1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RoutePath, RouteParameters};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, MAX_VALUE_MSAT, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Level, Logger};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
72 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
73 use std::time::Instant;
76 use alloc::string::ToString;
77 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
78 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
79 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
80 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
81 use chain::keysinterface::{KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, Sign};
82 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
83 use ln::channelmanager::APIError;
85 use ln::msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
86 use util::chacha20::ChaCha20;
87 use util::logger::Logger;
89 use core::convert::TryInto;
92 const IV_LEN: usize = 16;
93 const METADATA_LEN: usize = 16;
94 const METADATA_KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
95 const AMT_MSAT_LEN: usize = 8;
96 // Used to shift the payment type bits to take up the top 3 bits of the metadata bytes, or to
97 // retrieve said payment type bits.
98 const METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET: usize = 5;
100 /// A set of keys that were HKDF-expanded from an initial call to
101 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
103 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
104 pub(super) struct ExpandedKey {
105 /// The key used to encrypt the bytes containing the payment metadata (i.e. the amount and
106 /// expiry, included for payment verification on decryption).
107 metadata_key: [u8; 32],
108 /// The key used to authenticate an LDK-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
109 /// registered with LDK.
110 ldk_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
111 /// The key used to authenticate a user-provided payment hash and metadata as previously
112 /// registered with LDK.
113 user_pmt_hash_key: [u8; 32],
117 pub(super) fn new(key_material: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
118 hkdf_extract_expand(b"LDK Inbound Payment Key Expansion", &key_material)
128 fn from_bits(bits: u8) -> Result<Method, u8> {
130 bits if bits == Method::LdkPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash),
131 bits if bits == Method::UserPaymentHash as u8 => Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash),
132 unknown => Err(unknown),
137 pub(super) fn create<Signer: Sign, K: Deref>(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, keys_manager: &K, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()>
138 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
140 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::LdkPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
142 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
143 let rand_bytes = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
144 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&rand_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
146 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
147 hmac.input(&iv_bytes);
148 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
149 let payment_preimage_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
151 let ldk_pmt_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_bytes).into_inner());
152 let payment_secret = construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key);
153 Ok((ldk_pmt_hash, payment_secret))
156 pub(super) fn create_from_hash(keys: &ExpandedKey, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
157 let metadata_bytes = construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat, Method::UserPaymentHash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, highest_seen_timestamp)?;
159 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
160 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes);
161 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
162 let hmac_bytes = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
164 let mut iv_bytes = [0 as u8; IV_LEN];
165 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&hmac_bytes[..IV_LEN]);
167 Ok(construct_payment_secret(&iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, &keys.metadata_key))
170 fn construct_metadata_bytes(min_value_msat: Option<u64>, payment_type: Method, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, highest_seen_timestamp: u64) -> Result<[u8; METADATA_LEN], ()> {
171 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
175 let mut min_amt_msat_bytes: [u8; AMT_MSAT_LEN] = match min_value_msat {
176 Some(amt) => amt.to_be_bytes(),
177 None => [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN],
179 min_amt_msat_bytes[0] |= (payment_type as u8) << METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET;
181 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time - it's updated when
182 // we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in a header. It should never be more
183 // than two hours in the future. Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we
184 // absolutely never fail a payment too early.
185 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date timestamps.
186 let expiry_bytes = (highest_seen_timestamp + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200).to_be_bytes();
188 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
189 metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN].copy_from_slice(&min_amt_msat_bytes);
190 metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&expiry_bytes);
195 fn construct_payment_secret(iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], metadata_key: &[u8; METADATA_KEY_LEN]) -> PaymentSecret {
196 let mut payment_secret_bytes: [u8; 32] = [0; 32];
197 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_slice) = payment_secret_bytes.split_at_mut(IV_LEN);
198 iv_slice.copy_from_slice(iv_bytes);
200 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(metadata_key, iv_bytes);
201 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
202 encrypted_metadata_slice[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ metadata_bytes[i];
204 PaymentSecret(payment_secret_bytes)
207 /// Check that an inbound payment's `payment_data` field is sane.
209 /// LDK does not store any data for pending inbound payments. Instead, we construct our payment
210 /// secret (and, if supplied by LDK, our payment preimage) to include encrypted metadata about the
213 /// The metadata is constructed as:
214 /// payment method (3 bits) || payment amount (8 bytes - 3 bits) || expiry (8 bytes)
215 /// and encrypted using a key derived from [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`].
217 /// Then on payment receipt, we verify in this method that the payment preimage and payment secret
218 /// match what was constructed.
220 /// [`create_inbound_payment`] and [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] are called by the user to
221 /// construct the payment secret and/or payment hash that this method is verifying. If the former
222 /// method is called, then the payment method bits mentioned above are represented internally as
223 /// [`Method::LdkPaymentHash`]. If the latter, [`Method::UserPaymentHash`].
225 /// For the former method, the payment preimage is constructed as an HMAC of payment metadata and
226 /// random bytes. Because the payment secret is also encoded with these random bytes and metadata
227 /// (with the metadata encrypted with a block cipher), we're able to authenticate the preimage on
230 /// For the latter, the payment secret instead contains an HMAC of the user-provided payment hash
231 /// and payment metadata (encrypted with a block cipher), allowing us to authenticate the payment
232 /// hash and metadata on payment receipt.
234 /// See [`ExpandedKey`] docs for more info on the individual keys used.
236 /// [`KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material`]: crate::chain::keysinterface::KeysInterface::get_inbound_payment_key_material
237 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment
238 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
239 pub(super) fn verify<L: Deref>(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_data: &msgs::FinalOnionHopData, highest_seen_timestamp: u64, keys: &ExpandedKey, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<PaymentPreimage>, ()>
240 where L::Target: Logger
242 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_data.payment_secret, keys);
244 let payment_type_res = Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET);
245 let mut amt_msat_bytes = [0; AMT_MSAT_LEN];
246 amt_msat_bytes.copy_from_slice(&metadata_bytes[..AMT_MSAT_LEN]);
247 // Zero out the bits reserved to indicate the payment type.
248 amt_msat_bytes[0] &= 0b00011111;
249 let min_amt_msat: u64 = u64::from_be_bytes(amt_msat_bytes.into());
250 let expiry = u64::from_be_bytes(metadata_bytes[AMT_MSAT_LEN..].try_into().unwrap());
252 // Make sure to check to check the HMAC before doing the other checks below, to mitigate timing
254 let mut payment_preimage = None;
255 match payment_type_res {
256 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => {
257 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.user_pmt_hash_key);
258 hmac.input(&metadata_bytes[..]);
259 hmac.input(&payment_hash.0);
260 if !fixed_time_eq(&iv_bytes, &Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner().split_at_mut(IV_LEN).0) {
261 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash {}: unexpected payment_secret", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
265 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
266 match derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys) {
267 Ok(preimage) => payment_preimage = Some(preimage),
268 Err(bad_preimage_bytes) => {
269 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to mismatching preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes));
274 Err(unknown_bits) => {
275 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment hash {} due to unknown payment type {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), unknown_bits);
280 if payment_data.total_msat < min_amt_msat {
281 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} due to total_msat {} being less than the minimum amount of {} msat", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, min_amt_msat);
285 if expiry < highest_seen_timestamp {
286 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {}: expired payment", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
293 pub(super) fn get_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
294 let (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes) = decrypt_metadata(payment_secret, keys);
296 match Method::from_bits((metadata_bytes[0] & 0b1110_0000) >> METHOD_TYPE_OFFSET) {
297 Ok(Method::LdkPaymentHash) => {
298 derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash, &iv_bytes, &metadata_bytes, keys)
299 .map_err(|bad_preimage_bytes| APIError::APIMisuseError {
300 err: format!("Payment hash {} did not match decoded preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(bad_preimage_bytes))
303 Ok(Method::UserPaymentHash) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
304 err: "Expected payment type to be LdkPaymentHash, instead got UserPaymentHash".to_string()
306 Err(other) => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Unknown payment type: {}", other) }),
310 fn decrypt_metadata(payment_secret: PaymentSecret, keys: &ExpandedKey) -> ([u8; IV_LEN], [u8; METADATA_LEN]) {
311 let mut iv_bytes = [0; IV_LEN];
312 let (iv_slice, encrypted_metadata_bytes) = payment_secret.0.split_at(IV_LEN);
313 iv_bytes.copy_from_slice(iv_slice);
315 let chacha_block = ChaCha20::get_single_block(&keys.metadata_key, &iv_bytes);
316 let mut metadata_bytes: [u8; METADATA_LEN] = [0; METADATA_LEN];
317 for i in 0..METADATA_LEN {
318 metadata_bytes[i] = chacha_block[i] ^ encrypted_metadata_bytes[i];
321 (iv_bytes, metadata_bytes)
324 // Errors if the payment preimage doesn't match `payment_hash`. Returns the bad preimage bytes in
326 fn derive_ldk_payment_preimage(payment_hash: PaymentHash, iv_bytes: &[u8; IV_LEN], metadata_bytes: &[u8; METADATA_LEN], keys: &ExpandedKey) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, [u8; 32]> {
327 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&keys.ldk_pmt_hash_key);
328 hmac.input(iv_bytes);
329 hmac.input(metadata_bytes);
330 let decoded_payment_preimage = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
331 if !fixed_time_eq(&payment_hash.0, &Sha256::hash(&decoded_payment_preimage).into_inner()) {
332 return Err(decoded_payment_preimage);
334 return Ok(PaymentPreimage(decoded_payment_preimage))
337 fn hkdf_extract_expand(salt: &[u8], ikm: &KeyMaterial) -> ExpandedKey {
338 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(salt);
340 let prk = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
341 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
343 let metadata_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
345 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
346 hmac.input(&metadata_key);
348 let ldk_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
350 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&prk[..]);
351 hmac.input(&ldk_pmt_hash_key);
353 let user_pmt_hash_key = Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner();
363 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
365 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
366 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
367 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
369 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
370 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
371 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
372 // before we forward it.
374 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
375 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
376 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
377 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
378 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
380 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
381 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
383 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
384 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
387 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
388 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
391 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
392 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
396 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
397 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
398 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
399 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
400 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
401 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
402 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
405 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
406 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
407 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
408 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
411 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
412 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
413 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
414 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
415 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
418 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
420 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
422 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
423 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
424 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
426 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
428 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
432 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
436 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
437 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
438 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
439 short_channel_id: u64,
441 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
443 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
444 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
449 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
450 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
451 /// are part of the same payment.
453 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
454 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.104 and earlier.
455 _legacy_hop_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
457 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
458 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
461 struct ClaimableHTLC {
462 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
465 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
469 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
470 /// (C-not exported) as we just use [u8; 32] directly
471 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
472 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; 32]);
474 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
475 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
480 impl Readable for PaymentId {
481 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
482 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
486 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
487 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
488 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
489 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
490 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
493 session_priv: SecretKey,
494 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
495 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
496 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
497 payment_id: PaymentId,
498 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
499 payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters>,
502 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
503 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
504 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
506 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
508 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
510 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, payment_secret, first_hop_htlc_msat, payment_params } => {
513 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
514 payment_id.hash(hasher);
515 payment_secret.hash(hasher);
516 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
517 payment_params.hash(hasher);
524 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
525 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
527 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
528 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
529 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
530 payment_secret: None,
531 payment_params: None,
536 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
537 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
539 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
547 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
548 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
550 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
555 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
557 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
558 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
559 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
560 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
561 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
563 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
564 err: msgs::LightningError,
565 chan_id: Option<([u8; 32], u64)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
566 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
568 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
570 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
572 err: LightningError {
574 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
575 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
582 shutdown_finish: None,
586 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
588 err: LightningError {
590 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
593 shutdown_finish: None,
597 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
598 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
601 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], user_channel_id: u64, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
603 err: LightningError {
605 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
606 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
612 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
613 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
617 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
620 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
622 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
623 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
627 log_level: Level::Warn,
630 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
632 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
634 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
636 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
637 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
643 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
645 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
646 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
654 shutdown_finish: None,
659 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
660 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
661 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
662 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
663 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
665 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
666 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
667 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
668 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
669 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
670 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
671 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
673 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
677 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
678 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
679 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
680 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
681 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
682 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
683 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
684 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
685 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
686 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
687 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
688 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
690 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
691 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
692 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
693 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
696 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
697 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
698 /// quite some time lag.
699 enum BackgroundEvent {
700 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
701 /// commitment transaction.
702 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
705 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
706 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
708 latest_features: InitFeatures,
711 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
712 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
714 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
717 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
718 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
719 struct PendingInboundPayment {
720 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
721 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
722 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
723 /// this payment being removed.
725 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
726 user_payment_id: u64,
727 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
728 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
729 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
732 /// Stores the session_priv for each part of a payment that is still pending. For versions 0.0.102
733 /// and later, also stores information for retrying the payment.
734 pub(crate) enum PendingOutboundPayment {
736 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
739 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
740 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
741 payment_secret: Option<PaymentSecret>,
742 pending_amt_msat: u64,
743 /// Used to track the fee paid. Only present if the payment was serialized on 0.0.103+.
744 pending_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
745 /// The total payment amount across all paths, used to verify that a retry is not overpaying.
747 /// Our best known block height at the time this payment was initiated.
748 starting_block_height: u32,
750 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
751 /// been resolved. This ensures we don't look up pending payments in ChannelMonitors on restart
752 /// and add a pending payment that was already fulfilled.
754 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
755 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
757 /// When a payer gives up trying to retry a payment, they inform us, letting us generate a
758 /// `PaymentFailed` event when all HTLCs have irrevocably failed. This avoids a number of race
759 /// conditions in MPP-aware payment retriers (1), where the possibility of multiple
760 /// `PaymentPathFailed` events with `all_paths_failed` can be pending at once, confusing a
761 /// downstream event handler as to when a payment has actually failed.
763 /// (1) https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1164
765 session_privs: HashSet<[u8; 32]>,
766 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
770 impl PendingOutboundPayment {
771 fn is_retryable(&self) -> bool {
773 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { .. } => true,
777 fn is_fulfilled(&self) -> bool {
779 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => true,
783 fn abandoned(&self) -> bool {
785 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => true,
789 fn get_pending_fee_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
791 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { pending_fee_msat, .. } => pending_fee_msat.clone(),
796 fn payment_hash(&self) -> Option<PaymentHash> {
798 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None,
799 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
800 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => *payment_hash,
801 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => Some(*payment_hash),
805 fn mark_fulfilled(&mut self) {
806 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
807 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
808 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
809 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
810 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
811 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. }
814 let payment_hash = self.payment_hash();
815 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, payment_hash };
818 fn mark_abandoned(&mut self) -> Result<(), ()> {
819 let mut session_privs = HashSet::new();
820 let our_payment_hash;
821 core::mem::swap(&mut session_privs, match self {
822 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } |
823 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } =>
825 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } |
826 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash, .. } => {
827 our_payment_hash = *payment_hash;
831 *self = PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, payment_hash: our_payment_hash };
835 /// panics if path is None and !self.is_fulfilled
836 fn remove(&mut self, session_priv: &[u8; 32], path: Option<&Vec<RouteHop>>) -> bool {
837 let remove_res = match self {
838 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
839 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
840 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
841 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
842 session_privs.remove(session_priv)
846 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
847 let path = path.expect("Fulfilling a payment should always come with a path");
848 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
849 *pending_amt_msat -= path_last_hop.fee_msat;
850 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
851 *fee_msat -= path.get_path_fees();
858 fn insert(&mut self, session_priv: [u8; 32], path: &Vec<RouteHop>) -> bool {
859 let insert_res = match self {
860 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
861 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
862 session_privs.insert(session_priv)
864 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => false,
865 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => false,
868 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { ref mut pending_amt_msat, ref mut pending_fee_msat, .. } = self {
869 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
870 *pending_amt_msat += path_last_hop.fee_msat;
871 if let Some(fee_msat) = pending_fee_msat.as_mut() {
872 *fee_msat += path.get_path_fees();
879 fn remaining_parts(&self) -> usize {
881 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
882 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } |
883 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { session_privs, .. } |
884 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { session_privs, .. } => {
891 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
892 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
893 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
894 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
895 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
896 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
897 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
898 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
900 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
901 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
902 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
903 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
904 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
905 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
906 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
907 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
908 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
910 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
911 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
913 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
914 /// to individual Channels.
916 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
917 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
918 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
919 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
921 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
922 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
923 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
924 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
925 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
926 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
927 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
929 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
930 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
931 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
932 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
935 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
936 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
937 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
938 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
939 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
941 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
942 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
943 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
944 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
945 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
946 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
947 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
948 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
949 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
950 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
953 default_configuration: UserConfig,
954 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
960 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
962 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
963 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
965 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
966 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
967 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
968 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
970 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
971 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
972 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
973 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
974 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
975 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
977 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
978 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
979 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
980 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
981 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
982 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
983 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
984 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
986 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
988 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
989 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment>>,
991 our_network_key: SecretKey,
992 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
994 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
996 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
997 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
998 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
1000 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1001 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1002 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1003 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1005 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
1006 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1007 /// are currently open with that peer.
1008 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1009 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
1012 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
1013 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
1015 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
1016 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1017 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1018 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1019 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1020 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1021 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1022 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1023 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1025 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
1032 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1034 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1035 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1036 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1037 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1038 pub struct ChainParameters {
1039 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1040 pub network: Network,
1042 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1044 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1045 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1048 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1054 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1055 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1056 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1057 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1058 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1059 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1061 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1062 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1063 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1064 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1065 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
1067 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1068 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1071 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1072 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1073 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1076 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1077 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1079 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1080 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1081 should_persist: persist_check,
1082 _read_guard: read_guard,
1087 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1088 fn drop(&mut self) {
1089 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1090 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1095 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1096 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1098 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1100 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1101 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1102 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1103 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1104 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1106 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1107 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1109 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1111 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1112 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1113 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1114 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1115 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1116 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1117 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
1119 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1120 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
1122 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1123 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1124 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1125 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
1127 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1128 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1129 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1130 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1131 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1132 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1135 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1137 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1138 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1141 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1143 /// The number of blocks before we consider an outbound payment for expiry if it doesn't have any
1144 /// pending HTLCs in flight.
1145 pub(crate) const PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS: u32 = 3;
1147 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1148 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1149 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1150 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1151 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1152 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1153 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1154 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1155 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1156 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1157 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1160 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1161 /// to better separate parameters.
1162 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1163 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1164 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1165 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1166 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1167 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1168 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1169 pub features: InitFeatures,
1170 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1171 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1172 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1174 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1176 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1177 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1178 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1179 /// payments to us through this channel.
1180 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1183 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
1184 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1185 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1186 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1187 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1188 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1189 /// lifetime of the channel.
1190 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
1191 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1192 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1193 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1194 /// our counterparty already.
1196 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1197 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1198 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1199 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1200 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1201 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1202 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1203 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1204 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1205 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1206 /// this value on chain.
1208 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1210 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1212 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1213 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1214 /// The `user_channel_id` passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
1215 pub user_channel_id: u64,
1216 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1217 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1218 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1220 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1221 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1222 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1223 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1225 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1226 pub balance_msat: u64,
1227 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1228 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1229 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1230 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1232 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1234 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1235 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1236 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1237 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1238 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1239 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1240 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1241 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1242 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1244 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1245 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1246 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1247 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1248 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1249 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1250 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1251 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1252 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1254 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1256 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1257 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1258 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1259 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1260 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1261 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1262 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1263 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1264 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1266 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1267 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1268 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1269 pub is_outbound: bool,
1270 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
1271 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
1272 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1273 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1274 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1276 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1277 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
1278 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
1279 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1281 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
1282 pub is_usable: bool,
1283 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1284 pub is_public: bool,
1287 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
1288 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
1289 /// states for more.
1290 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
1291 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
1292 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
1293 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
1294 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
1295 ParameterError(APIError),
1296 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
1297 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
1298 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
1299 /// payment in full.
1301 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1303 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
1304 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
1305 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
1306 /// paths than the ones selected).
1307 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
1308 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
1309 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
1310 /// in over-/re-payment.
1312 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
1313 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
1314 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
1316 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
1317 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
1318 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
1319 /// with the latest update_id.
1321 /// The errors themselves, in the same order as the route hops.
1322 results: Vec<Result<(), APIError>>,
1323 /// If some paths failed without irrevocably committing to the new HTLC(s), this will
1324 /// contain a [`RouteParameters`] object which can be used to calculate a new route that
1325 /// will pay all remaining unpaid balance.
1326 failed_paths_retry: Option<RouteParameters>,
1327 /// The payment id for the payment, which is now at least partially pending.
1328 payment_id: PaymentId,
1332 macro_rules! handle_error {
1333 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
1336 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
1337 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1339 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1340 // entering the macro.
1341 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
1342 assert!($self.pending_events.try_lock().is_ok());
1345 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1347 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1348 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1349 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1350 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1354 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1355 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1356 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1357 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() }
1362 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1363 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1365 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1366 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1367 action: err.action.clone()
1371 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1372 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1375 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1382 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1383 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
1384 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1386 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1387 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1389 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1390 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1392 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1393 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1394 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1395 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1397 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
1398 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1399 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1401 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
1402 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
1403 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1404 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1406 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
1407 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.get_user_id(),
1408 shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
1414 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
1415 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1419 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1421 $entry.remove_entry();
1429 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
1430 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1434 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1436 $entry.remove_entry();
1444 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1445 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1447 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1448 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
1449 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1456 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
1457 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1458 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
1460 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
1462 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
1463 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
1464 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1465 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1467 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
1468 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
1469 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
1470 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
1471 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
1472 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
1473 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
1474 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
1475 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
1476 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id, $chan.get_user_id(),
1477 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
1480 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
1481 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards, {} fails, and {} fulfill finalizations",
1482 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
1483 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
1484 match $action_type {
1485 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
1486 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
1488 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
1489 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
1491 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
1492 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len(),
1493 (&$failed_finalized_fulfills as &Vec<HTLCSource>).len());
1494 if !$resend_commitment {
1495 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
1498 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
1500 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills);
1501 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
1505 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $failed_finalized_fulfills: expr) => { {
1506 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $failed_finalized_fulfills, $entry.key());
1508 $entry.remove_entry();
1512 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1513 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, Vec::new())
1517 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
1518 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1519 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
1521 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
1522 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1526 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1527 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1528 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1529 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1530 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1533 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1538 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1539 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1540 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1541 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1542 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1543 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1545 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1546 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1548 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1549 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1550 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1551 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1554 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1555 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1556 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1557 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1558 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1559 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1560 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1561 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1562 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1563 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1564 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1565 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1568 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1569 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1570 // before it should be allowed to.
1571 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1572 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1573 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1576 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1577 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1578 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1579 msg: announcement_sigs,
1582 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1585 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1586 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1587 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1588 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1589 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1590 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1591 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1592 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1593 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1594 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1595 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1596 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1597 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1598 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1599 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1600 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1601 let mut order = $order;
1603 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1605 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1609 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1610 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1611 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1612 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1617 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1618 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1619 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1620 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1621 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1626 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1630 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1635 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1636 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1637 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1642 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1643 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1644 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1645 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1646 assert!(res.is_ok());
1649 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1653 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1654 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1655 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1657 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1659 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1660 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1665 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1666 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1667 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1668 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1669 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1672 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1674 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1675 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1677 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1679 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1681 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1682 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1683 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1684 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1685 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1686 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1687 let inbound_pmt_key_material = keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
1688 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
1690 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1691 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1692 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1696 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1698 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1699 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1700 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1701 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1702 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1703 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1705 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1706 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1708 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1709 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1712 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
1714 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1715 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1717 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1719 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1720 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1721 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1722 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1730 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1731 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1732 &self.default_configuration
1735 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1737 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
1738 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
1739 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to 0
1740 /// for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for `user_channel_id` here.
1741 /// `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and otherwise
1744 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
1745 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
1747 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1748 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1749 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
1751 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
1752 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
1753 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
1754 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
1755 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
1756 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
1758 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
1759 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
1760 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
1761 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<[u8; 32], APIError> {
1762 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1763 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1768 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1769 Some(peer_state) => {
1770 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1771 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1772 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1773 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features,
1774 channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height())?
1776 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1779 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1781 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1782 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1783 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1785 let temporary_channel_id = channel.channel_id();
1786 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1787 match channel_state.by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
1788 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1789 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1790 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1792 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1795 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1797 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1798 node_id: their_network_key,
1801 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
1804 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1805 let mut res = Vec::new();
1807 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1808 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1809 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1810 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1811 let balance_msat = channel.get_balance_msat();
1812 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1813 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1814 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1815 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1816 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1817 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1818 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1819 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1820 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1822 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1823 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1824 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1825 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1827 inbound_capacity_msat,
1828 outbound_capacity_msat,
1829 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1830 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1831 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1832 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1833 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1834 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1835 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1839 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1840 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1841 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1842 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1848 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1849 /// more information.
1850 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1851 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1854 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1855 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1857 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1858 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1860 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1861 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1862 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1863 // really wanted anyway.
1864 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1867 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
1868 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, channel: &Channel<Signer>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
1869 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
1870 match channel.unbroadcasted_funding() {
1871 Some(transaction) => {
1872 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::DiscardFunding { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), transaction })
1876 pending_events_lock.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1877 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
1878 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1879 reason: closure_reason
1883 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1884 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1886 let counterparty_node_id;
1887 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1888 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1889 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1890 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1891 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1892 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1893 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1894 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1895 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1896 Some(peer_state) => {
1897 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1898 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1899 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1901 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1903 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1905 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1906 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1907 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1908 let (result, is_permanent) =
1909 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1911 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1917 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1918 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1922 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1923 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1924 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1925 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1929 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
1933 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1937 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1938 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1941 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1945 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1946 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1947 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1949 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1950 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1952 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1953 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1954 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1955 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1957 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1959 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1960 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1961 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1962 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1963 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1966 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1967 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1968 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1970 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1971 /// the channel being closed or not:
1972 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1973 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1974 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1975 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1976 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1977 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1978 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1980 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1982 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1983 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1984 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1985 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1986 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1990 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1991 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1992 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1993 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1994 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1996 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1997 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1998 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1999 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2000 // ignore the result here.
2001 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
2005 /// `peer_node_id` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2006 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2007 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>, peer_msg: Option<&String>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2009 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2010 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2011 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2012 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
2013 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
2014 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2017 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
2018 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2020 if peer_node_id.is_some() {
2021 if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2022 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: peer_msg.to_string() });
2025 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan.get(),ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2027 chan.remove_entry().1
2029 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
2032 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
2033 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
2034 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2035 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2036 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2041 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
2044 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
2045 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
2046 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2047 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2048 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None, None) {
2049 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2050 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
2051 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2052 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2053 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2054 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2064 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2065 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2066 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
2067 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2068 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
2072 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
2073 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2074 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2076 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2077 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2078 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2079 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2080 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2081 failure_code: $err_code,
2082 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2087 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2088 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2091 let shared_secret = {
2092 let mut arr = [0; 32];
2093 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
2096 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
2098 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2099 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2100 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2101 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2102 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2103 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2104 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2105 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2108 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
2109 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
2110 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
2111 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
2112 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
2115 let mut channel_state = None;
2116 macro_rules! return_err {
2117 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2119 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2120 if channel_state.is_none() {
2121 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2123 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2124 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2125 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2126 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
2127 })), channel_state.unwrap());
2132 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
2133 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
2134 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
2135 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
2137 let error_code = match err {
2138 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
2139 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
2140 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
2141 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
2142 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
2144 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
2147 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
2148 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
2149 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2156 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
2159 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
2160 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
2161 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
2162 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
2163 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
2164 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
2165 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
2166 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
2167 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2168 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2169 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
2170 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
2174 // final_expiry_too_soon
2175 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2176 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2177 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2178 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2179 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2180 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2181 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
2183 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
2184 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
2185 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2187 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2188 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
2189 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2192 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
2193 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
2194 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
2195 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
2196 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
2197 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2198 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2199 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2201 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2203 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2204 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2205 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2206 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2207 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2208 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2209 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2210 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
2211 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
2214 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2216 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2219 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
2224 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
2225 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
2226 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
2227 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
2229 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2231 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2232 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2233 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2234 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2237 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
2238 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
2239 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2241 // Check two things:
2242 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
2243 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
2244 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
2246 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
2248 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
2249 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
2250 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
2252 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
2254 let blinding_factor = {
2255 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
2256 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
2257 sha.input(&shared_secret);
2258 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
2261 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
2263 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
2265 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2268 hop_data: new_packet_data,
2269 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
2272 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
2273 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2274 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
2275 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
2276 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
2280 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
2281 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2282 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2285 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
2286 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2287 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
2288 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
2292 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2293 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
2294 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
2295 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
2296 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
2297 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
2298 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
2299 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
2300 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
2301 None => { // unknown_next_peer
2302 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2304 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2307 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
2309 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
2310 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
2311 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
2312 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
2313 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
2316 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
2317 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
2318 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
2319 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
2320 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
2321 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
2322 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2324 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
2325 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2327 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
2328 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
2329 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
2330 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
2331 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2333 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
2334 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2336 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2337 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
2338 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
2339 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2340 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
2341 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2343 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
2344 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
2346 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
2347 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
2348 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
2349 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
2350 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
2351 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
2352 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
2353 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
2354 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
2355 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
2361 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
2362 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
2363 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
2364 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
2366 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
2367 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
2369 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
2370 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
2371 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
2373 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
2375 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
2380 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
2383 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
2384 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
2385 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
2387 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2388 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2389 if !chan.should_announce() {
2390 return Err(LightningError {
2391 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
2392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
2395 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2396 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
2399 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
2400 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
2401 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
2402 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
2403 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
2404 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
2405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2406 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
2407 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
2411 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
2413 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
2414 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
2416 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
2417 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
2418 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
2419 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
2420 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
2421 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
2422 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
2423 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2426 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
2427 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
2429 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
2435 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
2436 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_params: &Option<PaymentParameters>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
2438 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2439 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
2440 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
2442 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
2443 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
2444 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
2445 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
2446 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
2448 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
2450 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2452 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
2453 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2455 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2456 let payment_entry = pending_outbounds.entry(payment_id);
2457 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(payment) = &payment_entry {
2458 if !payment.get().is_retryable() {
2459 return Err(APIError::RouteError {
2460 err: "Payment already completed"
2465 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
2466 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
2467 Some(id) => id.clone(),
2470 macro_rules! insert_outbound_payment {
2472 let payment = payment_entry.or_insert_with(|| PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2473 session_privs: HashSet::new(),
2474 pending_amt_msat: 0,
2475 pending_fee_msat: Some(0),
2476 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2477 payment_secret: *payment_secret,
2478 starting_block_height: self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
2479 total_msat: total_value,
2481 assert!(payment.insert(session_priv_bytes, path));
2485 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
2486 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
2488 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
2489 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
2491 if !chan.get().is_live() {
2492 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
2494 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(
2495 htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
2497 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
2498 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
2500 payment_secret: payment_secret.clone(),
2501 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2502 }, onion_packet, &self.logger),
2503 channel_state, chan)
2505 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
2506 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2507 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
2508 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
2509 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
2510 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
2511 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
2512 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
2513 insert_outbound_payment!(); // Only do this after possibly break'ing on Perm failure above.
2514 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
2516 insert_outbound_payment!();
2518 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2519 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2520 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
2521 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2522 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
2523 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2524 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2525 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2531 None => { insert_outbound_payment!(); },
2533 } else { unreachable!(); }
2537 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
2538 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
2540 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
2545 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
2547 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
2548 /// fields for more info.
2550 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
2551 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
2552 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
2553 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
2554 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
2555 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
2557 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
2559 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
2560 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
2561 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
2563 /// In general, a path may raise:
2564 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
2565 /// node public key) is specified.
2566 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
2567 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
2569 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
2570 /// relevant updates.
2572 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
2573 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
2574 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
2576 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
2577 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
2578 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
2579 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
2581 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
2582 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
2583 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
2584 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2585 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None, None, None)
2588 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: Option<PaymentId>, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>) -> Result<PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure> {
2589 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
2590 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
2592 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
2593 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
2594 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
2595 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
2596 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
2598 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
2599 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2601 let mut total_value = 0;
2602 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2603 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2604 let payment_id = if let Some(id) = payment_id { id } else { PaymentId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()) };
2605 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2606 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2607 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2608 continue 'path_check;
2610 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2611 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2612 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2613 continue 'path_check;
2616 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2617 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2619 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2620 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2622 if let Some(amt_msat) = recv_value_msat {
2623 debug_assert!(amt_msat >= total_value);
2624 total_value = amt_msat;
2627 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2628 let mut results = Vec::new();
2629 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2630 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &route.payment_params, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, &keysend_preimage));
2632 let mut has_ok = false;
2633 let mut has_err = false;
2634 let mut pending_amt_unsent = 0;
2635 let mut max_unsent_cltv_delta = 0;
2636 for (res, path) in results.iter().zip(route.paths.iter()) {
2637 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2638 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2639 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2640 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2644 } else if res.is_err() {
2645 pending_amt_unsent += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2646 max_unsent_cltv_delta = cmp::max(max_unsent_cltv_delta, path.last().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta);
2649 if has_err && has_ok {
2650 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure {
2653 failed_paths_retry: if pending_amt_unsent != 0 {
2654 if let Some(payment_params) = &route.payment_params {
2655 Some(RouteParameters {
2656 payment_params: payment_params.clone(),
2657 final_value_msat: pending_amt_unsent,
2658 final_cltv_expiry_delta: max_unsent_cltv_delta,
2664 // If we failed to send any paths, we shouldn't have inserted the new PaymentId into
2665 // our `pending_outbound_payments` map at all.
2666 debug_assert!(self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().get(&payment_id).is_none());
2667 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2673 /// Retries a payment along the given [`Route`].
2675 /// Errors returned are a superset of those returned from [`send_payment`], so see
2676 /// [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on errors. This method will also error if the
2677 /// retry amount puts the payment more than 10% over the payment's total amount, if the payment
2678 /// for the given `payment_id` cannot be found (likely due to timeout or success), or if
2679 /// further retries have been disabled with [`abandon_payment`].
2681 /// [`send_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::send_payment`]
2682 /// [`abandon_payment`]: [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`]
2683 pub fn retry_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
2684 const RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE: u64 = 10;
2685 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2686 if path.len() == 0 {
2687 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2688 err: "length-0 path in route".to_string()
2693 let (total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret) = {
2694 let outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2695 if let Some(payment) = outbounds.get(&payment_id) {
2697 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
2698 total_msat, payment_hash, payment_secret, pending_amt_msat, ..
2700 let retry_amt_msat: u64 = route.paths.iter().map(|path| path.last().unwrap().fee_msat).sum();
2701 if retry_amt_msat + *pending_amt_msat > *total_msat * (100 + RETRY_OVERFLOW_PERCENTAGE) / 100 {
2702 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2703 err: format!("retry_amt_msat of {} will put pending_amt_msat (currently: {}) more than 10% over total_payment_amt_msat of {}", retry_amt_msat, pending_amt_msat, total_msat).to_string()
2706 (*total_msat, *payment_hash, *payment_secret)
2708 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => {
2709 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2710 err: "Unable to retry payments that were initially sent on LDK versions prior to 0.0.102".to_string()
2713 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {
2714 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2715 err: "Payment already completed".to_owned()
2718 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {
2719 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2720 err: "Payment already abandoned (with some HTLCs still pending)".to_owned()
2725 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2726 err: format!("Payment with ID {} not found", log_bytes!(payment_id.0)),
2730 return self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &payment_secret, None, Some(payment_id), Some(total_msat)).map(|_| ())
2733 /// Signals that no further retries for the given payment will occur.
2735 /// After this method returns, any future calls to [`retry_payment`] for the given `payment_id`
2736 /// will fail with [`PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError`]. If no such event has been generated,
2737 /// an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event will be generated as soon as there are no remaining
2738 /// pending HTLCs for this payment.
2740 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
2741 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
2742 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
2744 /// [`retry_payment`]: Self::retry_payment
2745 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
2746 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2747 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
2748 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2750 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2751 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
2752 if let Ok(()) = payment.get_mut().mark_abandoned() {
2753 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
2754 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2756 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
2764 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2765 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2766 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2767 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2768 /// never reach the recipient.
2770 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2772 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2773 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2775 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2777 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2778 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
2779 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2781 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2783 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2784 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage), None, None) {
2785 Ok(payment_id) => Ok((payment_hash, payment_id)),
2790 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2791 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2792 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2793 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2795 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2797 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2799 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2800 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2801 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.get_user_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2802 } else { unreachable!(); })
2805 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2807 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2808 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2811 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2812 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2817 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2818 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2819 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2822 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2823 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2824 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2826 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2834 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2835 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2836 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2840 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2842 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2843 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2845 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
2846 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
2848 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2849 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2850 /// keys per-channel).
2852 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2853 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2854 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2856 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2857 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2858 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2860 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2861 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::util::events::Event::ChannelClosed
2862 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2863 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2865 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2866 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2867 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2868 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2872 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2873 let mut output_index = None;
2874 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2875 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2876 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2877 if output_index.is_some() {
2878 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2879 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2882 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2883 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2884 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2887 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2890 if output_index.is_none() {
2891 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2892 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2895 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2899 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2900 if !chan.should_announce() {
2901 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2905 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2907 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2909 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2910 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2912 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2913 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2914 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2915 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2916 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2921 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2922 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2923 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2925 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2928 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2929 // smaller than 500:
2930 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2932 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2933 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2934 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2935 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2936 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2937 /// our network addresses.
2939 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2940 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2942 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2943 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2944 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2945 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2947 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2949 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2950 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2951 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2953 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2954 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2957 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2958 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2959 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2961 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2962 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2963 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2964 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2965 rgb, alias, addresses,
2966 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2967 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2969 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2970 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2972 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2973 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2975 let mut announced_chans = false;
2976 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2977 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2978 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2980 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2985 announced_chans = true;
2987 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2988 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2989 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2993 if announced_chans {
2994 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2995 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2996 signature: node_announce_sig,
2997 contents: announcement
3003 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3005 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3006 /// Will likely generate further events.
3007 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3008 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3010 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
3011 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3012 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3014 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3015 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3017 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
3018 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3019 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
3020 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3022 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
3023 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3024 match forward_info {
3025 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
3026 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3027 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3028 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3029 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3030 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3031 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3033 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
3034 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
3037 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3038 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
3039 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
3040 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
3041 // problem, not ours.
3048 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
3049 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3050 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
3051 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3052 match forward_info {
3053 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3054 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
3056 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
3057 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3058 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
3059 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3060 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3061 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3062 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3063 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3065 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet, &self.logger) {
3067 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3068 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
3070 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
3072 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
3073 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3074 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
3080 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3082 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3083 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
3084 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
3085 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
3086 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
3087 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
3088 // this channel currently :/.
3094 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
3095 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
3097 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
3098 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
3099 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
3101 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
3102 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
3104 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
3106 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
3107 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
3108 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
3111 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
3113 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
3114 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
3115 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
3116 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
3117 // messages when we can.
3118 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
3119 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
3120 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
3127 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
3128 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
3131 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
3132 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
3133 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3134 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
3135 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
3136 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
3138 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
3139 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
3140 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
3141 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
3142 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3144 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us.
3145 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.get_user_id(), channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
3147 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
3149 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
3153 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3154 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
3157 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
3158 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3159 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3160 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3161 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3162 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
3163 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3164 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
3165 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3167 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
3175 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3176 match forward_info {
3177 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3178 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
3179 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
3180 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data) = match routing {
3181 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } => {
3182 let _legacy_hop_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
3183 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
3184 total_msat: payment_data.total_msat
3186 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data }, Some(payment_data))
3188 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
3189 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage), None),
3191 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
3194 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
3195 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
3196 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3197 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3198 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3199 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3201 value: amt_to_forward,
3202 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { amt_to_forward },
3207 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
3209 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
3210 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
3211 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
3213 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3214 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
3215 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3216 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
3217 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
3219 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
3224 macro_rules! check_total_value {
3225 ($payment_data: expr, $payment_preimage: expr) => {{
3226 let mut payment_received_generated = false;
3227 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
3228 .or_insert(Vec::new());
3229 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
3230 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
3231 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3232 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3236 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.value;
3237 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3238 total_value += htlc.value;
3239 match &htlc.onion_payload {
3240 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3241 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3242 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
3243 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
3244 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
3246 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
3248 _ => unreachable!(),
3251 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3252 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
3253 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, claimable_htlc.total_msat);
3254 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
3257 } else if total_value == claimable_htlc.total_msat {
3258 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3260 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
3261 payment_preimage: $payment_preimage,
3262 payment_secret: $payment_data.payment_secret,
3266 payment_received_generated = true;
3268 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
3269 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
3272 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
3273 payment_received_generated
3277 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
3278 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
3279 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
3280 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
3281 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
3282 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
3283 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3284 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
3285 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3286 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
3287 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
3288 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3289 let payment_preimage = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
3290 Ok(payment_preimage) => payment_preimage,
3292 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3296 check_total_value!(payment_data, payment_preimage);
3298 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
3299 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
3300 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3301 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
3302 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
3304 amt: amt_to_forward,
3305 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
3308 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3310 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3316 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
3317 if payment_data.is_none() {
3318 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3319 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3322 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
3323 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
3324 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3325 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3326 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
3327 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
3328 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
3329 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
3331 let payment_received_generated = check_total_value!(payment_data, inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage);
3332 if payment_received_generated {
3333 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
3339 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
3340 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
3348 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
3349 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
3352 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3353 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3356 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
3357 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3358 events.append(&mut new_events);
3361 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
3363 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
3364 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
3366 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
3367 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
3368 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
3369 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
3370 if background_events.is_empty() {
3374 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
3376 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
3377 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
3378 // monitor updating completing.
3379 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
3386 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
3387 /// Process background events, for functional testing
3388 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
3389 self.process_background_events();
3392 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
3393 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
3394 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
3395 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
3396 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3397 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3398 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3400 if !chan.is_live() {
3401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
3402 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3403 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
3405 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
3406 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
3408 let mut retain_channel = true;
3409 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
3412 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3413 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3417 let ret_err = match res {
3418 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
3419 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3420 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
3421 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
3424 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3425 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3426 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3427 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3428 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3429 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3430 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3431 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
3441 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
3445 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
3446 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
3447 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
3448 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
3449 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
3450 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3451 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3453 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3455 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3457 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3458 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3459 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3460 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3461 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3462 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3463 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3465 handle_errors.push(err);
3475 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
3477 /// This currently includes:
3478 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
3479 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
3480 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
3483 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
3484 /// estimate fetches.
3485 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
3486 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
3487 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
3488 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3490 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3492 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
3494 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3495 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3496 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3497 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3498 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
3499 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
3500 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
3501 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
3503 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
3505 if !retain_channel { return false; }
3507 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
3508 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
3509 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
3510 if needs_close { return false; }
3513 match chan.channel_update_status() {
3514 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
3515 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
3516 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
3517 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
3518 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
3519 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3520 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3524 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3525 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
3527 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
3528 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3529 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3533 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3534 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
3543 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
3544 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
3550 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
3551 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
3552 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
3553 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
3554 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
3555 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
3556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3558 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3559 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
3560 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3561 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3562 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3563 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3564 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3565 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3566 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3567 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
3568 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3574 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
3575 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
3576 // be surfaced to the user.
3577 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
3578 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
3580 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
3581 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
3582 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
3583 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
3584 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
3585 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
3587 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
3592 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3593 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
3594 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
3596 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, payment_params, .. } => {
3597 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3598 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3599 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3600 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3601 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) && !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3602 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3603 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3604 Some(RouteParameters {
3605 payment_params: payment_params_data,
3606 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3607 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3610 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3611 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3612 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3614 rejected_by_dest: false,
3615 network_update: None,
3616 all_paths_failed: payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0,
3618 short_channel_id: None,
3625 if payment.get().abandoned() && payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3626 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3628 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3634 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3641 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
3642 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
3643 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
3644 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
3645 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
3646 /// still-available channels.
3647 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
3648 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
3649 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
3650 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
3653 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
3654 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
3655 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3657 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, payment_id, ref payment_params, .. } => {
3658 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3659 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3660 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3661 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
3662 let mut full_failure_ev = None;
3663 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3664 if !payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3665 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3668 if payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3669 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received failure of HTLC with payment_hash {} after payment completion", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3672 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3673 all_paths_failed = true;
3674 if payment.get().abandoned() {
3675 full_failure_ev = Some(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
3677 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash().expect("PendingOutboundPayments::RetriesExceeded always has a payment hash set"),
3683 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3686 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3687 let retry = if let Some(payment_params_data) = payment_params {
3688 let path_last_hop = path.last().expect("Outbound payments must have had a valid path");
3689 Some(RouteParameters {
3690 payment_params: payment_params_data.clone(),
3691 final_value_msat: path_last_hop.fee_msat,
3692 final_cltv_expiry_delta: path_last_hop.cltv_expiry_delta,
3695 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3697 let path_failure = match &onion_error {
3698 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
3700 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3702 let (network_update, short_channel_id, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
3703 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
3704 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
3705 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
3706 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3707 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3708 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3709 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
3716 error_code: onion_error_code,
3718 error_data: onion_error_data
3721 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
3727 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
3728 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
3729 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
3730 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
3732 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
3733 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
3734 events::Event::PaymentPathFailed {
3735 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3736 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3737 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
3738 network_update: None,
3741 short_channel_id: Some(path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id),
3744 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
3746 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
3750 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3751 pending_events.push(path_failure);
3752 if let Some(ev) = full_failure_ev { pending_events.push(ev); }
3754 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3755 let err_packet = match onion_error {
3756 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
3757 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
3758 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
3759 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
3761 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
3762 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
3763 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
3767 let mut forward_event = None;
3768 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3769 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
3771 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
3772 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3773 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
3775 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3776 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3779 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3780 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3781 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3782 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3783 time_forwardable: time
3790 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentReceived`], generating any
3791 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
3793 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3794 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3795 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3796 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3798 /// Returns whether any HTLCs were claimed, and thus if any new [`MessageSendEvent`]s are now
3799 /// pending for processing via [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`].
3801 /// [`Event::PaymentReceived`]: crate::util::events::Event::PaymentReceived
3802 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3803 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3804 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
3805 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3806 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3808 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3810 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3811 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3812 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3813 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3815 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3816 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3817 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3818 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3820 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3821 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3822 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3823 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3824 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3826 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3827 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3828 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3834 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3835 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3836 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3838 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3839 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3840 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3841 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3842 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3843 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3844 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3846 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3847 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3848 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3849 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3850 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3851 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3852 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3853 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3855 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3856 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3857 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3858 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3859 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3860 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3862 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3867 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3868 // which were generated.
3869 channel_state.take();
3871 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3872 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3873 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3880 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3881 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3882 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3883 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3884 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3886 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3890 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3891 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3892 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3893 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3894 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3895 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3896 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3897 payment_preimage, e);
3898 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3899 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3900 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3901 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3904 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3905 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3906 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3907 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3908 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3909 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3910 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3911 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3912 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3913 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3919 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3921 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3924 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3925 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3926 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3927 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3928 payment_preimage, e);
3930 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3931 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3933 chan.remove_entry();
3935 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3938 } else { unreachable!(); }
3941 fn finalize_claims(&self, mut sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
3942 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3943 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3944 for source in sources.drain(..) {
3945 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } = source {
3946 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3947 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3948 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3949 assert!(payment.get().is_fulfilled());
3950 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, None) {
3951 pending_events.push(
3952 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
3954 payment_hash: payment.get().payment_hash(),
3959 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
3967 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3969 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
3970 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3971 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3972 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3973 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3974 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut payment) = outbounds.entry(payment_id) {
3975 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3976 if !payment.get().is_fulfilled() {
3977 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3978 let fee_paid_msat = payment.get().get_pending_fee_msat();
3979 pending_events.push(
3980 events::Event::PaymentSent {
3981 payment_id: Some(payment_id),
3987 payment.get_mut().mark_fulfilled();
3991 // We currently immediately remove HTLCs which were fulfilled on-chain.
3992 // This could potentially lead to removing a pending payment too early,
3993 // with a reorg of one block causing us to re-add the fulfilled payment on
3995 // TODO: We should have a second monitor event that informs us of payments
3996 // irrevocably fulfilled.
3997 if payment.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes, Some(&path)) {
3998 let payment_hash = Some(PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner()));
3999 pending_events.push(
4000 events::Event::PaymentPathSuccessful {
4008 if payment.get().remaining_parts() == 0 {
4013 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
4016 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
4017 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
4018 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
4019 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
4020 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
4021 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
4022 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
4025 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
4026 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4027 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
4028 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
4029 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4032 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
4033 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
4034 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
4035 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
4036 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
4037 payment_preimage, e);
4039 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
4040 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
4041 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
4042 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
4045 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
4046 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
4047 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
4048 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
4052 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
4053 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
4054 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
4057 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4058 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
4060 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
4068 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
4069 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4070 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
4073 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
4074 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4076 let chan_restoration_res;
4077 let (mut pending_failures, finalized_claims) = {
4078 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4079 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4080 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4081 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
4082 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
4084 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
4088 let updates = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
4089 let channel_update = if updates.funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
4090 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
4091 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
4092 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
4093 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
4094 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4095 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4096 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
4099 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, updates.raa, updates.commitment_update, updates.order, None, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.funding_locked);
4100 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4101 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4103 (updates.failed_htlcs, updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs)
4105 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4106 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claims);
4107 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4108 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4112 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4113 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
4114 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4117 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
4118 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
4121 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4122 &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), &self.logger)
4123 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
4124 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4125 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4126 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
4127 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
4128 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4129 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
4130 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4131 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
4133 entry.insert(channel);
4139 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4140 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
4141 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4142 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4143 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
4144 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4145 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4146 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4148 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
4149 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
4151 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4154 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4155 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
4156 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
4157 channel_value_satoshis: value,
4159 user_channel_id: user_id,
4164 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4165 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
4166 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4167 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4168 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4169 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
4170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4171 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4172 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
4174 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
4176 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
4179 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
4180 // lock before watch_channel
4181 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
4183 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
4184 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
4185 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
4186 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
4187 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
4188 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
4189 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
4190 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
4191 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
4192 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4193 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
4195 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
4196 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
4197 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
4198 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
4199 // until we have persisted our monitor.
4200 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4204 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4205 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4206 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
4207 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4208 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
4210 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4211 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
4212 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4221 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4223 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4224 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4225 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4226 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4227 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4228 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4229 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4231 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
4232 Ok(update) => update,
4233 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4235 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
4236 let mut res = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
4237 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
4238 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
4239 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
4240 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
4241 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
4242 shutdown_finish.0.take();
4249 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4252 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
4253 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
4257 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4258 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4259 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4260 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4261 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4262 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4263 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4265 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4266 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
4267 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
4268 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
4269 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
4270 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
4271 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
4272 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
4273 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
4274 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
4275 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
4276 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
4277 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4278 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4279 msg: announcement_sigs,
4281 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4282 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4283 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4284 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4289 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4293 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4294 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
4295 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
4296 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4297 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4299 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4300 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4301 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4302 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4305 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
4306 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
4307 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
4308 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
4311 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4312 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
4314 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
4315 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
4316 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4317 let (result, is_permanent) =
4318 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
4320 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
4326 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4327 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4328 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
4335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4338 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
4339 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4342 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
4346 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4347 let (tx, chan_option) = {
4348 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4349 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4350 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
4351 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
4352 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4353 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4355 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
4356 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
4357 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4358 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4363 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
4364 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
4365 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
4366 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
4367 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
4368 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
4369 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4371 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
4372 } else { (tx, None) }
4374 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4377 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
4378 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
4379 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
4381 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
4382 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4383 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4384 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4388 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4393 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4394 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
4395 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
4396 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
4398 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
4399 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
4400 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
4401 //but we should prevent it anyway.
4403 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
4404 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4406 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4407 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4408 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4409 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4412 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
4413 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
4414 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
4415 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
4416 match pending_forward_info {
4417 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
4418 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
4419 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
4420 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
4421 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
4422 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
4423 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
4424 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
4428 // The only case where we'd be unable to
4429 // successfully get a channel update is if the
4430 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
4431 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
4432 // payments over the channel back to themselves
4433 // (because no one else should know the short_id
4434 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
4435 // no problem just calling this
4436 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
4437 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
4440 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
4442 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4443 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
4444 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4447 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
4449 _ => pending_forward_info
4452 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4454 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4459 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4460 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4461 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
4462 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4463 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4464 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4465 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4466 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4468 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
4470 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4473 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
4477 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4478 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4479 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4480 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4481 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4482 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4483 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4485 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
4487 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4492 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4493 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4494 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4495 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4496 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4497 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4498 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4500 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
4501 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
4502 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
4504 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
4507 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4511 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4512 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4513 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4514 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4515 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4516 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4517 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4519 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
4520 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
4521 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
4522 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
4523 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
4524 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
4525 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
4530 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4531 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
4533 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
4534 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4535 msg: revoke_and_ack,
4537 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
4538 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4539 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4540 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4541 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4542 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4543 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4544 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4546 commitment_signed: msg,
4552 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4557 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
4558 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
4559 let mut forward_event = None;
4560 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
4561 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4562 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4563 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
4565 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4566 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
4567 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
4568 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
4569 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
4571 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4572 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4573 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
4575 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4576 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4577 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
4582 match forward_event {
4584 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4585 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
4586 time_forwardable: time
4594 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4595 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4597 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4598 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4599 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4600 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4601 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4602 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4604 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
4605 let raa_updates = break_chan_entry!(self,
4606 chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4607 htlcs_to_fail = raa_updates.holding_cell_failed_htlcs;
4608 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), raa_updates.monitor_update) {
4609 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
4610 assert!(raa_updates.commitment_update.is_none());
4611 assert!(raa_updates.accepted_htlcs.is_empty());
4612 assert!(raa_updates.failed_htlcs.is_empty());
4613 assert!(raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs.is_empty());
4614 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
4616 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan,
4617 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false,
4618 raa_updates.commitment_update.is_some(),
4619 raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4620 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs) {
4622 } else { unreachable!(); }
4625 if let Some(updates) = raa_updates.commitment_update {
4626 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4627 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4631 break Ok((raa_updates.accepted_htlcs, raa_updates.failed_htlcs,
4632 raa_updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs,
4633 chan.get().get_short_channel_id()
4634 .expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"),
4635 chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
4637 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4640 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
4642 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, finalized_claim_htlcs,
4643 short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) =>
4645 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
4646 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
4648 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
4649 self.finalize_claims(finalized_claim_htlcs);
4656 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4657 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4658 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4659 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4661 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4662 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4664 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
4666 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4671 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4672 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4673 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4675 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4676 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4677 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4678 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4680 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
4681 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
4684 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
4685 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
4686 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
4687 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
4688 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4691 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4696 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
4697 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4698 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4699 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4700 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
4701 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
4703 // It's not a local channel
4704 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
4707 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
4708 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4709 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4710 if chan.get().should_announce() {
4711 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
4712 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
4713 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
4714 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4716 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
4718 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4719 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
4720 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
4721 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
4723 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
4726 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
4728 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
4731 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
4732 let chan_restoration_res;
4733 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
4734 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4735 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4737 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
4738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
4739 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
4740 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
4742 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
4743 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
4744 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
4745 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
4746 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
4747 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
4748 let mut channel_update = None;
4749 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
4750 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
4751 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
4754 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
4755 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
4756 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
4757 // they have the latest channel parameters.
4758 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4759 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
4760 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
4763 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
4764 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
4765 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
4766 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
4768 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
4770 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
4773 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
4774 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
4776 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
4777 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
4782 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
4783 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
4784 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4785 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
4786 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
4787 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
4788 match monitor_event {
4789 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
4790 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
4791 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
4792 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
4794 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
4795 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
4798 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
4799 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
4800 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4801 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4802 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4803 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4804 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4805 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
4806 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4807 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4809 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
4810 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4811 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4815 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
4816 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
4818 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
4820 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan, reason);
4821 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4822 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4823 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4824 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4829 MonitorEvent::UpdateCompleted { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
4830 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id);
4835 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4836 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4839 has_pending_monitor_events
4842 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
4843 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
4844 /// update events as a separate process method here.
4845 #[cfg(feature = "fuzztarget")]
4846 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
4847 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
4850 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
4851 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
4852 /// update was applied.
4854 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
4855 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
4856 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
4857 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
4858 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
4859 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
4860 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4861 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4863 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4864 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4865 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4866 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4867 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4869 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4870 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4871 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4872 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4873 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4875 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4876 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4877 has_monitor_update = true;
4878 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4879 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4880 if close_channel { return false; }
4882 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4883 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4884 updates: commitment_update,
4891 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4892 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4893 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4900 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4901 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4902 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4905 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4906 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4912 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4913 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4914 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4915 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4916 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4917 let mut has_update = false;
4919 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4920 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4921 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4922 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4923 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4925 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4926 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4927 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4928 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4930 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4931 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4934 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4935 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4936 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4937 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4938 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4941 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4942 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4947 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
4949 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4950 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4956 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4957 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4964 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4965 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4971 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4972 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4974 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4975 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4976 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4977 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4978 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4979 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4980 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4981 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4982 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4983 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4984 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4985 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4986 assert!(should_broadcast);
4987 } else { unreachable!(); }
4988 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4990 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4994 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4995 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4997 if min_value_msat.is_some() && min_value_msat.unwrap() > MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4998 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("min_value_msat of {} greater than total 21 million bitcoin supply", min_value_msat.unwrap()) });
5001 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5003 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5004 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5005 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5006 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5007 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
5008 payment_secret, min_value_msat, payment_preimage,
5009 user_payment_id: 0, // For compatibility with version 0.0.103 and earlier
5010 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
5011 // it's updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
5012 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
5013 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
5014 // never fail a payment too early.
5015 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
5017 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
5020 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
5025 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
5028 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
5029 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
5031 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
5032 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
5033 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
5035 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
5037 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5038 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5042 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5043 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5045 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5047 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5048 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5049 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
5050 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5051 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
5052 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, &self.keys_manager, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5055 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5056 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5059 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5061 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5063 pub fn create_inbound_payment_legacy(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), APIError> {
5064 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5065 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5066 let payment_secret = self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)?;
5067 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret))
5070 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
5071 /// stored external to LDK.
5073 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
5074 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
5075 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
5077 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
5078 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
5081 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
5082 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
5083 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
5084 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
5086 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
5087 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
5088 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
5089 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
5090 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
5092 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
5093 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
5094 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
5095 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
5096 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
5098 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
5100 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
5101 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
5103 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
5104 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
5108 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
5109 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
5111 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
5113 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5114 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
5115 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
5116 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64)
5119 /// Legacy version of [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]. Use this method if you wish to share
5120 /// serialized state with LDK node(s) running 0.0.103 and earlier.
5123 /// This method is deprecated and will be removed soon.
5125 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5127 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash_legacy(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
5128 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs)
5131 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
5132 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
5134 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5135 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
5136 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
5139 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
5140 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
5141 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5142 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
5143 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
5148 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
5149 !self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().is_empty()
5153 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
5154 self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().clear()
5158 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5159 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5160 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5161 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5162 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5165 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
5166 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
5167 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5168 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5170 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5171 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5172 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5173 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5176 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5177 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5179 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
5180 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5183 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
5184 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5185 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
5187 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5188 events.replace(pending_events);
5197 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5199 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5200 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5201 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5202 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5205 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
5207 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
5208 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
5210 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
5211 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
5212 /// restarting from an old state.
5213 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
5214 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5215 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
5217 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
5218 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
5219 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
5220 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5223 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
5224 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
5225 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5228 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
5229 handler.handle_event(&event);
5237 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5239 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5240 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5241 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5242 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5245 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
5247 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5248 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
5249 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
5250 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
5251 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
5254 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
5255 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
5256 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
5259 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5260 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5261 let new_height = height - 1;
5263 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
5264 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
5265 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
5266 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
5267 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
5268 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
5271 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
5275 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5277 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5278 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5279 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5280 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5283 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
5284 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5285 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5286 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5288 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5289 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
5291 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5292 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
5295 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
5296 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5297 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5298 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5300 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
5301 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
5303 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5305 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
5307 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
5309 macro_rules! max_time {
5310 ($timestamp: expr) => {
5312 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
5313 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
5314 // having an explicit local time source.
5315 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
5316 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
5317 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5318 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
5319 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
5325 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
5326 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
5327 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5328 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
5329 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
5332 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5333 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5334 outbounds.retain(|payment_id, payment| {
5335 if payment.remaining_parts() != 0 { return true }
5336 if let PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { starting_block_height, payment_hash, .. } = payment {
5337 if *starting_block_height + PAYMENT_EXPIRY_BLOCKS <= height {
5338 log_info!(self.logger, "Timing out payment with id {} and hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_id.0), log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
5339 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentFailed {
5340 payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash,
5348 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
5349 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5350 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
5351 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
5352 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
5353 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
5359 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
5360 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5361 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
5362 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
5363 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
5364 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
5365 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5366 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
5371 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5373 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5374 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5375 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5376 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5379 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
5380 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
5382 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ClosureReason>>
5383 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
5384 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5385 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
5386 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5388 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5389 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5391 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5392 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
5393 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5394 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5395 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
5396 let res = f(channel);
5397 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
5398 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
5399 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
5400 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5401 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
5405 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
5406 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
5407 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5408 msg: funding_locked,
5410 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
5411 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5412 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5413 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5414 msg: announcement_sigs,
5416 } else if channel.is_usable() {
5417 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5418 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5419 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5420 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
5423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5425 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
5427 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
5428 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5429 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5431 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
5432 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
5433 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
5434 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
5435 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5439 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
5440 self.issue_channel_close_events(channel, reason);
5441 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5442 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5443 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5444 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
5445 data: reason_message,
5453 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
5454 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
5455 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5456 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
5457 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
5458 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
5459 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
5460 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
5461 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
5462 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
5463 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
5464 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
5465 data: htlc_msat_height_data
5470 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
5475 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
5477 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
5478 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
5482 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
5483 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
5484 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5487 /// Note that this method is not available with the `no-std` feature.
5488 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5489 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5490 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
5493 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
5494 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
5496 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
5497 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
5500 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5501 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
5502 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
5503 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
5504 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5508 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
5509 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
5510 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
5511 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
5515 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
5516 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5517 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5518 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5519 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5520 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5523 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
5524 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5525 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5528 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
5529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5530 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5533 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
5534 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5535 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5538 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
5539 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5540 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5543 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
5544 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5545 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5548 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
5549 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5550 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5553 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
5554 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5555 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5558 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
5559 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5560 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5563 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
5564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5565 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5568 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
5569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5570 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5573 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
5574 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5575 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5578 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
5579 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5580 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5583 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
5584 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5585 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5588 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
5589 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5590 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5593 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
5594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5595 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5598 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
5599 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
5600 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
5603 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
5608 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
5609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5610 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
5613 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
5614 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5615 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
5616 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
5618 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5619 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5620 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
5621 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5622 if no_connection_possible {
5623 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5624 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5625 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5626 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5627 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5629 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
5630 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5631 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5635 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5642 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5643 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5644 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5645 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
5646 if chan.is_shutdown() {
5647 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
5648 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
5650 self.issue_channel_close_events(chan, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
5653 no_channels_remain = false;
5659 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
5661 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5662 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5663 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5664 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5665 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5666 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5667 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5668 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5669 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5670 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5671 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5672 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5673 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
5674 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
5675 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5676 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
5677 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
5678 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
5679 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
5683 if no_channels_remain {
5684 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
5687 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
5688 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
5692 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
5693 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
5695 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5698 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5699 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
5700 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5701 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
5702 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
5705 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
5706 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
5711 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5712 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
5713 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
5714 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
5715 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
5716 if !chan.have_received_message() {
5717 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
5718 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
5719 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
5723 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
5724 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5725 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
5731 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
5734 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
5735 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
5737 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
5738 for chan in self.list_channels() {
5739 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
5740 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5741 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5745 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
5746 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(&msg.data));
5751 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
5752 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
5753 struct PersistenceNotifier {
5754 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
5755 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
5756 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
5759 impl PersistenceNotifier {
5762 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
5768 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5769 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5774 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
5775 let result = *guard;
5783 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "std"))]
5784 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
5785 let current_time = Instant::now();
5787 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
5788 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
5793 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
5794 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
5795 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
5796 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
5797 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
5799 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
5800 let result = *guard;
5801 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
5805 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
5806 None => return result,
5812 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
5814 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
5815 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5816 *persistence_lock = true;
5817 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
5822 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5823 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
5825 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
5827 (0, onion_packet, required),
5828 (2, short_channel_id, required),
5831 (0, payment_data, required),
5832 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5834 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
5835 (0, payment_preimage, required),
5836 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
5840 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
5841 (0, routing, required),
5842 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
5843 (4, payment_hash, required),
5844 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
5845 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
5849 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5850 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5852 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
5854 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5855 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5856 reason.write(writer)?;
5858 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5859 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
5862 channel_id.write(writer)?;
5863 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5864 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
5865 failure_code.write(writer)?;
5872 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
5873 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5874 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5877 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5878 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5879 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5880 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
5884 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5885 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5886 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5887 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
5888 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
5891 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
5892 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
5893 // messages contained in the variants.
5894 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
5895 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
5896 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
5898 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5899 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5900 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5901 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5902 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
5905 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
5906 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
5907 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
5908 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
5909 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
5911 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5916 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
5921 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
5922 (0, short_channel_id, required),
5923 (2, outpoint, required),
5924 (4, htlc_id, required),
5925 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
5928 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
5929 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5930 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
5931 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => Some(_legacy_hop_data),
5934 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
5935 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => None,
5936 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
5938 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5939 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
5940 (1, self.total_msat, required),
5941 (2, self.value, required),
5942 (4, payment_data, option),
5943 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
5944 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
5950 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
5951 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5952 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
5954 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
5955 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
5956 let mut total_msat = None;
5957 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5958 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5959 (0, prev_hop, required),
5960 (1, total_msat, option),
5961 (2, value, required),
5962 (4, payment_data, option),
5963 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
5964 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
5966 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
5968 if payment_data.is_some() {
5969 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5971 if total_msat.is_none() {
5972 total_msat = Some(value);
5974 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
5977 if payment_data.is_none() {
5978 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5980 if total_msat.is_none() {
5981 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
5983 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data.unwrap() }
5987 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
5989 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
5996 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
5997 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5998 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6001 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
6002 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
6003 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
6004 let mut payment_id = None;
6005 let mut payment_secret = None;
6006 let mut payment_params = None;
6007 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6008 (0, session_priv, required),
6009 (1, payment_id, option),
6010 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6011 (3, payment_secret, option),
6012 (4, path, vec_type),
6013 (5, payment_params, option),
6015 if payment_id.is_none() {
6016 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
6018 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
6020 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6021 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
6022 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
6023 path: path.unwrap(),
6024 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
6029 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6030 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
6035 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
6036 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
6038 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id, payment_secret, payment_params } => {
6040 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
6041 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6042 (0, session_priv, required),
6043 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
6044 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
6045 (3, payment_secret, option),
6046 (4, path, vec_type),
6047 (5, payment_params, option),
6050 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
6052 field.write(writer)?;
6059 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
6060 (0, LightningError) => {
6064 (0, failure_code, required),
6065 (2, data, vec_type),
6069 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
6071 (0, forward_info, required),
6072 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
6073 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
6074 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
6077 (0, htlc_id, required),
6078 (2, err_packet, required),
6082 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
6083 (0, payment_secret, required),
6084 (2, expiry_time, required),
6085 (4, user_payment_id, required),
6086 (6, payment_preimage, required),
6087 (8, min_value_msat, required),
6090 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(PendingOutboundPayment,
6092 (0, session_privs, required),
6095 (0, session_privs, required),
6096 (1, payment_hash, option),
6099 (0, session_privs, required),
6100 (1, pending_fee_msat, option),
6101 (2, payment_hash, required),
6102 (4, payment_secret, option),
6103 (6, total_msat, required),
6104 (8, pending_amt_msat, required),
6105 (10, starting_block_height, required),
6108 (0, session_privs, required),
6109 (2, payment_hash, required),
6113 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6114 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6115 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6116 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6117 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6120 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6121 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
6123 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6125 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
6127 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6128 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
6129 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
6132 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
6133 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
6134 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6135 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6136 unfunded_channels += 1;
6139 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
6140 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
6141 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
6142 channel.write(writer)?;
6146 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6147 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
6148 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6149 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6150 for forward in pending_forwards {
6151 forward.write(writer)?;
6155 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6156 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
6157 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6158 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6159 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
6160 htlc.write(writer)?;
6164 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
6165 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6166 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6167 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
6168 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6169 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
6172 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6173 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
6174 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6175 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6176 for event in events.iter() {
6177 event.write(writer)?;
6180 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6181 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6182 for event in background_events.iter() {
6184 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
6186 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
6187 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
6192 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6193 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
6195 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6196 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
6197 hash.write(writer)?;
6198 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
6201 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
6202 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
6203 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6204 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
6205 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
6208 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
6209 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6211 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6212 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6213 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
6214 session_priv.write(writer)?;
6217 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
6218 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
6222 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
6223 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
6224 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
6226 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
6227 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
6228 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
6233 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6234 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
6235 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
6236 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required)
6243 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
6245 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
6247 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6248 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
6249 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
6250 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
6251 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
6252 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
6253 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
6254 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
6255 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
6256 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
6257 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
6258 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
6259 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
6261 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
6262 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
6264 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
6265 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
6267 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
6268 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
6269 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
6270 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
6271 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
6272 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
6274 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
6275 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6276 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6277 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6278 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6279 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6282 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
6283 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
6285 pub keys_manager: K,
6287 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6289 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
6290 pub fee_estimator: F,
6291 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
6293 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
6294 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
6295 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
6296 pub chain_monitor: M,
6298 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
6299 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
6300 /// force-closed during deserialization.
6301 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
6302 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
6303 /// deserialization.
6305 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
6306 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
6307 pub default_config: UserConfig,
6309 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
6310 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
6312 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
6313 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
6314 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
6315 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
6317 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
6320 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
6321 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
6324 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6325 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
6326 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6327 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6328 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6329 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6332 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
6333 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
6334 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
6335 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
6336 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
6338 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
6339 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
6344 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
6345 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
6346 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6347 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
6348 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6349 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6350 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6351 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6354 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6355 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
6356 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
6360 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
6361 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
6362 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
6363 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
6364 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
6365 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6368 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6369 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6371 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6372 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6373 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6375 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6377 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6378 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6379 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6380 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
6381 let mut channel_closures = Vec::new();
6382 for _ in 0..channel_count {
6383 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, (&args.keys_manager, best_block_height))?;
6384 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6385 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
6386 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
6387 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6388 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6389 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6390 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6391 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
6392 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
6393 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6394 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6395 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6396 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6397 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6398 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6399 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6400 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
6401 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
6402 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
6403 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
6404 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
6405 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
6406 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
6407 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
6408 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
6409 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
6410 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
6411 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6412 channel_closures.push(events::Event::ChannelClosed {
6413 channel_id: channel.channel_id(),
6414 user_channel_id: channel.get_user_id(),
6415 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager
6418 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6419 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
6420 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
6422 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
6425 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
6426 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
6427 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
6428 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
6429 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
6430 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6434 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
6435 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
6436 log_info!(args.logger, "Broadcasting latest holder commitment transaction for closed channel {}", log_bytes!(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
6437 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
6441 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
6442 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6443 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6444 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
6445 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6446 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6447 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
6448 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
6449 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6451 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
6454 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6455 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
6456 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
6457 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
6458 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6459 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
6460 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
6461 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
6463 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
6466 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6467 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
6468 for _ in 0..peer_count {
6469 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6470 let peer_state = PeerState {
6471 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
6473 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
6476 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6477 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
6478 for _ in 0..event_count {
6479 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
6480 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
6484 if forward_htlcs_count > 0 {
6485 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
6486 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
6487 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
6488 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
6489 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
6490 pending_events_read.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6491 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
6495 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6496 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
6497 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
6498 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6499 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
6500 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6504 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6505 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6507 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6508 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
6509 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
6510 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
6511 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6515 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6516 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
6517 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
6518 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
6519 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
6520 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
6521 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
6523 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
6524 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
6528 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
6529 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
6530 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
6531 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
6532 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6533 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
6534 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
6535 (5, received_network_pubkey, option)
6538 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
6539 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
6540 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
6541 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
6542 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
6543 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
6545 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
6547 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
6548 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
6549 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
6550 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
6551 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
6552 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
6553 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
6555 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors {
6556 if by_id.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id()).is_none() {
6557 for (htlc_source, htlc) in monitor.get_pending_outbound_htlcs() {
6558 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, payment_secret, .. } = htlc_source {
6559 if path.is_empty() {
6560 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
6561 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6563 let path_amt = path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
6564 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
6565 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
6566 match pending_outbound_payments.as_mut().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
6567 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6568 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
6569 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
6570 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6572 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6573 let path_fee = path.get_path_fees();
6574 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
6575 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
6576 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
6578 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
6579 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
6580 total_msat: path_amt,
6581 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
6583 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
6584 path_amt, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
6593 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6594 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
6596 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
6597 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
6600 let our_network_pubkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret());
6601 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
6602 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
6603 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
6604 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6608 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.keys_manager.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
6609 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
6610 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
6612 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
6613 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
6614 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
6616 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
6618 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
6623 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
6625 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
6626 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
6627 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
6629 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
6633 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
6634 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
6636 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
6638 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
6639 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
6640 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
6641 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
6643 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
6644 logger: args.logger,
6645 default_configuration: args.default_config,
6648 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6649 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
6652 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
6653 //connection or two.
6655 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
6661 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6662 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6663 use core::time::Duration;
6664 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
6665 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
6666 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure};
6667 use ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment;
6668 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
6669 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
6671 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
6672 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
6673 use util::errors::APIError;
6674 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
6675 use util::test_utils;
6677 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
6679 fn test_wait_timeout() {
6680 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
6682 use core::sync::atomic::AtomicBool;
6685 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
6686 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
6688 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
6689 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
6690 thread::spawn(move || {
6692 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
6693 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6694 *persistence_lock = true;
6697 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
6703 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
6704 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
6706 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
6709 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6714 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
6716 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
6719 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
6726 fn test_notify_limits() {
6727 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
6728 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
6729 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
6730 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
6731 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
6732 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6734 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
6735 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
6736 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6737 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6738 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6740 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6742 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
6743 // to connect messages with new values
6744 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6745 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
6746 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6747 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
6749 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
6750 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6751 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6752 // ... but the last node should not.
6753 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6754 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
6755 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6756 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6758 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
6759 // about the channel.
6760 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6761 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6762 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6764 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
6766 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6767 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6768 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
6769 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
6770 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6771 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6773 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
6774 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6775 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6777 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
6778 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
6779 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
6780 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
6781 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
6782 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
6784 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
6785 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
6786 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6787 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6788 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6789 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6790 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6791 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6793 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
6794 // the channel info has updated.
6795 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
6796 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
6797 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6798 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
6799 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
6800 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
6804 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
6805 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
6807 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6808 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6809 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6810 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6811 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6813 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
6814 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
6815 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
6816 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
6817 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
6818 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
6819 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6820 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6821 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6822 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6823 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
6825 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
6826 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6827 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6828 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6829 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6830 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6831 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6832 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6833 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6834 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6835 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6836 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6837 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6838 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6839 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6840 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6841 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6842 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6843 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6844 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6845 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6846 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
6848 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
6849 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &route.payment_params, &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None).unwrap();
6850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6851 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6852 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6853 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
6855 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
6856 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
6857 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
6858 // lightning messages manually.
6859 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6860 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
6861 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6862 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6863 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
6864 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6865 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6866 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
6867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6868 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6869 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
6870 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6871 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6872 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6873 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6874 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6875 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6876 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
6877 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
6878 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6879 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
6880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6881 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
6882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6883 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6884 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
6885 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6887 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
6888 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
6889 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
6890 assert_eq!(events.len(), 3);
6892 Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: ref id, payment_preimage: ref preimage, payment_hash: ref hash, .. } => {
6893 assert_eq!(Some(payment_id), *id);
6894 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
6895 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *hash);
6897 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6900 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6901 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6902 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6903 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6905 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6908 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
6909 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
6910 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
6911 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
6913 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
6918 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
6919 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
6920 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
6921 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
6922 // fails as expected.
6923 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
6924 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
6925 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
6926 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
6927 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
6928 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
6930 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
6931 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
6932 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
6934 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
6935 let route_params = RouteParameters {
6936 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id()),
6937 final_value_msat: 100_000,
6938 final_cltv_expiry_delta: TEST_FINAL_CLTV,
6940 let route = find_route(
6941 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6942 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6944 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6946 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6947 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6948 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6949 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6952 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6953 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6954 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6955 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6956 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6957 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6958 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
6959 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
6960 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
6961 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
6962 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
6963 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
6964 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
6966 // Finally, claim the original payment.
6967 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
6969 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
6970 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
6971 let route = find_route(
6972 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, nodes[0].network_graph, None,
6973 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
6975 let (payment_hash, _) = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
6976 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6977 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6978 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6979 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
6980 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
6981 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
6983 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
6984 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
6985 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6986 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
6987 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6988 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
6989 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
6990 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
6991 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6992 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
6993 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
6994 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6995 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
6996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
6997 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
6998 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
6999 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7000 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
7001 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7002 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7003 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
7004 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
7005 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
7007 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
7008 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
7012 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
7013 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
7014 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
7015 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7016 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7017 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7018 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7020 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7021 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7022 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7023 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7025 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7026 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7027 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7028 final_value_msat: 10000,
7029 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7031 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7032 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7033 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7034 let route = find_route(
7035 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7036 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7039 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7040 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
7041 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7042 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7044 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7045 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7046 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7047 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7048 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7049 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7050 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7052 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
7056 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
7057 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
7058 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7059 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7060 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7061 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7063 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
7064 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7065 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7066 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7068 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
7069 let route_params = RouteParameters {
7070 payment_params: PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey),
7071 final_value_msat: 10000,
7072 final_cltv_expiry_delta: 40,
7074 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
7075 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
7076 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7077 let route = find_route(
7078 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
7079 nodes[0].logger, &scorer
7082 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
7083 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
7084 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
7085 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage), None, None).unwrap();
7086 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
7088 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
7089 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
7090 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
7091 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
7092 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
7093 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
7094 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
7096 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
7100 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
7101 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
7102 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
7103 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
7104 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7106 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7107 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7108 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7109 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
7111 // Marshall an MPP route.
7112 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
7113 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
7114 route.paths.push(path);
7115 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
7116 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
7117 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
7118 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
7119 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
7120 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
7122 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
7123 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
7124 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
7125 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
7130 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
7131 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
7132 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
7133 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
7134 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
7135 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
7137 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
7138 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
7140 total_msat: 100_000,
7143 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
7144 // payment verification fails as expected.
7145 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
7146 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
7147 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
7148 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
7150 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager::inbound_payment".to_string(), "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash".to_string(), 1);
7154 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
7155 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
7159 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
7162 use chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
7163 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
7164 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7165 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
7166 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
7167 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
7168 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
7169 use routing::router::{PaymentParameters, get_route};
7170 use routing::scoring::Scorer;
7171 use util::test_utils;
7172 use util::config::UserConfig;
7173 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
7175 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7176 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7177 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
7179 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
7183 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
7184 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
7185 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
7186 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
7187 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
7188 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
7189 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
7194 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
7195 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
7198 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
7199 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
7200 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
7202 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
7203 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7205 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
7206 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
7208 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
7209 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
7211 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7212 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
7213 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
7214 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
7215 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7217 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7219 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
7221 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
7222 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
7223 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
7224 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
7225 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
7227 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
7229 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
7231 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7232 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
7233 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
7234 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7235 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7238 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
7239 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7240 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
7242 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
7243 } else { panic!(); }
7245 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7246 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7248 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
7251 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
7254 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
7255 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
7257 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7258 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
7259 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
7260 match msg_events[0] {
7261 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
7262 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
7263 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
7267 match msg_events[1] {
7268 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
7272 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
7274 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
7275 macro_rules! send_payment {
7276 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
7277 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
7278 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id())
7279 .with_features(InvoiceFeatures::known());
7280 let scorer = Scorer::with_fixed_penalty(0);
7281 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_params, &dummy_graph,
7282 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a, &scorer).unwrap();
7284 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
7285 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
7287 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
7288 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200).unwrap();
7290 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
7291 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
7292 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
7293 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
7294 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7295 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7296 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7297 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
7299 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
7300 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
7301 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
7303 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
7304 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
7305 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
7306 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
7307 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
7309 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
7312 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
7313 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
7314 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
7315 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
7317 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
7322 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
7323 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);