1068 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1069 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1070 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1071 pub features: InitFeatures,
1072 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1073 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1074 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1076 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1078 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1079 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1080 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1081 /// payments to us through this channel.
1082 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1083 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1084 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1085 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1086 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1087 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1088 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1091 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1092 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1093 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1094 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1095 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1096 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1097 /// lifetime of the channel.
1098 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1099 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1100 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1101 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1102 /// our counterparty already.
1104 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1105 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1106 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1107 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1109 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1110 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1111 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1112 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1114 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1115 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1117 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1118 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1120 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1121 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1122 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1123 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1124 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1125 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1126 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1127 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1128 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1131 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1133 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1134 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1135 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1136 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1137 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1138 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1139 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1141 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1142 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1144 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1145 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1146 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1147 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1148 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1149 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1150 /// this value on chain.
1152 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1154 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1156 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1157 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1158 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1159 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1161 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1162 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1163 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1164 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1166 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1167 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1168 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1169 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1171 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1172 pub balance_msat: u64,
1173 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1174 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1175 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1176 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1178 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1180 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1181 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1182 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1183 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1184 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1185 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1186 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1187 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1189 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1190 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1191 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1192 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1193 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1194 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1195 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1197 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1198 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1199 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1200 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1201 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1202 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1203 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1204 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1205 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1207 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1209 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1210 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1211 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1212 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1213 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1215 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1216 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1217 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1218 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1219 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1220 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1221 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1223 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1224 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1225 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1226 pub is_outbound: bool,
1227 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1228 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1229 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1230 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1231 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1233 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1234 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1235 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1236 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1238 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1239 pub is_usable: bool,
1240 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1241 pub is_public: bool,
1242 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1243 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1244 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1245 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1246 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1247 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1249 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1250 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1253 impl ChannelDetails {
1254 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1255 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1256 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1258 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1259 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1260 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1261 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1264 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1265 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1266 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1268 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1269 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1270 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1271 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1275 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1276 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1277 /// states for more.
1278 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1279 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1280 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1281 /// send the payment at all.
1283 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1285 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1286 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1287 /// for this payment.
1288 ParameterError(APIError),
1289 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1290 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1292 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1294 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1297 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1298 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1299 /// for this payment.
1300 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1301 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1302 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1303 /// paths than the ones selected).
1305 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1306 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1307 /// for this payment.
1308 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1309 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1310 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1311 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1313 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1315 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1316 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1317 /// in over-/re-payment.
1319 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1320 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1321 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1323 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1324 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1325 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1326 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1328 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1329 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1330 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1331 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1332 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1333 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1334 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1335 payment_id: PaymentId,
1339 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1341 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1343 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1344 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1345 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1346 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1348 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1349 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1350 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1353 macro_rules! handle_error {
1354 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1357 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1358 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1360 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1361 // entering the macro.
1362 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1363 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1366 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1368 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1369 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1370 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1371 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1375 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1376 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1377 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1378 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1383 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1384 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1386 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1387 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1388 action: err.action.clone()
1392 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1393 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1396 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1403 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1404 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1405 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1406 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1407 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1408 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1410 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1411 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1412 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1413 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1414 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1416 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1417 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1419 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1423 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1424 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1425 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1427 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1428 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1430 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1431 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1433 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1434 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1435 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1436 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1437 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1438 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1444 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1445 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1449 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1451 $entry.remove_entry();
1459 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1460 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1464 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1466 $entry.remove_entry();
1474 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1475 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1477 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1478 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1484 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1485 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1487 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1488 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1489 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1490 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1491 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1492 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1493 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1494 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1495 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1496 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1497 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1498 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1499 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1500 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1503 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1504 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1505 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1506 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1507 match $action_type {
1508 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1509 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1511 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1512 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1514 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1515 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1516 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1517 if !$resend_commitment {
1518 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1521 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1523 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1524 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1526 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1531 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1532 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1534 $entry.remove_entry();
1538 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1539 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1540 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1542 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1543 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1545 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1546 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1548 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1549 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1551 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1552 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1556 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1557 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1558 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1559 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1560 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1562 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1563 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1564 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1565 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1566 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1567 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1568 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1569 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1570 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1571 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1576 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1577 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1578 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1580 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1581 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1582 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1583 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1584 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1585 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1588 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1593 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1594 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1595 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1596 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1597 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1600 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1602 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1603 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1605 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1607 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1608 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1609 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1610 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1611 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1612 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1613 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1614 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1616 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1617 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1618 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1622 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1624 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1625 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1626 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1628 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1629 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1630 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1631 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1632 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1633 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1634 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1635 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1637 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1638 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1641 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1642 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1644 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1646 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1648 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1650 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1651 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1652 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1653 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1661 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1662 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1663 &self.default_configuration
1666 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1667 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1668 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1671 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1672 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1674 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1676 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1680 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1685 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1687 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1688 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1689 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1690 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1691 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1693 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1694 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1696 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1697 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1698 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1700 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1701 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1702 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1703 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1704 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1705 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1707 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1708 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1709 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1710 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1711 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1712 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1717 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1718 Some(peer_state) => {
1719 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1720 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1721 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1722 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1723 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1724 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1725 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1729 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1734 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1737 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1740 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1741 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1743 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1744 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1745 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1746 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1748 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1750 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1753 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1755 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1756 node_id: their_network_key,
1759 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1762 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1763 let mut res = Vec::new();
1765 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1766 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1767 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1768 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1769 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1770 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1771 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1772 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1773 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1774 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1775 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1776 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1777 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1778 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1779 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1780 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1781 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1782 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1783 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1784 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1785 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1786 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1788 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1789 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1790 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1791 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1792 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1793 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1794 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1795 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1796 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1797 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1798 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1799 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1800 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1801 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1802 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1803 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1804 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1805 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1806 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1807 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1808 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1809 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1810 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1811 config: Some(channel.config()),
1815 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1816 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1817 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1818 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1824 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1825 /// more information.
1826 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1827 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1830 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1831 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1833 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1834 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1837 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1838 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1839 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1840 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1841 // really wanted anyway.
1842 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1845 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1846 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1847 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1848 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1849 Some(transaction) => {
1850 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1854 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1855 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1856 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1857 reason: closure_reason
1861 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1862 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1864 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1865 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1866 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1867 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1868 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1869 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1870 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1871 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1873 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1874 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1875 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1876 Some(peer_state) => {
1877 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1878 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1879 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1881 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1884 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1886 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1887 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1888 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1889 let (result, is_permanent) =
1890 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1892 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1897 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1898 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1902 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1903 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1904 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1905 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1909 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1913 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1917 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1918 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1919 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1920 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1923 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1927 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1928 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1929 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1931 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1932 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1934 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1935 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1936 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1937 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1939 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1941 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1942 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1943 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1944 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1945 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1948 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1949 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1950 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1952 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1953 /// the channel being closed or not:
1954 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1955 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1956 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1957 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1958 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1959 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1960 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1962 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1964 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1965 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1966 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1967 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1968 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1972 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1973 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1974 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1975 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1976 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1977 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1978 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1979 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1981 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1982 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1983 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1984 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1985 // ignore the result here.
1986 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1990 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1991 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1992 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1993 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1995 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1996 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1997 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1998 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
1999 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2001 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2002 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2004 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2006 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2008 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2011 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2012 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2013 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2014 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2015 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2020 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2023 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2024 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2025 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2026 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2027 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2028 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2029 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2030 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2031 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2041 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2042 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2043 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2045 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2046 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2047 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2050 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2051 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2052 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2054 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2055 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2056 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2057 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2058 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2061 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2062 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2063 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2064 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2065 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2069 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2070 /// local transaction(s).
2071 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2072 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2073 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2077 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2078 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2080 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2081 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2082 return Err(ReceiveError {
2083 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2085 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2088 // final_expiry_too_soon
2089 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2090 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2091 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2092 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2093 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2094 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2095 return Err(ReceiveError {
2097 err_data: Vec::new(),
2098 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2101 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2102 return Err(ReceiveError {
2104 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2105 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2109 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2110 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2111 return Err(ReceiveError {
2112 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2113 err_data: Vec::new(),
2114 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2117 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2118 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2119 return Err(ReceiveError {
2120 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2121 err_data: Vec::new(),
2122 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2124 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2125 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2127 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2128 phantom_shared_secret,
2130 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2131 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2132 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2133 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2134 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2135 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2136 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2137 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2138 return Err(ReceiveError {
2139 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2140 err_data: Vec::new(),
2141 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2145 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2147 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2150 return Err(ReceiveError {
2151 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2152 err_data: Vec::new(),
2153 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2158 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2161 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2162 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2163 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2164 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2168 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2169 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2170 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2172 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2173 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2174 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2175 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2176 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2177 failure_code: $err_code,
2183 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2184 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2187 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2189 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2190 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2191 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2192 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2193 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2194 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2195 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2196 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2198 macro_rules! return_err {
2199 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2201 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2202 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2203 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2204 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2205 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2211 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2213 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2214 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2216 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2217 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2221 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2222 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2224 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2226 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2227 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2228 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2229 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2230 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2232 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2235 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2236 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2237 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2239 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2240 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2241 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2244 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2245 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2246 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2247 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2251 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2252 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2253 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2256 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2257 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2258 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2259 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2260 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2265 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2266 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2267 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2268 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2269 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2270 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2271 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2272 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2273 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2274 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2275 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2276 // phantom or an intercept.
2277 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2278 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2279 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2283 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2286 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2288 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2289 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2291 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2292 // no consistency guarantees.
2293 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2297 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2298 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2299 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2300 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2301 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2303 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2304 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2305 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2306 // we don't have the channel here.
2307 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2309 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2311 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2312 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2313 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2314 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2315 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2316 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2317 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2319 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2320 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2322 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2323 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2327 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2329 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2336 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2337 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2338 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2339 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2340 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2341 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2343 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2344 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2346 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2347 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2348 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2349 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2350 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2351 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2352 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2353 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2354 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2355 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2361 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2362 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2363 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2364 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2366 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2367 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2369 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2370 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2371 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2373 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2374 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2375 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2377 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2382 pending_forward_info
2385 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2386 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2387 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2389 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2390 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2391 if !chan.should_announce() {
2392 return Err(LightningError {
2393 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2394 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2397 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2398 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2400 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2401 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2404 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2405 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2406 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2407 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2408 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2409 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2410 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2411 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2412 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2416 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2418 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2419 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2420 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2422 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2423 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2425 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2426 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2427 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2428 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2429 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2430 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2431 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2432 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2435 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2436 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2438 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2444 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2445 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2446 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2447 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2448 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2450 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2451 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2452 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2453 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2454 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2456 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2458 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2460 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2461 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2462 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2463 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2466 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2467 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2468 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2470 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2471 return Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2473 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2474 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2476 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2477 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2479 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2480 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2482 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2483 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2484 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2487 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2488 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2489 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2491 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2492 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2494 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2495 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2496 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2497 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2498 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2499 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2500 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2501 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2502 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2503 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2505 _ => unreachable!(),
2508 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2509 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2510 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2511 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2512 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2513 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2514 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2515 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2524 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2525 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2526 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2527 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2532 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2533 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2535 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2540 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2542 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2543 /// fields for more info.
2545 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2546 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2547 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2548 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2551 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2552 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2553 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2554 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2555 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2557 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2558 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2560 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2561 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2562 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2564 /// In general, a path may raise:
2565 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2566 /// node public key) is specified.
2567 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2568 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2570 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2571 /// relevant updates.
2573 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2574 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2575 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2577 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2578 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2579 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2580 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2583 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2584 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2585 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2587 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2588 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2589 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2590 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2591 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2595 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2596 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2599 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2600 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2601 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2602 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2605 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2606 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2607 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2608 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2609 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2610 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2611 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2612 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2615 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2616 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2619 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2620 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2623 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2628 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2629 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2630 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2632 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2633 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2635 let mut total_value = 0;
2636 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2637 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2638 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2639 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2640 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2641 continue 'path_check;
2643 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2644 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2645 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2646 continue 'path_check;
2649 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2650 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2652 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2653 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2655 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2656 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2657 total_value = amt_msat;
2660 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2661 let mut results = Vec::new();
2662 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2663 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2664 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2667 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2668 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2669 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2670 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2673 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2674 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2675 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2676 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2678 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2679 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2683 results.push(path_res);
2685 let mut has_ok = false;
2686 let mut has_err = false;
2687 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2688 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2689 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2690 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2691 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2692 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2693 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2697 } else if res.is_err() {
2698 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2699 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2702 if has_err && has_ok {
2703 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2706 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2707 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2708 Some(RouteParameters {
2709 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2710 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2711 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2717 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2718 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2719 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2720 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2721 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2727 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2729 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2730 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2731 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2732 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2733 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2735 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2736 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2737 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2738 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2739 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2740 if path.len() == 0 {
2741 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2742 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2747 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2748 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2749 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2752 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2753 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2754 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2756 let res = match payment {
2757 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2758 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2760 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2761 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2762 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2763 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2766 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2768 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2769 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2770 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2773 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2774 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2775 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2778 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2779 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2780 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2784 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2785 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2790 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2791 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2795 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2798 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2800 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2801 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2802 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2803 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2805 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2806 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2807 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2809 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2810 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2811 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2812 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2815 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2816 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2817 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2818 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2819 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2821 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2829 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2830 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2831 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2832 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2833 /// never reach the recipient.
2835 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2836 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2838 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2839 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2841 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2843 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2844 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2845 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2847 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2849 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2850 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2852 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2853 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2858 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2859 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2860 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2861 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2862 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2864 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2867 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2868 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2872 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2873 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2875 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2876 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2881 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2883 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2884 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2885 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2888 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2889 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2890 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2891 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2892 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2893 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2896 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2897 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2898 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2899 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2900 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2902 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2904 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2906 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2907 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2908 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2909 } else { unreachable!(); })
2912 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2914 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2915 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2918 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2919 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2924 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2925 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2926 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2929 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2930 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2931 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2933 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2934 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2935 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2936 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2945 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2946 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2947 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2951 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2953 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2954 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2956 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2957 /// across the p2p network.
2959 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2960 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2962 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2963 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2964 /// keys per-channel).
2966 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2967 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2968 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2970 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2971 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2972 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2974 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2975 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2976 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2977 /// for more details.
2979 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2980 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2981 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2984 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2985 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2987 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2992 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2993 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2994 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2995 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2996 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2998 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3002 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3003 let mut output_index = None;
3004 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3005 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3006 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3007 if output_index.is_some() {
3008 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3009 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3012 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3013 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3014 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3017 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3020 if output_index.is_none() {
3021 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3022 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3025 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3029 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3031 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3032 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3033 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3034 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3036 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3037 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3039 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3040 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3042 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3044 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3045 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3046 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3047 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3048 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3049 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3050 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3051 pub fn update_channel_config(
3052 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3053 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3054 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3055 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3056 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3060 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3061 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3064 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3065 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3066 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3067 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3068 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3069 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3071 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3072 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3073 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3074 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3078 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3079 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3080 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3083 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3084 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3085 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3086 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3087 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3096 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3097 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3099 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3100 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3102 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3103 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3104 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3105 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3106 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3108 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3109 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3111 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3114 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3115 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3116 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3117 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3118 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3119 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3121 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3123 if !chan.is_usable() {
3124 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3125 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3128 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3130 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3131 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3135 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3136 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3137 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3140 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3141 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3142 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3144 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3146 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3147 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3150 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3151 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3152 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3153 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3154 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3156 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3160 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3161 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3163 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3166 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3167 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3168 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3170 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3171 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3172 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3175 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3176 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3177 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3178 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3179 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3180 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3181 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3184 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3185 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3186 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3187 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3192 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3194 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3195 /// Will likely generate further events.
3196 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3199 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3200 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3201 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3202 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3204 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3205 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3207 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3208 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3209 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3211 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3212 match forward_info {
3213 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3214 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3215 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3216 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3217 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3220 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3221 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3222 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3224 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3225 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3226 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3227 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3228 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3229 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3232 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3233 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3235 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3238 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3239 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3245 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3246 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3248 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3252 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3253 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3255 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3259 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3260 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3261 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3262 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3263 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3265 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3266 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3267 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3268 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3269 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3271 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3273 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3274 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3278 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3279 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3280 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3281 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3287 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3290 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3293 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3294 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3295 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3296 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3297 // problem, not ours.
3303 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3304 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3306 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3310 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3311 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3312 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3313 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3314 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3318 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3319 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3320 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3321 match forward_info {
3322 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3323 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3324 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3325 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3326 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3330 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3331 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3332 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3333 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3334 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3335 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3336 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3338 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3340 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3341 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3343 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3345 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3346 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3347 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3348 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3354 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3356 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3357 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3358 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3359 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3360 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3361 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3362 // this channel currently :/.
3368 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3369 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3371 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3372 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3373 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3375 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3376 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3378 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3380 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3381 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3382 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3385 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3387 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3388 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3389 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3390 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3391 // messages when we can.
3392 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3393 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3394 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3401 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3402 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3405 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3406 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3407 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3408 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3409 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3410 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3412 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3413 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3414 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3415 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3416 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3419 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3423 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3424 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3426 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3430 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3431 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3432 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3433 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3434 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3435 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3436 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3437 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3438 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3440 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3447 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3448 match forward_info {
3449 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3450 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3451 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3452 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3455 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3456 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3457 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3458 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3460 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3461 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3463 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3466 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3467 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3468 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3469 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3470 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3471 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3472 phantom_shared_secret,
3474 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3476 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3481 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3482 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3483 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3484 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3485 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3487 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3488 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3489 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3490 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3491 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3492 phantom_shared_secret,
3494 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3495 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3499 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3500 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3501 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3502 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3503 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3506 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3507 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3508 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3510 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3511 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3512 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3515 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3516 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3517 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3520 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3521 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3522 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3523 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3524 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3525 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3529 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3530 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3531 total_value += htlc.value;
3532 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3533 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3534 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3535 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3536 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3537 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3539 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3541 _ => unreachable!(),
3544 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3545 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3546 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3547 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3548 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3549 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3550 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3551 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3552 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3555 amount_msat: total_value,
3556 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3557 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3559 payment_received_generated = true;
3561 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3562 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3564 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3566 payment_received_generated
3570 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3571 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3572 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3573 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3574 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3575 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3576 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3577 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3578 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3579 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3580 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3581 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3582 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3583 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3585 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3589 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3591 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3592 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3593 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3594 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3597 match claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3598 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3599 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3600 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3601 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3602 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3603 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3605 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3607 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3608 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3611 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3612 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3613 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3620 if payment_data.is_none() {
3621 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3622 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3625 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3626 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3627 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3628 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3629 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3630 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3631 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3632 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3634 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3635 if payment_received_generated {
3636 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3642 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3643 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3651 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3652 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3654 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3656 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3657 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3660 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3661 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3662 events.append(&mut new_events);
3665 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3667 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3668 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3670 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3671 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3672 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3673 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3674 if background_events.is_empty() {
3678 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3680 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3681 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3682 // monitor updating completing.
3683 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3690 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3691 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3692 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3693 self.process_background_events();
3696 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3697 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3698 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3699 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3700 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3701 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3702 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3704 if !chan.is_live() {
3705 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3706 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3707 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3709 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3710 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3712 let mut retain_channel = true;
3713 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3716 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3717 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3721 let ret_err = match res {
3722 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3723 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3724 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3725 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3726 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3727 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3728 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3729 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3730 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3731 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3732 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3739 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3740 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3748 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3752 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3753 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3754 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3755 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3756 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3757 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3758 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3760 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3762 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3764 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3765 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3766 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3767 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3768 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3769 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3771 handle_errors.push(err);
3781 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3782 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3783 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3784 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3785 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3786 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3787 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3789 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3790 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3791 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3792 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3793 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3794 if no_remaining_entries {
3795 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3797 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3798 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3799 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3800 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3801 no_remaining_entries = false;
3809 if no_remaining_entries {
3810 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3811 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3813 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3820 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3822 /// This currently includes:
3823 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3824 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3825 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3827 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3828 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3830 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3831 /// estimate fetches.
3832 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3833 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3834 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3835 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3837 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3839 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3840 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3842 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3843 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3844 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3845 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3846 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3847 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3848 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3850 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3852 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3854 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3855 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3856 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3857 if needs_close { return false; }
3860 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3861 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3862 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3863 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3864 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3865 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3866 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3867 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3871 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3872 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3874 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3875 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3876 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3880 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3881 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3886 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3892 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3893 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3894 // This should be unreachable
3895 debug_assert!(false);
3898 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3899 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3900 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3901 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3903 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3904 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3905 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3907 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3914 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3915 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3916 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3917 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3918 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3921 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3922 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3925 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3931 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3932 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3933 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3935 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3936 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3937 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3938 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3940 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3941 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3942 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3943 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3944 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3945 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3947 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3948 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3949 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3950 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3951 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
3952 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3953 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3954 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3955 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3960 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3961 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3963 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3965 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3966 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3967 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3968 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3969 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3970 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3971 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3973 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3975 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3976 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3978 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3983 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3984 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3985 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3986 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3987 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3988 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3989 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3990 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3991 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3992 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3994 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3995 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3996 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3997 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3999 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4000 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4001 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4002 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4003 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4007 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4008 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4009 // be surfaced to the user.
4010 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4011 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4012 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4014 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
4015 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4016 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4017 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4019 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4022 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4023 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4024 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4025 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4029 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4030 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4031 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4032 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4034 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
4035 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
4036 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
4037 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
4038 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
4041 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4042 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4043 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4046 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4047 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4048 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4050 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
4051 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4052 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4053 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4054 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
4055 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
4056 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
4057 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4058 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4061 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4062 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4065 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4066 all_paths_failed = true;
4067 if payment.get().abandoned() {
4068 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4069 payment_id: *payment_id,
4070 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
4076 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4079 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
4080 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
4081 Some(RouteParameters {
4082 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
4083 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
4084 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
4087 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4089 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
4090 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4092 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4094 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4096 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4097 if !payment_retryable {
4098 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4099 payment_id: *payment_id,
4100 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4104 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4105 payment_id: *payment_id,
4106 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4112 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4113 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4114 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4115 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4116 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4118 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4119 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4120 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4121 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4128 error_code: onion_error_code,
4130 error_data: onion_error_data
4134 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4140 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4141 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4142 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4143 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4145 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4146 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4147 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4148 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4150 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4151 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4152 payment_id: *payment_id,
4153 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4155 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4158 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4159 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4160 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4161 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4162 network_update: None,
4165 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4168 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4170 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4175 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4176 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4177 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4179 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4180 let err_packet = match onion_error {
4181 HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
4182 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
4183 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
4184 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(phantom_ss, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4185 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
4186 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
4188 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
4189 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
4192 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
4193 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4194 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
4198 let mut forward_event = None;
4199 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4200 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4201 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4203 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4204 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4205 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4207 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4208 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4211 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4212 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4213 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4214 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4215 time_forwardable: time
4218 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4219 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4220 failed_next_destination: destination,
4226 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4227 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4229 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4230 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4231 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4233 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4234 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4235 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4236 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4238 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4239 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4240 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4241 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4242 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4243 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4244 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4245 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4247 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4250 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4251 if let Some((payment_purpose, sources)) = claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
4252 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4253 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4254 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4255 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4256 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4257 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4262 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4263 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: sources.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4264 payment_purpose, receiver_node_id,
4266 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4267 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4268 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4269 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4274 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4276 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we check that all channels which contain a claimable
4277 // HTLC still exist. While this isn't guaranteed to remain true if a channel closes while
4278 // we're claiming (or even after we claim, before the commitment update dance completes),
4279 // it should be a relatively rare race, and we'd rather not claim HTLCs that require us to
4280 // go on-chain (and lose the on-chain fee to do so) than just reject the payment.
4282 // Note that we'll still always get our funds - as long as the generated
4283 // `ChannelMonitorUpdate` makes it out to the relevant monitor we can claim on-chain.
4285 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4286 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4287 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4288 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4289 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4291 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4292 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4293 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4294 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4295 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
4296 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4297 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4298 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4305 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4310 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4311 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4312 debug_assert!(false);
4316 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4317 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4318 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4319 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4320 if sources.len() != 1 {
4321 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4322 debug_assert!(false);
4328 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4330 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4331 mem::drop(channel_state);
4332 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4333 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4336 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4337 mem::drop(channel_state);
4338 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4339 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4340 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4344 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4345 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
4346 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.take().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop,
4348 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4350 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4351 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4352 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4353 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4354 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4358 mem::drop(channel_state);
4360 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4361 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4362 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4363 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4364 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4365 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4366 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4368 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4371 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4372 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4373 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4374 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4378 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4379 mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
4380 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4381 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4382 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4384 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4385 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4386 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4387 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4388 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4389 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4390 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4391 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4392 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4394 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4395 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4396 payment_preimage, e);
4397 let err = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err();
4398 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4399 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4400 return Err((counterparty_node_id, err));
4403 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4404 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4405 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4406 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4407 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4408 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4409 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4410 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4411 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4412 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4418 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4419 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)));
4425 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4426 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4427 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4429 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4430 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4431 payment_preimage, e);
4434 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4436 chan.remove_entry();
4438 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4439 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4440 Err((counterparty_node_id, res))
4444 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4445 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4446 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4450 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4451 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4452 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update);
4453 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4454 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4455 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4456 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4457 // again on restart.
4458 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4459 payment_preimage, update_res);
4461 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4462 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4463 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4464 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4465 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4466 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4467 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4472 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4473 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4474 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4475 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4476 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4477 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4478 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4479 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4480 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4481 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4482 pending_events.push(
4483 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4485 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4495 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4497 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4498 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4499 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4500 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4501 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4502 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4503 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4504 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4505 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4506 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4507 pending_events.push(
4508 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4509 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4515 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4519 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4520 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4521 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4523 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4524 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4525 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4526 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4527 pending_events.push(
4528 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4537 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4540 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4541 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4542 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage,
4543 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4544 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4545 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4546 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4549 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4550 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4552 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4554 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4560 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4561 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4562 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4568 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4569 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4570 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4573 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4574 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4576 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4577 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4578 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4579 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4580 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4584 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4585 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(event);
4591 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4592 /// update completion.
4593 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4594 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4595 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4596 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4597 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4598 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4599 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4601 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4602 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4603 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4604 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4607 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4608 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4610 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4611 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4612 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4617 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4619 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4620 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4621 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4622 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4627 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4628 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4629 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4630 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4631 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4636 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4640 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4646 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4647 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4648 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4654 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4655 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4658 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4659 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4660 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4661 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4663 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4665 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4669 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4670 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4671 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4672 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4673 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4674 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4675 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4677 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4678 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4679 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4684 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4685 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4686 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4689 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4691 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4692 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4694 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4695 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4696 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4697 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4701 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4703 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4704 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4707 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4708 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4709 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4711 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4712 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4713 /// used to accept such channels.
4715 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4716 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4717 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4718 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4721 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4722 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4724 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4725 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4726 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4728 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4729 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4731 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4732 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4734 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4735 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4737 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4738 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4739 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4740 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4743 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4744 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4746 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4747 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4748 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4749 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4750 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4751 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4753 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4754 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4757 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4758 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4759 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4760 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4761 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4762 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4765 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4766 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4767 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4770 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4771 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4772 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4775 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4776 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4782 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4783 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4784 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4787 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4788 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4791 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4792 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4793 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4795 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4796 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4797 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4798 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4801 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4802 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4806 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4807 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4808 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4809 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4810 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4811 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4813 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4814 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4815 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4816 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4818 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4819 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4820 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4823 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4824 pending_events.push(
4825 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4826 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4827 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4828 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4829 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4830 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4835 entry.insert(channel);
4841 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4842 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4843 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4844 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4845 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4846 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4847 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4848 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4850 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4851 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4853 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4856 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4857 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4858 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4859 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4860 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4862 user_channel_id: user_id,
4867 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4868 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4869 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4870 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4871 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4872 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4873 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4874 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4875 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4877 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4882 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4883 // lock before watch_channel
4884 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4885 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4886 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4887 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4888 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4889 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4890 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4891 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4892 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4893 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4894 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4895 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4898 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4899 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4900 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4901 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4902 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4903 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4904 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4907 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4908 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4909 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4910 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4911 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4913 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4914 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4915 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4917 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4918 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4919 funding_msg.channel_id))
4921 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4922 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4925 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4926 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4929 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4930 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4938 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4940 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4941 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4942 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4943 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4944 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4945 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4946 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4948 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.keys_manager, &self.logger) {
4949 Ok(update) => update,
4950 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4952 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4953 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4955 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4956 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4957 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4958 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4959 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4960 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4961 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4967 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4968 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4972 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4975 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4976 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4980 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4981 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4982 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4983 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4985 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4986 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4988 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4989 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4990 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4991 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4992 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4993 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4994 msg: announcement_sigs,
4996 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4997 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4998 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4999 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5000 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5001 // announcement_signatures.
5002 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
5003 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5004 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5005 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5011 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
5015 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5019 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5020 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5021 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5022 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5023 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5025 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5026 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5027 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5028 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5031 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
5032 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5033 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
5034 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5037 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
5038 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5040 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5041 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
5042 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5043 let (result, is_permanent) =
5044 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
5046 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5051 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5052 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5053 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5060 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5063 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5064 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5065 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5066 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5069 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
5073 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5074 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5075 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5076 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5077 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5078 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5079 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5080 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5082 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5083 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5084 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5085 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5090 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5091 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5092 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5093 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5094 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5095 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5096 } else { (tx, None) }
5098 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5101 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5102 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5103 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5105 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5106 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5107 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5108 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5112 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5117 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5118 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5119 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5120 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5122 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5123 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5124 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5125 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5127 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5128 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5129 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5131 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5132 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5133 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5134 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5137 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5138 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5139 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5140 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5141 match pending_forward_info {
5142 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5143 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5144 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5145 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
5147 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
5149 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5150 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5151 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5154 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5156 _ => pending_forward_info
5159 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5166 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5167 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5168 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5169 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5170 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5171 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5172 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5173 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5175 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5177 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5180 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5184 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5185 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5186 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5187 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5188 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5189 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5190 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5192 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5199 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5200 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5201 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5202 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5203 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5204 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5205 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5207 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5208 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5209 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5211 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(msg.failure_code)), chan);
5214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5218 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5219 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5220 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5221 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5222 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5223 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5224 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5226 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5227 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5228 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5229 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5230 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5231 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5232 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5237 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5238 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5242 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5243 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5244 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5246 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5247 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5248 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5249 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5250 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5251 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5252 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5253 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5255 commitment_signed: msg,
5261 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5266 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5267 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5268 let mut forward_event = None;
5269 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5270 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5271 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5272 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5273 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5274 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5275 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5276 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5278 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5279 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5281 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5282 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5283 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5285 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5286 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5288 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5289 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5290 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5292 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5293 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5294 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5296 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5297 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5298 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5299 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5300 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5303 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5304 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5306 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5307 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5308 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5309 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5310 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5311 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5312 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5313 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5316 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5317 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5318 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5323 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5324 // payments are being processed.
5325 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5326 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
5328 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5329 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5336 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5337 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5340 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5341 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5342 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5345 match forward_event {
5347 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5348 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5349 time_forwardable: time
5357 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5358 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5360 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5361 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5362 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5363 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5364 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5365 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5367 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5368 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5369 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5370 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5371 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5372 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5373 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5374 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5375 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5376 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5377 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5378 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5380 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5381 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5382 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5383 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5384 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5385 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5387 } else { unreachable!(); }
5389 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5390 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5391 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5395 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5396 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5397 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5398 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5399 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5400 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5402 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5405 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5407 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5408 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5410 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5411 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5412 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5414 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5415 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5422 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5423 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5424 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5425 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5426 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5427 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5428 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5430 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5432 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5437 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5438 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5439 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5441 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5443 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5444 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5446 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5447 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5450 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5451 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5452 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5453 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5454 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5455 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5458 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5463 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5464 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5465 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5466 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5468 // It's not a local channel
5469 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5472 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5473 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5474 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5475 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5476 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5477 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5478 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5479 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5480 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5481 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5483 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5485 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5486 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5487 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5488 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5490 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5491 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5494 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5496 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5499 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5501 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5502 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5503 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5505 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5506 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5507 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5508 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5510 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5511 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5512 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5513 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5514 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5515 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5516 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5517 let mut channel_update = None;
5518 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5519 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5520 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5523 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5524 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5525 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5526 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5527 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5528 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5529 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5534 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5535 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5536 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5537 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5538 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5539 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5543 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5547 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5548 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5551 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5552 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5557 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5558 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5559 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5560 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5561 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5562 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5563 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5564 match monitor_event {
5565 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5566 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5567 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5568 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5570 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5571 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5572 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5573 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5576 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5577 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5578 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5579 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5580 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5581 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5582 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5583 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5584 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5585 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5586 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5590 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5591 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5593 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5595 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5596 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5597 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5598 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5599 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5604 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5605 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5611 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5612 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5615 has_pending_monitor_events
5618 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5619 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5620 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5622 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5623 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5626 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5627 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5628 /// update was applied.
5630 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5631 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5632 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5633 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5634 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5635 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5636 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5637 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5639 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5640 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5641 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5642 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5644 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5645 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5646 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5647 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5649 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5651 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5654 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5655 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5656 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5657 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5658 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5659 updates: commitment_update,
5663 has_monitor_update = true;
5664 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5665 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5666 if close_channel { return false; }
5673 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5674 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5675 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5682 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5683 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5684 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5687 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5688 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5694 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5695 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5696 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5697 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5698 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5699 let mut has_update = false;
5701 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5702 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5703 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5704 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5706 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5707 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5708 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5709 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5711 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5712 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5715 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5716 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5717 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5718 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5719 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5724 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5726 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5727 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5728 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5734 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5735 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5742 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5743 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5749 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5750 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5752 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5753 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5754 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5755 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5756 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5757 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5758 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5759 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5760 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5761 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5762 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5763 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5764 assert!(should_broadcast);
5765 } else { unreachable!(); }
5766 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5768 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5772 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5773 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5775 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5776 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5779 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5782 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5783 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5784 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5785 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5786 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5787 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5788 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5789 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5790 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5791 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5792 // never fail a payment too early.
5793 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5795 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5798 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5803 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5806 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5807 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5809 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5810 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5811 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5813 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5815 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5816 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5820 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5821 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5823 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5825 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5826 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5827 /// [`PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::payment_preimage
5828 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5829 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5830 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5833 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5834 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5836 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5839 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5841 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5843 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5844 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5845 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5846 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5847 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5850 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5851 /// stored external to LDK.
5853 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5854 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5855 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5857 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5858 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5861 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5862 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5863 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5864 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5866 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5867 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5868 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5869 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5870 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5872 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5873 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5874 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5875 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5876 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5878 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5879 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5881 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5882 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5886 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5887 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5889 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5891 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5892 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5893 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5894 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5897 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5898 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5900 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5903 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5905 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5907 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5908 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5911 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5912 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5914 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5915 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5916 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5919 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5920 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5922 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5923 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5924 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5925 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5927 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5928 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5929 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5930 Some(_) => continue,
5931 None => return scid_candidate
5936 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5938 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5939 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5941 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5942 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5943 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5947 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5948 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5949 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5951 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5952 /// times to get a unique scid.
5953 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5954 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5955 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5957 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5958 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5959 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5960 return scid_candidate
5964 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5965 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5966 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5967 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5969 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5970 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5971 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5972 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5980 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5981 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5982 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5983 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5984 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5989 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5990 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5991 if events.is_empty() { None } else { Some(events.remove(0)) }
5995 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5996 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
6000 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6001 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
6004 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6005 /// using the given event handler.
6007 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6008 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6011 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
6012 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
6013 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
6015 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6017 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6018 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6019 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6020 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6023 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
6024 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6025 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6028 for event in pending_events {
6029 handler(event).await;
6032 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
6033 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
6038 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6039 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6040 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6041 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6042 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6045 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6046 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6047 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6048 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6050 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6051 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6052 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6053 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6056 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6057 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6059 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6060 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6063 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6064 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6065 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
6067 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6068 events.replace(pending_events);
6077 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6079 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6080 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6081 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6082 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6085 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6087 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6088 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6089 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6090 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6091 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6093 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6094 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6095 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6096 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6099 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
6100 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6101 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6104 for event in pending_events {
6105 handler.handle_event(event);
6113 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6115 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6116 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6117 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6118 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6121 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6123 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6124 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6125 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6126 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6127 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6130 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6131 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6134 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6135 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6136 let new_height = height - 1;
6138 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6139 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6140 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6141 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6142 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6143 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6146 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6150 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6152 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6153 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6154 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6155 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6158 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6159 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6160 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6161 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6163 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6164 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6166 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6167 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
6168 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6170 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6171 if height < last_best_block_height {
6172 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6173 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6177 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6178 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6179 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6180 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6182 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6183 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6185 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6187 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6189 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6191 macro_rules! max_time {
6192 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6194 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6195 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6196 // having an explicit local time source.
6197 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6198 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6199 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6200 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6201 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6207 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6208 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6209 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6210 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6214 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6215 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6216 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
6217 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
6218 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6219 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
6225 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6226 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6227 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6228 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6229 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6230 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6231 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6232 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6237 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6239 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6240 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6241 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6242 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6245 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6246 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6248 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6249 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6250 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6251 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6252 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6254 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6255 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6257 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6258 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6259 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6260 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6261 let res = f(channel);
6262 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6263 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6264 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6265 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6266 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6268 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6269 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6270 if channel.is_usable() {
6271 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6272 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6273 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6274 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6279 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6283 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6285 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6286 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6287 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6288 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6289 msg: announcement_sigs,
6291 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6292 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6293 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6295 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6296 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6297 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6302 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6303 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6304 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6305 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6306 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6307 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6308 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6309 // is always consistent.
6310 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6311 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6312 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6313 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6314 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6317 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6318 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6319 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6320 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6321 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6322 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6323 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6327 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6328 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6329 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6330 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6331 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6332 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6333 data: reason_message,
6342 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6343 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6344 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6345 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6346 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6347 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6348 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6349 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6350 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6351 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6353 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6354 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6355 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6359 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6362 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6363 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6364 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6365 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6366 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6367 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6368 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6369 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6370 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6373 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6374 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6375 _ => unreachable!(),
6377 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6378 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6379 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6386 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6388 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6389 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6393 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6394 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6395 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6396 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6398 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6400 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6401 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6402 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6403 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6404 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6405 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6408 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6409 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6410 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6412 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6413 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6414 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6415 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6418 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6419 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6420 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6421 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6422 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6425 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6426 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6427 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6430 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6431 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6432 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6433 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6437 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6438 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6439 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6440 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6441 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6442 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6445 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6446 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6447 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6450 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6451 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6452 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6455 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6456 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6457 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6460 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6461 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6462 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6465 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6466 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6467 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6470 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6471 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6472 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6475 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6476 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6477 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6480 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6481 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6482 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6485 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6486 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6487 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6490 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6491 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6492 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6495 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6496 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6497 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6500 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6501 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6502 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6505 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6506 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6507 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6510 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6511 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6512 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6515 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6516 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6517 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6520 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6521 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6522 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6525 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6530 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6531 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6532 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6535 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6536 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6537 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6538 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6540 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6541 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6542 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6543 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6544 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6545 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6546 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6547 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6548 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6549 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6550 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6553 no_channels_remain = false;
6558 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6560 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6561 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6562 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6563 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6564 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6565 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6566 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6567 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6568 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6569 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6570 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6571 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6572 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6573 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6574 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6575 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6576 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6577 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6578 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6579 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6583 if no_channels_remain {
6584 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6587 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6588 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6592 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6593 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6594 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6598 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6600 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6603 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6604 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6605 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6606 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6607 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6611 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6616 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6617 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6618 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6619 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6620 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6621 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6622 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6623 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6624 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6628 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6629 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6630 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6635 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6636 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6637 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6638 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6639 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6647 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6651 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6654 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6655 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6656 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6657 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6658 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6663 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6664 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6665 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6666 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6669 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6670 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6671 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6679 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6680 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6684 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6685 provided_node_features()
6688 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6689 provided_init_features()
6693 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6694 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6695 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6696 provided_init_features().to_context()
6699 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6700 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6702 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6703 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6704 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6705 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6706 provided_init_features().to_context()
6709 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6710 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6711 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6712 provided_init_features().to_context()
6715 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6716 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6717 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6718 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6719 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6720 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6721 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6722 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6723 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6724 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6725 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6726 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6727 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6728 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6729 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6730 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6731 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6732 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6736 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6737 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6739 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6740 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6741 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6742 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6745 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6746 (2, node_id, required),
6747 (4, features, required),
6748 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6749 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6750 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6751 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6754 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6755 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6756 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6757 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6758 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6759 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6760 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6761 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6762 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6763 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6764 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6765 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6766 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6767 (7, self.config, option),
6768 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6769 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6770 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6771 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6772 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6773 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6774 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6775 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6776 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6777 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6778 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6779 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6780 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6781 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6782 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6783 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6784 (32, self.is_public, required),
6785 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6786 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6787 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6793 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6794 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6795 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6796 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6797 (2, channel_id, required),
6798 (3, channel_type, option),
6799 (4, counterparty, required),
6800 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6801 (6, funding_txo, option),
6802 (7, config, option),
6803 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6804 (9, confirmations, option),
6805 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6806 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6807 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6808 (16, balance_msat, required),
6809 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6810 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6811 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6812 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6813 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6814 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6815 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6816 (26, is_outbound, required),
6817 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6818 (30, is_usable, required),
6819 (32, is_public, required),
6820 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6821 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6822 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6825 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6826 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6827 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6828 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6829 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6833 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6835 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6836 outbound_scid_alias,
6840 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6841 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6843 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6844 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6845 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6846 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6847 confirmations_required,
6849 force_close_spend_delay,
6850 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6851 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6852 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6853 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6854 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6855 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6860 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6861 (2, channels, vec_type),
6862 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6863 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6866 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6868 (0, onion_packet, required),
6869 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6872 (0, payment_data, required),
6873 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6874 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6876 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6877 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6878 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6882 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6883 (0, routing, required),
6884 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6885 (4, payment_hash, required),
6886 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6887 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6888 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6892 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6893 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6895 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6897 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6898 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6899 reason.write(writer)?;
6901 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6902 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6905 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6906 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6907 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6908 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6915 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6916 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6917 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6920 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6921 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6922 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6923 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6927 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6928 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6929 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6930 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6931 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6934 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6935 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6936 // messages contained in the variants.
6937 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6938 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6939 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6941 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6942 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6943 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6944 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6945 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6948 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6949 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6950 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6951 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6952 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6954 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6959 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6964 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6965 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6966 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6967 (2, outpoint, required),
6968 (4, htlc_id, required),
6969 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6972 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6973 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6974 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6975 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6976 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6978 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6979 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6980 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6981 (2, self.value, required),
6982 (4, payment_data, option),
6983 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6984 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6990 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6991 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6992 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6994 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6995 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6996 let mut total_msat = None;
6997 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6998 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6999 (0, prev_hop, required),
7000 (1, total_msat, option),
7001 (2, value, required),
7002 (4, payment_data, option),
7003 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7004 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7006 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7008 if payment_data.is_some() {
7009 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7011 if total_msat.is_none() {
7012 total_msat = Some(value);
7014 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7017 if total_msat.is_none() {
7018 if payment_data.is_none() {
7019 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7021 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7023 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7027 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7030 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7037 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7038 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7039 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7042 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
7043 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7044 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
7045 let mut payment_id = None;
7046 let mut payment_secret = None;
7047 let mut payment_params = None;
7048 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7049 (0, session_priv, required),
7050 (1, payment_id, option),
7051 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7052 (3, payment_secret, option),
7053 (4, path, vec_type),
7054 (5, payment_params, option),
7056 if payment_id.is_none() {
7057 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7059 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7061 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7062 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7063 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7064 path: path.unwrap(),
7065 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7070 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7071 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7076 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7077 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7079 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
7081 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7082 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7083 (0, session_priv, required),
7084 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7085 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7086 (3, payment_secret, option),
7087 (4, *path, vec_type),
7088 (5, payment_params, option),
7091 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7093 field.write(writer)?;
7100 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
7101 (0, LightningError) => {
7105 (0, failure_code, required),
7106 (2, data, vec_type),
7110 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7111 (0, forward_info, required),
7112 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7113 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7114 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7115 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7118 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7120 (0, htlc_id, required),
7121 (2, err_packet, required),
7126 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7127 (0, payment_secret, required),
7128 (2, expiry_time, required),
7129 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7130 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7131 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7134 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
7136 (0, session_privs, required),
7139 (0, session_privs, required),
7140 (1, payment_hash, option),
7141 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
7144 (0, session_privs, required),
7145 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
7146 (2, payment_hash, required),
7147 (4, payment_secret, option),
7148 (6, total_msat, required),
7149 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
7150 (10, starting_block_height, required),
7153 (0, session_privs, required),
7154 (2, payment_hash, required),
7158 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
7159 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7160 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7161 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7162 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7165 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7166 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7168 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7170 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7172 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7173 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7174 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7178 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
7179 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
7180 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7181 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7182 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7183 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7184 unfunded_channels += 1;
7187 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7188 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7189 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7190 channel.write(writer)?;
7196 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7197 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7198 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7199 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7200 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7201 for forward in pending_forwards {
7202 forward.write(writer)?;
7207 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7208 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7209 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7211 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7212 (claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7213 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_payments.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7214 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7215 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7216 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7217 htlc.write(writer)?;
7219 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7222 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7223 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7224 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7225 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7226 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7227 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7230 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7231 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7232 for event in events.iter() {
7233 event.write(writer)?;
7236 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7237 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7238 for event in background_events.iter() {
7240 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7242 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7243 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7248 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7249 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7250 // likely to be identical.
7251 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7252 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7254 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7255 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7256 hash.write(writer)?;
7257 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7260 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7261 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7262 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7263 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7264 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7267 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7268 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7270 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7271 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7272 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7273 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7276 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7277 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7281 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7282 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7283 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7285 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7286 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7287 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7293 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7294 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7295 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7296 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7299 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7300 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7301 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7302 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7303 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7305 debug_assert!(false, "While we have code to serialize pending_claiming_payments, the map should always be empty until a later PR");
7308 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7309 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7310 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7311 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7312 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7313 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7314 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7315 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7316 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7323 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7325 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7327 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7328 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7329 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7330 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7331 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7332 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7333 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7334 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7335 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7336 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7337 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7338 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7339 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7341 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7342 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7344 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7345 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7347 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7348 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7349 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7350 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7351 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7352 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7354 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7355 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7356 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7357 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7358 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7359 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7362 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7363 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7365 pub keys_manager: K,
7367 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7369 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7370 pub fee_estimator: F,
7371 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7373 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7374 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7375 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7376 pub chain_monitor: M,
7378 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7379 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7380 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7381 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7382 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7383 /// deserialization.
7385 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7386 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7387 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7389 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7390 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7392 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7393 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7394 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7395 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7397 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7400 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7401 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7404 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7405 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7406 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7407 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7408 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7409 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7412 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7413 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7414 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7415 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7416 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7418 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7419 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7424 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7425 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7426 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7427 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7428 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7429 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7430 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7431 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7434 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7435 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7436 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7440 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7441 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7442 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7443 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7444 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7445 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7448 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7449 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7451 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7455 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7457 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7458 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7459 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7460 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7461 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7462 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7463 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7464 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7465 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7466 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7467 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7468 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7469 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7470 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7471 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7472 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7473 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7474 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7475 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7476 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7477 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7478 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7479 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7480 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7481 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7482 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7483 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7484 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7485 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7486 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7487 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7488 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7489 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7490 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7491 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7492 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7493 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7494 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7495 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7496 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7498 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7499 let mut found_htlc = false;
7500 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7501 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7504 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7505 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7506 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7507 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7508 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7509 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7510 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7511 log_info!(args.logger,
7512 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7513 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7514 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7518 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7519 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7520 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7522 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7523 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7525 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7527 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7528 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7529 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7530 // safely discard the channel.
7531 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7532 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7533 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7534 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7535 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7538 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7539 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7540 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7541 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7542 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7543 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7547 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7548 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7549 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7550 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7554 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7555 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7556 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7557 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7558 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7559 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7560 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7561 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7562 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7564 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7567 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7568 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7569 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7570 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7571 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7572 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7573 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7574 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7576 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7579 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7580 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7581 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7582 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7583 let peer_state = PeerState {
7584 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7586 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7589 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7590 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7591 for _ in 0..event_count {
7592 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7593 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7598 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7599 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7600 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7601 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7602 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7603 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7607 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7608 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7610 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7611 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7612 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7613 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7614 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7618 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7619 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7620 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7621 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7622 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7623 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7624 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7626 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7627 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7631 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7632 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7633 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7634 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7635 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7636 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7637 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7638 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7639 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7640 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7641 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7642 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7643 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7644 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7645 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7646 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7647 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7648 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7650 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7651 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7654 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7655 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7658 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7659 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7660 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7661 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7662 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7663 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7665 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7667 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7668 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7669 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7670 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7671 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7672 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7673 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7675 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7676 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7677 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7678 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7679 if path.is_empty() {
7680 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7681 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7683 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7684 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7685 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7686 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7688 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7689 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7690 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7692 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7693 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7694 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7695 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7696 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7698 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7699 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7700 total_msat: path_amt,
7701 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7703 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7704 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7709 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7710 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) = htlc_source {
7711 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
7712 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
7713 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs`, we were
7714 // apparently not persisted after the monitor was when forwarding
7716 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
7717 forwards.retain(|forward| {
7718 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
7719 if htlc_info.prev_short_channel_id == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
7720 htlc_info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
7722 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
7723 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
7728 !forwards.is_empty()
7736 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
7737 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7738 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7739 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7740 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7741 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7742 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7743 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7747 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7748 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7750 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7751 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7752 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7753 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7755 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7756 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7759 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7760 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7761 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7762 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7763 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7765 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7766 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7767 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7768 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7769 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7770 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7771 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7772 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7774 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7775 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7779 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7781 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7783 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7784 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7786 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7790 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7791 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7793 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7794 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7797 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7799 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7801 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7802 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7803 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7804 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7805 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7809 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7810 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7811 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7812 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7814 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7815 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7816 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7818 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7819 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7820 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7821 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7822 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7823 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7825 if chan.is_usable() {
7826 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7827 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7828 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7829 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7830 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7835 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7837 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7838 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7839 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7840 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7841 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7842 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7843 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7844 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7845 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7846 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7847 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7849 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7850 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7852 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7853 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7854 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7855 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7857 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7858 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7859 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7860 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7862 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7863 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7864 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7865 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7867 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7868 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7869 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7871 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7872 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7875 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7878 purpose: payment_purpose,
7879 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7885 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7887 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7888 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7889 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7891 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7893 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7895 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7897 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7898 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7899 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7900 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7902 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7903 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_htlcs, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
7904 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7905 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7906 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7907 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7909 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7915 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7917 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7919 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7920 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7921 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7922 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7924 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7925 logger: args.logger,
7926 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7929 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7930 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7931 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7932 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7933 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7936 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7937 //connection or two.
7939 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7945 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7946 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7947 use core::time::Duration;
7948 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7949 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7950 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7951 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7952 use crate::ln::msgs;
7953 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7954 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7955 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7956 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7957 use crate::util::test_utils;
7958 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7961 fn test_notify_limits() {
7962 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7963 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7964 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7965 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7966 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7967 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7969 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7970 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7971 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7972 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7973 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7975 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7977 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7978 // to connect messages with new values
7979 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7980 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7981 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7982 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7984 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7985 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7986 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7987 // ... but the last node should not.
7988 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7989 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7990 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7991 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7993 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7994 // about the channel.
7995 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7996 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7997 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7999 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8001 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8002 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8003 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8004 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8005 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8006 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8008 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8009 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8010 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8012 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8013 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8014 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8015 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8016 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8017 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8019 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8020 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8021 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8022 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8023 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8024 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8025 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8026 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8028 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8029 // the channel info has updated.
8030 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8031 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8032 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8033 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
8034 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8035 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8039 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8040 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8042 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8043 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8044 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8045 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8046 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8048 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8049 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8050 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8051 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8053 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8054 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8055 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8056 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8057 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8058 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8059 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8060 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8061 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8062 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8064 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8065 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8067 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8068 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8069 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8070 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8071 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8072 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8073 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8074 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8075 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8077 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8078 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8079 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8080 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8081 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8082 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8083 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8084 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8085 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8087 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8088 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8090 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8091 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8092 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8094 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8095 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8096 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8097 // lightning messages manually.
8098 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8099 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8100 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8102 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8103 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8104 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8106 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8107 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8108 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8109 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8110 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8111 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8112 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8113 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8114 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8115 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8116 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8117 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8118 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8119 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8120 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8121 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8122 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8123 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8124 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8125 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8128 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8129 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8130 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8131 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8133 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8134 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8135 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8136 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8138 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8141 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8142 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8143 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8144 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8146 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8149 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8150 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8151 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8152 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8154 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8159 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8160 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8161 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8162 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8163 // fails as expected.
8164 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8165 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8166 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8167 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8168 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8169 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8170 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8172 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8173 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8174 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8176 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8177 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8178 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
8179 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8180 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8182 let route = find_route(
8183 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8184 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8186 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8187 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8188 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8189 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8190 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8191 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8192 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8193 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8194 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8195 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8196 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8197 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8198 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8200 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8201 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8202 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8203 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8204 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8205 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8206 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8207 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8208 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8210 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8211 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8213 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8214 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8215 let route = find_route(
8216 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8217 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8219 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8220 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8221 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8222 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8223 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8224 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8225 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8227 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8228 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8229 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8231 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8232 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8233 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8234 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8235 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8237 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8238 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8239 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8240 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8241 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8242 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8243 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8244 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8245 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8246 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8247 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8248 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8249 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8251 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8252 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8256 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8257 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8258 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8259 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8260 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8261 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8262 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8264 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8265 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8266 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8267 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8269 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8270 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8271 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8272 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8273 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8275 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8276 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8277 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8278 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8279 let route = find_route(
8280 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8281 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8284 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8285 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8286 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8287 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8288 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8290 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8291 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8292 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8293 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8294 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8295 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8296 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8298 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8302 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8303 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8304 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8305 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8306 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8307 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8309 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8310 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8311 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8312 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8314 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8315 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8316 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8317 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8318 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8320 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8321 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8322 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8323 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8324 let route = find_route(
8325 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8326 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8329 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8330 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8331 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8332 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8333 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8334 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8336 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8337 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8338 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8339 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8340 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8341 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8342 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8344 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8348 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8349 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8350 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8351 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8352 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8354 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8355 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8356 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8357 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8359 // Marshall an MPP route.
8360 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8361 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8362 route.paths.push(path);
8363 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8364 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8365 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8366 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8367 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8368 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8370 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8371 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8372 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8373 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8378 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8379 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8380 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8381 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8382 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8383 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8385 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8386 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8388 total_msat: 100_000,
8391 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8392 // payment verification fails as expected.
8393 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8394 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8395 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8396 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8398 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8402 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8403 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8407 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8408 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8409 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8410 // the channel is successfully closed.
8411 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8412 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8413 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8414 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8416 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8417 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8418 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8419 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8420 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8422 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8423 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8425 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8426 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8427 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8428 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8431 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8433 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8434 // as it has the funding transaction.
8435 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8436 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8437 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8439 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8442 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8444 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8446 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8447 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8448 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8450 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8451 // as it has the funding transaction.
8452 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8453 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8454 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8456 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8457 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8458 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8459 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8460 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8461 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8462 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8464 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8465 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8466 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8467 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8469 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8470 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8472 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8473 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8474 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8475 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8476 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8477 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8478 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8480 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8481 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8482 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8483 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8484 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8485 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8486 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8489 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8491 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8492 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8493 // closing transaction).
8494 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8495 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8496 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8498 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8499 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8500 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8501 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8502 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8505 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8507 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8509 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8510 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8511 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8513 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8515 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8516 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8520 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8522 use crate::chain::Listen;
8523 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8524 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8525 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8526 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8527 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8528 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8529 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8530 use crate::util::test_utils;
8531 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8532 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8534 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8535 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8536 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8538 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8542 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8543 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8544 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8545 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8546 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8547 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8548 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8553 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8554 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8557 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8558 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8559 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8561 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8562 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8564 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8565 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8567 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8568 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8570 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8571 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8572 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8573 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8574 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8576 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8578 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8580 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8581 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8582 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8583 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8584 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8586 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8588 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8590 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8591 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8592 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8593 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8594 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8597 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8598 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8599 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8601 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8602 } else { panic!(); }
8604 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8605 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8607 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8610 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8613 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8614 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8616 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8617 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8618 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8619 match msg_events[0] {
8620 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8621 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8622 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8626 match msg_events[1] {
8627 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8631 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8632 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8634 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8635 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8637 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8640 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8641 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8643 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8644 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8646 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8649 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8651 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8652 macro_rules! send_payment {
8653 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8654 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8655 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8656 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8657 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8658 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8659 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8660 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8661 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8662 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8664 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8665 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8667 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8668 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8670 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8671 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8672 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8673 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8674 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8675 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8676 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8677 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8679 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8680 expect_payment_claimable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8681 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8682 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8684 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8685 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8686 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8687 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8688 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8690 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8693 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8694 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8695 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8696 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8698 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8703 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8704 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);