1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`find_route`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 //! [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
24 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
25 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
35 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
46 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::router::{InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
53 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
54 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, Recipient};
55 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
56 use crate::util::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination};
57 use crate::util::{byte_utils, events};
58 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
59 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
60 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
61 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
62 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
65 use crate::prelude::*;
67 use core::cell::RefCell;
69 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock};
70 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
71 use core::time::Duration;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
96 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
97 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
100 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
101 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
105 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
106 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
110 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
111 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
112 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
113 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
114 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
115 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
116 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
117 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
120 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
121 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
122 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
123 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
126 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
129 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
130 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
133 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
136 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
137 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
138 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
141 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
142 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
144 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
145 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
148 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
149 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
152 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
156 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
157 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
158 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
159 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
160 short_channel_id: u64,
162 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
163 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
165 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
166 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
171 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
173 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
174 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
175 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
177 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
178 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
181 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
182 struct ClaimableHTLC {
183 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
185 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
187 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
189 /// The sum total of all MPP parts
193 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
194 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
195 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
196 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
198 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
199 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
204 impl Readable for PaymentId {
205 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
206 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
211 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
212 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
213 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
214 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
216 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
217 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
222 impl Readable for InterceptId {
223 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
224 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
228 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
229 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
230 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
231 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
232 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
235 session_priv: SecretKey,
236 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
237 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
238 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
239 payment_id: PaymentId,
240 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
241 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
244 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
245 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
246 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
248 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
250 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
252 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
255 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
256 payment_id.hash(hasher);
257 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
258 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
259 payment_params.hash(hasher);
264 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
267 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
268 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
270 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
271 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
272 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
273 payment_secret: None,
274 payment_params: None,
279 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
280 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
282 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
290 impl core::fmt::Debug for HTLCFailReason {
291 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), core::fmt::Error> {
293 HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, .. } => {
294 write!(f, "HTLC error code {}", failure_code)
296 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { .. } => {
297 write!(f, "pre-built LightningError")
303 impl HTLCFailReason {
304 pub(super) fn reason(failure_code: u16, data: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
305 Self::Reason { failure_code, data }
308 pub(super) fn from_failure_code(failure_code: u16) -> Self {
309 Self::Reason { failure_code, data: Vec::new() }
312 fn get_encrypted_failure_packet(&self, incoming_packet_shared_secret: &[u8; 32], phantom_shared_secret: &Option<[u8; 32]>) -> msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
314 HTLCFailReason::Reason { ref failure_code, ref data } => {
315 if let Some(phantom_ss) = phantom_shared_secret {
316 let phantom_packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(phantom_ss, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
317 let encrypted_phantom_packet = onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(phantom_ss, &phantom_packet);
318 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &encrypted_phantom_packet.data[..])
320 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, *failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
321 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
324 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
325 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
331 struct ReceiveError {
337 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
338 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
340 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
345 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
347 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
348 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
349 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
350 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
351 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
353 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
354 err: msgs::LightningError,
355 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
356 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
358 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
360 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
362 err: LightningError {
364 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
365 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
372 shutdown_finish: None,
376 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
378 err: LightningError {
380 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
383 shutdown_finish: None,
387 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
388 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
391 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
393 err: LightningError {
395 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
396 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
402 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
403 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
407 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
410 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
412 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
413 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
417 log_level: Level::Warn,
420 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
422 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
424 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
426 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
427 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
435 shutdown_finish: None,
440 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
441 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
442 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
443 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
444 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
446 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
447 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
448 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
449 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
450 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
451 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
452 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
454 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
458 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
459 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
460 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
461 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
462 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
463 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
466 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
467 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
468 /// quite some time lag.
469 enum BackgroundEvent {
470 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
471 /// commitment transaction.
472 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
475 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
476 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
478 latest_features: InitFeatures,
481 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
482 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
484 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
487 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
488 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
489 struct PendingInboundPayment {
490 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
491 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
492 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
493 /// this payment being removed.
495 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
496 user_payment_id: u64,
497 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
498 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
499 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
502 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
503 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
504 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
506 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
509 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
510 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
511 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
512 pending_amt_msat: u64,
513 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
514 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
515 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
517 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
518 starting_block_height: u32,
520 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
521 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
522 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
524 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
525 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
526 timer_ticks_without_htlcs: u8,
528 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
529 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
530 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
531 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
532 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
534 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
536 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
537 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
541 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
542 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
544 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
548 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
550 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
554 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
556 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
561 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
563 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
564 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
565 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
566 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
570 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
571 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
572 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
573 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
574 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
575 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
576 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
579 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
580 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash, timer_ticks_without_htlcs: 0 };
583 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
584 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
585 let our_payment_hash;
586 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
587 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
588 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
590 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
591 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
592 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
596 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
600 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
601 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
602 let remove_res = match self {
603 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
604 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
605 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
606 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
607 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
611 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
612 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
613 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
614 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
615 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
616 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
623 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
624 let insert_res = match self {
625 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
626 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
627 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
629 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
630 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
633 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
634 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
635 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
636 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
637 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
644 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
646 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
647 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
648 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
649 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
656 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
657 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
658 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
659 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
660 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
661 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
662 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
664 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
665 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
667 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
668 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
669 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
670 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
671 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
672 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
673 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
674 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
676 /// (C-not exported) as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
677 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
679 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
680 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
682 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
683 /// to individual Channels.
685 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
686 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
687 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
688 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
690 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
691 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
692 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
693 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
694 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
695 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
696 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
698 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
699 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
700 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
701 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
704 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
705 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
706 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
707 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
708 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
710 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
711 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
712 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
713 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
714 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
717 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
718 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
719 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
720 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
721 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
725 // `total_consistency_lock`
727 // |__`forward_htlcs`
729 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
731 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
733 // | |__`claimable_htlcs`
735 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments`
737 // | |__`channel_state`
741 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
743 // | |__`per_peer_state`
745 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
749 // | |__`pending_events`
751 // | |__`pending_background_events`
753 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
754 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
755 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
756 K::Target: KeysInterface,
757 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
760 default_configuration: UserConfig,
761 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
762 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
766 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
768 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
770 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
771 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
773 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
774 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
775 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
776 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
777 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
779 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
780 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
781 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
782 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
784 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
785 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
787 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
788 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
789 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
790 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
791 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
792 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
793 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
794 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
796 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
798 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
799 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
801 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
803 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
804 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
805 /// and via the classic SCID.
807 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
808 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
810 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
812 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
814 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
815 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
816 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
818 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
819 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
821 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
822 /// failed/claimed by the user.
824 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
825 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
827 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
828 claimable_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, (events::PaymentPurpose, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>)>>,
830 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
831 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
832 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
833 /// active channel list on load.
835 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
836 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
838 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
840 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
841 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
842 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
844 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
845 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
846 /// the handling of the events.
849 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
850 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
851 /// would break backwards compatability.
852 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
853 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
854 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
856 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
857 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
859 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
861 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
862 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
863 /// confirmation depth.
865 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
866 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
867 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
869 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
871 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
873 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
875 our_network_key: SecretKey,
876 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
878 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
880 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
881 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
882 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
884 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
885 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
887 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
888 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
889 /// keeping additional state.
890 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
892 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
893 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
894 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
895 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
897 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
898 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
899 /// are currently open with that peer.
900 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
901 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
904 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
905 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
907 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
908 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
909 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
910 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
911 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
912 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
913 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
914 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
915 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
916 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
917 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
919 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
926 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
928 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
929 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
930 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
931 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
932 pub struct ChainParameters {
933 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
934 pub network: Network,
936 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
938 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
939 pub best_block: BestBlock,
942 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
948 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
949 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
950 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
951 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
952 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
953 /// updates are ready for persistence).
955 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
956 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
957 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
958 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
959 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
961 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
962 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
965 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
966 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
967 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
970 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
971 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
973 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
974 persistence_notifier: notifier,
975 should_persist: persist_check,
976 _read_guard: read_guard,
981 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
983 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
984 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
989 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
990 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
992 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
994 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
995 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
996 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
997 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
998 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1000 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1001 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1003 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1005 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1006 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1007 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1008 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1009 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1010 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1011 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1012 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1013 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1014 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1015 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1016 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1017 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1019 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1020 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1022 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1023 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1024 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1025 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1027 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1028 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1029 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1030 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1031 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1032 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1035 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1037 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1038 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1041 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1043 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1044 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1046 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1047 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1048 /// [`ChannelManager::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1049 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1051 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1052 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1053 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1054 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1055 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1056 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1057 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1058 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1059 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1060 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1061 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1064 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1065 /// to better separate parameters.
1066 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1067 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1068 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1069 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1070 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1071 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1072 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1073 pub features: InitFeatures,
1074 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1075 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1076 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1078 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1080 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1081 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1082 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1083 /// payments to us through this channel.
1084 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1085 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1086 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1087 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1088 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1089 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1090 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1093 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1094 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1095 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1096 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1097 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1098 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1099 /// lifetime of the channel.
1100 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1101 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1102 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1103 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1104 /// our counterparty already.
1106 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1107 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1108 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1109 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1111 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1112 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1113 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1114 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1116 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1117 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1119 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1120 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1122 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1123 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1124 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1125 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1126 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1127 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1128 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1129 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1130 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1133 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1135 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1136 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1137 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1138 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1139 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1140 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1141 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1143 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1144 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1146 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1147 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1148 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1149 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1150 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1151 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1152 /// this value on chain.
1154 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1156 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1158 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1159 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1160 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1161 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1163 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1164 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1165 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1166 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1168 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1169 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1170 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1171 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1173 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1174 pub balance_msat: u64,
1175 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1176 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1177 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1178 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1180 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1182 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1183 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1184 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1185 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1186 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1187 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1188 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1189 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1191 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1192 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1193 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1194 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1195 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1196 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1197 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1199 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1200 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1201 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1202 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1203 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1204 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1205 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1206 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1207 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1209 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1211 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1212 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1213 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1214 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1215 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1217 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1218 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1219 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1220 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1221 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1222 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1223 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1225 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1226 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1227 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1228 pub is_outbound: bool,
1229 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1230 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1231 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1232 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1233 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1235 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1236 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1237 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1238 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1240 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1241 pub is_usable: bool,
1242 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1243 pub is_public: bool,
1244 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1245 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1246 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1247 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1248 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1249 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1251 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1252 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1255 impl ChannelDetails {
1256 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1257 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1258 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1260 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1261 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1262 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1263 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1266 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1267 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1268 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1270 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1271 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1272 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1273 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1277 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1278 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1279 /// states for more.
1280 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1281 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1282 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1283 /// send the payment at all.
1285 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1287 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1288 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1289 /// for this payment.
1290 ParameterError(APIError),
1291 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1292 /// from attempting to send the payment at all.
1294 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (with the parameter error fixed).
1296 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1299 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1300 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1301 /// for this payment.
1302 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1303 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1304 /// You can freely resend the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1305 /// paths than the ones selected).
1307 /// Because the payment failed outright, no payment tracking is done, you do not need to call
1308 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] and [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`] will *not* work
1309 /// for this payment.
1310 AllFailedResendSafe(Vec<APIError>),
1311 /// Indicates that a payment for the provided [`PaymentId`] is already in-flight and has not
1312 /// yet completed (i.e. generated an [`Event::PaymentSent`]) or been abandoned (via
1313 /// [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]).
1315 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
1317 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1318 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1319 /// in over-/re-payment.
1321 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1322 /// send_payment, and any `Err`s which are not [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] can be
1323 /// safely retried via [`ChannelManager::retry_payment`].
1325 /// Any entries which contain `Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInprogress)` or `Ok(())` MUST NOT be
1326 /// retried as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent
1327 /// (in the case of `Ok(())`) or will send once a [`MonitorEvent::Completed`] is provided for
1328 /// the next-hop channel with the latest update_id.
1330 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1331 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1332 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1333 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1334 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1335 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1336 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1337 payment_id: PaymentId,
1341 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1343 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
1345 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1346 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1347 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1348 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1350 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1351 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1352 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1355 macro_rules! handle_error {
1356 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1359 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1360 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1362 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1363 // entering the macro.
1364 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1365 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1368 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1370 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1371 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1372 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1373 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1377 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1378 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1379 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1380 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1385 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1386 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1388 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1389 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1390 action: err.action.clone()
1394 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1395 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1398 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1405 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1406 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1407 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1408 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1409 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1410 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1412 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1413 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1414 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1415 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1416 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1418 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1419 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1421 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1425 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1426 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1427 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1429 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1430 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1432 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1433 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1435 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1436 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1437 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1438 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1439 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1440 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1446 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1447 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1451 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1453 $entry.remove_entry();
1461 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1462 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1466 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1468 $entry.remove_entry();
1476 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1477 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1479 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1480 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1486 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_res {
1487 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1489 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1490 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1491 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1492 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1493 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1494 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1495 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1496 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1497 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1498 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1499 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1500 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1501 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1502 $chan.force_shutdown(false), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1505 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1506 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update in progress. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1507 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1508 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1509 match $action_type {
1510 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1511 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1513 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1514 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1516 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1517 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1518 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1519 if !$resend_commitment {
1520 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1523 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1525 $chan.monitor_updating_paused($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1526 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1528 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1533 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $resend_channel_ready: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1534 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $resend_channel_ready, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1536 $entry.remove_entry();
1540 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY) => { {
1541 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst);
1542 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1544 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $chan_id: expr, NO_UPDATE) => {
1545 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), $chan_id)
1547 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_channel_ready: expr, OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED) => {
1548 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, false, false, $resend_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1550 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1551 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1553 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1554 handle_monitor_update_res!($self, $err, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, false, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1558 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1559 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1560 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1561 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1562 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1564 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1565 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1566 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1567 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1568 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1569 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1570 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1571 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1572 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1573 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1578 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1579 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1580 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1582 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1583 pending_events.push(events::Event::ChannelReady {
1584 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1585 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1586 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1587 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1590 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1595 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
1596 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
1597 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1598 K::Target: KeysInterface,
1599 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1602 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1604 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1605 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1607 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1609 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1610 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1611 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1612 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1613 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1614 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1615 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1616 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1618 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1619 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1620 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1624 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1626 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1627 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1628 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1630 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1631 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1632 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1633 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1634 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1635 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1636 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1637 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1639 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1640 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node).unwrap()),
1643 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1644 fake_scid_rand_bytes: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1646 probing_cookie_secret: keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1648 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1650 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1652 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1653 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1654 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1655 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1663 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1664 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1665 &self.default_configuration
1668 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1669 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1670 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1673 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1674 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1676 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
1678 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1682 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1687 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1689 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1690 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1691 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1692 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1693 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1695 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1696 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1698 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1699 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1700 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1702 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1703 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1704 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1705 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1706 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1707 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1709 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1710 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1711 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1712 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1713 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1714 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1718 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1719 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1720 Some(peer_state) => {
1721 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1722 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1723 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1724 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1725 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key,
1726 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1727 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1731 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1736 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1739 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1741 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1742 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1743 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1745 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1746 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1747 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1748 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1750 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1752 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1755 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1757 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1758 node_id: their_network_key,
1761 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1764 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1765 let mut res = Vec::new();
1767 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1768 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1769 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1770 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1771 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1772 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1773 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1774 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1775 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1776 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1777 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1778 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1779 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1780 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1781 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1782 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1783 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1784 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1785 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1786 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1787 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1788 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1790 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1791 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1792 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1793 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1794 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1795 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1796 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1797 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1798 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1799 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1800 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1801 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1802 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1803 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1804 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1805 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1806 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1807 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1808 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1809 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1810 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1811 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1812 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1813 config: Some(channel.config()),
1817 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1818 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1819 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1820 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1826 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1827 /// more information.
1828 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1829 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1832 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to [`find_route`]
1833 /// to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1835 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1836 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1839 /// [`find_route`]: crate::routing::router::find_route
1840 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1841 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1842 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1843 // really wanted anyway.
1844 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1847 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1848 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1849 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1850 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1851 Some(transaction) => {
1852 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1856 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1857 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1858 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1859 reason: closure_reason
1863 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1864 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1866 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1867 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1868 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1869 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1870 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1871 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1872 if *counterparty_node_id != chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id(){
1873 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
1875 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = {
1876 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1877 match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1878 Some(peer_state) => {
1879 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1880 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1881 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1883 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1886 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1888 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1889 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1890 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
1891 let (result, is_permanent) =
1892 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
1894 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1899 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1900 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
1904 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1905 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
1906 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1907 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1911 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1915 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1919 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1920 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1921 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
1922 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
1925 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
1929 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1930 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1931 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1933 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1934 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1936 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1937 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1938 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1939 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1941 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1943 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1944 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1945 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1946 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1947 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None)
1950 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1951 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1952 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1954 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1955 /// the channel being closed or not:
1956 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1957 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1958 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1959 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1960 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1961 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1962 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1964 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1966 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1967 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1968 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1969 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1970 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1974 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1975 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1976 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1977 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1978 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
1979 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
1980 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1981 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
1983 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1984 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1985 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1986 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1987 // ignore the result here.
1988 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1992 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
1993 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
1994 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
1995 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1997 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1998 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1999 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2000 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *peer_node_id {
2001 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2003 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2004 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2006 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2008 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2010 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2013 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2014 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2015 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2016 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2017 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2022 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2025 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2026 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2027 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2028 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2029 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2030 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2031 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2032 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2033 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2043 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2044 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2045 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2047 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2048 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2049 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2052 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2053 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2054 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2056 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2057 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2058 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2059 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2060 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2063 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2064 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2065 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2066 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2067 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2071 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2072 /// local transaction(s).
2073 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2074 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2075 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2079 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2080 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2082 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2083 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != cltv_expiry {
2084 return Err(ReceiveError {
2085 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value",
2087 err_data: byte_utils::be32_to_array(cltv_expiry).to_vec()
2090 // final_expiry_too_soon
2091 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2092 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2093 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2094 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2095 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2096 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2097 return Err(ReceiveError {
2099 err_data: Vec::new(),
2100 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2103 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2104 return Err(ReceiveError {
2106 err_data: byte_utils::be64_to_array(amt_msat).to_vec(),
2107 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2111 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2112 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2113 return Err(ReceiveError {
2114 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2115 err_data: Vec::new(),
2116 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2119 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2120 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2121 return Err(ReceiveError {
2122 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2123 err_data: Vec::new(),
2124 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2126 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2127 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2129 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2130 phantom_shared_secret,
2132 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2133 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2134 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2135 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2136 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2137 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2138 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2139 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2140 return Err(ReceiveError {
2141 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2142 err_data: Vec::new(),
2143 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2147 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2149 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2152 return Err(ReceiveError {
2153 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2154 err_data: Vec::new(),
2155 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2160 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2163 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2164 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2165 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_msat,
2166 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2170 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2171 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2172 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2174 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2175 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2176 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2177 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2178 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2179 failure_code: $err_code,
2185 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2186 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2189 let shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key).secret_bytes();
2191 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2192 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2193 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2194 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2195 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2196 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2197 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2198 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2200 macro_rules! return_err {
2201 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2203 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2204 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2205 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2206 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2207 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2213 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2215 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2216 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2218 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2219 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2223 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2224 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2226 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2228 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2229 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2230 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2231 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2232 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2234 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2237 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2238 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2239 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2241 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2242 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2243 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2246 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2247 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2248 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2249 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2253 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2254 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2255 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2258 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2259 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2260 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2261 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2262 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2267 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2268 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2269 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2270 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2271 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2272 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2273 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2274 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2275 let forwarding_id_opt = match id_option {
2276 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2277 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2278 // phantom or an intercept.
2279 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2280 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2281 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2285 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2288 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => Some(chan_id.clone()),
2290 let chan_update_opt = if let Some(forwarding_id) = forwarding_id_opt {
2291 let chan = match channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2293 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and by_id maps have
2294 // no consistency guarantees.
2295 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2299 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2300 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2301 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2302 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2303 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2305 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2306 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2307 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2308 // we don't have the channel here.
2309 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2311 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2313 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2314 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2315 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2316 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2317 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2318 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2319 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2321 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2322 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2324 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2325 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2329 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2331 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2338 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2339 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2340 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2341 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2342 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2343 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2345 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2346 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2348 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2349 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2350 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2351 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2352 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2353 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2354 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2355 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2356 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2357 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2363 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2364 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2365 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2366 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2368 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2369 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2371 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2372 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2373 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2375 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2376 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2377 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2379 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2384 pending_forward_info
2387 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2388 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2389 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2391 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2392 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2393 if !chan.should_announce() {
2394 return Err(LightningError {
2395 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2399 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2400 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2402 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2403 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2406 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2407 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2408 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2409 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2410 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2411 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2412 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2413 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2414 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2418 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2420 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2421 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2422 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2424 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2425 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2427 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2428 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2429 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2430 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2431 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2432 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2433 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2434 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2437 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2438 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2440 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2446 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2447 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2448 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2449 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2450 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2452 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2453 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2454 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2455 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2456 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2458 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2460 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2462 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2463 let id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2464 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2465 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
2468 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2469 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2470 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2472 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2473 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2475 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2476 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2478 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2479 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2481 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2482 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2484 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2485 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2486 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2489 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2490 let update_err = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
2491 let chan_id = chan.get().channel_id();
2493 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_err, chan,
2494 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true))
2496 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure, Err(e)) => break Err(e),
2497 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed, Ok(())) => {},
2498 (ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress, Err(_)) => {
2499 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2500 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2501 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2502 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2503 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2504 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2505 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2507 _ => unreachable!(),
2510 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan_id));
2511 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2512 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2513 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2514 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2515 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2516 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2517 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2526 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2527 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the `by_id` map.
2528 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2529 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2534 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2535 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2537 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2542 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2544 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2545 /// fields for more info.
2547 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2548 /// method will error with an [`APIError::RouteError`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2549 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2550 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a second payment with the same
2553 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2554 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2555 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2556 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2557 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2559 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2560 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2562 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2563 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2564 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2566 /// In general, a path may raise:
2567 /// * [`APIError::RouteError`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2568 /// node public key) is specified.
2569 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2570 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2572 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2573 /// relevant updates.
2575 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2576 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2577 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2579 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2580 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2581 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2582 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2585 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2586 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2587 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2589 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2590 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2591 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2592 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, *payment_secret, payment_id, route)?;
2593 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs)
2597 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2598 self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, payment_secret, payment_id, route)
2601 fn add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2602 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2603 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2604 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2607 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2608 match pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2609 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => Err(PaymentSendFailure::DuplicatePayment),
2610 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
2611 let payment = entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2612 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2613 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2614 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2617 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2618 total_msat: route.get_total_amount(),
2621 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2622 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2625 Ok(onion_session_privs)
2630 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2631 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2632 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2634 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2635 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2637 let mut total_value = 0;
2638 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2639 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2640 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2641 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2642 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2643 continue 'path_check;
2645 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2646 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2647 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2648 continue 'path_check;
2651 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2652 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2654 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2655 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2657 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2658 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2659 total_value = amt_msat;
2662 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2663 let mut results = Vec::new();
2664 debug_assert_eq!(route.paths.len(), onion_session_privs.len());
2665 for (path, session_priv) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.into_iter()) {
2666 let mut path_res = self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage, session_priv);
2669 Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) => {
2670 // While a MonitorUpdateInProgress is an Err(_), the payment is still
2671 // considered "in flight" and we shouldn't remove it from the
2672 // PendingOutboundPayment set.
2675 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2676 if let Some(payment) = pending_outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2677 let removed = payment.remove(&session_priv, Some(path));
2678 debug_assert!(removed, "This can't happen as the payment has an entry for this path added by callers");
2680 debug_assert!(false, "This can't happen as the payment was added by callers");
2681 path_res = Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Internal error: payment disappeared during processing. Please report this bug!".to_owned() });
2685 results.push(path_res);
2687 let mut has_ok = false;
2688 let mut has_err = false;
2689 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2690 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2691 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2692 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2693 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2694 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress) = res {
2695 // MonitorUpdateInProgress is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2699 } else if res.is_err() {
2700 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2701 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2704 if has_err && has_ok {
2705 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2708 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2709 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2710 Some(RouteParameters {
2711 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2712 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2713 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2719 // If we failed to send any paths, we should remove the new PaymentId from the
2720 // `pending_outbound_payments` map, as the user isn't expected to `abandon_payment`.
2721 let removed = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_id).is_some();
2722 debug_assert!(removed, "We should always have a pending payment to remove here");
2723 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedResendSafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2729 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2731 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2732 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2733 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2734 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2735 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2737 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2738 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2739 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2740 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2741 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2742 if path.len() == 0 {
2743 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2744 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2749 let mut onion_session_privs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2750 for _ in 0..route.paths.len() {
2751 onion_session_privs.push(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2754 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2755 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2756 match outbounds.get_mut(&payment_id) {
2758 let res = match payment {
2759 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2760 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2762 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2763 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2764 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2765 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2768 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2770 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2771 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2772 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2775 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2776 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2777 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2780 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2781 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2782 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2786 for (path, session_priv_bytes) in route.paths.iter().zip(onion_session_privs.iter()) {
2787 assert!(payment.insert(*session_priv_bytes, path));
2792 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2793 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2797 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, payment_id, Some(total_msat), onion_session_privs)
2800 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2802 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2803 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2804 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2805 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2807 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2808 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2809 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2811 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2812 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2813 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2814 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2815 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2817 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2818 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2819 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2820 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2821 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2823 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2831 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2832 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2833 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2834 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2835 /// never reach the recipient.
2837 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2838 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2840 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2841 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2843 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2845 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2846 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2847 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2849 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2851 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2852 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2854 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2855 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2860 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2861 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2862 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2863 pub fn send_probe(&self, hops: Vec<RouteHop>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2864 let payment_id = PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2866 let payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(&payment_id);
2869 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2870 err: "No need probing a path with less than two hops".to_string()
2874 let route = Route { paths: vec![hops], payment_params: None };
2875 let onion_session_privs = self.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, None, payment_id, &route)?;
2877 match self.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &None, None, payment_id, None, onion_session_privs) {
2878 Ok(()) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2883 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2885 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2886 let target_payment_hash = self.probing_cookie_from_id(payment_id);
2887 target_payment_hash == *payment_hash
2890 /// Returns the 'probing cookie' for the given [`PaymentId`].
2891 fn probing_cookie_from_id(&self, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> PaymentHash {
2892 let mut preimage = [0u8; 64];
2893 preimage[..32].copy_from_slice(&self.probing_cookie_secret);
2894 preimage[32..].copy_from_slice(&payment_id.0);
2895 PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage).into_inner())
2898 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2899 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2900 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2901 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2902 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2904 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2906 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2908 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2909 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2910 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2911 } else { unreachable!(); })
2914 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2916 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2917 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2920 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2921 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2926 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2927 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2928 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2931 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2932 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2933 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2935 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2936 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
2937 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
2938 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
2947 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2948 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2949 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2953 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2955 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2956 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2958 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
2959 /// across the p2p network.
2961 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2962 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2964 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2965 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2966 /// keys per-channel).
2968 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2969 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2970 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2972 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2973 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2974 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2976 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
2977 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
2978 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
2979 /// for more details.
2981 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2982 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2983 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2984 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2986 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2987 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2988 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2989 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2994 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2995 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools at the next block. However, the modules
2996 // constituting our Lightning node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if
2997 // the wallet module is in advance on the LDK view, allow one more block of headroom.
2998 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 2 {
2999 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3000 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3004 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3005 let mut output_index = None;
3006 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3007 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3008 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3009 if output_index.is_some() {
3010 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3011 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3014 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3015 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3016 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3019 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3022 if output_index.is_none() {
3023 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3024 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3027 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3031 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3033 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3034 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3035 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3036 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3038 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3039 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3041 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3042 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3044 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3046 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3047 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3048 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3049 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3050 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3051 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3052 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3053 pub fn update_channel_config(
3054 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3055 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3056 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3057 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3058 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3062 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3063 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3066 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3067 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3068 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3069 let channel_counterparty_node_id = channel_state.by_id.get(channel_id)
3070 .ok_or(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3071 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found", log_bytes!(*channel_id)),
3073 .get_counterparty_node_id();
3074 if channel_counterparty_node_id != *counterparty_node_id {
3075 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3076 err: "counterparty node id mismatch".to_owned(),
3080 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3081 let channel = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3082 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3085 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3086 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3087 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3088 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3089 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3098 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3099 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3101 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3102 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3104 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3105 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3106 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3107 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3108 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3110 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3111 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3113 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3116 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3117 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3118 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3119 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3120 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], _next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3121 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3123 let next_hop_scid = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3125 if !chan.is_usable() {
3126 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3127 err: format!("Channel with id {:?} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3130 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3132 None => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3133 err: format!("Channel with id {:?} not found", next_hop_channel_id)
3137 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3138 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3139 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {:?} not found", intercept_id.0)
3142 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3143 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3144 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3146 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3148 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3149 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3152 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3153 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3154 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3155 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3156 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3158 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3162 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3163 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3165 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3168 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3169 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3170 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3172 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3173 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3174 err: format!("Payment with InterceptId {:?} not found", intercept_id)
3177 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3178 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3179 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3180 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3181 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3182 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3183 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3186 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3187 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3188 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3189 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3194 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3196 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3197 /// Will likely generate further events.
3198 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3199 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3201 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3202 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3203 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3204 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3206 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3207 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3209 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3210 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3211 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3213 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3214 match forward_info {
3215 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3216 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3217 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3218 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3219 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3222 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3223 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3224 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3226 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3227 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3228 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3229 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3230 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3231 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3234 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3235 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3237 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3240 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3241 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3247 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3248 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3250 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3254 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3255 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3257 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3261 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3262 let phantom_secret_res = self.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3263 if phantom_secret_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3264 let phantom_shared_secret = SharedSecret::new(&onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &phantom_secret_res.unwrap()).secret_bytes();
3265 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3267 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3268 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3269 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3270 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3271 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3273 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3275 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3276 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3280 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3281 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3282 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3283 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3289 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3292 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3295 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3296 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3297 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3298 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3299 // problem, not ours.
3305 let forward_chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3306 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
3308 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3312 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3313 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3314 match channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3315 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3316 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3319 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3320 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3321 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3322 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3323 match forward_info {
3324 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3325 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3326 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3327 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3328 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3331 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3332 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3333 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3334 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3335 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3336 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3337 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3338 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3340 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3342 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3343 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3345 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3347 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3348 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3349 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3350 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3356 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3358 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3359 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3360 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3361 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3362 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3363 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3364 // this channel currently :/.
3370 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3371 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3373 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3374 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3375 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3377 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3378 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3380 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3382 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3383 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3384 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3387 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3389 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3390 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3391 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3392 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3393 // messages when we can.
3394 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3395 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3396 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3403 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3404 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3407 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3408 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3409 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3410 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3411 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3412 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3414 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3415 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3416 let mut channel = remove_channel!(self, chan);
3417 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3418 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel.channel_id(), channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3421 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3425 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3426 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
3428 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3432 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3433 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3434 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3435 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3436 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3437 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3438 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3439 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3440 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3442 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3449 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3450 match forward_info {
3451 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3452 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3453 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3454 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3457 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret) = match routing {
3458 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3459 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3460 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret)
3462 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3463 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None, None),
3465 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3468 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3469 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3470 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3471 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3472 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3473 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3474 phantom_shared_secret,
3476 value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3478 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3483 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3484 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3485 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3486 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3487 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3489 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3490 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3491 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3492 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3493 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3494 phantom_shared_secret,
3496 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3497 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3501 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3502 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3503 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3504 receiver_node_id = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3505 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3508 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3509 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3510 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3512 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3513 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3514 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3517 let mut claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
3518 let (_, htlcs) = claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3519 .or_insert_with(|| (purpose(), Vec::new()));
3520 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3521 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3522 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3523 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3527 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3528 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3529 total_value += htlc.value;
3530 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3531 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3532 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3533 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3534 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3535 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3537 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3539 _ => unreachable!(),
3542 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > $payment_data.total_msat {
3543 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3544 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, $payment_data.total_msat);
3545 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3546 } else if total_value == $payment_data.total_msat {
3547 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3548 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3549 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3550 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3553 amount_msat: total_value,
3554 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3555 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3557 payment_received_generated = true;
3559 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3560 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3562 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3564 payment_received_generated
3568 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3569 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3570 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3571 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3572 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3573 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3574 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3575 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3576 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3577 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3578 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3579 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3580 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3581 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3583 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3587 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3589 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3590 match self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_hash) {
3591 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3592 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3593 e.insert((purpose.clone(), vec![claimable_htlc]));
3594 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3595 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3596 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3598 amount_msat: outgoing_amt_msat,
3600 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3601 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3604 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3605 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3606 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3612 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3613 if payment_data.is_none() {
3614 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3615 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3618 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3619 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3620 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3621 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3622 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3623 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3624 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3625 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3627 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3628 if payment_received_generated {
3629 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3635 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3636 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3644 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3645 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3647 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3649 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3650 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3653 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3654 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3655 events.append(&mut new_events);
3658 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3660 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3661 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3663 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3664 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3665 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3666 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3667 if background_events.is_empty() {
3671 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3673 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3674 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3675 // monitor updating completing.
3676 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3683 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3684 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3685 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3686 self.process_background_events();
3689 fn update_channel_fee(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3690 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3691 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3692 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3693 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3694 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3695 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3697 if !chan.is_live() {
3698 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3699 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3700 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3702 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3703 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3705 let mut retain_channel = true;
3706 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3709 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3710 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3714 let ret_err = match res {
3715 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3716 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3717 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3718 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3719 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3720 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3721 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3722 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3723 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3724 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3725 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3732 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
3733 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3741 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3745 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3746 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3747 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3748 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3749 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3750 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3751 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3753 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3755 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3757 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3758 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3759 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3760 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3761 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3762 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3764 handle_errors.push(err);
3774 fn remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self) {
3775 // If an outbound payment was completed, and no pending HTLCs remain, we should remove it
3776 // from the map. However, if we did that immediately when the last payment HTLC is claimed,
3777 // this could race the user making a duplicate send_payment call and our idempotency
3778 // guarantees would be violated. Instead, we wait a few timer ticks to do the actual
3779 // removal. This should be more than sufficient to ensure the idempotency of any
3780 // `send_payment` calls that were made at the same time the `PaymentSent` event was being
3782 let mut pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3783 let pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3784 pending_outbound_payments.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
3785 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, .. } = payment {
3786 let mut no_remaining_entries = session_privs.is_empty();
3787 if no_remaining_entries {
3788 for ev in pending_events.iter() {
3790 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } |
3791 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ev_payment_id, .. } |
3792 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed { payment_id: Some(ev_payment_id), .. } => {
3793 if payment_id == ev_payment_id {
3794 no_remaining_entries = false;
3802 if no_remaining_entries {
3803 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs += 1;
3804 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs <= IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3806 *timer_ticks_without_htlcs = 0;
3813 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3815 /// This currently includes:
3816 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3817 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3818 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3820 /// * Expiring a channel's previous `ChannelConfig` if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3821 /// with the current `ChannelConfig`.
3823 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3824 /// estimate fetches.
3825 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3826 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3827 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3828 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3830 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3832 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3833 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3835 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3836 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3837 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3838 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3839 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3840 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3841 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3843 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3845 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3847 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3848 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3849 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3850 if needs_close { return false; }
3853 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3854 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3855 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3856 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3857 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3858 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3859 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3860 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3864 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3865 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3867 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3868 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3869 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3873 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3874 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3879 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3885 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
3886 if htlcs.is_empty() {
3887 // This should be unreachable
3888 debug_assert!(false);
3891 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3892 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3893 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3894 if htlcs[0].total_msat == htlcs.iter().fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.value) {
3896 } else if htlcs.into_iter().any(|htlc| {
3897 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3898 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3900 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(htlcs.drain(..).map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3907 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3908 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3909 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3910 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3911 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3914 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3915 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3918 self.remove_stale_resolved_payments();
3924 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3925 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3926 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3928 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
3929 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
3930 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentReceived`] event. Alternatively, the payment
3931 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
3933 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
3934 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
3935 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
3936 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
3937 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
3938 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3940 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(payment_hash);
3941 if let Some((_, mut sources)) = removed_source {
3942 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3943 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3944 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3945 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3946 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
3947 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
3948 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
3949 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3954 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3955 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3957 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
3959 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3960 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
3961 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
3962 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
3963 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
3964 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
3965 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
3967 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
3969 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
3970 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
3972 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3977 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
3978 /// that we want to return and a channel.
3979 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
3980 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
3981 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
3982 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
3983 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3984 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
3985 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
3986 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3988 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3989 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3990 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3991 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
3993 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
3994 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
3995 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
3996 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
3997 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4001 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4002 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4003 // be surfaced to the user.
4004 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4005 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4006 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4008 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
4009 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4010 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4011 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4013 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4016 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4017 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4018 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4019 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4023 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4024 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4025 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4026 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4028 // Ensure that the `channel_state` lock is not held when calling this function.
4029 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock_order requirement for
4030 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `channel_state` lock, which calling this
4031 // function with the `channel_state` locked would.
4032 assert!(self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
4035 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4036 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4037 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4040 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4041 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4042 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4044 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
4045 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4046 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4047 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4048 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
4049 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
4050 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(*payment_id) {
4051 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4052 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4055 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4056 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4059 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4060 all_paths_failed = true;
4061 if payment.get().abandoned() {
4062 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
4063 payment_id: *payment_id,
4064 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
4070 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4073 let mut retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
4074 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
4075 Some(RouteParameters {
4076 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
4077 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
4078 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
4081 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4083 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
4084 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
4086 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4088 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
4090 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4091 if !payment_retryable {
4092 events::Event::ProbeSuccessful {
4093 payment_id: *payment_id,
4094 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4098 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4099 payment_id: *payment_id,
4100 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4106 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
4107 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
4108 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
4109 if let Some(scid) = short_channel_id {
4110 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4112 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4113 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4114 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4115 payment_failed_permanently: !payment_retryable,
4122 error_code: onion_error_code,
4124 error_data: onion_error_data
4128 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4134 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
4135 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
4136 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as find_route
4137 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
4139 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
4140 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
4141 let scid = path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id;
4142 retry.as_mut().map(|r| r.payment_params.previously_failed_channels.push(scid));
4144 if self.payment_is_probe(payment_hash, &payment_id) {
4145 events::Event::ProbeFailed {
4146 payment_id: *payment_id,
4147 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4149 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4152 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
4153 payment_id: Some(*payment_id),
4154 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4155 payment_failed_permanently: false,
4156 network_update: None,
4159 short_channel_id: Some(scid),
4162 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
4164 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
4169 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4170 pending_events.push(path_failure);
4171 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
4173 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4174 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4175 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4177 let mut forward_event = None;
4178 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4179 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4180 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
4182 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4183 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4184 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4186 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4187 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4190 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4191 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4192 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
4193 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4194 time_forwardable: time
4197 pending_events.push(events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4198 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4199 failed_next_destination: destination,
4205 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
4206 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4208 /// Note that calling this method does *not* guarantee that the payment has been claimed. You
4209 /// *must* wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] event which upon a successful claim will be
4210 /// provided to your [`EventHandler`] when [`process_pending_events`] is next called.
4212 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4213 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
4214 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4215 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4217 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
4218 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4219 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4220 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4221 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4222 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
4223 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4224 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4226 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4228 let removed_source = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&payment_hash);
4229 if let Some((payment_purpose, mut sources)) = removed_source {
4230 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4232 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
4233 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
4234 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
4235 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
4237 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
4238 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
4239 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
4240 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
4241 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
4243 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4244 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4245 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4246 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4247 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
4248 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4249 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4250 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(self.our_network_pubkey);
4251 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4252 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4253 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
4260 if let None = channel_state.by_id.get(&chan_id) {
4265 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4266 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4267 debug_assert!(false);
4271 expected_amt_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4272 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4273 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4274 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4275 if sources.len() != 1 {
4276 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4277 debug_assert!(false);
4282 let phantom_shared_secret = htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4283 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4284 let phantom_pubkey = self.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4285 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4286 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
4289 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4291 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4292 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4295 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4296 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4297 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4301 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4302 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
4303 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
4304 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4305 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4306 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4307 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4308 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
4309 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4311 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
4312 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
4313 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
4314 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
4315 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
4316 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
4318 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
4322 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4324 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4325 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4326 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
4327 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
4328 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4329 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4330 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4331 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4335 if claimed_any_htlcs {
4336 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4339 purpose: payment_purpose,
4340 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
4344 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4345 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4346 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4347 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4352 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
4353 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4355 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4356 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
4357 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4358 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
4359 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
4360 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
4361 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4362 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4364 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
4365 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4366 payment_preimage, e);
4367 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
4368 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4369 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
4370 Some(htlc_value_msat)
4374 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
4375 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
4376 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4377 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4378 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4379 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4380 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4381 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
4382 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4383 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4389 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
4391 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
4394 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
4395 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4396 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4398 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
4399 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
4400 payment_preimage, e);
4403 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4404 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
4406 chan.remove_entry();
4408 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
4411 } else { return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed }
4414 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4415 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4416 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4417 for source in sources.drain(..) {
4418 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
4419 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4420 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4421 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4422 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
4423 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
4424 pending_events.push(
4425 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4427 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
4437 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4439 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4440 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4441 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
4442 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
4443 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4444 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
4445 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4446 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
4447 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4448 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
4449 pending_events.push(
4450 events::Event::PaymentSent {
4451 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
4457 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
4461 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
4462 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
4463 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
4465 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
4466 // irrevocably fulfilled.
4467 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
4468 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
4469 pending_events.push(
4470 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4479 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4482 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4483 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4484 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4485 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4486 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4487 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4488 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4491 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4492 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4493 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4494 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4495 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4498 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4499 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4500 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4501 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update);
4502 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4503 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4504 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4505 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4506 // again on restart.
4507 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4508 payment_preimage, update_res);
4510 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4511 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4512 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4513 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4516 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4517 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4518 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4519 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4523 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4524 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4525 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4528 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4529 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4530 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4532 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4534 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4544 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4545 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4546 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4549 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4550 /// update completion.
4551 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4552 channel: &mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4553 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4554 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4555 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4556 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4557 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4559 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4560 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4561 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4562 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4565 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4566 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4568 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4569 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4570 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4575 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
4577 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4578 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4579 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4580 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4585 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4586 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4587 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4588 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4589 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4594 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4598 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4604 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4605 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4606 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4612 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4613 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4616 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims, counterparty_node_id) = {
4617 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4618 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4619 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4620 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4621 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4623 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4627 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4628 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
4629 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() {
4630 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4631 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
4632 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
4633 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
4635 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()) {
4636 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4637 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4642 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(&mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, channel.get_mut(), updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready, updates.announcement_sigs);
4643 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4644 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4647 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs, counterparty_node_id)
4649 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
4650 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
4652 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4653 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4654 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id: funding_txo.to_channel_id() };
4655 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
4659 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4661 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4662 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4665 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4666 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4667 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4669 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4670 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4671 /// used to accept such channels.
4673 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4674 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4675 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4676 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4679 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4680 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4682 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4683 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4684 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4686 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4687 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4689 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4690 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4692 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4693 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4695 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4696 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4697 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4698 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4701 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4702 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4704 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4705 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4706 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4707 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4708 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4709 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4711 if *counterparty_node_id != channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id() {
4712 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The passed counterparty_node_id doesn't match the channel's counterparty node_id".to_owned() });
4715 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4716 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4717 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4718 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4719 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4720 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4723 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4724 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4725 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4728 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4729 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4730 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4733 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4734 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Can't accept a channel that doesn't exist".to_owned() });
4740 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4741 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4742 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4745 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4746 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4749 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4750 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4751 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4753 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4754 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager,
4755 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration,
4756 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4759 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4760 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4764 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4765 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4766 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4768 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4769 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4771 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4772 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4773 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4774 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4776 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4777 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4778 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4781 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4782 pending_events.push(
4783 events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4784 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4785 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4786 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4787 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4788 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4793 entry.insert(channel);
4799 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4800 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4801 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4802 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4803 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4805 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4806 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4808 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &their_features), chan);
4809 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4811 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4814 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4815 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4816 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4817 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4818 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4820 user_channel_id: user_id,
4825 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4826 let ((funding_msg, monitor, mut channel_ready), mut chan) = {
4827 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4828 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4830 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4831 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4832 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4833 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4835 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4837 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4840 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4841 // lock before watch_channel
4842 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4843 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4844 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
4845 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4846 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4847 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4848 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4849 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4850 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4851 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4852 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(false);
4853 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4854 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4856 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
4857 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4858 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4859 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4860 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4861 chan.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, channel_ready.is_some(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4862 channel_ready = None; // Don't send the channel_ready now
4865 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4866 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4867 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4868 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4869 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4871 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4872 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4873 match id_to_peer.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4875 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4876 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4877 funding_msg.channel_id))
4879 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4880 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4883 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4884 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4887 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4888 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
4896 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4898 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4899 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4900 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4901 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4902 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4903 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4904 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4906 let (monitor, funding_tx, channel_ready) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4907 Ok(update) => update,
4908 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
4910 match self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4911 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {},
4913 let mut res = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, channel_ready.is_some(), OPTIONALLY_RESEND_FUNDING_LOCKED);
4914 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4915 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4916 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4917 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4918 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4919 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4925 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4926 send_channel_ready!(self, channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get(), msg);
4930 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4933 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4934 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4938 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4939 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4940 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4941 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4942 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4943 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4944 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4946 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, self.get_our_node_id(),
4947 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4948 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4949 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4950 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4951 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4952 msg: announcement_sigs,
4954 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4955 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4956 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4957 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4958 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4959 // announcement_signatures.
4960 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4961 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4962 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4963 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4969 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, chan.get_mut());
4973 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4977 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4978 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4979 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4980 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4981 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4983 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4984 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4985 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4986 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4989 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4990 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4991 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4992 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4995 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4996 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4998 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4999 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
5000 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5001 let (result, is_permanent) =
5002 handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, chan_entry.key(), NO_UPDATE);
5004 remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5009 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5010 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5011 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5018 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5021 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5022 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5023 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5024 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5027 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
5031 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5032 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5033 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5034 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5035 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5036 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5037 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5038 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5040 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5041 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5042 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5043 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5048 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5049 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5050 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5051 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5052 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5053 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5054 } else { (tx, None) }
5056 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5059 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5060 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5061 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5063 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5064 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5065 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5066 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5070 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5075 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5076 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5077 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5078 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5080 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5081 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5082 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5083 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5085 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5086 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5087 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5089 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5090 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5091 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5092 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5095 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5096 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5097 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5098 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5099 match pending_forward_info {
5100 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5101 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5102 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5103 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, real_code, &error_data)
5105 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
5107 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5108 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5109 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5112 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5114 _ => pending_forward_info
5117 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5119 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5124 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5125 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5126 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5127 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5128 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5130 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5133 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5135 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5138 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5142 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5143 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5144 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5145 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5146 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5147 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5148 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5150 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), chan);
5152 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5157 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5158 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5159 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5160 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5161 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5162 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5163 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5165 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5166 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5167 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5169 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(msg.failure_code)), chan);
5172 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5176 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5177 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5178 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5179 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5180 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5181 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5182 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5184 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
5185 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
5186 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan),
5187 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
5188 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
5189 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
5190 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), chan);
5195 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update);
5196 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some()) {
5200 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5201 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5202 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5204 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
5205 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5206 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5207 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5208 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5209 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5210 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5211 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5213 commitment_signed: msg,
5219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5224 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5225 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5226 let mut forward_event = None;
5227 let mut new_intercept_events = Vec::new();
5228 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5229 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5230 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5231 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5232 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5233 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5234 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5236 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5237 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5239 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5240 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5241 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5242 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5243 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5244 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5247 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5248 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5250 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5251 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5252 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5253 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5254 new_intercept_events.push(events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5255 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5256 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5257 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5258 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5261 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5262 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5264 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5265 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5266 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5267 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5268 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5269 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5270 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5271 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5274 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5275 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5276 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5281 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5282 // payments are being processed.
5283 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5284 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
5286 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5287 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5294 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5295 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5298 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5299 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5300 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5303 match forward_event {
5305 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5306 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5307 time_forwardable: time
5315 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5316 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
5318 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5319 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5320 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5322 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5323 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5325 let was_paused_for_mon_update = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
5326 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
5327 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5328 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
5329 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update);
5330 if was_paused_for_mon_update {
5331 assert!(update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed);
5332 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
5333 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
5334 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
5335 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
5336 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Existing pending monitor update prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
5338 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5339 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, update_res, chan,
5340 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
5341 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(), false,
5342 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5343 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
5345 } else { unreachable!(); }
5347 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
5348 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5349 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5353 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
5354 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5355 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
5356 .unwrap_or(chan.get().outbound_scid_alias()),
5357 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5358 chan.get().get_user_id()))
5360 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5363 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5365 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
5366 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id)) =>
5368 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
5369 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: channel_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5370 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
5372 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, user_channel_id, pending_forwards)]);
5373 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
5380 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5381 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5382 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5383 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5384 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5385 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5388 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5390 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5395 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5396 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5397 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5399 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5400 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5401 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5402 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5404 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5405 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5408 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5409 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5410 self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), msg), chan),
5411 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5412 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5413 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
5416 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5421 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5422 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5423 let chan_id = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5424 Some((_cp_id, chan_id)) => chan_id.clone(),
5426 // It's not a local channel
5427 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5430 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5431 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5432 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5433 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5434 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5435 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5436 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5437 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5438 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5439 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5441 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5443 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5444 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5445 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5446 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5448 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5449 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5452 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5454 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5457 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5459 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5460 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5461 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5463 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5465 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5466 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5468 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5469 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5470 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5471 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5472 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5473 msg, &self.logger, self.our_network_pubkey.clone(), self.genesis_hash,
5474 &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5475 let mut channel_update = None;
5476 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5477 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5478 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5481 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5482 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5483 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5484 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5485 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5486 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5487 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5492 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5493 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5494 &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5495 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5496 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5497 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5501 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5505 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5506 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5509 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5510 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5515 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
5516 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5517 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5518 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5519 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5520 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5521 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5522 match monitor_event {
5523 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5524 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5525 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5526 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5528 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5529 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5530 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5531 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5534 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5535 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5536 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5537 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5538 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5539 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5540 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5541 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5542 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5543 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5544 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5548 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5549 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5551 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5553 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5554 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5555 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5556 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5557 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5562 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5563 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
5569 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5570 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5573 has_pending_monitor_events
5576 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5577 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5578 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5580 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5581 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
5584 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5585 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5586 /// update was applied.
5588 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
5589 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
5590 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
5591 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
5592 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5593 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5594 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5595 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5597 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5598 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5599 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5600 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5602 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5603 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
5604 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
5605 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5607 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
5609 chan.get_counterparty_node_id()
5612 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
5613 match self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
5614 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
5615 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5616 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5617 updates: commitment_update,
5621 has_monitor_update = true;
5622 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_update_res!(self, e, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, channel_id, COMMITMENT_UPDATE_ONLY);
5623 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
5624 if close_channel { return false; }
5631 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5632 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5633 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
5640 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5641 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5642 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5645 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5646 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5652 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5653 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5654 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5655 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5656 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5657 let mut has_update = false;
5659 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5660 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5661 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
5662 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5664 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5665 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5666 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5667 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5669 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5670 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5673 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5674 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5675 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5676 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5677 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5682 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5684 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5685 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5686 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5692 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5693 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5700 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5701 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5707 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5708 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5710 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5711 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5712 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5713 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5714 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5715 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5716 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5717 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5718 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5719 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5720 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5721 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5722 assert!(should_broadcast);
5723 } else { unreachable!(); }
5724 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5726 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5730 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5731 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5733 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5734 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5737 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5739 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5740 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5741 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5743 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5744 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5745 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5746 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5747 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5748 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5749 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5750 // never fail a payment too early.
5751 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5753 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5756 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5761 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5764 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5765 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5767 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5768 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5769 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5771 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5773 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5774 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5778 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5779 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5781 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5783 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5784 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5785 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5786 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5787 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5788 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5791 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5792 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5794 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5797 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5799 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5801 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5802 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5803 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5804 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5805 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5808 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5809 /// stored external to LDK.
5811 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5812 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5813 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5815 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5816 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5819 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5820 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5821 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5822 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5824 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5825 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5826 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5827 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5828 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5830 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5831 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5832 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5833 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5834 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5836 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5837 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5839 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5840 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5844 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5845 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5847 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5849 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5850 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5851 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5852 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5855 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5856 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5858 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5861 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5863 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5865 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5866 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5869 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5870 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5872 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5873 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5874 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5877 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5878 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5880 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5881 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5882 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5883 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5885 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5886 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5887 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5888 Some(_) => continue,
5889 None => return scid_candidate
5894 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5896 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::chain::keysinterface::PhantomKeysManager
5897 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5899 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5900 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5901 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5905 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5906 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5907 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5909 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5910 /// times to get a unique scid.
5911 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5912 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5913 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5915 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.keys_manager);
5916 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5917 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5918 return scid_candidate
5922 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5923 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5924 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5925 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5927 for chan in self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.values() {
5928 for htlc_source in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5929 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5930 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5938 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5939 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5940 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5941 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5942 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5947 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5948 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5952 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5953 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5956 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
5957 /// using the given event handler.
5959 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
5960 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
5963 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock until the returned future completes so that
5964 // we can be sure no other persists happen while processing events.
5965 let _read_guard = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5967 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5969 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5970 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5971 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5972 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5975 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5976 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5977 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5980 for event in pending_events {
5981 handler(event).await;
5984 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
5985 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
5990 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
5991 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
5992 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5993 K::Target: KeysInterface,
5994 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5997 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5998 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5999 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6000 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6002 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6003 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6004 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6005 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6008 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6009 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6011 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6012 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6015 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6016 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6017 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
6019 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6020 events.replace(pending_events);
6029 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6031 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6032 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6033 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6034 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6037 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6039 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6040 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6041 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6042 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6043 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6045 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6046 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6047 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6048 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6051 let pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
6052 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6053 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6056 for event in pending_events {
6057 handler.handle_event(event);
6065 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6067 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6068 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6069 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6070 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6073 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6075 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6076 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6077 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6078 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6079 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6082 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6083 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6086 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6087 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6088 let new_height = height - 1;
6090 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6091 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6092 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6093 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6094 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6095 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6098 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6102 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6104 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6105 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6106 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6107 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6110 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6111 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6112 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6113 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6115 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6116 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6118 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6119 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger)
6120 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6122 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6123 if height < last_best_block_height {
6124 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6125 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6129 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6130 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6131 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6132 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6134 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6135 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6137 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6139 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6141 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.get_our_node_id(), &self.logger));
6143 macro_rules! max_time {
6144 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6146 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6147 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6148 // having an explicit local time source.
6149 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6150 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6151 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6152 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6153 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6159 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6160 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6161 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6162 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6166 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6167 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6168 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.by_id.len());
6169 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
6170 if let (Some(funding_txo), block_hash) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6171 res.push((funding_txo.txid, block_hash));
6177 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6178 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6179 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6180 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6181 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6182 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6183 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6184 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6189 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6191 M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6192 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6193 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6194 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6197 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6198 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6200 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6201 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6202 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6203 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6204 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6206 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6207 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6209 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6210 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
6211 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6212 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6213 let res = f(channel);
6214 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6215 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6216 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6217 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6218 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6220 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6221 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6222 if channel.is_usable() {
6223 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6224 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6225 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6226 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6231 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6235 emit_channel_ready_event!(self, channel);
6237 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6238 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6239 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6240 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6241 msg: announcement_sigs,
6243 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6244 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash, height) {
6245 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6247 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6248 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6249 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap(),
6254 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6255 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6256 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6257 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6258 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6259 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6260 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6261 // is always consistent.
6262 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6263 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6264 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6265 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6266 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6269 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6270 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6271 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6272 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6273 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6274 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6275 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6279 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6280 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6281 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6282 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6283 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6284 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6285 data: reason_message,
6294 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6295 self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap().retain(|payment_hash, (_, htlcs)| {
6296 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6297 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6298 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6299 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6300 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6301 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6302 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
6303 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
6305 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6306 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6307 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6311 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6314 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6315 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6316 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6317 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6318 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6319 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6320 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6321 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6322 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6325 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6326 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6327 _ => unreachable!(),
6329 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6330 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6331 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6332 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6338 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6340 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6341 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6345 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
6346 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
6347 /// [`await_persistable_update`], [`await_persistable_update_timeout`], or a future returned by
6348 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6350 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
6352 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6353 /// [`await_persistable_update_timeout`]: Self::await_persistable_update_timeout
6354 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6355 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
6356 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
6357 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
6360 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
6361 /// [`await_persistable_update`], `await_persistable_update_timeout`, or a future returned by
6362 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`] is guaranteed to be woken up.
6364 /// [`await_persistable_update`]: Self::await_persistable_update
6365 /// [`get_persistable_update_future`]: Self::get_persistable_update_future
6366 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
6367 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
6370 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when a persistable update is available. Note that
6371 /// callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this [`ChannelManager`] and
6372 /// should instead register actions to be taken later.
6373 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6374 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6377 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6378 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6379 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6382 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6383 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6384 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6385 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6389 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref >
6390 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
6391 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
6392 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6393 K::Target: KeysInterface,
6394 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6397 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6398 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6399 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6402 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6403 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6404 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6407 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6409 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6412 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6413 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6414 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6417 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6418 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6419 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6422 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6423 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6424 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6427 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6428 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6429 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6432 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6433 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6434 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6437 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6438 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6439 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6442 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6443 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6444 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6447 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6448 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6449 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6452 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6453 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6454 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6457 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6458 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6459 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6462 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6463 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6464 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6467 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6468 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6469 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6472 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6473 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6474 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6477 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6482 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6484 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6487 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
6488 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6489 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6490 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
6492 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6493 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6494 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6495 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates. We believe we {} make future connections to this peer.",
6496 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id), if no_connection_possible { "cannot" } else { "can" });
6497 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6498 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6499 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6500 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6501 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6502 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6505 no_channels_remain = false;
6510 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6512 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6513 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6514 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6515 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6516 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6517 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6518 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6519 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6520 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6521 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6522 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6523 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6524 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6525 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6526 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6527 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
6528 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6529 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6530 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6531 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6535 if no_channels_remain {
6536 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
6539 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6540 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6544 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) -> Result<(), ()> {
6545 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6546 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting with no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6550 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6555 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6556 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6557 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6558 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6559 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6562 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6563 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6568 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6569 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
6570 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
6571 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6572 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6573 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6574 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6575 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6576 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6580 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6581 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6582 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6587 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6588 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()) {
6589 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6590 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6591 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6599 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6603 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6604 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6606 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6607 for chan in self.list_channels() {
6608 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
6609 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6610 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6615 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6616 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6617 if let Some(chan) = channel_state.by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6618 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6621 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6622 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6623 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6631 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6632 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6636 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6637 provided_node_features()
6640 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6641 provided_init_features()
6645 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6646 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6647 pub fn provided_node_features() -> NodeFeatures {
6648 provided_init_features().to_context()
6651 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6652 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6654 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6655 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6656 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6657 pub fn provided_invoice_features() -> InvoiceFeatures {
6658 provided_init_features().to_context()
6661 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6662 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6663 pub fn provided_channel_features() -> ChannelFeatures {
6664 provided_init_features().to_context()
6667 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6668 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6669 pub fn provided_init_features() -> InitFeatures {
6670 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6671 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the ChannelMessageHandler impl for
6672 // ErroringMessageHandler.
6673 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6674 features.set_data_loss_protect_optional();
6675 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6676 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6677 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6678 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6679 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6680 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6681 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6682 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6683 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6684 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6688 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6689 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6691 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6692 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6693 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6694 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6697 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6698 (2, node_id, required),
6699 (4, features, required),
6700 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6701 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6702 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6703 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6706 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6707 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6708 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6709 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6710 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6711 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6712 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6713 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6714 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6715 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6716 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6717 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6718 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6719 (7, self.config, option),
6720 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6721 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6722 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6723 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6724 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6725 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6726 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6727 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6728 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6729 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6730 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6731 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6732 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6733 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6734 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6735 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6736 (32, self.is_public, required),
6737 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6738 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6739 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6745 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6746 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6747 init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6748 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6749 (2, channel_id, required),
6750 (3, channel_type, option),
6751 (4, counterparty, required),
6752 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6753 (6, funding_txo, option),
6754 (7, config, option),
6755 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6756 (9, confirmations, option),
6757 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6758 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6759 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6760 (16, balance_msat, required),
6761 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6762 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6763 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6764 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6765 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6766 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6767 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6768 (26, is_outbound, required),
6769 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6770 (30, is_usable, required),
6771 (32, is_public, required),
6772 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6773 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6774 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6777 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6778 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6779 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
6780 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
6781 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
6785 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
6787 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
6788 outbound_scid_alias,
6792 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
6793 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
6795 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
6796 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6797 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
6798 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
6799 confirmations_required,
6801 force_close_spend_delay,
6802 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
6803 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
6804 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
6805 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
6806 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
6807 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
6812 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
6813 (2, channels, vec_type),
6814 (4, phantom_scid, required),
6815 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
6818 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
6820 (0, onion_packet, required),
6821 (2, short_channel_id, required),
6824 (0, payment_data, required),
6825 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6826 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6828 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
6829 (0, payment_preimage, required),
6830 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
6834 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
6835 (0, routing, required),
6836 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
6837 (4, payment_hash, required),
6838 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
6839 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
6840 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
6844 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6845 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6847 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
6849 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6850 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6851 reason.write(writer)?;
6853 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6854 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
6857 channel_id.write(writer)?;
6858 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6859 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
6860 failure_code.write(writer)?;
6867 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
6868 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6869 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6872 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6873 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6874 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6875 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
6879 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6880 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6881 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6882 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
6883 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
6886 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
6887 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
6888 // messages contained in the variants.
6889 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
6890 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
6891 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
6893 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6894 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6895 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6896 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6897 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
6900 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
6901 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
6902 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
6903 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
6904 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
6906 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6911 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
6916 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
6917 (0, short_channel_id, required),
6918 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
6919 (2, outpoint, required),
6920 (4, htlc_id, required),
6921 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
6924 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
6925 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6926 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
6927 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
6928 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
6930 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6931 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
6932 (1, self.total_msat, required),
6933 (2, self.value, required),
6934 (4, payment_data, option),
6935 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
6936 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
6942 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
6943 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6944 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6946 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
6947 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
6948 let mut total_msat = None;
6949 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6950 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6951 (0, prev_hop, required),
6952 (1, total_msat, option),
6953 (2, value, required),
6954 (4, payment_data, option),
6955 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
6956 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
6958 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
6960 if payment_data.is_some() {
6961 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6963 if total_msat.is_none() {
6964 total_msat = Some(value);
6966 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
6969 if total_msat.is_none() {
6970 if payment_data.is_none() {
6971 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6973 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
6975 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
6979 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
6982 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
6989 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
6990 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6991 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6995 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6996 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6997 let mut payment_id = None;
6998 let mut payment_secret = None;
6999 let mut payment_params = None;
7000 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7001 (0, session_priv, required),
7002 (1, payment_id, option),
7003 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7004 (3, payment_secret, option),
7005 (4, path, vec_type),
7006 (5, payment_params, option),
7008 if payment_id.is_none() {
7009 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7011 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7013 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7014 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7015 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7016 path: path.unwrap(),
7017 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7022 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7023 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7028 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7029 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7031 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
7033 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7034 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7035 (0, session_priv, required),
7036 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7037 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7038 (3, payment_secret, option),
7039 (4, *path, vec_type),
7040 (5, payment_params, option),
7043 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7045 field.write(writer)?;
7052 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
7053 (0, LightningError) => {
7057 (0, failure_code, required),
7058 (2, data, vec_type),
7062 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7063 (0, forward_info, required),
7064 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7065 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7066 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7067 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7070 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7072 (0, htlc_id, required),
7073 (2, err_packet, required),
7078 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7079 (0, payment_secret, required),
7080 (2, expiry_time, required),
7081 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7082 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7083 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7086 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
7088 (0, session_privs, required),
7091 (0, session_privs, required),
7092 (1, payment_hash, option),
7093 (3, timer_ticks_without_htlcs, (default_value, 0)),
7096 (0, session_privs, required),
7097 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
7098 (2, payment_hash, required),
7099 (4, payment_secret, option),
7100 (6, total_msat, required),
7101 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
7102 (10, starting_block_height, required),
7105 (0, session_privs, required),
7106 (2, payment_hash, required),
7110 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>
7111 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7112 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7113 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7114 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7117 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7118 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7120 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7122 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7124 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7125 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7126 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7130 // Take `channel_state` lock temporarily to avoid creating a lock order that requires
7131 // that the `forward_htlcs` lock is taken after `channel_state`
7132 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
7133 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7134 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7135 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7136 unfunded_channels += 1;
7139 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7140 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
7141 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7142 channel.write(writer)?;
7148 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7149 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7150 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7151 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7152 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7153 for forward in pending_forwards {
7154 forward.write(writer)?;
7159 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7160 let claimable_htlcs = self.claimable_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7161 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7163 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7164 (claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7165 for (payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops)) in claimable_htlcs.iter() {
7166 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7167 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7168 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
7169 htlc.write(writer)?;
7171 htlc_purposes.push(purpose);
7174 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7175 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7176 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7177 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7178 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7179 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7182 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7183 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7184 for event in events.iter() {
7185 event.write(writer)?;
7188 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7189 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7190 for event in background_events.iter() {
7192 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7194 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7195 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7200 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7201 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7202 // likely to be identical.
7203 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7204 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7206 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7207 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7208 hash.write(writer)?;
7209 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7212 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7213 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7214 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7215 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7216 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7219 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7220 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7222 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7223 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7224 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7225 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7228 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7229 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7233 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7234 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7235 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7237 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7238 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7239 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7245 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7246 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7247 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7248 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7250 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7251 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7252 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7253 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7254 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7255 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7256 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7257 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7264 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7266 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7268 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7269 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7270 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7271 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7272 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7273 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7274 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7275 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7276 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7277 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7278 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7279 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7280 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7282 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7283 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7285 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7286 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7288 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7289 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7290 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7291 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7292 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7293 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7295 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7296 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7297 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7298 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7299 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7300 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7303 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7304 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7306 pub keys_manager: K,
7308 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7310 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7311 pub fee_estimator: F,
7312 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7314 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7315 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7316 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7317 pub chain_monitor: M,
7319 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7320 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7321 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7322 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7323 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7324 /// deserialization.
7326 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7327 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7328 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7330 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7331 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7333 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7334 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7335 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7336 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7338 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7341 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
7342 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>,
7345 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7346 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>
7347 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7348 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7349 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7350 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7353 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7354 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7355 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7356 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7357 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7359 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
7360 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7365 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7366 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7367 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7368 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>>)
7369 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7370 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7371 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7372 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7375 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7376 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7377 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7381 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
7382 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, K, F, L>)
7383 where M::Target: chain::Watch<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>,
7384 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7385 K::Target: KeysInterface,
7386 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7389 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7390 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7392 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7393 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7394 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7396 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7398 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7399 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7400 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7401 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7402 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7403 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
7404 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7405 let mut channel: Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
7406 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7407 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7408 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7409 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7410 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7411 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7412 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7413 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7414 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7415 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7416 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7417 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7418 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7419 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7420 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7421 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7422 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7423 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7424 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7425 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7426 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7427 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7428 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7429 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7430 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7431 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7432 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7433 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7434 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7435 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7436 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7437 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7440 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7441 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7442 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7444 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7445 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7447 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7449 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7450 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7451 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7452 // safely discard the channel.
7453 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7454 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7455 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7456 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7457 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7460 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7461 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7462 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7463 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7464 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7465 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7469 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
7470 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7471 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7472 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
7476 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7477 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7479 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7480 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7481 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7482 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7483 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7484 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7486 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7489 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7490 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7491 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7492 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7493 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7494 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7495 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7496 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7498 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7501 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7502 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
7503 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7504 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7505 let peer_state = PeerState {
7506 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7508 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7511 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7512 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
7513 for _ in 0..event_count {
7514 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7515 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
7519 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
7520 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
7521 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
7522 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
7523 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
7524 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
7525 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7526 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
7530 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7531 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
7532 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7533 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7534 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
7535 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7539 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7540 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7542 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7543 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7544 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7545 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7546 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7550 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7551 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7552 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7553 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7554 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7555 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7556 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7558 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7559 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7563 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7564 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7565 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7566 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7567 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7568 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7569 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7570 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7571 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7572 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7573 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7574 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7575 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7576 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7577 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7578 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7580 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7581 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7584 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7585 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7588 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7589 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7590 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7591 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7592 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7593 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7595 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7597 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7598 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
7599 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
7600 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
7601 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
7602 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
7603 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
7605 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7606 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
7607 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
7608 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
7609 if path.is_empty() {
7610 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
7611 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7613 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
7614 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
7615 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
7616 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
7617 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7618 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
7619 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
7620 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
7622 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7623 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
7624 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
7625 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
7626 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
7628 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
7629 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
7630 total_msat: path_amt,
7631 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
7633 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
7634 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
7643 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
7644 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
7646 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
7647 if let Some(mut purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
7648 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
7649 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7651 for (purpose, (payment_hash, previous_hops)) in purposes.drain(..).zip(claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..)) {
7652 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7655 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
7656 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
7657 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
7658 if previous_hops.is_empty() {
7659 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7661 let purpose = match &previous_hops[0].onion_payload {
7662 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
7663 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
7664 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
7665 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
7666 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
7667 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
7668 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
7670 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7671 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7675 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
7677 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
7679 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
7680 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
7682 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, (purpose, previous_hops));
7686 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7687 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
7689 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7690 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7693 let our_network_key = match args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(Recipient::Node) {
7695 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7697 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &our_network_key);
7698 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
7699 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
7700 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
7701 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7705 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
7706 for (chan_id, chan) in by_id.iter_mut() {
7707 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
7708 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
7710 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
7711 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.keys_manager);
7712 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
7714 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7715 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
7716 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7717 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7718 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7719 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7721 if chan.is_usable() {
7722 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
7723 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
7724 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
7725 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
7726 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7731 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
7733 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7734 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
7735 if let Some((payment_purpose, claimable_htlcs)) = claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash) {
7736 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7737 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
7738 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
7739 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
7740 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
7741 let phantom_pubkey = args.keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
7742 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
7743 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
7745 for claimable_htlc in claimable_htlcs {
7746 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
7748 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
7749 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
7750 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
7751 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
7753 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
7754 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
7755 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
7756 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
7758 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
7759 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
7760 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
7761 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
7763 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
7764 if let Some(channel) = by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
7765 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
7767 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
7768 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
7771 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
7774 purpose: payment_purpose,
7775 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
7781 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
7783 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
7784 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
7785 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
7787 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
7789 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
7791 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7793 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
7794 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
7795 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7796 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
7798 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
7799 claimable_htlcs: Mutex::new(claimable_htlcs),
7800 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
7801 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
7802 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
7803 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
7805 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
7811 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
7813 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
7815 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
7816 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
7817 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
7818 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
7820 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
7821 logger: args.logger,
7822 default_configuration: args.default_config,
7825 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7826 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
7827 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
7828 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7829 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7832 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
7833 //connection or two.
7835 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
7841 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7842 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7843 use core::time::Duration;
7844 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
7845 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
7846 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
7847 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7848 use crate::ln::msgs;
7849 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
7850 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
7851 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7852 use crate::util::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
7853 use crate::util::test_utils;
7854 use crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface;
7857 fn test_notify_limits() {
7858 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
7859 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
7860 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
7861 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
7862 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
7863 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7865 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
7866 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
7867 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7868 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7869 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7871 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7873 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
7874 // to connect messages with new values
7875 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7876 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
7877 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7878 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
7880 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
7881 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7882 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7883 // ... but the last node should not.
7884 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7885 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
7886 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7887 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7889 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
7890 // about the channel.
7891 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7892 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7893 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7895 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
7897 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7898 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7899 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
7900 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
7901 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7902 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7904 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
7905 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7906 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7908 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
7909 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
7910 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
7911 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
7912 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
7913 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
7915 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
7916 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
7917 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7918 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7919 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7920 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7921 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7922 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7924 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
7925 // the channel info has updated.
7926 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
7927 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
7928 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7929 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
7930 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
7931 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
7935 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
7936 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
7938 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7939 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7940 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7941 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7942 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
7944 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
7945 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
7946 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
7947 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
7949 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
7950 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
7951 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
7952 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
7953 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
7954 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
7955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7956 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7957 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7958 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
7960 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
7961 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
7962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7963 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7964 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7965 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
7966 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
7967 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7968 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
7969 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
7970 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
7971 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
7972 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
7973 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7974 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
7975 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7976 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7977 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7978 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7979 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7980 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7981 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
7983 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
7984 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
7985 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7986 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7987 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
7988 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
7990 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
7991 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
7992 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
7993 // lightning messages manually.
7994 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
7995 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
7996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
7998 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
7999 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8000 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8001 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8002 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8003 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8004 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8005 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8006 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8007 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8008 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8009 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8010 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8011 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8012 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8013 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8014 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8015 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8016 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8017 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8018 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8019 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8020 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8021 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8022 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8024 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8025 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8026 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8027 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8029 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8030 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8031 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8032 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8034 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8037 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8038 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8039 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8040 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8042 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8045 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8046 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8047 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8048 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8050 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8055 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8056 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8057 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8058 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8059 // fails as expected.
8060 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8061 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8062 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8063 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8064 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8065 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8066 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8068 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8069 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8070 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8072 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8073 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8074 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
8075 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8076 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
8078 let route = find_route(
8079 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8080 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8082 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8084 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8085 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8086 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8087 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8088 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8089 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8090 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8091 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8092 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8093 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8094 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8095 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8096 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8097 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8098 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8099 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8100 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8101 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8102 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8103 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8104 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8106 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8107 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8109 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8110 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8111 let route = find_route(
8112 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8113 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8115 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8116 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8117 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8118 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8119 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8120 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8121 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8123 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8124 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8125 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8126 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8127 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8128 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8129 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8130 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8131 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8132 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8133 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8134 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8135 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8136 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8137 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8138 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8139 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8140 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8141 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8142 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8143 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8144 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8145 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8147 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8148 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8152 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8153 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8154 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8155 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8156 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8157 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8158 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8160 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8161 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8162 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8163 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8165 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8166 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8167 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8168 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8169 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8171 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8172 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8173 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8174 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8175 let route = find_route(
8176 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8177 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8180 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8181 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8182 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash, None, PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8183 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8184 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8186 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8187 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8188 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8189 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8190 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8191 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8192 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8194 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
8198 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8199 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8200 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8201 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8202 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8203 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8205 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8206 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8207 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8208 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8210 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features());
8211 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8212 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
8213 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8214 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
8216 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
8217 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8218 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8219 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8220 let route = find_route(
8221 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8222 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8225 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8226 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8227 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8228 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, Some(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8229 nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8230 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8232 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8233 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8234 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8235 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8236 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8237 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8238 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8240 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
8244 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8245 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8246 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8247 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8248 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8250 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8251 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8252 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8253 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channelmanager::provided_init_features()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8255 // Marshall an MPP route.
8256 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8257 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8258 route.paths.push(path);
8259 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8260 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8261 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8262 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8263 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8264 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8266 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap_err() {
8267 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8268 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
8269 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8274 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8275 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8276 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8277 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8278 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8279 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8281 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8282 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8284 total_msat: 100_000,
8287 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8288 // payment verification fails as expected.
8289 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8290 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8291 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8292 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8294 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
8298 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8299 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8303 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8304 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8305 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8306 // the channel is successfully closed.
8307 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8308 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8309 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8310 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8312 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8313 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8314 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel);
8315 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8316 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &accept_channel);
8318 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8319 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8321 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8322 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8323 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8324 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8327 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8329 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8330 // as it has the funding transaction.
8331 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8332 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8333 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8335 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8338 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8340 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8342 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8343 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8344 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8346 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8347 // as it has the funding transaction.
8348 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8349 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8350 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8352 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8353 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8354 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8355 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8356 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8357 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8358 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8360 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8361 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8362 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8363 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8365 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8366 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8368 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8369 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8370 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8371 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8372 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8373 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8374 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8376 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8377 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8378 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8379 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8380 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8381 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8382 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8385 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8387 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8388 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8389 // closing transaction).
8390 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8391 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8392 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8394 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8395 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8396 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8397 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8398 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8401 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8403 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8405 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8406 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8407 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8409 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8411 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8412 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8416 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
8418 use crate::chain::Listen;
8419 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
8420 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, KeysInterface, InMemorySigner};
8421 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId};
8422 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8423 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
8424 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
8425 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
8426 use crate::util::test_utils;
8427 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8428 use crate::util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
8430 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8431 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8432 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
8434 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
8438 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
8439 node: &'a ChannelManager<
8440 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
8441 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
8442 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
8443 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
8444 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>,
8449 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
8450 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
8453 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
8454 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
8455 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
8457 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
8458 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
8460 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
8461 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
8463 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
8464 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
8466 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8467 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
8468 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
8469 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
8470 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8472 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8474 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
8476 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
8477 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
8478 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
8479 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
8480 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
8482 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
8484 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
8486 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8487 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: channelmanager::provided_init_features(), remote_network_address: None }).unwrap();
8488 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8489 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8490 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8493 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
8494 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8495 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
8497 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8498 } else { panic!(); }
8500 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8501 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8503 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
8506 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
8509 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
8510 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
8512 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8513 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8514 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
8515 match msg_events[0] {
8516 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
8517 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
8518 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8522 match msg_events[1] {
8523 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
8527 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8528 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
8530 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8531 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
8533 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8536 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8537 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
8539 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
8540 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
8542 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8545 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash, &logger_a);
8547 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
8548 macro_rules! send_payment {
8549 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
8550 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
8551 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
8552 .with_features(channelmanager::provided_invoice_features());
8553 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_penalty(0);
8554 let seed = [3u8; 32];
8555 let keys_manager = KeysManager::new(&seed, 42, 42);
8556 let random_seed_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8557 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph.read_only(),
8558 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes).unwrap();
8560 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
8561 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
8563 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
8564 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
8566 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8567 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
8568 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8569 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
8570 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8571 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8572 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8573 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
8575 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
8576 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
8577 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8578 expect_payment_claimed!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
8580 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
8581 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
8582 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
8583 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8584 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
8586 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
8589 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
8590 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
8591 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
8592 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
8594 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
8599 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
8600 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);