1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1113 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1115 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1116 /// to individual Channels.
1118 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1119 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1120 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1121 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1123 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1124 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1125 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1126 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1127 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1128 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1129 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1130 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1131 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1133 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1134 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1135 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1137 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1138 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1139 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1140 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1141 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1143 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1144 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1145 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1146 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1148 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1149 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1150 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1152 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1153 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1154 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1155 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1156 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1158 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1159 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1160 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1161 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1162 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1163 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1164 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1165 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1168 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1169 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1170 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1171 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1172 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1176 // `pending_offers_messages`
1178 // `total_consistency_lock`
1180 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1182 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1184 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1186 // |__`per_peer_state`
1188 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1190 // |__`claimable_payments`
1192 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1196 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1198 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1200 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1204 // |__`pending_events`
1206 // |__`pending_background_events`
1208 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1210 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1211 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1212 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1213 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1214 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1219 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1220 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1221 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1227 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1229 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1231 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1232 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1234 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1235 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1236 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1237 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1239 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1240 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1242 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1243 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1244 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1245 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1246 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1247 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1248 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1249 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1251 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1253 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1254 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1256 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1258 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1259 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1260 /// and via the classic SCID.
1262 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1263 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1265 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1267 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1269 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1270 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1271 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1273 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1274 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1276 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1278 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1279 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1280 /// and via the classic SCID.
1282 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1283 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1285 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1286 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1288 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1289 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1291 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1292 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1294 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1295 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1296 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1297 /// active channel list on load.
1299 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1300 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1302 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1304 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1305 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1306 /// the handling of the events.
1308 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1309 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1312 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1313 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1314 /// would break backwards compatability.
1315 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1316 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1317 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1319 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1321 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1323 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1325 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1327 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1328 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1329 /// confirmation depth.
1331 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1332 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1333 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1335 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1337 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1339 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1341 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1343 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1345 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1346 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1347 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1349 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1350 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1352 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1353 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1354 /// keeping additional state.
1355 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1357 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1358 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1359 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1360 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1362 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1363 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1365 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1366 /// are currently open with that peer.
1368 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1369 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1372 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1374 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1375 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1376 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1377 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1378 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1380 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1381 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1382 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1383 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1384 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1386 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1387 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1389 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1390 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1391 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1392 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1393 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1395 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1396 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1398 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1399 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1400 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1401 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1402 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1404 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1406 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1408 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1409 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1410 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1411 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1412 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1413 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1414 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1415 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1416 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1417 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1418 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1420 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1421 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1422 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1424 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1426 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1427 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1429 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1433 signer_provider: SP,
1438 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1440 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1441 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1442 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1444 pub struct ChainParameters {
1445 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1446 pub network: Network,
1448 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1450 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1451 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1454 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1458 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1459 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1462 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1463 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1464 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1465 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1466 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1467 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1469 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1470 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1471 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1472 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1473 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1474 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1476 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1477 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1480 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1481 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1482 /// events to handle.
1484 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1485 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1487 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1488 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1491 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1492 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1493 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1494 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1496 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1497 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1498 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1499 should_persist: move || {
1500 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1501 // processing and return that.
1502 let notify = persist_check();
1503 match (notify, force_notify) {
1504 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1505 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1506 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1507 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1508 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1511 _read_guard: read_guard,
1515 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1516 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1517 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1518 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1519 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1520 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1522 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1523 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1524 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1525 should_persist: persist_check,
1526 _read_guard: read_guard,
1531 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1532 fn drop(&mut self) {
1533 match (self.should_persist)() {
1534 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1535 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1536 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1538 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1539 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1540 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1545 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1546 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1548 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1550 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1551 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1552 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1553 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1554 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1556 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1557 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1559 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1561 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1562 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1563 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1564 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1565 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1566 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1567 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1568 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1569 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1570 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1571 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1572 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1573 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1575 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1576 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1578 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1579 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1580 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1581 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1583 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1584 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1585 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1586 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1587 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1588 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1590 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1592 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1593 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1595 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1597 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1598 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1600 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1601 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1602 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1604 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1605 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1606 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1608 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1609 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1610 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1611 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1613 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1614 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1615 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1617 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1618 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1619 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1621 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1622 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1623 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1624 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1625 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1626 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1627 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1628 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1629 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1630 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1631 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1634 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1635 /// to better separate parameters.
1636 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1637 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1638 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1639 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1640 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1641 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1642 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1643 pub features: InitFeatures,
1644 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1645 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1646 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1648 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1650 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1651 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1652 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1653 /// payments to us through this channel.
1654 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1655 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1656 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1657 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1658 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1659 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1660 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1663 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1664 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1665 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1666 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1667 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1668 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1669 /// lifetime of the channel.
1670 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1671 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1672 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1673 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1674 /// our counterparty already.
1675 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1676 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1678 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1679 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1680 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1681 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1683 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1684 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1686 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1687 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1689 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1690 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1691 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1692 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1693 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1694 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1695 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1696 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1697 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1700 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1702 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1703 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1704 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1705 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1706 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1707 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1708 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1710 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1711 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1713 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1714 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1715 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1716 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1717 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1718 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1719 /// this value on chain.
1721 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1723 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1725 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1726 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1727 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1728 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1729 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1730 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1731 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1733 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1734 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1735 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1736 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1737 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1738 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1740 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1741 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1742 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1743 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1744 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1746 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1747 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1748 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1749 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1751 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1752 pub balance_msat: u64,
1753 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1754 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1755 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1756 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1758 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1760 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1761 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1762 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1763 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1764 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1765 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1766 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1767 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1769 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1770 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1771 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1772 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1773 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1774 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1775 /// route which is valid.
1776 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1777 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1778 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1779 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1780 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1781 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1783 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1784 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1785 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1786 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1787 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1788 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1789 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1790 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1791 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1793 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1795 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1796 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1797 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1798 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1799 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1801 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1802 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1803 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1804 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1805 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1806 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1807 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1809 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1810 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1811 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1812 pub is_outbound: bool,
1813 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1814 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1815 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1816 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1817 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1819 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1820 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1821 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1822 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1823 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1824 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1825 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1827 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1828 pub is_usable: bool,
1829 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1830 pub is_public: bool,
1831 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1832 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1833 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1834 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1835 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1836 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1838 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1839 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1840 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1842 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1843 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1844 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1846 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1847 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1850 impl ChannelDetails {
1851 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1852 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1853 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1855 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1856 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1857 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1858 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1861 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1862 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1863 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1865 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1866 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1867 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1868 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1871 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1872 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1873 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1876 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1877 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1879 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1880 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1881 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1883 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1884 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1885 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1886 features: latest_features,
1887 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1888 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1889 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1890 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1891 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1892 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1893 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1894 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1895 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1896 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1898 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1899 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1900 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1901 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1902 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1903 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1904 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1905 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1906 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1907 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1908 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1909 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1910 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1911 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1912 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1913 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1914 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1915 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1916 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1917 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1918 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1919 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1920 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1921 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1922 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1923 config: Some(context.config()),
1924 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1925 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1926 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1931 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1932 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1933 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1934 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1935 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1936 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1937 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1938 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1939 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1941 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1943 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1944 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1946 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1947 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1948 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1949 /// to drop the channel.
1953 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1954 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1955 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1956 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1957 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1959 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1960 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1961 payment_id: PaymentId,
1963 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1965 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1966 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1967 payment_id: PaymentId,
1968 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1970 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1971 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1972 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1975 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1976 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1977 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1979 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1980 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1981 payment_id: PaymentId,
1982 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1983 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1984 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1986 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1987 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1988 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1990 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1991 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1992 payment_id: PaymentId,
1993 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1994 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1998 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2000 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2002 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2003 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2004 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2005 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2007 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2008 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2009 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2012 macro_rules! handle_error {
2013 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2014 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2015 // entering the macro.
2016 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2017 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2021 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2022 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2024 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2025 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2026 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2027 let logger = WithContext::from(
2028 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2030 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2032 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2033 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2034 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2039 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2042 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2044 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2045 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2046 action: err.action.clone()
2050 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2051 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2052 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2053 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2058 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2065 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2066 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2067 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2068 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2070 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2071 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2072 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2074 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2075 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2076 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2077 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2078 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2080 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2081 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2083 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2087 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2088 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2089 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2091 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2092 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2094 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2095 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2097 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2098 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2099 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2100 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2101 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2102 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2104 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2109 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2110 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2112 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2113 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2115 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2116 match $channel_phase {
2117 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2118 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2120 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2121 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2123 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2124 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2126 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2127 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2128 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2130 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2131 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2132 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2138 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2139 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2143 let key = *$entry.key();
2144 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2146 $entry.remove_entry();
2154 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2155 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2159 let key = *$entry.key();
2160 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2162 $entry.remove_entry();
2170 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2171 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2173 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2174 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2180 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2181 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2182 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2183 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2184 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2186 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2187 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2188 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2189 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2190 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2191 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2192 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2193 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2194 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2195 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2200 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2201 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2202 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2203 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2204 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2205 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2206 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2207 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2208 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2209 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2211 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2216 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2217 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2218 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2219 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2220 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2221 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2222 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2223 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2224 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2226 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2231 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2232 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2233 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2234 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2235 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2236 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2237 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2238 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2239 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2240 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2241 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2242 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2244 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2245 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2246 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2252 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2253 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2255 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2256 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2257 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2258 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2259 updates.announcement_sigs);
2260 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2261 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2264 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2265 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2266 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2267 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2269 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2270 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2271 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2272 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2273 let mut batch_completed = false;
2274 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2275 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2276 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2277 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2279 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2280 channel_state.2 = true;
2282 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2284 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2286 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2289 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2290 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2291 if batch_completed {
2292 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2293 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2294 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2295 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2296 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2297 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2298 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2299 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2300 chan.set_batch_ready();
2301 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2302 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2306 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2307 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2308 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2313 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2315 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2316 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2318 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2319 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2321 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2322 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2323 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2324 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2329 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2330 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2331 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2332 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2334 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2335 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2336 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2337 panic!("{}", err_str);
2339 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2340 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2341 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2344 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2350 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2351 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2352 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2354 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2355 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2356 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2357 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2358 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2359 // filter for uniqueness here.
2360 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2361 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2362 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2363 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2365 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2366 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2368 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2369 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2370 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2376 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2377 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2378 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2379 while !processed_all_events {
2380 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2387 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2388 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2389 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2391 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2392 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2393 result = $self.process_background_events();
2395 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2396 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2397 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2398 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2402 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2403 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2404 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2405 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2408 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2410 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2411 $event_to_handle = event;
2413 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2414 post_event_actions.push(action);
2419 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2420 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2421 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2422 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2423 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2424 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2427 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2428 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2429 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2430 processed_all_events = false;
2434 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2435 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2436 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2438 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2439 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2440 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2446 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2448 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2449 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2450 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2452 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2453 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2457 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2459 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2461 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2462 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2464 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2466 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2467 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2468 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2471 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2472 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2473 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2475 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2476 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2477 current_timestamp: u32,
2479 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2480 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2481 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2482 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2484 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2485 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2486 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2491 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2493 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2494 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2495 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2496 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2497 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2498 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2499 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2500 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2501 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2503 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2506 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2507 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2509 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2511 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2513 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2515 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2516 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2517 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2518 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2519 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2520 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2521 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2522 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2524 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2534 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2535 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2536 &self.default_configuration
2539 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2540 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2541 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2544 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2545 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2547 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2549 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2553 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2558 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2560 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2561 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2562 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2563 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2564 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2566 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2567 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2569 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2570 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2571 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2573 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2574 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2575 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2577 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2578 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2580 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2581 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2582 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2583 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2584 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2585 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2587 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2588 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2589 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2590 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2591 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2596 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2597 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2599 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2601 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2602 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2604 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2606 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2607 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2608 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2613 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2614 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2615 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2616 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2617 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2618 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2622 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2627 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2629 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2630 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2633 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2635 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2641 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2642 node_id: their_network_key,
2645 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2648 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2649 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2650 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2651 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2652 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2653 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2654 // the same channel.
2655 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2657 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2658 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2659 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2662 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2663 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2664 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2665 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2669 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2670 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2671 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2679 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2680 /// more information.
2681 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2682 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2683 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2684 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2685 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2686 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2687 // the same channel.
2688 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2690 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2692 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2693 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2694 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2695 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2696 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2697 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2705 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2706 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2708 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2709 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2711 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2712 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2713 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2714 // really wanted anyway.
2715 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2718 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2719 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2720 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2723 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2726 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2727 let context_to_details = |context| {
2728 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2730 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2732 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2733 .map(context_to_details)
2739 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2740 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2742 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2743 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2744 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2746 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2747 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2748 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2749 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2750 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2751 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2753 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2754 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2755 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2757 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2758 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2759 payment_id: *payment_id,
2760 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2761 total_msat: *total_msat,
2764 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2765 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2767 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2768 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2770 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2775 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2778 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2779 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2784 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2785 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2790 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2792 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2793 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2794 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2795 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2796 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2797 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2799 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2800 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2801 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2802 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2803 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2807 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2808 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2810 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2811 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2812 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2813 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2816 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2817 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2821 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2823 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2824 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2831 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2832 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2833 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2834 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2837 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2838 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2844 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2845 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2846 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2848 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2849 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2851 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2852 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2853 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2854 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2856 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2858 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2859 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2860 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2863 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2864 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2865 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2866 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2867 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2868 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2871 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2872 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2873 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2875 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2876 /// the channel being closed or not:
2877 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2878 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2879 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2880 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2881 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2882 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2883 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2885 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2886 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2887 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2888 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2890 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2892 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2893 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2894 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2897 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2898 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2899 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2900 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2901 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2904 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2905 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2906 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2907 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2908 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2911 let logger = WithContext::from(
2912 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2915 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2916 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2917 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2918 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2919 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2920 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2921 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2923 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2924 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2925 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2926 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2927 // ignore the result here.
2928 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2930 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2931 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2932 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2933 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2935 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2936 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2937 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2938 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2939 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2940 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2941 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2944 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2947 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2948 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2953 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2954 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2955 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2956 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2957 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2958 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2959 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2960 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2963 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2964 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2965 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2969 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2970 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2974 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2975 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2976 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2977 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2979 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2980 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2981 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2982 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2983 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2984 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2986 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2988 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2989 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2990 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2991 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2992 mem::drop(peer_state);
2993 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2995 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2996 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2997 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2999 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3000 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3001 // Unfunded channel has no update
3002 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3004 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3005 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3006 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3007 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3008 // Unfunded channel has no update
3009 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3012 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3013 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3014 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3015 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3017 (None, *peer_node_id)
3019 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3022 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3023 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3024 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3026 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3027 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3028 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3029 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3030 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3036 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3039 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3041 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3042 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3044 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3045 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3046 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3047 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3048 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3049 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3050 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3061 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3062 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3063 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3065 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3066 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3067 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3070 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3071 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3072 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3074 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3075 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3076 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3077 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3078 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3081 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3082 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3083 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3084 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3085 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3089 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3090 /// local transaction(s).
3091 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3092 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3093 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3097 fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3098 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3099 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3100 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3101 ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3102 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3103 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3104 if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3105 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3107 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3108 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3110 else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3111 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3112 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3114 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3115 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3116 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3117 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3118 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3119 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3120 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3122 err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3126 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3127 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3129 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3130 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3131 return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3132 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3133 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3134 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3135 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3139 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3140 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3142 (err_code, &res.0[..])
3144 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3145 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3146 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3147 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3148 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3152 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3153 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3155 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3157 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3158 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3161 let NextPacketDetails {
3162 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3163 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3164 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3165 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3166 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3169 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3170 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3171 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
3172 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3173 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3174 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3175 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3176 // phantom or an intercept.
3177 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3178 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3179 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3183 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3186 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3188 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3189 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3190 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3191 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3192 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3194 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3195 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3196 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3197 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3200 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3201 // have no consistency guarantees.
3202 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3206 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3207 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3208 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3209 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3210 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3212 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3213 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3214 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3215 // we don't have the channel here.
3216 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3218 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3220 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3221 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3222 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3223 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3224 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3225 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3226 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3227 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3228 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3229 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3230 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3232 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3235 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3236 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3238 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3239 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3246 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3248 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3249 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3251 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3252 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3253 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3254 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3255 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3257 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3258 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3264 return Err(self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3265 msg, counterparty_node_id, err, code, chan_update, next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3268 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3271 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3272 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3273 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3274 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3275 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3276 macro_rules! return_err {
3277 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3279 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3280 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3281 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3282 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3283 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3284 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3285 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3286 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3287 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3291 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3292 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3293 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3294 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3295 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3301 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3303 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3304 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3305 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3306 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3309 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3310 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3311 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3312 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3313 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3315 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3318 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3319 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3320 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3321 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3322 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3328 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3329 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3330 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3332 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3333 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3334 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3336 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3337 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3338 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3339 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3340 return Err(LightningError {
3341 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3342 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3345 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3346 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3348 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3349 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3350 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3353 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3354 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3355 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3356 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3358 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3359 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3360 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3362 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3363 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3364 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3365 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3366 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3367 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3368 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3372 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3375 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3376 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3377 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3378 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3380 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3381 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3382 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3383 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3384 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3387 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3388 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3390 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3391 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3392 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3393 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3394 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3395 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3396 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3397 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3399 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3400 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3401 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3403 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3405 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3412 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3413 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3414 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3415 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3420 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3421 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3422 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3425 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3426 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3427 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3428 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3430 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3431 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3432 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3434 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3435 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3439 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3440 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3442 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3443 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3444 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3446 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3449 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3451 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3452 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3454 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3455 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3456 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3457 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3458 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3459 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3460 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3461 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3462 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3463 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3465 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3466 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3467 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3468 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3470 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3471 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3473 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3474 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3475 Some(monitor_update) => {
3476 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3478 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3479 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3480 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3481 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3482 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3483 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3484 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3492 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3495 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3496 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3497 // `channel_by_id` map.
3498 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3499 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3503 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3504 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3506 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3511 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3513 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3514 /// fields for more info.
3516 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3517 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3519 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3521 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3522 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3523 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3524 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3525 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3527 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3528 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3529 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3530 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3531 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3533 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3534 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3535 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3536 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3538 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3540 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3541 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3542 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3544 /// In general, a path may raise:
3545 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3546 /// node public key) is specified.
3547 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3548 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3549 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3550 /// relevant updates.
3552 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3553 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3554 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3556 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3557 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3558 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3559 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3560 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3561 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3562 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3563 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3564 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3565 self.pending_outbound_payments
3566 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3567 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3568 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3571 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3572 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3573 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3574 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3575 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3576 self.pending_outbound_payments
3577 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3578 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3579 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3580 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3584 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3585 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3587 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3588 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3589 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3593 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3594 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3595 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3599 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3600 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3603 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3604 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3605 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3606 self.pending_outbound_payments
3607 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3608 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3609 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3610 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3611 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3615 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3616 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3617 /// retries are exhausted.
3619 /// # Event Generation
3621 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3622 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3624 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3625 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3626 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3628 /// # Requested Invoices
3630 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3631 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3632 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3633 /// once the invoice has been received.
3635 /// # Restart Behavior
3637 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3638 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3639 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3641 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3642 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3644 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3647 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3648 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3649 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3650 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3651 /// never reach the recipient.
3653 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3654 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3656 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3657 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3659 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3660 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3661 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3662 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3663 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3664 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3665 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3668 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3669 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3671 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3674 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3675 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3676 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3677 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3678 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3679 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3680 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3681 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3684 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3685 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3686 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3687 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3688 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3689 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3690 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3691 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3692 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3695 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3698 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3699 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3702 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3703 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3705 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3706 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3707 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3708 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3709 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3710 let payment_params =
3711 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3713 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3715 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3718 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3719 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3721 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3722 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3723 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3724 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3726 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3727 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3728 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3729 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3730 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3731 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3732 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3733 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3734 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3735 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3737 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3738 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3739 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3740 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3744 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3746 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3747 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3750 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3752 let mut res = Vec::new();
3754 for mut path in route.paths {
3755 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3756 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3757 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3758 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3759 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3762 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3765 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3766 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3768 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3770 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3771 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3776 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3779 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3784 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3785 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3786 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3788 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3789 let used_liquidity =
3790 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3792 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3793 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3795 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3798 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3803 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3804 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3805 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3812 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3813 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3814 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3815 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3816 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3817 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3818 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3819 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3820 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3822 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3823 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3825 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3826 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3827 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3829 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3830 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3831 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3832 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3833 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3834 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3835 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3836 } else { unreachable!(); });
3838 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3839 Err((chan, err)) => {
3840 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3841 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3842 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3843 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3844 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3850 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3851 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3853 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3854 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3857 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3858 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3859 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3863 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3864 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3865 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3869 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3870 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3871 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3873 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3874 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3875 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3876 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3877 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3879 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3880 funding_txo, o.get()
3882 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3883 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3884 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3885 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3886 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3887 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3890 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3897 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3898 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3899 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3903 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3905 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3906 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3908 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3909 /// across the p2p network.
3911 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3912 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3914 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3915 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3916 /// keys per-channel).
3918 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3919 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3920 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3922 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3923 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3924 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3926 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3927 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3928 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3929 /// for more details.
3931 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3932 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3933 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3934 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3937 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3939 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3940 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3942 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3943 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3944 /// signature for each channel.
3946 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3947 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3948 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3949 let mut result = Ok(());
3951 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3952 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3953 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3954 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3955 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3960 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3961 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3962 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3966 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3967 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3968 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3969 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3970 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3971 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3972 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3973 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3975 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3976 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3981 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3982 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3983 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3984 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3988 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3989 match states.entry(txid) {
3990 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3991 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3992 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3996 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3999 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4000 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4001 temporary_channel_id,
4002 counterparty_node_id,
4003 funding_transaction.clone(),
4006 let mut output_index = None;
4007 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4008 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4009 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4010 if output_index.is_some() {
4011 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4012 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4015 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4018 if output_index.is_none() {
4019 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4020 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4023 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4024 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4025 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4026 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4027 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4028 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4034 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4035 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4036 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4037 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4038 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4039 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4040 .into_iter().flatten()
4041 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4043 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4044 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4046 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4048 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4049 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4050 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4051 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4052 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4054 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4055 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4056 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4060 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4061 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4062 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4068 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4070 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4071 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4072 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4073 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4075 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4076 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4078 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4079 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4081 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4083 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4084 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4085 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4086 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4087 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4088 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4089 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4090 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4091 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4092 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4093 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4094 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4095 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4099 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4100 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4101 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4102 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4103 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4104 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4105 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4106 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4107 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4108 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4112 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4113 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4114 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4115 config.apply(config_update);
4116 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4119 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4120 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4121 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4122 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4123 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4124 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4131 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4132 debug_assert!(false);
4133 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4135 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4136 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4143 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4145 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4146 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4147 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4148 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4150 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4151 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4153 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4154 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4156 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4158 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4159 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4160 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4161 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4162 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4163 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4164 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4165 pub fn update_channel_config(
4166 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4167 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4168 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4171 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4172 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4174 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4175 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4177 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4178 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4179 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4180 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4181 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4183 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4184 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4185 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4188 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4191 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4192 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4193 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4194 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4195 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4196 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4197 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4199 let next_hop_scid = {
4200 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4201 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4202 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4203 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4204 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4205 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4206 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4207 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4208 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4209 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4212 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4214 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4215 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4216 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4219 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4220 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4221 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4222 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4223 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4230 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4231 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4232 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4235 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4236 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4237 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4238 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4241 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4243 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4244 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4245 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4246 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4247 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4250 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4251 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4252 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4253 payment.prev_channel_id,
4254 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4255 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4257 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4261 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4262 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4264 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4267 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4268 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4269 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4271 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4272 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4273 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4276 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4277 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4278 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4279 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4280 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4281 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4282 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4283 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4284 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4285 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4288 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4289 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4290 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4291 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4296 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4298 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4299 /// Will likely generate further events.
4300 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4301 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4303 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4304 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4305 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4307 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4308 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4310 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4311 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4312 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4313 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4315 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4316 match forward_info {
4317 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4318 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4319 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4320 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4321 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4324 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4325 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4326 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4327 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4329 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4330 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4331 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4332 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4333 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4334 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4335 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4336 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4337 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4340 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4341 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4343 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4346 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4347 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4353 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4354 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4356 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4360 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4361 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4363 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4367 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4368 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4369 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4370 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4371 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4372 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4373 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4376 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4377 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4378 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4379 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4380 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4382 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4384 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4385 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4389 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4390 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4391 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4392 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4393 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4394 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4396 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4397 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4403 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4406 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4409 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4410 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4411 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4412 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4413 // problem, not ours.
4419 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4420 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4421 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4423 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4427 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4428 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4429 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4430 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4431 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4434 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4435 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4436 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4437 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4438 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4439 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4440 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4441 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4442 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4443 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4444 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4445 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4446 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4449 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4450 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4451 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4452 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4453 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4454 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4455 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4456 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4457 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4458 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4459 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4461 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4462 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4463 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4464 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4465 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4466 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4469 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4470 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4471 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4474 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4475 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4477 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4479 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4480 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4481 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4482 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4488 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4489 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4491 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4492 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4493 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4495 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4496 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4497 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4498 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4500 Some((res, htlc_id))
4503 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4504 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4505 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4506 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4508 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4510 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4511 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4512 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4518 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4522 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4523 match forward_info {
4524 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4525 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4526 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4527 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4528 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4531 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4532 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4533 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4534 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4535 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4537 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4538 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4539 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4540 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4541 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4543 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4544 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4545 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4547 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4548 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4552 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4553 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4556 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4559 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4560 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4561 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4562 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4563 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4564 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4565 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4566 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4567 phantom_shared_secret,
4570 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4571 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4572 // if routing nodes overpay
4573 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4574 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4576 total_value_received: None,
4577 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4580 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4583 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4585 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4586 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4587 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4588 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4589 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4590 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4592 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4593 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4594 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4595 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4596 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4597 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4598 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4599 phantom_shared_secret,
4602 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4603 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4605 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4608 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4609 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4610 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4611 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4612 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4615 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4616 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4617 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4618 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4619 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4620 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4622 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4623 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4624 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4626 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4627 .entry(payment_hash)
4628 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4629 .or_insert_with(|| {
4630 committed_to_claimable = true;
4632 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4635 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4636 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4637 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4638 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4640 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4641 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4642 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4644 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4645 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4646 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4649 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4651 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4652 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4653 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4654 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4655 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4656 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4657 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4658 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4659 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4660 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4662 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4664 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4665 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4666 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4667 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4668 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4669 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4671 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4672 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4673 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4674 committed_to_claimable = true;
4676 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4677 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4678 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4679 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4680 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4681 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4682 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4683 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4684 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4688 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4689 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4690 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4691 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4692 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4694 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4696 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4697 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4699 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4700 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4701 committed_to_claimable = true;
4704 payment_claimable_generated
4708 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4709 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4710 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4711 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4712 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4713 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4714 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4715 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4716 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4717 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4718 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4719 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4720 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4721 Ok(result) => result,
4723 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4724 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4727 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4728 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4729 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4730 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4731 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4732 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4735 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4736 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4737 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4739 check_total_value!(purpose);
4741 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4742 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4743 check_total_value!(purpose);
4747 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4748 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4749 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4750 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4752 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4753 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4754 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4755 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4756 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4757 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4758 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4759 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4761 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4762 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4763 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4765 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4766 if payment_claimable_generated {
4767 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4773 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4774 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4782 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4783 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4784 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4785 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4787 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4788 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4790 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4792 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4793 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4794 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4796 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4798 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4799 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4800 events.append(&mut new_events);
4803 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4805 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4806 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4807 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4809 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4811 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4812 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4813 if background_events.is_empty() {
4814 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4817 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4819 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4820 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4821 // monitor updating completing.
4822 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4824 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4825 let mut updated_chan = false;
4827 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4828 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4829 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4830 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4831 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4833 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4834 updated_chan = true;
4835 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4836 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4838 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4841 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4846 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4847 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4850 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4851 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4852 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4853 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4854 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4855 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4856 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4858 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4859 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4860 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4861 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4862 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4868 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4871 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4872 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4873 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4874 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4875 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4878 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4879 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4881 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4883 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4884 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4885 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4887 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4888 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4889 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4890 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4892 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4893 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4895 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4896 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4900 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4901 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4902 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4903 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4904 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4905 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4906 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4908 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4909 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4912 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4913 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4914 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4915 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4916 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4918 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4923 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4924 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4932 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4934 /// This currently includes:
4935 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4936 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4937 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4939 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4940 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4941 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4942 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4943 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4944 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4945 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4946 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4948 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4949 /// estimate fetches.
4951 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4952 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4953 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4954 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4955 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4957 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4958 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4960 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4961 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4962 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4963 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4965 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4966 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4967 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4968 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4969 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4970 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4972 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4973 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4974 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4976 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4977 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4978 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4979 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4980 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4981 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4982 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4983 channel_id: *chan_id,
4984 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4995 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4996 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4997 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4998 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4999 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5000 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5001 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5003 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5004 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5009 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5010 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5012 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5013 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5014 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5015 if needs_close { return false; }
5018 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5019 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5020 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5021 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5022 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5023 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5024 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5025 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5027 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5028 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5029 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5030 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5034 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5036 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5039 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5041 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5042 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5043 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5044 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5048 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5050 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5056 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5058 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5059 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5060 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5061 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5062 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5063 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5064 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5065 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5066 channel_id: *chan_id,
5067 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5075 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5076 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5077 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5079 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5080 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5081 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5083 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5084 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5085 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5086 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5088 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5089 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5090 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5091 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5096 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5097 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5098 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5099 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5100 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5101 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5102 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5103 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5104 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5110 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5112 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5113 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5118 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5119 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5120 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5121 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5122 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5123 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5124 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5125 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5126 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5127 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5128 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5129 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5130 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5131 // have no channels to the peer.
5132 let remove_entry = {
5133 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5134 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5137 entry.remove_entry();
5140 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5145 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5146 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5147 // This should be unreachable
5148 debug_assert!(false);
5151 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5152 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5153 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5154 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5155 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5156 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5157 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5160 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5161 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5162 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5164 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5165 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5172 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5173 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5174 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5175 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5176 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5179 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5180 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5183 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5184 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5187 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5188 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5189 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5190 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5191 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5192 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5193 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5196 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5197 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5200 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5201 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5202 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5203 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5204 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5211 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5212 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5213 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5215 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5216 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5217 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5218 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5220 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5221 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5222 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5223 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5224 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5225 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5228 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5229 /// reason for the failure.
5231 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5232 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5233 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5235 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5236 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5237 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5238 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5239 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5240 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5241 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5246 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5247 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5248 match failure_code {
5249 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5250 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5251 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5252 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5253 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5254 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5256 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5257 let fail_data = match data {
5258 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5261 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5266 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5267 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5269 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5271 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5272 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5273 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5274 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5275 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5276 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5277 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5279 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5281 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5282 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5284 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5289 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5290 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5291 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5292 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5293 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5294 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5295 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5296 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5297 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5298 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5300 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5301 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5302 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5303 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5305 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5306 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5307 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5308 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5309 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5313 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5314 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5315 // be surfaced to the user.
5316 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5317 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5318 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5320 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5321 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5322 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5323 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5324 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5325 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5326 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5327 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5328 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5330 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5331 debug_assert!(false);
5332 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5335 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5337 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5340 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5341 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5342 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5343 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5347 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5348 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5349 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5350 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5351 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5352 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5353 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5354 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5355 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5356 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5359 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5360 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5361 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5364 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5365 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5366 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5368 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5369 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5370 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5371 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5372 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5374 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5375 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5376 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5379 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5380 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5381 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5383 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5384 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5385 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5386 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5387 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5389 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5391 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5392 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5394 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5395 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5399 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5400 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5402 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5406 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5407 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5408 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5409 push_forward_ev = true;
5411 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5412 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5413 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5415 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5416 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5419 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5420 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5421 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5422 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5423 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5424 failed_next_destination: destination,
5430 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5431 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5433 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5434 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5435 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5436 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5438 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5439 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5440 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5441 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5443 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5444 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5445 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5447 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5448 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5449 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5450 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5451 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5452 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5453 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5454 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5455 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5458 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5459 /// even type numbers.
5463 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5464 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5466 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5467 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5468 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5471 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5472 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5474 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5477 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5478 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5479 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5480 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5481 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5482 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5483 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5484 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5489 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5490 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5491 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5492 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5493 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5495 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5496 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5497 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5501 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5502 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5503 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5504 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5505 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5506 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5507 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5508 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5509 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5510 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5511 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5520 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5522 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5523 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5524 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5525 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5526 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5527 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5528 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5529 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5530 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5531 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5532 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5533 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5534 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5535 debug_assert!(false);
5539 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5541 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5542 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5543 debug_assert!(false);
5547 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5548 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5550 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5551 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5552 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5553 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5556 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5557 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5558 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5559 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5563 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5564 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5565 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5566 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5567 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5568 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5569 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5572 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5573 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5574 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5575 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5576 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5577 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5582 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5583 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5584 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5585 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5586 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5587 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5588 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5590 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5593 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5594 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5595 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5596 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5600 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5601 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5602 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5603 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5605 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5606 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5607 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5608 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5610 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5611 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5612 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5613 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5616 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5617 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5618 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5619 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5623 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5624 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5625 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5628 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5629 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5630 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5631 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5632 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5633 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5634 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5635 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5638 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5639 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5640 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5642 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5645 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5646 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5648 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5649 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5650 // monitor update as a background event.
5651 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5652 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5653 counterparty_node_id,
5654 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5655 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5656 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5660 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5661 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5666 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5668 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5670 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5671 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5672 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5673 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5674 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5676 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5678 debug_assert!(false,
5679 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5682 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5683 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5684 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5685 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5686 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5688 let mut found_blocker = false;
5689 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5690 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5691 // which case we need to only remove the one
5692 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5693 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5694 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5695 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5697 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5700 debug_assert!(false);
5709 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5710 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5711 counterparty_node_id: None,
5712 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5715 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5719 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5720 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5721 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5722 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5723 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5724 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5725 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5726 // again on restart.
5727 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5728 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5729 payment_preimage, update_res);
5732 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5733 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5735 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5736 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5737 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5738 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5739 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5740 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5741 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5742 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5743 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5744 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5747 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5748 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5749 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5750 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5751 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5752 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5756 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5757 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5760 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5761 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5762 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5763 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
5766 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5767 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5768 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5769 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5770 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5772 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5773 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5774 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5776 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5777 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5780 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5781 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5782 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
5783 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5784 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5785 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5786 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5787 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5788 let chan_to_release =
5789 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5790 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5792 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5793 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5794 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5795 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5800 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5801 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5802 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5803 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5804 // in the background.
5805 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5806 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5807 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5808 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5810 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5811 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5812 funding_txo, update, ..
5814 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5815 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5816 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5817 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5819 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5825 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5826 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5827 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5829 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5830 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5832 monitor_update.updates[0],
5833 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5838 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5839 // immediately once we get going.
5840 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5843 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
5845 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5848 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5849 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5850 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5851 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5852 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5853 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5854 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5858 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5859 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5860 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5863 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5864 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5865 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5866 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5867 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5868 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5869 prev_user_channel_id,
5870 next_user_channel_id,
5871 total_fee_earned_msat,
5873 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5874 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5876 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5880 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5881 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5882 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5888 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5889 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5890 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5893 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5894 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5895 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5896 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5898 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5900 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5901 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5902 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5904 payment_purpose: purpose,
5907 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5909 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5913 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5915 sender_intended_total_msat,
5919 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5920 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5922 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5923 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5924 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5927 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5928 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5930 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5931 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5932 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5933 downstream_channel_id,
5934 Some(blocking_action),
5941 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5942 /// update completion.
5943 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5944 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5945 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5946 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
5947 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5948 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5949 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
5950 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5951 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5952 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5953 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5954 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5955 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
5956 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5957 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5958 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5960 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5961 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
5963 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5964 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5965 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5966 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5968 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
5969 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
5970 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
5973 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5974 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5976 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5977 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5978 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5983 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5984 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5985 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5986 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5991 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5992 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5993 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5994 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5995 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6000 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6004 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6010 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6011 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6012 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6016 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6017 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6018 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6021 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6024 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6025 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6027 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6028 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6030 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6031 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6032 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6033 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6034 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6039 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6040 let mut peer_state_lock;
6041 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6042 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6043 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6044 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6046 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6049 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6050 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6051 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6052 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6053 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6056 let remaining_in_flight =
6057 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6058 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6061 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6062 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6063 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6064 remaining_in_flight);
6065 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6068 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6071 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6073 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6074 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6077 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6078 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6079 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6081 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6082 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6083 /// used to accept such channels.
6085 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6086 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6087 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6088 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6091 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6092 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6094 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6095 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6096 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6098 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6099 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6101 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6102 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6104 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6105 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6107 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6108 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6109 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6110 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6113 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6115 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6116 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6118 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6119 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6120 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6121 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6123 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6124 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6126 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6128 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6129 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6130 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6132 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6133 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6134 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6136 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6137 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6138 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6139 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6140 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6141 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6142 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6145 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6146 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6148 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6154 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6155 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6156 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6157 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6159 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6163 Ok(mut channel) => {
6165 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6166 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6167 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6168 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6169 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6170 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6171 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6174 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6175 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6176 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6178 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6180 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6181 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6182 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6183 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6184 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6185 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6186 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6187 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6190 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6191 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6192 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6194 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6198 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6199 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6200 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6202 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6203 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6204 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6207 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6214 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6215 /// or 0-conf channels.
6217 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6218 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6219 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6220 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6221 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6222 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6224 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6225 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6226 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6227 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6228 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6229 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6230 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6234 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6237 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6238 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6240 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6241 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6243 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6244 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6245 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6246 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6247 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6249 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6252 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6253 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6254 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6257 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6258 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6259 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6260 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6261 // included in the unfunded count.
6262 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6263 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6264 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6267 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6268 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6271 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6272 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6273 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6274 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6279 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6282 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6283 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6284 // likely to be lost on restart!
6285 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6286 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6287 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6290 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6291 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6292 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6295 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6296 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6297 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6298 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6299 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6301 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6302 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6304 debug_assert!(false);
6305 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6306 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6307 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6309 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6310 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6312 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6313 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6314 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6315 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6316 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6317 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6319 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6320 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6321 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6324 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6325 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6326 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6327 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6328 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6331 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6332 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6334 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6335 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6336 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6339 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6340 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6341 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6342 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6344 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6346 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6347 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6348 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6349 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6350 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6351 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6354 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6355 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6356 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6361 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6362 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6363 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6364 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6365 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6366 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6367 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6370 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6375 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6376 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6377 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6378 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6379 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6381 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6382 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6383 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6384 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6387 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6388 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6390 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6391 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6392 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6394 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6398 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6399 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6400 // likely to be lost on restart!
6401 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6402 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6403 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6405 debug_assert!(false);
6406 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6408 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6409 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6410 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6411 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6412 match phase.get_mut() {
6413 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6414 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6415 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6418 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6422 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6425 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6426 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6427 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6428 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6429 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6431 user_channel_id: user_id,
6436 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6437 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6439 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6440 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6442 debug_assert!(false);
6443 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6446 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6447 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6448 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6449 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6450 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6451 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6452 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6454 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6455 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6456 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6457 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6458 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6459 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6460 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6461 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6462 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6466 Some(mut phase) => {
6467 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6468 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6469 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6471 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6474 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6476 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6477 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6478 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6479 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6480 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6481 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6483 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6484 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6485 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6488 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6489 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6490 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6492 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6493 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6494 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6495 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6496 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6498 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6499 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6500 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6501 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6502 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6504 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6505 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6506 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6507 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6508 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6509 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6510 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6515 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6516 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6517 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6519 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6523 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6524 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6525 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6533 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6534 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6536 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6538 debug_assert!(false);
6539 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6542 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6543 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6544 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6545 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6546 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6547 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6548 let logger = WithContext::from(
6550 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6551 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6554 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6556 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6557 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6558 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6559 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6560 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6561 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6562 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6563 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6564 } else { unreachable!(); }
6567 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6568 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6569 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6570 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6571 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6572 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6573 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6577 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6578 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6579 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6580 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6581 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6582 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6586 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6589 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6593 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6594 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6595 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6596 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6597 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6599 debug_assert!(false);
6600 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6602 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6603 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6604 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6605 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6606 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6607 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6608 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6609 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6610 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6611 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6612 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6613 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6614 msg: announcement_sigs,
6616 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6617 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6618 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6619 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6620 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6621 // announcement_signatures.
6622 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6623 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6624 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6625 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6632 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6633 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6638 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6639 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6642 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6643 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6648 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6649 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6650 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6652 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6653 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6655 debug_assert!(false);
6656 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6658 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6659 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6660 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6661 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6663 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6664 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6665 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6666 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6668 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6671 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6672 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6673 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6674 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6676 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6677 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6678 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6679 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6680 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6681 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6685 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6686 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6687 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6688 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6691 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6692 let context = phase.context_mut();
6693 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6694 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6695 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6696 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6698 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6699 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6700 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6701 let context = phase.context_mut();
6702 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6703 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6704 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6708 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6711 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6712 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6713 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6714 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6716 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6717 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6723 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6724 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6725 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6727 debug_assert!(false);
6728 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6730 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6731 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6732 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6733 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6734 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6735 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6736 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6737 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6738 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6739 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6740 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6745 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6746 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6747 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6748 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6749 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6750 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6751 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6753 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6754 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6757 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6760 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6761 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6762 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6763 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6765 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6766 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6767 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6768 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6769 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6774 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6775 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6776 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6781 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6782 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6783 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6784 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6786 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6787 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6788 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6789 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6791 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6792 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6794 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6795 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6796 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6798 debug_assert!(false);
6799 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6801 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6802 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6803 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6804 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6805 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6806 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6807 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6808 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6809 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6810 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6812 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6814 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6815 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6816 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6817 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6818 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6819 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6820 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6821 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6825 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6826 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6827 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6828 match pending_forward_info {
6829 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6830 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6832 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6833 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6834 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6835 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6836 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6838 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6839 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6840 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6841 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6842 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6845 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6847 _ => pending_forward_info
6850 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6851 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6853 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6854 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6857 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6862 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6864 let next_user_channel_id;
6865 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6866 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6867 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6869 debug_assert!(false);
6870 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6872 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6873 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6874 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6875 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6876 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6877 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6878 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6879 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6881 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6883 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6884 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6885 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6887 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6888 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6889 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6890 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6891 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6892 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6893 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6894 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
6897 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6898 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6901 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6904 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6905 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6906 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
6912 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6913 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6914 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6915 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6916 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6918 debug_assert!(false);
6919 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6921 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6922 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6923 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6924 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6925 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6926 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6928 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6929 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6932 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6937 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6938 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6939 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6940 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6941 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6943 debug_assert!(false);
6944 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6946 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6947 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6948 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6949 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6950 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6951 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6952 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6954 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6955 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6957 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6958 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6962 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6966 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6967 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6968 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6970 debug_assert!(false);
6971 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6973 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6974 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6975 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6976 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6977 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6978 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6979 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6980 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6981 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6982 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6983 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6987 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6988 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6991 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6995 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
6996 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6997 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
6998 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6999 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7000 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7005 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7006 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7007 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7008 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7009 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7010 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7011 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7012 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7013 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7014 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7015 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7017 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7018 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7020 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7021 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7022 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7023 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7024 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7025 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7027 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7028 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7029 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7031 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7032 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7033 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7034 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7035 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7036 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7037 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7038 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7039 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7042 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7043 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7045 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7046 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7047 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7048 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7049 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7050 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7051 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7052 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7053 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7054 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7055 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7056 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7059 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7060 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7061 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7066 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7067 // payments are being processed.
7068 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7069 push_forward_event = true;
7071 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7072 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7079 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7080 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7083 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7084 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7085 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7087 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7091 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7092 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7093 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7094 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7095 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7097 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7098 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7099 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7100 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7101 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7102 // real by taking more time.
7103 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7104 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7105 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7110 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7111 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7112 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7113 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7114 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7115 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7116 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7118 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7119 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7120 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7121 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7122 channel_funding_outpoint,
7124 counterparty_node_id,
7129 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7130 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7131 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7133 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7134 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7135 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7138 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7139 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7140 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7146 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7147 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7148 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7149 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7151 debug_assert!(false);
7152 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7153 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7154 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7155 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7156 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7157 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7158 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7159 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7160 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7161 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7162 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7163 *counterparty_node_id)
7165 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7166 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7167 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7168 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7169 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7170 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7171 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7175 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7176 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7179 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7182 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7186 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7187 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7188 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7190 debug_assert!(false);
7191 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7193 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7194 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7195 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7196 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7197 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7198 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7199 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7201 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7202 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7205 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7210 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7211 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7212 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7214 debug_assert!(false);
7215 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7217 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7218 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7219 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7220 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7221 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7222 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7223 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7226 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7227 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7228 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7229 msg, &self.default_configuration
7230 ), chan_phase_entry),
7231 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7232 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7233 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7236 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7237 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7240 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7245 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7246 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7247 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7248 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7250 // It's not a local channel
7251 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7254 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7255 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7256 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7257 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7259 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7260 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7261 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7262 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7263 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7264 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7265 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7266 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7267 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7268 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7269 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7271 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7273 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7274 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7275 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7276 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7278 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7279 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7280 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7281 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7284 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7288 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7289 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7292 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7294 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7297 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7298 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7299 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7301 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7303 debug_assert!(false);
7304 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7305 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7309 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7310 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7311 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7312 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7313 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7314 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7315 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7316 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7317 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7318 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7319 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7320 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7321 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7322 let mut channel_update = None;
7323 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7324 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7325 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7328 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7329 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7330 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7331 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7332 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7333 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7334 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7339 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7340 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7341 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7342 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7343 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7344 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7345 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7346 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7350 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7351 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7354 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7355 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7357 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7358 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7359 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7360 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7361 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7362 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7364 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7365 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7366 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7367 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7368 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7369 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7370 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7371 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7372 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7373 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7374 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7375 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7376 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7377 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7378 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7379 next_funding_txid: None,
7382 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7383 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7384 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7390 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7391 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7393 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
7396 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7397 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7398 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7400 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7401 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7402 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7403 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7404 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7405 match monitor_event {
7406 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7407 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7408 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7409 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7410 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7411 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7412 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7414 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7415 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7416 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7417 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7420 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7421 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7422 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7424 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7425 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7426 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7427 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7430 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7431 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7432 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7433 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7434 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7435 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7436 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7437 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7438 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7441 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7443 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7444 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7445 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7449 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7450 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7451 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7452 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7460 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7461 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7467 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7468 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7471 has_pending_monitor_events
7474 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7475 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7476 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7478 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7479 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7480 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7483 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7484 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7485 /// update was applied.
7486 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7487 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7488 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7490 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7491 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7492 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7493 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7495 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7496 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7498 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7499 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7500 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7501 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7503 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7504 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7505 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7506 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7507 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7508 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7510 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7511 has_monitor_update = true;
7513 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7514 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7515 continue 'peer_loop;
7524 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7525 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7526 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7532 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7533 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7535 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7536 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7538 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7539 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7540 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7543 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7544 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7546 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7547 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7548 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7549 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7554 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7555 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7560 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7561 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7564 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7565 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7566 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7572 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7576 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7577 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7578 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7579 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7580 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7581 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7582 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7586 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7587 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7588 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7589 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7590 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7596 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7597 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7598 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7599 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7600 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7601 let mut has_update = false;
7602 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7604 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7606 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7607 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7608 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7609 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7610 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7612 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7613 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7614 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7615 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7616 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7618 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7619 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7622 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7623 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7624 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7626 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7627 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7628 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7629 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7630 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7635 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7636 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7637 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7643 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7644 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7649 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7655 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7656 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7659 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7660 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7666 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7667 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7669 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7670 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7671 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7672 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7673 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7674 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7675 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7676 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7677 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7678 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7679 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7680 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7681 assert!(should_broadcast);
7682 } else { unreachable!(); }
7683 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7684 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7685 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7688 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7693 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7694 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7695 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7696 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7700 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7701 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7702 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7703 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7704 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7706 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7710 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7715 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7717 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7719 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7720 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7721 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7722 &$self, description: String
7723 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7724 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7725 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7726 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7727 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7729 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7730 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7731 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7733 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7740 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7741 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7742 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7746 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7747 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7749 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7750 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7751 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7754 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7755 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7756 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7758 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7759 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7763 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7764 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7765 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7766 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7767 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7769 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7773 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7774 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7779 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7780 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7781 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7783 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7785 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7786 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7787 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7788 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7789 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7790 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7791 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7792 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7793 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7794 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7795 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7796 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7798 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7799 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7800 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7802 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7803 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7806 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7808 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7809 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7810 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7811 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7813 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7819 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7821 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7822 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7823 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7824 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7825 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7826 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7830 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7831 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7832 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7833 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7836 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7838 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7840 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7841 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7842 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7844 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7845 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7846 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7847 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7848 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7849 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7850 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7852 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7853 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7857 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7858 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7861 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7862 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7863 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7867 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7868 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7869 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7870 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7874 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7875 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7876 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7881 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7882 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7883 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
7884 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7887 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7888 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7889 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7890 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7891 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7892 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7893 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7894 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7895 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7896 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7897 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7898 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7899 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7900 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7901 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7903 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
7904 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7906 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7908 let builder = match quantity {
7910 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7912 let builder = match amount_msats {
7914 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7916 let builder = match payer_note {
7918 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7920 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7921 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7923 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7925 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7926 self.pending_outbound_payments
7927 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7928 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7930 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7932 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7933 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7934 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7935 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7936 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7939 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7941 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7942 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7943 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7944 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7945 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7946 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7947 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7948 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7949 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7951 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7958 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7961 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7962 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7963 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7967 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7968 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7969 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7970 /// received and no retries will be made.
7975 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
7976 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
7979 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7980 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7981 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7982 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7983 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7985 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7986 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7988 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
7989 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
7992 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7994 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7995 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7996 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7997 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7999 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8000 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8001 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8003 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8004 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8005 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8007 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8008 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8009 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8011 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8012 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8013 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8014 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8016 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8017 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8018 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8019 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8020 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8023 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8025 for path in refund.paths() {
8026 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8027 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8028 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8029 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8031 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8037 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8041 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8044 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8045 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8047 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8048 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8049 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8050 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8052 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8054 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8055 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8059 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8060 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8062 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8064 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8065 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8067 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8068 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8069 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8070 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8071 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8072 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8073 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8074 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8075 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8076 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8077 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8080 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8081 /// stored external to LDK.
8083 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8084 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8085 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8087 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8088 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8091 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8092 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8093 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8094 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8096 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8097 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8098 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8099 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8100 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8102 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8103 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8104 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8105 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8106 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8108 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8109 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8111 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8112 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8116 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8117 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8119 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8121 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8122 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8124 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8125 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8126 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8127 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8128 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8129 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8130 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8133 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8134 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8136 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8137 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8138 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8141 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8143 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8144 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8145 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8146 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8148 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8150 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8151 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8152 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8155 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8156 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8159 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8160 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8161 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8162 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8163 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8164 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8166 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8167 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8168 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8169 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8170 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8172 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8174 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8177 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8178 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8182 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8183 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8185 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8186 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8187 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8188 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8190 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8191 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8192 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8193 Some(_) => continue,
8194 None => return scid_candidate
8199 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8201 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8202 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8204 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8205 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8206 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8210 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8211 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8212 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8214 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8215 /// times to get a unique scid.
8216 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8217 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8218 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8220 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8221 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8222 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8223 return scid_candidate
8227 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8228 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8229 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8230 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8232 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8233 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8234 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8235 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8236 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8237 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8239 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8240 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8241 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8250 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8251 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8252 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8253 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8254 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8258 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8259 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8260 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8261 events.push_back((event, None));
8265 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8266 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8267 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8271 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8272 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8276 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8277 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8280 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8281 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8282 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8283 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8284 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8285 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8286 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8288 let logger = WithContext::from(
8289 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8292 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8293 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8294 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8295 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8296 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8297 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8298 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8299 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8301 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8305 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8306 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8307 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8308 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8309 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8310 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8315 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8317 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8318 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8319 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8320 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8322 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8323 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8324 if further_update_exists {
8325 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8330 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8337 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8338 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8344 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8345 for action in actions {
8347 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8348 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8350 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8356 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8357 /// using the given event handler.
8359 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8360 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8364 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8368 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8370 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8371 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8372 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8373 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8374 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8375 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8379 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8380 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8381 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8382 /// is always placed next to each other.
8384 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8385 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8386 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8387 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8389 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8390 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8391 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8392 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8393 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8394 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8395 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8397 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8398 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8399 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8400 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8403 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8404 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8406 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8407 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8410 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8411 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8412 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8413 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8414 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8415 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8416 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8420 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8421 events.replace(pending_events);
8430 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8432 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8433 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8434 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8435 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8436 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8437 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8441 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8443 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8444 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8445 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8447 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8451 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8453 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8454 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8455 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8456 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8457 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8458 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8462 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8464 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8465 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8466 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8467 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8468 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8471 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8472 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8475 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8476 let _persistence_guard =
8477 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8478 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8479 let new_height = height - 1;
8481 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8482 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8483 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8484 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8485 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8486 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8489 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8493 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8495 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8496 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8497 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8498 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8499 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8500 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8504 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8505 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8506 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8507 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8509 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8510 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8512 let _persistence_guard =
8513 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8514 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8515 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8516 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8518 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8519 if height < last_best_block_height {
8520 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8521 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8525 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8526 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8527 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8528 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8530 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8531 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8533 let _persistence_guard =
8534 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8535 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8536 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8538 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8540 macro_rules! max_time {
8541 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8543 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8544 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8545 // having an explicit local time source.
8546 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8547 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8548 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8549 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8550 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8556 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8557 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8558 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8559 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8563 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8564 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8565 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8566 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8567 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8568 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8569 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8570 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8571 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8572 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8573 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8580 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8581 let _persistence_guard =
8582 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8583 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8584 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8585 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8586 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8587 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8588 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8589 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8594 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8596 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8597 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8598 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8599 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8600 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8601 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8605 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8606 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8608 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8609 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8610 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8611 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8612 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8614 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8615 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8617 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8618 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8619 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8620 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8621 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8622 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8624 // Retain unfunded channels.
8625 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8626 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8627 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8628 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8629 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8630 let res = f(channel);
8631 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8632 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8633 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8634 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8635 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8637 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8638 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8639 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8640 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8641 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8642 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8643 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8644 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8649 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8654 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8655 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8658 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8659 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8660 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8661 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8662 msg: announcement_sigs,
8664 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8665 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8666 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8668 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8669 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8670 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8675 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8676 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8677 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8678 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8679 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8680 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8681 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8682 // is always consistent.
8683 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8684 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8685 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8686 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8687 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8690 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8691 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8692 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8693 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8694 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8695 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8696 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8697 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8701 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8702 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8703 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8704 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8705 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8706 data: reason_message,
8719 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8720 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8721 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8722 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8723 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8724 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8725 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8726 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8727 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8728 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8730 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8731 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8732 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8736 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8739 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8740 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8741 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8742 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8743 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8744 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8745 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8746 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8747 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8748 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8749 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8750 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8753 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8754 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8755 _ => unreachable!(),
8757 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8758 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8759 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8760 let logger = WithContext::from(
8761 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8763 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8769 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8771 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8772 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8776 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8777 /// may have events that need processing.
8779 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8780 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8782 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8783 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8784 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8785 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8788 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8789 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8790 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8793 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8794 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8795 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8798 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8799 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8800 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8801 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8804 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8805 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8806 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8807 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8810 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8811 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8813 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8814 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8815 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8816 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8817 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8820 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8821 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8822 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8823 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8826 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8827 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8828 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8829 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8832 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8833 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8834 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8835 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8838 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8839 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8840 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8841 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8845 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8846 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8848 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8849 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8850 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8851 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8852 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8853 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8857 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8858 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8859 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8860 // change to the contents.
8861 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8862 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8863 let persist = match &res {
8864 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8865 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8866 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8868 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8870 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8875 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8876 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8877 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8878 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8881 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8882 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8883 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8884 // change to the contents.
8885 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8886 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8887 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8891 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8892 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8893 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8894 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8897 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8898 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8899 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8902 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8903 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8904 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8907 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8908 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8909 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8910 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8911 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8912 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8913 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8914 let persist = match &res {
8915 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8916 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8918 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8923 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8924 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8925 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8926 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8929 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8930 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8931 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8932 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8935 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8936 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8937 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8938 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8941 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8942 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8943 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8944 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8947 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8948 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8949 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8952 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8953 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8954 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8957 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8958 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8959 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8960 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8961 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8962 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8963 let persist = match &res {
8964 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8965 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8966 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8968 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8973 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8974 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8975 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8978 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8979 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8980 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8981 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8982 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8983 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8984 let persist = match &res {
8985 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8986 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8987 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8989 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8994 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8995 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8996 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8997 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8998 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8999 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9000 let persist = match &res {
9001 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9002 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9003 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9005 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9010 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9011 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9012 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9015 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9016 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9017 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9020 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9021 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9022 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9023 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9024 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9025 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9026 let persist = match &res {
9027 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9028 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9029 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9031 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9036 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9037 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9038 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9041 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9042 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9043 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9046 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9051 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9052 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9053 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9054 let persist = match &res {
9055 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9056 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9057 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9059 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9064 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9065 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9066 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9067 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9068 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9071 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9072 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9073 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9075 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9076 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9077 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9078 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9079 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9080 let context = match phase {
9081 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9082 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9083 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9084 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9089 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9090 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9091 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9094 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9095 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9098 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9099 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9102 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9103 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9107 // Clean up for removal.
9108 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9109 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9112 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9113 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9114 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9115 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9117 // V1 Channel Establishment
9118 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9119 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9120 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9121 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9122 // V2 Channel Establishment
9123 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9124 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9125 // Common Channel Establishment
9126 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9127 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9129 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9131 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9132 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9133 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9134 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9135 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9136 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9137 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9138 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9139 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9142 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9143 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9144 // Channel Operations
9145 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9146 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9147 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9148 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9149 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9150 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9152 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9153 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9154 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9155 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9156 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9157 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9158 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9159 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9160 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9163 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9164 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9165 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9166 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9169 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9171 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9173 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9174 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9178 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9179 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9180 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9181 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9185 let mut res = Ok(());
9187 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9188 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9189 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9190 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9191 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9192 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9193 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9196 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9197 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9198 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9199 if inbound_peer_limited {
9201 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9203 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9204 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9205 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9206 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9207 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9208 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9209 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9210 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9214 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9215 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9216 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9218 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9219 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9220 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9221 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9224 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9227 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9228 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9233 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9235 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9236 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9237 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9238 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9239 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9241 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9243 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9244 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9245 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9246 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9247 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9251 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9252 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9253 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9254 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9258 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9259 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9260 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9261 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9262 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9263 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9267 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9268 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9269 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9270 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9271 debug_assert!(false);
9274 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9275 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9276 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9277 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9278 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9279 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9280 debug_assert!(false);
9286 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9287 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9292 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9293 match &msg.data as &str {
9294 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9295 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9297 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9298 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9299 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9300 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9301 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9302 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9303 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9304 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9305 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9307 || -> NotifyOption {
9308 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9309 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9310 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9311 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9312 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9313 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9314 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9315 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9319 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9320 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9321 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9322 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9323 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9324 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9326 log_level: Level::Trace,
9329 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9330 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9331 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9333 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9342 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9344 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9345 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9346 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9347 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9348 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9349 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9350 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9351 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9352 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9353 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9354 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9356 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9357 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9358 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9362 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9363 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9364 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9365 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9366 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9367 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9368 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9369 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9370 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9371 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9372 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9378 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9379 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9380 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9381 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9382 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9388 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9389 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9390 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9394 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9395 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9399 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9400 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9403 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9404 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9407 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9408 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9411 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9412 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9413 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9414 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9417 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9418 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9419 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9420 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9423 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9424 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9425 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9426 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9429 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9430 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9431 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9432 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9435 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9436 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9437 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9438 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9441 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9442 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9443 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9444 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9447 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9448 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9449 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9450 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9453 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9454 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9455 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9456 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9459 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9460 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9461 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9462 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9466 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9467 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9469 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9470 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9471 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9472 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9473 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9474 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9478 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9479 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9480 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9483 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9484 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9487 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9488 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9490 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9491 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9493 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9494 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9498 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9499 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9500 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9502 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9504 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9505 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9509 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9510 amount_msats, payment_secret
9512 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9514 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9515 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9519 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9520 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9521 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9524 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9525 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9526 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9527 payment_paths, payment_hash
9529 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9530 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9531 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9533 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9534 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9535 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9536 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9537 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9540 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9541 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9542 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9543 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9544 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9546 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9547 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9548 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9549 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9550 .and_then(|invoice| {
9552 let mut invoice = invoice;
9553 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9554 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9556 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9557 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9558 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9560 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9561 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9566 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9567 Err(error) => Some(error),
9571 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9572 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9574 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9576 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9577 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9580 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9581 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9582 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9589 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9590 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9596 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9597 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9601 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9602 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9603 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9604 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9605 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9609 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9610 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9612 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9613 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9614 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9615 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9616 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9619 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9620 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9621 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9622 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9625 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9626 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9627 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9628 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9631 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9632 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9633 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9634 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9637 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9638 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9639 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9640 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9641 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9642 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9643 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9644 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9645 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9646 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9647 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9648 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9649 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9650 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9651 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9652 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9653 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9654 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9655 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9656 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9657 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9662 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9663 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9665 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9666 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9667 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9668 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9671 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9672 (2, node_id, required),
9673 (4, features, required),
9674 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9675 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9676 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9677 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9680 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9681 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9682 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9683 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9684 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9685 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9686 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9687 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9688 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9689 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9690 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9691 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9692 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9693 (7, self.config, option),
9694 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9695 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9696 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9697 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9698 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9699 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9700 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9701 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9702 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9703 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9704 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9705 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9706 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9707 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9708 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9709 (32, self.is_public, required),
9710 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9711 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9712 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9713 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9714 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9715 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9716 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9722 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9723 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9724 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9725 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9726 (2, channel_id, required),
9727 (3, channel_type, option),
9728 (4, counterparty, required),
9729 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9730 (6, funding_txo, option),
9731 (7, config, option),
9732 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9733 (9, confirmations, option),
9734 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9735 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9736 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9737 (16, balance_msat, required),
9738 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9739 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9740 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9741 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9742 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9743 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9744 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9745 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9746 (26, is_outbound, required),
9747 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9748 (30, is_usable, required),
9749 (32, is_public, required),
9750 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9751 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9752 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9753 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9754 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9755 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9756 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9759 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9760 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9761 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9762 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9763 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9767 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9769 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9770 outbound_scid_alias,
9774 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9775 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9777 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9778 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9779 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9780 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9781 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9782 confirmations_required,
9784 force_close_spend_delay,
9785 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9786 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9787 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9788 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9789 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9790 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9791 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9792 channel_shutdown_state,
9793 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9794 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9799 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9800 (2, channels, required_vec),
9801 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9802 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9805 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9806 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9807 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9810 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9812 (0, onion_packet, required),
9813 (1, blinded, option),
9814 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9817 (0, payment_data, required),
9818 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9819 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9820 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9821 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9822 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9824 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9825 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9826 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9827 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9828 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9829 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9830 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9834 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9835 (0, routing, required),
9836 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9837 (4, payment_hash, required),
9838 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9839 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9840 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9841 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9845 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9846 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9848 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9850 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9851 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9852 reason.write(writer)?;
9854 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9855 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9858 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9859 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9860 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9861 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9868 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9869 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9870 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9873 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9874 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9875 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9876 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9880 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9881 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9882 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9883 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9884 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9887 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9888 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9889 // messages contained in the variants.
9890 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9891 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9892 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9894 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9895 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9896 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9897 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9898 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9901 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9902 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9903 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9904 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9905 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9907 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9912 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9917 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9918 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9919 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9922 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9923 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9924 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9925 (2, outpoint, required),
9926 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9927 (4, htlc_id, required),
9928 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9929 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9930 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9931 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9932 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9935 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9936 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9937 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9938 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9939 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9941 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9942 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9943 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9944 (2, self.value, required),
9945 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9946 (4, payment_data, option),
9947 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9948 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9949 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9950 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9956 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9957 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9958 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9959 (0, prev_hop, required),
9960 (1, total_msat, option),
9961 (2, value_ser, required),
9962 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9963 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9964 (5, total_value_received, option),
9965 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9966 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9967 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9969 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9970 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9971 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9973 if payment_data.is_some() {
9974 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9976 if total_msat.is_none() {
9977 total_msat = Some(value);
9979 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9982 if total_msat.is_none() {
9983 if payment_data.is_none() {
9984 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9986 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9988 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9992 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9995 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9996 total_value_received,
9997 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9999 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10000 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10005 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10006 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10007 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10010 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10011 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10012 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10013 let mut payment_id = None;
10014 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10015 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10016 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10017 (0, session_priv, required),
10018 (1, payment_id, option),
10019 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10020 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10021 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10022 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10024 if payment_id.is_none() {
10025 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10027 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10029 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10030 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10031 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10033 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10034 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10035 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10036 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10040 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10041 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10042 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10044 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10047 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10048 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10053 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10054 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10056 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10057 0u8.write(writer)?;
10058 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10059 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10060 (0, session_priv, required),
10061 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10062 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10063 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10064 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10065 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10066 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10069 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10070 1u8.write(writer)?;
10071 field.write(writer)?;
10078 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10079 (0, forward_info, required),
10080 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10081 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10082 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10083 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10084 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10085 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10086 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10089 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10090 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10091 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10093 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10097 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10098 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10099 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10100 (0, htlc_id, required),
10101 (2, err_packet, required),
10104 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10105 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10106 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10107 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10108 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10109 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10110 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10111 (0, htlc_id, required),
10112 (1, failure_code, required),
10113 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10114 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10122 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10123 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10124 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10126 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10128 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10129 (0, htlc_id, required),
10130 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10131 (2, err_packet, required),
10132 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10134 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10135 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10136 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10138 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10142 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10143 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10147 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10152 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10153 (0, payment_secret, required),
10154 (2, expiry_time, required),
10155 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10156 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10157 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10160 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10162 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10163 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10164 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10165 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10166 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10167 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10171 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10172 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10174 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10176 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10178 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10179 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10180 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10183 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10185 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10186 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10187 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10188 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10189 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10190 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10191 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10194 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10195 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10199 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10201 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10202 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10203 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10204 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10205 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10206 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10209 channel.write(writer)?;
10215 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10216 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10217 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10218 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10219 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10220 for forward in pending_forwards {
10221 forward.write(writer)?;
10226 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10227 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10228 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10229 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10232 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10234 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10235 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10236 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10238 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10239 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10240 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10241 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10242 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10243 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10244 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10245 htlc.write(writer)?;
10247 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10248 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10251 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10252 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10253 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10254 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10255 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10256 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10257 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10260 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10261 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10262 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10263 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10264 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10266 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10267 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10268 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10269 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10270 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10271 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10272 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10277 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10278 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10279 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10280 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10281 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10282 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10283 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10284 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10285 0u64.write(writer)?;
10287 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10288 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10289 event.write(writer)?;
10293 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10294 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10295 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10296 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10297 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10298 0u64.write(writer)?;
10300 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10301 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10302 // likely to be identical.
10303 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10304 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10306 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10307 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10308 hash.write(writer)?;
10309 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10312 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10313 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10314 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10315 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10316 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10319 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10320 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10322 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10323 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10324 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10325 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10328 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10329 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10330 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10331 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10335 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10336 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10337 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10339 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10340 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10341 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10347 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10348 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10349 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10350 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10353 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10354 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10355 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10356 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10357 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10360 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10361 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10362 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10363 if !updates.is_empty() {
10364 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10365 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10370 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10371 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10372 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10373 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10374 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10375 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10376 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10377 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10378 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10379 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10380 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10381 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10382 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10383 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
10390 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10391 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10392 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10393 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10396 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10397 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10398 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10399 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10400 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10401 // check that the event is sane here.
10402 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10403 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10404 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10405 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10411 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10412 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10413 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10414 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10415 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10416 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10419 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10420 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10421 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10422 events.push_back((ev, action));
10423 } else if action.is_some() {
10424 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10431 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10432 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10433 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10434 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10435 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10436 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10439 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10441 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10443 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10444 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10445 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10446 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10447 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10448 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10449 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10450 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10451 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10452 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10453 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10454 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10455 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10457 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10458 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10460 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10461 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10463 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10464 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10465 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10466 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10467 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10468 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10470 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10471 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10473 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10474 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10475 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10476 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10477 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10478 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10482 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10483 pub entropy_source: ES,
10485 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10486 pub node_signer: NS,
10488 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10489 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10491 pub signer_provider: SP,
10493 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10495 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10496 pub fee_estimator: F,
10497 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10499 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10500 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10501 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10502 pub chain_monitor: M,
10504 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10505 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10506 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10507 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10508 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10509 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10511 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10513 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10514 /// deserialization.
10516 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10517 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10518 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10520 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10521 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10523 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10524 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10525 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10526 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10528 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10531 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10532 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10535 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10536 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10538 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10539 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10540 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10541 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10542 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10543 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10547 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10548 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10549 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10550 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10551 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10553 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10554 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10555 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10561 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10562 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10563 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10564 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10566 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10567 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10568 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10569 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10570 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10571 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10575 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10576 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10577 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10581 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10582 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10584 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10585 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10586 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10587 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10588 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10589 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10593 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10594 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10596 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10597 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10598 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10600 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10602 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10603 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10604 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10605 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10606 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10607 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10608 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10609 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10610 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10611 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10612 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10614 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10615 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10616 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10617 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10618 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10619 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10620 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10621 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10622 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10623 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10624 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10625 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10626 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10627 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10628 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10630 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10631 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10632 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10634 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10635 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10636 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10638 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10639 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10640 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10642 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10643 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10644 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10646 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10647 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10648 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10651 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10652 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10653 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10654 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10655 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10656 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10657 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10658 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10660 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10661 let mut found_htlc = false;
10662 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10663 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10666 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10667 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10668 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10669 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10670 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10671 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10672 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10674 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10675 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10676 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10680 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10681 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10682 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10683 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10684 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10686 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10687 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10689 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10690 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10691 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10692 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10694 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10695 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10696 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10697 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10701 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10702 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10703 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10704 // safely discard the channel.
10705 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10706 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10707 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10708 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10709 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10710 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10711 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10712 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10715 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10716 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10717 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10718 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10719 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10720 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10724 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10725 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10726 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10727 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10728 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10730 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10731 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10732 counterparty_node_id: None,
10733 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10734 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10736 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10740 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10741 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10742 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10743 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10744 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10745 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10746 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10747 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10748 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10750 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10753 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10754 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10755 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10756 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10757 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10758 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10759 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10760 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10762 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10765 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10768 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10769 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10770 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10771 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10772 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10773 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10774 is_connected: false,
10778 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10779 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10780 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10781 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10782 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10783 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10784 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10785 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10788 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10789 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10790 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10791 for _ in 0..event_count {
10792 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10793 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10798 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10799 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10800 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10802 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10803 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10804 // on-startup monitor updates.
10805 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10806 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10808 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10812 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10813 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10815 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10816 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10817 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10818 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10819 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10823 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10824 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10825 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10826 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10827 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10828 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10829 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10831 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10832 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10836 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10837 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10838 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10839 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10840 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10841 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10842 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10843 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10844 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10845 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10846 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10847 let mut events_override = None;
10848 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10849 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
10850 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10851 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10852 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10853 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10854 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10855 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10856 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10857 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10858 (8, events_override, option),
10859 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10860 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10861 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10862 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10863 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
10865 let decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
10866 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10867 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10870 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10871 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10874 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10875 pending_events_read = events;
10878 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10879 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10882 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10883 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10884 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10885 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10886 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10887 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10889 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10891 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10892 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10893 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10896 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10897 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10898 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10899 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10900 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10902 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10903 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10904 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10906 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10907 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10908 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10909 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10910 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10912 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10913 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10914 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10915 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10916 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10917 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10918 pending_background_events.push(
10919 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10920 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10921 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10922 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10923 update: update.clone(),
10926 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10927 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10928 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10929 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10930 pending_background_events.push(
10931 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10932 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10933 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10936 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10937 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10938 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10940 max_in_flight_update_id
10944 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10945 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10946 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10947 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10948 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10949 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10951 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10953 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10954 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10955 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10956 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10957 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10958 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10959 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10960 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10961 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10964 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10965 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10966 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10967 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10968 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10969 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10970 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10971 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10972 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10973 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10974 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10977 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10978 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10979 debug_assert!(false);
10980 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10985 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10986 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10987 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
10988 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
10989 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10990 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10991 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10992 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10993 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10994 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
10996 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10997 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10998 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11000 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11001 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11002 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11003 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11004 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11005 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11006 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11007 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11012 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11013 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11015 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11016 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11017 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11018 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11021 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11022 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11023 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11024 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11025 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11026 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11027 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11029 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11030 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11031 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11032 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11033 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11034 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11035 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11036 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11037 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11040 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11041 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11042 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11043 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11044 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11045 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11046 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11047 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11049 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11050 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11051 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11052 retry_strategy: None,
11053 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11054 payment_params: None,
11055 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11056 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11057 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11058 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11059 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11060 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11061 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11062 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11063 total_msat: path_amt,
11064 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11065 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11067 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11068 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11073 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11074 match htlc_source {
11075 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11076 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11077 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11078 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11080 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11081 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11082 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11083 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11084 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11085 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11086 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11087 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11088 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11089 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11090 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11095 !forwards.is_empty()
11097 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11098 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11099 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11100 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11101 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11102 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11103 intercepted_id != ev_id
11110 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11111 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11112 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11113 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11114 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11115 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11116 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11117 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11118 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11119 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11120 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11122 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11123 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11124 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11125 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11127 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11128 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11129 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11136 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11137 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11139 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11141 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11142 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11143 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11144 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11145 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11146 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11147 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11148 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11149 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11150 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11153 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11154 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11155 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11156 // channel still live case here.
11160 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11161 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11166 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11167 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11168 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11169 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11170 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11171 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11172 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11173 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11177 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11178 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11180 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11181 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11182 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11183 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11185 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11186 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11187 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11189 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11190 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11192 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11193 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11195 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11198 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11199 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11200 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11202 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11206 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11207 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11208 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11209 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11210 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11212 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11213 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11214 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11215 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11216 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11217 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11218 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11219 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11221 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11222 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11226 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11228 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11230 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11231 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11233 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11234 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11239 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11240 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11242 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11244 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11246 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11247 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11248 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11249 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11253 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11254 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11255 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11256 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11257 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11258 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11259 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11260 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11261 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11263 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11264 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11265 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11267 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11268 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11269 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11270 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11271 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11272 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11274 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11275 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11276 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11277 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11278 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11279 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11283 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11284 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11285 debug_assert!(false);
11286 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11291 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11293 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11294 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11295 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11296 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11297 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11298 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11299 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11300 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11301 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11302 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11303 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11305 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11306 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11308 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11309 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11310 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11311 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11313 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11314 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11315 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11316 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11318 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11319 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11320 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11321 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11323 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11324 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11325 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11326 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11327 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11328 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11329 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11330 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11333 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11334 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11337 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11340 purpose: payment.purpose,
11341 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11342 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11343 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11349 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11350 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11351 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11352 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11353 for action in actions.iter() {
11354 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11355 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11356 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11358 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11360 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11361 blocked_channel_id);
11362 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11363 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11364 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11366 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11367 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11368 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11369 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11373 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11374 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11378 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11380 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11381 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11385 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11387 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11388 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11389 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11390 router: args.router,
11392 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11394 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11395 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11396 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11397 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11399 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11400 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
11401 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11402 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11403 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11404 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11405 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11407 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11409 our_network_pubkey,
11412 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11414 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11416 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11417 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11418 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11419 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11420 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11422 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11423 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11425 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11427 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11429 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11430 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11431 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11433 logger: args.logger,
11434 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11437 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11438 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11439 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11440 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11441 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11444 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11445 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11446 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11447 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11448 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11449 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11450 downstream_channel_id, None
11454 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11455 //connection or two.
11457 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11463 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11464 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11465 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11466 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11467 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11468 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11469 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11470 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11471 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11472 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11473 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11474 use crate::prelude::*;
11475 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11476 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11477 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11478 use crate::util::test_utils;
11479 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11480 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11483 fn test_notify_limits() {
11484 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11485 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11486 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11487 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11488 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11489 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11491 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11492 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11493 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11494 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11495 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11497 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11499 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11500 // to connect messages with new values
11501 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11502 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11503 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11504 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11505 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11506 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11508 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11509 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11510 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11511 // ... but the last node should not.
11512 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11513 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11514 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11515 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11517 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11518 // about the channel.
11519 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11520 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11521 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11523 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11525 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11526 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11527 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11528 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11529 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11530 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11532 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11533 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11534 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11536 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11537 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11538 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11539 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11540 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11541 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11543 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11544 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11545 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11546 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11547 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11548 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11549 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11550 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11552 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11553 // the channel info has updated.
11554 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11555 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11556 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11557 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11558 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11559 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11563 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11564 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11566 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11567 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11568 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11569 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11570 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11572 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11573 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11574 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11575 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11577 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11578 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11579 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11580 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11581 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11582 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11583 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11584 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11585 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11586 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11587 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11588 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11590 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11591 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11592 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11593 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11594 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11595 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11596 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11597 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11598 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11599 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11600 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11601 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11602 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11604 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11605 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11606 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11607 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11608 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11609 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11610 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11611 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11612 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11614 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11615 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11616 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11617 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11618 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11619 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11620 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11622 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11623 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11624 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11625 // lightning messages manually.
11626 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11627 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11628 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11630 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11631 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11632 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11633 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11634 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11635 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11636 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11637 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11638 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11639 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11640 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11641 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11642 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11643 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11645 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11646 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11647 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11649 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11650 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11651 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11653 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11654 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11655 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11657 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11658 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11659 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11660 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11662 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11663 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11664 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11665 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11667 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11670 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11671 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11672 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11673 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11675 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11680 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11681 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11682 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11685 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11686 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11687 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11688 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11689 // fails as expected.
11690 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11691 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11692 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11693 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11694 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11695 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11696 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11697 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11698 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11699 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11700 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11701 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11702 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11703 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11704 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11706 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11707 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11708 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11710 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11711 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11712 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11713 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11714 let route = find_route(
11715 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11716 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11718 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11719 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11720 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11721 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11722 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11723 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11724 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11725 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11726 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11727 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11728 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11729 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11730 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11731 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11732 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11733 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11734 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11735 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11736 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11737 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11738 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11739 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11740 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11741 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11743 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11744 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11746 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11747 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11748 let route = find_route(
11749 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11750 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11752 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11753 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11754 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11755 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11756 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11757 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11758 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11759 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11761 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11762 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11763 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11764 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11765 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11766 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11767 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11768 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11769 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11770 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11771 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11772 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11773 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11774 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11776 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11777 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11778 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11779 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11780 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11781 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11782 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11783 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11784 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11786 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11787 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11789 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11790 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11791 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11792 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11793 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11794 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11795 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11796 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11797 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11798 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11800 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11801 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11802 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11805 let route = find_route(
11806 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11807 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11809 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11810 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11811 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11812 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11813 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11814 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11815 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11816 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11817 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11819 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11820 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11821 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11823 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11824 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11825 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11826 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11827 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11828 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11829 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11830 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11831 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11833 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11834 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11838 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11839 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11840 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11841 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11842 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11843 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11844 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11846 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11847 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11849 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11850 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11851 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11852 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11853 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11854 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11855 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11856 let route = find_route(
11857 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11858 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11861 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11862 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11863 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11864 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11865 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11866 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11867 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11869 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11870 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11871 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11872 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11873 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11874 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11875 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11877 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11881 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11882 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11883 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11884 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11885 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11886 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11887 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11888 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11889 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11891 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11892 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11894 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11895 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11896 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11897 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11898 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11899 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11900 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11901 let route = find_route(
11902 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11903 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11906 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11907 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11908 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11909 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11910 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11911 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11912 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11913 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11914 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11916 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11917 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11918 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11919 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11920 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11921 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11922 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11924 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11928 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11929 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11930 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11931 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11932 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11934 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11935 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11936 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11937 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11939 // Marshall an MPP route.
11940 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11941 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11942 route.paths.push(path);
11943 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11944 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11945 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11946 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11947 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11948 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11950 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11951 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11953 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11954 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11956 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11961 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11962 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11963 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11964 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11965 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11967 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11969 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11970 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11972 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11973 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11974 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11975 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11978 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11979 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11980 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11981 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11982 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11983 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11986 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11989 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11990 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11995 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11996 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11997 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11998 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11999 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12000 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12002 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12003 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12005 total_msat: 100_000,
12008 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12009 // payment verification fails as expected.
12010 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12011 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12012 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12013 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12015 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12019 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12020 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12024 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12025 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12026 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12027 // the channel is successfully closed.
12028 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12029 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12030 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12031 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12033 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12034 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12035 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12036 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12037 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12039 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12040 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12042 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12043 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12044 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12045 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12048 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12050 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12051 // as it has the funding transaction.
12052 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12053 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12054 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12057 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12059 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12061 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12063 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12064 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12065 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12067 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12070 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12071 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12072 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12073 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12074 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12076 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12077 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12078 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12079 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12080 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12081 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12082 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12083 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12085 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12086 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12087 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12088 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12090 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12091 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12093 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12094 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12095 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12096 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12097 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12098 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12099 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12103 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12104 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12105 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12106 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12107 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12108 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12109 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12112 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12114 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12115 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12116 // closing transaction).
12117 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12118 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12119 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12121 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12122 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12123 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12124 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12125 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12128 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12130 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12132 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12133 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12134 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12136 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12138 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12139 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12142 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12143 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12144 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12147 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12148 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12149 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12152 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12153 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12154 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12157 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12158 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12159 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12162 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12164 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12165 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12167 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12168 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12170 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12171 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12176 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12177 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12178 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12179 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12180 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12181 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12182 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12183 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12186 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12187 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12188 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12190 // Test the API functions.
12191 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12193 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12195 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12197 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12199 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12201 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12203 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12207 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12208 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12209 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12210 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12211 // the given `channel_id`.
12212 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12213 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12214 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12215 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12217 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12220 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12222 // Test the API functions.
12223 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12225 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12227 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12229 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12231 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12233 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12237 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12238 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12239 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12240 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12241 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12242 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12244 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12246 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12247 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12249 let mut funding_tx = None;
12250 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12251 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12252 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12255 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12256 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12257 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12258 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12259 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12261 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12262 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12263 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12265 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12267 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12268 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12269 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12271 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12274 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12275 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12276 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12277 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12278 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12279 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12281 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12282 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12284 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12285 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12286 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12287 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12288 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12289 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12290 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12293 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12294 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12295 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12296 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12297 }, true).unwrap_err();
12299 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12300 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12301 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12302 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12303 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12304 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12305 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12307 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12308 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12310 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12311 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12312 }, true).unwrap_err();
12314 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12315 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12316 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12317 }, false).unwrap();
12318 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12320 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12321 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12323 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12324 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12325 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12326 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12327 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12329 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12330 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12331 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12333 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12334 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12335 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12337 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12338 // "protected" and can connect again.
12339 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12340 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12341 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12343 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12345 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12347 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12348 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12352 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12353 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12354 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12355 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12356 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12357 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12359 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12361 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12362 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12364 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12365 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12366 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12367 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12370 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12372 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12373 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12374 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12376 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12377 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12378 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12380 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12381 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12382 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12383 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12387 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12388 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12389 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12390 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12391 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12392 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12393 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12394 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12395 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12397 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12399 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12400 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12402 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12403 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12404 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12405 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12406 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12407 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12410 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12411 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12413 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12414 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12416 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12418 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12419 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12422 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12423 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12424 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12425 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12426 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12428 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12429 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12431 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12432 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12433 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12434 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12438 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12440 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12441 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12443 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12444 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12445 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12447 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12448 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12450 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12452 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12456 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12457 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12458 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12459 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12460 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12461 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12462 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12463 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12464 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12465 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12466 payment_metadata: None,
12467 keysend_preimage: None,
12468 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12469 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12471 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12473 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12474 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12475 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12476 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12477 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12478 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12479 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12481 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12482 } else { panic!(); }
12484 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12485 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12486 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12487 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12488 payment_metadata: None,
12489 keysend_preimage: None,
12490 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12491 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12493 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12495 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12496 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12497 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12498 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12502 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12503 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12504 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12505 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12506 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12508 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12509 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12510 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12511 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12512 payment_metadata: None,
12513 keysend_preimage: None,
12514 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12515 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12517 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12518 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12519 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12521 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12522 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12523 // is not satisfied.
12524 assert!(result.is_ok());
12528 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12529 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12530 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12531 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12532 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12534 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12535 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12537 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12538 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12539 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12540 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12541 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12543 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12544 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12546 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12547 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12548 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12549 match &msg_events[0] {
12550 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12551 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12553 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12554 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12555 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12558 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12561 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12562 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12564 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12565 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12566 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12568 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12572 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12573 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12574 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12575 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12576 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12577 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12578 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12579 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12580 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12581 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12582 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12584 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12585 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12586 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12588 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12589 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12591 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12592 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12594 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12597 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12598 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12600 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12601 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12603 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12604 // not have generated any events.
12605 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12609 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12610 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12611 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12612 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12613 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12614 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12615 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12616 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12618 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12619 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12620 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12622 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12623 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12624 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12625 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12626 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12628 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12629 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12632 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12633 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12634 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12636 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12637 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12638 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12639 ..Default::default()
12641 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12642 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12643 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12645 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12646 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12649 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12650 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12651 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12652 ..Default::default()
12654 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12655 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12656 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12657 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12659 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12660 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12663 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12664 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12665 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12666 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12667 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12670 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12671 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12672 ..Default::default()
12674 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12677 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12678 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12679 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12680 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12684 fn test_payment_display() {
12685 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12686 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12687 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12688 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12689 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12690 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12694 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12695 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12696 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12697 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12698 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12699 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12701 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12702 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12703 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12704 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12705 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12706 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12707 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12708 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12710 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12711 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12712 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12715 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12716 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12718 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12719 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12721 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12722 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12723 }, false).unwrap();
12724 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12725 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12726 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12728 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12730 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12731 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12732 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12733 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12734 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12735 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12736 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12737 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12738 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12739 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12740 } else { panic!() };
12741 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12742 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12743 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12744 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12746 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12748 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12749 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12750 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12755 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12756 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12757 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12758 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12761 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12762 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12763 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12765 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12766 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12768 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12769 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12772 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12773 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12774 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12776 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12780 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12781 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12782 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12784 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12789 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12790 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12791 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12792 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12794 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12795 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12796 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12798 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12800 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12801 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12802 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12803 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12805 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12806 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12808 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12814 use crate::chain::Listen;
12815 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12816 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12817 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12818 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12819 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12820 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12821 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12822 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12823 use crate::util::test_utils;
12824 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12826 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12827 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12828 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12829 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12831 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12833 use criterion::Criterion;
12835 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12836 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12837 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12838 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12839 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12840 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12841 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12843 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12844 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12846 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12847 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12849 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12851 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12854 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12855 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12858 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12859 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12860 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12862 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12863 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12865 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12866 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12867 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12868 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12869 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12871 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12872 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12873 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12875 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12876 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12877 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12878 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12880 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12881 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12882 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12884 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12885 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12886 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12887 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12888 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12890 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12891 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12892 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12894 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12895 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12897 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12898 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12899 }, false).unwrap();
12900 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12901 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12902 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12905 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12906 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12907 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12909 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12910 } else { panic!(); }
12912 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12913 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12914 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12915 match events_b[0] {
12916 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12917 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12919 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12922 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12923 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12924 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12925 match events_a[0] {
12926 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12927 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12929 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12932 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12934 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
12935 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12936 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12938 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12939 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12940 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12941 match msg_events[0] {
12942 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12943 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12944 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12948 match msg_events[1] {
12949 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12953 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12954 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12955 match events_a[0] {
12956 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12957 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12959 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12962 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12963 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12964 match events_b[0] {
12965 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12966 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12968 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12971 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12972 macro_rules! send_payment {
12973 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12974 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12975 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12976 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12977 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12978 payment_count += 1;
12979 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12980 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12982 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12983 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12984 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12985 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12986 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12987 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12988 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12989 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12990 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12991 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12992 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12994 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12995 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12996 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12997 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12999 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13000 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13001 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13002 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13003 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13005 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13008 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13009 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13010 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13011 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13013 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13017 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13018 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13019 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);