1 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
3 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
4 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
5 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
7 //! It does not manage routing logic (see ln::router for that) nor does it manage constructing
8 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
9 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
14 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
15 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
17 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
18 use bitcoin_hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
19 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
21 use bitcoin_hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
23 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
24 use secp256k1::Secp256k1;
25 use secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
28 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface,ChainListener,FeeEstimator};
29 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
30 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError};
31 use ln::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, ManyChannelMonitor, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY};
32 use ln::router::Route;
33 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
36 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemoryChannelKeys};
38 use util::config::UserConfig;
39 use util::{byte_utils, events};
40 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
41 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
42 use util::logger::Logger;
43 use util::errors::APIError;
46 use std::collections::{HashMap, hash_map, HashSet};
47 use std::io::{Cursor, Read};
48 use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock};
49 use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
50 use std::time::Duration;
51 use std::marker::{Sync, Send};
54 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
56 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
57 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
58 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
60 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
61 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
62 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
63 // before we forward it.
65 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
66 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
67 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
68 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
69 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
71 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
72 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
73 onion_packet: Option<msgs::OnionPacket>,
74 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
75 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
76 short_channel_id: u64,
77 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
78 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
81 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
82 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
83 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
84 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
87 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
88 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
89 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
90 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
94 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
96 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
98 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
102 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
106 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
107 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
108 pub(super) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
109 short_channel_id: u64,
111 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
115 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
116 pub(super) enum HTLCSource {
117 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
120 session_priv: SecretKey,
121 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
122 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
123 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
128 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
129 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
130 route: Route { hops: Vec::new() },
131 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
132 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
137 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
138 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
140 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
148 /// payment_hash type, use to cross-lock hop
149 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
150 pub struct PaymentHash(pub [u8;32]);
151 /// payment_preimage type, use to route payment between hop
152 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
153 pub struct PaymentPreimage(pub [u8;32]);
155 type ShutdownResult = (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
157 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
158 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
159 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
160 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
161 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
163 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
164 err: msgs::LightningError,
165 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
167 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
169 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
171 err: LightningError {
173 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
174 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
176 data: err.to_string()
180 shutdown_finish: None,
184 fn ignore_no_close(err: &'static str) -> Self {
186 err: LightningError {
188 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
190 shutdown_finish: None,
194 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
195 Self { err, shutdown_finish: None }
198 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: &'static str, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
200 err: LightningError {
202 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
203 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
205 data: err.to_string()
209 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
213 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
216 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
218 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
220 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
222 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
223 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
225 data: msg.to_string()
229 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => LightningError {
231 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
232 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
234 data: msg.to_string()
239 shutdown_finish: None,
244 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
245 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
246 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
247 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
248 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
250 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
251 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
252 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
253 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
254 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
255 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
256 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
258 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
262 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
263 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
264 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<ChanSigner>>,
265 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
266 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
267 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
268 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
269 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
270 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
271 /// payment_hash -> Vec<(amount_received, htlc_source)> for tracking things that were to us and
272 /// can be failed/claimed by the user
273 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
274 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
276 pub(super) claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<(u64, HTLCPreviousHopData)>>,
277 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
278 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
279 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>,
282 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
283 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
285 latest_features: InitFeatures,
288 #[cfg(not(any(target_pointer_width = "32", target_pointer_width = "64")))]
289 const ERR: () = "You need at least 32 bit pointers (well, usize, but we'll assume they're the same) for ChannelManager::latest_block_height";
291 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
292 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
293 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
294 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
295 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
296 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
297 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
298 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T> = Arc<ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>>>;
300 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
301 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
302 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
303 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
304 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
305 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
306 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
307 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
308 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, M, T> = ChannelManager<InMemoryChannelKeys, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager>;
310 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
311 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
313 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
314 /// to individual Channels.
316 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
317 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
318 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
319 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
321 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
322 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
323 /// returning from ManyChannelMonitor::add_/update_monitor, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
324 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
325 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
326 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
327 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
329 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager), which
330 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
331 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
332 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
335 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
336 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
337 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
338 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
339 /// timer_chan_freshness_every_min roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
341 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
342 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
343 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
344 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
345 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
346 pub struct ChannelManager<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref>
347 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
348 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
349 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
351 default_configuration: UserConfig,
352 genesis_hash: Sha256dHash,
353 fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
358 pub(super) latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
360 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize,
361 last_block_hash: Mutex<Sha256dHash>,
362 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
365 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
367 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>,
368 our_network_key: SecretKey,
370 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
371 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
372 /// are currently open with that peer.
373 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
374 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
376 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
378 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
379 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
380 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
381 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
382 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
389 /// The amount of time we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time between when
390 /// we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
391 pub(crate) const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
392 /// The amount of time we're willing to wait to claim money back to us
393 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24 * 7;
395 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
396 /// HTLC's CLTV. This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
397 /// ie the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
398 /// the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
399 /// CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
400 const CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6 * 12; //TODO?
401 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
403 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
404 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
405 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
406 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
407 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
408 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
411 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
413 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying inbound claim. See
414 // ChannelMontior::would_broadcast_at_height for a description of why this is needed.
417 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
419 macro_rules! secp_call {
420 ( $res: expr, $err: expr ) => {
423 Err(_) => return Err($err),
428 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
429 pub struct ChannelDetails {
430 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
431 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
432 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
433 /// lifetime of the channel.
434 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
435 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
436 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
437 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
438 /// The node_id of our counterparty
439 pub remote_network_id: PublicKey,
440 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
441 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
442 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
443 pub counterparty_features: InitFeatures,
444 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
445 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
446 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
448 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
449 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
450 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
451 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
452 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
453 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
454 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
455 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
456 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
457 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
458 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
459 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
460 /// the peer is connected, and (c) no monitor update failure is pending resolution.
464 macro_rules! handle_error {
465 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $their_node_id: expr, $locked_channel_state: expr) => {
468 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish }) => {
469 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
470 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
471 if let Some(update) = update_option {
472 $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
477 log_error!($self, "{}", err.err);
478 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
479 } else { $locked_channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id: $their_node_id, action: err.action.clone() }); }
480 // Return error in case higher-API need one
487 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
488 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
491 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
492 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
494 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
495 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
496 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
497 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
498 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
500 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
502 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
507 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
508 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
511 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(msg)) => {
512 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $entry.key().clone()))
514 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => {
515 log_trace!($self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
516 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
517 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
518 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
520 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
522 Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, update }) => {
523 log_error!($self, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]), msg);
524 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
525 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
526 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
528 if let Err(e) = $self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update) {
530 // Upstream channel is dead, but we want at least to fail backward HTLCs to save
531 // downstream channels. In case of PermanentFailure, we are not going to be able
532 // to claim back to_remote output on remote commitment transaction. Doesn't
533 // make a difference here, we are concern about HTLCs circuit, not onchain funds.
534 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {},
535 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {},
538 let mut shutdown_res = chan.force_shutdown();
539 if shutdown_res.0.len() >= 1 {
540 log_error!($self, "You have a toxic local commitment transaction {} avaible in channel monitor, read comment in ChannelMonitor::get_latest_local_commitment_txn to be informed of manual action to take", shutdown_res.0[0].txid());
542 shutdown_res.0.clear();
543 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()))
549 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
550 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
551 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
553 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
555 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
556 log_error!($self, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]));
557 let (channel_id, mut chan) = $entry.remove_entry();
558 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
559 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
561 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
562 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
563 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
564 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
565 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
566 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
567 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
568 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
569 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
570 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), $self.get_channel_update(&chan).ok()));
573 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
574 log_info!($self, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
575 log_bytes!($entry.key()[..]),
576 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
578 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
579 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
581 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
582 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
584 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
585 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
586 if !$resend_commitment {
587 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
590 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
592 $entry.get_mut().monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
593 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor"), *$entry.key()))
599 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
600 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
601 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
603 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
604 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
608 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
609 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
610 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
611 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
612 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
615 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
620 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref> ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K>
621 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
622 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
623 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
625 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
627 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
628 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
630 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
632 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
634 /// Users must provide the current blockchain height from which to track onchain channel
635 /// funding outpoints and send payments with reliable timelocks.
637 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
638 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods.
639 /// However, rather than calling these methods directly, the user should register
640 /// the ChannelManager as a listener to the BlockNotifier and call the BlockNotifier's
641 /// `block_(dis)connected` methods, which will notify all registered listeners in one
643 pub fn new(network: Network, feeest: Arc<FeeEstimator>, monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: Arc<Logger>, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, current_blockchain_height: usize) -> Result<ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K>, secp256k1::Error> {
644 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
646 let res = ChannelManager {
647 default_configuration: config.clone(),
648 genesis_hash: genesis_block(network).header.bitcoin_hash(),
649 fee_estimator: feeest.clone(),
653 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(current_blockchain_height),
654 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(Default::default()),
657 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
658 by_id: HashMap::new(),
659 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
660 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
661 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
662 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
664 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
666 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
668 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
669 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
679 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
681 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady and
682 /// FundingBroadcastSafe events to allow tracking of which events correspond with which
683 /// create_channel call. Note that user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you
684 /// may wish to avoid using 0 for user_id here.
686 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
687 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
689 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
690 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
691 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
692 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
693 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "channel_value must be at least 1000 satoshis" });
696 let channel = Channel::new_outbound(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)?;
697 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone(), &*self.fee_estimator);
699 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
700 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
701 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
702 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
703 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
704 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG" });
706 panic!("RNG is bad???");
709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
711 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
712 node_id: their_network_key,
718 fn list_channels_with_filter<F: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<ChanSigner>)) -> bool>(&self, f: F) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
719 let mut res = Vec::new();
721 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
722 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
723 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
724 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
725 res.push(ChannelDetails {
726 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
727 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
728 remote_network_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
729 counterparty_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
730 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
731 inbound_capacity_msat,
732 outbound_capacity_msat,
733 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
734 is_live: channel.is_live(),
738 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
739 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
740 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.remote_network_id) {
741 chan.counterparty_features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
747 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
748 /// more information.
749 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
750 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
753 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
754 /// Router::get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
756 /// These are guaranteed to have their is_live value set to true, see the documentation for
757 /// ChannelDetails::is_live for more info on exactly what the criteria are.
758 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
759 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
760 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
761 // really wanted anyway.
762 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
765 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
766 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
767 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
769 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
770 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
771 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
773 let (mut failed_htlcs, chan_option) = {
774 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
775 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
776 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
777 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
778 let (shutdown_msg, failed_htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown()?;
779 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
780 node_id: chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id(),
783 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
784 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
785 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
787 (failed_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
788 } else { (failed_htlcs, None) }
790 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel"})
793 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
794 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
796 let chan_update = if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
797 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
802 if let Some(update) = chan_update {
803 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
804 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
813 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
814 let (local_txn, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
815 log_trace!(self, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} transactions to broadcast and {} HTLCs to fail", local_txn.len(), failed_htlcs.len());
816 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
817 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
819 for tx in local_txn {
820 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(tx));
821 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
825 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
826 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel.
827 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) {
828 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
831 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
832 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
833 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.remove(channel_id) {
834 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
835 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
842 log_trace!(self, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
843 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown());
844 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
845 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
846 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
852 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
853 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
854 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
855 for chan in self.list_channels() {
856 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
860 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>) {
861 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
862 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
864 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
865 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
866 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
867 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
868 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
869 failure_code: $err_code,
870 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
875 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
876 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
879 let shared_secret = {
880 let mut arr = [0; 32];
881 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
884 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
886 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
887 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
888 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
889 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
890 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
891 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
892 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
893 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
896 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
897 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
898 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
899 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
900 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
903 let mut channel_state = None;
904 macro_rules! return_err {
905 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
907 log_info!(self, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
908 if channel_state.is_none() {
909 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
911 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
912 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
913 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
914 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
915 })), channel_state.unwrap());
920 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
921 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
922 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac) = {
923 match msgs::OnionHopData::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
925 let error_code = match err {
926 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
927 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
928 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
929 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
930 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
932 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
935 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
936 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
937 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
944 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
947 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
948 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
949 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
950 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
951 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
952 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
953 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
954 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
955 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
956 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
957 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
958 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
962 // final_expiry_too_soon
963 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + (CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
964 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
966 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
967 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
968 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
970 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
971 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
972 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
975 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
976 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
977 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
978 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
980 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
982 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
984 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
985 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
986 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
989 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
990 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
991 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
994 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
995 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
996 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
998 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1000 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1001 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1002 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1004 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1006 let blinding_factor = {
1007 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1008 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1009 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1010 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1013 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1015 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1017 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1020 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1021 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1024 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1025 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1026 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1027 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode => {
1028 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1032 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1033 onion_packet: Some(outgoing_packet),
1034 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1035 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1036 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1037 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1038 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1042 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1043 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref onion_packet, ref short_channel_id, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1044 if onion_packet.is_some() { // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject them in the body here
1045 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1046 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1047 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1048 return_err!("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, &[0;0]);
1050 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1052 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1053 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1055 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1056 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1057 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1058 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1059 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1060 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1061 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1063 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_their_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1064 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1066 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64).and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator) as u64) });
1067 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1068 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1070 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1071 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1073 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1074 // We want to have at least LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS to fail prior to going on chain CLAIM_BUFFER blocks before expiration
1075 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1076 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update(chan).unwrap())));
1078 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1079 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1084 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1085 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1086 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1087 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1089 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1090 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1092 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1093 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(chan_update.contents.flags));
1095 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1097 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1102 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1105 /// only fails if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id
1106 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1107 fn get_channel_update(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1108 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1109 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1113 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_their_node_id().serialize()[..];
1115 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1116 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1117 short_channel_id: short_channel_id,
1118 timestamp: chan.get_channel_update_count(),
1119 flags: (!were_node_one) as u16 | ((!chan.is_live() as u16) << 1),
1120 cltv_expiry_delta: CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA,
1121 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1122 fee_base_msat: chan.get_our_fee_base_msat(&*self.fee_estimator),
1123 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1124 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1127 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1128 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1130 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1136 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1138 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1139 /// fields for more info.
1141 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1142 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1143 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1144 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1145 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1146 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1148 /// May generate a SendHTLCs message event on success, which should be relayed.
1150 /// Raises APIError::RoutError when invalid route or forward parameter
1151 /// (cltv_delta, fee, node public key) is specified.
1152 /// Raises APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1153 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update failure).
1154 /// Raised APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1155 /// relevant updates.
1157 /// In case of APIError::RouteError/APIError::ChannelUnavailable, the payment send has failed
1158 /// and you may wish to retry via a different route immediately.
1159 /// In case of APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed, the commitment update has been irrevocably
1160 /// committed on our end and we're just waiting for a monitor update to send it. Do NOT retry
1161 /// the payment via a different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1162 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1163 if route.hops.len() < 1 || route.hops.len() > 20 {
1164 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"});
1166 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
1167 for (idx, hop) in route.hops.iter().enumerate() {
1168 if idx != route.hops.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
1169 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"});
1173 let (session_priv, prng_seed) = self.keys_manager.get_onion_rand();
1175 let cur_height = self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32 + 1;
1177 let onion_keys = secp_call!(onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &route, &session_priv),
1178 APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"});
1179 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(&route, cur_height)?;
1180 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1181 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1183 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, &payment_hash);
1185 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1187 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1188 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1190 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&route.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1191 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!"}),
1192 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1195 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1196 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1198 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1199 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1201 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1202 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!"});
1204 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1205 route: route.clone(),
1206 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1207 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1208 }, onion_packet), channel_state, chan)
1210 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1211 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1212 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1213 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1214 // that we will resent the commitment update once we unfree monitor
1215 // updating, so we have to take special care that we don't return
1216 // something else in case we will resend later!
1217 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1220 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1221 node_id: route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1222 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1223 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1224 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1225 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1226 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1234 } else { unreachable!(); }
1238 match handle_error!(self, err, route.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey, channel_lock) {
1239 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1240 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err }) }
1244 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
1246 /// Note that ALL inputs in the transaction pointed to by funding_txo MUST spend SegWit outputs
1247 /// or your counterparty can steal your funds!
1249 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
1251 /// May panic if the funding_txo is duplicative with some other channel (note that this should
1252 /// be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction keys per-channel).
1253 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_txo: OutPoint) {
1254 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1256 let (mut chan, msg, chan_monitor) = {
1257 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1258 let (res, chan) = match channel_state.by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
1260 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_txo)
1261 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
1262 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(), None)
1263 } else { unreachable!(); })
1268 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1269 Ok(funding_msg) => {
1270 (chan, funding_msg.0, funding_msg.1)
1272 Err(_) => { return; }
1275 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1276 // lock before add_monitor
1277 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(chan_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan_monitor) {
1279 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1281 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1282 match handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", *temporary_channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None)), chan.get_their_node_id(), channel_state) {
1283 Err(_) => { return; },
1284 Ok(()) => unreachable!(),
1288 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1289 // Its completely fine to continue with a FundingCreated until the monitor
1290 // update is persisted, as long as we don't generate the FundingBroadcastSafe
1291 // until the monitor has been safely persisted (as funding broadcast is not,
1293 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1298 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1299 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
1300 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
1303 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
1304 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1305 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
1307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1313 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<ChanSigner>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
1314 if !chan.should_announce() {
1315 log_trace!(self, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1319 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
1321 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
1323 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
1324 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
1326 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
1327 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
1328 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
1329 node_signature: our_node_sig,
1330 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
1334 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
1336 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
1337 /// Will likely generate further events.
1338 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
1339 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1341 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
1342 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
1343 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
1345 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1346 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1348 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
1349 if short_chan_id != 0 {
1350 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
1351 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1353 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
1354 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1355 match forward_info {
1356 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1357 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1358 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1359 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1360 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1362 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x4000 | 10, None));
1364 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1365 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
1366 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
1367 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
1368 // problem, not ours.
1375 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
1376 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1377 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
1378 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1379 match forward_info {
1380 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1381 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), prev_short_channel_id, short_chan_id);
1382 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
1383 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1384 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1385 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1387 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(forward_info.amt_to_forward, forward_info.payment_hash, forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), forward_info.onion_packet.unwrap()) {
1389 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1390 log_trace!(self, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(forward_info.payment_hash.0), msg);
1392 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
1394 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap();
1395 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash, 0x1000 | 7, Some(chan_update)));
1400 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1402 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1403 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
1404 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
1405 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
1406 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
1407 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
1408 // this channel currently :/.
1414 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
1415 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} after delay", short_chan_id);
1416 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet) {
1418 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
1419 log_trace!(self, "Failed to fail backwards to short_id {}: {}", short_chan_id, msg);
1421 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
1423 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
1424 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
1425 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
1428 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
1430 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
1431 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
1432 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
1433 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
1434 // messages when we can.
1435 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
1436 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
1437 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
1444 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
1445 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment() {
1448 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
1449 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
1450 let their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
1451 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
1452 ChannelError::Ignore(_) => {
1453 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
1455 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1456 log_trace!(self, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
1457 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
1458 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1459 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1461 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(), self.get_channel_update(&channel).ok()))
1463 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. } => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
1465 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state) {
1466 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1467 Err(_) => { continue; },
1471 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1472 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
1475 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1476 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1477 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1478 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
1479 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1480 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
1481 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1483 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
1491 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
1492 match forward_info {
1493 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info } => {
1494 let prev_hop_data = HTLCPreviousHopData {
1495 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
1496 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
1497 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
1499 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(forward_info.payment_hash) {
1500 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => entry.get_mut().push((forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)),
1501 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(vec![(forward_info.amt_to_forward, prev_hop_data)]); },
1503 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
1504 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
1505 amt: forward_info.amt_to_forward,
1508 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
1509 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
1517 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_code, update) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
1519 None => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }),
1520 Some(chan_update) => self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }),
1524 if handle_errors.len() > 0 {
1525 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1526 for (their_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
1527 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1531 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
1532 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1533 events.append(&mut new_events);
1536 /// If a peer is disconnected we mark any channels with that peer as 'disabled'.
1537 /// After some time, if channels are still disabled we need to broadcast a ChannelUpdate
1538 /// to inform the network about the uselessness of these channels.
1540 /// This method handles all the details, and must be called roughly once per minute.
1541 pub fn timer_chan_freshness_every_min(&self) {
1542 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1543 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1544 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1545 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter_mut() {
1546 if chan.is_disabled_staged() && !chan.is_live() {
1547 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
1548 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1553 } else if chan.is_disabled_staged() && chan.is_live() {
1555 } else if chan.is_disabled_marked() {
1556 chan.to_disabled_staged();
1561 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
1562 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
1563 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
1564 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
1565 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
1566 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
1567 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1569 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1570 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
1571 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1572 for (recvd_value, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1573 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1574 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1575 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_hash,
1576 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(recvd_value).to_vec() });
1582 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
1583 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
1584 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
1585 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
1586 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
1587 /// still-available channels.
1588 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
1589 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
1590 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
1591 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
1594 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, .. } => {
1595 log_trace!(self, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1596 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1597 match &onion_error {
1598 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
1600 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1602 let (channel_update, payment_retryable, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
1603 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
1604 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
1605 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
1606 if let Some(update) = channel_update {
1607 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1608 events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate {
1613 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1614 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1615 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1616 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
1618 error_code: onion_error_code
1622 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
1626 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
1627 // TODO: We'd like to generate a PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate for temporary
1628 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as Router::get_route
1629 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
1631 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
1632 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
1633 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
1634 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
1635 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
1636 rejected_by_dest: route.hops.len() == 1,
1638 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
1644 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret }) => {
1645 let err_packet = match onion_error {
1646 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
1647 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
1648 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
1649 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
1651 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
1652 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1653 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
1657 let mut forward_event = None;
1658 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
1659 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
1661 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
1662 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
1663 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
1665 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1666 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
1669 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1670 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
1671 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1672 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
1673 time_forwardable: time
1680 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
1681 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
1682 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
1684 /// You must specify the expected amounts for this HTLC, and we will only claim HTLCs
1685 /// available within a few percent of the expected amount. This is critical for several
1686 /// reasons : a) it avoids providing senders with `proof-of-payment` (in the form of the
1687 /// payment_preimage without having provided the full value and b) it avoids certain
1688 /// privacy-breaking recipient-probing attacks which may reveal payment activity to
1689 /// motivated attackers.
1691 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
1692 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, expected_amount: u64) -> bool {
1693 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1695 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1697 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1698 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
1699 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
1700 for (received_amount, htlc_with_hash) in sources.drain(..) {
1701 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
1702 if received_amount < expected_amount || received_amount > expected_amount * 2 {
1703 let mut htlc_msat_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(received_amount).to_vec();
1704 let mut height_data = byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).to_vec();
1705 htlc_msat_data.append(&mut height_data);
1706 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
1707 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), &payment_hash,
1708 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_data });
1710 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(), HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_with_hash), payment_preimage);
1716 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<ChanSigner>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
1717 let (their_node_id, err) = loop {
1719 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { .. } => {
1720 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
1721 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1722 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentSent {
1726 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, .. }) => {
1727 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
1728 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1730 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id) {
1731 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
1733 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1734 // learn the preimage as the channel already hit the chain and that's
1735 // why it's missing.
1740 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
1741 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
1742 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(htlc_id, payment_preimage) {
1743 Ok((msgs, monitor_option)) => {
1744 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_option {
1745 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1746 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
1747 assert!(msgs.is_none());
1749 break (chan.get().get_their_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()));
1753 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
1754 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1755 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
1756 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1757 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1758 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
1759 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1760 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1768 // TODO: There is probably a channel manager somewhere that needs to
1769 // learn the preimage as the channel may be about to hit the chain.
1770 //TODO: Do something with e?
1774 } else { unreachable!(); }
1780 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
1783 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
1784 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1785 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key)
1788 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
1789 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
1792 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
1793 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
1795 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
1796 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
1797 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
1798 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
1800 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
1801 /// 1) You register a ManyChannelMonitor with this ChannelManager,
1802 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
1803 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
1804 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
1805 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
1806 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
1807 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
1808 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
1809 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1811 let mut close_results = Vec::new();
1812 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
1813 let mut htlc_failures = Vec::new();
1814 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
1817 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1818 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1819 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
1820 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
1821 let channel = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
1825 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
1829 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked) = channel.monitor_updating_restored();
1830 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
1831 htlc_forwards.push((channel.get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"), pending_forwards));
1833 htlc_failures.append(&mut pending_failures);
1835 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1836 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
1837 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1838 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1843 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1844 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
1845 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1846 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1847 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1852 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1856 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1861 if needs_broadcast_safe {
1862 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
1863 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
1864 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1867 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
1868 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1869 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1872 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
1873 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1874 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
1875 msg: announcement_sigs,
1878 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
1882 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().append(&mut pending_events);
1884 for failure in htlc_failures.drain(..) {
1885 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
1887 self.forward_htlcs(&mut htlc_forwards[..]);
1889 for res in close_results.drain(..) {
1890 self.finish_force_close_channel(res);
1894 fn internal_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1895 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
1896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
1899 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&*self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_node_id.clone(), their_features, msg, 0, Arc::clone(&self.logger), &self.default_configuration)
1900 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
1901 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1902 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1903 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1904 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!", msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
1905 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
1906 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
1907 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1908 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
1910 entry.insert(channel);
1916 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1917 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
1918 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1919 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1920 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
1921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1922 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1923 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1925 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, their_features), channel_state, chan);
1926 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
1928 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1931 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1932 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1933 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1934 channel_value_satoshis: value,
1935 output_script: output_script,
1936 user_channel_id: user_id,
1941 fn internal_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1942 let ((funding_msg, monitor_update), mut chan) = {
1943 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1944 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1945 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
1946 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1947 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1948 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.temporary_channel_id));
1950 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
1952 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.temporary_channel_id))
1955 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
1956 // lock before add_monitor
1957 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.add_monitor(monitor_update.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1959 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1960 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
1961 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
1962 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
1963 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
1964 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure", funding_msg.channel_id, chan.force_shutdown(), None));
1966 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1967 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
1968 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
1969 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
1970 // until we have persisted our monitor.
1971 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1975 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1976 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1977 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
1978 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1979 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id", funding_msg.channel_id))
1981 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
1982 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
1983 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
1992 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
1993 let (funding_txo, user_id) = {
1994 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1995 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1996 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
1997 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
1998 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
1999 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2001 let monitor_update = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg) {
2002 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2003 Err((Some(monitor_update), e)) => {
2004 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2005 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2006 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2009 Ok(update) => update,
2011 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2012 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
2014 (chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), chan.get().get_user_id())
2016 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2019 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2020 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingBroadcastSafe {
2021 funding_txo: funding_txo,
2022 user_channel_id: user_id,
2027 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2028 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2029 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2030 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2032 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2033 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2035 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg), channel_state, chan);
2036 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
2037 log_trace!(self, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2038 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
2039 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
2040 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
2041 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
2042 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
2043 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
2044 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
2045 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
2046 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
2047 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2048 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2049 msg: announcement_sigs,
2054 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2058 fn internal_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2059 let (mut dropped_htlcs, chan_option) = {
2060 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2061 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2063 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2064 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2065 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2066 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2068 let (shutdown, closing_signed, dropped_htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2069 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2070 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2071 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2075 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2076 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2077 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2081 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2082 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2083 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2085 (dropped_htlcs, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2086 } else { (dropped_htlcs, None) }
2088 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2091 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
2092 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2094 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2095 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2096 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2097 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2105 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2106 let (tx, chan_option) = {
2107 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2108 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2109 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
2110 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2111 if chan_entry.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2112 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2114 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
2115 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2116 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2117 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2122 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
2123 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
2124 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
2125 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
2126 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
2127 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2128 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2130 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
2131 } else { (tx, None) }
2133 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2136 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
2137 log_trace!(self, "Broadcast onchain {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
2138 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
2140 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
2141 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2142 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2143 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2151 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2152 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
2153 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
2154 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
2156 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
2157 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
2158 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
2159 //but we should prevent it anyway.
2161 let (mut pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
2162 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2164 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2165 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2166 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2167 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2169 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2170 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
2171 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
2172 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
2173 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { incoming_shared_secret, .. }) = pending_forward_info {
2174 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(chan.get());
2175 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2176 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2177 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2178 reason: if let Ok(update) = chan_update {
2179 // TODO: Note that |20 is defined as "channel FROM the processing
2180 // node has been disabled" (emphasis mine), which seems to imply
2181 // that we can't return |20 for an inbound channel being disabled.
2182 // This probably needs a spec update but should definitely be
2184 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x1000|20, &{
2185 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2186 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(update.contents.flags));
2187 res.extend_from_slice(&update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2191 // This can only happen if the channel isn't in the fully-funded
2192 // state yet, implying our counterparty is trying to route payments
2193 // over the channel back to themselves (cause no one else should
2194 // know the short_id is a lightning channel yet). We should have no
2195 // problem just calling this unknown_next_peer
2196 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
2201 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), channel_state, chan);
2203 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2208 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2209 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2211 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2212 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2213 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2214 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2215 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2217 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
2219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2222 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone());
2226 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2227 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2228 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2229 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2230 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2231 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2232 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2234 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
2236 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2241 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2242 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2243 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2244 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2245 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2246 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2247 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2249 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
2250 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set");
2251 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2253 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
2256 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2260 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2261 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2262 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2263 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2264 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2265 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2266 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2268 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2269 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator) {
2270 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
2271 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
2272 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
2273 let _ = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
2274 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
2279 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2280 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
2281 //TODO: Rebroadcast closing_signed if present on monitor update restoration
2283 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2284 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2285 msg: revoke_and_ack,
2287 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
2288 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2289 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2290 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2291 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2292 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2293 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2294 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2296 commitment_signed: msg,
2300 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2301 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2302 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2308 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2313 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
2314 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
2315 let mut forward_event = None;
2316 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
2317 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2318 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2319 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
2321 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2322 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(forward_info.short_channel_id) {
2323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2324 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
2326 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2327 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
2332 match forward_event {
2334 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2335 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
2336 time_forwardable: time
2344 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2345 let (pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id) = {
2346 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2347 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2348 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2349 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2350 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2353 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
2354 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, closing_signed, monitor_update) =
2355 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &*self.fee_estimator), channel_state, chan);
2356 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2357 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
2358 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && closing_signed.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
2359 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA"));
2361 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures);
2364 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2365 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2366 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2370 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
2371 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
2372 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2376 (pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"))
2378 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2381 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
2382 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
2384 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
2389 fn internal_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2390 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2391 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2392 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2393 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2394 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2395 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2397 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&*self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
2399 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2404 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2405 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2406 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2408 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2410 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2411 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2413 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
2414 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it", action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
2417 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2418 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) =
2419 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), self.genesis_hash.clone()), channel_state, chan);
2421 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
2422 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2423 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.node_id_2 } else { &announcement.node_id_1 }).is_err() ||
2424 self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, if were_node_one { &announcement.bitcoin_key_2 } else { &announcement.bitcoin_key_1 }).is_err() {
2425 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Bad announcement_signatures node_signature");
2426 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
2429 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2431 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2432 msg: msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
2433 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { msg.node_signature },
2434 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.node_signature } else { our_node_sig },
2435 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { msg.bitcoin_signature },
2436 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { msg.bitcoin_signature } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
2437 contents: announcement,
2439 update_msg: self.get_channel_update(chan.get()).unwrap(), // can only fail if we're not in a ready state
2442 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2447 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
2448 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2449 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2451 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
2452 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2453 if chan.get().get_their_node_id() != *their_node_id {
2454 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!", msg.channel_id));
2456 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, mut order, shutdown) =
2457 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg), channel_state, chan);
2458 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
2459 if let Err(e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2460 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
2461 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
2462 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
2463 if revoke_and_ack.is_none() {
2464 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2466 if commitment_update.is_none() {
2467 order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
2469 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, order, revoke_and_ack.is_some(), commitment_update.is_some());
2470 //TODO: Resend the funding_locked if needed once we get the monitor running again
2473 if let Some(msg) = funding_locked {
2474 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2475 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2479 macro_rules! send_raa { () => {
2480 if let Some(msg) = revoke_and_ack {
2481 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
2482 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2487 macro_rules! send_cu { () => {
2488 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
2489 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2490 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2496 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
2500 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
2505 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
2506 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2507 node_id: their_node_id.clone(),
2513 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel", msg.channel_id))
2517 /// Begin Update fee process. Allowed only on an outbound channel.
2518 /// If successful, will generate a UpdateHTLCs event, so you should probably poll
2519 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
2520 /// Note: This API is likely to change!
2522 pub fn update_fee(&self, channel_id: [u8;32], feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2523 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2524 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2526 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2527 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2529 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2530 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Failed to find corresponding channel"}),
2531 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
2532 if !chan.get().is_outbound() {
2533 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "update_fee cannot be sent for an inbound channel"});
2535 if chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
2536 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2538 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2539 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel is either not yet fully established or peer is currently disconnected"});
2541 their_node_id = chan.get().get_their_node_id();
2542 if let Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) =
2543 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_update_fee_and_commit(feerate_per_kw), channel_state, chan)
2545 if let Err(_e) = self.monitor.update_monitor(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2548 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2549 node_id: chan.get().get_their_node_id(),
2550 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2551 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2552 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2553 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2554 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2555 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2565 match handle_error!(self, err, their_node_id, channel_state_lock) {
2566 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2567 Err(e) => { Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: e.err })}
2572 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref> events::MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K>
2573 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2574 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2575 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2577 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<events::MessageSendEvent> {
2578 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2579 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2580 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2582 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2583 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2584 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2585 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2586 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2588 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2589 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2594 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2595 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2596 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
2601 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref> events::EventsProvider for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K>
2602 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2603 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2604 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2606 fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
2607 // TODO: Event release to users and serialization is currently race-y: it's very easy for a
2608 // user to serialize a ChannelManager with pending events in it and lose those events on
2609 // restart. This is doubly true for the fail/fulfill-backs from monitor events!
2611 //TODO: This behavior should be documented.
2612 for htlc_update in self.monitor.get_and_clear_pending_htlcs_updated() {
2613 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
2614 log_trace!(self, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
2615 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage);
2617 log_trace!(self, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
2618 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
2623 let mut ret = Vec::new();
2624 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2625 mem::swap(&mut ret, &mut *pending_events);
2630 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send>
2631 ChainListener for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K>
2632 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2633 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2634 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2636 fn block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
2637 let header_hash = header.bitcoin_hash();
2638 log_trace!(self, "Block {} at height {} connected with {} txn matched", header_hash, height, txn_matched.len());
2639 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2640 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2642 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2643 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2644 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2645 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2646 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
2647 let chan_res = channel.block_connected(header, height, txn_matched, indexes_of_txn_matched);
2648 if let Ok(Some(funding_locked)) = chan_res {
2649 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
2650 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2651 msg: funding_locked,
2653 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
2654 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2655 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
2656 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2657 msg: announcement_sigs,
2660 log_trace!(self, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2662 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
2663 } else if let Err(e) = chan_res {
2664 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2665 node_id: channel.get_their_node_id(),
2666 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
2670 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
2671 for tx in txn_matched {
2672 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
2673 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
2674 log_trace!(self, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
2675 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2676 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2678 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain. We go ahead and
2679 // broadcast our latest local state as well here, just in case its
2680 // some kind of SPV attack, though we expect these to be dropped.
2681 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2682 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2683 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2692 if channel.is_funding_initiated() && channel.channel_monitor().would_broadcast_at_height(height) {
2693 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2694 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2696 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown());
2697 // If would_broadcast_at_height() is true, the channel_monitor will broadcast
2698 // the latest local tx for us, so we should skip that here (it doesn't really
2699 // hurt anything, but does make tests a bit simpler).
2700 failed_channels.last_mut().unwrap().0 = Vec::new();
2701 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&channel) {
2702 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2711 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2712 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2714 self.latest_block_height.store(height as usize, Ordering::Release);
2715 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header_hash;
2718 /// We force-close the channel without letting our counterparty participate in the shutdown
2719 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, _: u32) {
2720 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2721 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2723 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2724 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2725 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2726 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2727 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, v| {
2728 if v.block_disconnected(header) {
2729 if let Some(short_id) = v.get_short_channel_id() {
2730 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2732 failed_channels.push(v.force_shutdown());
2733 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&v) {
2734 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2744 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2745 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2747 self.latest_block_height.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
2748 *self.last_block_hash.try_lock().expect("block_(dis)connected must not be called in parallel") = header.bitcoin_hash();
2752 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys, M: Deref + Sync + Send, T: Deref + Sync + Send, K: Deref + Sync + Send>
2753 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K>
2754 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
2755 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2756 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
2758 fn handle_open_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
2759 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2760 let res = self.internal_open_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2762 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2763 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2767 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
2768 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2769 let res = self.internal_accept_channel(their_node_id, their_features, msg);
2771 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2772 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2776 fn handle_funding_created(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
2777 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2778 let res = self.internal_funding_created(their_node_id, msg);
2780 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2781 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2785 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
2786 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2787 let res = self.internal_funding_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2789 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2790 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2794 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
2795 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2796 let res = self.internal_funding_locked(their_node_id, msg);
2798 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2799 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2803 fn handle_shutdown(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
2804 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2805 let res = self.internal_shutdown(their_node_id, msg);
2807 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2808 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2812 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
2813 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2814 let res = self.internal_closing_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2816 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2817 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2821 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
2822 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2823 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2825 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2826 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2830 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
2831 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2832 let res = self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2834 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2835 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2839 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
2840 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2841 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2843 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2844 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2848 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
2849 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2850 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(their_node_id, msg);
2852 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2853 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2857 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
2858 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2859 let res = self.internal_commitment_signed(their_node_id, msg);
2861 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2862 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2866 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
2867 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2868 let res = self.internal_revoke_and_ack(their_node_id, msg);
2870 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2871 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2875 fn handle_update_fee(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
2876 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2877 let res = self.internal_update_fee(their_node_id, msg);
2879 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2880 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2884 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
2885 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2886 let res = self.internal_announcement_signatures(their_node_id, msg);
2888 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2889 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2893 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
2894 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2895 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(their_node_id, msg);
2897 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2898 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *their_node_id, channel_state_lock);
2902 fn peer_disconnected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
2903 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2904 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
2905 let mut failed_payments = Vec::new();
2906 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
2908 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2909 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2910 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2911 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2912 if no_connection_possible {
2913 log_debug!(self, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2914 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2915 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2916 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2917 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2919 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown());
2920 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update(&chan) {
2921 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2931 log_debug!(self, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2932 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
2933 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
2934 let failed_adds = chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused();
2935 chan.to_disabled_marked();
2936 if !failed_adds.is_empty() {
2937 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update(&chan).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
2938 failed_payments.push((chan_update, failed_adds));
2940 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2941 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2942 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2946 no_channels_remain = false;
2952 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
2954 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2955 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2956 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2957 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2958 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2959 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2960 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2961 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2962 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2963 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2964 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2965 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
2966 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
2967 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != their_node_id,
2968 &events::MessageSendEvent::PaymentFailureNetworkUpdate { .. } => true,
2972 if no_channels_remain {
2973 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(their_node_id);
2976 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
2977 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
2979 for (chan_update, mut htlc_sources) in failed_payments {
2980 for (htlc_source, payment_hash) in htlc_sources.drain(..) {
2981 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.clone() });
2986 fn peer_connected(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
2987 log_debug!(self, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(their_node_id));
2989 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2992 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
2993 match peer_state_lock.entry(their_node_id.clone()) {
2994 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2995 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
2996 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
2999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
3000 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
3005 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3006 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3007 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3008 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
3009 if chan.get_their_node_id() == *their_node_id {
3010 if !chan.have_received_message() {
3011 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
3012 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
3013 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
3017 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
3018 node_id: chan.get_their_node_id(),
3019 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(),
3025 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
3028 fn handle_error(&self, their_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
3029 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3031 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
3032 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3033 if chan.remote_network_id == *their_node_id {
3034 self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
3038 self.force_close_channel(&msg.channel_id);
3043 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3044 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3046 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCInfo {
3047 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3048 self.onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3049 self.incoming_shared_secret.write(writer)?;
3050 self.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3051 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3052 self.amt_to_forward.write(writer)?;
3053 self.outgoing_cltv_value.write(writer)?;
3058 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCInfo {
3059 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, DecodeError> {
3060 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3061 onion_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3062 incoming_shared_secret: Readable::read(reader)?,
3063 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3064 short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3065 amt_to_forward: Readable::read(reader)?,
3066 outgoing_cltv_value: Readable::read(reader)?,
3071 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
3072 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3074 &HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(ref fail_msg) => {
3076 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3078 &HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(ref fail_msg) => {
3080 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3087 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailureMsg {
3088 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailureMsg, DecodeError> {
3089 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3090 0 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3091 1 => Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3092 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3097 impl Writeable for PendingHTLCStatus {
3098 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3100 &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(ref forward_info) => {
3102 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3104 &PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(ref fail_msg) => {
3106 fail_msg.write(writer)?;
3113 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for PendingHTLCStatus {
3114 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<PendingHTLCStatus, DecodeError> {
3115 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3116 0 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3117 1 => Ok(PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3118 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3123 impl_writeable!(HTLCPreviousHopData, 0, {
3126 incoming_packet_shared_secret
3129 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
3130 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3132 &HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref hop_data) => {
3134 hop_data.write(writer)?;
3136 &HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref route, ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
3138 route.write(writer)?;
3139 session_priv.write(writer)?;
3140 first_hop_htlc_msat.write(writer)?;
3147 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCSource {
3148 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCSource, DecodeError> {
3149 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3150 0 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3151 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3152 route: Readable::read(reader)?,
3153 session_priv: Readable::read(reader)?,
3154 first_hop_htlc_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3156 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3161 impl Writeable for HTLCFailReason {
3162 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3164 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3168 &HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
3170 failure_code.write(writer)?;
3171 data.write(writer)?;
3178 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCFailReason {
3179 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCFailReason, DecodeError> {
3180 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3181 0 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: Readable::read(reader)? }),
3182 1 => Ok(HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3183 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
3184 data: Readable::read(reader)?,
3186 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3191 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
3192 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3194 &HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { ref prev_short_channel_id, ref prev_htlc_id, ref forward_info } => {
3196 prev_short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3197 prev_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3198 forward_info.write(writer)?;
3200 &HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3202 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3203 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3210 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for HTLCForwardInfo {
3211 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<HTLCForwardInfo, DecodeError> {
3212 match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3213 0 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC {
3214 prev_short_channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3215 prev_htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3216 forward_info: Readable::read(reader)?,
3218 1 => Ok(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
3219 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3220 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3222 _ => Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3227 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K>
3228 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3229 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3230 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3232 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3233 let _ = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
3235 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3236 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3238 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
3239 (self.latest_block_height.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
3240 self.last_block_hash.lock().unwrap().write(writer)?;
3242 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3243 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
3244 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3245 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3246 unfunded_channels += 1;
3249 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
3250 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
3251 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
3252 channel.write(writer)?;
3256 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3257 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
3258 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
3259 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3260 for forward in pending_forwards {
3261 forward.write(writer)?;
3265 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3266 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
3267 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3268 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3269 for &(recvd_amt, ref previous_hop) in previous_hops.iter() {
3270 recvd_amt.write(writer)?;
3271 previous_hop.write(writer)?;
3275 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3276 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3277 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3278 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3279 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3280 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
3287 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
3289 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
3291 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
3292 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling <(Sha256dHash,
3293 /// ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args).
3294 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
3295 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
3296 /// 3) Register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints with your chain watch mechanism using
3297 /// ChannelMonitor::get_monitored_outpoints and ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
3298 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
3299 /// 5) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local ManyChannelMonitor.
3300 /// 6) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
3301 /// 7) Register the new ChannelManager with your ChainWatchInterface.
3302 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner: 'a + ChannelKeys, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref>
3303 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3304 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3305 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3308 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
3309 /// deserialization.
3310 pub keys_manager: K,
3312 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3314 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
3315 pub fee_estimator: Arc<FeeEstimator>,
3316 /// The ManyChannelMonitor for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
3318 /// No calls to the ManyChannelMonitor will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
3319 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
3320 /// ManyChannelMonitor after deserializing this ChannelManager.
3323 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
3324 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
3325 /// force-closed during deserialization.
3326 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
3327 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
3328 /// deserialization.
3329 pub logger: Arc<Logger>,
3330 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
3331 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
3332 pub default_config: UserConfig,
3334 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
3335 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
3337 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
3338 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
3339 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
3340 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
3342 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
3344 pub channel_monitors: &'a mut HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>>,
3347 impl<'a, R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref>
3348 ReadableArgs<R, ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K>> for (Sha256dHash, ChannelManager<ChanSigner, M, T, K>)
3349 where M::Target: ManyChannelMonitor<ChanSigner>,
3350 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3351 K::Target: KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>,
3353 fn read(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, ChanSigner, M, T, K>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3354 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3355 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3356 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3357 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3360 let genesis_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3361 let latest_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3362 let last_block_hash: Sha256dHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3364 let mut closed_channels = Vec::new();
3366 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3367 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3368 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3369 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
3370 for _ in 0..channel_count {
3371 let mut channel: Channel<ChanSigner> = ReadableArgs::read(reader, args.logger.clone())?;
3372 if channel.last_block_connected != Default::default() && channel.last_block_connected != last_block_hash {
3373 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3376 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
3377 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
3378 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
3379 if channel.get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_local_commitment_number() ||
3380 channel.get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
3381 channel.get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number() != monitor.get_cur_remote_commitment_number() ||
3382 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
3383 let mut force_close_res = channel.force_shutdown();
3384 force_close_res.0 = monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn();
3385 closed_channels.push(force_close_res);
3387 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3388 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
3390 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
3393 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3397 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
3398 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
3399 closed_channels.push((monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), Vec::new()));
3403 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3404 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3405 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
3406 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3407 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3408 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, 128));
3409 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
3410 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
3412 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
3415 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3416 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
3417 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
3418 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
3419 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3420 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, 2));
3421 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
3422 previous_hops.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3424 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
3427 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3428 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, 128));
3429 for _ in 0..peer_count {
3430 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3431 let peer_state = PeerState {
3432 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
3434 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
3437 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
3439 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
3440 monitor: args.monitor,
3441 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
3443 latest_block_height: AtomicUsize::new(latest_block_height as usize),
3444 last_block_hash: Mutex::new(last_block_hash),
3445 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3447 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
3452 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
3454 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
3456 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
3458 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3459 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3460 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
3461 logger: args.logger,
3462 default_configuration: args.default_config,
3465 for close_res in closed_channels.drain(..) {
3466 channel_manager.finish_force_close_channel(close_res);
3467 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
3468 //connection or two.
3471 Ok((last_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))