1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::ProbabilisticScorer;
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, ChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
115 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
116 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
117 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
122 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
123 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
124 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
125 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
127 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
128 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
129 /// may overshoot this in either case)
130 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
131 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
134 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
135 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
136 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
137 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
140 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
141 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
142 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
143 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
144 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
147 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
148 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
150 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
151 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
152 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
155 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
156 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
158 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
159 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
162 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
163 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
166 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
170 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
171 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
172 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 short_channel_id: u64,
176 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
177 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
179 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
180 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
185 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
187 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
188 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
189 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
191 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
192 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
195 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
196 struct ClaimableHTLC {
197 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
199 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
201 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
202 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
203 sender_intended_value: u64,
204 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
206 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
207 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
208 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
209 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
213 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
215 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
216 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
217 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
219 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
220 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
225 impl Readable for PaymentId {
226 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
227 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
232 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
234 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
235 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
236 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
238 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
239 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
244 impl Readable for InterceptId {
245 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
251 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
252 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
253 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
254 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
255 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
258 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
260 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
261 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
262 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
264 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
265 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
269 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
270 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
271 (0, short_channel_id, required),
272 (2, htlc_id, required),
274 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
275 (0, session_priv, required),
280 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
281 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
282 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
283 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
284 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
287 session_priv: SecretKey,
288 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
289 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
290 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
291 payment_id: PaymentId,
294 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
295 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
296 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
298 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
300 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
302 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
305 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
306 payment_id.hash(hasher);
307 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
313 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
315 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
316 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
317 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
318 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
319 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
320 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
324 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
325 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
326 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
327 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
328 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
329 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
331 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
337 struct ReceiveError {
343 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
344 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
346 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
347 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
348 pub enum FailureCode {
349 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
350 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
351 TemporaryNodeFailure = 0x2000 | 2,
352 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
353 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
354 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing = 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
355 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
356 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
357 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
358 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
359 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails = 0x4000 | 15,
362 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>);
364 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
365 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
366 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
367 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
368 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
370 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
371 err: msgs::LightningError,
372 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
373 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
375 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
377 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
379 err: LightningError {
381 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
382 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
389 shutdown_finish: None,
393 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
394 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
397 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
399 err: LightningError {
401 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
402 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
408 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
409 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
413 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
416 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
418 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
419 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
423 log_level: Level::Warn,
426 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
428 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
430 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
432 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
433 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
441 shutdown_finish: None,
446 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
447 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
448 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
449 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
450 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
452 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
453 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
454 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
455 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
456 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
457 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
458 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
460 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
464 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
465 struct ClaimingPayment {
467 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
468 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
470 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
471 (0, amount_msat, required),
472 (2, payment_purpose, required),
473 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
476 struct ClaimablePayment {
477 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
478 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
479 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
482 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
483 struct ClaimablePayments {
484 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
485 /// failed/claimed by the user.
487 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
488 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
490 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
491 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
492 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
494 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
495 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
496 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
497 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
500 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
501 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
502 /// quite some time lag.
503 enum BackgroundEvent {
504 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
505 /// commitment transaction.
506 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
510 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
511 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
512 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
513 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
514 /// event can be generated.
515 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
516 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user.
517 EmitEvent { event: events::Event },
520 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
521 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
522 (2, EmitEvent) => { (0, event, upgradable_required) },
525 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
526 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
527 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
528 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
529 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
532 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
533 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
534 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
535 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
539 /// State we hold per-peer.
540 pub(super) struct PeerState<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
541 /// `temporary_channel_id` or `channel_id` -> `channel`.
543 /// Holds all channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once a channel has been assigned a
544 /// `channel_id`, the `temporary_channel_id` key in the map is updated and is replaced by the
546 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
547 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
548 latest_features: InitFeatures,
549 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
550 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
551 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
552 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
553 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
555 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
556 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
557 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
558 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
560 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
561 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
562 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
563 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
564 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
565 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
566 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<[u8; 32], Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
567 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
568 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
569 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
573 impl <Signer: ChannelSigner> PeerState<Signer> {
574 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
575 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
576 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
577 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
578 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
581 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
585 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
586 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
588 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
591 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
592 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
593 struct PendingInboundPayment {
594 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
595 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
596 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
597 /// this payment being removed.
599 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
600 user_payment_id: u64,
601 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
602 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
603 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
606 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
607 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
608 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
609 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
610 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
611 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
612 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
613 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
615 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
616 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
624 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
626 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>
631 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
632 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
633 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
634 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
635 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
636 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
637 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
638 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
639 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
641 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
642 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<&'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e DefaultRouter<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L, &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>>, &'g L>;
644 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
645 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
646 pub trait AChannelManager {
647 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer>;
648 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
649 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface;
650 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
651 type EntropySource: EntropySource;
652 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
653 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner;
654 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
655 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
656 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer>;
657 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
658 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator;
659 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
661 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
663 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
664 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
666 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
667 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
668 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
670 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> + Sized,
671 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface + Sized,
672 ES::Target: EntropySource + Sized,
673 NS::Target: NodeSigner + Sized,
674 SP::Target: SignerProvider + Sized,
675 F::Target: FeeEstimator + Sized,
676 R::Target: Router + Sized,
677 L::Target: Logger + Sized,
679 type Watch = M::Target;
681 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
683 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
685 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
687 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
688 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
690 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
692 type Router = R::Target;
694 type Logger = L::Target;
696 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
699 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
700 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
702 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
703 /// to individual Channels.
705 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
706 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
707 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
708 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
710 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
711 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
712 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
713 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
714 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
715 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
716 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
718 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
719 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
720 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
722 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
723 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
724 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
725 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
726 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
728 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
729 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
730 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
731 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
733 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
734 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
735 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
737 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
738 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
739 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
740 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
741 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
743 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
744 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
745 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
746 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
747 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
748 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
749 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
750 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
753 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
754 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
755 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
756 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
757 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
761 // `total_consistency_lock`
763 // |__`forward_htlcs`
765 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
767 // |__`per_peer_state`
769 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
771 // | |__`claimable_payments`
773 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
779 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
781 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
785 // | |__`pending_events`
787 // | |__`pending_background_events`
789 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
791 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
792 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
793 ES::Target: EntropySource,
794 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
795 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
796 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
800 default_configuration: UserConfig,
801 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
802 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
808 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
810 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
812 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
813 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
815 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
816 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
817 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
818 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
820 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
821 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
823 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
824 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
825 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
826 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
827 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
828 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
829 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
830 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
832 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
834 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
835 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
837 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
839 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
840 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
841 /// and via the classic SCID.
843 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
844 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
846 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
848 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
850 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
851 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
852 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
854 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
855 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
857 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
858 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
860 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
861 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
863 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
864 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
865 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
866 /// active channel list on load.
868 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
869 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
871 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
873 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
874 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
875 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
877 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
878 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
879 /// the handling of the events.
881 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
882 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
885 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
886 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
887 /// would break backwards compatability.
888 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
889 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
890 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
892 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
893 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<[u8; 32], PublicKey>>,
895 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
897 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
898 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
899 /// confirmation depth.
901 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
902 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
903 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
905 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
907 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
909 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, [u8; 32])>>,
911 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
913 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
915 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
916 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
917 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
919 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
920 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
922 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
923 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
924 /// keeping additional state.
925 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
927 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
928 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
929 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
930 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
932 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
933 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
935 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
936 /// are currently open with that peer.
938 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
939 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
942 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
944 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
945 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
946 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
947 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
948 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>>>,
950 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
951 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
952 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
953 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
954 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
956 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
957 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
959 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
960 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
961 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
962 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
964 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
965 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
966 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
967 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
968 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
969 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
970 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
971 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
973 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
982 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
984 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
985 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
986 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
987 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
988 pub struct ChainParameters {
989 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
990 pub network: Network,
992 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
994 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
995 pub best_block: BestBlock,
998 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1004 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1005 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1006 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1007 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1008 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1009 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1011 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1012 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1013 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1014 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1015 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1017 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1018 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1021 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1022 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1023 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1026 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1027 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1029 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1030 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1031 should_persist: persist_check,
1032 _read_guard: read_guard,
1037 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1038 fn drop(&mut self) {
1039 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1040 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1045 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1046 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1048 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1050 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1051 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1052 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1053 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1054 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1056 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1057 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1059 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1061 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1062 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1063 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1064 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1065 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1066 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1067 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1068 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1069 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1070 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1071 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1072 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1073 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1075 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1076 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1078 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1079 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1080 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1081 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1083 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1084 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1085 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1086 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1087 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1088 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1091 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1093 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1094 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1097 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1099 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1100 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1102 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until we time-out the
1103 /// idempotency of payments by [`PaymentId`]. See
1104 /// [`OutboundPayments::remove_stale_resolved_payments`].
1105 pub(crate) const IDEMPOTENCY_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 7;
1107 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1108 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1109 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1111 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1112 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1113 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1115 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1116 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1117 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1118 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1120 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1121 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1122 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1124 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1125 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1126 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1128 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1129 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1130 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1131 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1132 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1133 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1134 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1135 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1136 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1137 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1138 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1141 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1142 /// to better separate parameters.
1143 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1144 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1145 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1146 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1147 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1148 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1149 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1150 pub features: InitFeatures,
1151 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1152 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1153 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1155 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1157 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1158 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1159 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1160 /// payments to us through this channel.
1161 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1162 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1163 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1164 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1165 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1166 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1167 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1170 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1171 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1172 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1173 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1174 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1175 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1176 /// lifetime of the channel.
1177 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1178 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1179 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1180 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1181 /// our counterparty already.
1183 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1184 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1185 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1186 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1188 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1189 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1190 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1191 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1193 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1194 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1196 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1197 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1199 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1200 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1201 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1202 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1203 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1204 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1205 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1206 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1207 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1210 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1212 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1213 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1214 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1215 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1216 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1217 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1218 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1220 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1221 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1223 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1224 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1225 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1226 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1227 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1228 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1229 /// this value on chain.
1231 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1233 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1235 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1236 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1237 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or a random value if the channel was
1238 /// inbound. This may be zero for inbound channels serialized with LDK versions prior to
1240 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1241 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1242 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1244 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1245 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1246 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1247 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1248 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1250 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1251 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1252 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1253 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1255 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1256 pub balance_msat: u64,
1257 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1258 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1259 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1260 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1262 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1264 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1265 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1266 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1267 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1268 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1269 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1270 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1271 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1273 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`] and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1274 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1275 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1276 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1277 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1278 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1279 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1281 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1282 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1283 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1284 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1285 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1286 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1287 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1288 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1289 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1291 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1293 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1294 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1295 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1296 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1297 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1299 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1300 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1301 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1302 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1303 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1304 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1305 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1307 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1308 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1309 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1310 pub is_outbound: bool,
1311 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1312 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1313 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1314 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1315 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1317 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1318 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1319 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1320 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1322 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1323 pub is_usable: bool,
1324 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1325 pub is_public: bool,
1326 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1327 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1328 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1329 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1330 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1331 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1333 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1334 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1337 impl ChannelDetails {
1338 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1339 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1340 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1342 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1343 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1344 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1345 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1348 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1349 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1350 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1352 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1353 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1354 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1355 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1358 fn from_channel<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner>(channel: &Channel<Signer>,
1359 best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures) -> Self {
1361 let balance = channel.get_available_balances();
1362 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1363 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1365 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1366 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1367 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1368 features: latest_features,
1369 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1370 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1371 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1372 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1373 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1374 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1375 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1376 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if channel.have_received_message() {
1377 Some(channel.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1378 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1380 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1381 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1382 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1383 channel_type: if channel.have_received_message() { Some(channel.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1384 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1385 outbound_scid_alias: if channel.is_usable() { Some(channel.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1386 inbound_scid_alias: channel.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1387 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1388 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(channel.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1389 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1390 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1391 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1392 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1393 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1394 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1395 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1396 confirmations: Some(channel.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1397 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1398 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1399 is_channel_ready: channel.is_usable(),
1400 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1401 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1402 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(channel.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1403 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: channel.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1404 config: Some(channel.config()),
1409 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1410 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1411 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1412 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1413 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1415 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1417 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1418 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1419 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1422 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1423 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1424 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1426 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1427 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1428 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1430 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1431 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1432 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1434 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1435 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1439 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1441 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1443 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1444 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1445 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1446 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1448 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1449 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1450 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1453 macro_rules! handle_error {
1454 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1455 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1456 // entering the macro.
1457 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1458 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1462 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1463 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1465 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1466 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1467 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1468 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1472 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1473 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1474 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1475 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1480 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1481 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1483 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1484 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1485 action: err.action.clone()
1489 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1490 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1491 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1492 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1493 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1497 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1504 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1505 ($self: expr, $channel: expr) => {{
1506 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.channel_id());
1507 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1508 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1509 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1511 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1512 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1513 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1514 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1515 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1517 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1518 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1520 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel.outbound_scid_alias());
1524 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1525 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1526 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1528 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1529 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1531 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1532 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1534 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1535 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1536 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel);
1537 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1538 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1539 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1545 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1546 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1550 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1552 $entry.remove_entry();
1560 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1561 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1565 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1567 $entry.remove_entry();
1575 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1576 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1578 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1579 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, channel);
1585 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1586 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1587 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1588 node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1589 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1591 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1592 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1593 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1594 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1595 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1596 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1597 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1598 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()));
1599 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.channel_id()),
1600 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1605 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1606 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1607 if $channel.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1608 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1609 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1610 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.temporary_channel_id(),
1611 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1612 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1613 funding_txo: $channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1615 $channel.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1620 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1621 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1622 if $channel.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1623 debug_assert!($channel.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1624 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1625 channel_id: $channel.channel_id(),
1626 user_channel_id: $channel.get_user_id(),
1627 counterparty_node_id: $channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1628 channel_type: $channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
1630 $channel.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1635 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1636 ($self: ident, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1637 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1638 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1639 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
1640 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1641 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.is_usable() {
1642 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
1643 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
1644 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
1645 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
1647 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
1648 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
1649 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1655 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
1656 .remove(&$chan.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
1658 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
1659 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
1660 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
1661 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
1662 updates.announcement_sigs);
1663 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
1664 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
1667 let channel_id = $chan.channel_id();
1668 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
1669 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
1671 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
1673 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1674 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1676 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
1677 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1678 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
1679 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
1684 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
1685 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
1686 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
1687 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
1688 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1690 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
1691 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
1692 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1695 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
1696 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
1697 log_bytes!($chan.channel_id()[..]));
1698 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $chan);
1699 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
1700 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.channel_id(),
1701 $chan.get_user_id(), $chan.force_shutdown(false),
1702 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok()));
1706 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
1707 $chan.complete_one_mon_update($update_id);
1708 if $chan.no_monitor_updates_pending() {
1709 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
1715 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $update_id: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
1716 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $update_id, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan_entry.get_mut(), MANUALLY_REMOVING, $chan_entry.remove_entry())
1720 macro_rules! process_events_body {
1721 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
1722 let mut processed_all_events = false;
1723 while !processed_all_events {
1724 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
1728 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
1731 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
1732 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
1733 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1735 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
1736 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
1737 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
1738 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1742 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
1743 let num_events = pending_events.len();
1744 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
1745 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
1748 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
1750 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
1751 $event_to_handle = event;
1753 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
1754 post_event_actions.push(action);
1759 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1760 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
1761 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
1762 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
1765 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
1766 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
1767 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
1768 processed_all_events = false;
1771 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1772 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1778 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1780 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1781 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1782 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1783 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1784 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1785 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1789 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
1791 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1792 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
1794 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1796 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
1797 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
1798 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
1801 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
1802 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
1803 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
1804 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1805 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1806 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1807 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1808 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1810 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1811 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1812 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
1817 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1819 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
1820 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1821 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
1822 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1823 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
1824 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1825 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1826 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1828 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
1831 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1832 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1834 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1836 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1838 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1840 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
1841 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
1842 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1843 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1844 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
1854 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
1855 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1856 &self.default_configuration
1859 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1860 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1861 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
1864 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
1865 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
1867 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
1869 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
1873 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
1878 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1880 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1881 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1882 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
1883 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
1884 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
1886 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1887 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1889 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
1890 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
1891 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
1893 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1894 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1895 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1897 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1898 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1899 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1900 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1901 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1902 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1904 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1905 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1906 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1907 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1908 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1909 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1913 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1914 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1916 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1918 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
1919 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
1921 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1923 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
1924 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1925 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1926 match Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
1927 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
1928 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
1932 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
1937 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1939 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1940 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1941 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1943 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1945 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1948 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1951 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1952 node_id: their_network_key,
1955 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1958 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1959 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
1960 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
1961 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
1962 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
1963 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
1964 // the same channel.
1965 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
1967 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
1968 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1969 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
1970 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1971 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
1972 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1973 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height,
1974 peer_state.latest_features.clone());
1982 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
1983 /// more information.
1984 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1985 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1988 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1989 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1991 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1992 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1994 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1995 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1996 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1997 // really wanted anyway.
1998 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
2001 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2002 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2003 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2004 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2006 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2007 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2008 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2009 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2010 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2013 ChannelDetails::from_channel(channel, best_block_height, features.clone()))
2019 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2020 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2022 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2023 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2024 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2026 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2027 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2028 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2029 .filter_map(|(_, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2030 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2031 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2032 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2033 total_msat: *total_msat,
2036 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2037 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2039 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2040 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2042 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2047 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2048 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2049 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2050 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2051 Some(transaction) => {
2052 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2053 channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction
2058 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2059 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
2060 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
2061 reason: closure_reason
2065 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2066 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2068 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2069 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2070 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2072 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2073 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2075 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2076 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2077 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2078 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
2079 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
2080 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2081 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = chan_entry.get_mut()
2082 .get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2083 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2085 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2086 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2087 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2088 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2089 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2093 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2094 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2095 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2096 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
2097 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
2100 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
2101 let channel = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
2102 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
2103 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2107 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2111 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id) })
2115 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2116 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2117 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2118 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2121 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2125 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2126 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2127 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2129 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2130 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2132 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2133 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2134 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2135 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2137 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2139 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2140 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2141 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2144 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2145 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2146 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2147 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2148 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2149 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2152 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2153 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2154 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2156 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2157 /// the channel being closed or not:
2158 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2159 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2160 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2161 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2162 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2163 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2164 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2166 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2167 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2168 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2169 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2171 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2173 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2174 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2175 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2178 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2179 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2180 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2181 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2182 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2183 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2187 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2188 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2189 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2190 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2191 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2192 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2193 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2194 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2196 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2197 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2198 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2199 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2200 // ignore the result here.
2201 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2205 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2206 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2207 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2208 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2209 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2210 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2211 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2213 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2214 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2215 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2216 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2217 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) });
2219 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2221 remove_channel!(self, chan)
2223 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), peer_node_id) });
2226 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2227 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2228 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2229 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2230 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2235 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2238 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2239 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2240 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2241 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2242 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2243 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2244 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2245 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2246 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2247 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2248 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2249 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2260 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2261 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2262 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2264 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2265 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2266 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2269 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2270 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2271 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2273 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2274 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2275 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2276 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2277 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2280 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2281 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2282 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2283 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2284 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2288 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2289 /// local transaction(s).
2290 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2291 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2292 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2296 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(&self, hop_data: msgs::OnionHopData, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2297 payment_hash: PaymentHash, amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, ReceiveError>
2299 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2300 if hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2301 return Err(ReceiveError {
2302 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2304 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2307 // final_expiry_too_soon
2308 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2309 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2311 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2312 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2313 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2314 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2315 if (hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2316 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2317 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2318 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2319 return Err(ReceiveError {
2320 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2321 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2324 if hop_data.amt_to_forward > amt_msat {
2325 return Err(ReceiveError {
2327 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2328 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2332 let routing = match hop_data.format {
2333 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => {
2334 return Err(ReceiveError {
2335 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2336 err_data: Vec::new(),
2337 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2340 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage, payment_metadata } => {
2341 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2342 return Err(ReceiveError {
2343 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2344 err_data: Vec::new(),
2345 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2347 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2348 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2351 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2352 phantom_shared_secret,
2354 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2355 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2356 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2357 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2358 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2359 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2360 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2361 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2362 return Err(ReceiveError {
2363 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2364 err_data: Vec::new(),
2365 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2369 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2372 incoming_cltv_expiry: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2375 return Err(ReceiveError {
2376 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2377 err_data: Vec::new(),
2378 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2383 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2386 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2387 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2388 outgoing_amt_msat: hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2389 outgoing_cltv_value: hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2393 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
2394 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2395 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2397 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2398 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2399 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2400 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2401 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2402 failure_code: $err_code,
2408 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2409 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2412 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2413 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2414 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2416 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2417 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2418 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2419 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2420 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2421 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2422 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2423 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2425 macro_rules! return_err {
2426 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2428 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2429 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2430 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2431 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2432 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
2433 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
2439 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
2441 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2442 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
2444 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
2445 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
2449 let pending_forward_info = match next_hop {
2450 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
2452 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash, msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None) {
2454 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2455 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2456 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2457 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2458 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
2460 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
2463 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
2464 let new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2465 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2467 public_key: onion_utils::next_hop_packet_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx, new_pubkey, &shared_secret),
2468 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2469 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2472 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2473 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2474 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2475 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2479 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2480 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2481 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2484 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2485 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2486 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2487 outgoing_amt_msat: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2488 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2493 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref outgoing_amt_msat, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2494 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2495 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2496 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2497 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2498 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
2499 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(short_channel_id).cloned();
2500 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
2501 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2502 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
2503 // phantom or an intercept.
2504 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
2505 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
2506 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, *short_channel_id, &self.genesis_hash)
2510 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2513 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
2515 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
2516 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2517 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
2518 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
2519 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2521 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
2522 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2523 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id) {
2525 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
2526 // have no consistency guarantees.
2527 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2531 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2532 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2533 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2534 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2535 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2537 if chan.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && *short_channel_id != chan.outbound_scid_alias() {
2538 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
2539 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
2540 // we don't have the channel here.
2541 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2543 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*short_channel_id, chan).ok();
2545 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2546 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2547 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2548 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2549 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2550 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2551 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
2552 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
2553 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
2554 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
2555 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
2557 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
2560 if *outgoing_amt_msat < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2561 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
2563 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, *outgoing_amt_msat, *outgoing_cltv_value) {
2564 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
2568 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
2569 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
2570 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
2571 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
2573 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
2580 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2581 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2582 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2583 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2584 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2585 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2587 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2588 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2590 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2591 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2592 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2593 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2594 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2595 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2596 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2597 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2598 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2599 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
2605 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
2606 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2607 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2608 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2610 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2611 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2613 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2614 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
2615 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2617 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2618 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2619 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
2620 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
2621 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
2622 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
2623 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
2627 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
2632 pending_forward_info
2635 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2636 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2637 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2639 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
2640 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
2641 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2643 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2644 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2645 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2646 if !chan.should_announce() {
2647 return Err(LightningError {
2648 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2649 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2652 if chan.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
2653 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
2655 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2656 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2659 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2660 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
2661 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2662 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2664 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
2665 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
2666 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
2668 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
2669 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
2670 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2671 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2672 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
2673 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2677 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
2679 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2680 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2681 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2683 let enabled = chan.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
2684 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
2685 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
2686 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
2687 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
2690 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2691 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2693 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2694 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
2695 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2696 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2697 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
2698 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2699 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2700 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2702 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
2703 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
2704 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
2706 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
2708 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2715 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2716 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2717 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes)
2720 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2721 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
2722 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2724 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2725 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
2726 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2728 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2729 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
2730 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2732 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
2733 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
2735 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2736 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2737 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2738 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
2741 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2742 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
2743 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
2744 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2745 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2746 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
2747 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2748 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
2750 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2751 let send_res = chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
2752 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2754 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2755 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2757 }, onion_packet, &self.logger);
2758 match break_chan_entry!(self, send_res, chan) {
2759 Some(monitor_update) => {
2760 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2761 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2762 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
2765 if update_res == ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress {
2766 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
2767 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
2768 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
2769 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
2770 // which we do in the send_payment check for
2771 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
2772 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
2778 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
2779 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
2780 // `channel_by_id` map.
2781 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
2782 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
2787 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2788 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2790 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2795 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2797 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
2798 /// fields for more info.
2800 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
2801 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
2803 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
2805 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
2806 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
2807 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
2808 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
2809 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
2811 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
2812 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
2813 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
2814 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
2815 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
2817 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
2818 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
2819 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
2820 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
2822 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
2824 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
2825 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2826 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
2828 /// In general, a path may raise:
2829 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2830 /// node public key) is specified.
2831 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2832 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2834 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2835 /// relevant updates.
2837 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
2838 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2839 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2841 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2842 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2843 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
2844 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
2845 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
2846 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2847 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2848 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2849 self.pending_outbound_payments
2850 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2851 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2852 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2855 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment`], but will automatically find a route based on
2856 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2857 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
2858 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2859 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2860 self.pending_outbound_payments
2861 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
2862 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
2863 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
2864 &self.pending_events,
2865 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2866 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2870 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2871 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2872 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2873 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2874 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2875 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2879 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
2880 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2881 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
2885 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
2886 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
2890 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
2891 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
2892 /// retries are exhausted.
2894 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
2895 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
2897 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2898 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2899 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2901 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event is generated and we restart without this
2902 /// [`ChannelManager`] having been persisted, another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
2904 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2905 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2906 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2908 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
2911 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2912 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2913 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2914 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2915 /// never reach the recipient.
2917 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
2918 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
2920 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2921 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2923 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2925 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2926 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2927 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2928 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2929 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
2930 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
2931 &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2932 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2933 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2936 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
2937 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
2939 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
2942 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
2943 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
2944 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2945 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2946 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
2947 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
2948 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2949 &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
2950 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2951 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2954 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
2955 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
2956 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
2957 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2958 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2959 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2960 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
2961 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
2962 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv))
2965 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
2968 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
2969 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
2972 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2973 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2974 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
2975 &self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
2976 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2977 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2978 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2979 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2981 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2982 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2983 let (msg, chan) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2985 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2987 let funding_res = chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2988 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2989 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2990 } else { unreachable!(); });
2992 Ok(funding_msg) => (funding_msg, chan),
2994 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2995 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2997 let _ = handle_error!(self, funding_res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
2998 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2999 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3005 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3007 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3008 log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3013 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3014 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3017 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
3018 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3019 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3021 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3022 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3023 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.channel_id(), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3024 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3033 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3034 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3035 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3039 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3041 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3042 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3044 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3045 /// across the p2p network.
3047 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3048 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3050 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3051 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3052 /// keys per-channel).
3054 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3055 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3056 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3058 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3059 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3060 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3062 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3063 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3064 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3065 /// for more details.
3067 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3068 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3069 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3070 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3072 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3073 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3074 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3075 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3080 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3081 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3082 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3083 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3084 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3085 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3086 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3087 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3091 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3092 let mut output_index = None;
3093 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3094 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3095 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
3096 if output_index.is_some() {
3097 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3098 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3101 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
3102 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3103 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3106 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3109 if output_index.is_none() {
3110 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3111 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3114 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3118 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3120 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3121 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3122 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3123 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3125 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3126 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3128 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3129 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3131 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3133 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3134 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3135 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3136 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3137 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3138 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3139 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3140 pub fn update_channel_config(
3141 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[[u8; 32]], config: &ChannelConfig,
3142 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3143 if config.cltv_expiry_delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA {
3144 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3145 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3149 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(
3150 &self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier,
3152 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3153 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3154 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3155 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3156 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3157 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3158 if !peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) {
3159 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3160 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", log_bytes!(*channel_id), counterparty_node_id),
3164 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3165 let channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id).unwrap();
3166 if !channel.update_config(config) {
3169 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3170 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3171 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3172 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3173 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3181 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3182 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3184 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3185 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3187 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3188 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3189 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3190 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3191 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3193 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3194 /// you from forwarding more than you received.
3196 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3199 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3200 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3201 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3202 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3203 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &[u8; 32], next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3206 let next_hop_scid = {
3207 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3208 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3209 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3210 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3211 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3212 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3214 if !chan.is_usable() {
3215 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3216 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id))
3219 chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.outbound_scid_alias())
3221 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3222 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*next_hop_channel_id), next_node_id)
3227 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3228 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3229 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3232 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3233 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3234 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3236 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3238 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3239 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3242 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3243 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3244 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3245 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3246 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3248 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3252 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3253 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3255 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3258 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3259 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3262 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3263 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3264 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3267 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3268 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3269 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3270 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3271 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3272 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3273 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3276 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3277 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3278 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3279 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3284 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3286 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3287 /// Will likely generate further events.
3288 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3289 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3291 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3292 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3293 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3295 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3296 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3298 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3299 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3300 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3302 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3303 match forward_info {
3304 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3305 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3306 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3307 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3308 outgoing_cltv_value, incoming_amt_msat: _
3311 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3312 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3313 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3315 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3316 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3317 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3318 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3319 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3320 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3323 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3324 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3326 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3329 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3330 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
3336 macro_rules! fail_forward {
3337 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3339 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
3343 macro_rules! failed_payment {
3344 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
3346 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
3350 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
3351 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
3352 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
3353 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3354 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
3356 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3357 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
3358 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
3359 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
3360 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
3362 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
3364 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3365 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
3369 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
3370 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret)) {
3371 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
3372 Err(ReceiveError { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
3378 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3381 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
3384 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3385 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3386 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3387 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3388 // problem, not ours.
3394 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
3395 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3397 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3401 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3402 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3403 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3404 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3407 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3408 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3409 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3410 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3411 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
3414 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3415 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3416 match forward_info {
3417 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3418 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id: _,
3419 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3420 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
3421 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, incoming_amt_msat: _,
3424 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3425 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3426 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3427 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3428 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3429 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3430 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
3431 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3433 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
3434 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
3435 onion_packet, &self.logger)
3437 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3438 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3440 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3442 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan.get());
3443 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3444 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
3445 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
3450 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3451 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3453 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3454 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3455 if let Err(e) = chan.get_mut().queue_fail_htlc(
3456 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
3458 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3459 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3461 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
3463 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3464 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3465 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3474 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3475 match forward_info {
3476 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3477 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3478 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3479 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat, ..
3482 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
3483 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret } => {
3484 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
3486 RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret), payment_metadata };
3487 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
3488 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
3490 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3491 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: None, payment_metadata };
3492 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
3493 None, None, onion_fields)
3496 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3499 let mut claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3500 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3501 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3502 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3503 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3504 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3505 phantom_shared_secret,
3507 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
3508 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
3509 // if routing nodes overpay
3510 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
3511 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
3513 total_value_received: None,
3514 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
3519 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
3521 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3522 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
3523 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
3524 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
3525 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3526 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
3528 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3529 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3530 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3531 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3532 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3533 phantom_shared_secret,
3535 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
3536 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
3538 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
3541 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
3542 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
3543 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
3544 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
3545 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
3548 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3549 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3550 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
3552 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3553 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3554 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3557 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3558 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3559 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3561 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
3562 .entry(payment_hash)
3563 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
3564 .or_insert_with(|| {
3565 committed_to_claimable = true;
3567 purpose: purpose(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
3570 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
3571 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
3572 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3575 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
3577 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
3578 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3579 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3580 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3581 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3584 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
3585 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
3586 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3587 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
3588 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
3589 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3590 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3591 if htlc.total_msat != $payment_data.total_msat {
3592 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3593 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), $payment_data.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3594 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3596 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3598 _ => unreachable!(),
3601 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
3602 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
3603 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
3604 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3605 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3606 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
3607 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3608 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3609 } else if total_value >= $payment_data.total_msat {
3610 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3611 committed_to_claimable = true;
3613 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3614 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3615 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
3616 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
3617 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3618 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3622 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3623 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3624 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
3625 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
3627 payment_claimable_generated = true;
3629 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3630 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3632 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3633 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
3634 committed_to_claimable = true;
3637 payment_claimable_generated
3641 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3642 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3643 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3644 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3645 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3646 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3647 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3648 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3649 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3650 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3651 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3652 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3653 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3654 Ok(result) => result,
3656 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3657 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3660 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
3661 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
3662 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
3663 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
3664 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
3665 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3668 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3670 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3671 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
3672 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
3673 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3675 match claimable_payments.claimable_payments.entry(payment_hash) {
3676 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3677 let amount_msat = claimable_htlc.value;
3678 claimable_htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat);
3679 let claim_deadline = Some(claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER);
3680 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
3681 e.insert(ClaimablePayment {
3682 purpose: purpose.clone(),
3683 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields.clone()),
3684 htlcs: vec![claimable_htlc],
3686 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
3687 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
3688 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
3692 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
3693 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3695 onion_fields: Some(onion_fields),
3698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3699 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3700 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3706 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3707 if payment_data.is_none() {
3708 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3709 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3711 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3712 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3713 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3714 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3715 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3716 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3717 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3718 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
3720 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3721 if payment_claimable_generated {
3722 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3728 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3729 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3737 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3738 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
3739 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3740 &self.pending_events, &self.logger,
3741 |path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv|
3742 self.send_payment_along_path(path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv));
3744 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3745 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3747 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
3749 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
3750 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
3751 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
3753 self.check_free_holding_cells();
3755 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3756 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3757 events.append(&mut new_events);
3760 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3762 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3763 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3765 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3766 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3767 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3768 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3769 if background_events.is_empty() {
3773 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3775 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3776 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3777 // monitor updating completing.
3778 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
3785 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3786 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3787 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3788 self.process_background_events();
3791 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
3792 if !chan.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
3793 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3794 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
3795 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3796 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3797 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3799 if !chan.is_live() {
3800 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3801 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3802 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3804 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3805 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
3807 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.logger);
3808 NotifyOption::DoPersist
3812 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3813 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3814 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3815 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3816 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3817 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3818 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3820 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3822 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3823 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3824 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3825 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3826 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
3827 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3828 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3836 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3838 /// This currently includes:
3839 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3840 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3841 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3843 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
3844 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
3845 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
3847 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
3848 /// estimate fetches.
3850 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3851 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
3852 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3853 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3854 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3855 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3857 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3859 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
3860 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
3861 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
3863 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3864 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3865 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3866 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3867 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
3868 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
3869 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3870 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3871 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3873 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3874 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id);
3875 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
3876 if needs_close { return false; }
3879 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3880 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
3881 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
3882 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.is_live()
3883 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3884 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.is_live()
3885 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3886 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.is_live() => {
3888 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3889 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3890 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3891 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3895 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3897 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
3900 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.is_live() => {
3902 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
3903 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3904 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3905 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3909 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3911 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
3917 chan.maybe_expire_prev_config();
3921 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
3922 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
3927 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
3928 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
3929 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
3930 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
3931 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
3932 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
3933 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
3934 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
3935 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
3936 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
3937 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
3938 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
3939 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
3940 // have no channels to the peer.
3941 let remove_entry = {
3942 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
3943 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
3946 entry.remove_entry();
3949 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
3954 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
3955 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
3956 // This should be unreachable
3957 debug_assert!(false);
3960 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3961 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
3962 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
3963 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
3964 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
3965 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
3966 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
3969 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
3970 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
3971 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
3973 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
3974 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
3981 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
3982 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
3983 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
3984 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
3985 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3988 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3989 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3992 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_resolved_payments(&self.pending_events);
3994 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
3995 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
3996 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
3997 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
3998 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4005 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4006 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4007 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4009 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4010 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4011 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4012 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4014 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4015 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4016 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4017 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4018 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4019 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4022 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4023 /// reason for the failure.
4025 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4026 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4027 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4029 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4030 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4031 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4032 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4033 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4034 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4035 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4040 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4041 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4042 match failure_code {
4043 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4044 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code as u16),
4045 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4046 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4047 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4048 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code as u16, htlc_msat_height_data)
4053 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4054 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4056 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4058 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4059 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4060 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4061 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4062 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4063 let scid_pref = if chan.should_announce() {
4064 chan.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4066 chan.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.get_short_channel_id())
4068 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4069 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4071 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4076 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4077 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4078 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4079 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4080 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4081 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4082 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4083 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4084 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4085 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4087 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4088 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4089 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4090 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4092 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4093 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4094 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4095 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4096 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4100 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4101 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4102 // be surfaced to the user.
4103 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4104 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32],
4105 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4107 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4108 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4109 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4110 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4111 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4112 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4113 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
4114 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan_entry.get())
4116 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4118 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4121 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4122 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4123 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4124 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4128 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4129 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4130 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4131 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4132 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4133 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4134 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4135 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4136 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4139 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4140 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4141 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4144 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4145 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4146 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4148 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4149 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4150 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4151 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4152 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4154 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint }) => {
4155 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), onion_error);
4156 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4158 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4159 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4160 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4161 push_forward_ev = true;
4163 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4164 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4165 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4167 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4168 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4171 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4172 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4173 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4174 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4175 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4176 failed_next_destination: destination,
4182 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4183 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4185 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4186 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4187 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4188 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4190 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
4191 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
4192 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
4193 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
4195 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
4196 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
4197 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
4198 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
4199 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4200 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4201 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
4202 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4204 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4207 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4208 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
4209 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4210 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
4211 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4212 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4213 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4214 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
4219 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
4220 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
4221 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id,
4223 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
4224 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
4225 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
4226 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
4231 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
4233 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
4234 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
4235 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
4236 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
4237 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
4238 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
4239 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
4240 let mut valid_mpp = true;
4241 let mut errs = Vec::new();
4242 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4243 for htlc in sources.iter() {
4244 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
4245 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4246 debug_assert!(false);
4250 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
4252 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
4253 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
4254 debug_assert!(false);
4258 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
4260 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = &htlc.onion_payload {
4261 // We don't currently support MPP for spontaneous payments, so just check
4262 // that there's one payment here and move on.
4263 if sources.len() != 1 {
4264 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP spontaneous payment - this should not be reachable!");
4265 debug_assert!(false);
4271 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
4273 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4274 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
4275 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4276 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
4279 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
4280 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4281 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
4282 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
4286 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4287 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
4288 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
4289 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
4291 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
4292 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
4293 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
4294 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
4295 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
4300 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
4301 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4302 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4303 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4304 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
4305 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
4306 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4308 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4311 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
4312 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
4313 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4314 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4318 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
4319 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
4320 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
4321 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
4324 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4325 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
4326 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
4327 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
4331 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
4332 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4333 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4336 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
4337 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
4338 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4339 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4340 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
4341 let fulfill_res = chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
4343 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
4344 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
4345 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
4346 log_bytes!(chan_id), action);
4347 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
4349 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4350 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update);
4351 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
4352 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4353 if let Err(e) = res {
4354 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
4355 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
4356 // update over and over again until morale improves.
4357 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
4358 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
4365 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4366 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4367 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4371 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4372 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
4373 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
4374 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
4375 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
4376 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
4377 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
4378 // again on restart.
4379 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4380 payment_preimage, update_res);
4382 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
4383 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
4384 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
4385 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
4386 // `PaymentForwarded`).
4387 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
4391 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
4392 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
4395 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
4397 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
4398 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage, session_priv, path, from_onchain, &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
4400 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4401 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4402 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
4403 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
4404 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4405 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4406 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4409 let prev_channel_id = Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id());
4410 let next_channel_id = Some(next_channel_id);
4412 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4414 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4417 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
4421 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
4422 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4423 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4429 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4430 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4431 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4434 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
4435 for action in actions.into_iter() {
4437 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
4438 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
4439 if let Some(ClaimingPayment { amount_msat, payment_purpose: purpose, receiver_node_id }) = payment {
4440 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
4441 payment_hash, purpose, amount_msat, receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4445 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEvent { event } => {
4446 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
4452 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
4453 /// update completion.
4454 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4455 channel: &mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
4456 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
4457 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
4458 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
4459 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
4460 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
4461 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()),
4462 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4463 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
4464 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
4465 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
4466 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
4468 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
4470 let counterparty_node_id = channel.get_counterparty_node_id();
4471 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4472 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.outbound_scid_alias()),
4473 channel.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
4476 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
4477 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
4479 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
4480 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4481 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4486 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
4487 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
4488 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4489 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4494 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
4495 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
4496 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4497 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4498 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4503 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
4507 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
4513 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
4514 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
4515 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4519 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4520 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
4521 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
4527 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
4528 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
4530 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
4531 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4533 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
4534 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
4535 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4536 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4537 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
4542 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4543 let mut peer_state_lock;
4544 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4545 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
4546 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4549 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()){
4550 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4551 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4554 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}",
4555 highest_applied_update_id, channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id());
4556 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4559 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, highest_applied_update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel.get_mut());
4562 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
4564 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
4565 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
4568 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4569 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4570 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4572 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
4573 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
4574 /// used to accept such channels.
4576 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4577 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4578 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4579 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
4582 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
4583 /// it as confirmed immediately.
4585 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
4586 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
4587 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
4589 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
4590 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
4592 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
4593 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
4595 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
4596 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
4598 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
4599 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
4600 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4601 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
4604 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4607 let peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| !peer.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4608 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4609 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4610 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4611 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4612 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4613 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.channel_by_id.len() == 1;
4614 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4615 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut channel) => {
4616 if !channel.get().inbound_is_awaiting_accept() {
4617 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "The channel isn't currently awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() });
4620 channel.get_mut().set_0conf();
4621 } else if channel.get().get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4622 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4623 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4624 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4625 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
4628 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4629 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4630 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
4632 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4633 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4634 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4635 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
4636 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4637 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4638 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
4639 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
4642 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
4643 let _ = remove_channel!(self, channel);
4644 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
4648 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4649 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4650 msg: channel.get_mut().accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4653 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4654 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", log_bytes!(*temporary_channel_id), counterparty_node_id) });
4660 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
4661 /// or 0-conf channels.
4663 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
4664 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
4665 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
4666 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> bool {
4667 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
4668 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4670 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4671 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
4672 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4673 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
4674 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
4675 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.channel_by_id.len() {
4676 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
4680 return peers_without_funded_channels;
4683 fn unfunded_channel_count(
4684 peer: &PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, best_block_height: u32
4686 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
4687 for (_, chan) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
4688 if !chan.is_outbound() && chan.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
4689 chan.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
4691 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
4694 num_unfunded_channels
4697 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4698 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4699 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4702 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4703 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4706 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
4707 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
4708 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
4709 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
4711 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
4712 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
4713 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
4714 let channeled_peers_without_funding = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| !node.channel_by_id.is_empty());
4716 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4717 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4719 debug_assert!(false);
4720 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
4722 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4723 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4725 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
4726 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
4727 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
4728 if peer_state.channel_by_id.is_empty() &&
4729 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
4730 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
4732 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4733 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
4734 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4737 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4738 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
4739 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4740 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
4741 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4744 let mut channel = match Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
4745 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
4746 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, outbound_scid_alias)
4749 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4750 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
4754 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4755 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4756 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
4757 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()))
4759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4760 if !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
4761 if channel.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
4762 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4764 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4765 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4766 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(user_channel_id),
4769 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4770 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
4771 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
4772 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4773 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
4774 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
4775 channel_type: channel.get_channel_type().clone(),
4779 entry.insert(channel);
4785 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4786 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4788 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4790 debug_assert!(false);
4791 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4793 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4794 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4795 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4796 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4797 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
4798 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4800 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4803 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4804 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4805 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4806 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4807 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4809 user_channel_id: user_id,
4814 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4815 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4817 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4818 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4820 debug_assert!(false);
4821 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
4824 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4825 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4826 let ((funding_msg, monitor), chan) =
4827 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4828 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4829 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan), chan.remove())
4831 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4834 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4835 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4836 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4838 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4839 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.channel_id()) {
4840 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4841 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
4842 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
4843 funding_msg.channel_id))
4845 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
4846 i_e.insert(chan.get_counterparty_node_id());
4850 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4851 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4852 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
4853 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4854 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
4855 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4856 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4860 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
4862 let chan = e.insert(chan);
4863 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
4864 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
4866 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4867 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4868 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4869 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4870 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
4871 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
4872 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4873 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
4881 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4882 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4883 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4884 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4886 debug_assert!(false);
4887 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4890 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4891 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4892 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4894 let monitor = try_chan_entry!(self,
4895 chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan);
4896 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
4897 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, 0, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4898 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4899 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4900 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4901 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4902 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4903 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4908 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4912 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4914 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4916 debug_assert!(false);
4917 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4919 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4920 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4921 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4923 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
4924 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan);
4925 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
4926 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4927 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4928 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4929 msg: announcement_sigs,
4931 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4932 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
4933 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
4934 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
4935 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
4936 // announcement_signatures.
4937 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4938 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
4939 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4940 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4947 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4948 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan.get_mut());
4953 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
4957 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4958 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4959 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4960 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4961 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4963 debug_assert!(false);
4964 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
4966 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4967 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4968 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4969 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4971 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4972 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4973 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4974 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4977 let funding_txo_opt = chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo();
4978 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self,
4979 chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_entry);
4980 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4982 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4983 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
4984 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
4985 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
4986 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4987 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4992 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4993 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
4994 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4995 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update);
4996 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_entry);
5000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5003 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5004 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5005 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5006 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5012 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5013 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5014 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5016 debug_assert!(false);
5017 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5019 let (tx, chan_option) = {
5020 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5021 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5022 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
5024 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_entry);
5025 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
5026 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5027 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5032 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
5033 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
5034 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
5035 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
5036 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
5037 (tx, Some(remove_channel!(self, chan_entry)))
5038 } else { (tx, None) }
5040 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5043 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
5044 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
5045 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
5047 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
5048 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5049 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5050 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5051 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5055 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5060 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5061 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
5062 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
5063 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
5065 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
5066 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
5067 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
5068 //but we should prevent it anyway.
5070 let pending_forward_info = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
5071 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5072 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5074 debug_assert!(false);
5075 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5077 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5078 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5079 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5080 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5082 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
5083 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
5084 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
5085 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
5086 match pending_forward_info {
5087 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
5088 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
5089 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
5090 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
5092 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
5093 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
5094 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5095 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
5096 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
5099 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
5101 _ => pending_forward_info
5104 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), chan);
5106 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5111 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5112 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
5113 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5114 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5116 debug_assert!(false);
5117 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5119 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5120 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5121 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5122 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5123 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan)
5125 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5128 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, msg.channel_id);
5132 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5133 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5134 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5136 debug_assert!(false);
5137 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5139 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5140 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5141 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5142 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5143 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan);
5145 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5150 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5151 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5152 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5154 debug_assert!(false);
5155 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5157 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5158 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5159 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5160 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5161 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
5162 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
5163 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan);
5165 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan);
5168 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5172 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5174 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5176 debug_assert!(false);
5177 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5179 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5180 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5181 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5182 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5183 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5184 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5185 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5186 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5187 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5188 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id, peer_state_lock,
5189 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5192 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5197 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
5198 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
5199 let mut push_forward_event = false;
5200 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
5201 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
5202 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5203 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5204 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
5205 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
5206 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
5207 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
5209 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
5210 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
5212 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5213 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5214 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
5215 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5216 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5217 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
5219 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5220 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
5221 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
5223 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
5224 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5225 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
5226 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5227 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
5228 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
5229 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
5230 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
5231 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
5234 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5235 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
5237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5238 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
5239 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5240 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5241 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5242 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5243 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
5244 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5247 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
5248 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
5249 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
5254 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
5255 // payments are being processed.
5256 if forward_htlcs_empty {
5257 push_forward_event = true;
5259 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5260 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
5267 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
5268 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5271 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
5272 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5273 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
5275 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
5279 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued.
5280 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
5281 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5282 let forward_ev_exists = pending_events.iter()
5283 .find(|(ev, _)| if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false })
5285 if !forward_ev_exists {
5286 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
5288 Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
5293 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5294 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
5295 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5296 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5298 debug_assert!(false);
5299 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5300 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
5301 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5302 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5303 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5304 let funding_txo = chan.get().get_funding_txo();
5305 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), chan);
5306 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5307 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update);
5308 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5309 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5310 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5312 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
5314 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5317 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
5321 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5322 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5323 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5325 debug_assert!(false);
5326 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5328 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5329 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5330 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5331 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5332 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan);
5334 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5339 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5340 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5341 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5343 debug_assert!(false);
5344 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5346 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5347 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5348 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5349 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5350 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
5351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
5354 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
5355 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(
5356 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
5357 msg, &self.default_configuration
5359 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
5360 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
5361 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap()),
5364 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5369 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
5370 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5371 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
5372 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
5374 // It's not a local channel
5375 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5378 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5379 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
5380 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5381 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5383 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5384 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5385 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5387 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
5388 if chan.get().should_announce() {
5389 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
5390 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
5391 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
5392 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5394 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
5396 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
5397 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
5398 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
5399 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
5401 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", log_bytes!(chan_id));
5402 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), chan);
5405 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
5407 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
5410 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5412 let need_lnd_workaround = {
5413 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5415 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5417 debug_assert!(false);
5418 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5420 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5421 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5422 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5423 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5424 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
5425 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
5426 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
5427 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
5428 let responses = try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(
5429 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
5430 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan);
5431 let mut channel_update = None;
5432 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
5433 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5434 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5437 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
5438 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
5439 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
5440 // they have the latest channel parameters.
5441 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()) {
5442 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5443 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
5448 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
5449 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
5450 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan.get_mut(), responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
5451 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
5452 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
5453 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
5457 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5461 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
5462 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
5465 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
5466 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
5471 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
5472 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
5473 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5475 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5476 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
5477 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
5478 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
5479 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
5480 match monitor_event {
5481 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
5482 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
5483 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
5484 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
5486 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
5487 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
5488 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5489 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5492 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
5493 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
5494 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
5495 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
5497 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5498 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5499 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5500 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
5503 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
5504 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5505 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5506 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5507 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5508 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5509 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5510 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5511 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
5512 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5513 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5517 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
5518 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
5520 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
5522 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
5523 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5524 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5525 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5526 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5533 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
5534 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
5540 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5541 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5544 has_pending_monitor_events
5547 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
5548 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
5549 /// update events as a separate process method here.
5551 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
5552 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5553 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5554 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5556 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5561 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
5562 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
5563 /// update was applied.
5564 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
5565 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
5566 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5567 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
5569 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
5570 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
5571 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
5572 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
5574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5575 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5577 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5578 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5579 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
5580 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
5581 let funding_txo = chan.get_funding_txo();
5582 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
5583 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger);
5584 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
5585 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
5587 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
5588 has_monitor_update = true;
5590 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(
5591 funding_txo.expect("channel is live"), monitor_update);
5592 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5593 let channel_id: [u8; 32] = *channel_id;
5594 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5595 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
5596 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
5598 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
5600 continue 'peer_loop;
5609 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
5610 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5611 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
5614 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5615 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5621 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
5622 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
5623 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
5624 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
5625 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
5626 let mut has_update = false;
5628 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5630 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5631 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5633 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5634 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
5635 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
5636 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
5637 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
5639 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
5640 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
5643 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
5644 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
5645 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
5646 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5647 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5652 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
5654 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
5655 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
5656 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
5662 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id);
5663 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
5671 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5672 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5678 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
5679 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
5681 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
5682 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5683 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
5684 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
5685 // reorganized out of the main chain.
5686 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
5687 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
5688 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
5689 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
5690 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
5691 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
5692 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
5693 assert!(should_broadcast);
5694 } else { unreachable!(); }
5695 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
5697 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5701 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5702 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
5704 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5705 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5708 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5711 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5712 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5713 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5714 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5715 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5716 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5717 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5718 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5719 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5720 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5721 // never fail a payment too early.
5722 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5724 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5727 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5732 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5735 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5736 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5738 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
5739 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
5740 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5741 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5743 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5745 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5746 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5750 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5751 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5753 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5755 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5756 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5758 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5759 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5760 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
5761 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
5762 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
5763 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5764 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
5765 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5766 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
5767 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5768 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
5771 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5772 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5774 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5777 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5779 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5781 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5782 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5783 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5784 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5785 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5788 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5789 /// stored external to LDK.
5791 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5792 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5793 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5795 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5796 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5799 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5800 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5801 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5802 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5804 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5805 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5806 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5807 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5808 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5810 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5811 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5812 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
5813 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5814 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
5816 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
5817 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
5819 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5820 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5824 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5825 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5827 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5829 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
5830 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
5832 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5833 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5834 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
5835 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5836 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
5837 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
5838 min_final_cltv_expiry)
5841 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5842 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5844 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5847 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5849 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5851 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5852 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5855 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5856 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5858 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5859 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5860 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5863 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
5864 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
5866 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5867 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5868 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5869 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5871 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5872 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5873 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
5874 Some(_) => continue,
5875 None => return scid_candidate
5880 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
5882 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
5883 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
5885 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
5886 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
5887 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
5891 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
5892 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
5893 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
5895 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
5896 /// times to get a unique scid.
5897 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
5898 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5899 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
5901 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
5902 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
5903 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
5904 return scid_candidate
5908 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
5909 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
5910 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
5911 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
5913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5914 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5915 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5916 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5917 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
5918 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
5919 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
5920 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
5929 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5930 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5931 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5932 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
5933 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5937 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
5938 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
5939 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5940 events.push_back((event, None));
5944 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
5945 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5946 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
5950 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5951 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
5955 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5956 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
5959 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5960 let mut errors = Vec::new();
5962 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5963 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5964 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5965 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
5966 if self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter()
5967 .any(|(_ev, action_opt)| action_opt == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5968 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
5971 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have another event
5972 // blocking any monitor updates for this channel. If we do, let those
5973 // events be the ones that ultimately release the monitor update(s).
5974 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another event is pending",
5975 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5978 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
5979 debug_assert_eq!(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
5980 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.get_mut().unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
5981 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
5982 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
5983 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update);
5984 let update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5985 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, update_id,
5986 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan)
5988 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
5990 if further_update_exists {
5991 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
5996 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
5997 log_bytes!(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()[..]));
6001 log_debug!(self.logger,
6002 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
6003 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6007 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
6008 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
6009 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6013 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
6014 for action in actions {
6016 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6017 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
6019 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint);
6025 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
6026 /// using the given event handler.
6028 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
6029 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
6033 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
6037 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6039 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6040 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6041 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6042 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6043 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6044 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6048 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
6049 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
6050 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
6051 /// is always placed next to each other.
6053 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
6054 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
6055 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
6056 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
6058 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
6059 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
6060 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
6061 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
6062 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6063 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6064 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
6066 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
6067 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
6068 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
6069 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6072 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6073 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6075 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
6076 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6079 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
6080 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6081 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6082 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6083 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6084 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
6085 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
6089 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
6090 events.replace(pending_events);
6099 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6101 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6102 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6103 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6104 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6105 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6106 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6110 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
6112 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
6113 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
6114 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
6116 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
6120 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6122 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6123 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6124 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6125 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6126 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6127 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6131 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6133 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6134 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
6135 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
6136 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
6137 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
6140 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
6141 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
6144 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6145 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6146 let new_height = height - 1;
6148 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
6149 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
6150 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
6151 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
6152 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
6153 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
6156 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6160 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6162 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6163 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6164 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6165 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6166 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6167 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6171 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
6172 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6173 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6174 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6176 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6177 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
6179 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6180 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
6181 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
6183 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6184 if height < last_best_block_height {
6185 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6186 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6190 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
6191 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6192 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6193 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6195 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
6196 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
6198 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6200 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
6202 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
6204 macro_rules! max_time {
6205 ($timestamp: expr) => {
6207 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
6208 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
6209 // having an explicit local time source.
6210 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
6211 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
6212 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6213 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
6214 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
6220 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
6221 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6222 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
6223 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
6227 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
6228 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
6229 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6230 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6231 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6232 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
6233 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.get_funding_txo(), chan.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
6234 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
6241 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
6242 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6243 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
6244 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
6245 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
6246 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
6247 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6248 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
6253 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6255 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6256 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6257 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6258 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6259 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6260 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6264 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
6265 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
6267 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
6268 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
6269 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6270 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
6271 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6273 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6274 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6276 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6277 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6278 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6279 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6280 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6281 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
6282 let res = f(channel);
6283 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
6284 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
6285 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
6286 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
6287 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.channel_id() }));
6289 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
6290 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
6291 if channel.is_usable() {
6292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6293 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
6294 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6295 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6300 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6305 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6306 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6309 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
6310 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6311 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6312 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6313 msg: announcement_sigs,
6315 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6316 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
6317 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6319 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6320 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6321 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
6326 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
6327 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6328 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
6329 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
6330 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
6331 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
6332 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
6333 // is always consistent.
6334 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
6335 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
6336 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()),
6337 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
6338 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
6341 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
6342 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, channel);
6343 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
6344 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
6345 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
6346 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
6347 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6351 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
6352 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
6353 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6354 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6355 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
6356 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6357 data: reason_message,
6367 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
6368 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
6369 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
6370 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
6371 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
6372 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
6373 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
6374 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6375 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6376 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
6378 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
6379 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
6380 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
6384 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
6387 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6388 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
6389 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
6390 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6391 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
6392 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
6393 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6394 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6395 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
6398 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
6399 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6400 _ => unreachable!(),
6402 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
6403 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
6404 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
6405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
6411 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
6413 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
6414 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
6418 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
6420 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
6421 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
6423 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
6424 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
6427 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6428 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
6429 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
6432 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
6433 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
6434 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
6435 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
6438 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6439 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6440 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6441 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6444 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6445 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6447 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6448 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6449 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6450 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6451 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
6454 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6455 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6456 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
6457 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
6460 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6461 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6462 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6463 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
6466 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6467 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6468 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
6469 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6473 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
6474 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
6476 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
6477 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6478 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6479 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6480 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
6481 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6485 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
6486 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6487 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6490 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
6491 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6492 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6493 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6496 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
6497 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6498 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6501 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
6502 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6503 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6504 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6507 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
6508 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6509 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6512 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
6513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6514 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6517 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
6518 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6519 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6522 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
6523 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6524 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6527 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
6528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6529 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6532 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
6533 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6534 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6537 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
6538 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6539 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6542 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
6543 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6544 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6547 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
6548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6549 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6552 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
6553 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6554 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6557 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
6558 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6559 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6562 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
6563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6564 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6567 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
6568 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6569 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6572 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
6573 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
6574 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
6577 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
6582 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
6583 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6584 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
6587 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
6588 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6589 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6590 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6592 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
6593 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6594 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6595 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6596 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6597 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6598 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6599 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
6600 if chan.is_shutdown() {
6601 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, chan);
6602 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
6607 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
6609 // V1 Channel Establishment
6610 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
6611 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
6612 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
6613 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
6614 // V2 Channel Establishment
6615 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6616 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
6617 // Common Channel Establishment
6618 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
6619 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
6620 // Interactive Transaction Construction
6621 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
6622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
6623 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
6624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
6625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
6626 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
6627 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
6628 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
6629 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
6630 // Channel Operations
6631 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
6632 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
6633 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
6634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
6635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
6636 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
6638 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
6639 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6640 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
6641 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
6642 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
6643 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
6644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
6645 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
6646 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
6649 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
6650 peer_state.is_connected = false;
6651 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
6652 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
6655 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
6657 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6659 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6660 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6664 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
6665 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
6666 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6672 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
6673 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
6674 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
6675 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
6676 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
6677 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
6680 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6681 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
6682 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6683 if inbound_peer_limited {
6686 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
6687 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
6688 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
6689 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6690 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
6694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
6695 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
6696 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
6698 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6699 if inbound_peer_limited &&
6700 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
6701 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
6706 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
6707 peer_state.is_connected = true;
6712 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
6714 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6715 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6716 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6717 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6718 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6719 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
6720 let retain = if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
6721 if !chan.have_received_message() {
6722 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
6723 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
6724 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
6728 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
6729 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6730 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
6735 if retain && chan.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6736 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.default_configuration) {
6737 if let Ok(update_msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
6738 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement {
6739 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6748 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
6752 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
6753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
6755 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
6756 let channel_ids: Vec<[u8; 32]> = {
6757 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6758 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6759 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6760 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6761 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6762 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
6764 for channel_id in channel_ids {
6765 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6766 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6770 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
6771 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6772 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
6773 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
6774 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6775 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6776 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
6777 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash) {
6778 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
6779 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6787 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
6788 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
6792 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
6793 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
6796 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
6797 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
6800 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
6801 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6802 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6803 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6806 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
6807 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6808 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6809 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6812 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
6813 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6814 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6815 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6818 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
6819 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6820 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6821 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6824 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
6825 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6826 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6827 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6830 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
6831 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6832 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6833 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6836 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
6837 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6838 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6839 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6842 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
6843 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6844 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6845 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6848 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
6849 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6850 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
6851 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
6855 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6856 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6857 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
6858 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6861 /// Fetches the set of [`InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6862 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6864 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
6865 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
6866 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
6867 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InvoiceFeatures {
6868 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6871 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6872 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6873 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
6874 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
6877 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6878 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6879 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6880 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
6883 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
6884 /// [`ChannelManager`].
6885 pub fn provided_init_features(_config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
6886 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
6887 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
6888 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
6889 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
6890 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
6891 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
6892 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
6893 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
6894 features.set_payment_secret_required();
6895 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
6896 features.set_wumbo_optional();
6897 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
6898 features.set_channel_type_optional();
6899 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
6900 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
6902 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6903 if _config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
6904 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
6910 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6911 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
6913 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
6914 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
6915 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
6916 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
6919 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
6920 (2, node_id, required),
6921 (4, features, required),
6922 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
6923 (8, forwarding_info, option),
6924 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6925 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6928 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
6929 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6930 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6931 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
6932 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
6933 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
6934 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6935 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
6936 (2, self.channel_id, required),
6937 (3, self.channel_type, option),
6938 (4, self.counterparty, required),
6939 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
6940 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
6941 (7, self.config, option),
6942 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
6943 (9, self.confirmations, option),
6944 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
6945 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6946 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6947 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
6948 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6949 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6950 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6951 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6952 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6953 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
6954 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
6955 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
6956 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
6957 (30, self.is_usable, required),
6958 (32, self.is_public, required),
6959 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6960 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6961 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6962 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
6968 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
6969 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6970 _init_and_read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6971 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
6972 (2, channel_id, required),
6973 (3, channel_type, option),
6974 (4, counterparty, required),
6975 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6976 (6, funding_txo, option),
6977 (7, config, option),
6978 (8, short_channel_id, option),
6979 (9, confirmations, option),
6980 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
6981 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
6982 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
6983 (16, balance_msat, required),
6984 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
6985 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
6986 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
6987 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
6988 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
6989 (22, confirmations_required, option),
6990 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
6991 (26, is_outbound, required),
6992 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
6993 (30, is_usable, required),
6994 (32, is_public, required),
6995 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
6996 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
6997 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
6998 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
7001 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7002 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
7003 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
7004 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
7005 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
7009 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
7011 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
7012 outbound_scid_alias,
7016 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
7017 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
7019 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
7020 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7021 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
7022 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
7023 confirmations_required,
7025 force_close_spend_delay,
7026 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
7027 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
7028 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
7029 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
7030 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
7031 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
7032 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7037 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
7038 (2, channels, vec_type),
7039 (4, phantom_scid, required),
7040 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
7043 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
7045 (0, onion_packet, required),
7046 (2, short_channel_id, required),
7049 (0, payment_data, required),
7050 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7051 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7052 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7054 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
7055 (0, payment_preimage, required),
7056 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
7057 (3, payment_metadata, option),
7061 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
7062 (0, routing, required),
7063 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
7064 (4, payment_hash, required),
7065 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
7066 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
7067 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
7071 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7072 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7074 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
7076 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7077 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7078 reason.write(writer)?;
7080 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7081 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
7084 channel_id.write(writer)?;
7085 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7086 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
7087 failure_code.write(writer)?;
7094 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
7095 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7096 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7099 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7100 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7101 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7102 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
7106 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7107 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7108 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7109 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
7110 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
7113 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
7114 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
7115 // messages contained in the variants.
7116 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
7117 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
7118 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
7120 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7121 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7122 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7123 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7124 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
7127 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
7128 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
7129 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
7130 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
7131 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
7133 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7138 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
7143 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
7144 (0, short_channel_id, required),
7145 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
7146 (2, outpoint, required),
7147 (4, htlc_id, required),
7148 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
7151 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
7152 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7153 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
7154 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
7155 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
7157 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7158 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
7159 (1, self.total_msat, required),
7160 (2, self.value, required),
7161 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
7162 (4, payment_data, option),
7163 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
7164 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
7165 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
7171 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
7172 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7173 let mut prev_hop = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7175 let mut sender_intended_value = None;
7176 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
7177 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
7178 let mut total_value_received = None;
7179 let mut total_msat = None;
7180 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7181 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7182 (0, prev_hop, required),
7183 (1, total_msat, option),
7184 (2, value, required),
7185 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
7186 (4, payment_data, option),
7187 (5, total_value_received, option),
7188 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
7189 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
7191 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
7193 if payment_data.is_some() {
7194 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7196 if total_msat.is_none() {
7197 total_msat = Some(value);
7199 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
7202 if total_msat.is_none() {
7203 if payment_data.is_none() {
7204 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7206 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
7208 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
7212 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
7215 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
7216 total_value_received,
7217 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
7224 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
7225 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7226 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7229 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
7230 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
7231 let mut path_hops: Option<Vec<RouteHop>> = Some(Vec::new());
7232 let mut payment_id = None;
7233 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
7234 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
7235 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7236 (0, session_priv, required),
7237 (1, payment_id, option),
7238 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7239 (4, path_hops, vec_type),
7240 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
7241 (6, blinded_tail, option),
7243 if payment_id.is_none() {
7244 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
7246 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
7248 let path = Path { hops: path_hops.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?, blinded_tail };
7249 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
7250 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7252 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
7253 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
7254 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
7255 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7259 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7260 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
7261 first_hop_htlc_msat,
7263 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
7266 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7267 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
7272 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
7273 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
7275 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
7277 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
7278 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7279 (0, session_priv, required),
7280 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
7281 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
7282 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
7283 (4, path.hops, vec_type),
7284 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
7285 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
7288 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
7290 field.write(writer)?;
7297 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
7298 (0, forward_info, required),
7299 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
7300 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
7301 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
7302 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
7305 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
7307 (0, htlc_id, required),
7308 (2, err_packet, required),
7313 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
7314 (0, payment_secret, required),
7315 (2, expiry_time, required),
7316 (4, user_payment_id, required),
7317 (6, payment_preimage, required),
7318 (8, min_value_msat, required),
7321 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7323 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7324 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7325 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7326 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7327 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7328 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7332 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7333 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
7335 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7337 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
7339 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7340 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
7341 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
7344 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
7346 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7347 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
7348 let mut number_of_channels = 0;
7349 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7350 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7351 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7352 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7353 serializable_peer_count += 1;
7355 number_of_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.len();
7356 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7357 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7358 unfunded_channels += 1;
7363 ((number_of_channels - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
7365 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7366 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7367 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7368 for (_, channel) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter() {
7369 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7370 channel.write(writer)?;
7377 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7378 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7379 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
7380 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7381 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7382 for forward in pending_forwards {
7383 forward.write(writer)?;
7388 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7390 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7391 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
7392 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7394 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
7395 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
7396 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7397 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
7398 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7399 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7400 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
7401 htlc.write(writer)?;
7403 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
7404 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
7407 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
7408 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
7409 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7410 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
7411 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
7412 // per_peer_state lock at all.
7413 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
7416 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
7417 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
7418 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
7419 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
7420 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
7422 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
7423 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
7424 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
7425 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
7426 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
7427 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7428 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
7433 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7434 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
7435 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
7436 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
7437 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
7438 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
7439 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
7440 // well save the space and not write any events here.
7441 0u64.write(writer)?;
7443 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7444 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
7445 event.write(writer)?;
7449 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
7450 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7451 for event in background_events.iter() {
7453 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
7455 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
7456 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
7461 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
7462 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
7463 // likely to be identical.
7464 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7465 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
7467 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7468 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
7469 hash.write(writer)?;
7470 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
7473 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
7474 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
7475 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7476 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
7477 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
7480 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
7481 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7483 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7484 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7485 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
7486 session_priv.write(writer)?;
7489 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
7490 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
7494 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
7495 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
7496 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
7498 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
7499 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
7500 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
7506 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
7507 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7508 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
7509 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
7512 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
7513 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
7514 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
7515 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
7516 pending_claiming_payments = None;
7519 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7520 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
7521 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7522 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
7523 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7524 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
7525 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7526 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
7527 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
7528 (9, htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7529 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
7530 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7537 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7538 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7539 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
7540 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
7543 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
7544 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
7545 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
7546 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
7547 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
7548 // check that the event is sane here.
7549 let event_encoded = event.encode();
7550 let event_read: Option<Event> =
7551 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
7552 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
7558 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
7559 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7560 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7561 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
7562 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
7563 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
7566 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
7567 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
7568 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
7569 events.push_back((ev, action));
7570 } else if action.is_some() {
7571 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7578 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
7580 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
7582 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7583 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
7584 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
7585 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
7586 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
7587 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
7588 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
7589 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
7590 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
7591 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
7592 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
7593 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
7594 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
7596 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
7597 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
7599 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
7600 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
7602 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
7603 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
7604 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
7605 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
7606 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
7607 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
7609 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
7610 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7612 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7613 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7614 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7615 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7616 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7617 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7621 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
7622 pub entropy_source: ES,
7624 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
7625 pub node_signer: NS,
7627 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
7628 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
7630 pub signer_provider: SP,
7632 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7634 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
7635 pub fee_estimator: F,
7636 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
7638 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
7639 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
7640 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
7641 pub chain_monitor: M,
7643 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
7644 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
7645 /// force-closed during deserialization.
7646 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
7647 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
7648 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
7650 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
7652 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
7653 /// deserialization.
7655 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
7656 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
7657 pub default_config: UserConfig,
7659 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
7660 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
7662 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
7663 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
7664 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
7665 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
7667 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
7670 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
7671 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
7674 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7675 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7677 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7678 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7679 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7680 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7681 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7682 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7686 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
7687 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
7688 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
7689 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
7690 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
7692 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
7693 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
7698 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
7699 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
7700 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7701 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
7703 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7704 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7705 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7706 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7707 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7708 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7712 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7713 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
7714 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
7718 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7719 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
7721 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7722 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7723 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7724 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7725 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7726 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7730 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7731 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7733 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7734 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7735 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7737 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7739 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7740 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7741 let mut peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7742 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7743 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
7744 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
7745 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
7746 for _ in 0..channel_count {
7747 let mut channel: Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (
7748 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
7750 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7751 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
7752 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
7753 if channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7754 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
7755 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
7756 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7757 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id());
7758 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7759 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7760 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7761 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7762 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7763 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
7764 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
7765 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
7766 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
7767 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
7768 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
7769 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
7770 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
7771 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
7772 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
7773 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
7774 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate(monitor_update));
7776 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
7777 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7778 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7779 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7780 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
7782 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7783 let mut found_htlc = false;
7784 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
7785 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
7788 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
7789 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
7790 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
7791 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
7792 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
7793 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
7794 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
7795 log_info!(args.logger,
7796 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
7797 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
7798 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7802 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7803 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
7804 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.channel_id()));
7806 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
7807 id_to_peer.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel.get_counterparty_node_id());
7809 match peer_channels.entry(channel.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
7810 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7811 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
7812 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7814 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7815 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
7816 by_id_map.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
7817 entry.insert(by_id_map);
7821 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
7822 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
7823 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
7824 // safely discard the channel.
7825 let _ = channel.force_shutdown(false);
7826 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
7827 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
7828 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
7829 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
7832 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
7833 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
7834 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
7835 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
7836 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
7837 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7841 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
7842 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
7843 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
7844 log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
7845 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7846 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
7847 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
7849 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7853 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
7854 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7855 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7856 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
7857 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7858 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7859 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
7860 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
7861 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
7863 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
7866 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7867 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
7868 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
7869 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
7870 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7871 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
7872 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
7873 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
7875 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
7878 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7879 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>)>()));
7880 for _ in 0..peer_count {
7881 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7882 let peer_state = PeerState {
7883 channel_by_id: peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new()),
7884 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
7885 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7886 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7887 is_connected: false,
7889 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
7892 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7893 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
7894 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
7895 for _ in 0..event_count {
7896 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
7897 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
7902 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7903 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
7904 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7906 let (funding_txo, monitor_update): (OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate) = (Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?);
7907 if pending_background_events.iter().find(|e| {
7908 let BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((pending_funding_txo, pending_monitor_update)) = e;
7909 *pending_funding_txo == funding_txo && *pending_monitor_update == monitor_update
7911 pending_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)));
7914 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7918 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
7919 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7921 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7922 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
7923 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
7924 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
7925 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7929 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7930 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
7931 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
7932 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
7933 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
7934 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
7935 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
7937 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
7938 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
7942 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
7943 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
7944 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
7945 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
7946 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
7947 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7948 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7949 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
7950 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
7951 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
7952 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = Some(Vec::new());
7953 let mut events_override = None;
7954 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7955 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
7956 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
7957 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
7958 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
7959 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
7960 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
7961 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
7962 (8, events_override, option),
7963 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, vec_type),
7964 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
7965 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
7967 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
7968 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7971 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
7972 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7975 if let Some(events) = events_override {
7976 pending_events_read = events;
7979 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
7980 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
7983 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
7984 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
7985 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
7986 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
7987 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
7988 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
7990 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
7992 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
7993 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
7994 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
7998 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
7999 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
8000 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
8001 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
8002 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
8003 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
8004 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
8006 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8007 if id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
8008 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
8009 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
8010 if path.hops.is_empty() {
8011 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
8012 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8015 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
8016 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
8017 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
8018 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
8019 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8020 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
8021 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
8022 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
8024 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8025 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
8026 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
8027 retry_strategy: None,
8028 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
8029 payment_params: None,
8030 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
8031 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
8032 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8033 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8034 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
8035 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
8036 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
8037 total_msat: path_amt,
8038 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
8040 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
8041 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
8046 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8048 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
8049 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
8050 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
8051 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
8053 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
8054 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
8055 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
8056 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
8057 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
8058 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
8059 forwards.retain(|forward| {
8060 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
8061 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8062 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8063 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8068 !forwards.is_empty()
8070 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
8071 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
8072 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
8073 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()));
8074 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
8075 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
8076 intercepted_id != ev_id
8083 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
8084 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
8085 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
8086 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
8087 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
8088 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
8089 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
8090 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
8091 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
8092 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
8093 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
8094 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv, path, false, &pending_events, &args.logger);
8095 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
8104 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
8105 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
8106 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
8107 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
8108 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
8109 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
8110 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
8111 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
8115 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
8116 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
8118 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
8119 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
8120 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8121 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8123 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
8124 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
8125 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8127 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
8128 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
8130 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8131 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
8133 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8136 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
8137 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8138 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8140 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8144 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
8145 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
8146 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
8147 if htlcs.is_empty() {
8148 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8150 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
8151 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
8152 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
8153 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
8154 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
8155 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
8156 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
8157 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
8159 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8160 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8164 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
8166 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
8168 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
8169 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
8171 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
8172 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
8177 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8178 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8180 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
8182 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8184 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
8185 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
8186 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
8187 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8191 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
8192 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
8193 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8194 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8195 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8196 if chan.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
8197 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
8199 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
8200 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
8201 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
8203 chan.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
8204 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias()) {
8205 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8206 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8207 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8208 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8210 if chan.is_usable() {
8211 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
8212 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
8213 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
8214 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.outbound_scid_alias());
8215 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8221 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
8223 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8224 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
8225 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
8226 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
8227 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
8228 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
8229 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
8230 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
8231 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
8232 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
8233 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
8235 for claimable_htlc in payment.htlcs {
8236 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
8238 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
8239 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
8240 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
8241 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
8243 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
8244 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
8245 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
8246 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
8248 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
8249 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
8250 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
8251 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
8253 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
8254 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
8255 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
8256 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8257 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8258 if let Some(channel) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
8259 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
8262 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
8263 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
8266 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
8269 purpose: payment.purpose,
8270 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
8276 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
8277 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get_mut(&node_id) {
8278 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
8280 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
8281 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8285 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
8287 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
8288 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
8289 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
8290 router: args.router,
8292 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
8294 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
8295 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
8296 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
8297 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
8299 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
8300 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
8301 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
8302 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
8303 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
8304 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
8306 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
8311 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
8313 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
8315 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
8316 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
8317 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
8318 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
8319 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
8321 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
8322 node_signer: args.node_signer,
8323 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
8325 logger: args.logger,
8326 default_configuration: args.default_config,
8329 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8330 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
8331 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
8332 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8333 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8336 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
8337 //connection or two.
8339 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
8345 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8346 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8347 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
8348 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
8349 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
8350 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
8351 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
8352 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
8353 use crate::ln::msgs;
8354 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
8355 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
8356 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8357 use crate::util::test_utils;
8358 use crate::util::config::ChannelConfig;
8359 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
8362 fn test_notify_limits() {
8363 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
8364 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
8365 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
8366 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
8367 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
8368 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8370 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
8371 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
8372 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8373 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8374 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8376 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8378 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
8379 // to connect messages with new values
8380 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8381 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
8382 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8383 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8384 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
8385 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
8387 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
8388 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8389 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8390 // ... but the last node should not.
8391 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8392 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
8393 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8394 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8396 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
8397 // about the channel.
8398 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8399 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8400 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8402 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
8404 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8405 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8406 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
8407 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
8408 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8409 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8411 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
8412 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8413 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8415 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
8416 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
8417 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
8418 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
8419 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
8420 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
8422 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
8423 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
8424 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8425 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8426 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8427 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8428 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8429 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8431 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
8432 // the channel info has updated.
8433 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
8434 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
8435 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8436 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
8437 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
8438 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
8442 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
8443 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
8445 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8446 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8447 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8448 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8449 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8451 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
8452 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
8453 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
8454 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
8456 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
8457 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
8458 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
8459 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
8460 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
8461 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
8462 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
8463 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
8464 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8465 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8466 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8467 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
8469 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
8470 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8471 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8472 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8473 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8474 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8475 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8476 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8477 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8478 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8479 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8480 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8481 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
8482 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8483 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8484 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8485 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8486 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8487 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8488 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8489 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8490 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8491 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
8493 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
8494 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
8495 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
8496 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8497 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8498 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8499 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
8501 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
8502 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
8503 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
8504 // lightning messages manually.
8505 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
8506 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
8507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
8509 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8510 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8511 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
8512 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8513 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8514 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
8515 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8516 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8517 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
8518 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8519 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8520 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
8521 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8522 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8523 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8524 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
8525 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8526 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8527 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
8528 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8529 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
8530 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8531 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8532 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
8533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8535 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
8536 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
8537 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
8538 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
8540 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
8541 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
8542 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
8543 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
8545 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8548 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8549 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8550 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8551 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8553 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8556 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
8557 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
8558 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
8559 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
8561 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
8566 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
8567 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
8568 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
8569 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
8570 // fails as expected.
8571 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8572 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8573 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8574 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8575 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8576 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8577 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8579 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
8580 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
8581 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
8583 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
8584 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8585 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV),
8586 final_value_msat: 100_000,
8588 let route = find_route(
8589 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8590 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8592 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8593 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8594 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8595 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8596 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8597 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8598 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8599 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8600 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8601 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8602 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
8603 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
8604 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8605 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8606 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8607 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8608 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8609 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8610 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8611 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8612 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8613 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8614 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8615 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8617 // Finally, claim the original payment.
8618 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8620 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
8621 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8622 let route = find_route(
8623 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
8624 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8626 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
8627 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
8628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8629 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8631 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
8632 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
8633 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
8635 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
8636 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8637 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8638 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
8639 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8640 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
8641 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
8642 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
8643 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
8644 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
8645 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
8646 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
8647 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
8648 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
8649 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8650 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8651 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
8652 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8653 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
8654 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8655 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8656 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
8657 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
8658 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
8660 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
8661 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
8665 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
8666 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
8667 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
8668 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8669 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8670 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8671 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8673 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8674 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8676 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8677 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8678 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8679 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8681 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8682 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8683 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8684 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8685 let route = find_route(
8686 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8687 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8690 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8691 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
8692 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
8693 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8694 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
8695 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8696 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8698 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8699 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8700 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8701 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8702 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8703 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8704 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8706 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
8710 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
8711 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
8712 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8713 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8714 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8715 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8717 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
8718 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8720 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
8721 let route_params = RouteParameters {
8722 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40),
8723 final_value_msat: 10_000,
8725 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
8726 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
8727 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
8728 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
8729 let route = find_route(
8730 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
8731 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &random_seed_bytes
8734 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
8735 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
8736 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
8737 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
8738 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
8739 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
8740 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
8741 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
8742 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8744 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8745 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
8746 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
8747 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
8748 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
8749 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
8750 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
8752 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
8756 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
8757 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
8758 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
8759 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
8760 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8762 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8763 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8764 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8765 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
8767 // Marshall an MPP route.
8768 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
8769 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
8770 route.paths.push(path);
8771 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
8772 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
8773 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
8774 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
8775 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
8776 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
8778 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
8779 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
8781 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
8782 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
8784 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
8789 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
8790 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8791 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8792 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8793 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8795 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
8797 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8798 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8800 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8801 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
8802 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8803 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
8806 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
8807 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
8808 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8809 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
8810 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
8811 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
8814 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
8817 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
8818 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
8823 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
8824 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
8825 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8826 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8827 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8828 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8830 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
8831 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
8833 total_msat: 100_000,
8836 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
8837 // payment verification fails as expected.
8838 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
8839 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
8840 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
8841 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
8843 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
8847 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
8848 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
8852 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
8853 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
8854 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
8855 // the channel is successfully closed.
8856 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8857 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
8858 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
8859 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
8861 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
8862 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8863 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
8864 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8865 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
8867 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
8868 let channel_id = &tx.txid().into_inner();
8870 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
8871 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
8872 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8873 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8876 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
8878 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8879 // as it has the funding transaction.
8880 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8881 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8882 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8885 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8887 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8889 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
8891 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8892 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8893 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8895 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8898 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
8899 // as it has the funding transaction.
8900 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8901 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8902 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8904 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
8905 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8906 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
8907 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
8908 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8909 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
8910 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
8911 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
8913 nodes[0].node.close_channel(channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
8914 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
8915 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8916 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
8918 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8919 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
8921 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
8922 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
8923 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
8924 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
8925 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8926 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
8927 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8931 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
8932 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
8933 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
8934 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
8935 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8936 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8937 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8940 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
8942 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
8943 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
8944 // closing transaction).
8945 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
8946 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
8947 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8949 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
8950 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
8951 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8952 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
8953 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(channel_id));
8956 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
8958 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
8960 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
8961 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
8962 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
8964 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
8966 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8967 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
8970 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8971 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
8972 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8975 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
8976 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
8977 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
8980 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
8982 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
8983 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8985 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
8986 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
8988 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
8989 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
8994 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
8995 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
8996 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
8997 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
8998 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
8999 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
9000 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
9001 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
9004 let channel_id = [4; 32];
9005 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9006 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
9008 // Test the API functions.
9009 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
9011 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
9013 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9015 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9017 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
9019 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
9021 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
9025 fn test_connection_limiting() {
9026 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
9027 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9028 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9029 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9030 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9032 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9034 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9035 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9037 let mut funding_tx = None;
9038 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9039 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9040 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9043 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
9044 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
9045 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
9046 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
9047 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9049 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
9050 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9051 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9053 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9055 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
9056 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9057 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9059 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9062 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
9063 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9064 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9065 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9066 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9068 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
9069 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
9071 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
9072 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
9073 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9074 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9075 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
9076 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9077 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9079 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9080 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9081 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9082 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9084 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
9085 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
9086 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9087 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9088 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
9089 for ev in chan_closed_events {
9090 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
9092 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9093 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9094 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9095 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap_err();
9097 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
9098 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9099 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9100 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9102 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
9103 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
9105 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
9106 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9107 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
9108 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
9109 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9111 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9112 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9113 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9115 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
9116 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9117 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
9119 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
9120 // "protected" and can connect again.
9121 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
9122 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
9123 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9124 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9126 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
9128 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9129 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9133 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
9134 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
9135 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9136 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9137 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9138 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9140 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9142 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9143 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9145 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
9146 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9147 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9148 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9151 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
9153 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9154 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9155 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9157 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
9158 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9159 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9161 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
9162 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9163 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
9164 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9168 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
9169 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
9170 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
9171 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9172 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9173 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
9174 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9175 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
9176 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9178 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
9180 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9181 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9183 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
9184 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
9185 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9186 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9187 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9188 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9190 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9191 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9193 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9194 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9196 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9198 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
9199 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = nodes[0].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9202 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
9203 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
9204 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
9205 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
9206 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9207 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9208 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9210 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9211 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
9212 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
9213 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
9217 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9219 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
9220 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
9222 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
9223 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
9224 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9226 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9227 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
9229 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9231 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
9236 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
9237 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
9238 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
9239 // the channel without the anchors feature.
9240 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9241 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9242 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
9243 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9244 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
9245 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
9246 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9248 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
9249 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9250 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9252 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
9253 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9255 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
9256 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
9258 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9261 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9262 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
9264 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9265 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9267 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
9271 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "_bench_unstable"))]
9273 use crate::chain::Listen;
9274 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
9275 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
9276 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
9277 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
9278 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9279 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
9280 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
9281 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
9282 use crate::util::test_utils;
9283 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9285 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9286 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9287 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
9289 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
9293 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
9294 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
9295 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
9296 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
9297 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
9298 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
9299 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
9301 struct ANodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
9302 node: &'a Manager<'a, P>,
9304 impl<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'a, P> {
9305 type CM = Manager<'a, P>;
9307 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'a, P> { self.node }
9309 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
9314 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
9315 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
9318 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
9319 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
9320 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
9322 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
9324 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
9325 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
9326 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9327 let scorer = Mutex::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
9328 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
9330 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
9331 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
9333 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
9334 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
9335 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
9336 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9338 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9340 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
9342 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
9343 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
9344 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
9345 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
9346 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
9348 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
9350 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
9352 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_b.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, true).unwrap();
9353 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: node_a.init_features(), remote_network_address: None }, false).unwrap();
9354 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
9355 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9356 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9359 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
9360 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9361 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
9363 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
9364 } else { panic!(); }
9366 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9367 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9368 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9370 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9371 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9373 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9376 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9377 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9378 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9380 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9381 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9383 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9386 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
9389 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
9392 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
9393 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
9395 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9396 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9397 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
9398 match msg_events[0] {
9399 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
9400 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
9401 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9405 match msg_events[1] {
9406 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
9410 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9411 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
9413 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9414 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
9416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9419 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9420 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
9422 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
9423 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
9425 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9428 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
9429 macro_rules! send_payment {
9430 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
9431 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
9432 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
9433 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
9434 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
9436 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
9437 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
9439 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
9440 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), RouteParameters {
9441 payment_params, final_value_msat: 10_000,
9442 }, Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
9443 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
9444 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9445 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
9446 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
9447 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9448 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9449 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
9451 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
9452 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
9453 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9454 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
9456 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
9457 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
9458 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
9459 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9460 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
9462 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
9465 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
9466 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
9467 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
9468 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
9470 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
9475 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
9476 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);