1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::message::ForwardNode;
36 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{Bolt12OfferContext, Bolt12RefundContext, PaymentConstraints, PaymentContext, ReceiveTlvs};
38 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
44 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
45 // construct one themselves.
46 use crate::ln::inbound_payment;
47 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
48 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
49 use crate::ln::channel_state::ChannelDetails;
50 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
51 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
52 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
53 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
54 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
56 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
57 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
58 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
60 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
61 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
62 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
63 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
64 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
65 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
67 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
68 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
69 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{new_pending_onion_message, Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, Responder, ResponseInstruction};
70 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
71 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
72 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
73 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
74 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
75 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
76 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
77 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
78 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
79 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
81 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
83 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
84 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
85 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
86 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
87 crate::sign::KeysManager,
91 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
92 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
95 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
98 use crate::prelude::*;
100 use core::cell::RefCell;
102 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
103 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
104 use core::time::Duration;
105 use core::ops::Deref;
107 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
108 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
109 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
111 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
113 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
114 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
115 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
117 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
118 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
119 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
120 // before we forward it.
122 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
123 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
124 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
125 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
126 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
128 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
129 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
130 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
131 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
132 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
134 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
135 /// do with the HTLC.
136 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
137 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
139 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
140 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
141 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
142 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
143 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
144 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
146 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
148 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
149 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
151 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
152 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
153 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
154 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
155 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
157 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
158 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
159 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
160 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
161 /// The context of the payment included by the recipient in a blinded path, or `None` if a
162 /// blinded path was not used.
164 /// Used in part to determine the [`events::PaymentPurpose`].
165 payment_context: Option<PaymentContext>,
166 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
168 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
169 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
170 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
171 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
173 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
174 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
176 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
177 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
178 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
179 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
180 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
181 requires_blinded_error: bool,
183 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
184 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
185 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
187 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
188 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
190 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
191 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
192 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
193 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
194 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
195 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
196 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
198 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
199 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
200 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
201 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
203 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
204 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
205 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
207 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
208 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
209 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
210 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
211 requires_blinded_error: bool,
215 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
216 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
217 pub struct BlindedForward {
218 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
219 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
220 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
221 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
222 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
223 /// the introduction node.
224 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
227 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
228 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
229 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
231 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
232 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
233 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
239 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
241 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
242 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
243 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
244 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
245 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
246 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
248 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
249 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
250 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
251 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
252 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
254 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
256 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
257 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
258 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
260 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
261 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
262 /// it along another path).
264 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
265 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
266 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
267 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
268 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
269 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
270 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
271 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
272 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
274 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
277 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
279 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
281 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
286 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
287 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
290 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
291 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
292 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
293 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
294 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
297 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
298 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
299 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
301 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
302 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
303 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
306 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
307 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
309 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
310 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
311 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
314 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
315 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
316 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
319 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
324 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
328 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
329 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
330 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
331 pub enum BlindedFailure {
332 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
333 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
334 FromIntroductionNode,
335 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
336 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
340 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
341 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
342 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
343 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
344 short_channel_id: u64,
345 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
348 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
349 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
350 channel_id: ChannelId,
352 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
353 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
358 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
360 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
361 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
362 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
364 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
365 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
368 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
369 struct ClaimableHTLC {
370 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
372 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
374 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
375 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
376 sender_intended_value: u64,
377 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
379 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
380 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
381 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
382 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
384 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
385 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
388 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
389 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
390 events::ClaimedHTLC {
391 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
392 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
393 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
394 value_msat: val.value,
395 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
400 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
401 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
403 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
404 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
405 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
408 /// Number of bytes in the id.
409 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
412 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
413 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
418 impl Readable for PaymentId {
419 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
420 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
425 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
426 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
427 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
431 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
433 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
434 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
435 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
437 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
438 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
443 impl Readable for InterceptId {
444 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
445 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
450 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
451 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
452 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
453 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
454 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
457 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
459 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
460 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
461 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
463 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
464 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
468 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
469 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
470 (0, short_channel_id, required),
471 (2, htlc_id, required),
473 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
474 (0, session_priv, required),
479 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
480 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
481 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
482 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
483 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
486 session_priv: SecretKey,
487 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
488 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
489 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
490 payment_id: PaymentId,
493 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
494 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
495 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
497 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
499 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
501 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
504 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
505 payment_id.hash(hasher);
506 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
512 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
514 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
515 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
516 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
517 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
518 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
519 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
523 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
524 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
525 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
526 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
527 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
528 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
530 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
536 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
537 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
539 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
540 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
541 pub enum FailureCode {
542 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
543 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
544 TemporaryNodeFailure,
545 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
546 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
547 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
548 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
549 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
550 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
551 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
552 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
553 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
554 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
556 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
557 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
558 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
561 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
562 fn into(self) -> u16 {
564 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
565 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
566 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
567 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
572 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
573 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
574 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
575 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
576 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
578 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
579 err: msgs::LightningError,
580 closes_channel: bool,
581 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
583 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
585 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
587 err: LightningError {
589 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
590 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
596 closes_channel: false,
597 shutdown_finish: None,
601 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
602 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
605 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
606 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
607 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
608 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
609 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
610 // commitment upon reconnecting.
611 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
613 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
616 err: LightningError { err, action },
617 closes_channel: true,
618 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
622 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
625 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
627 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
628 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
632 log_level: Level::Warn,
635 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
637 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
639 ChannelError::Close((msg, _reason)) => LightningError {
641 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
642 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
649 closes_channel: false,
650 shutdown_finish: None,
654 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
659 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
660 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
661 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
662 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
663 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
665 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
666 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
667 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
668 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
669 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
670 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
671 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
673 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
677 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
678 struct ClaimingPayment {
680 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
681 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
682 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
683 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
684 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
686 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
687 (0, amount_msat, required),
688 (2, payment_purpose, required),
689 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
690 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
691 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
692 (9, onion_fields, option),
695 struct ClaimablePayment {
696 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
697 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
698 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
701 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
702 struct ClaimablePayments {
703 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
704 /// failed/claimed by the user.
706 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
707 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
709 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
710 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
711 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
713 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
714 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
715 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
716 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
719 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
720 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
721 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
722 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
724 enum BackgroundEvent {
725 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
726 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
727 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
728 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
730 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
731 /// are regenerated on startup.
732 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
733 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
734 /// channel to continue normal operation.
736 /// In general this should be used rather than
737 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
738 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
739 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
741 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
742 /// are regenerated on startup.
743 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 funding_txo: OutPoint,
746 channel_id: ChannelId,
747 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
749 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
750 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
752 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
753 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
754 channel_id: ChannelId,
759 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
760 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
761 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
762 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
763 /// event can be generated.
764 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
765 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
766 /// operation of another channel.
768 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
769 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
770 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
771 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
773 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
774 event: events::Event,
775 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
777 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
778 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
779 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
781 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
782 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
783 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
784 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
785 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
787 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
788 /// stored for later processing.
789 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
790 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
791 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
792 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
793 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
797 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
798 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
799 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
800 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
801 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
802 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
803 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
804 (4, blocking_action, required),
805 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
806 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
807 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
809 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
810 (0, event, upgradable_required),
811 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
812 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
813 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
814 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
815 // downgrades to prior versions.
816 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
820 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
821 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
822 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
823 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
824 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
825 channel_id: ChannelId,
828 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
829 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
830 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
831 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
832 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
833 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
834 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
838 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
839 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
840 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
841 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
842 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
843 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
845 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
846 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
847 channel_id: ChannelId,
848 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
853 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
854 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
855 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
856 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
857 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
862 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
863 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
867 /// State we hold per-peer.
868 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
869 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
871 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
872 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
873 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
875 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
876 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
877 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
878 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
879 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
880 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
881 latest_features: InitFeatures,
882 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
883 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
884 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
885 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
886 /// user but which have not yet completed.
888 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
889 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
890 /// for a missing channel.
891 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
892 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
893 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
895 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
896 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
897 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
898 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
900 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
901 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
902 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
903 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
904 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
905 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
906 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
907 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
908 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
909 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
910 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
911 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
912 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
913 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
914 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
915 pub is_connected: bool,
918 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
919 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
920 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
921 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
922 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
923 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
926 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
928 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
929 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
930 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
931 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
932 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
933 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
936 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
937 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
940 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
941 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
942 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
945 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
946 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
947 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
948 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
952 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
953 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
954 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
955 /// The original OpenChannel message.
956 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
957 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
958 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
961 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
962 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
963 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
965 /// The number of blocks of historical feerate estimates we keep around and consider when deciding
966 /// to force-close a channel for having too-low fees. Also the number of blocks we have to see
967 /// after startup before we consider force-closing channels for having too-low fees.
968 pub(super) const FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS: usize = 144;
970 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
971 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
973 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
976 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
977 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
978 struct PendingInboundPayment {
979 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
980 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
981 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
982 /// this payment being removed.
984 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
985 user_payment_id: u64,
986 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
987 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
988 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
991 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
992 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
993 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
994 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
995 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
996 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
997 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
998 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1000 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1001 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1002 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
1010 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
1013 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1014 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1015 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1020 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1021 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1022 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1023 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1024 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1025 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1026 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1027 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1028 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1030 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1031 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1032 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1041 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1044 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1045 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1046 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1051 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1053 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1055 pub trait AChannelManager {
1056 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1057 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1058 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1059 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1060 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1061 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1063 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1065 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1067 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1069 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1071 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`EcdsaChannelSigner`].
1073 type Signer: EcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1074 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1075 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1076 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1077 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1078 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1079 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1080 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1081 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1082 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1083 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1084 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1085 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1086 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1087 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1088 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1089 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1090 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1091 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1094 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1095 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1097 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1098 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1099 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1100 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1101 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1102 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1106 type Watch = M::Target;
1108 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1110 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1112 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1114 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1115 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1117 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1119 type Router = R::Target;
1121 type Logger = L::Target;
1123 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1126 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1127 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1129 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1130 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1132 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1133 /// closing channels
1134 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1135 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1136 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1137 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1139 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1140 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1142 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1143 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1144 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1145 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1146 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1147 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1149 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1150 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1152 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1154 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1155 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1156 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1157 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1158 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1160 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1161 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1162 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1164 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1165 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1166 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1168 /// # Initialization
1170 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1171 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1172 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1173 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1174 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1177 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1178 /// use bitcoin::network::Network;
1179 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1180 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1181 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1182 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1183 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1184 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1186 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1189 /// # L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1190 /// # ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1191 /// # S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1192 /// # SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1194 /// # R: lightning::io::Read,
1196 /// # fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1197 /// # chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1198 /// # tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1199 /// # router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1201 /// # entropy_source: &ES,
1202 /// # node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1203 /// # signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1204 /// # best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1205 /// # current_timestamp: u32,
1206 /// # mut reader: R,
1207 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1208 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1209 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1210 /// network: Network::Bitcoin,
1213 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1214 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1215 /// fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1216 /// signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1219 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1220 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1221 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1222 /// entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1223 /// router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1225 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1226 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1228 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1231 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1232 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1233 /// chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1241 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1242 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1243 /// called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1244 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1245 /// (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1246 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1247 /// as documented by those traits
1248 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1250 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1251 /// [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1252 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1254 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1255 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1257 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1258 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1259 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1260 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1264 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1265 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1266 /// currently open channels.
1269 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1271 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1272 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1273 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1274 /// for details in channels {
1275 /// println!("{:?}", details);
1280 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1281 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1282 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1283 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1285 /// ## Opening Channels
1287 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1288 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1289 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1292 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1293 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1294 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1295 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1297 /// # trait Wallet {
1298 /// # fn create_funding_transaction(
1299 /// # &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1300 /// # ) -> Transaction;
1303 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1304 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1305 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1306 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1307 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1308 /// Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1309 /// Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1312 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1313 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1314 /// Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1315 /// temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1316 /// user_channel_id, ..
1318 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1319 /// let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1320 /// channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1322 /// match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1323 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1325 /// Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1326 /// Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1329 /// Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1330 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1332 /// "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1333 /// former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1336 /// Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1337 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1338 /// println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1346 /// ## Accepting Channels
1348 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1349 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1350 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1353 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1354 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1355 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1357 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1359 /// # unimplemented!()
1362 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1363 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1364 /// # let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
1365 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1366 /// Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
1367 /// if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1368 /// match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1369 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()
1371 /// Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1372 /// Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1377 /// let user_channel_id = 43;
1378 /// match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1379 /// &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1381 /// Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1382 /// Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1391 /// ## Closing Channels
1393 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1394 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1395 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1396 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1397 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1400 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1401 /// # use lightning::ln::types::ChannelId;
1402 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1403 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1405 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1406 /// # channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1408 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1409 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1410 /// Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1411 /// Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1414 /// // On the event processing thread
1415 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1416 /// Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1417 /// assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1418 /// println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1428 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1429 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1430 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1431 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1432 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1435 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1436 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1437 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1438 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1440 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1442 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1443 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1444 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1445 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1446 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1447 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1449 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1450 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1451 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1454 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1455 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1457 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1458 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1459 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1460 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1461 /// Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1463 /// Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1464 /// println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1467 /// Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1470 /// // On the event processing thread
1471 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1472 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1473 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1474 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1475 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1476 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1478 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1479 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1481 /// PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1482 /// assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1483 /// println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1484 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1489 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1490 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1491 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1499 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1500 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1503 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1504 /// # use lightning::ln::types::PaymentHash;
1505 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1506 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1508 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1509 /// # channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1510 /// # route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1512 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1513 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1514 /// // payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1515 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1516 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1517 /// payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1519 /// Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1520 /// Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1523 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1524 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1526 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1528 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1529 /// payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1530 /// payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1536 /// // On the event processing thread
1537 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1538 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1539 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1546 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1548 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1549 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1550 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1551 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1552 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1553 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1556 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1557 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1558 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1560 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1561 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1562 /// # let absolute_expiry = None;
1563 /// let offer = channel_manager
1564 /// .create_offer_builder(absolute_expiry)?
1566 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1567 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1568 /// # let offer = builder
1569 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1570 /// .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1572 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1574 /// // On the event processing thread
1575 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1576 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1577 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1578 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1579 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1581 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12OfferPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1582 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1587 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1588 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1597 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1598 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1599 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1602 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1603 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1604 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1606 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1607 /// # channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1608 /// # payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1610 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1611 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1612 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1613 /// offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1615 /// Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1616 /// Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1619 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1620 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1622 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1624 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1628 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1630 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1632 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1636 /// // On the event processing thread
1637 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1638 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1639 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1640 /// Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1647 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1649 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1650 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1651 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1652 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1655 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1656 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1657 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1658 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1660 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1661 /// # channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1662 /// # max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1663 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1664 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1665 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1666 /// let refund = channel_manager
1667 /// .create_refund_builder(
1668 /// amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1671 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1672 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1673 /// # let refund = builder
1674 /// .description("coffee".to_string())
1675 /// .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1677 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1679 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1680 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1682 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1684 /// RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1688 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1690 /// channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1692 /// RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, .. }
1696 /// // On the event processing thread
1697 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1698 /// Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1699 /// Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1707 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1708 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1711 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1712 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1713 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1715 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1716 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1717 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1718 /// Ok(invoice) => {
1719 /// let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1720 /// println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1723 /// Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1726 /// // On the event processing thread
1727 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1728 /// Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1729 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1730 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1731 /// println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1732 /// channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1734 /// PaymentPurpose::Bolt12RefundPayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1735 /// println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1740 /// Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1741 /// assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1742 /// println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1752 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1753 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1754 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1755 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1757 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1758 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1759 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1760 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1761 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1762 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1763 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1764 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1765 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1767 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1768 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1769 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1771 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1773 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1774 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1775 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1776 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1777 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1779 /// # DoS Mitigation
1781 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1782 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1783 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1784 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1786 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1787 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1788 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1792 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1793 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1794 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1795 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1796 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1798 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1799 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1800 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1801 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1802 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1803 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1804 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1805 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1806 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1807 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1808 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1809 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1810 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1811 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1812 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1813 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1814 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1815 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1816 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1817 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1818 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1819 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1820 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1821 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1822 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1823 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1824 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1825 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1826 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1827 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1828 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1829 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1830 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1831 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1832 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1833 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1834 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1835 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1836 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1837 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1840 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1841 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1842 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1843 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1844 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1848 // `pending_offers_messages`
1850 // `total_consistency_lock`
1852 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1854 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1856 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1858 // |__`per_peer_state`
1860 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1862 // |__`claimable_payments`
1864 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1868 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1870 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1872 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1876 // |__`pending_events`
1878 // |__`pending_background_events`
1880 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1882 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1883 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1884 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1885 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1886 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1887 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1891 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1892 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1893 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1899 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1901 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1903 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1904 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1906 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1907 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1908 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1909 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1911 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1912 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1914 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1915 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1916 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1917 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1918 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1919 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1920 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1921 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1923 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1925 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1926 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1928 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1930 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1931 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1932 /// and via the classic SCID.
1934 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1935 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1937 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1939 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1941 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1942 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1943 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1945 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1946 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1948 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1950 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1951 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1952 /// and via the classic SCID.
1954 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1955 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1957 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1958 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1960 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1961 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1963 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1964 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1966 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1967 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1968 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1969 /// active channel list on load.
1971 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1972 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1974 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1976 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1977 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1978 /// the handling of the events.
1980 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1981 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1984 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1985 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1986 /// would break backwards compatability.
1987 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1988 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1989 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1991 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1993 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1995 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1997 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1999 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
2000 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
2001 /// confirmation depth.
2003 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
2004 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
2005 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
2007 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2009 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2011 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
2013 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
2015 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
2017 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
2018 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
2019 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2021 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2022 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2024 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2025 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2026 /// keeping additional state.
2027 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2029 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2030 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2031 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2032 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2034 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2035 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2037 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2038 /// are currently open with that peer.
2040 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2041 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2044 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2046 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2047 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2048 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2049 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2050 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2052 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2053 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2054 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2055 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2056 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2058 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2059 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2061 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2062 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2063 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2064 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2065 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2067 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2068 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2070 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2071 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2072 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2073 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2074 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2076 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2078 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2080 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2081 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2082 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2083 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2084 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2085 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2086 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2087 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2088 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2089 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2090 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2092 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2093 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2094 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2096 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2098 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2099 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2101 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2103 /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2104 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2106 /// We only want to force-close our channels on peers based on stale feerates when we're
2107 /// confident the feerate on the channel is *really* stale, not just became stale recently.
2108 /// Thus, we store the fee estimates we had as of the last [`FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS`] blocks
2109 /// (after startup completed) here, and only force-close when channels have a lower feerate
2110 /// than we predicted any time in the last [`FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS`] blocks.
2112 /// We only keep this in memory as we assume any feerates we receive immediately after startup
2113 /// may be bunk (as they often are if Bitcoin Core crashes) and want to delay taking any
2114 /// actions for a day anyway.
2116 /// The first element in the pair is the
2117 /// [`ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee`] estimate, the second the
2118 /// [`ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee`] estimate.
2119 last_days_feerates: Mutex<VecDeque<(u32, u32)>>,
2123 signer_provider: SP,
2128 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2130 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2131 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2132 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2133 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2134 pub struct ChainParameters {
2135 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2136 pub network: Network,
2138 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2140 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2141 pub best_block: BestBlock,
2144 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2148 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2149 SkipPersistNoEvents,
2152 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2153 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2154 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2155 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2156 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2157 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2159 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2160 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2161 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2162 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2163 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2164 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2166 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2167 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2170 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2171 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2172 /// events to handle.
2174 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2175 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2177 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2178 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2181 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2182 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2183 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2184 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2186 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2187 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2188 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2189 should_persist: move || {
2190 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2191 // processing and return that.
2192 let notify = persist_check();
2193 match (notify, force_notify) {
2194 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2195 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2196 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2197 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2198 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2201 _read_guard: read_guard,
2205 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2206 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2207 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2208 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2209 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2210 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2212 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2213 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2214 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2215 should_persist: persist_check,
2216 _read_guard: read_guard,
2221 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2222 fn drop(&mut self) {
2223 match (self.should_persist)() {
2224 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2225 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2226 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2228 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2229 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2230 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2235 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2236 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2238 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2240 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2241 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2242 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2243 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2244 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2246 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2247 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2249 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2251 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2252 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2253 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2254 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2255 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2256 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2257 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2258 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2259 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2260 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2261 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2262 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2263 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2265 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2266 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2268 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2269 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2270 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2271 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2273 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2274 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2275 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2276 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2277 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2278 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2280 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2282 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2283 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2285 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2287 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2288 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2290 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2291 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2292 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2294 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2295 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2296 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2298 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2299 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2300 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2301 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2303 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2304 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2305 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2307 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2308 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2309 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2311 /// The maximum expiration from the current time where an [`Offer`] or [`Refund`] is considered
2312 /// short-lived, while anything with a greater expiration is considered long-lived.
2314 /// Using [`ChannelManager::create_offer_builder`] or [`ChannelManager::create_refund_builder`],
2315 /// will included a [`BlindedPath`] created using:
2316 /// - [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`] when short-lived, and
2317 /// - [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] when long-lived.
2319 /// Using compact [`BlindedPath`]s may provide better privacy as the [`MessageRouter`] could select
2320 /// more hops. However, since they use short channel ids instead of pubkeys, they are more likely to
2321 /// become invalid over time as channels are closed. Thus, they are only suitable for short-term use.
2322 pub const MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60 * 60 * 24);
2324 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2325 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2326 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2327 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2328 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2330 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2331 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2332 payment_id: PaymentId,
2334 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2336 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2337 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2338 payment_id: PaymentId,
2339 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2341 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2342 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2343 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2346 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2347 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2348 /// payment is removed from tracking.
2350 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2351 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2352 payment_id: PaymentId,
2353 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2354 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2355 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2357 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2358 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2359 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2361 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2362 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2363 payment_id: PaymentId,
2364 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2365 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2369 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2371 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2373 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2374 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2375 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2376 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2378 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2379 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2380 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2383 macro_rules! handle_error {
2384 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2385 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2386 // entering the macro.
2387 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2388 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2392 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2393 let mut msg_event = None;
2395 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2396 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2397 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2398 let logger = WithContext::from(
2399 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
2401 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2403 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2404 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2405 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2406 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2411 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2414 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2416 msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2417 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2418 action: err.action.clone()
2422 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2423 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2424 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2425 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2426 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2430 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2437 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2438 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2439 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2440 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2442 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2443 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2444 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2446 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2447 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2448 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2449 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2450 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2452 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2453 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2455 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2459 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2460 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2461 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2463 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2464 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2466 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2467 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2469 ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) => {
2470 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context, None);
2471 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2472 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2473 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2475 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2480 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2481 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2483 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2484 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2486 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2487 match $channel_phase {
2488 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2489 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2491 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2492 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2494 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2495 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2497 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2498 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2499 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2501 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
2502 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2503 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2509 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2510 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2514 let key = *$entry.key();
2515 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2517 $entry.remove_entry();
2525 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2526 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2530 let key = *$entry.key();
2531 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2533 $entry.remove_entry();
2541 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2542 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2544 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2545 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2551 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2552 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2553 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2554 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2555 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2557 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2558 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2559 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2560 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2561 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2562 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2563 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2564 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2565 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2566 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2571 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2572 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2573 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2574 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2575 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2576 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2577 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2578 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2579 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2580 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2582 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2587 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2588 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2589 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2590 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2591 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2592 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2593 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2594 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2595 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2597 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2602 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2603 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2604 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2605 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2606 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2607 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2608 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2609 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2610 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2611 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2612 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2613 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2615 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2616 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2617 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2623 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2624 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2626 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2627 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2628 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2629 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2630 updates.announcement_sigs);
2631 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2632 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2635 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2636 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2637 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2638 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2640 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2641 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2642 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2643 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2644 let mut batch_completed = false;
2645 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2646 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2647 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2648 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2650 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2651 channel_state.2 = true;
2653 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2655 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2657 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2660 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2661 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2662 if batch_completed {
2663 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2664 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2665 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2666 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2667 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2668 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2669 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2670 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2671 chan.set_batch_ready();
2672 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2673 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2677 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2678 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2679 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2684 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2686 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2687 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2689 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2690 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2692 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2693 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2694 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2695 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2700 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2701 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2702 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2703 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context, None);
2705 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2706 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2707 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2708 panic!("{}", err_str);
2710 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2711 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2712 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2715 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2721 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2722 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2723 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2725 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2726 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2727 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2728 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2729 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2730 // filter for uniqueness here.
2731 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2732 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2733 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2734 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2736 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2737 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2739 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2740 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2741 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2747 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2748 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2749 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2750 while !processed_all_events {
2751 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2758 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2759 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2760 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2762 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2763 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2764 result = $self.process_background_events();
2766 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2767 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2768 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2769 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2773 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2774 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2775 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2776 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2779 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2781 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2782 $event_to_handle = event;
2784 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2785 post_event_actions.push(action);
2790 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2791 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2792 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2793 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2794 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2795 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2798 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2799 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2800 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2801 processed_all_events = false;
2805 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2806 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2807 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2809 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2810 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2811 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2817 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2819 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2820 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2821 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2822 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2823 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2824 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2828 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2830 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2832 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2833 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2835 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2837 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2838 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2839 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2842 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2843 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2844 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2846 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2847 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2848 current_timestamp: u32,
2850 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2851 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2852 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2853 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2855 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2856 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2857 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2862 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2864 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2865 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2866 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2867 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2868 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2869 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2870 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2871 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2872 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2874 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2877 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2878 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2880 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2882 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2884 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2886 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2887 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2888 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2889 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2890 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2891 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2892 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2893 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2895 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2896 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2898 last_days_feerates: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2908 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2909 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2910 &self.default_configuration
2913 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2914 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2915 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2918 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2919 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2921 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2923 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2927 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2932 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2934 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2935 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2936 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2937 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2938 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2940 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2941 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2943 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2944 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2945 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2947 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2948 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2949 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2951 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2952 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2954 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2955 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2956 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2957 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2958 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2959 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2961 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2962 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2963 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2964 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2965 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2966 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2969 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2970 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2971 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2975 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2976 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2978 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2980 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2981 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2987 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2988 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2989 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2990 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2991 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2992 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2996 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3001 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3003 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3004 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3005 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3007 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3009 panic!("RNG is bad???");
3012 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3015 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3016 node_id: their_network_key,
3019 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3022 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3023 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3024 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3025 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3026 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3027 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3028 // the same channel.
3029 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3031 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3032 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3033 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3034 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3035 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3036 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3037 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3038 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3039 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3043 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3044 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3045 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3053 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3054 /// more information.
3055 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3056 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3057 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3058 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3059 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3060 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3061 // the same channel.
3062 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3064 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3065 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3066 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3067 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3068 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3069 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3070 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3071 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3079 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3080 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3082 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3083 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3085 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3086 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3087 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3088 // really wanted anyway.
3089 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3092 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3093 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3094 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3095 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3097 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3098 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3099 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3100 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3101 let context_to_details = |context| {
3102 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3104 return peer_state.channel_by_id
3106 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3107 .map(context_to_details)
3113 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3114 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3116 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3117 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3118 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3120 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3121 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3122 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3123 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3124 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3125 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3127 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3128 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3129 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3131 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3132 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3133 payment_id: *payment_id,
3134 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3135 total_msat: *total_msat,
3138 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3139 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3141 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3142 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3144 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3149 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3150 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3152 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3153 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3156 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3158 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3159 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3161 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3162 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3164 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3165 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3166 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3167 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3168 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3169 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3170 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3171 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3173 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3174 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3175 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3176 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3177 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3181 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3182 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3184 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3185 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3186 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3187 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3190 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3191 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3194 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3195 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3197 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3198 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3205 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3206 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3207 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3208 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3211 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3212 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3218 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3219 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3220 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3222 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3223 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3225 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3226 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3227 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3228 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3230 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3232 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3233 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3234 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3237 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3238 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3239 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3240 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3241 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3242 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3245 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3246 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3247 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3249 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3250 /// the channel being closed or not:
3251 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3252 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3253 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3254 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3255 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3256 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3257 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3259 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3260 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3261 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3262 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3264 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3266 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3267 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3268 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3271 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3272 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3273 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3274 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3275 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3278 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3279 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3280 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3281 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3282 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3285 let logger = WithContext::from(
3286 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id), None
3289 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3290 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3291 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3292 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3293 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3294 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3295 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3297 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3298 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3299 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3300 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3301 // ignore the result here.
3302 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3304 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3305 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3306 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3307 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3308 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3309 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3310 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3311 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3312 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3313 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3314 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3315 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3318 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3321 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3322 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3327 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3328 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3329 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3330 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3331 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3332 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3333 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3334 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3337 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3338 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3339 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3343 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3344 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3348 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3349 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3350 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3351 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3352 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3353 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3354 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3355 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3356 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3357 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3358 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3360 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3362 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
3363 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3364 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3365 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3366 mem::drop(peer_state);
3367 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3369 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3370 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3371 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3373 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3374 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3375 // Unfunded channel has no update
3376 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3378 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
3379 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3380 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3381 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3382 // Unfunded channel has no update
3383 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3386 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3387 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3388 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3389 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3391 (None, *peer_node_id)
3393 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3396 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3397 // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3398 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3399 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3404 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3407 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool, error_message: String)
3408 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3409 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3410 log_debug!(self.logger,
3411 "Force-closing channel, The error message sent to the peer : {}", error_message);
3412 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3413 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3414 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3415 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3416 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3417 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3418 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3419 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3420 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3421 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: error_message }
3432 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s),
3433 /// rejecting new HTLCs.
3435 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing
3436 /// channels and should be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3438 /// Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id`
3439 /// isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3440 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, error_message: String)
3441 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3442 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, error_message)
3445 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3446 /// the latest local transaction(s).
3448 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and should
3449 /// be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3451 /// Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3452 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3453 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3454 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3455 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, error_message: String)
3456 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3457 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, error_message)
3460 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3461 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3463 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and should
3464 /// be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3465 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, error_message: String) {
3466 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3467 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id, error_message.clone());
3471 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3472 /// local transaction(s).
3474 /// The provided `error_message` is sent to connected peers for closing channels and
3475 /// should be a human-readable description of what went wrong.
3476 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, error_message: String) {
3477 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3478 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id, error_message.clone());
3482 fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3483 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3484 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3485 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3486 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3487 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3488 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3489 return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3491 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3492 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3493 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3494 // we don't have the channel here.
3495 return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3498 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3499 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3500 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3501 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3502 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3503 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3504 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3505 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3506 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3507 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3508 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3509 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3511 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3514 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3515 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3516 return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3518 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3519 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3520 return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3526 /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3527 /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3528 fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3529 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3531 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3532 None => return None,
3533 Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3536 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3537 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3540 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3541 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3542 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3543 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3546 Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3550 fn can_forward_htlc(
3551 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3552 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3553 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3554 self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3557 Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3559 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3560 // intercept forward.
3561 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3562 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3563 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3565 return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3570 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3571 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3572 cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3574 let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3575 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3577 return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3583 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3584 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3585 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3586 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3587 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3588 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3589 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3590 let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3591 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3592 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3594 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3595 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3597 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3598 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3599 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3601 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3602 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3603 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3604 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3605 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3606 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3607 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3609 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3613 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash)),
3614 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3616 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3617 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3618 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3619 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3620 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3621 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3622 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3626 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3627 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3629 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3631 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3632 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3633 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3634 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3635 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3639 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3640 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3642 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3644 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3645 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3648 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3649 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3650 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3651 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3654 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3655 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3656 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3657 let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3658 self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3659 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3660 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3664 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3667 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3668 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3669 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3670 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3671 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3672 macro_rules! return_err {
3673 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3675 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), Some(msg.payment_hash));
3676 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3677 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3678 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3679 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3680 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3681 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3682 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3683 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3687 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3688 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3689 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3690 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3691 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3697 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3699 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3700 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3701 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3702 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3705 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3706 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3707 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3708 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3709 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3711 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3714 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3715 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3716 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3717 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3718 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3724 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3725 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3726 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3728 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3729 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3730 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3732 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3733 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3734 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3735 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3736 return Err(LightningError {
3737 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3738 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3741 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3742 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3744 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3745 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3746 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3749 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3750 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3751 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3752 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3754 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3755 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3756 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3758 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3759 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3760 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3761 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3762 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3763 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3764 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3768 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3771 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3772 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
3773 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3774 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3776 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3777 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3778 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3779 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3780 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3783 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3784 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3786 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3787 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3788 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3789 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3790 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3791 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3792 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3793 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3795 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3796 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3797 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3799 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3801 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3808 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3809 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3810 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3811 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion: &recipient_onion, total_value,
3812 cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage, session_priv_bytes
3816 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3817 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3818 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3821 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3822 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3823 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3824 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3826 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3827 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3828 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3830 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3831 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3835 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3836 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3838 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None, Some(*payment_hash));
3839 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3840 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3842 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3845 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id), Some(*payment_hash));
3847 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3848 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3850 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3851 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3852 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3853 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3854 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3855 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3856 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3857 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3858 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3859 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3861 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3862 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(*payment_hash));
3863 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3864 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3866 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3867 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3869 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3870 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3871 Some(monitor_update) => {
3872 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3874 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3875 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3876 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3877 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3878 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3879 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3880 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3888 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3891 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3892 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3893 // `channel_by_id` map.
3894 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3895 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3899 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3900 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3902 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3907 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3909 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3910 /// fields for more info.
3912 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3913 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3915 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3917 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3918 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3919 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3920 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3921 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3923 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3924 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3925 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3926 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3927 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3929 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3930 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3931 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3932 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3934 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3936 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3937 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3938 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3940 /// In general, a path may raise:
3941 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3942 /// node public key) is specified.
3943 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3944 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3945 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3946 /// relevant updates.
3948 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3949 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3950 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3952 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3953 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3954 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3955 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3956 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3957 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3958 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3959 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3960 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3961 self.pending_outbound_payments
3962 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3963 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3964 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3967 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3968 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3969 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3970 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3971 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3972 self.pending_outbound_payments
3973 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3974 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3975 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3976 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3980 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3981 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3983 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3984 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3985 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3989 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3990 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3991 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3995 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3996 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3999 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4000 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4001 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4002 self.pending_outbound_payments
4003 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4004 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4005 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4006 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4007 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4011 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4012 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4013 /// retries are exhausted.
4015 /// # Event Generation
4017 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4018 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4020 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4021 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4022 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4024 /// # Requested Invoices
4026 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4027 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4028 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4029 /// once the invoice has been received.
4031 /// # Restart Behavior
4033 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4034 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4035 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4037 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4038 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4039 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4040 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4043 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4044 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4045 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4046 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4047 /// never reach the recipient.
4049 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4050 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4052 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4053 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4055 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4056 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4057 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4058 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4059 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4060 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4061 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4064 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4065 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4067 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4070 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4071 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4072 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4073 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4074 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4075 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4076 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4077 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4080 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4081 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4082 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4083 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4084 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4085 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4086 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4087 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4088 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4091 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4094 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4095 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4098 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4099 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4101 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4102 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4103 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4104 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4105 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4106 let payment_params =
4107 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4109 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4111 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4114 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4115 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4117 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4118 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4119 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4120 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4122 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4123 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4124 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4125 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4126 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4127 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4128 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4129 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4130 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4131 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4133 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4134 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4135 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4136 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4140 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4142 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4143 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4146 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4148 let mut res = Vec::new();
4150 for mut path in route.paths {
4151 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4152 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4153 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4154 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4155 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4158 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4161 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4162 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4164 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4166 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4167 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4172 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4175 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4180 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4181 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4182 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4184 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4185 let used_liquidity =
4186 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4188 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4189 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4191 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4194 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4199 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4200 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4201 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4208 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4209 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4210 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, &'static str>>(
4211 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4212 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4213 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4214 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4215 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4216 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4218 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4219 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4221 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4222 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4223 macro_rules! close_chan { ($err: expr, $api_err: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
4225 let err = if let ChannelError::Close((msg, reason)) = $err {
4226 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
4227 counterparty = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4228 let shutdown_res = $chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4229 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None)
4230 } else { unreachable!(); };
4232 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4233 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4234 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), counterparty);
4237 match find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction) {
4238 Ok(found_funding_txo) => funding_txo = found_funding_txo,
4240 let chan_err = ChannelError::close(err.to_owned());
4241 let api_err = APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err.to_owned() };
4242 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4246 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4247 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger);
4249 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4250 Err((mut chan, chan_err)) => {
4251 let api_err = APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned() };
4252 return close_chan!(chan_err, api_err, chan);
4257 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4258 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4260 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4261 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4264 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4265 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4266 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4270 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4271 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4272 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4276 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4277 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4278 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4280 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4281 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4282 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4283 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4284 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4286 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4287 funding_txo, o.get()
4289 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4290 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4291 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4292 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4293 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4294 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4297 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4304 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4305 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4306 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4310 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4312 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4313 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4315 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4316 /// across the p2p network.
4318 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4319 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4321 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4322 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4323 /// keys per-channel).
4325 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4326 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4327 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4329 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4330 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4331 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4333 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4334 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4335 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4336 /// for more details.
4338 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4339 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4340 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4341 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4344 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4346 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4347 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4349 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4350 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4351 /// signature for each channel.
4353 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4354 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4355 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4356 let mut result = Ok(());
4358 if !funding_transaction.is_coinbase() {
4359 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4360 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4361 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4362 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4367 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4368 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4369 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4373 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4374 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4375 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4376 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4377 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4378 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4379 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4380 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4382 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4383 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4388 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4389 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4390 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4391 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4395 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4396 match states.entry(txid) {
4397 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4398 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4399 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4403 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4406 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4407 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4408 temporary_channel_id,
4409 counterparty_node_id,
4410 funding_transaction.clone(),
4413 let mut output_index = None;
4414 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh();
4415 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4416 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value.to_sat() == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4417 if output_index.is_some() {
4418 return Err("Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value");
4420 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4423 if output_index.is_none() {
4424 return Err("No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event");
4426 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4427 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4428 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4429 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4430 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4431 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4437 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4438 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4439 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4440 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4441 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4442 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4443 .into_iter().flatten()
4444 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4446 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4447 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4449 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4451 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4452 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4453 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4454 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4455 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id).map(|chan| (chan, peer_state)))
4456 .map(|(mut chan, mut peer_state)| {
4457 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4458 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4459 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4460 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4461 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4462 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4463 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4465 data: "Failed to fund channel".to_owned(),
4472 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4473 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4474 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4480 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4482 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4483 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4484 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4485 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4487 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4488 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4490 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4491 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4493 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4495 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4496 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4497 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4498 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4499 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4500 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4501 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4502 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4503 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4504 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4505 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4506 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4507 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4511 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4512 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4513 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4514 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4515 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4516 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4518 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4519 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4520 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4521 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4525 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4526 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4527 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4528 config.apply(config_update);
4529 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4532 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4533 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4534 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4535 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4536 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4537 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4538 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4545 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4546 debug_assert!(false);
4547 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4549 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4550 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4557 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4559 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4560 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4561 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4562 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4564 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4565 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4567 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4568 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4570 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4572 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4573 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4574 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4575 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4576 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4577 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4578 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4579 pub fn update_channel_config(
4580 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4581 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4582 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4585 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4586 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4588 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4589 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4591 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4592 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4593 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4594 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4595 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4597 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4598 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4599 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4602 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4605 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4606 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4607 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4608 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4609 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4610 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4611 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4613 let next_hop_scid = {
4614 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4615 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4616 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4617 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4618 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4619 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4620 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4621 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4622 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4623 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4626 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4628 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4629 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4630 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4633 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4634 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4635 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id), None);
4636 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4637 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4644 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4645 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4646 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4649 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4650 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4651 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4652 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4655 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4657 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4658 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4659 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4660 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4661 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4664 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4665 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4666 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4667 payment.prev_channel_id,
4668 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4669 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4671 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4675 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4676 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4678 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4681 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4682 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4683 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4685 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4686 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4687 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4690 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4691 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4692 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4693 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4694 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4695 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4696 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4697 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4698 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4699 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4702 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4703 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4704 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4705 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4710 fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4711 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4712 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4714 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4715 if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4716 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4717 Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4718 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4719 node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4720 channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4722 None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4723 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4727 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4731 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4732 let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4733 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4734 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4735 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4736 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4737 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4738 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4741 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
4742 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
4743 ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
4744 incoming_channel_details
4746 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4750 let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
4751 let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
4752 for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
4753 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
4754 &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
4756 Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
4758 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
4763 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
4764 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
4766 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
4767 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4768 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(update_add_htlc.payment_hash));
4769 chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
4770 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
4774 Some(Err((err, code))) => {
4775 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
4776 self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4777 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
4782 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4783 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4784 outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4786 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4787 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4790 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4791 None => continue 'outer_loop,
4794 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
4795 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
4796 if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
4797 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
4799 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
4800 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
4801 chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
4803 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4804 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4809 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
4810 &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
4811 incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
4813 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
4814 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
4816 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
4817 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
4818 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
4823 // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
4824 // proposed to as a batch.
4825 let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
4826 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
4827 self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
4828 for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
4829 let failure = match htlc_fail {
4830 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
4831 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
4832 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
4834 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
4835 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
4836 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
4837 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
4840 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
4841 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4842 prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
4843 failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
4849 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4851 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4852 /// Will likely generate further events.
4853 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4854 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4856 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
4858 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4859 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4860 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4862 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4863 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4865 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4866 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4867 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4868 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4870 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4871 match forward_info {
4872 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4873 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4874 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4875 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4876 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4879 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4880 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4881 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(payment_hash));
4882 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4884 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4885 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4886 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4887 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4888 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4889 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4890 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4891 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4892 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4895 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4896 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4898 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4901 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4902 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4908 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4909 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4911 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4915 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4916 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4918 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4922 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4923 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4924 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4925 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4926 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4927 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4928 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4931 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4932 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4933 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4934 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4935 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4937 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4939 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4940 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4944 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4945 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4946 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4947 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4948 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4949 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4951 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4952 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4958 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4961 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4964 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4965 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4966 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4967 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4968 // problem, not ours.
4974 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4975 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4976 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4978 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4982 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4983 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4984 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4985 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4986 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4989 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4990 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4991 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4992 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
4993 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4994 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4995 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4996 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4997 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4998 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4999 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5000 onion_packet, blinded, ..
5001 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5004 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(payment_hash));
5005 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5006 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5007 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5008 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5009 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5010 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5011 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5012 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5013 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5014 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5015 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5017 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5018 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5019 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5020 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5021 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5022 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5025 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5026 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5027 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5030 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5031 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5033 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5035 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5036 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5037 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5038 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5044 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5045 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5047 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5048 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5049 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5051 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5052 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5053 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5054 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5056 Some((res, htlc_id))
5059 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5060 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5061 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5062 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5064 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5066 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5067 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5068 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5074 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5078 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5079 match forward_info {
5080 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5081 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5082 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5083 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5084 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5087 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5088 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5089 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5090 payment_data, payment_metadata, payment_context,
5091 incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs,
5092 requires_blinded_error: _
5094 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5095 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5096 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5097 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5098 Some(payment_data), payment_context, phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5100 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5101 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5102 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5104 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5105 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5109 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5110 payment_data, None, None, onion_fields)
5113 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5116 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5117 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5118 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5119 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5120 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5121 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5122 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5123 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5124 phantom_shared_secret,
5127 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5128 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5129 // if routing nodes overpay
5130 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5131 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5133 total_value_received: None,
5134 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5137 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5140 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5142 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5143 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5144 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5145 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5146 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5147 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5149 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5150 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5151 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5152 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5153 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5154 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5155 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5156 phantom_shared_secret,
5159 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5160 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5162 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5165 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5166 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5167 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5168 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5169 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5172 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5173 ($purpose: expr) => {{
5174 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5175 let is_keysend = $purpose.is_keysend();
5176 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5177 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5178 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5180 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5181 .entry(payment_hash)
5182 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5183 .or_insert_with(|| {
5184 committed_to_claimable = true;
5186 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5189 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5190 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5191 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5192 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5194 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5195 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5196 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5198 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5199 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5200 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5203 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5205 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5206 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5207 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5208 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5209 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5210 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5211 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5212 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5213 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5214 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5216 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5218 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5219 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5220 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5221 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5222 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5223 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5225 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5226 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5227 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5228 committed_to_claimable = true;
5230 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5231 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5232 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5233 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5234 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5235 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5236 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5237 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5238 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5242 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5243 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5244 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5245 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5246 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5248 payment_claimable_generated = true;
5250 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5251 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5253 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5254 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5255 committed_to_claimable = true;
5258 payment_claimable_generated
5262 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5263 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5264 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5265 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5266 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5267 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5268 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5269 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5270 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5271 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5272 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5273 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5274 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5275 Ok(result) => result,
5277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5278 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5281 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5282 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5283 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5284 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5285 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5286 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5289 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5291 payment_data.payment_secret,
5294 check_total_value!(purpose);
5296 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5297 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5298 check_total_value!(purpose);
5302 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5303 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5305 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5307 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5308 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5309 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5310 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5311 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5313 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5314 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5316 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::from_parts(
5317 inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5318 payment_data.payment_secret,
5321 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5322 if payment_claimable_generated {
5323 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5329 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5330 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5338 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5339 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5340 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5341 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5343 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5344 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5346 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5348 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5349 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5350 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5352 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5354 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5355 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5356 events.append(&mut new_events);
5359 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5361 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5362 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5363 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5365 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5367 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5368 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5369 if background_events.is_empty() {
5370 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5373 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5375 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5376 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5377 // monitor updating completing.
5378 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5380 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5381 let mut updated_chan = false;
5383 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5384 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5385 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5386 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5387 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5388 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5389 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5390 updated_chan = true;
5391 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5392 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5394 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5397 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5402 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5403 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5406 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5407 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5408 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5409 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5411 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5412 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5414 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5415 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5416 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5417 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5418 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5424 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5427 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5428 /// Process background events, for functional testing
5429 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5430 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5431 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5434 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5435 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5437 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5439 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5440 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5441 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5443 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5444 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5445 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5446 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5448 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5449 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5451 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5452 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5456 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5457 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5458 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5459 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5460 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5461 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5462 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5464 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5465 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5467 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5468 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5469 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5470 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5471 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5472 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5474 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5479 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5480 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5488 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5490 /// This currently includes:
5491 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5492 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5493 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5495 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5496 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5497 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5498 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5499 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5500 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5501 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5502 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
5504 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5505 /// estimate fetches.
5507 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5508 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5509 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5510 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5511 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5513 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5514 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5516 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5517 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5518 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5519 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5521 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5522 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5523 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5524 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5525 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5526 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5528 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5529 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5530 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
5532 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5533 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5534 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5535 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5536 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5537 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5538 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5539 channel_id: *chan_id,
5540 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5551 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5552 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5553 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5554 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5555 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5556 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5557 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5559 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5560 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5565 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5566 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5568 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5569 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5570 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5571 if needs_close { return false; }
5574 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5575 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5576 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5577 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5578 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5579 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5580 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5581 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5583 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5584 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5585 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5586 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5587 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5591 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5593 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5596 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5598 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5599 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5600 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5601 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5602 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5606 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5608 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5614 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5616 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5617 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
5618 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5619 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5620 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5621 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5622 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5623 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5624 channel_id: *chan_id,
5625 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5633 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5634 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5635 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5637 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5638 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5639 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5641 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5642 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5643 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5644 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5646 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
5647 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5648 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5649 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5654 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5655 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5656 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id), None);
5657 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5658 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5659 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5660 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5661 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5662 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5668 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5670 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5671 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5676 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5677 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5678 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5679 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5680 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5681 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5682 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5683 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5684 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5685 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5686 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5687 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5688 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5689 // have no channels to the peer.
5690 let remove_entry = {
5691 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5692 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5695 entry.remove_entry();
5698 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5703 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5704 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5705 // This should be unreachable
5706 debug_assert!(false);
5709 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5710 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5711 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5712 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5713 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5714 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5715 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5718 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5719 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5720 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5722 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5723 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5730 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5731 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5732 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5733 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5734 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5737 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5738 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5741 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5742 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5745 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5746 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5747 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5748 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5749 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5750 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5751 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5754 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5755 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5758 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5759 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5760 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5761 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5762 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5769 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5770 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5771 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5773 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5774 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5775 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5776 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5778 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5779 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5780 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5781 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5782 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5783 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5786 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5787 /// reason for the failure.
5789 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5790 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5791 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5793 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5794 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5795 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5796 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5797 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5798 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5799 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5804 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5805 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5806 match failure_code {
5807 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5808 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5809 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5810 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5811 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5812 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5814 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5815 let fail_data = match data {
5816 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5819 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5824 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5825 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5827 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5829 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5830 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5831 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5832 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5833 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5834 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5835 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5837 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5839 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5840 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5842 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5847 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5848 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5849 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5850 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5851 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5852 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5853 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5854 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5855 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5856 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5858 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5859 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5860 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5861 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5863 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5864 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5865 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5866 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5867 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5871 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5872 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5873 // be surfaced to the user.
5874 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5875 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5876 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5878 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5879 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5880 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5881 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5882 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5883 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5884 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5885 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5886 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5888 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5889 debug_assert!(false);
5890 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5893 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5895 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5898 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5899 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5900 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5901 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5905 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5906 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
5907 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5910 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5911 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5912 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
5913 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5914 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5915 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5916 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5917 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5918 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5919 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5922 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5923 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5924 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5927 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5928 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5929 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5930 let mut push_forward_event;
5932 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5933 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5934 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5935 &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
5937 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5938 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5939 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5942 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id), Some(*payment_hash)),
5943 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5944 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5946 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5947 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5948 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5949 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5950 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5952 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5954 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5955 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5957 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5958 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5962 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5963 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5965 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5969 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
5970 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5971 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
5972 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5974 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5977 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5980 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5981 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5982 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5983 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5984 failed_next_destination: destination,
5991 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5992 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5994 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5995 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5996 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5997 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5999 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6000 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6001 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6002 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6004 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6005 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6006 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6008 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6009 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6010 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6011 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6012 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6013 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6014 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6015 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6016 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6019 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6020 /// even type numbers.
6024 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6025 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6027 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6028 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6029 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6032 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6033 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6035 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6038 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6039 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6040 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6041 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6042 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6043 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6044 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6045 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6050 let claiming_payment = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments
6051 .entry(payment_hash)
6053 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6054 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6057 .or_insert_with(|| {
6058 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6059 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6061 amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6062 payment_purpose: payment.purpose,
6065 sender_intended_value,
6066 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
6070 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = claiming_payment.onion_fields {
6071 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6072 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6073 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6074 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6075 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6076 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6077 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6078 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6079 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6080 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6089 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6091 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6092 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6093 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6094 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6095 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6096 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6097 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6098 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6099 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6100 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6101 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6102 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6103 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6104 debug_assert!(false);
6108 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6110 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6111 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6112 debug_assert!(false);
6116 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6117 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6119 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6120 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6121 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6122 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6125 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6126 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6127 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6128 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6132 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6133 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6134 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6135 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6136 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6137 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6138 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6141 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6142 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6143 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6144 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id), Some(payment_hash));
6145 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6146 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6151 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6152 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6153 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6154 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6155 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6156 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6157 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6159 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6162 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6163 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6164 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6165 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6169 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6170 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6171 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6172 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6174 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6175 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6176 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6177 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6179 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6180 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6181 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6182 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6186 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6187 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6188 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6192 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6193 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6194 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6197 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6198 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6199 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6200 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6201 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6202 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6203 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
6204 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6207 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6208 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6209 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6211 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6214 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6215 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6217 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6218 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6219 // monitor update as a background event.
6220 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6221 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6222 counterparty_node_id,
6223 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6224 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6225 update: monitor_update.clone(),
6229 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6230 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6235 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6237 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6239 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6240 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6241 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6242 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6243 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6245 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6247 debug_assert!(false,
6248 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6251 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6252 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6253 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6254 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6255 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6257 let mut found_blocker = false;
6258 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6259 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6260 // which case we need to only remove the one
6261 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6262 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6263 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6264 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6266 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6269 debug_assert!(false);
6278 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6279 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6280 counterparty_node_id: None,
6281 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6284 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6288 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6289 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6290 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6291 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6292 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6293 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6294 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6295 // again on restart.
6296 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id), None),
6297 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6298 payment_preimage, update_res);
6301 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6302 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6304 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6305 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6306 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6307 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6308 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6309 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6310 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6311 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6312 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6313 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6316 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6317 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6318 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6319 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6320 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6321 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6325 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6326 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6329 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6330 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6331 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6332 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6335 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6336 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6337 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6338 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6339 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6341 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6342 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6343 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6345 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6346 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6349 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6350 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6351 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6352 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6353 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6354 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6355 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6356 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6357 let chan_to_release =
6358 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6359 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6361 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6362 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6363 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6364 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6369 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6370 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6371 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6372 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6373 // in the background.
6374 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6375 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6376 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6377 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6379 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6380 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6381 funding_txo, update, ..
6383 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6384 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6385 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6386 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6388 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6394 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6395 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6396 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6398 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6399 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6401 monitor_update.updates[0],
6402 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6407 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6408 // immediately once we get going.
6409 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6412 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6414 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6417 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6418 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6419 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6420 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6421 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6422 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6423 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6427 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6428 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6429 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6432 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6433 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6434 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6435 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6436 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6437 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6438 prev_user_channel_id,
6439 next_user_channel_id,
6440 total_fee_earned_msat,
6442 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6443 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6445 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6449 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6450 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6451 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6457 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6458 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6459 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6462 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6463 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6464 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6465 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6467 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6469 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6470 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6471 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6473 payment_purpose: purpose,
6476 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6479 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6483 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6485 sender_intended_total_msat,
6490 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6491 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6493 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6494 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6495 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6498 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6499 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6501 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6502 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6503 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6504 downstream_channel_id,
6505 Some(blocking_action),
6512 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6513 /// update completion.
6514 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6515 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6516 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6517 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6518 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6519 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6520 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6521 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6522 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6523 &channel.context.channel_id(),
6524 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6525 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6526 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6527 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6528 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6529 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6531 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6532 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6534 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6535 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6536 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6537 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6539 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6540 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6541 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6544 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6545 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6547 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6548 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6549 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6554 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6555 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6556 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6557 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6562 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6563 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6564 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6565 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6566 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6571 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6575 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6581 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6582 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6583 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6587 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6588 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6589 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6592 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6595 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6596 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6598 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6599 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6601 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6602 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6603 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6604 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6605 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6610 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6611 let mut peer_state_lock;
6612 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6613 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6614 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6615 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6617 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6620 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6621 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6622 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6623 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6624 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6627 let remaining_in_flight =
6628 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6629 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6632 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
6633 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6634 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6635 remaining_in_flight);
6636 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6639 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6642 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6644 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6645 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6648 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6649 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6650 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6652 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6653 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6654 /// used to accept such channels.
6656 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6657 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6658 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6659 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6662 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6663 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6665 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6666 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6667 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6669 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6670 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6672 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6673 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6675 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6676 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6678 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6679 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6680 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6681 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6684 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6686 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id), None);
6687 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6689 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6690 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6692 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6694 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6695 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6697 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6699 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6700 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6701 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6703 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6704 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6705 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6707 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6708 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6709 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6710 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6711 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6712 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6713 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6716 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6717 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6719 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6725 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6726 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6727 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6728 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6730 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6734 Ok(mut channel) => {
6736 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6737 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6738 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6739 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6740 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6741 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6742 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6745 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6746 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6747 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6749 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6751 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6752 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6753 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6754 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6755 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6756 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6757 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6758 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6761 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6762 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6763 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6765 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6769 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6770 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6771 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6773 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6774 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6775 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6778 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6785 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6786 /// or 0-conf channels.
6788 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6789 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6790 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6791 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6792 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6793 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6795 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6796 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6797 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6798 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6799 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6800 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6801 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6805 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6808 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6809 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6811 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6812 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6814 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6815 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6816 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6817 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6818 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6820 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6823 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6824 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6825 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6828 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6829 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6830 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6831 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6832 // included in the unfunded count.
6833 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6834 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6835 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6838 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6839 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6842 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
6843 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
6844 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6845 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6850 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6853 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6854 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6855 // likely to be lost on restart!
6856 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6857 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6858 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6861 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6862 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6863 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6866 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6867 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6868 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6869 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6870 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6872 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6873 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6875 debug_assert!(false);
6876 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6877 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6878 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6880 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6881 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6883 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6884 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6885 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6886 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6887 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6888 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6890 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6891 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6892 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6895 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6896 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6897 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6898 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6899 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6902 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6903 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6905 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6906 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6907 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6910 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6911 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6912 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6913 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6915 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6917 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6918 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6919 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6920 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6921 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6922 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6925 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6926 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6927 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6932 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6933 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6934 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6935 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6936 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6937 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6938 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6941 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6946 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6947 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6948 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6949 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6950 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6952 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6953 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6954 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6955 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6958 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6959 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6961 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6962 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6963 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6965 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6969 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6970 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6971 // likely to be lost on restart!
6972 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6973 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6974 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6976 debug_assert!(false);
6977 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6979 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6980 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6981 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6982 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6983 match phase.get_mut() {
6984 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6985 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6986 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6989 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6993 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6996 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6997 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6998 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6999 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7000 channel_value_satoshis: value,
7002 user_channel_id: user_id,
7007 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7008 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7010 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7011 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7013 debug_assert!(false);
7014 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7017 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7018 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7019 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7020 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7021 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7022 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context, None);
7023 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7025 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7026 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7027 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7028 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7029 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7030 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7031 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7032 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7033 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7037 Some(mut phase) => {
7038 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7039 let err = ChannelError::close(err_msg);
7040 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7042 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7045 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7047 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7048 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7049 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7050 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7051 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7052 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7054 let err = ChannelError::close($err.to_owned());
7055 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7056 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7059 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7060 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7061 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7063 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7064 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7065 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7066 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7067 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7069 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7070 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7071 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7072 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7073 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7075 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7076 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7077 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7078 // until we have persisted our monitor.
7079 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7080 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7081 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7086 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7087 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7088 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7090 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7094 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7095 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7096 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7104 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7105 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7106 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7107 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7109 debug_assert!(false);
7110 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7113 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7114 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7115 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7116 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7117 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7118 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7119 let logger = WithContext::from(
7121 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7122 Some(chan.context.channel_id()),
7126 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7128 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7129 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7130 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7131 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7132 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7133 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7134 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7135 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7136 } else { unreachable!(); }
7139 let e = ChannelError::close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7140 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7141 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7142 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7143 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7144 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7145 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7149 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7150 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7151 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7152 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7153 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7154 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7158 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7161 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7165 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7166 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7167 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7168 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7169 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7171 debug_assert!(false);
7172 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7174 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7175 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7176 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7177 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7178 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7179 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7180 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7181 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7182 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7183 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7184 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7185 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7186 msg: announcement_sigs,
7188 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7189 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7190 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7191 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7192 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7193 // announcement_signatures.
7194 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7195 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7196 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7197 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7204 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7205 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7210 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7211 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7214 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7215 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7220 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7221 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7222 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7224 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7225 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7227 debug_assert!(false);
7228 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7230 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7231 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7232 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7233 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7235 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7236 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7237 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7238 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7240 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7243 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7244 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7245 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7246 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7248 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7249 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7250 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7251 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7252 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7253 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7257 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7258 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7259 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7260 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7263 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7264 let context = phase.context_mut();
7265 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context, None);
7266 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7267 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7268 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7270 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7271 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7272 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7273 let context = phase.context_mut();
7274 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7275 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7276 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7280 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7283 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7284 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7285 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7286 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7288 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7289 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7295 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7296 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7297 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7299 debug_assert!(false);
7300 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7302 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7303 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7304 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7305 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7306 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7307 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7308 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7309 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7310 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7311 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7312 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7317 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7318 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7319 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7320 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7321 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7322 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7323 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7325 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7326 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7329 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7332 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7333 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7334 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id, None), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7335 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7337 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7338 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7339 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7340 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7345 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7346 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7347 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7352 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7353 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7354 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7355 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7357 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7358 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7359 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7360 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7362 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7363 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7365 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7366 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7367 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7369 debug_assert!(false);
7370 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7372 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7373 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7374 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7375 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7376 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7377 let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7378 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7379 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7380 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7381 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7383 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7385 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, Some(msg.payment_hash));
7386 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7387 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7388 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7389 if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7390 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7391 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7392 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7393 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7394 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7395 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7396 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7400 match pending_forward_info {
7401 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7402 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7404 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7405 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7406 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7407 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7408 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7410 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7411 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7412 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7413 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7414 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7417 pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7423 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, &self.fee_estimator), chan_phase_entry);
7425 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7426 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7434 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7436 let next_user_channel_id;
7437 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7438 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7439 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7441 debug_assert!(false);
7442 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7444 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7445 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7446 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7447 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7448 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7449 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7450 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7451 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7453 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7455 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7456 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7457 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7459 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7460 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7461 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7462 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7463 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7464 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7465 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7466 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7469 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7470 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7473 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7476 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7477 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7478 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7484 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7485 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7486 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7487 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7488 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7490 debug_assert!(false);
7491 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7495 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7496 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7497 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7498 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7500 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7501 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7504 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7509 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7510 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7511 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7512 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7513 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7515 debug_assert!(false);
7516 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7518 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7519 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7520 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7522 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7523 let chan_err = ChannelError::close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7524 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7526 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7527 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7529 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7530 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7534 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7538 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7539 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7540 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7542 debug_assert!(false);
7543 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7545 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7546 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7547 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7548 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7549 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7550 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7551 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7552 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7553 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7554 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7555 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7559 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7560 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7563 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7567 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7568 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7569 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7570 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7571 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7572 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7573 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7574 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7576 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7580 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7581 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7582 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7586 fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7587 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7588 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7589 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7590 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7591 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7592 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7593 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7594 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7595 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7596 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7598 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7599 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7601 let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7602 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7603 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7604 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7605 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7606 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7607 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7609 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7610 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7611 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7613 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7614 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7615 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7616 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7617 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7618 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7619 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7620 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7621 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7624 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7625 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7627 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7628 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id), Some(forward_info.payment_hash));
7629 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7630 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7631 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7632 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7633 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7634 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7635 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7636 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7637 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7638 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7641 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7642 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7643 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7648 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7649 // payments are being processed.
7650 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7651 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7652 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7659 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7660 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7663 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7664 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7665 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7671 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7672 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7673 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7674 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7675 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7677 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7678 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7679 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7680 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7681 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7682 // real by taking more time.
7683 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7684 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7685 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7690 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7691 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7692 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7693 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7694 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7695 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7696 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7698 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7699 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7700 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7701 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7702 channel_funding_outpoint,
7704 counterparty_node_id,
7709 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7710 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7711 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7713 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7714 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7715 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7716 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7718 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7719 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7720 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7726 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7727 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7729 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7731 debug_assert!(false);
7732 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7733 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7734 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7735 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7736 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7737 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7738 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7739 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7740 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7741 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7742 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7743 *counterparty_node_id)
7745 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7746 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7747 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7748 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7749 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7750 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7751 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7755 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7756 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7759 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7762 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7766 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7768 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7770 debug_assert!(false);
7771 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7773 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7774 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7775 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7776 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7777 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7778 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7779 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7781 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7782 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7785 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7790 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7792 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7794 debug_assert!(false);
7795 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7797 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7798 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7799 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7800 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7801 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7802 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7803 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7806 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7807 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7808 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7809 msg, &self.default_configuration
7810 ), chan_phase_entry),
7811 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7812 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7813 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7816 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7817 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7825 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7826 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7827 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7828 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7830 // It's not a local channel
7831 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7835 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7836 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7837 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7839 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7841 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7842 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7843 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7844 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7845 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7846 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7847 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7848 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7849 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7851 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7853 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7854 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7855 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7856 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7858 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
7859 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7860 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7861 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7864 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7868 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7869 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7874 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7877 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7878 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7879 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7881 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7883 debug_assert!(false);
7884 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7885 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7889 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id), None);
7890 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7891 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7892 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7893 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7894 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7895 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7896 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7897 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7898 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7899 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7900 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7901 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7902 let mut channel_update = None;
7903 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7904 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7905 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7908 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7909 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7910 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7911 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7912 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7913 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7914 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7919 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7920 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7921 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7922 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7923 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7924 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7925 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7926 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7930 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::close(
7931 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7934 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7935 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7937 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7938 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7939 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7940 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7941 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7942 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7944 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7945 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7946 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7947 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7948 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7949 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7950 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7951 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7952 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7953 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7954 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7955 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7956 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7957 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7958 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7959 next_funding_txid: None,
7962 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7963 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7964 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7970 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7971 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7973 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
7976 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7977 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7978 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7980 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7981 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7982 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7983 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7984 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7985 match monitor_event {
7986 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7987 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id), Some(htlc_update.payment_hash));
7988 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7989 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7990 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7991 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7992 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7994 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7995 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7996 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7997 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8000 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8001 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8002 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8004 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8005 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8006 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8007 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8010 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8012 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8013 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8014 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8015 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8016 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8017 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8018 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8021 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8023 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8024 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8025 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8026 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8030 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8031 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8032 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8033 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8041 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8042 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8048 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8049 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8052 has_pending_monitor_events
8055 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8056 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8057 /// update events as a separate process method here.
8059 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8060 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8061 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8064 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8065 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8066 /// update was applied.
8067 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8068 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8069 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8071 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8072 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8073 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8074 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8076 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8077 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8079 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8080 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8081 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8082 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8084 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8085 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8086 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8087 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None));
8088 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8089 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8091 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8092 has_monitor_update = true;
8094 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8095 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8096 continue 'peer_loop;
8105 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8106 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8107 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8113 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8114 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8116 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8117 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8119 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8120 #[cfg(async_signing)]
8121 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8122 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8124 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8125 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8127 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8128 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8129 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8130 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8135 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8136 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8141 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8142 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8145 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8146 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8147 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8153 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8157 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8158 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8159 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8160 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8161 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8162 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8163 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8167 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8168 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8169 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8170 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8171 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8177 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8178 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8179 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8180 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8181 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8182 let mut has_update = false;
8183 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8187 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8188 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8189 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8190 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8191 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8193 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8194 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
8195 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8196 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8197 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8199 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8200 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8203 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8204 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8205 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8207 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8208 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8209 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8210 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8211 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8212 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8217 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8218 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8219 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8225 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8226 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8231 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8237 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8238 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8241 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8242 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8248 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8249 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8251 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8252 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8253 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8254 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8255 // reorganized out of the main chain.
8256 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8257 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8258 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8259 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8260 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8261 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8262 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8263 assert!(should_broadcast);
8264 } else { unreachable!(); }
8265 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8266 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8267 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8270 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8275 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8276 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8277 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer's
8278 /// expiration will be `absolute_expiry` if `Some`, otherwise it will not expire.
8282 /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer based on the given
8283 /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
8284 /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
8285 /// [`MessageRouter`].
8287 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8291 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8296 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8298 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8299 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8300 pub fn create_offer_builder(
8301 &$self, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>
8302 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8303 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8304 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8305 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8306 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8308 let path = $self.create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8309 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8310 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8311 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8313 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8316 let builder = match absolute_expiry {
8318 Some(absolute_expiry) => builder.absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry),
8325 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8326 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8327 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8331 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8332 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8334 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8335 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8336 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8339 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8340 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8341 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8343 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8344 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8348 /// Uses [`MessageRouter`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund based on the given
8349 /// `absolute_expiry` according to [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`]. See those docs for
8350 /// privacy implications as well as those of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements
8351 /// [`MessageRouter`].
8353 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8357 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8358 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8363 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8364 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8365 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8367 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8368 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8369 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8370 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8371 pub fn create_refund_builder(
8372 &$self, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, payment_id: PaymentId,
8373 retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8374 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8375 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8376 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8377 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8378 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8380 let path = $self.create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(Some(absolute_expiry))
8381 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8382 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8383 node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8385 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8386 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8389 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8391 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8392 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8393 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8394 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8396 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8402 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8404 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8405 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8406 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8407 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8408 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8409 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8413 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8414 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8415 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8416 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8419 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8421 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8423 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8424 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8425 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8427 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8428 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8429 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8430 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8431 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8432 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8433 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8435 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8436 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8440 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8441 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8444 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8445 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8446 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8450 /// For payer privacy, uses a derived payer id and uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`]
8451 /// to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path. For further privacy implications, see the
8452 /// docs of the parameterized [`Router`], which implements [`MessageRouter`].
8456 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8457 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8458 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8463 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8464 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8465 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8466 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8469 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8470 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8471 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8472 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8473 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8474 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8475 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8476 pub fn pay_for_offer(
8477 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8478 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8479 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8480 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8481 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8482 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8483 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8485 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8486 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8488 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8490 let builder = match quantity {
8492 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8494 let builder = match amount_msats {
8496 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8498 let builder = match payer_note {
8500 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8502 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8503 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8505 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8507 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8508 self.pending_outbound_payments
8509 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8510 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8512 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8514 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8515 if !offer.paths().is_empty() {
8516 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8517 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8518 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8519 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8520 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8521 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8522 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8523 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8524 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8526 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8528 } else if let Some(signing_pubkey) = offer.signing_pubkey() {
8529 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8530 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8531 Destination::Node(signing_pubkey),
8534 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8536 debug_assert!(false);
8537 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::MissingSigningPubkey);
8543 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8546 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8547 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8548 /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8552 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8553 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8554 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8555 /// received and no retries will be made.
8560 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8561 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8564 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8565 pub fn request_refund_payment(
8566 &self, refund: &Refund
8567 ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8568 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8569 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8570 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8572 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8573 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8575 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8576 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8579 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8581 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8582 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8583 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Refund(Bolt12RefundContext {});
8584 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8585 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
8587 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8589 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8590 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8591 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8593 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8594 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8595 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8597 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8598 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8599 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8601 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8602 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8603 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8604 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8606 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8607 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8608 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8609 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8610 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8613 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8615 for path in refund.paths() {
8616 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8617 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8618 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8619 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8621 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8627 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8631 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8634 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8635 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8637 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`] event, which
8638 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] return `Some` for [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]. That
8639 /// should then be passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8641 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8643 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8644 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8648 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8649 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8651 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8653 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8654 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8656 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8657 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8658 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8659 /// [`PaymentPurpose::preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::preimage
8660 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8661 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8662 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8663 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8664 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8665 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8668 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8669 /// stored external to LDK.
8671 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8672 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8673 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8675 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8676 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8679 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8680 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8681 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8682 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8684 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8685 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8686 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8687 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8688 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8690 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8691 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8692 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8693 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8694 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8696 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8697 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8699 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8700 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8704 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8705 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8707 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8709 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8710 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8712 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8713 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8714 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8715 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8716 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8717 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8718 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8721 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8722 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8724 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8725 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8726 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8729 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter`] based on the path's intended
8732 /// Whether or not the path is compact depends on whether the path is short-lived or long-lived,
8733 /// respectively, based on the given `absolute_expiry` as seconds since the Unix epoch. See
8734 /// [`MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY`].
8735 fn create_blinded_path_using_absolute_expiry(
8736 &self, absolute_expiry: Option<Duration>
8737 ) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8738 let now = self.duration_since_epoch();
8739 let max_short_lived_absolute_expiry = now.saturating_add(MAX_SHORT_LIVED_RELATIVE_EXPIRY);
8741 if absolute_expiry.unwrap_or(Duration::MAX) <= max_short_lived_absolute_expiry {
8742 self.create_compact_blinded_path()
8744 self.create_blinded_path()
8748 pub(super) fn duration_since_epoch(&self) -> Duration {
8749 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8750 let now = Duration::from_secs(
8751 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8753 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8754 let now = std::time::SystemTime::now()
8755 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
8756 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
8761 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8763 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8764 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8765 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8766 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8768 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8770 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8771 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
8772 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8773 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8774 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8777 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8778 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8781 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_compact_blinded_paths`].
8783 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8784 fn create_compact_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8785 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8786 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8788 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8790 .map(|(node_id, peer_state)| (node_id, peer_state.lock().unwrap()))
8791 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.is_connected)
8792 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8793 .map(|(node_id, peer)| ForwardNode {
8795 short_channel_id: peer.channel_by_id
8797 .filter(|(_, channel)| channel.context().is_usable())
8798 .min_by_key(|(_, channel)| channel.context().channel_creation_height)
8799 .and_then(|(_, channel)| channel.context().get_short_channel_id()),
8801 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8804 .create_compact_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8805 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8808 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8809 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8810 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8811 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret, payment_context: PaymentContext
8812 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8813 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8815 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8816 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8817 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8818 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8819 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8821 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8823 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8827 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8828 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8832 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8833 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8835 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8836 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8837 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8838 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8840 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8841 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8842 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8843 Some(_) => continue,
8844 None => return scid_candidate
8849 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8851 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8852 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8854 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8855 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8856 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8860 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8861 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8862 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8864 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8865 /// times to get a unique scid.
8866 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8867 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8868 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8870 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8871 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8872 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8873 return scid_candidate
8877 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8878 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8879 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8880 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8883 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8884 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8885 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8886 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8887 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8889 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8890 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8891 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8900 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8901 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8902 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8903 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8904 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8908 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8909 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8910 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8911 events.push_back((event, None));
8915 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8916 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8917 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8921 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8922 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8926 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8927 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8930 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8931 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8932 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8933 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8934 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8935 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8936 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8938 let logger = WithContext::from(
8939 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id), None
8942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8943 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8944 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8946 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8947 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8948 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8949 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8951 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8955 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8956 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8957 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8958 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8959 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8960 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8965 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8967 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8968 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8969 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8970 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8972 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8973 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8974 if further_update_exists {
8975 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8980 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8987 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8988 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8994 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8995 for action in actions {
8997 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8998 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9000 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9006 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9007 /// using the given event handler.
9009 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9010 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9014 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9018 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9020 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9021 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9022 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9023 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9024 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9025 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9029 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9030 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9031 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9032 /// is always placed next to each other.
9034 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9035 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9036 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9037 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9039 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9040 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9041 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9042 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9043 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9044 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9045 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9047 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9048 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9049 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9050 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9053 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9054 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9056 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9057 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9060 let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9061 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9062 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9063 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9064 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9065 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9066 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9067 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9069 if peer_state.is_connected {
9070 is_any_peer_connected = true
9074 // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9075 if is_any_peer_connected {
9076 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9077 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9080 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9081 events.replace(pending_events);
9090 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9092 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9093 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9094 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9095 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9096 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9097 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9101 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9103 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9104 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9105 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9107 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9111 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9113 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9114 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9115 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9116 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9117 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9118 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9122 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9124 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9125 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9126 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9127 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9128 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9131 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9132 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9135 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9136 let _persistence_guard =
9137 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9138 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9139 let new_height = height - 1;
9141 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9142 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9143 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9144 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9145 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9146 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9149 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9153 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9155 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9156 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9157 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9158 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9159 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9164 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9165 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9166 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9167 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9169 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9170 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9172 let _persistence_guard =
9173 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9174 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9175 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9176 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9178 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9179 if height < last_best_block_height {
9180 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9181 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)));
9185 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9186 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9187 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9188 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9190 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9191 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9193 let _persistence_guard =
9194 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9195 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9196 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9198 let mut min_anchor_feerate = None;
9199 let mut min_non_anchor_feerate = None;
9200 if self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Relaxed) {
9201 // If we're past the startup phase, update our feerate cache
9202 let mut last_days_feerates = self.last_days_feerates.lock().unwrap();
9203 if last_days_feerates.len() >= FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS {
9204 last_days_feerates.pop_front();
9206 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator
9207 .bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee);
9208 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator
9209 .bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee);
9210 last_days_feerates.push_back((anchor_feerate, non_anchor_feerate));
9211 if last_days_feerates.len() >= FEERATE_TRACKING_BLOCKS {
9212 min_anchor_feerate = last_days_feerates.iter().map(|(f, _)| f).min().copied();
9213 min_non_anchor_feerate = last_days_feerates.iter().map(|(_, f)| f).min().copied();
9217 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| {
9218 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9219 if channel.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
9220 if let Some(feerate) = min_anchor_feerate {
9221 channel.check_for_stale_feerate(&logger, feerate)?;
9224 if let Some(feerate) = min_non_anchor_feerate {
9225 channel.check_for_stale_feerate(&logger, feerate)?;
9228 channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None))
9231 macro_rules! max_time {
9232 ($timestamp: expr) => {
9234 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9235 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9236 // having an explicit local time source.
9237 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9238 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9239 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9240 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9241 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9247 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9248 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9249 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9250 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9254 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9255 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9256 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9257 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9258 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9259 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9260 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9261 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9262 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9263 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9264 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9271 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9272 let _persistence_guard =
9273 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9274 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9275 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9276 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9277 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9278 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9279 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9280 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9285 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9287 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9288 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9289 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9290 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9291 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9292 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9296 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9297 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9299 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9300 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9301 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9302 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9303 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9305 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9306 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9308 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9309 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9310 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9311 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9312 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9314 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9316 // Retain unfunded channels.
9317 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9318 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9319 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9320 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9321 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9322 let res = f(channel);
9323 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9324 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9325 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9326 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9327 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9329 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context, None);
9330 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9331 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9332 if channel.context.is_usable() {
9333 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9334 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9335 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9336 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9341 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9346 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9347 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9350 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9351 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9352 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9353 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9354 msg: announcement_sigs,
9356 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9357 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9358 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9360 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9361 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9362 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9367 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9368 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9369 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9370 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9371 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9372 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9373 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9374 // is always consistent.
9375 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9376 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9377 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9378 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9379 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9382 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9383 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9384 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9385 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9386 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9387 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9388 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9389 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9390 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9394 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9395 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9396 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9397 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9398 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9399 data: reason_message,
9412 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9413 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9414 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9415 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9416 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9417 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9418 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9419 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9420 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9421 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9423 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9424 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9425 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9429 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9432 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9433 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9434 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9435 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9436 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9437 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9438 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9439 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9440 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9441 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9442 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9443 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9446 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9447 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9448 _ => unreachable!(),
9450 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9451 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9452 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9453 let logger = WithContext::from(
9454 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id), Some(htlc.forward_info.payment_hash)
9456 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9462 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9464 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9465 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9469 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9470 /// may have events that need processing.
9472 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9473 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9475 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9476 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9477 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9478 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9481 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9483 /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9484 /// indicates this should be checked.
9485 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9486 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9489 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9490 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9491 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9494 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9495 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9496 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9497 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9500 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9501 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9502 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9503 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9506 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9507 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9509 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9510 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9511 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9512 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9513 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9516 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9517 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9518 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9519 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9522 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9523 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9524 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9525 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9528 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9529 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9530 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9531 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9534 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9535 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9536 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9537 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9541 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9542 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9544 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9545 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9546 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9547 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9548 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9549 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9553 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9554 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9555 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9556 // change to the contents.
9557 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9558 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9559 let persist = match &res {
9560 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9561 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9562 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9564 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9566 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9571 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9572 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9573 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9574 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9577 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9578 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9579 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9580 // change to the contents.
9581 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9582 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9583 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9587 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9588 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9589 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9590 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9593 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9594 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9595 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9598 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9599 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9600 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9603 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9604 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9605 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9606 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9607 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9609 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9610 let persist = match &res {
9611 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9612 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9614 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9619 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9620 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9621 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9622 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9626 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9627 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9628 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9629 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9633 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9634 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9635 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9636 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9640 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9641 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9642 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9643 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9646 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9648 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9651 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9652 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9653 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9656 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9657 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9658 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9659 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9660 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9661 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9662 let persist = match &res {
9663 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9664 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9665 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9667 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9672 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9673 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9674 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9677 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9678 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9679 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9680 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9681 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9682 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9683 let persist = match &res {
9684 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9685 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9686 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9688 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9693 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9694 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9695 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9696 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9697 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9698 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9699 let persist = match &res {
9700 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9701 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9702 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9704 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9709 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9710 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9711 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9714 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9715 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9716 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9719 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9720 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9721 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9722 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9723 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9724 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9725 let persist = match &res {
9726 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9727 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9728 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9730 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9735 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9736 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9737 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9740 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9741 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9742 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9745 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9750 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9751 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9752 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9753 let persist = match &res {
9754 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9755 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9756 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9758 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9763 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9764 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9765 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9766 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9767 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9770 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None),
9771 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9772 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9774 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9775 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9776 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9777 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9778 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9779 let context = match phase {
9780 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9781 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9782 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9783 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9788 // If we get disconnected and haven't yet committed to a funding
9789 // transaction, we can replay the `open_channel` on reconnection, so don't
9790 // bother dropping the channel here. However, if we already committed to
9791 // the funding transaction we don't yet support replaying the funding
9792 // handshake (and bailing if the peer rejects it), so we force-close in
9794 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) if chan.is_resumable() => return true,
9795 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &mut chan.context,
9796 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9797 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9800 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9801 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9804 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9805 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9809 // Clean up for removal.
9810 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9811 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9814 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9815 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9816 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9817 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9819 // V1 Channel Establishment
9820 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9821 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9822 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9823 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9824 // V2 Channel Establishment
9825 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9826 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9827 // Common Channel Establishment
9828 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9829 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9831 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9833 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9834 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9835 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9836 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9837 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9838 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9839 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9840 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9841 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9842 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9843 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9844 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9845 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9846 // Channel Operations
9847 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9848 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9849 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9850 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9851 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9852 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9854 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9855 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9856 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
9857 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
9858 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
9859 debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
9862 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9863 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9864 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9865 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9866 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9867 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9870 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9871 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9872 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9873 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9876 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9878 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9880 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9881 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9885 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9886 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None, None);
9887 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9888 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9892 let mut res = Ok(());
9894 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9895 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9896 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9897 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9898 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9899 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9900 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9903 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9904 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9905 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9906 if inbound_peer_limited {
9908 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9910 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9911 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9912 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9913 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9914 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9915 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9916 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9917 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9921 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9922 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9923 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9925 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9926 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9927 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9928 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9931 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9934 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9935 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9940 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9942 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9943 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9944 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9945 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9946 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9948 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9950 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9951 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context, None);
9952 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9953 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9954 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9958 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9959 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9960 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9961 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9965 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
9966 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9967 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9968 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9969 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9970 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9974 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9975 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9976 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9977 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9978 debug_assert!(false);
9981 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))] is removed.
9982 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9983 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9984 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9985 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9986 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9987 debug_assert!(false);
9993 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9994 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9999 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10000 match &msg.data as &str {
10001 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10002 "link failed to shutdown" =>
10004 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10005 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10006 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10007 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10008 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10009 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10010 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10011 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10012 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10014 || -> NotifyOption {
10015 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10016 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10017 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10018 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10019 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10020 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10021 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10022 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10026 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10027 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10028 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10029 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10030 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10031 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10033 log_level: Level::Trace,
10036 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10037 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10038 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10040 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10049 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10051 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10052 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10053 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10054 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10055 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10056 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10057 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10058 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10059 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10060 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10061 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10063 for channel_id in channel_ids {
10064 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10065 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10069 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10070 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10071 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10072 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10073 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10074 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10075 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10076 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10077 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10078 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10079 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10085 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10086 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10087 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10088 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10089 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10095 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10096 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
10097 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10101 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10102 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10106 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10107 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10110 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10111 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10114 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10115 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10118 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10119 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10120 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10121 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10124 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10125 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10126 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10127 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10130 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10131 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10132 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10133 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10136 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10137 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10138 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10139 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10142 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10143 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10144 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10145 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10148 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10149 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10150 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10151 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10154 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10155 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10156 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10157 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10160 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10161 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10162 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10163 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10166 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10167 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10168 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10169 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10173 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10174 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10176 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10177 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10178 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10179 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10180 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10181 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10185 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage, responder: Option<Responder>) -> ResponseInstruction<OffersMessage> {
10186 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10187 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10190 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10191 let responder = match responder {
10192 Some(responder) => responder,
10193 None => return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10195 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10198 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10199 Err(error) => return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10201 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10202 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10204 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10205 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10209 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10210 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10211 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10213 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10215 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10216 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10220 let payment_context = PaymentContext::Bolt12Offer(Bolt12OfferContext {
10221 offer_id: invoice_request.offer_id,
10222 invoice_request: invoice_request.fields(),
10224 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10225 amount_msats, payment_secret, payment_context
10227 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10229 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10230 return responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10234 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10235 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10236 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10239 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10240 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10241 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10242 payment_paths, payment_hash
10244 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10245 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10246 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10249 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10250 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10251 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10253 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10254 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10255 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10256 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10257 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10260 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10261 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10262 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10263 .and_then(|invoice| {
10265 let mut invoice = invoice;
10267 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10268 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10270 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10275 Ok(invoice) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10276 Err(error) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10279 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10280 let result = match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10281 Ok(payment_id) => {
10282 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10283 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10284 Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10285 } else if self.default_configuration.manually_handle_bolt12_invoices {
10286 let event = Event::InvoiceReceived { payment_id, invoice, responder };
10287 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
10288 return ResponseInstruction::NoResponse;
10290 self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10292 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10293 InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10297 Err(()) => Err(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())),
10301 Ok(()) => ResponseInstruction::NoResponse,
10302 Err(e) => match responder {
10303 Some(responder) => responder.respond(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10305 log_trace!(self.logger, "No reply path for sending invoice error: {:?}", e);
10306 ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
10311 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10312 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10313 ResponseInstruction::NoResponse
10318 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10319 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10323 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10324 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10326 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10327 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10328 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10329 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10330 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10331 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10335 fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10336 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10340 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10341 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10342 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10343 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10344 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10348 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10349 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10351 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10352 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10353 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10354 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10355 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10358 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10359 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10360 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10361 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10364 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10365 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10366 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10367 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10370 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10371 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10372 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10373 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10376 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10377 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10378 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10379 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10380 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10381 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10382 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10383 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10384 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10385 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10386 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10387 features.set_payment_secret_required();
10388 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10389 features.set_wumbo_optional();
10390 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10391 features.set_channel_type_optional();
10392 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10393 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10394 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10395 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10396 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10401 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10402 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10404 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10405 (2, channels, required_vec),
10406 (4, phantom_scid, required),
10407 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10410 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10411 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10412 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10415 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10417 (0, onion_packet, required),
10418 (1, blinded, option),
10419 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10422 (0, payment_data, required),
10423 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10424 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10425 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10426 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10427 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10428 (9, payment_context, option),
10430 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10431 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10432 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10433 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10434 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10435 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10436 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10440 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10441 (0, routing, required),
10442 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10443 (4, payment_hash, required),
10444 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10445 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10446 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10447 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10451 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10452 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10454 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10455 0u8.write(writer)?;
10456 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10457 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10458 reason.write(writer)?;
10460 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10461 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10463 1u8.write(writer)?;
10464 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10465 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10466 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10467 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10474 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10475 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10476 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10479 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10480 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10481 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10482 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10486 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10487 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10488 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10489 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10490 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10493 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10494 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10495 // messages contained in the variants.
10496 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10497 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10498 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10500 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10501 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10502 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10503 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10504 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10507 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10508 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10509 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10510 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10511 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10513 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10518 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10523 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10524 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10525 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10528 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10529 (0, short_channel_id, required),
10530 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10531 (2, outpoint, required),
10532 (3, blinded_failure, option),
10533 (4, htlc_id, required),
10534 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10535 (7, user_channel_id, option),
10536 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10537 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10538 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10541 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10542 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10543 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10544 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10545 (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None)
10547 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10549 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10550 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10551 (1, self.total_msat, required),
10552 (2, self.value, required),
10553 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10554 (4, payment_data, option),
10555 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10556 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10557 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10558 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10564 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10565 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10566 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10567 (0, prev_hop, required),
10568 (1, total_msat, option),
10569 (2, value_ser, required),
10570 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10571 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10572 (5, total_value_received, option),
10573 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10574 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10575 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10577 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10578 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10579 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10581 if payment_data.is_some() {
10582 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10584 if total_msat.is_none() {
10585 total_msat = Some(value);
10587 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10590 if total_msat.is_none() {
10591 if payment_data.is_none() {
10592 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10594 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10596 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10600 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10603 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10604 total_value_received,
10605 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10607 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10608 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10613 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10614 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10615 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10618 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10619 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10620 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10621 let mut payment_id = None;
10622 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10623 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10624 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10625 (0, session_priv, required),
10626 (1, payment_id, option),
10627 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10628 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10629 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10630 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10632 if payment_id.is_none() {
10633 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10635 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10637 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10638 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10639 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10641 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10642 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10643 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10644 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10648 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10649 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10650 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10652 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10655 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10656 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10661 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10662 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10664 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10665 0u8.write(writer)?;
10666 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10667 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10668 (0, session_priv, required),
10669 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10670 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10671 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10672 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10673 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10674 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10677 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10678 1u8.write(writer)?;
10679 field.write(writer)?;
10686 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10687 (0, forward_info, required),
10688 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10689 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10690 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10691 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10692 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10693 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10694 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10697 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10698 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10699 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10701 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10705 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10706 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10707 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10708 (0, htlc_id, required),
10709 (2, err_packet, required),
10712 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10713 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10714 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10715 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10716 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10717 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10718 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10719 (0, htlc_id, required),
10720 (1, failure_code, required),
10721 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10722 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10730 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10731 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10732 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10734 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10736 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10737 (0, htlc_id, required),
10738 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10739 (2, err_packet, required),
10740 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10742 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10743 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10744 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10746 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10750 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10751 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10755 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10760 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10761 (0, payment_secret, required),
10762 (2, expiry_time, required),
10763 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10764 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10765 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10768 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10770 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10771 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10772 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10773 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10774 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10775 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10779 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10780 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10782 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10784 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10786 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10787 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10788 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10791 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10793 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10795 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10796 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10797 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10798 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10799 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10800 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10803 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10804 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10808 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10810 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10811 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10812 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10813 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10814 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10815 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10818 channel.write(writer)?;
10824 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10825 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10826 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10827 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10828 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10829 for forward in pending_forwards {
10830 forward.write(writer)?;
10835 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10836 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10837 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10838 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10841 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10842 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10843 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10845 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10846 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10847 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10848 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10849 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10850 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10851 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10852 htlc.write(writer)?;
10854 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10855 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10858 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10859 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10860 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10861 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10862 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10863 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10864 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10867 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10868 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10869 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10870 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10871 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10873 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10874 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10875 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10876 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10877 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10878 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10879 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10884 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10885 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10886 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10887 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10888 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10889 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10890 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10891 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10892 0u64.write(writer)?;
10894 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10895 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10896 event.write(writer)?;
10900 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10901 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10902 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10903 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10904 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10905 0u64.write(writer)?;
10907 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10908 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10909 // likely to be identical.
10910 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10911 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10913 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10914 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10915 hash.write(writer)?;
10916 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10919 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10920 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10921 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10922 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10923 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10926 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10927 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10929 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10930 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10931 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10932 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10935 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10936 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10937 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10938 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10942 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10943 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10944 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10946 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10947 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10948 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10954 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10955 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10956 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10957 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10960 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10961 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10962 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10963 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10964 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10967 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10968 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10969 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10970 if !updates.is_empty() {
10971 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10972 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10977 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10978 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10979 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10980 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10981 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10982 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10983 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10984 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10985 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10986 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10987 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10988 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10989 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10990 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
10997 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10998 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10999 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11000 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11003 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11004 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11005 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11006 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11007 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11008 // check that the event is sane here.
11009 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11010 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11011 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11012 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11018 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11019 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11020 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11021 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11022 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11023 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11026 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11027 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11028 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11029 events.push_back((ev, action));
11030 } else if action.is_some() {
11031 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11038 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11040 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11042 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11043 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11044 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11045 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11046 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11047 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11048 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11049 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11050 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11051 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11052 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11053 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11054 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11056 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11057 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11059 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11060 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11062 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11063 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11064 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11065 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11066 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11067 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11069 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11070 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11072 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11073 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11074 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11075 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11076 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11077 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11081 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11082 pub entropy_source: ES,
11084 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11085 pub node_signer: NS,
11087 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11088 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11090 pub signer_provider: SP,
11092 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11094 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11095 pub fee_estimator: F,
11096 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11098 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11099 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11100 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11101 pub chain_monitor: M,
11103 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11104 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11105 /// force-closed during deserialization.
11106 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11107 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11108 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11110 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11112 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11113 /// deserialization.
11115 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11116 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11117 pub default_config: UserConfig,
11119 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11120 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11122 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11123 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11124 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11125 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11127 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11130 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11131 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11134 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11135 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11137 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11138 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11139 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11140 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11141 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11142 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11146 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11147 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11148 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11149 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11150 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11152 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11153 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11154 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11160 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11161 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11162 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11163 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11165 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11166 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11167 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11168 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11169 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11170 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11174 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11175 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11176 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11180 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11181 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11183 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11184 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11185 ES::Target: EntropySource,
11186 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11187 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11188 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11192 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11193 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11195 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11196 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11197 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11199 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11201 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11202 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11203 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11204 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11205 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11206 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11207 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11208 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11209 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11210 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11211 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11213 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, None);
11214 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11215 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11216 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11217 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11218 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11219 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11220 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11221 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11222 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11223 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11224 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11225 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11226 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11227 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11229 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11230 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11231 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11233 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11234 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11235 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11237 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11238 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11239 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11241 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11242 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11243 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11245 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11246 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11247 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11250 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11251 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11252 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11253 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11254 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11255 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11256 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11257 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11259 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11260 let mut found_htlc = false;
11261 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11262 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11265 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11266 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11267 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11268 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11269 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11270 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11271 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11272 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(*payment_hash));
11274 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11275 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11276 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11280 channel.on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through(&logger, monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11281 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {} with {} blocked updates",
11282 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11283 monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.blocked_monitor_updates_pending());
11284 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11285 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11287 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11288 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11290 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11291 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11292 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11293 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11295 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11296 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11297 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11298 entry.insert(by_id_map);
11302 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11303 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11304 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11305 // safely discard the channel.
11306 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11307 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11308 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11309 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11310 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11311 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11312 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11313 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11316 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11317 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11318 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11319 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11320 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11321 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11325 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11326 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11327 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, None);
11328 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11329 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11331 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11332 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11333 counterparty_node_id: None,
11334 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11335 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11337 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11341 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11342 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11343 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11344 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11345 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11346 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11347 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11348 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11349 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11351 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11354 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11355 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11356 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11357 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11358 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11359 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11360 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11361 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11363 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11366 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11369 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11370 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11371 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11372 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11373 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11374 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11375 is_connected: false,
11379 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11380 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11381 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11382 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11383 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11384 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11385 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11386 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11389 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11390 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11391 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11392 for _ in 0..event_count {
11393 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11394 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11399 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11400 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11401 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11403 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11404 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11405 // on-startup monitor updates.
11406 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11407 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11409 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11413 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11414 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11416 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11417 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11418 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11419 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11420 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11424 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11425 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11426 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11427 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11428 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11429 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11430 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11432 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11433 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11437 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11438 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11439 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11440 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11441 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11442 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11443 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11444 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11445 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11446 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11447 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11448 let mut events_override = None;
11449 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11450 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11451 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11452 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11453 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11454 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11455 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11456 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11457 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11458 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11459 (8, events_override, option),
11460 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11461 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11462 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11463 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11464 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11466 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11467 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11468 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11471 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11472 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11475 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11476 pending_events_read = events;
11479 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11480 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11483 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11484 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11485 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11486 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11487 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11488 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11490 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11492 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11493 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11494 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11497 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11498 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11499 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11500 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11501 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11503 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11504 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11505 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11507 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11508 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11509 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11510 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11511 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11513 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11514 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11515 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11516 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11517 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11518 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11519 pending_background_events.push(
11520 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11521 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11522 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11523 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11524 update: update.clone(),
11527 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11528 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11529 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11530 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11531 pending_background_events.push(
11532 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11533 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11534 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11537 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11538 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11539 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11541 max_in_flight_update_id
11545 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11548 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11549 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11550 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11552 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11554 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11555 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11556 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11557 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11558 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11559 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11560 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11561 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11562 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11565 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11566 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11567 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11568 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11569 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11570 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11571 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11572 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11573 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11574 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11575 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11578 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11579 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11580 debug_assert!(false);
11581 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11586 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11587 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11588 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11589 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id, None);
11590 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11591 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11592 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11593 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11594 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11595 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11597 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11598 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11599 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11601 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11602 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11603 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11604 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11605 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11606 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11607 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11608 log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
11609 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11614 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11615 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11617 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11618 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11619 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11620 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11623 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11624 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11625 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11626 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11627 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11628 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11629 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11631 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11632 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11633 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11634 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11635 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11636 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11637 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11638 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11639 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11642 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11643 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11644 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11645 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11646 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11647 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11648 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11649 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11651 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11652 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11653 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11654 retry_strategy: None,
11655 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11656 payment_params: None,
11657 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11658 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11659 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11660 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11661 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11662 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11663 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11664 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11665 total_msat: path_amt,
11666 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11667 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11669 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11670 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11675 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11676 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor, Some(htlc.payment_hash));
11677 match htlc_source {
11678 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11679 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11680 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11681 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11683 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11684 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11685 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11686 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11687 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11688 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11689 update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11690 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11691 update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11693 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11694 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11698 !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11700 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11701 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11702 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11703 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11704 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11705 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11710 !forwards.is_empty()
11712 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11713 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11714 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11715 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11716 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11717 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11718 intercepted_id != ev_id
11725 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11726 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11727 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11728 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11729 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11730 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11731 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11732 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11733 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11734 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11735 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11737 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11738 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11739 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11740 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11742 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11743 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11744 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11751 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11752 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11754 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11756 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11757 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11758 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11759 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11760 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11761 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11762 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11763 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11764 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11765 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11768 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11769 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11770 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11771 // channel still live case here.
11775 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11776 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11781 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11782 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11783 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11784 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11785 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11786 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11787 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11788 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11792 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11793 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11795 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11796 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11797 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11798 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11800 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11801 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11802 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11804 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11805 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11807 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11808 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11810 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11813 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11814 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11815 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11817 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11821 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11822 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11823 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11824 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11825 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11827 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11828 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11829 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11830 events::PaymentPurpose::Bolt11InvoicePayment {
11831 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11832 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11833 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11834 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11836 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11837 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11841 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11843 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11845 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11846 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11848 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11849 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11854 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11855 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11857 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11859 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11861 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11862 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11863 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11864 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11868 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11869 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11870 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11871 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11872 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11873 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11874 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context, None);
11875 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11876 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11878 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11879 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11880 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11882 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11883 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11884 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11885 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11886 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11887 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11889 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11890 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11891 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11892 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11893 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11894 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11898 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11899 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11900 debug_assert!(false);
11901 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11906 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11908 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11909 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11910 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11911 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11912 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11913 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11914 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11915 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11916 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11917 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11918 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11920 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11921 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11923 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11924 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11925 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11926 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11928 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11929 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11930 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11931 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11933 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11934 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11935 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11936 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11938 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11939 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11940 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11941 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11942 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11943 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11944 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context, Some(payment_hash));
11945 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11948 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11949 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11952 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11955 purpose: payment.purpose,
11956 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11957 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11958 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11959 onion_fields: payment.onion_fields,
11965 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11966 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11967 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11968 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id), None);
11969 for action in actions.iter() {
11970 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11971 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11972 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11974 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11976 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11977 blocked_channel_id);
11978 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11979 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11980 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11982 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11983 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11984 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11985 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11989 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11990 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11994 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11996 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None, None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11997 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12001 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12003 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12004 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12005 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12006 router: args.router,
12008 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12010 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12011 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12012 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12013 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12015 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12016 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12017 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12018 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12019 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12020 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12021 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12023 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12025 our_network_pubkey,
12028 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12030 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12032 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12033 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12034 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12035 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12036 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12038 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12039 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12041 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12043 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12045 pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12047 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12048 node_signer: args.node_signer,
12049 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12051 last_days_feerates: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
12053 logger: args.logger,
12054 default_configuration: args.default_config,
12057 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12058 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12059 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12060 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12061 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12064 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12065 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12066 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12067 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12068 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12069 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12070 downstream_channel_id, None
12074 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12075 //connection or two.
12077 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12083 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12084 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12085 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12086 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12087 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12088 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12089 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12090 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12091 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12092 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12093 use crate::prelude::*;
12094 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12095 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12096 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12097 use crate::util::test_utils;
12098 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12099 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12102 fn test_notify_limits() {
12103 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12104 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12105 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12106 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12107 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12108 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12110 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12111 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12112 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12113 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12114 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12116 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12118 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12119 // to connect messages with new values
12120 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12121 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12122 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12123 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12124 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12125 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12127 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12128 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12129 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12130 // ... but the last node should not.
12131 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12132 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12133 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12134 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12136 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12137 // about the channel.
12138 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12139 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12140 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12142 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12144 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12145 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12146 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12147 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12148 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12149 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12151 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12152 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12153 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12155 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12156 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12157 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12158 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12159 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12160 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12162 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12163 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12164 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12165 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12166 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12167 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12168 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12169 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12171 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12172 // the channel info has updated.
12173 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12174 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12175 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12176 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12177 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12178 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12182 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12183 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12185 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12186 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12187 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12188 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12189 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12191 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12192 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12193 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12194 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12196 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12197 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12198 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12199 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12200 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12201 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12202 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12203 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12204 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12205 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12206 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12207 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12209 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12210 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12211 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12212 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12213 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12214 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12215 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12216 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12217 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12218 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12219 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12220 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12221 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12222 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12223 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12224 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12225 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12226 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12227 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12228 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12229 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12230 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12231 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12233 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12234 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12235 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12236 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12237 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12238 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12239 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12241 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12242 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12243 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12244 // lightning messages manually.
12245 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12246 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12247 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12249 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12250 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12251 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12252 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12253 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12254 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12255 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12256 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12257 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12258 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12259 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12260 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12261 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12262 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12263 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12264 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12265 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12266 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12267 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12268 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12269 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12270 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12271 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12272 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12273 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12274 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12276 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12277 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12278 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12279 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12281 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12282 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12283 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12284 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12286 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12289 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12290 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12291 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12292 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12294 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12299 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12300 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12301 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12304 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12305 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12306 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12307 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12308 // fails as expected.
12309 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12310 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12311 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12312 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12313 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12314 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12315 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12316 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12317 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12318 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12319 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12320 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12321 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12322 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12323 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12325 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12326 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12327 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12329 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12330 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12331 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12332 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12333 let route = find_route(
12334 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12335 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12337 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12338 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12339 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12340 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12341 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12342 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12343 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12344 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12345 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12346 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12347 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12348 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12349 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12350 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12351 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12352 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12353 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12354 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12355 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12356 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12357 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12358 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12359 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12360 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12362 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12363 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12365 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12366 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12367 let route = find_route(
12368 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12369 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12371 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12372 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12373 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12374 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12375 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12376 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12377 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12378 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12380 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12381 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12382 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12383 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12384 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12385 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12386 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12387 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12388 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12389 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12390 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12391 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12392 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12393 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12394 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12395 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12396 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12397 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12398 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12399 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12400 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12401 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12402 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12403 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12405 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12406 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12408 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12409 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12410 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12411 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12412 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12413 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12414 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12415 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12416 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12417 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12419 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12420 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12421 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12424 let route = find_route(
12425 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12426 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12428 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12429 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12430 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12431 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12432 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12433 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12434 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12435 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12436 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12437 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12438 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12439 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12440 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12441 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12442 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12443 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12444 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12445 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12446 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12447 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12448 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12449 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12450 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12452 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12453 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12457 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12458 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12459 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12460 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12461 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12462 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12463 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12465 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12466 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12468 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12469 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12470 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12471 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12472 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12473 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12474 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12475 let route = find_route(
12476 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12477 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12480 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12481 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12482 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12483 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12484 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12485 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12486 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12488 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12489 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12490 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12491 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12492 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12493 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12494 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12496 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12500 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12501 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12502 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12503 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12504 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12505 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12506 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12507 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12508 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12510 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12511 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12513 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12514 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12515 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12516 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12517 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12518 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12519 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12520 let route = find_route(
12521 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12522 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12525 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12526 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12527 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12528 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12529 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12530 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12531 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12532 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12533 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12535 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12536 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12537 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12538 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12539 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12540 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12541 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12543 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12547 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12548 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12549 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12550 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12551 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12553 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12554 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12555 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12556 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12558 // Marshall an MPP route.
12559 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12560 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12561 route.paths.push(path);
12562 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12563 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12564 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12565 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12566 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12567 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12569 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12570 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12572 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12573 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12575 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12580 fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12581 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12582 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12583 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12584 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12586 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12588 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12590 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12592 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12593 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12594 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12597 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12598 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12599 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12602 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12603 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12604 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12606 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12607 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12609 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12610 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12612 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12613 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12614 features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12616 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12617 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12618 }, false).unwrap();
12620 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12621 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12622 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12623 match &node_0_events[0] {
12624 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12625 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12628 // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12629 let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12630 assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12635 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12636 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12637 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12638 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12639 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12641 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12643 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12644 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12645 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12646 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
12647 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12649 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12652 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12653 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12654 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12655 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12656 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12657 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12660 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12663 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12664 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12669 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12670 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12671 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12672 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12673 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12674 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12676 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12677 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12679 total_msat: 100_000,
12682 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12683 // payment verification fails as expected.
12684 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12685 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12686 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12687 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12689 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12693 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12694 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12698 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12699 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12700 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12701 // the channel is successfully closed.
12702 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12703 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12705 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12707 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12708 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12709 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12710 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12711 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12713 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12714 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12716 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12717 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12718 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12719 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12722 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12724 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12725 // as it has the funding transaction.
12726 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12727 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12728 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12731 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12733 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12735 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12737 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12738 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12739 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12741 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12744 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12745 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12746 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12747 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12748 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12750 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12751 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12752 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12753 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12754 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12755 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12756 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12757 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12759 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12760 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12761 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12762 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12764 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12765 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12767 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12768 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12769 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12770 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12771 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12772 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12773 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12777 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12778 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12779 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12780 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12781 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12782 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12783 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12786 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12788 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12789 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12790 // closing transaction).
12791 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12792 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12793 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12795 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12796 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12797 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12798 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12799 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12802 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12804 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12806 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12807 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12808 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12810 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12812 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12813 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12816 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12817 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12818 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12821 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12822 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12823 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12826 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12827 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12828 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12831 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12832 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12833 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12836 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12838 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12839 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12841 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12842 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12844 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12845 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12850 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12851 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12852 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12853 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12854 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12855 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12856 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12857 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12860 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12861 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12862 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12863 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12865 // Test the API functions.
12866 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12868 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12870 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12872 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, error_message.to_string()), unkown_public_key);
12874 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, error_message.to_string()), unkown_public_key);
12876 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12878 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12882 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12883 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12884 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12885 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12886 // the given `channel_id`.
12887 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12888 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12889 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12890 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12892 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12895 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12896 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
12898 // Test the API functions.
12899 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12901 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12903 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12905 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, error_message.to_string()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12907 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12909 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12913 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12914 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12915 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12916 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12917 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12918 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12920 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12922 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12923 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12925 let mut funding_tx = None;
12926 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12927 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12928 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12931 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12932 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12933 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12934 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12935 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12937 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12938 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12939 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12941 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12943 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12944 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12945 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12947 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12950 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12951 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12952 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12953 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12954 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12955 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12957 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12958 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12960 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12961 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12962 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12963 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12964 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12965 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12966 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12969 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12970 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12971 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12972 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12973 }, true).unwrap_err();
12975 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12976 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12977 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12978 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12979 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12980 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12981 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12983 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12984 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12986 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12987 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12988 }, true).unwrap_err();
12990 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12991 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12992 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12993 }, false).unwrap();
12994 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12996 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12997 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12999 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13000 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13001 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13002 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13003 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13005 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13006 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13007 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13009 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13010 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13011 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13013 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13014 // "protected" and can connect again.
13015 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13016 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13017 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13019 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13021 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13023 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13024 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13028 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13029 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13030 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13031 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13032 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13033 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13035 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13037 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13038 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13040 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13041 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13042 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13043 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13046 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13048 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13049 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13050 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13052 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13053 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13054 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13056 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13057 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13058 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13059 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13063 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13064 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13065 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13068 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13069 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13070 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13071 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13073 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13075 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13076 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13078 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13079 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13080 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13081 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13082 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13083 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13086 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13087 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13089 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13090 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13092 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13094 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13095 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13098 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13099 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13100 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13101 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13102 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13104 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13105 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13107 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13108 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13109 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13110 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13114 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13116 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13117 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13119 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13120 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13121 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13123 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13124 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13126 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13128 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13132 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13133 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13134 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13135 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13136 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13137 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13138 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13139 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13140 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13141 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13142 payment_metadata: None,
13143 keysend_preimage: None,
13144 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13145 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13147 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13149 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13150 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13151 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13152 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13153 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13154 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13155 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13157 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13158 } else { panic!(); }
13160 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13161 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13162 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13163 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13164 payment_metadata: None,
13165 keysend_preimage: None,
13166 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13167 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13169 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13171 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13172 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13173 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13174 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13178 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13179 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13180 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13181 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13182 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13184 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13185 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13186 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13187 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13188 payment_metadata: None,
13189 keysend_preimage: None,
13190 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13191 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13193 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13194 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13195 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13197 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13198 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13199 // is not satisfied.
13200 assert!(result.is_ok());
13204 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13205 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13206 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13207 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13208 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13210 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13211 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13213 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13214 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13215 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13216 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13217 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13219 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13220 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13222 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13223 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13224 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13225 match &msg_events[0] {
13226 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13227 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13229 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13230 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13231 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13234 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13237 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13238 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13240 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13241 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13242 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13244 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13248 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13249 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13250 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13251 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13252 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13253 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13254 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13255 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13256 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13257 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13258 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13259 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
13261 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13262 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13263 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13265 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13266 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13268 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13269 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
13271 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13274 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13275 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13277 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13278 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13280 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13281 // not have generated any events.
13282 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13286 fn test_update_channel_config() {
13287 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13288 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13289 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13290 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13291 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13292 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13293 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13295 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13296 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13297 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13299 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13300 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13301 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13302 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13303 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13305 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13306 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13309 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13310 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13311 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13313 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13314 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13315 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13316 ..Default::default()
13318 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13319 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13320 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13322 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13323 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13326 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13327 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13328 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13329 ..Default::default()
13331 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13332 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13333 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13334 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13336 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13337 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13340 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13341 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13342 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13343 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13344 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13347 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13348 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13349 ..Default::default()
13351 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13354 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13355 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13356 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13357 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13361 fn test_payment_display() {
13362 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13363 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13364 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13365 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13366 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13367 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13371 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13372 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13373 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13374 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13375 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13376 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13377 let error_message = "Channel force-closed";
13379 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13380 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13381 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13382 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13383 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), error_message.to_string()).unwrap();
13384 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13385 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13386 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13388 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13389 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13390 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13393 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13394 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13396 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13397 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13399 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13400 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13401 }, false).unwrap();
13402 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13403 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13404 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13406 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13408 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13409 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13410 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13411 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13412 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13413 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13414 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13415 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13416 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13417 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13418 } else { panic!() };
13419 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13420 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13421 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13422 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13424 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13426 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13427 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13428 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13433 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13434 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13435 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13436 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13439 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13440 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13441 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13443 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13444 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13446 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13447 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13450 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13451 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13452 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13454 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13458 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13459 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13460 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13462 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13467 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13468 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13469 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13470 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13472 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13473 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13474 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13476 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13478 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13479 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13480 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13481 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13483 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13484 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13486 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13492 use crate::chain::Listen;
13493 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13494 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13495 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13496 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13497 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13498 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13499 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13500 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13501 use crate::util::test_utils;
13502 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13504 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
13505 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13506 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13507 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13508 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13509 use bitcoin::transaction::Version;
13511 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13513 use criterion::Criterion;
13515 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13516 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13517 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13518 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13519 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13520 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13521 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13523 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13524 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13526 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13527 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13529 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13531 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13534 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13535 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13538 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13539 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13540 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13542 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13543 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13545 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13546 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13547 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13548 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13549 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13551 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13552 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13553 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13555 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13556 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13557 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13558 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13560 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13561 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13562 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13564 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13565 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13566 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13567 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13568 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13570 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13571 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13572 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13574 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13575 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13577 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13578 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13579 }, false).unwrap();
13580 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13581 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13582 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13585 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13586 tx = Transaction { version: Version::TWO, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13587 value: Amount::from_sat(8_000_000), script_pubkey: output_script,
13589 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13590 } else { panic!(); }
13592 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13593 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13594 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13595 match events_b[0] {
13596 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13597 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13599 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13602 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13603 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13604 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13605 match events_a[0] {
13606 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13607 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13609 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13612 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13614 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13615 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13616 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13618 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13619 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13620 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13621 match msg_events[0] {
13622 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13623 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13624 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13628 match msg_events[1] {
13629 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13633 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13634 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13635 match events_a[0] {
13636 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13637 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13639 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13642 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13643 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13644 match events_b[0] {
13645 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13646 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13648 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13651 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13652 macro_rules! send_payment {
13653 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13654 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13655 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13656 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13657 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13658 payment_count += 1;
13659 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13660 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13662 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13663 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13664 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13665 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13666 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13667 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13668 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13669 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13670 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13671 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13672 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13674 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13675 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13676 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13677 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13679 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13680 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13681 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13682 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13683 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13685 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13688 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13689 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13690 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13691 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13693 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13697 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13698 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13699 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);