1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
41 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
42 // construct one themselves.
43 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
44 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
45 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
46 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
47 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
48 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
49 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
50 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
54 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
58 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
59 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, OfferBuilder};
60 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
61 use crate::offers::refund::RefundBuilder;
62 use crate::onion_message::{OffersMessage, PendingOnionMessage};
63 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
64 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
65 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
66 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
67 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
68 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
69 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
70 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
72 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
75 use crate::prelude::*;
77 use core::cell::RefCell;
79 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
80 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
81 use core::time::Duration;
84 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
85 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
86 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
88 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
90 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
91 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
92 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
94 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
95 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
96 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
97 // before we forward it.
99 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
100 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
101 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
102 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
103 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
105 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
106 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
108 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
109 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
110 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
111 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
114 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
115 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
116 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
117 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
118 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
119 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
122 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
123 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
124 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
125 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
126 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
127 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
128 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
132 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
133 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
134 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
135 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
136 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
138 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
139 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
140 /// may overshoot this in either case)
141 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
142 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
143 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
144 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
145 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
148 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
149 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
150 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
151 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
154 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
155 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
156 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
157 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
158 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
161 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
162 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
164 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
165 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
166 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
169 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
170 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
172 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
173 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
176 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
177 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
180 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
184 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
185 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
186 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
187 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
188 short_channel_id: u64,
189 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
191 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
192 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
194 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
195 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
200 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
202 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
203 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
204 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
206 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
207 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
210 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
211 struct ClaimableHTLC {
212 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
214 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
216 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
217 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
218 sender_intended_value: u64,
219 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
221 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
222 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
223 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
224 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
226 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
227 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
231 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
232 events::ClaimedHTLC {
233 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
234 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
235 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
236 value_msat: val.value,
241 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
242 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
244 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
245 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
246 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
249 /// Number of bytes in the id.
250 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
253 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
254 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
259 impl Readable for PaymentId {
260 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
261 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
266 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
267 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
268 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
272 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
274 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
275 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
276 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
278 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
279 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
284 impl Readable for InterceptId {
285 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
286 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
291 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
292 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
293 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
294 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
295 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
298 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
300 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
301 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
302 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
304 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
305 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
309 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
310 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
311 (0, short_channel_id, required),
312 (2, htlc_id, required),
314 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
315 (0, session_priv, required),
320 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
321 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
322 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
323 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
324 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
327 session_priv: SecretKey,
328 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
329 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
330 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
331 payment_id: PaymentId,
334 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
335 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
336 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
338 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
340 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
342 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
345 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
346 payment_id.hash(hasher);
347 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
353 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
355 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
356 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
357 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
358 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
359 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
360 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
364 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
365 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
366 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
367 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
368 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
369 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
371 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
377 struct InboundOnionErr {
383 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
384 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
386 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
387 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
388 pub enum FailureCode {
389 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
390 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
391 TemporaryNodeFailure,
392 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
393 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
394 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
395 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
396 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
397 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
398 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
399 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
400 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
401 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
403 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
404 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
405 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
408 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
409 fn into(self) -> u16 {
411 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
412 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
413 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
414 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
419 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
420 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
421 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
422 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
423 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
425 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
426 err: msgs::LightningError,
427 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
428 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
429 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
431 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
433 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
435 err: LightningError {
437 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
438 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
445 shutdown_finish: None,
446 channel_capacity: None,
450 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
451 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
454 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
455 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
456 let action = if let (Some(_), ..) = &shutdown_res {
457 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
458 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
459 // commitment upon reconnecting.
460 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
462 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
465 err: LightningError { err, action },
466 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
467 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
468 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
472 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
475 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
477 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
478 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
482 log_level: Level::Warn,
485 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
487 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
489 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
491 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
492 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
500 shutdown_finish: None,
501 channel_capacity: None,
505 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
506 self.chan_id.is_some()
510 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
511 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
512 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
513 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
514 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
516 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
517 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
518 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
519 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
520 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
521 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
522 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
524 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
528 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
529 struct ClaimingPayment {
531 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
532 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
533 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
534 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
536 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
537 (0, amount_msat, required),
538 (2, payment_purpose, required),
539 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
540 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
541 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
544 struct ClaimablePayment {
545 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
546 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
547 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
550 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
551 struct ClaimablePayments {
552 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
553 /// failed/claimed by the user.
555 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
556 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
558 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
559 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
560 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
562 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
563 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
564 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
565 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
568 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
569 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
570 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
571 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
573 enum BackgroundEvent {
574 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
575 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
576 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
577 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
579 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
580 /// are regenerated on startup.
581 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
582 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
583 /// channel to continue normal operation.
585 /// In general this should be used rather than
586 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
587 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
588 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
590 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
591 /// are regenerated on startup.
592 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
593 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
594 funding_txo: OutPoint,
595 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
597 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
598 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
600 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
601 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
602 channel_id: ChannelId,
607 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
608 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
609 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
610 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
611 /// event can be generated.
612 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
613 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
614 /// operation of another channel.
616 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
617 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
618 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
619 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
621 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
622 event: events::Event,
623 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
625 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
626 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
627 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
629 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
630 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
631 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
632 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
633 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
635 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
636 /// stored for later processing.
637 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
638 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
639 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
640 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
644 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
645 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
646 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
647 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
648 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
649 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
650 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
651 (4, blocking_action, required),
653 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
654 (0, event, upgradable_required),
655 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
656 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
657 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
658 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
659 // downgrades to prior versions.
660 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
664 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
665 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
666 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
667 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
668 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
671 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
672 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
673 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
674 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
678 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
679 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
680 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
681 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
682 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
683 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
685 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
686 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
687 channel_id: ChannelId,
688 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
693 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
694 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
695 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
696 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
697 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
702 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
703 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
707 /// State we hold per-peer.
708 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
709 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
711 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
712 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
713 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
715 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
716 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
717 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
718 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
719 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
720 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
721 latest_features: InitFeatures,
722 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
723 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
724 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
725 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
726 /// user but which have not yet completed.
728 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
729 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
730 /// for a missing channel.
731 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
732 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
733 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
735 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
736 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
737 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
738 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
740 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
741 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
742 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
743 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
744 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
745 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
746 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
747 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
748 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
749 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
750 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
751 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
752 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
753 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
754 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
758 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
759 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
760 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
761 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
762 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
763 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
766 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
767 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
768 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
771 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
772 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
773 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
776 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
777 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
778 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
779 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
783 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
784 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
785 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
786 /// The original OpenChannel message.
787 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
788 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
789 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
792 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
793 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
794 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
796 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
797 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
799 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
802 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
803 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
804 struct PendingInboundPayment {
805 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
806 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
807 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
808 /// this payment being removed.
810 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
811 user_payment_id: u64,
812 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
813 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
814 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
817 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
818 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
819 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
820 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
821 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
822 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
823 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
824 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
826 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
827 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
835 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
837 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
838 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
839 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
844 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
845 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
846 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
847 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
848 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
849 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
850 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
851 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
852 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
854 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
855 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
864 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
866 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
867 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
868 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
873 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
875 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
877 pub trait AChannelManager {
878 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
879 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
880 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
881 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
882 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
883 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
884 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
885 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
886 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
887 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
888 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
889 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
890 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
891 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
892 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
893 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
894 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
895 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
896 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
897 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
898 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
899 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
900 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
901 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
902 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
903 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
904 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
905 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
906 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
907 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
908 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
909 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
910 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
911 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
912 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
913 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
916 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
917 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
919 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
920 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
921 ES::Target: EntropySource,
922 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
923 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
924 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
928 type Watch = M::Target;
930 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
932 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
934 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
936 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
937 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
939 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
941 type Router = R::Target;
943 type Logger = L::Target;
945 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
948 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
949 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
951 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
952 /// to individual Channels.
954 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
955 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
956 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
957 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
959 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
960 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
961 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
962 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
963 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
964 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
965 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
966 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
967 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
969 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
970 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
971 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
973 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
974 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
975 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
976 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
977 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
979 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
980 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
981 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
982 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
984 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
985 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
986 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
988 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
989 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
990 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
991 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
992 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
994 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
995 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
996 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
997 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
998 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
999 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1000 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1001 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1004 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1005 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1006 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1007 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1008 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1012 // `pending_offers_messages`
1014 // `total_consistency_lock`
1016 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1018 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1020 // |__`per_peer_state`
1022 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1024 // |__`claimable_payments`
1026 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1032 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1034 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1038 // |__`pending_events`
1040 // |__`pending_background_events`
1042 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1044 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1045 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1046 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1047 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1048 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1049 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1053 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1054 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1055 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1061 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1063 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1065 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1066 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1068 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1069 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1070 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1071 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1073 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1074 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1076 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1077 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1078 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1079 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1080 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1081 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1082 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1083 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1085 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1087 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1088 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1090 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1092 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1093 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1094 /// and via the classic SCID.
1096 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1097 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1099 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1101 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1103 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1104 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1105 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1107 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1108 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1110 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1111 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1113 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1114 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1116 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1117 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1118 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1119 /// active channel list on load.
1121 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1122 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1124 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1126 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1127 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1128 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1130 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1131 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1132 /// the handling of the events.
1134 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1135 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1138 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1139 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1140 /// would break backwards compatability.
1141 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1142 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1143 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1145 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1146 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1148 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1150 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1151 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1152 /// confirmation depth.
1154 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1155 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1156 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1158 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1160 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1162 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1164 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1166 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1168 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1169 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1170 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1172 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1173 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1175 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1176 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1177 /// keeping additional state.
1178 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1180 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1181 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1182 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1183 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1185 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1186 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1188 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1189 /// are currently open with that peer.
1191 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1192 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1195 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1197 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1198 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1199 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1200 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1201 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1203 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1204 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1205 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1206 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1207 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1209 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1210 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1212 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1213 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1214 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1215 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1216 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1218 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1219 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1221 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1222 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1223 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1224 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1225 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1227 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1229 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1231 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1232 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1233 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1234 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1235 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1236 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1237 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1238 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1239 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1240 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1241 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1243 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1244 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1245 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1247 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1249 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1250 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1252 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1256 signer_provider: SP,
1261 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1263 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1264 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1265 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1266 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1267 pub struct ChainParameters {
1268 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1269 pub network: Network,
1271 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1273 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1274 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1277 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1281 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1282 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1285 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1286 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1287 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1288 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1289 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1290 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1292 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1293 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1294 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1295 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1296 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1297 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1299 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1300 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1303 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1304 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1305 /// events to handle.
1307 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1308 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1310 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1311 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1314 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1315 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1316 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1317 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1319 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1320 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1321 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1322 should_persist: move || {
1323 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1324 // processing and return that.
1325 let notify = persist_check();
1326 match (notify, force_notify) {
1327 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1328 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1329 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1330 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1331 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1334 _read_guard: read_guard,
1338 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1339 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1340 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1341 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1342 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1343 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1345 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1346 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1347 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1348 should_persist: persist_check,
1349 _read_guard: read_guard,
1354 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1355 fn drop(&mut self) {
1356 match (self.should_persist)() {
1357 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1358 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1359 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1361 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1362 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1363 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1368 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1369 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1371 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1373 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1374 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1375 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1376 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1377 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1379 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1380 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1382 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1384 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1385 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1386 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1387 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1388 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1389 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1390 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1391 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1392 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1393 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1394 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1395 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1396 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1398 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1399 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1401 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1402 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1403 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1404 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1406 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1407 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1408 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1409 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1410 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1411 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1414 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1416 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1417 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1420 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1422 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1423 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1425 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1426 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1427 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1429 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1430 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1431 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1433 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1434 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1435 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1436 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1438 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1439 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1440 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1442 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1443 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1444 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1446 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1447 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1448 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1449 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1450 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1451 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1452 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1453 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1454 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1455 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1456 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1459 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1460 /// to better separate parameters.
1461 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1462 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1463 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1464 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1465 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1466 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1467 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1468 pub features: InitFeatures,
1469 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1470 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1471 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1473 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1475 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1476 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1477 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1478 /// payments to us through this channel.
1479 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1480 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1481 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1482 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1483 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1484 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1485 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1488 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1489 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1490 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1491 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1492 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1493 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1494 /// lifetime of the channel.
1495 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1496 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1497 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1498 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1499 /// our counterparty already.
1501 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1502 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1503 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1504 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1506 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1507 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1508 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1509 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1511 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1512 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1514 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1515 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1517 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1518 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1519 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1520 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1521 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1522 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1523 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1524 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1525 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1528 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1530 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1531 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1532 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1533 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1534 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1535 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1536 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1538 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1539 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1541 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1542 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1543 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1544 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1545 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1546 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1547 /// this value on chain.
1549 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1551 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1553 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1554 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1555 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1556 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1557 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1558 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1559 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1561 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1562 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1563 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1564 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1565 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1566 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1568 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1569 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1570 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1571 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1572 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1574 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1575 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1576 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1577 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1579 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1580 pub balance_msat: u64,
1581 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1582 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1583 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1584 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1586 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1588 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1589 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1590 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1591 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1592 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1593 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1594 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1595 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1597 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1598 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1599 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1600 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1601 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1602 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1603 /// route which is valid.
1604 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1605 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1606 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1607 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1608 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1609 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1611 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1612 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1613 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1614 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1615 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1616 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1617 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1618 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1619 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1621 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1623 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1624 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1625 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1626 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1627 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1629 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1630 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1631 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1632 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1633 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1634 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1635 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1637 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1638 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1639 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1640 pub is_outbound: bool,
1641 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1642 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1643 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1644 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1645 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1647 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1648 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1649 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1650 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1651 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1652 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1653 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1655 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1656 pub is_usable: bool,
1657 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1658 pub is_public: bool,
1659 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1660 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1661 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1662 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1663 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1664 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1666 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1667 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1670 impl ChannelDetails {
1671 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1672 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1673 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1675 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1676 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1677 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1678 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1681 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1682 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1683 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1685 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1686 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1687 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1688 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1691 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1692 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1693 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1696 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1697 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1699 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1700 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1701 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1703 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1704 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1705 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1706 features: latest_features,
1707 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1708 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1709 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1710 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1711 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1712 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1713 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1714 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1715 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1716 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1718 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1719 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1720 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1721 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1722 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1723 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1724 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1725 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1726 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1727 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1728 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1729 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1730 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1731 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1732 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1733 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1734 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1735 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1736 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1737 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1738 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1739 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1740 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1741 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1742 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1743 config: Some(context.config()),
1744 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1749 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1750 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1751 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1752 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1753 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1754 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1755 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1756 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1757 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1759 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1761 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1762 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1764 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1765 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1766 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1767 /// to drop the channel.
1771 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1772 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1773 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1774 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1775 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1777 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1778 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1779 payment_id: PaymentId,
1781 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1783 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1784 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1785 payment_id: PaymentId,
1786 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1788 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1789 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1790 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1793 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1794 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1795 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1797 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1798 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1799 payment_id: PaymentId,
1800 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1801 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1802 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1804 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1805 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1806 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1808 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1809 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1810 payment_id: PaymentId,
1811 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1812 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1816 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1818 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1820 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1821 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1822 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1823 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1825 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1826 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1827 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1830 macro_rules! handle_error {
1831 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1832 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1833 // entering the macro.
1834 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1835 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1839 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1840 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1842 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1843 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1844 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1845 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1849 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1850 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1851 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1852 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1853 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1854 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1859 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1860 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1862 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1863 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1864 action: err.action.clone()
1868 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1869 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1870 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1871 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1872 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1876 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1881 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1884 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1885 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1886 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1892 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1893 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1894 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1895 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1896 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1897 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1899 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1900 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1901 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1902 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1903 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1905 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1906 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1908 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1912 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1913 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1914 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1916 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1917 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1919 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1920 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1922 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1923 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1924 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1925 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1926 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1927 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1929 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1930 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1934 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1935 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1937 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1938 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1940 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1941 match $channel_phase {
1942 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1943 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1945 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1946 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1948 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1949 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1955 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1956 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1960 let key = *$entry.key();
1961 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1963 $entry.remove_entry();
1971 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1972 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1976 let key = *$entry.key();
1977 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1979 $entry.remove_entry();
1987 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1988 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1990 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1991 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1997 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1998 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1999 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2000 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2001 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2003 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2004 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2005 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2006 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2007 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2008 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2009 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2010 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2011 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2012 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2017 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2018 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2019 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2020 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2021 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2022 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2023 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2024 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2025 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2027 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2032 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2033 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2034 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2035 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2036 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2037 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2038 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2039 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2040 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2042 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2047 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2048 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2049 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2050 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2051 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2052 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2053 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2054 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2055 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2056 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2057 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2059 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2060 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2061 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2067 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2068 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2070 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2071 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2072 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2073 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2074 updates.announcement_sigs);
2075 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2076 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2079 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2080 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2081 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2082 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2084 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2085 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2086 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2087 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2088 let mut batch_completed = false;
2089 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2090 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2091 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2092 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2094 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2095 channel_state.2 = true;
2097 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2099 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2101 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2104 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2105 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2106 if batch_completed {
2107 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2108 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2109 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2110 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2111 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2112 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2113 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2114 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2115 chan.set_batch_ready();
2116 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2117 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2121 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2122 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2123 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2128 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2130 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2131 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2133 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2134 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2135 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2136 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2141 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2142 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2143 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2145 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2146 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2147 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2148 panic!("{}", err_str);
2150 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2151 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2152 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2155 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2161 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2162 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2163 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2165 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2166 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2167 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2168 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2169 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2170 // filter for uniqueness here.
2171 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2172 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2173 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2174 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2176 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2177 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2179 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2180 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2181 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2187 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2188 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2189 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2190 while !processed_all_events {
2191 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2198 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2199 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2200 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2202 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2203 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2204 result = $self.process_background_events();
2206 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2207 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2208 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2209 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2213 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2214 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2215 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2216 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2219 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2221 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2222 $event_to_handle = event;
2224 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2225 post_event_actions.push(action);
2230 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2231 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2232 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2233 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2234 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2235 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2238 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2239 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2240 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2241 processed_all_events = false;
2245 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2246 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2247 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2249 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2250 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2251 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2257 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2259 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2260 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2261 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2262 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2263 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2264 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2268 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2270 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2272 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2273 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2275 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2277 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2278 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2279 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2282 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2283 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2284 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2286 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2287 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2288 current_timestamp: u32,
2290 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2291 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2292 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2293 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2295 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2296 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2297 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2302 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2304 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2305 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2306 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2307 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2308 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2309 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2310 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2311 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2313 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2316 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2317 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2319 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2321 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2323 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2325 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2326 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2327 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2328 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2329 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2330 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2331 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2332 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2334 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2344 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2345 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2346 &self.default_configuration
2349 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2350 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2351 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2354 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2355 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2357 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2359 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2363 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2368 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2370 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2371 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2372 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2373 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2374 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2376 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2377 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2379 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2380 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2381 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2383 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2384 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2385 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2387 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2388 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2389 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2390 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2391 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2392 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2394 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2395 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2396 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2397 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2398 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2399 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2402 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2403 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2404 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2406 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2408 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2409 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2411 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2413 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2414 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2415 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2416 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2417 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2418 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2422 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2427 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2429 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2430 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2433 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2435 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2438 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2441 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2442 node_id: their_network_key,
2445 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2448 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2449 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2450 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2451 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2452 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2453 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2454 // the same channel.
2455 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2457 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2458 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2459 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2460 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2461 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2462 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2463 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2464 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2465 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2469 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2470 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2471 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2479 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2480 /// more information.
2481 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2482 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2483 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2484 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2485 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2486 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2487 // the same channel.
2488 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2490 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2491 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2492 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2493 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2494 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2495 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2496 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2497 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2505 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2506 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2508 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2509 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2511 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2512 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2513 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2514 // really wanted anyway.
2515 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2518 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2519 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2520 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2521 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2523 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2524 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2525 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2526 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2527 let context_to_details = |context| {
2528 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2530 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2532 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2533 .map(context_to_details)
2539 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2540 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2542 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2543 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2544 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2546 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2547 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2548 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2549 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2550 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2551 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2553 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2554 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2555 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2557 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2558 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2559 payment_id: *payment_id,
2560 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2561 total_msat: *total_msat,
2564 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2565 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2567 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2568 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2570 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2575 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2576 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2577 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2578 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2579 Some(transaction) => {
2580 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2581 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2586 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2587 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2588 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2589 reason: closure_reason,
2590 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2591 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2595 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2596 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2598 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2599 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2601 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2603 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2604 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2606 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2607 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2609 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2610 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2611 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2612 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2613 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2614 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2615 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2616 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2617 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2619 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2620 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2621 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2622 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2623 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2627 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2628 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2630 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2631 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2632 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2633 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2637 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2638 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2639 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2640 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2644 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2645 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
2651 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2652 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2653 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2655 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2656 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2657 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2658 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2663 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2664 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2665 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2666 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2669 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2670 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2676 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2677 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2678 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2680 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2681 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2683 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2684 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2685 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2686 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2688 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2690 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2691 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2692 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2695 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2696 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2697 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2698 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2699 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2700 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2703 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2704 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2705 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2707 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2708 /// the channel being closed or not:
2709 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2710 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2711 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2712 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2713 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2714 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2715 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2717 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2718 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2719 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2720 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2722 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2724 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2725 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2726 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2729 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2730 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2731 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2732 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2733 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2734 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2737 fn finish_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2738 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2739 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2740 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2741 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2744 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid) = shutdown_res;
2745 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2746 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2747 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2748 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2749 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2750 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2752 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2753 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2754 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2755 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2756 // ignore the result here.
2757 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2759 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2760 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2761 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2762 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2763 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2764 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2765 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2766 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2767 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2768 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2769 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2770 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2771 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2774 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2777 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2778 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2781 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2782 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2786 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2787 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2788 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2789 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2790 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2791 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2792 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2793 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2794 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2795 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2796 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2798 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2800 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2801 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2802 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2803 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2804 mem::drop(peer_state);
2805 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2807 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2808 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2809 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2811 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2812 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2813 // Unfunded channel has no update
2814 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2817 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2818 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2819 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2820 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2822 (None, *peer_node_id)
2824 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2827 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2828 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2829 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2830 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2831 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2832 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2833 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2834 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2835 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2841 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2844 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2845 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2846 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2847 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2848 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2849 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2850 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2851 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2852 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2853 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2854 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2855 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2866 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2867 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2868 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2870 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2871 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2872 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2875 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2876 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2877 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2879 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2880 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2881 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2882 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2883 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2886 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2887 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2888 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2889 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2890 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2894 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2895 /// local transaction(s).
2896 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2897 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2898 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2902 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2903 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2904 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2905 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2906 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2907 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2908 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2910 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2911 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2915 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2916 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2917 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2918 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2919 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2920 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2921 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2922 err_data: Vec::new(),
2926 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2927 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2928 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2931 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2932 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2933 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2934 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2935 outgoing_cltv_value,
2936 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2940 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2941 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2942 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2943 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2944 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2945 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2946 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2947 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2949 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2950 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2951 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2953 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2954 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2956 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2957 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2958 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2959 err_data: Vec::new(),
2960 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2964 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2965 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2966 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2967 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2969 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2972 // final_expiry_too_soon
2973 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2974 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2976 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2977 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2978 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2979 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2980 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2981 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2982 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2983 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2984 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2985 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2986 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2989 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2990 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2991 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2993 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2995 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2996 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
3000 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
3001 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
3002 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
3003 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
3004 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
3005 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
3006 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3007 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3008 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3009 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3010 err_data: Vec::new(),
3011 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3014 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3015 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3016 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3017 err_data: Vec::new(),
3018 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3021 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3025 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3028 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3029 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3032 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3033 phantom_shared_secret,
3037 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3038 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3039 err_data: Vec::new(),
3040 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3043 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3046 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3047 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3048 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3049 outgoing_cltv_value,
3050 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3054 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3055 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3056 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3057 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3058 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3060 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3061 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3062 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3063 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3064 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3065 failure_code: $err_code,
3071 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3072 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3075 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3076 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3077 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3079 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3080 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3081 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3082 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3083 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3084 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3085 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3086 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3088 macro_rules! return_err {
3089 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3091 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3092 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3093 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3094 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3095 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3096 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3102 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3103 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3104 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3107 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3108 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3110 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3111 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3114 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3115 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3116 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3117 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3120 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3121 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3122 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3124 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3125 // inbound channel's state.
3126 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3127 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3128 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3130 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3134 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3135 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3136 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3137 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3138 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3139 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3140 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3141 // phantom or an intercept.
3142 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3143 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3144 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3148 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3151 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3153 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3154 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3155 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3156 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3157 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3159 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3160 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3161 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3162 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3165 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3166 // have no consistency guarantees.
3167 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3171 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3172 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3173 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3174 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3175 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3177 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3178 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3179 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3180 // we don't have the channel here.
3181 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3183 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3185 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3186 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3187 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3188 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3189 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3190 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3191 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3192 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3193 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3194 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3195 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3197 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3200 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3201 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3203 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3204 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3208 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3209 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3210 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3211 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3213 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3220 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3221 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3222 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3223 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3224 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3225 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3227 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3228 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3230 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3231 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3232 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3233 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3234 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3235 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3236 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3237 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3238 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3239 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3245 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3246 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3247 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3248 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3250 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3251 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3253 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3254 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3255 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3257 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3258 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3259 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3260 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3261 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3262 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3263 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3267 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3269 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3272 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3273 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3274 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3275 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3276 macro_rules! return_err {
3277 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3279 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3280 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3281 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3282 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3283 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3284 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3290 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3292 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3293 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3296 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3297 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3298 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3299 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3300 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3302 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3305 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3306 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3307 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3308 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3309 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3315 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3316 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3317 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3319 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3320 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3321 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3323 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3324 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3325 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3326 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3327 return Err(LightningError {
3328 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3329 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3332 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3333 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3335 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3336 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3339 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3340 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3341 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3342 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3344 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3345 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3346 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3348 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3349 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3350 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3351 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3352 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3353 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3357 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3360 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3362 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3364 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3365 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3366 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3367 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3368 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3371 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3372 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3374 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3375 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3376 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3377 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3378 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3379 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3380 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3381 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3383 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3384 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3385 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3387 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3389 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3396 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3397 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3398 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3399 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3404 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3405 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3406 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3409 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3410 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3412 log_trace!(self.logger,
3413 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3414 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3415 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3416 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3418 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3419 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3420 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3422 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3423 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3425 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3426 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3427 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3428 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3431 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3432 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3433 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3434 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3436 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3437 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3438 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3439 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3440 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3442 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3443 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3444 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3446 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3447 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3449 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3450 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3451 Some(monitor_update) => {
3452 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3454 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3455 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3456 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3457 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3458 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3459 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3460 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3468 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3471 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3472 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3473 // `channel_by_id` map.
3474 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3475 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3480 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3481 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3483 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3488 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3490 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3491 /// fields for more info.
3493 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3494 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3496 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3498 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3499 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3500 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3501 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3502 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3504 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3505 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3506 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3507 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3508 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3510 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3511 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3512 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3513 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3515 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3517 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3518 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3519 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3521 /// In general, a path may raise:
3522 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3523 /// node public key) is specified.
3524 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3525 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3526 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3527 /// relevant updates.
3529 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3530 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3531 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3533 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3534 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3535 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3536 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3537 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3538 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3539 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3540 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3542 self.pending_outbound_payments
3543 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3544 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3545 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3548 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3549 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3550 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3551 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3552 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3553 self.pending_outbound_payments
3554 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3555 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3556 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3557 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3561 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3562 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3564 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3565 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3566 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3570 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3571 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3572 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3576 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3577 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3581 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3582 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3583 /// retries are exhausted.
3585 /// # Event Generation
3587 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3588 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3590 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3591 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3592 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3594 /// # Restart Behavior
3596 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3597 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated.
3598 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3599 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3600 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3603 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3604 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3605 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3606 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3607 /// never reach the recipient.
3609 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3610 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3612 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3613 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3615 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3616 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3617 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3618 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3619 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3620 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3621 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3624 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3625 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3627 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3630 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3631 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3632 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3633 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3634 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3635 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3636 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3637 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3640 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3641 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3642 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3643 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3644 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3645 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3646 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3647 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3648 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3651 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3654 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3655 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3658 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3659 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3661 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3662 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3663 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3664 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3665 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3666 let payment_params =
3667 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3669 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3671 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3674 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3675 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3677 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3678 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3679 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3680 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3682 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3683 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3684 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3685 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3686 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3687 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3688 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3689 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3690 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3691 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3693 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3694 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3695 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3696 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3700 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3702 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3703 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3706 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3708 let mut res = Vec::new();
3710 for mut path in route.paths {
3711 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3712 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3713 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3714 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3715 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3718 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3721 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3722 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3724 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3726 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3727 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3732 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3735 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3740 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3741 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3742 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3744 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3745 let used_liquidity =
3746 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3748 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3749 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3751 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3754 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3759 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3760 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3761 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3768 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3769 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3770 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3771 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3772 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3773 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3774 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3775 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3776 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3778 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3779 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3780 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3781 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3782 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3784 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3785 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3786 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3787 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3788 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3789 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3790 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3791 } else { unreachable!(); });
3793 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3794 Err((chan, err)) => {
3795 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3796 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3798 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3799 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3800 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3806 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3807 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3809 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3810 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3813 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3814 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3815 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3819 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3820 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3823 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3824 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3825 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3827 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3828 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3829 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3830 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3832 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3839 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3840 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3841 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3845 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3847 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3848 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3850 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3851 /// across the p2p network.
3853 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3854 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3856 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3857 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3858 /// keys per-channel).
3860 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3861 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3862 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3864 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3865 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3866 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3868 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3869 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3870 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3871 /// for more details.
3873 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3874 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3875 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3876 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3879 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3881 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3882 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3884 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transcaction
3885 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3886 /// signature for each channel.
3888 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3889 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3890 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3891 let mut result = Ok(());
3893 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3894 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3895 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3896 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3897 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3902 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3903 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3904 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3908 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3909 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3910 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3911 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3912 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3913 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3914 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3915 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3920 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3921 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3922 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3923 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3927 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3928 match states.entry(txid) {
3929 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3930 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3931 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3935 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3938 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels.iter() {
3939 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3940 temporary_channel_id,
3941 counterparty_node_id,
3942 funding_transaction.clone(),
3945 let mut output_index = None;
3946 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3947 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3948 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3949 if output_index.is_some() {
3950 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3951 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3954 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3957 if output_index.is_none() {
3958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3959 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3962 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3963 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3964 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3970 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3971 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3972 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3973 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3974 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3975 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3976 .into_iter().flatten()
3977 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3979 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3980 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3982 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3984 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3985 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3986 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3987 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3988 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3990 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3991 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
3992 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
3996 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3997 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4003 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4005 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4006 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4007 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4008 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4010 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4011 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4013 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4014 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4016 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4018 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4019 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4020 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4021 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4022 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4023 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4024 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4025 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4026 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4027 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4028 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4029 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4030 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4034 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4035 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4036 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4037 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4038 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4039 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4040 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4041 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4042 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4043 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4047 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4048 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4049 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4050 config.apply(config_update);
4051 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4054 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4055 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4056 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4057 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4058 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4059 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4066 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4067 debug_assert!(false);
4068 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4070 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4071 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4078 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4080 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4081 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4082 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4083 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4085 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4086 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4088 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4089 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4091 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4093 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4094 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4095 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4096 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4097 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4098 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4099 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4100 pub fn update_channel_config(
4101 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4102 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4103 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4106 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4107 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4109 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4110 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4112 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4113 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4114 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4115 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4116 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4118 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4119 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4120 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4123 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4126 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4127 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4128 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4129 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4130 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4131 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4132 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4134 let next_hop_scid = {
4135 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4136 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4137 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4138 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4139 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4140 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4141 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4142 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4143 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4144 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4147 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4149 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4150 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4151 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4153 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4154 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4155 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4160 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4161 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4162 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4165 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4166 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4167 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4169 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4171 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4172 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4173 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4174 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4175 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4178 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4179 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4180 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4181 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4182 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4184 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4188 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4189 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4191 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4194 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4195 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4196 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4198 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4199 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4200 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4203 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4204 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4205 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4206 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4207 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4208 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4209 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4210 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4213 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4214 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4215 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4216 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4221 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4223 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4224 /// Will likely generate further events.
4225 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4226 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4228 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4229 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4230 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4232 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4233 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4235 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4236 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4237 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4239 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4240 match forward_info {
4241 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4242 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4243 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4244 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4245 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4248 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4249 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4250 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4252 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4253 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4254 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4255 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4256 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4257 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4258 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4261 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4262 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4264 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4267 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4268 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4274 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4275 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4277 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4281 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4282 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4284 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4288 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4289 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4290 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4291 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4292 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4293 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4294 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4297 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4298 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4299 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4300 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4301 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4303 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4305 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4306 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4310 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4311 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4312 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4313 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4315 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4316 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4322 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4325 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4328 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4329 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4330 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4331 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4332 // problem, not ours.
4338 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4339 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4340 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4342 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4346 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4347 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4348 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4349 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4352 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4353 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4354 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4355 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4356 match forward_info {
4357 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4358 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4359 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4360 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4361 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4364 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4365 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4366 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4367 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4368 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4369 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4370 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4371 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4372 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4374 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4375 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4376 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4379 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4380 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4382 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4384 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4385 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4386 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4387 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4392 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4393 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4395 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4396 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4397 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4398 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4400 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4401 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4403 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4405 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4406 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4407 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4414 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4418 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4419 match forward_info {
4420 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4421 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4422 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4423 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4424 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4427 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4428 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4429 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4430 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4431 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4432 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4433 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4435 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4436 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4437 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4441 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4442 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4445 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4448 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4449 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4450 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4451 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4452 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4453 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4454 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4455 phantom_shared_secret,
4457 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4458 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4459 // if routing nodes overpay
4460 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4461 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4463 total_value_received: None,
4464 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4467 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4470 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4472 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4473 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4474 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4475 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4476 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4477 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4479 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4480 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4481 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4482 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4483 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4484 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4485 phantom_shared_secret,
4487 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4488 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4490 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4493 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4494 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4495 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4496 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4497 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4500 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4501 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4502 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4503 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4504 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4505 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4507 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4508 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4509 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4511 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4512 .entry(payment_hash)
4513 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4514 .or_insert_with(|| {
4515 committed_to_claimable = true;
4517 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4520 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4521 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4522 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4523 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4525 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4526 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4527 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4529 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4530 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4531 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4534 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4536 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4537 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4538 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4539 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4540 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4541 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4542 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4543 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4544 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4545 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4547 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4549 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4550 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4551 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4552 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4553 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4554 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4556 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4557 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4558 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4559 committed_to_claimable = true;
4561 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4562 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4563 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4564 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4565 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4566 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4567 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4568 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4569 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4570 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4574 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4575 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4576 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4577 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4578 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4580 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4582 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4583 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4585 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4586 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4587 committed_to_claimable = true;
4590 payment_claimable_generated
4594 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4595 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4596 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4597 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4598 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4599 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4600 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4601 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4602 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4603 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4604 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4605 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4606 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4607 Ok(result) => result,
4609 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4610 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4613 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4614 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4615 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4616 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4617 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4618 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4621 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4622 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4623 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4625 check_total_value!(purpose);
4627 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4628 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4629 check_total_value!(purpose);
4633 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4634 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4635 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4636 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4638 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4639 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4640 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4641 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4642 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4643 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4644 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4645 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4647 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4648 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4649 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4651 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4652 if payment_claimable_generated {
4653 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4659 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4660 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4668 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4669 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4670 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4671 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4673 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4674 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4676 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4678 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4679 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4680 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4682 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4684 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4685 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4686 events.append(&mut new_events);
4689 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4691 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4692 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4693 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4695 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4697 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4698 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4699 if background_events.is_empty() {
4700 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4703 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4705 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4706 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4707 // monitor updating completing.
4708 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4710 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4711 let mut updated_chan = false;
4713 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4714 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4715 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4716 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4717 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4718 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4719 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4720 updated_chan = true;
4721 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4722 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4724 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4727 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4732 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4733 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4736 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4737 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4738 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4739 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4740 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4741 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4742 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4744 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4745 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4746 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4747 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4748 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4754 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4757 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4758 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4759 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4760 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4761 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4764 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4765 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4766 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4767 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4768 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4769 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4770 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4772 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4774 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4775 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4776 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4777 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4779 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4780 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4782 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4783 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4787 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4788 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4789 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4790 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4791 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4792 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4793 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4795 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4796 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4798 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4799 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4800 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4801 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4802 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4803 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4805 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4810 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4811 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4819 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4821 /// This currently includes:
4822 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4823 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4824 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4826 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4827 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4828 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4829 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4830 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4831 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4832 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4833 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4835 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4836 /// estimate fetches.
4838 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4839 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4840 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4841 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4842 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4844 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4845 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4847 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4848 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4849 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4850 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4852 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4853 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4854 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4855 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4856 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4857 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4859 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4860 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4861 log_error!(self.logger,
4862 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4863 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4864 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4865 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4866 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4867 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4868 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4869 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4870 channel_id: *chan_id,
4871 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4882 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4883 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4884 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4885 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4886 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4887 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4888 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4890 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4891 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4896 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4897 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4899 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4900 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4901 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4902 if needs_close { return false; }
4905 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4906 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4907 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4908 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4909 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4910 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4911 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4912 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4914 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4915 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4916 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4917 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4921 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4923 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4926 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4928 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4929 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4930 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4931 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4935 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4937 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4943 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4945 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4946 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4947 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4948 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4949 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4950 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4951 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4952 channel_id: *chan_id,
4953 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4961 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4962 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4963 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4965 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4966 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4967 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4972 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4973 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4974 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4975 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4976 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4977 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4978 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4979 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4985 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4987 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4988 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4993 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4994 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4995 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4996 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4997 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4998 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4999 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5000 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5001 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5002 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5003 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5004 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5005 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5006 // have no channels to the peer.
5007 let remove_entry = {
5008 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5009 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5012 entry.remove_entry();
5015 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5020 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5021 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5022 // This should be unreachable
5023 debug_assert!(false);
5026 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5027 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5028 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5029 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5030 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5031 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5032 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5035 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5036 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5037 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5039 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5040 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5047 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5048 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5049 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5050 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5051 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5054 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5055 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5058 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5059 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5062 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5063 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5064 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5065 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5066 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5067 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5068 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5071 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5072 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5075 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5076 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5077 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5078 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5079 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5086 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5087 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5088 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5090 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5091 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5092 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5093 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5095 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5096 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5097 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5098 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5099 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5100 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5103 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5104 /// reason for the failure.
5106 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5107 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5108 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5110 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5111 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5112 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5113 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5114 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5115 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5116 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5121 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5122 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5123 match failure_code {
5124 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5125 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5126 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5127 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5128 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5129 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5131 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5132 let fail_data = match data {
5133 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5136 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5141 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5142 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5144 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5146 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5147 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5148 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5149 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5150 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5151 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5152 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5154 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5156 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5157 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5159 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5164 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5165 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5166 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5167 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5168 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5169 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5170 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5171 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5172 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5173 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5175 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5176 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5177 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5178 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5180 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5181 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5182 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5183 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5184 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5188 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5189 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5190 // be surfaced to the user.
5191 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5192 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5193 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5195 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5196 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5197 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5198 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5199 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5200 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5201 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5202 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5203 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5205 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5206 debug_assert!(false);
5207 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5210 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5212 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5215 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5216 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5217 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5218 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5222 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5223 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5224 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5225 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5226 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5227 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5228 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5229 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5230 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5231 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5234 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5235 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5236 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5239 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5240 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5241 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5243 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5244 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5245 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5246 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5247 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5249 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5250 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5251 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5253 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5254 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5255 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5256 push_forward_ev = true;
5258 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5259 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5260 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5262 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5263 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5266 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5267 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5268 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5269 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5270 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5271 failed_next_destination: destination,
5277 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5278 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5280 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5281 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5282 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5283 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5285 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5286 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5287 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5288 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5290 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5291 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5292 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5294 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5295 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5296 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5297 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5298 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5299 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5300 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5301 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5302 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5305 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5306 /// even type numbers.
5310 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5311 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5313 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5314 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5315 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5318 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5319 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5321 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5324 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5325 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5326 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5327 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5328 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5329 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5330 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5331 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5336 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5337 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5338 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5339 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5340 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5342 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5343 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5344 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5348 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5349 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5350 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5351 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5352 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5353 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5354 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5355 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5356 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5357 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5358 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5367 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5369 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5370 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5371 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5372 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5373 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5374 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5375 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5376 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5377 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5378 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5379 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5380 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5381 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5382 debug_assert!(false);
5386 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5388 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5389 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5390 debug_assert!(false);
5394 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5395 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5397 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5398 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5399 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5400 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5403 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5404 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5405 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5406 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5410 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5411 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5412 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5413 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5414 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5415 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5418 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5419 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5420 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5421 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5422 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5427 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5428 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5429 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5430 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5431 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5432 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5433 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5435 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5438 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5439 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5440 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5441 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5445 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5446 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5447 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5448 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5450 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5451 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5452 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5453 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5455 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5456 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5457 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5458 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5461 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5462 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5463 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5464 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5468 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5469 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5470 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5473 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5474 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5475 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5476 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5477 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5478 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5479 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5482 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5483 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5484 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5486 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5489 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5490 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5492 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5493 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5494 // monitor update as a background event.
5495 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5496 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5497 counterparty_node_id,
5498 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5499 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5503 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5504 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5509 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5511 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5513 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5514 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5515 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5516 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5517 blocking_action: blocker,
5519 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5521 debug_assert!(false,
5522 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5525 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5526 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5527 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5528 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5529 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5531 let mut found_blocker = false;
5532 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5533 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5534 // which case we need to only remove the one
5535 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5536 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5537 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5538 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5540 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5543 debug_assert!(false);
5552 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5553 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5554 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5560 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5561 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5562 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5563 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5564 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5565 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5566 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5567 // again on restart.
5568 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5569 payment_preimage, update_res);
5572 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5573 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5575 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5576 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5577 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5578 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5579 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5580 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5581 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5582 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5583 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5584 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5587 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5588 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5589 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5590 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5591 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5592 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5596 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5597 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5600 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5601 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5602 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5605 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5606 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5607 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5608 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5609 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5611 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5612 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5613 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5615 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5616 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5619 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5620 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5621 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5622 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5623 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5624 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5625 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5626 let chan_to_release =
5627 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5628 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5630 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5631 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5632 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5633 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5638 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5639 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5640 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5641 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5642 // in the background.
5643 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5644 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5645 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5646 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5648 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5649 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5650 funding_txo, update, ..
5652 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5653 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5654 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5655 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5657 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5663 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5664 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5665 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5667 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5668 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5670 monitor_update.updates[0],
5671 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5676 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5677 // immediately once we get going.
5678 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5681 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5683 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5686 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5687 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5688 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5689 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5690 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5691 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5695 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5696 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5697 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5700 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5701 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5703 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5704 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5705 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5706 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5708 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5712 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5713 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5714 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5720 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5721 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5722 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5725 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5726 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5727 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5728 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5730 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5732 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5733 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5734 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5736 payment_purpose: purpose,
5739 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5741 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5745 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5747 sender_intended_total_msat,
5751 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5752 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5754 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5755 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5756 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5759 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5760 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5762 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5763 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5764 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5765 Some(blocking_action),
5772 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5773 /// update completion.
5774 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5775 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5776 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5777 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5778 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5779 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5780 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5781 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5782 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5783 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5784 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5785 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5786 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5788 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5790 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5791 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5792 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5793 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5796 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5797 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5799 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5800 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5801 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5806 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5807 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5808 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5809 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5814 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5815 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5816 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5817 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5818 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5823 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5827 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5833 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5834 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5835 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5839 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5840 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5841 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5847 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5848 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5850 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5851 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5853 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5854 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5855 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5856 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5857 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5862 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5863 let mut peer_state_lock;
5864 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5865 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5866 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5867 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5869 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5872 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5873 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5874 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5875 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5876 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5879 let remaining_in_flight =
5880 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5881 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5884 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5885 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5886 remaining_in_flight);
5887 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5890 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5893 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5895 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5896 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5899 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5900 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5901 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5903 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5904 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5905 /// used to accept such channels.
5907 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5908 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5909 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5910 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5913 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5914 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5916 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5917 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5918 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5920 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5921 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5923 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5924 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5926 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5927 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5929 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5930 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5931 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5932 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5935 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5936 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5938 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5939 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5940 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5941 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5942 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5943 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5944 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5945 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5947 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5948 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5949 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5951 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5952 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5953 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5954 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5955 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5956 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5957 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5959 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5963 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5964 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5965 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5966 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5967 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5968 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5969 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5972 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5973 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5975 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5976 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5977 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5978 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5979 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5980 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5981 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5982 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5985 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5990 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5991 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5992 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5994 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5995 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5996 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5999 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6004 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6005 /// or 0-conf channels.
6007 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6008 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6009 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6010 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6011 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6012 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6014 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6015 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6016 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6017 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6018 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6019 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6020 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6024 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6027 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6028 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6030 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6031 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6033 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6034 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6035 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6036 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6037 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6039 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6042 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6043 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6044 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6047 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6048 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6053 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6056 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6057 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6058 // likely to be lost on restart!
6059 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6060 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6063 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6064 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6067 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6068 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6069 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6070 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6071 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6073 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6074 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6076 debug_assert!(false);
6077 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6079 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6080 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6082 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6083 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6084 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6085 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6086 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6087 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6089 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6090 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6091 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6094 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6095 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6096 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6097 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6098 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6101 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6102 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6104 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6107 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6108 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6109 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6110 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6111 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6112 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6113 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6114 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6115 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6117 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6118 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6119 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6124 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6125 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6126 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6127 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6128 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6129 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6130 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6133 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6138 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6139 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6140 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6142 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6143 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6146 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6147 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6149 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6150 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6151 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6153 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6157 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6158 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6159 // likely to be lost on restart!
6160 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6161 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6162 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6164 debug_assert!(false);
6165 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6167 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6168 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6169 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6170 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6171 match phase.get_mut() {
6172 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6173 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6174 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6177 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6181 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6184 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6185 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6186 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6187 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6188 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6190 user_channel_id: user_id,
6195 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6196 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6198 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6199 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6201 debug_assert!(false);
6202 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6205 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6206 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6207 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
6208 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6209 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6210 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6212 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6213 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6214 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6215 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6216 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6217 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6218 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6219 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6220 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6224 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6225 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6227 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6230 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
6231 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6232 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
6234 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6235 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6236 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6237 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6238 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6239 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6240 funding_msg.channel_id))
6242 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6243 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6244 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6245 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6246 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6248 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6249 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6250 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6251 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6252 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6253 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6257 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6258 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6259 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6261 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6265 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6266 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6267 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6268 funding_msg.channel_id));
6276 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6277 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6278 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6279 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6281 debug_assert!(false);
6282 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6285 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6286 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6287 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6288 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6289 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6290 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6291 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6292 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6293 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6294 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6297 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6301 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6305 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6309 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6310 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6311 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6313 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6315 debug_assert!(false);
6316 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6318 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6319 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6320 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6321 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6322 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6323 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6324 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6325 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6326 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6327 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6328 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6329 msg: announcement_sigs,
6331 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6332 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6333 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6334 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6335 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6336 // announcement_signatures.
6337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6338 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6339 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6340 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6347 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6348 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6353 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6354 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6357 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6358 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6363 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6364 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6365 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6368 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6370 debug_assert!(false);
6371 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6373 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6374 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6375 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6376 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6378 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6379 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6380 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6382 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6385 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6386 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6387 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6388 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6390 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6391 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6392 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6393 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6394 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6395 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6399 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6400 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6401 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6402 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6405 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6406 let context = phase.context_mut();
6407 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6408 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6409 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6410 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6414 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6417 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6418 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6419 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6420 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6422 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6423 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6429 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6430 let mut shutdown_result = None;
6431 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid;
6432 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6433 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6435 debug_assert!(false);
6436 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6438 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6439 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6440 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6441 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6442 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6443 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6444 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
6445 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6446 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6447 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6448 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6453 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6454 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6455 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6456 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6457 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6458 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6459 } else { (tx, None) }
6461 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6462 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6465 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6468 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6469 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6470 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6472 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6473 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6474 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6475 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6476 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6480 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6481 shutdown_result = Some((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
6483 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6484 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6485 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6490 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6491 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6492 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6493 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6495 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6496 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6497 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6498 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6500 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6501 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6503 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6504 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6505 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6507 debug_assert!(false);
6508 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6510 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6511 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6512 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6513 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6514 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6515 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6516 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6517 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6518 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6519 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6521 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6522 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6523 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6524 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6525 match pending_forward_info {
6526 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6527 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6528 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6529 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6531 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6532 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6533 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6534 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6535 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6538 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6540 _ => pending_forward_info
6543 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6545 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6546 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6549 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6554 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6556 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6557 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6558 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6560 debug_assert!(false);
6561 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6563 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6564 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6565 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6566 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6567 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6568 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6569 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6570 log_trace!(self.logger,
6571 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6573 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6574 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6575 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6577 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6578 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6579 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6580 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6581 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6582 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6583 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6586 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6587 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6590 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6593 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6597 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6598 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6599 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6600 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6601 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6603 debug_assert!(false);
6604 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6606 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6607 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6608 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6609 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6610 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6611 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6613 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6614 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6617 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6622 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6623 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6624 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6625 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6626 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6628 debug_assert!(false);
6629 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6631 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6632 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6633 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6635 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6636 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6637 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6639 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6640 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6642 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6643 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6647 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6651 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6652 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6653 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6655 debug_assert!(false);
6656 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6658 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6659 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6660 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6661 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6662 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6663 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6664 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6665 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6666 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6667 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6671 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6672 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6675 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6680 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6681 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6682 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6683 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6684 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6685 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6686 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6687 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6688 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6689 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6690 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6692 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6693 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6695 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6696 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6697 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6698 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6699 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6700 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6702 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6703 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6704 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6706 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6707 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6708 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6709 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6710 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6711 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6712 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6713 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6714 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6717 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6718 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6720 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6721 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6722 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6723 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6724 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6725 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6726 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6727 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6728 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6731 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6732 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6733 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6738 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6739 // payments are being processed.
6740 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6741 push_forward_event = true;
6743 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6744 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6751 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6752 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6755 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6756 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6757 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6759 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6763 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6764 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6765 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6766 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6767 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6769 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6770 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6771 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6772 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6773 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6774 // real by taking more time.
6775 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6776 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6777 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6782 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6783 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6784 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6785 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6786 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6787 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6788 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6790 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6791 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6792 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6793 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6794 channel_funding_outpoint,
6795 counterparty_node_id,
6800 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6801 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6802 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6804 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6805 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6806 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6807 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6809 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6810 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6811 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6817 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6818 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6819 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6820 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6822 debug_assert!(false);
6823 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6824 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6825 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6826 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6827 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6828 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6829 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6830 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6831 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6832 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6833 *counterparty_node_id)
6835 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6836 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6837 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6838 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6839 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6840 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6841 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6845 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6846 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6849 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6852 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6856 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6858 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6860 debug_assert!(false);
6861 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6863 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6864 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6865 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6866 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6867 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6868 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6870 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6871 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6874 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6879 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6880 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6881 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6883 debug_assert!(false);
6884 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6886 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6887 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6888 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6889 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6890 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6891 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6892 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6895 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6896 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6897 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6898 msg, &self.default_configuration
6899 ), chan_phase_entry),
6900 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6901 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6902 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6905 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6906 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6909 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6914 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6915 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6916 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6917 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6919 // It's not a local channel
6920 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6923 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6924 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6925 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6926 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6928 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6929 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6930 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6931 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6932 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6933 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6934 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6935 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6936 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6937 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6938 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6940 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6942 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6943 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6944 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6945 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6947 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6948 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6949 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6952 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6956 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6957 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6960 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6962 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6965 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6967 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6968 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6970 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6972 debug_assert!(false);
6973 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6974 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6978 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6979 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6980 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6981 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6982 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6983 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6984 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6985 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6986 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6987 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6988 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
6989 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6990 let mut channel_update = None;
6991 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6992 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6993 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6996 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6997 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6998 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6999 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7000 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7001 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7002 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7007 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7008 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7009 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7010 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7011 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7012 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7016 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7017 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7020 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7021 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7022 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7023 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7024 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7025 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7026 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7027 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7028 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7030 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7031 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7032 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7033 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7034 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7035 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7036 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7037 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7038 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7039 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7040 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7041 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7042 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7043 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7044 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7045 next_funding_txid: None,
7048 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7049 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7050 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7056 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7057 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7058 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7059 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7062 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7063 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7068 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7069 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7070 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7072 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7073 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7074 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7075 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7076 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7077 match monitor_event {
7078 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7079 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7080 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7081 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7083 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7084 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7085 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7086 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7089 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7090 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7091 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7093 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7094 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7095 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7096 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7099 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7100 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7101 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7102 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7103 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7104 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7105 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7106 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7107 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7108 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7109 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7113 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7114 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7115 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7116 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7117 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7125 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7126 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7132 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7133 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7136 has_pending_monitor_events
7139 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7140 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7141 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7143 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7144 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7145 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7148 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7149 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7150 /// update was applied.
7151 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7152 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7153 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7155 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7156 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7157 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7158 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7160 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7161 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7164 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7165 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7166 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7168 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7169 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7170 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7171 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7172 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7173 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7175 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7176 has_monitor_update = true;
7178 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7179 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7180 continue 'peer_loop;
7189 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7190 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7191 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7197 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7198 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7199 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7200 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7201 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7202 let mut has_update = false;
7203 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7205 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7207 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7208 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7209 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7210 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7211 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7213 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7214 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
7215 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7216 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
7217 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7219 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7220 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7223 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7224 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7225 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7226 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7227 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7232 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7234 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7235 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7236 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7237 shutdown_results.push((None, Vec::new(), unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid));
7243 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7244 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7249 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7255 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7256 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7259 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7260 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7266 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7267 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7269 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7270 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7271 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7272 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7273 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7274 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7275 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7276 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7277 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7278 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
7279 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7280 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7281 assert!(should_broadcast);
7282 } else { unreachable!(); }
7283 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7284 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7285 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7288 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7292 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7293 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7294 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7296 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7297 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7298 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7299 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7301 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7302 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7303 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7304 &self, description: String
7305 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7306 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7307 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7308 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7309 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7310 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7312 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7313 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7317 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7318 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7320 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7321 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7322 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7325 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund. To
7326 /// revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the invoice.
7328 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7329 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for sender privacy. As such, currently, the
7330 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7331 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7333 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7334 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7335 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7336 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7337 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7338 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7339 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7340 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7341 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7342 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7343 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7345 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7346 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7348 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7349 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7352 self.pending_outbound_payments
7353 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7354 payment_id, absolute_expiry, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7356 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7361 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7364 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7365 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7367 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7368 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7369 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7370 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7372 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7374 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7375 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7379 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7380 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7382 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7384 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7385 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7387 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7388 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7389 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7390 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7391 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7392 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7393 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7394 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7395 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7396 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7397 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7400 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7401 /// stored external to LDK.
7403 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7404 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7405 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7407 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7408 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7411 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7412 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7413 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7414 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7416 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7417 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7418 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7419 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7420 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7422 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7423 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7424 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7425 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7426 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7428 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7429 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7431 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7432 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7436 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7437 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7439 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7441 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7442 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7444 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7445 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7446 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7447 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7448 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7449 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7450 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7453 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7454 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7456 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7457 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7458 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7461 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7463 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7464 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7465 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7466 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7469 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7470 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7472 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7473 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7474 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7475 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7477 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7478 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7479 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7480 Some(_) => continue,
7481 None => return scid_candidate
7486 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7488 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7489 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7491 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7492 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7493 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7497 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7498 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7499 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7501 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7502 /// times to get a unique scid.
7503 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7504 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7505 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7507 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7508 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7509 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7510 return scid_candidate
7514 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7515 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7516 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7517 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7519 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7520 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7521 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7522 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7523 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7524 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7526 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7527 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7528 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7537 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7538 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7539 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7540 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7541 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7545 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7546 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7547 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7548 events.push_back((event, None));
7552 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7553 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7554 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7558 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7559 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7563 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7564 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7567 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7568 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7569 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7570 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7571 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7573 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7574 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7575 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7576 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7578 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7579 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7580 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7581 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7583 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7587 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7588 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7589 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7590 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7591 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7592 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7593 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7597 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7598 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7599 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7600 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7601 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7602 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7603 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7604 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7605 if further_update_exists {
7606 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7611 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7612 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7617 log_debug!(self.logger,
7618 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7619 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7625 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7626 for action in actions {
7628 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7629 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7631 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7637 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7638 /// using the given event handler.
7640 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7641 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7645 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7649 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7651 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7652 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7653 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7654 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7655 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7656 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7660 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7661 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7662 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7663 /// is always placed next to each other.
7665 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7666 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7667 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7668 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7670 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7671 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7672 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7673 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7674 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7675 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7676 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7678 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7679 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7680 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7681 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7684 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7685 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7687 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7688 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7691 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7692 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7693 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7694 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7695 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7696 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7697 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7701 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7702 events.replace(pending_events);
7711 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7713 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7714 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7715 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7716 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7717 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7718 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7722 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7724 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7725 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7726 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7728 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7732 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7734 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7735 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7736 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7737 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7738 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7739 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7743 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7745 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7746 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7747 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7748 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7749 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7752 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7753 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7756 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7757 let _persistence_guard =
7758 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7759 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7760 let new_height = height - 1;
7762 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7763 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7764 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7765 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7766 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7767 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7770 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7774 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7776 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7777 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7778 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7779 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7780 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7781 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7785 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7786 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7787 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7788 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7790 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7791 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7793 let _persistence_guard =
7794 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7795 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7796 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7797 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7799 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7800 if height < last_best_block_height {
7801 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7802 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7806 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7807 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7808 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7809 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7811 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7812 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7814 let _persistence_guard =
7815 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7816 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7817 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7819 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7821 macro_rules! max_time {
7822 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7824 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7825 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7826 // having an explicit local time source.
7827 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7828 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7829 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7830 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7831 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7837 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7838 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7839 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7840 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7844 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7845 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7846 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7847 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7848 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7849 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7850 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7851 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7858 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7859 let _persistence_guard =
7860 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
7861 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7862 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7863 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7864 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7865 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7866 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7867 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7872 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7874 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7875 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7876 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7877 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7878 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7879 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7883 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7884 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7886 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7887 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7888 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7889 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7890 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7892 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7893 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7895 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7896 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7897 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7898 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7899 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7900 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7902 // Retain unfunded channels.
7903 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7904 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7905 let res = f(channel);
7906 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7907 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7908 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7909 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7910 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7912 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7913 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7914 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7915 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7916 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7917 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7918 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7923 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7928 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7929 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7932 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7933 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7934 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7935 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7936 msg: announcement_sigs,
7938 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7939 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7940 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7942 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7943 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7944 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7949 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7950 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7951 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7952 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7953 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7954 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7955 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7956 // is always consistent.
7957 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7958 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7959 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7960 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7961 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7964 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7965 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7966 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7967 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7968 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7969 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7970 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7974 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7975 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7976 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7977 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7978 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7979 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
7980 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7981 data: reason_message,
7994 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7995 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7996 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7997 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7998 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7999 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8000 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8001 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8002 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8003 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8005 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8006 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8007 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8011 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8014 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8015 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8016 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8017 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8018 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8019 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8020 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8021 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8022 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8023 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8026 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8027 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8028 _ => unreachable!(),
8030 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8031 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8032 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8033 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8039 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8041 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8042 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8046 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8047 /// may have events that need processing.
8049 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8050 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8052 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8053 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8054 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8055 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8058 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8059 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8060 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8063 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8064 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8065 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8068 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8069 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8070 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8071 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8074 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8075 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8076 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8077 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8080 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8081 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8083 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8084 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8085 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8086 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8087 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8090 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8091 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8092 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8093 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8096 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8097 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8098 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8099 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8102 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8103 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8104 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8105 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8109 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8110 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8112 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8113 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8114 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8115 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8116 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8117 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8121 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8122 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8123 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8124 // change to the contents.
8125 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8126 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8127 let persist = match &res {
8128 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8129 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8130 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8132 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8134 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8139 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8140 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8141 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8142 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8145 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8146 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8147 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8148 // change to the contents.
8149 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8150 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8151 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8155 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8156 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8157 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8158 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8161 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8162 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8163 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8166 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8167 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8168 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8171 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8172 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8173 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8174 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8175 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8176 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8177 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8178 let persist = match &res {
8179 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8180 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8182 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8187 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8188 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8189 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8192 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8193 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8194 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8197 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8198 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8199 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8200 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8201 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8202 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8203 let persist = match &res {
8204 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8205 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8206 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8208 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8213 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8214 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8215 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8218 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8219 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8220 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8221 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8222 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8223 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8224 let persist = match &res {
8225 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8226 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8227 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8229 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8234 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8235 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8236 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8237 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8238 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8239 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8240 let persist = match &res {
8241 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8242 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8243 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8245 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8250 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8251 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8252 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8255 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8256 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8257 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8260 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8261 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8262 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8263 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8264 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8265 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8266 let persist = match &res {
8267 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8268 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8269 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8271 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8276 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8277 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8278 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8281 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8282 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8283 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8286 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8291 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8292 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8293 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8294 let persist = match &res {
8295 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8296 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8297 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8299 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8304 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8306 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8307 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8308 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8310 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8311 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8312 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8313 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8315 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8316 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8317 let context = match phase {
8318 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8319 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8320 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8325 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8326 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8329 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8333 // Clean up for removal.
8334 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8335 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8336 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8339 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8340 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8341 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8342 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8344 // V1 Channel Establishment
8345 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8346 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8347 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8348 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8349 // V2 Channel Establishment
8350 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8351 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8352 // Common Channel Establishment
8353 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8354 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8355 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8356 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8357 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8358 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8359 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8360 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8361 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8362 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8363 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8364 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8365 // Channel Operations
8366 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8367 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8368 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8369 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8370 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8371 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8373 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8374 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8375 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8376 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8377 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8378 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8379 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8380 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8381 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8384 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8385 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8386 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8387 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8390 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8392 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8394 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8395 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8399 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8400 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8401 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8405 let mut res = Ok(());
8407 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8408 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8409 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8410 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8411 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8412 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8413 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8416 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8417 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8418 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8419 if inbound_peer_limited {
8421 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8423 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8424 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8425 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8426 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8427 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8428 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8429 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8430 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8434 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8435 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8436 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8438 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8439 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8440 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8441 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8444 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8447 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8448 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8453 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8455 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8456 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8459 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8461 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8462 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8463 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8464 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8465 // worry about closing and removing them.
8466 debug_assert!(false);
8470 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8471 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8472 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8477 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8478 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8483 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8484 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8486 match &msg.data as &str {
8487 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8488 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8490 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8491 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8492 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8493 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8494 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8495 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8496 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8497 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8498 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8499 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8500 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8501 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8502 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8503 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8504 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8505 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8509 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8510 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8511 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8512 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8513 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8514 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8516 log_level: Level::Trace,
8526 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8527 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8528 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8529 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8530 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8531 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8532 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8533 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8534 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8535 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8536 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8538 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8539 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8540 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8544 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8545 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8546 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8547 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8548 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8549 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8550 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8551 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8552 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8553 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8561 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8562 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8566 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8567 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8570 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8571 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8574 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8575 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8578 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8579 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8580 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8581 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8584 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8585 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8586 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8587 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8590 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8591 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8592 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8593 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8596 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8597 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8598 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8599 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8602 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8603 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8604 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8605 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8608 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8609 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8610 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8611 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8614 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8615 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8616 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8617 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8620 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8621 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8622 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8623 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8626 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8627 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8628 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8629 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8633 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8634 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8635 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
8636 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
8637 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
8641 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8642 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8644 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8645 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8646 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8647 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8648 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8651 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8652 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8653 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
8654 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
8657 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8658 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8659 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8660 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
8663 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
8664 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8665 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
8666 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
8667 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
8668 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8669 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8670 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8671 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8672 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8673 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8674 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8675 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8676 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8677 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8678 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8679 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8680 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8681 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8682 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8687 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8688 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8690 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8691 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8692 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8693 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8696 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8697 (2, node_id, required),
8698 (4, features, required),
8699 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8700 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8701 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8702 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8705 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8706 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8707 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8708 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8709 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8710 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8711 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8712 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8713 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8714 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8715 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8716 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8717 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8718 (7, self.config, option),
8719 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8720 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8721 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8722 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8723 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8724 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
8725 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8726 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8727 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8728 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8729 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8730 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8731 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8732 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8733 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8734 (32, self.is_public, required),
8735 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8736 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8737 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8738 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8739 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8745 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8746 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8747 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8748 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8749 (2, channel_id, required),
8750 (3, channel_type, option),
8751 (4, counterparty, required),
8752 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8753 (6, funding_txo, option),
8754 (7, config, option),
8755 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8756 (9, confirmations, option),
8757 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8758 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8759 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8760 (16, balance_msat, required),
8761 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8762 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8763 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8764 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8765 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8766 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8767 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8768 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8769 (26, is_outbound, required),
8770 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8771 (30, is_usable, required),
8772 (32, is_public, required),
8773 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8774 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8775 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8776 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8777 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8780 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8781 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8782 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8783 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8784 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8788 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8790 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8791 outbound_scid_alias,
8795 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8796 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8798 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
8799 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8800 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8801 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8802 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8803 confirmations_required,
8805 force_close_spend_delay,
8806 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8807 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8808 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8809 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8810 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8811 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8812 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8813 channel_shutdown_state,
8818 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8819 (2, channels, required_vec),
8820 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8821 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8824 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8826 (0, onion_packet, required),
8827 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8830 (0, payment_data, required),
8831 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8832 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8833 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8834 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8836 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8837 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8838 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8839 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8840 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8841 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8845 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8846 (0, routing, required),
8847 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8848 (4, payment_hash, required),
8849 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8850 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8851 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8852 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8856 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8857 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8859 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8861 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8862 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8863 reason.write(writer)?;
8865 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8866 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8869 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8870 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8871 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8872 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8879 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8880 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8881 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8884 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8885 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8886 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8887 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8891 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8892 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8893 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8894 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8895 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8898 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8899 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8900 // messages contained in the variants.
8901 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8902 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8903 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8905 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8906 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8907 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8908 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8909 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8912 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8913 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8914 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8915 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8916 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8918 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8923 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8928 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8929 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8930 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8931 (2, outpoint, required),
8932 (4, htlc_id, required),
8933 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8934 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8937 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8938 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8939 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8940 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8941 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8943 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8944 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8945 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8946 (2, self.value, required),
8947 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8948 (4, payment_data, option),
8949 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8950 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8951 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8952 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8958 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8959 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8960 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8961 (0, prev_hop, required),
8962 (1, total_msat, option),
8963 (2, value_ser, required),
8964 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8965 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8966 (5, total_value_received, option),
8967 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8968 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8969 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8971 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8972 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8973 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8975 if payment_data.is_some() {
8976 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8978 if total_msat.is_none() {
8979 total_msat = Some(value);
8981 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8984 if total_msat.is_none() {
8985 if payment_data.is_none() {
8986 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8988 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8990 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8994 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8997 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8998 total_value_received,
8999 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9001 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9002 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9007 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9008 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9009 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9012 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9013 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9014 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9015 let mut payment_id = None;
9016 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9017 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9018 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9019 (0, session_priv, required),
9020 (1, payment_id, option),
9021 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9022 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9023 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9024 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9026 if payment_id.is_none() {
9027 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9029 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9031 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9032 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9033 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9035 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9036 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9037 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9038 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9042 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9043 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9044 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9046 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9049 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9050 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9055 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9056 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9058 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9060 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9061 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9062 (0, session_priv, required),
9063 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9064 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9065 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9066 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9067 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9068 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9071 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9073 field.write(writer)?;
9080 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9081 (0, forward_info, required),
9082 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9083 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9084 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9085 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9088 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9090 (0, htlc_id, required),
9091 (2, err_packet, required),
9096 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9097 (0, payment_secret, required),
9098 (2, expiry_time, required),
9099 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9100 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9101 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9104 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9106 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9107 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9108 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9109 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9110 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9111 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9115 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9116 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9118 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9120 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9122 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9123 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9124 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9127 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9129 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9130 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9131 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9132 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9133 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9134 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9135 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9138 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9139 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9143 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9145 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9146 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9147 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9148 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9149 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9150 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9153 channel.write(writer)?;
9159 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9160 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9161 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9162 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9163 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9164 for forward in pending_forwards {
9165 forward.write(writer)?;
9170 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9172 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9173 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9174 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9176 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9177 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9178 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9179 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9180 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9181 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9182 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9183 htlc.write(writer)?;
9185 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9186 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9189 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9190 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9191 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9192 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9193 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9194 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9195 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9198 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9199 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9200 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9201 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9202 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9204 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9205 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9206 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9207 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9208 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9209 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9210 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9215 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9216 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9217 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9218 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9219 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9220 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9221 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9222 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9223 0u64.write(writer)?;
9225 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9226 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9227 event.write(writer)?;
9231 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9232 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9233 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9234 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9235 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9236 0u64.write(writer)?;
9238 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9239 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9240 // likely to be identical.
9241 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9242 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9244 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9245 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9246 hash.write(writer)?;
9247 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9250 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9251 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9252 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9253 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9254 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9257 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9258 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9260 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9261 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9262 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9263 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9266 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9267 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9268 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9269 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9273 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9274 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9275 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9277 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9278 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9279 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9285 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9286 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9287 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9288 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9291 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9292 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9293 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9294 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9295 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9298 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9299 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9300 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9301 if !updates.is_empty() {
9302 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9303 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9308 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9309 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9310 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9311 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9312 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9313 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9314 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9315 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9316 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9317 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9318 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9319 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9320 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9327 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9328 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9329 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9330 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9333 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9334 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9335 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9336 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9337 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9338 // check that the event is sane here.
9339 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9340 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9341 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9342 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9348 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9349 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9350 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9351 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9352 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9353 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9356 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9357 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9358 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9359 events.push_back((ev, action));
9360 } else if action.is_some() {
9361 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9368 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9369 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9370 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9371 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9372 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9373 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9376 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9378 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9380 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9381 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9382 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9383 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9384 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9385 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9386 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9387 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9388 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9389 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9390 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9391 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9392 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9394 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9395 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9397 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9398 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9400 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9401 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9402 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9403 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9404 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9405 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9407 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9408 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9410 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9411 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9412 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9413 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9414 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9415 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9419 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9420 pub entropy_source: ES,
9422 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9423 pub node_signer: NS,
9425 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9426 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9428 pub signer_provider: SP,
9430 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9432 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9433 pub fee_estimator: F,
9434 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9436 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9437 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9438 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9439 pub chain_monitor: M,
9441 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9442 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9443 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9444 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9445 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9446 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9448 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9450 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9451 /// deserialization.
9453 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9454 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9455 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9457 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9458 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9460 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9461 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9462 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9463 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9465 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9468 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9469 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9472 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9473 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9475 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9476 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9477 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9478 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9479 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9480 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9484 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9485 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9486 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9487 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9488 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9490 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9491 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9496 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9497 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9498 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9499 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9501 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9502 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9503 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9504 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9505 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9506 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9510 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9511 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9512 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9516 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9517 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9519 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9520 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9521 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9522 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9523 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9524 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9528 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9529 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9531 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9532 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9533 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9535 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9537 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9538 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9539 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9540 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9541 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9542 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9543 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9544 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9545 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9546 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9548 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9549 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9550 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9551 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9552 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9553 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9554 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9555 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9556 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9557 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9558 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9559 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9560 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9562 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9563 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9564 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9566 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9567 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9568 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9570 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9571 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9572 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9574 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs, batch_funding_txid) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9575 if batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9576 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9578 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
9579 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9580 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9583 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
9584 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9585 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9586 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9587 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9588 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9589 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9591 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9592 let mut found_htlc = false;
9593 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9594 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
9597 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
9598 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
9599 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
9600 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
9601 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
9602 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
9603 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
9604 log_info!(args.logger,
9605 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
9606 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
9607 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9611 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
9612 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
9613 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9614 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9615 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9617 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
9618 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
9620 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
9621 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9622 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
9623 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9625 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9626 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
9627 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
9628 entry.insert(by_id_map);
9632 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
9633 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
9634 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
9635 // safely discard the channel.
9636 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
9637 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9638 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9639 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9640 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
9641 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9642 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9645 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
9646 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9647 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9648 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9649 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9650 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9654 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9655 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
9656 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
9657 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9658 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
9659 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
9660 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
9662 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
9666 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
9667 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9668 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9669 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
9670 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9671 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9672 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9673 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9674 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9676 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9679 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9680 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9681 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9682 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9683 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9684 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9685 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9686 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9688 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9691 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9694 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9695 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9696 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9697 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9698 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9699 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9700 is_connected: false,
9704 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9705 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9706 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9707 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9708 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9709 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9710 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9711 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9714 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9715 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9716 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9717 for _ in 0..event_count {
9718 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9719 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9724 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9725 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9726 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9728 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9729 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9730 // on-startup monitor updates.
9731 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9732 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9734 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9738 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9739 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9741 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9742 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9743 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9744 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9745 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9749 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9750 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9751 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9752 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9753 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9754 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9755 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9757 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9758 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9762 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9763 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9764 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9765 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9766 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9767 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9768 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9769 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9770 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9771 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9772 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9773 let mut events_override = None;
9774 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9775 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9776 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9777 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9778 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9779 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9780 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9781 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9782 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9783 (8, events_override, option),
9784 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9785 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9786 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9787 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9789 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9790 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9793 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9794 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9797 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9798 pending_events_read = events;
9801 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9802 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9805 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9806 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9807 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9808 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9809 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9810 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9812 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9814 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9815 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9816 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9819 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9820 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9821 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9822 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9823 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9825 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9826 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9827 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9829 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9830 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9831 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9832 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9833 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9835 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9836 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9837 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9838 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9839 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9840 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9841 pending_background_events.push(
9842 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9843 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9844 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9845 update: update.clone(),
9848 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9849 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9850 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9851 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9852 pending_background_events.push(
9853 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9854 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9855 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9858 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9859 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9860 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9862 max_in_flight_update_id
9866 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9867 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9868 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9869 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9870 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9871 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9873 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9874 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9875 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9876 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9877 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9878 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9879 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9880 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9881 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9884 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9885 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9886 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9887 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9888 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9889 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9890 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9891 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9892 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9893 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9894 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9897 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9898 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9899 debug_assert!(false);
9900 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9905 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9906 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9907 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9908 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9909 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9910 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9911 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9912 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9914 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9915 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9916 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9918 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9919 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9920 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9921 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9922 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9923 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9924 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9925 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9930 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9931 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9933 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9934 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9935 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9936 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9939 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9940 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9941 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9942 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9943 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9944 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9945 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9947 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9948 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9949 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9950 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9951 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9952 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9953 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9954 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9957 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9958 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9959 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9960 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9961 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9962 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9963 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9964 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9966 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9967 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9968 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9969 retry_strategy: None,
9970 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9971 payment_params: None,
9972 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9973 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9974 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9975 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9976 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9977 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9978 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9979 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9980 total_msat: path_amt,
9981 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9982 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9984 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9985 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9990 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9992 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9993 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9994 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9995 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9997 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9998 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9999 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10000 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10001 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10002 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10003 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10004 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10005 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10006 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10007 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10012 !forwards.is_empty()
10014 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10015 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10016 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10017 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10018 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10019 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10020 intercepted_id != ev_id
10027 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10028 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10029 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10030 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10031 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10032 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10033 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10034 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10035 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10036 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10037 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10039 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10040 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10041 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10043 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10044 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10045 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10052 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10053 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10055 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10057 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10058 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10059 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10060 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10061 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10062 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10063 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10064 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10065 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10066 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10069 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10070 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10071 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10072 // channel still live case here.
10076 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10077 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10082 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10083 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10084 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10085 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10086 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10087 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10088 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10089 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10093 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10094 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10096 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10097 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10098 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10099 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10101 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10102 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10103 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10105 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10106 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10108 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10109 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10111 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10114 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10115 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10116 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10118 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10122 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10123 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10124 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10125 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10126 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10128 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10129 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10130 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10131 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10132 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10133 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10134 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10135 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10137 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10138 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10142 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10144 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10146 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10147 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10149 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10150 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10155 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10156 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10158 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10160 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10162 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10163 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10164 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10165 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10169 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10170 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10171 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10172 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10173 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10174 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10175 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10176 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10178 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10179 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10180 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10182 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10183 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10184 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10185 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10186 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10187 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10189 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10190 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10191 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10192 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10193 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10194 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10198 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10199 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10200 debug_assert!(false);
10201 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10206 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10208 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10209 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10210 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10211 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10212 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10213 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10214 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10215 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10216 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10217 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10218 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10220 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10221 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10223 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10224 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10225 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10226 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10228 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10229 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10230 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10231 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10233 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10234 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10235 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10236 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10238 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10239 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10240 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10241 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10242 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10243 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10244 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10247 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10248 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10251 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10254 purpose: payment.purpose,
10255 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10256 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10257 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10263 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10264 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10265 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10266 for action in actions.iter() {
10267 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10268 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10269 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10271 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10272 log_trace!(args.logger,
10273 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10274 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10275 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10276 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10277 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10279 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10280 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10281 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10282 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10286 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10287 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10291 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10293 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10294 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10298 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10300 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10301 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10302 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10303 router: args.router,
10305 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10307 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10308 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10309 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10310 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10312 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10313 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10314 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10315 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10316 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10317 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10319 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10321 our_network_pubkey,
10324 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10326 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10328 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10329 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10330 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10331 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10332 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10334 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10335 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10337 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10339 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10341 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10342 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10343 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10345 logger: args.logger,
10346 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10349 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10350 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10351 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10352 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10353 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10356 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10357 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10358 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10359 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10360 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10361 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10364 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10365 //connection or two.
10367 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10373 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10374 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10375 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10376 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10377 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10378 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10379 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10380 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10381 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10382 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10383 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10384 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10385 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10386 use crate::util::test_utils;
10387 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10388 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10391 fn test_notify_limits() {
10392 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10393 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10396 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10397 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10399 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10400 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10401 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10402 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10403 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10405 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10407 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10408 // to connect messages with new values
10409 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10410 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10411 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10412 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10413 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10414 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10416 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10417 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10418 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10419 // ... but the last node should not.
10420 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10421 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10422 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10423 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10425 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10426 // about the channel.
10427 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10428 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10429 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10431 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10433 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10434 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10435 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10436 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10437 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10438 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10440 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10441 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10442 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10444 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10445 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10446 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10447 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10448 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10449 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10451 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10452 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10453 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10454 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10455 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10456 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10457 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10458 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10460 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10461 // the channel info has updated.
10462 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10463 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10464 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10465 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10466 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10467 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10471 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10472 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10474 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10475 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10476 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10477 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10478 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10480 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10481 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10482 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10483 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10485 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10486 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10487 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10488 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10489 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10490 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10491 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10492 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10493 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10494 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10495 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10496 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10498 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10499 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10500 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10501 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10502 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10503 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10504 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10505 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10506 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10507 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10508 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10509 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10510 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10511 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10512 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10513 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10514 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10515 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10516 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10517 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10518 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10519 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10520 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10522 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10523 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10524 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10525 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10526 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10527 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10528 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10530 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10531 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10532 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10533 // lightning messages manually.
10534 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10535 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10536 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10538 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10539 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10540 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10541 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10542 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10543 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10544 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10545 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10546 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10547 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10548 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10549 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10550 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10551 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10552 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10553 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10554 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10555 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10556 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10557 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10558 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10559 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10560 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10561 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10562 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10563 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10565 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10566 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10567 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10568 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10570 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10571 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10572 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10573 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10575 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10578 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10579 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10580 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10581 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10583 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10588 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10589 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10590 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10593 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10594 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10595 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
10596 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
10597 // fails as expected.
10598 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
10599 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
10600 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
10601 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
10602 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
10603 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
10604 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10605 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10606 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10607 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
10608 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10609 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10610 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10611 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10612 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10614 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
10615 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
10616 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
10618 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10619 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10620 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
10621 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
10622 let route = find_route(
10623 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10624 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10626 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10627 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10629 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10631 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10632 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10633 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10635 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10636 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
10637 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
10638 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10639 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10641 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10642 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10643 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10644 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10645 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10646 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10647 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10648 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10649 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10651 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10652 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10654 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10655 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10656 let route = find_route(
10657 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10658 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10660 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10661 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10662 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10663 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10664 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10665 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10666 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10667 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10669 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
10670 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10671 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10672 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
10673 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10674 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10675 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10676 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10677 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10678 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10679 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10680 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10681 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10682 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10683 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10684 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10685 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10686 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10687 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10688 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10689 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10690 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10691 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10692 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10694 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10695 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10697 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10698 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10699 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10700 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10701 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10702 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10703 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10704 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10705 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10706 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10708 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10709 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10710 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10713 let route = find_route(
10714 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10715 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10717 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10718 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10719 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10721 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10722 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10723 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10724 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10725 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10727 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10728 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10729 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10731 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10732 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10733 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10734 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10735 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10736 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10737 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10738 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10739 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10741 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10742 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10746 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10747 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10748 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10749 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10750 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10751 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10752 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10754 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10755 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10757 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10758 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10759 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10760 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10761 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10762 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10763 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10764 let route = find_route(
10765 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10766 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10769 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10770 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10771 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10772 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10773 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10774 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10777 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10778 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10779 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10780 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10781 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10782 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10783 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10785 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10789 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10790 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10791 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10792 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10793 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10794 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10795 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10796 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10797 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10799 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10800 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10802 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10803 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10804 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10805 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10806 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10807 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10808 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10809 let route = find_route(
10810 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10811 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
10814 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10815 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10816 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10817 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10818 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10819 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10820 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10821 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10824 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10825 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10826 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10827 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10828 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10829 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10830 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10832 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10836 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10837 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10838 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10839 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10840 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10842 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10843 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10844 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10845 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10847 // Marshall an MPP route.
10848 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10849 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10850 route.paths.push(path);
10851 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10852 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10853 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10854 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10855 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10856 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10858 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10859 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10861 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10862 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10864 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10869 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10870 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10871 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10872 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10873 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10875 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10877 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10878 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10880 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10881 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10882 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10883 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10886 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10887 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10888 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10889 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10890 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10891 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10894 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10897 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10898 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10903 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10904 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10905 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10906 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10907 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10908 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10910 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10911 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10913 total_msat: 100_000,
10916 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10917 // payment verification fails as expected.
10918 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10919 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10920 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10921 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10923 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10927 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10928 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10932 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10933 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10934 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10935 // the channel is successfully closed.
10936 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10937 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10938 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10939 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10941 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10942 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10943 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10944 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10945 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10947 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10948 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10950 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10951 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10952 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10953 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10956 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10958 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10959 // as it has the funding transaction.
10960 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10961 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10962 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10965 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10967 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10969 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10971 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10972 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10973 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10975 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10978 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10979 // as it has the funding transaction.
10980 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10981 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10982 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10984 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10985 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10986 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10987 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10988 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10989 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10990 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10991 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10993 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10994 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10995 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10996 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10998 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10999 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11001 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11002 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11003 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11004 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11005 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11006 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11007 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11011 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11012 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11013 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11014 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11015 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11016 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11017 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11020 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11022 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11023 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11024 // closing transaction).
11025 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11026 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11027 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11029 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11030 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11031 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11032 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11033 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11036 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11038 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11040 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11041 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11042 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11044 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11046 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11047 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11050 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11051 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11052 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11055 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11056 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11057 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11060 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11061 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11062 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11065 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11066 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11067 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11070 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11072 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11073 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11075 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11076 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11078 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11079 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11084 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11085 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11086 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11087 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11088 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11089 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11090 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11091 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11094 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11095 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11096 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11098 // Test the API functions.
11099 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
11101 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11103 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11105 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11107 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11109 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11111 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11115 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11116 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11117 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11118 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11119 // the given `channel_id`.
11120 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11121 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11122 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11123 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11125 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11128 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11130 // Test the API functions.
11131 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11133 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11135 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11137 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11139 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11141 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11145 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11146 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11147 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11148 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11149 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11150 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11152 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11154 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11155 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11157 let mut funding_tx = None;
11158 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11159 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11160 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11163 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11164 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11165 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11166 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11167 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11169 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11170 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11171 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11173 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11175 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11176 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11177 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11179 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11182 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11183 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11184 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11185 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11186 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11188 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11189 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11191 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11192 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11193 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11194 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11195 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11196 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11197 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11200 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11201 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11202 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11203 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11204 }, true).unwrap_err();
11206 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11207 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11208 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11209 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11210 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11211 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11212 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11214 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11215 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11217 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11218 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11219 }, true).unwrap_err();
11221 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11222 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11223 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11224 }, false).unwrap();
11225 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11227 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11228 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11230 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11231 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11232 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11233 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11234 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11236 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11237 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11238 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11240 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11241 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11242 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11244 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11245 // "protected" and can connect again.
11246 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11247 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11248 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11250 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11252 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11254 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11255 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11259 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11260 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11261 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11262 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11263 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11264 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11266 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11268 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11269 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11271 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11272 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11273 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11274 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11277 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11279 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11280 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11281 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11283 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11284 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11285 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11287 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11288 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11289 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11290 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11294 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11295 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11296 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11297 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11298 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11299 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11300 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11301 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11302 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11304 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11306 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11307 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11309 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11310 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11311 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11312 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11313 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11314 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11317 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11318 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11320 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11321 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11323 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11325 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11326 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11329 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11330 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11331 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11332 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11333 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11335 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11336 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11338 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11339 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11340 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11341 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11345 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11347 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11348 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11350 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11351 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11352 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11354 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11355 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11357 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11359 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11363 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11364 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11365 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11366 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11367 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11368 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11369 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11370 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11372 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11373 payment_metadata: None,
11374 keysend_preimage: None,
11375 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11376 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11378 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11380 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11381 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11382 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11383 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11384 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11386 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11387 } else { panic!(); }
11389 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11390 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11392 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11393 payment_metadata: None,
11394 keysend_preimage: None,
11395 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11396 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11398 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11400 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11401 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11405 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11406 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11407 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11408 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11409 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11411 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11413 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11414 payment_metadata: None,
11415 keysend_preimage: None,
11416 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11417 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11419 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11420 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11422 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11423 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11424 // is not satisfied.
11425 assert!(result.is_ok());
11429 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11430 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11431 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11432 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11433 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11435 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11436 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11438 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11439 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11440 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11441 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11442 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11444 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11445 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11447 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11448 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11449 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11450 match &msg_events[0] {
11451 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11452 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11454 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11455 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11456 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11459 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11462 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11463 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11465 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11466 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11467 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11469 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11473 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11474 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11475 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11476 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11477 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11478 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11479 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11480 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11481 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11482 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11483 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11485 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11486 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11487 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11489 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11490 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11492 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11493 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11495 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11498 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11499 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11501 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11502 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11504 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11505 // not have generated any events.
11506 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11510 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11511 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11512 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11513 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11514 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11515 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11516 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11517 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11519 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11520 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11521 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11523 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11524 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11525 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11526 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11527 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11529 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11530 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11533 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11534 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11535 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11537 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11538 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11539 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11540 ..Default::default()
11542 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11543 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11544 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11546 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11547 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11550 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11551 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11552 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11553 ..Default::default()
11555 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11556 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11557 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11558 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11560 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11561 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11564 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11565 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11566 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11567 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11568 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11571 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11572 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11573 ..Default::default()
11575 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11578 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11579 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11580 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11581 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11585 fn test_payment_display() {
11586 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11587 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11588 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11589 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11590 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11591 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11595 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
11596 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11597 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11598 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11599 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11600 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11602 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
11603 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11604 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11605 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11606 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11607 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
11608 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
11609 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11611 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11612 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11613 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11616 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
11617 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
11619 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11620 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11622 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11623 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11624 }, false).unwrap();
11625 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
11626 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
11627 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
11629 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
11631 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
11632 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
11633 // close even if it was an lnd node.
11634 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11635 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11636 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
11637 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11638 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
11639 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
11640 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
11641 } else { panic!() };
11642 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
11643 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
11644 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
11645 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
11647 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11649 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
11650 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
11651 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
11658 use crate::chain::Listen;
11659 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
11660 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
11661 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
11662 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
11663 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11664 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
11665 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
11666 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
11667 use crate::util::test_utils;
11668 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
11670 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11671 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11672 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
11674 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
11676 use criterion::Criterion;
11678 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
11679 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
11680 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
11681 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
11682 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
11683 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
11684 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
11686 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
11687 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
11689 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
11690 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
11692 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
11694 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
11697 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
11698 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
11701 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
11702 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
11703 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
11705 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
11706 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
11708 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
11709 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
11710 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11711 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
11712 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
11714 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
11715 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
11716 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
11718 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
11719 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
11720 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
11721 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11723 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11724 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11725 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
11727 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
11728 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
11729 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
11730 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
11731 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
11733 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
11734 }, genesis_block.header.time);
11735 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
11737 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11738 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11740 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
11741 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11742 }, false).unwrap();
11743 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11744 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11745 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11748 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
11749 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
11750 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
11752 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11753 } else { panic!(); }
11755 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11756 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11757 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11758 match events_b[0] {
11759 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11760 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11762 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11765 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11766 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11767 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11768 match events_a[0] {
11769 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11770 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11772 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11775 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
11777 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
11778 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
11779 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
11781 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11782 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11783 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
11784 match msg_events[0] {
11785 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
11786 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
11787 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11791 match msg_events[1] {
11792 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11796 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11797 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
11798 match events_a[0] {
11799 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11800 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
11802 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11805 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11806 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
11807 match events_b[0] {
11808 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11809 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11811 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11814 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11815 macro_rules! send_payment {
11816 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11817 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11818 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11819 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11820 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11821 payment_count += 1;
11822 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11823 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11825 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11826 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11827 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11828 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11829 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11830 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11831 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11832 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11833 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11834 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11835 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11837 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11838 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11839 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11840 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11842 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11843 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11844 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11845 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11846 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11848 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11851 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11852 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11853 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11854 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11856 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11860 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11861 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11862 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);