1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
65 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
66 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
67 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
68 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
69 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
70 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
71 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
72 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
73 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
74 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
75 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
76 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
77 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
78 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
79 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
81 crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
82 crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
83 crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
84 crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
85 crate::sign::KeysManager,
89 crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
93 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
96 use crate::prelude::*;
98 use core::cell::RefCell;
100 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
101 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
102 use core::time::Duration;
103 use core::ops::Deref;
105 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
106 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
107 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
109 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
111 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
112 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
113 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
115 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
116 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
117 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
118 // before we forward it.
120 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
121 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
122 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
123 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
124 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
126 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
129 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
130 /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
132 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
133 /// do with the HTLC.
134 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
135 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
137 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
138 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
139 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
140 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
141 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
142 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
144 /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
146 /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
147 /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
149 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
150 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
151 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
152 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
153 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
155 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
156 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
157 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
158 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
159 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
161 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
162 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
163 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
164 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
166 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
167 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
169 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
170 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
171 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
172 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
173 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
174 requires_blinded_error: bool,
176 /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
177 /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
178 /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
180 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
181 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
183 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
184 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
185 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
186 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
187 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
188 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
189 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
191 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
192 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
193 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
194 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
196 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
197 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
198 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
200 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
201 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
202 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
203 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
204 requires_blinded_error: bool,
208 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
209 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
210 pub struct BlindedForward {
211 /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
212 /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
213 /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
214 pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
215 /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
216 /// the introduction node.
217 pub failure: BlindedFailure,
220 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
221 // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
222 fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
224 Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
225 Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226 Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
232 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
234 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
235 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
236 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
237 /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
238 pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
239 /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
241 /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
242 pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
243 /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
244 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
245 /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
247 /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
249 pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
250 /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
251 /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
253 /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
254 /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
255 /// it along another path).
257 /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
258 /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
259 /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
260 /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
261 pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
262 /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
263 /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
264 pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
265 /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
267 /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
270 /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
272 /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
274 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
277 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
278 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
279 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
280 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
283 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
284 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
285 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
286 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
287 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
290 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
291 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
292 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
294 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
295 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
296 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
299 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
300 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
302 prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
303 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
304 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
307 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
308 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
309 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
312 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
317 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
321 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
322 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
323 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
324 pub enum BlindedFailure {
325 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
326 /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
327 FromIntroductionNode,
328 /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
329 /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
333 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
334 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
335 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
336 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
337 short_channel_id: u64,
338 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
340 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
341 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
342 blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
343 channel_id: ChannelId,
345 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
346 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
351 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
353 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
354 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
355 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
357 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
358 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
361 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
362 struct ClaimableHTLC {
363 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
365 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
367 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
368 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
369 sender_intended_value: u64,
370 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
372 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
373 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
374 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
375 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
377 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
378 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
381 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
382 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
383 events::ClaimedHTLC {
384 channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
385 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
386 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
387 value_msat: val.value,
388 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
393 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
394 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
396 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
397 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
398 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
401 /// Number of bytes in the id.
402 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
405 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
406 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
411 impl Readable for PaymentId {
412 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
413 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
418 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
419 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
420 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
424 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
426 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
427 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
428 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
430 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
431 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
436 impl Readable for InterceptId {
437 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
438 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
444 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
445 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
446 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
447 OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
450 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
452 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
453 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
454 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
456 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
457 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
462 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
463 (0, short_channel_id, required),
464 (2, htlc_id, required),
466 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
467 (0, session_priv, required),
472 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
475 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
476 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
479 session_priv: SecretKey,
480 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
481 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
482 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
483 payment_id: PaymentId,
486 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
487 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
488 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
490 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
492 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
494 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
497 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
498 payment_id.hash(hasher);
499 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
505 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
507 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
508 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
509 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
510 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
511 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
512 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
516 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
517 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
518 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
519 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
520 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
521 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
523 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
529 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
530 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
532 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
533 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
534 pub enum FailureCode {
535 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
536 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
537 TemporaryNodeFailure,
538 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
539 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
540 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
541 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
542 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
543 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
544 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
545 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
546 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
547 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
549 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
550 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
551 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
554 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
555 fn into(self) -> u16 {
557 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
558 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
559 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
560 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
565 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
566 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
567 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
568 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
569 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
571 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
572 err: msgs::LightningError,
573 closes_channel: bool,
574 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
576 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
578 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
580 err: LightningError {
582 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
583 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
589 closes_channel: false,
590 shutdown_finish: None,
594 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
595 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
598 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
599 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
600 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
601 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
602 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
603 // commitment upon reconnecting.
604 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
606 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
609 err: LightningError { err, action },
610 closes_channel: true,
611 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
615 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
618 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
620 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
621 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
625 log_level: Level::Warn,
628 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
630 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
632 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
634 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
635 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
642 closes_channel: false,
643 shutdown_finish: None,
647 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
652 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
653 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
654 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
655 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
656 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
658 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
659 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
660 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
661 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
662 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
663 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
664 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
666 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
670 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
671 struct ClaimingPayment {
673 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
674 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
675 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
676 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
678 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
679 (0, amount_msat, required),
680 (2, payment_purpose, required),
681 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
682 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
683 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
686 struct ClaimablePayment {
687 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
688 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
689 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
692 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
693 struct ClaimablePayments {
694 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
695 /// failed/claimed by the user.
697 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
698 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
700 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
701 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
702 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
704 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
705 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
706 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
707 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
710 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
711 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
712 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
713 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
715 enum BackgroundEvent {
716 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
717 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
718 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
719 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
721 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
722 /// are regenerated on startup.
723 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
724 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
725 /// channel to continue normal operation.
727 /// In general this should be used rather than
728 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
729 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
730 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
732 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
733 /// are regenerated on startup.
734 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
735 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
736 funding_txo: OutPoint,
737 channel_id: ChannelId,
738 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
740 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
741 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
743 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
744 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
745 channel_id: ChannelId,
750 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
751 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
752 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
753 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
754 /// event can be generated.
755 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
756 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
757 /// operation of another channel.
759 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
760 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
761 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
762 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
764 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
765 event: events::Event,
766 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
768 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
769 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
770 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
772 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
773 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
774 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
775 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
776 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
778 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
779 /// stored for later processing.
780 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
781 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
782 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
783 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
784 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
788 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
789 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
790 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
791 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
792 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
793 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
794 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
795 (4, blocking_action, required),
796 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
797 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
798 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
800 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
801 (0, event, upgradable_required),
802 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
803 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
804 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
805 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
806 // downgrades to prior versions.
807 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
811 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
812 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
813 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
814 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
815 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
816 channel_id: ChannelId,
819 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
820 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
821 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
822 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
823 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
824 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
825 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
829 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
830 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
831 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
832 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
833 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
834 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
836 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
837 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
838 channel_id: ChannelId,
839 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
844 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
845 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
846 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
847 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
848 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
853 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
854 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
858 /// State we hold per-peer.
859 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
860 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
862 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
863 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
864 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
866 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
867 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
868 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
869 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
870 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
871 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
872 latest_features: InitFeatures,
873 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
874 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
875 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
876 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
877 /// user but which have not yet completed.
879 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
880 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
881 /// for a missing channel.
882 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
883 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
884 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
886 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
887 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
888 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
889 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
891 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
892 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
893 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
894 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
895 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
896 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
897 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
898 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
899 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
900 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
901 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
902 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
903 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
904 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
905 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
909 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
910 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
911 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
912 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
913 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
914 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
917 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
919 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
920 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
924 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
927 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
928 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
931 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
932 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
933 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
936 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
937 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
938 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
939 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
943 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
944 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
945 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
946 /// The original OpenChannel message.
947 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
948 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
949 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
952 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
953 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
954 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
956 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
957 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
959 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
962 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
963 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
964 struct PendingInboundPayment {
965 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
966 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
967 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
968 /// this payment being removed.
970 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
971 user_payment_id: u64,
972 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
973 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
974 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
977 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
978 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
979 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
980 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
981 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
982 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
983 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
984 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
986 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
987 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
988 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
996 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
999 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
1000 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1001 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1006 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1007 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1008 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1009 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1010 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1011 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1012 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1013 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1014 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1016 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1017 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1018 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1027 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1030 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1031 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1032 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1037 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1039 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1041 pub trait AChannelManager {
1042 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1043 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1044 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1045 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1046 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1047 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1048 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1049 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1050 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1051 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1052 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1053 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1054 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1055 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1056 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1057 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1058 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1059 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1060 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1061 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1062 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1063 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1064 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1065 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1066 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1067 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1068 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1069 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1070 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1071 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1072 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1073 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1074 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1075 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1076 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1077 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1080 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1081 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1083 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1084 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1085 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1086 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1087 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1088 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1092 type Watch = M::Target;
1094 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1096 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1098 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1100 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1101 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1103 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1105 type Router = R::Target;
1107 type Logger = L::Target;
1109 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1112 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1113 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1115 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1116 /// to individual Channels.
1118 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1119 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1120 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1121 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1123 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1124 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1125 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1126 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1127 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1128 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1129 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1130 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1131 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1133 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1134 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1135 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1137 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1138 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1139 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1140 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1141 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1143 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1144 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1145 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1146 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1148 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1149 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1150 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1152 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1153 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1154 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1155 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1156 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1158 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1159 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1160 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1161 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1162 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1163 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1164 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1165 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1168 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1169 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1170 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1171 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1172 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1176 // `pending_offers_messages`
1178 // `total_consistency_lock`
1180 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1182 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1184 // |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1186 // |__`per_peer_state`
1188 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1190 // |__`claimable_payments`
1192 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1196 // |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1198 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1200 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1204 // |__`pending_events`
1206 // |__`pending_background_events`
1208 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1210 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1211 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1212 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1213 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1214 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1215 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1219 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1220 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1221 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1227 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1229 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1231 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1232 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1234 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1235 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1236 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1237 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1239 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1240 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1242 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1243 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1244 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1245 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1246 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1247 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1248 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1249 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1251 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1253 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1254 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1256 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1258 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1259 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1260 /// and via the classic SCID.
1262 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1263 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1265 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1267 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1269 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1270 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1271 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1273 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1274 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1276 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1278 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1279 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1280 /// and via the classic SCID.
1282 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1283 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1285 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1286 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1288 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1289 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1291 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1292 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1294 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1295 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1296 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1297 /// active channel list on load.
1299 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1300 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1302 /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1304 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1305 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1306 /// the handling of the events.
1308 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1309 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1312 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1313 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1314 /// would break backwards compatability.
1315 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1316 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1317 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1319 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1321 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1323 pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1325 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1327 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1328 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1329 /// confirmation depth.
1331 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1332 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1333 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1335 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1337 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1339 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1341 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1343 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1345 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1346 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1347 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1349 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1350 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1352 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1353 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1354 /// keeping additional state.
1355 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1357 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1358 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1359 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1360 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1362 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1363 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1365 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1366 /// are currently open with that peer.
1368 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1369 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1372 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1374 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1375 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1376 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1377 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1378 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1380 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1381 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1382 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1383 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1384 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1386 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1387 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1389 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1390 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1391 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1392 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1393 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1395 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1396 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1398 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1399 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1400 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1401 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1402 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1404 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1406 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1408 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1409 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1410 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1411 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1412 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1413 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1414 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1415 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1416 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1417 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1418 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1420 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1421 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1422 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1424 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1426 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1427 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1429 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1433 signer_provider: SP,
1438 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1440 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1441 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1442 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1443 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1444 pub struct ChainParameters {
1445 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1446 pub network: Network,
1448 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1450 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1451 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1454 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1458 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1459 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1462 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1463 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1464 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1465 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1466 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1467 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1469 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1470 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1471 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1472 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1473 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1474 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1476 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1477 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1480 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1481 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1482 /// events to handle.
1484 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1485 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1487 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1488 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1491 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1492 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1493 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1494 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1496 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1497 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1498 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1499 should_persist: move || {
1500 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1501 // processing and return that.
1502 let notify = persist_check();
1503 match (notify, force_notify) {
1504 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1505 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1506 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1507 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1508 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1511 _read_guard: read_guard,
1515 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1516 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1517 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1518 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1519 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1520 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1522 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1523 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1524 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1525 should_persist: persist_check,
1526 _read_guard: read_guard,
1531 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1532 fn drop(&mut self) {
1533 match (self.should_persist)() {
1534 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1535 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1536 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1538 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1539 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1540 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1545 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1546 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1548 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1550 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1551 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1552 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1553 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1554 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1556 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1557 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1559 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1561 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1562 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1563 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1564 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1565 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1566 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1567 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1568 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1569 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1570 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1571 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1572 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1573 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1575 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1576 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1578 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1579 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1580 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1581 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1583 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1584 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1585 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1586 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1587 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1588 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1590 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1592 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1593 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1595 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1597 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1598 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1600 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1601 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1602 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1604 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1605 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1606 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1608 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1609 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1610 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1611 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1613 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1614 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1615 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1617 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1618 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1619 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1621 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1622 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1623 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1624 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1625 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1626 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1627 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1628 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1629 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1630 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1631 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1634 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1635 /// to better separate parameters.
1636 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1637 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1638 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1639 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1640 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1641 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1642 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1643 pub features: InitFeatures,
1644 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1645 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1646 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1648 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1650 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1651 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1652 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1653 /// payments to us through this channel.
1654 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1655 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1656 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1657 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1658 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1659 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1660 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1663 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1664 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1665 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1666 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1667 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1668 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1669 /// lifetime of the channel.
1670 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1671 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1672 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1673 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1674 /// our counterparty already.
1675 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1676 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1678 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1679 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1680 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1681 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1683 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1684 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1686 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1687 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1689 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1690 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1691 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1692 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1693 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1694 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1695 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1696 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1697 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1700 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1702 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1703 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1704 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1705 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1706 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1707 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1708 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1710 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1711 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1713 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1714 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1715 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1716 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1717 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1718 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1719 /// this value on chain.
1721 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1723 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1725 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1726 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1727 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1728 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1729 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1730 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1731 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1733 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1734 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1735 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1736 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1737 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1738 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1740 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1741 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1742 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1743 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1744 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1746 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1747 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1748 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1749 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1751 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1752 pub balance_msat: u64,
1753 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1754 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1755 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1756 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1758 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1760 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1761 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1762 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1763 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1764 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1765 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1766 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1767 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1769 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1770 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1771 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1772 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1773 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1774 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1775 /// route which is valid.
1776 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1777 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1778 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1779 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1780 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1781 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1783 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1784 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1785 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1786 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1787 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1788 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1789 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1790 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1791 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1793 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1795 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1796 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1797 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1798 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1799 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1801 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1802 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1803 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1804 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1805 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1806 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1807 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1809 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1810 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1811 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1812 pub is_outbound: bool,
1813 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1814 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1815 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1816 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1817 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1819 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1820 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1821 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1822 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1823 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1824 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1825 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1827 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1828 pub is_usable: bool,
1829 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1830 pub is_public: bool,
1831 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1832 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1833 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1834 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1835 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1836 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1838 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1839 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1840 /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
1842 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1843 pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
1844 /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
1846 /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
1847 pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
1850 impl ChannelDetails {
1851 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1852 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1853 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1855 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1856 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1857 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1858 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1861 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1862 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1863 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1865 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1866 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1867 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1868 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1871 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1872 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1873 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1876 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1877 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1879 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1880 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1881 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1883 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1884 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1885 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1886 features: latest_features,
1887 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1888 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1889 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1890 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1891 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1892 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1893 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1894 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1895 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1896 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1898 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1899 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1900 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1901 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1902 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1903 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1904 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1905 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1906 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1907 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1908 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1909 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1910 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1911 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1912 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1913 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1914 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1915 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1916 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1917 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1918 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1919 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1920 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1921 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1922 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1923 config: Some(context.config()),
1924 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1925 pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
1926 pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
1931 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1932 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1933 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1934 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1935 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1936 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1937 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1938 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1939 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1941 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1943 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1944 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1946 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1947 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1948 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1949 /// to drop the channel.
1953 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1954 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1955 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1956 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1957 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1959 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1960 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1961 payment_id: PaymentId,
1963 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1965 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1966 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1967 payment_id: PaymentId,
1968 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1970 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1971 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1972 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1975 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1976 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1977 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1979 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1980 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1981 payment_id: PaymentId,
1982 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1983 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1984 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1986 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1987 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1988 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1990 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1991 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1992 payment_id: PaymentId,
1993 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1994 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1998 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2000 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2002 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2003 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2004 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2005 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2007 pub phantom_scid: u64,
2008 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2009 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2012 macro_rules! handle_error {
2013 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2014 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2015 // entering the macro.
2016 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2017 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2021 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2022 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
2024 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2025 let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2026 let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2027 let logger = WithContext::from(
2028 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2030 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2032 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2033 if let Some(update) = update_option {
2034 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2039 log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2042 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2044 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2045 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2046 action: err.action.clone()
2050 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
2051 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2052 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2053 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2054 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2058 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2065 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2066 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2067 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2068 $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2070 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2071 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2072 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2074 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2075 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2076 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2077 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2078 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2080 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2081 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2083 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2087 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2088 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2089 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2091 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2092 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2094 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2095 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2097 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2098 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2099 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2100 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2101 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2102 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2104 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2109 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2110 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2112 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2113 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2115 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2116 match $channel_phase {
2117 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2118 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2120 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2121 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2123 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2124 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2126 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2127 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2128 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2130 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2131 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2132 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2138 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2139 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2143 let key = *$entry.key();
2144 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2146 $entry.remove_entry();
2154 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2155 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2159 let key = *$entry.key();
2160 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2162 $entry.remove_entry();
2170 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2171 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2173 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2174 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2180 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2181 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2182 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2183 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2184 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2186 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2187 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2188 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2189 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2190 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2191 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2192 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2193 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2194 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2195 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2200 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2201 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2202 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2203 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2204 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2205 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2206 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2207 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2208 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2209 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2211 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2216 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2217 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2218 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2219 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2220 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2221 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2222 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2223 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2224 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2226 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2231 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2232 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2233 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2234 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2235 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2236 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2237 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2238 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2239 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2240 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2241 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2242 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2244 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2245 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2246 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2252 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2253 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2255 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2256 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2257 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2258 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2259 updates.announcement_sigs);
2260 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2261 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2264 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2265 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2266 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2267 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2269 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2270 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2271 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2272 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2273 let mut batch_completed = false;
2274 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2275 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2276 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2277 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2279 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2280 channel_state.2 = true;
2282 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2284 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2286 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2289 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2290 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2291 if batch_completed {
2292 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2293 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2294 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2295 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2296 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2297 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2298 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2299 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2300 chan.set_batch_ready();
2301 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2302 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2306 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2307 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2308 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2313 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2315 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2316 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2318 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2319 $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2321 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2322 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2323 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2324 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2329 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2330 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2331 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2332 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2334 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2335 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2336 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2337 panic!("{}", err_str);
2339 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2340 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2341 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2344 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2350 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2351 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2352 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2354 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2355 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2356 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2357 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2358 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2359 // filter for uniqueness here.
2360 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2361 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2362 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2363 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2365 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2366 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2368 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2369 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2370 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2376 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2377 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2378 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2379 while !processed_all_events {
2380 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2387 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2388 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2389 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2391 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2392 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2393 result = $self.process_background_events();
2395 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2396 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2397 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2398 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2402 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2403 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2404 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2405 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2408 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2410 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2411 $event_to_handle = event;
2413 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2414 post_event_actions.push(action);
2419 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2420 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2421 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2422 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2423 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2424 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2427 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2428 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2429 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2430 processed_all_events = false;
2434 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2435 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2436 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2438 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2439 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2440 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2446 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2448 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2449 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2450 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2452 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2453 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2457 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2459 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2461 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2462 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2464 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2466 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2467 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2468 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2471 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2472 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2473 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2475 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2476 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2477 current_timestamp: u32,
2479 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2480 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2481 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2482 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2484 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2485 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2486 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2491 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2493 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
2494 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2495 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2496 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2497 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2498 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
2499 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2500 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
2501 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2503 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2506 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2507 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2509 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2511 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2513 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
2515 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2516 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2517 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2518 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2519 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2520 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2521 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2522 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2524 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2534 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2535 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2536 &self.default_configuration
2539 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2540 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2541 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2544 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2545 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2547 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2549 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2553 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2558 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2560 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2561 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2562 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2563 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2564 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2566 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2567 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2569 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2570 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2571 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2573 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2574 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2575 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2577 /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2578 /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2580 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2581 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2582 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2583 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2584 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2585 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2587 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2588 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2589 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2590 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2591 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2595 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2596 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2597 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2599 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2601 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2602 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2604 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2606 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2607 if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2608 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2613 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2614 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2615 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2616 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2617 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2618 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2622 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2627 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2629 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2630 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2631 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2633 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2635 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2638 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2641 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2642 node_id: their_network_key,
2645 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2648 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2649 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2650 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2651 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2652 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2653 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2654 // the same channel.
2655 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2657 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2658 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2659 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2660 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2661 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2662 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2663 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2664 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2665 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2669 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2670 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2671 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2679 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2680 /// more information.
2681 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2682 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2683 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2684 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2685 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2686 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2687 // the same channel.
2688 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2690 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2691 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2692 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2693 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2694 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2695 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2696 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2697 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2705 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2706 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2708 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2709 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2711 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2712 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2713 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2714 // really wanted anyway.
2715 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2718 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2719 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2720 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
2721 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2723 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2724 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2725 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2726 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2727 let context_to_details = |context| {
2728 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2730 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2732 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2733 .map(context_to_details)
2739 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2740 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2742 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2743 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2744 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2746 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2747 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2748 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2749 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2750 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2751 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2753 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2754 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2755 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2757 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2758 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2759 payment_id: *payment_id,
2760 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2761 total_msat: *total_msat,
2764 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2765 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2767 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2768 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2770 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2775 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2776 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2778 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2779 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2782 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2784 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2785 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2787 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2788 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2790 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2791 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2792 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2793 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2794 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2795 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2796 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2797 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2799 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2800 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2801 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2802 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2803 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2807 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2808 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2810 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2811 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2812 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2813 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2816 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2817 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2820 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2821 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2823 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2824 channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2831 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2832 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2833 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2834 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2837 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2838 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2844 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2845 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2846 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2848 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2849 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2851 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2852 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2853 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2854 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2856 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2858 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2859 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2860 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2863 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2864 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2865 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2866 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2867 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2868 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2871 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2872 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2873 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2875 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2876 /// the channel being closed or not:
2877 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2878 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2879 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2880 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2881 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2882 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2883 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2885 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2886 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2887 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2888 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2890 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2892 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2893 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2894 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2897 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2898 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2899 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2900 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2901 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2904 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2905 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2906 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2907 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2908 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2911 let logger = WithContext::from(
2912 &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2915 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2916 shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2917 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2918 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2919 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2920 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2921 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2923 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2924 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2925 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2926 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2927 // ignore the result here.
2928 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2930 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2931 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2932 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2933 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2934 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2935 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2936 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2937 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2938 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2939 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2940 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2941 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2944 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2947 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2948 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2953 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2954 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2955 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2956 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2957 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2958 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2959 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2960 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2963 if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2964 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2965 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2969 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2970 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2974 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2975 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2976 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2977 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2978 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2979 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2980 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2981 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2982 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2983 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2984 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2986 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2988 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2989 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2990 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2991 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2992 mem::drop(peer_state);
2993 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2995 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2996 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2997 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2999 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3000 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3001 // Unfunded channel has no update
3002 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3004 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3005 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3006 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3007 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3008 // Unfunded channel has no update
3009 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3012 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3013 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3014 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3015 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3017 (None, *peer_node_id)
3019 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3022 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3023 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
3024 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
3025 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3026 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3027 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
3028 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
3029 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3030 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3036 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3039 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3040 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3041 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3042 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3044 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3045 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3046 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3047 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3048 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3049 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3050 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3061 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3062 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3063 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3065 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3066 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3067 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3070 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3071 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3072 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3074 /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3075 /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3076 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3077 -> Result<(), APIError> {
3078 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3081 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3082 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3083 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3084 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3085 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3089 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3090 /// local transaction(s).
3091 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3092 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3093 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3097 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3098 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3100 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3102 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3103 msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3106 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3107 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3108 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3109 intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3115 macro_rules! return_err {
3116 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3119 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3120 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3122 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3123 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3124 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3125 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3126 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3127 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3128 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3132 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3133 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3134 } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3135 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3136 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3137 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3138 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3139 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3145 let NextPacketDetails {
3146 next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3147 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3148 Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3149 // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3150 None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3153 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3154 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3155 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3156 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3157 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3158 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3159 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3160 // phantom or an intercept.
3161 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3162 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3163 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3167 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3170 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3172 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3173 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3174 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3175 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3176 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3178 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3179 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3180 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3181 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3184 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3185 // have no consistency guarantees.
3186 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3190 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3191 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3192 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3193 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3194 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3196 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3197 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3198 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3199 // we don't have the channel here.
3200 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3202 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3204 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3205 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3206 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3207 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3208 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3209 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3210 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3211 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3212 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3213 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3214 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3216 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3219 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3220 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3222 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3223 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3230 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3232 if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3233 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3235 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3236 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3237 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3238 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3239 break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3241 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3242 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3248 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3249 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3250 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3251 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3253 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3254 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3256 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3257 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3258 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3260 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3261 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3262 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3263 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3264 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3265 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3266 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3270 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3272 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3275 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3276 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3277 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3278 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3279 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3280 macro_rules! return_err {
3281 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3283 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3284 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3285 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3286 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3287 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3288 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3289 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3290 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3291 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3295 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3296 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3297 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3298 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3299 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3305 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3307 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3308 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3309 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3310 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3313 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3314 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3315 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3316 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3317 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3319 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3322 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3323 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3324 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3325 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3326 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3332 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3333 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3334 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3336 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3337 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3338 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3340 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3341 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3342 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3343 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3344 return Err(LightningError {
3345 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3346 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3349 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3350 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3352 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3353 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3354 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3357 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3358 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3359 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3360 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3362 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3363 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3364 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3366 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3367 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3368 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3369 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3370 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3371 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3372 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3376 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3379 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3380 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3381 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3382 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3384 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3385 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3386 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3387 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3388 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3391 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3392 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3394 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3395 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3396 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3397 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3398 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3399 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3400 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3401 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3403 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3404 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3405 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3407 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3409 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3416 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3417 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3418 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3419 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3424 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3425 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3426 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3429 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3430 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3431 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3432 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3434 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3435 &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3436 payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3438 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3439 log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3443 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3444 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3446 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3447 log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3448 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3450 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3453 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3455 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3456 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3458 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3459 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3460 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3461 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3462 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3463 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3464 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3465 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3466 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3467 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3469 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3470 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3471 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3472 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3474 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3475 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3477 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3478 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3479 Some(monitor_update) => {
3480 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3482 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3483 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3484 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3485 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3486 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3487 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3488 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3496 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3499 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3500 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3501 // `channel_by_id` map.
3502 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3503 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3507 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3508 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3510 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3515 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3517 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3518 /// fields for more info.
3520 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3521 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3523 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3525 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3526 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3527 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3528 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3529 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3531 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3532 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3533 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3534 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3535 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3537 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3538 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3539 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3540 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3542 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3544 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3545 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3546 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3548 /// In general, a path may raise:
3549 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3550 /// node public key) is specified.
3551 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3552 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3553 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3554 /// relevant updates.
3556 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3557 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3558 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3560 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3561 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3562 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3563 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3564 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3565 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3566 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3567 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3568 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3569 self.pending_outbound_payments
3570 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3571 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3572 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3575 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3576 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3577 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3578 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3579 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3580 self.pending_outbound_payments
3581 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3582 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3583 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3584 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3588 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3589 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3590 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3591 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3592 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3593 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3597 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3598 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3599 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3603 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3604 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3607 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3608 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3609 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3610 self.pending_outbound_payments
3611 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3612 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3613 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3614 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3615 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3619 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3620 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3621 /// retries are exhausted.
3623 /// # Event Generation
3625 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3626 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3628 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3629 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3630 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3632 /// # Requested Invoices
3634 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3635 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3636 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3637 /// once the invoice has been received.
3639 /// # Restart Behavior
3641 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3642 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3643 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3645 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3646 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3647 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3648 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3651 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3652 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3653 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3654 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3655 /// never reach the recipient.
3657 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3658 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3660 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3661 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3663 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3664 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3665 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3666 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3667 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3668 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3669 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3672 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3673 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3675 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3678 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3679 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3680 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3681 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3682 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3683 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3684 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3685 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3688 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3689 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3690 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3691 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3692 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3693 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3694 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3695 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3696 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3699 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3702 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3703 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3706 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3707 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3709 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3710 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3711 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3712 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3713 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3714 let payment_params =
3715 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3717 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3719 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3722 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3723 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3725 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3726 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3727 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3728 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3730 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3731 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3732 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3733 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3734 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3735 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3736 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3737 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3738 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3739 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3741 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3742 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3743 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3744 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3748 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3750 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3751 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3754 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3756 let mut res = Vec::new();
3758 for mut path in route.paths {
3759 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3760 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3761 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3762 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3763 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3766 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3769 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3770 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3772 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3774 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3775 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3780 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3783 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3788 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3789 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3790 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3792 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3793 let used_liquidity =
3794 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3796 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3797 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3799 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3802 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3807 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3808 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3809 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3816 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3817 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3818 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3819 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3820 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3821 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3822 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3823 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3824 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3826 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3827 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3829 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3830 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3831 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3833 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3834 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3835 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3836 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3837 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3838 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3839 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3840 } else { unreachable!(); });
3842 Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3843 Err((chan, err)) => {
3844 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3845 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3846 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3847 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3848 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3854 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3855 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3857 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3858 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3861 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3862 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3863 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3867 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3868 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3869 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3873 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3874 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3875 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3877 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3878 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3879 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3880 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3881 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3883 "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3884 funding_txo, o.get()
3886 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3887 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3888 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3889 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3890 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3891 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3894 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3901 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3902 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3903 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3907 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3909 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3910 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3912 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3913 /// across the p2p network.
3915 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3916 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3918 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3919 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3920 /// keys per-channel).
3922 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3923 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3924 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3926 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3927 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3928 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3930 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3931 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3932 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3933 /// for more details.
3935 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3936 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3937 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3938 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3941 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3943 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3944 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3946 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3947 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3948 /// signature for each channel.
3950 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3951 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3953 let mut result = Ok(());
3955 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3956 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3957 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3958 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3959 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3964 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3965 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3966 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3970 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3971 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3972 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3973 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3974 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3975 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3976 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3977 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3979 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3980 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3985 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3986 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3987 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3988 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3992 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3993 match states.entry(txid) {
3994 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3995 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3996 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4000 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4003 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4004 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4005 temporary_channel_id,
4006 counterparty_node_id,
4007 funding_transaction.clone(),
4010 let mut output_index = None;
4011 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4012 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4013 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4014 if output_index.is_some() {
4015 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4016 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4019 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4022 if output_index.is_none() {
4023 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4024 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4027 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4028 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4029 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4030 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4031 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4032 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4038 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4039 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4040 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4041 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4042 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4043 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4044 .into_iter().flatten()
4045 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4047 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4048 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4050 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4052 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4053 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4054 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4055 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4056 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4058 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4059 let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4060 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4064 mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4065 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4066 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4072 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4074 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4075 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4076 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4077 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4079 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4080 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4082 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4083 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4085 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4087 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4088 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4089 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4090 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4091 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4092 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4093 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4094 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4095 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4096 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4097 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4098 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4099 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4103 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4104 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4105 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4106 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4107 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4108 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4109 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4110 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4111 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4112 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4116 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4117 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4118 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4119 config.apply(config_update);
4120 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4123 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4124 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4125 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4126 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4127 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4128 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4135 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4136 debug_assert!(false);
4137 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4139 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4140 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4147 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4149 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4150 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4151 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4152 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4154 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4155 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4157 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4158 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4160 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4162 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4163 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4164 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4165 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4166 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4167 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4168 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4169 pub fn update_channel_config(
4170 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4171 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4172 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4175 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4176 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4178 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4179 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4181 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4182 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4183 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4184 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4185 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4187 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4188 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4189 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4192 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4195 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4196 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4197 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4198 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4199 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4200 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4201 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4203 let next_hop_scid = {
4204 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4205 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4206 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4207 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4208 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4209 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4210 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4211 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4212 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4213 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4216 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4218 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4219 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4220 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4223 let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4224 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4225 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4226 log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4227 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4234 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4235 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4236 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4239 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4240 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4241 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4242 onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4245 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4247 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4248 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4249 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4250 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4251 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4254 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4255 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4256 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4257 payment.prev_channel_id,
4258 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4259 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4261 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4265 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4266 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4268 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4271 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4272 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4273 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4275 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4276 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4277 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4280 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4281 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4282 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4283 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4284 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4285 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4286 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4287 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4288 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4289 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4292 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4293 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4294 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4295 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4300 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4302 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4303 /// Will likely generate further events.
4304 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4305 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4307 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4308 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4309 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4311 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4312 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4314 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4315 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4316 let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4317 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4319 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4320 match forward_info {
4321 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4322 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4323 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4324 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4325 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4328 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4329 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4330 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
4331 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4333 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4334 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4335 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4336 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4337 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4338 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4339 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4340 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4341 blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4344 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4345 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4347 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4350 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4351 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4357 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4358 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4360 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4364 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4365 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4367 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4371 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4372 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4373 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4374 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4375 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4376 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4377 payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4380 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4381 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4382 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4383 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4384 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4386 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4388 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4389 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4393 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4394 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4395 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4396 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4397 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4398 current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4400 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4401 Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4407 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4410 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4413 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4414 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4415 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4416 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4417 // problem, not ours.
4423 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4424 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4425 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4427 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4431 forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4432 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4433 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4434 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4435 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4440 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4441 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4442 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4443 let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4444 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4445 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4446 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4447 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4448 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4449 onion_packet, blinded, ..
4450 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4453 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4454 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4455 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4456 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4457 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4458 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4459 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4460 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4461 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4462 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4463 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4465 let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4466 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4467 Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4468 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4469 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4470 &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4473 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4474 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4475 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4478 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4479 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4481 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4483 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4484 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4485 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4486 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4492 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4493 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4495 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4496 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4497 Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4499 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4500 log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4501 let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4502 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4504 Some((res, htlc_id))
4507 if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4508 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4509 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4510 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4512 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4514 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4515 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4516 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4522 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4526 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4527 match forward_info {
4528 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4529 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
4530 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4531 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4532 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4535 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4536 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4537 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4538 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4539 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4541 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4542 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4543 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4544 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4545 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4547 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
4548 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
4549 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4551 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4552 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4556 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4557 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4560 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4563 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4564 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4565 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4566 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4567 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4568 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4569 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4570 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4571 phantom_shared_secret,
4574 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4575 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4576 // if routing nodes overpay
4577 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4578 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4580 total_value_received: None,
4581 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4584 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4587 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4589 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4590 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4591 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4592 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4593 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4594 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
4596 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4597 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4598 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4599 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
4600 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4601 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4602 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4603 phantom_shared_secret,
4606 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4607 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4609 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4612 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4613 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4614 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4615 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4616 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4619 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4620 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4621 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4622 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4623 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4624 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4626 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4627 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4628 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4630 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4631 .entry(payment_hash)
4632 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4633 .or_insert_with(|| {
4634 committed_to_claimable = true;
4636 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4639 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4640 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4641 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4642 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4644 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4645 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4646 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4648 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4649 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4650 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4653 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4655 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4656 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4657 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4658 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4659 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4660 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4661 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4663 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4664 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4666 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4668 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4669 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4670 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4671 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4672 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4673 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4675 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4676 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4677 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4678 committed_to_claimable = true;
4680 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4681 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4682 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4683 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4684 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4685 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4686 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4687 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4688 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4692 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4693 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4694 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4695 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4696 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4698 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4700 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4701 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4703 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4704 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4705 committed_to_claimable = true;
4708 payment_claimable_generated
4712 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4713 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4714 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4715 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4716 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4717 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4718 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4719 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4720 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4721 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4722 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4723 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4724 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4725 Ok(result) => result,
4727 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4728 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4731 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4732 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4733 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4734 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4735 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4736 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4739 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4740 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4741 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4743 check_total_value!(purpose);
4745 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4746 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4747 check_total_value!(purpose);
4751 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4752 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4753 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4754 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4756 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4757 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4758 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4759 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4760 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4761 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4762 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4763 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4765 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4766 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4767 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4769 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4770 if payment_claimable_generated {
4771 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4777 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4778 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4786 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4787 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4788 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4789 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4791 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4792 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4794 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4796 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4797 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4798 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4800 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4802 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4803 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4804 events.append(&mut new_events);
4807 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4809 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4810 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4811 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4813 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4815 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4816 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4817 if background_events.is_empty() {
4818 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4821 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4823 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
4824 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4825 // monitor updating completing.
4826 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4828 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
4829 let mut updated_chan = false;
4831 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4832 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4833 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4834 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4835 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4836 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4837 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4838 updated_chan = true;
4839 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4840 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4842 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4845 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4850 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4851 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4854 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4855 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4856 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4857 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4858 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4859 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4860 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4862 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4863 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4864 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4865 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4866 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4872 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4875 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4876 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4877 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4878 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4879 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4882 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4883 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4885 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4887 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4888 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4889 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4891 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4892 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4893 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4894 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4896 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4897 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4899 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4900 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4904 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4905 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4906 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4907 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4908 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4909 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4910 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4912 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4913 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4915 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4916 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4917 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4918 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4919 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4920 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4922 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4927 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4928 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4936 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4938 /// This currently includes:
4939 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4940 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4941 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4943 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4944 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4945 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4946 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4947 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4948 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4949 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4950 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4952 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4953 /// estimate fetches.
4955 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4956 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4957 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4958 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4959 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4961 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4962 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4964 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4965 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4966 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4967 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4969 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4970 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4971 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4972 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4973 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4974 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4976 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4977 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4978 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4980 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4981 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4982 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4983 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4984 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4985 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4986 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4987 channel_id: *chan_id,
4988 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4999 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5000 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5001 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5002 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5003 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5004 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5005 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5007 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5008 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5013 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5014 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5016 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5017 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5018 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5019 if needs_close { return false; }
5022 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5023 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5024 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5025 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5026 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5027 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5028 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5029 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5031 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5032 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5033 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5034 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5038 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5040 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5043 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5045 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5046 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5047 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5048 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5052 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5054 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5060 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5062 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5063 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5064 log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5065 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5066 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5067 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5068 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5069 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5070 channel_id: *chan_id,
5071 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5079 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5080 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5081 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5083 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5084 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5085 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5087 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5088 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5089 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5090 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5092 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5093 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5094 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5095 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5100 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5101 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5102 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5103 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5104 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5105 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5106 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5107 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5108 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5114 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5116 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5117 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5122 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5123 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5124 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5125 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5126 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5127 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5128 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5129 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5130 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5131 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5132 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5133 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5134 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5135 // have no channels to the peer.
5136 let remove_entry = {
5137 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5138 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5141 entry.remove_entry();
5144 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5149 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5150 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5151 // This should be unreachable
5152 debug_assert!(false);
5155 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5156 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5157 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5158 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5159 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5160 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5161 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5164 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5165 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5166 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5168 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5169 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5176 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5177 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5178 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5179 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5180 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5183 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5184 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5187 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5188 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5191 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5192 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5193 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5194 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5195 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5196 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5197 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5200 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5201 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5204 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5205 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5206 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5207 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5208 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5215 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5216 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5217 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5219 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5220 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5221 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5222 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5224 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5225 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5226 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5227 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5228 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5229 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5232 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5233 /// reason for the failure.
5235 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5236 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5237 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5239 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5240 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5241 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5242 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5243 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5244 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5245 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5250 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5251 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5252 match failure_code {
5253 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5254 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5255 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5256 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5257 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5258 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5260 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5261 let fail_data = match data {
5262 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5265 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5270 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5271 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5273 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5275 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5276 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5277 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5278 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5279 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5280 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5281 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5283 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5285 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5286 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5288 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5293 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5294 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5295 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5296 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5297 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5298 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5299 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5300 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5301 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5302 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5304 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5305 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5306 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5307 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5309 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5310 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5311 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5312 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5313 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5317 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5318 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5319 // be surfaced to the user.
5320 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5321 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5322 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5324 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5325 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5326 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5327 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5328 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5329 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5330 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5331 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5332 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5334 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5335 debug_assert!(false);
5336 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5339 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5341 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5344 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5345 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5346 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5347 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5351 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5352 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5353 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5354 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5355 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5356 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5357 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5358 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5359 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5360 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5363 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5364 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5365 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5368 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5369 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5370 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5372 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5373 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5374 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5375 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5376 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5378 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5379 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5380 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
5383 WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
5384 "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5385 if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5387 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5388 Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5389 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5390 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5391 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5393 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5395 Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5396 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5398 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5399 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5403 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5404 incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5406 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5410 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5411 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5412 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5413 push_forward_ev = true;
5415 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5416 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5417 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5419 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5420 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5423 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5424 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5425 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5426 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5427 prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
5428 failed_next_destination: destination,
5434 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5435 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5437 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5438 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5439 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5440 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5442 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5443 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5444 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5445 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5447 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5448 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5449 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5451 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5452 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5453 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5454 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5455 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5456 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5457 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5458 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5459 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5462 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5463 /// even type numbers.
5467 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5468 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5470 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5471 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5472 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5475 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5476 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5481 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5482 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5483 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5484 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5485 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5486 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5487 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5488 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5493 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5494 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5495 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5496 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5497 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5499 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5500 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5501 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5505 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5506 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5507 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5508 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5509 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5510 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5511 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5512 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5513 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5514 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5515 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5524 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5526 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5527 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5528 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5529 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5530 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5531 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5532 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5533 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5534 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5535 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5536 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5537 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5538 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5539 debug_assert!(false);
5543 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5545 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5546 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5547 debug_assert!(false);
5551 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5552 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5554 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5555 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5556 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5557 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5560 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5561 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5562 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5563 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5567 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5568 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
5569 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5570 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5571 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5572 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5573 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5576 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5577 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5578 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5579 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5580 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5581 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5586 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5587 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5588 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
5589 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5590 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5591 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5592 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5594 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5597 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5598 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5599 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5600 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5604 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5605 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5606 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5607 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5609 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5610 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5611 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5612 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5614 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5615 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5616 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5617 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5620 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5621 let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
5622 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5623 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5627 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5628 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5629 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5632 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5633 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5634 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5635 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5636 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5637 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5638 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5639 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5642 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5643 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5644 log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5646 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5649 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5650 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5652 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5653 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5654 // monitor update as a background event.
5655 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5656 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5657 counterparty_node_id,
5658 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5659 channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
5660 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5664 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5665 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5670 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5672 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5674 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
5675 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5676 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5677 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5678 blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
5680 (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
5682 debug_assert!(false,
5683 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5686 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5687 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5688 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5689 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5690 .get_mut(&channel_id)
5692 let mut found_blocker = false;
5693 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5694 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5695 // which case we need to only remove the one
5696 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5697 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5698 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5699 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5701 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5704 debug_assert!(false);
5713 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5714 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5715 counterparty_node_id: None,
5716 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5719 channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
5723 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5724 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5725 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5726 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5727 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5728 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5729 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5730 // again on restart.
5731 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
5732 "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5733 payment_preimage, update_res);
5736 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5737 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5739 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5740 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5741 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5742 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5743 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5744 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5745 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5746 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5747 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5748 prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
5751 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5752 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5753 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5754 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5755 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5756 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5760 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5761 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5764 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5765 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
5766 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
5767 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
5770 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5771 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5772 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5773 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5774 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5776 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5777 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
5778 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5780 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5781 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5784 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5785 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
5786 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
5787 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5788 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5789 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5790 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5791 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5792 let chan_to_release =
5793 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5794 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
5796 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5797 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5798 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5799 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5804 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5805 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5806 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5807 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5808 // in the background.
5809 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5810 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5811 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5812 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5814 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5815 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5816 funding_txo, update, ..
5818 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5819 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5820 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5821 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5823 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5829 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5830 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5831 (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
5833 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5834 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5836 monitor_update.updates[0],
5837 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5842 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5843 // immediately once we get going.
5844 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5847 *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
5849 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5852 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5853 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5854 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5855 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5856 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5857 downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
5858 blocking_action: other_chan.3,
5862 let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5863 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5864 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5867 debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
5868 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
5869 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5870 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5871 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5872 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
5873 prev_user_channel_id,
5874 next_user_channel_id,
5875 total_fee_earned_msat,
5877 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5878 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5880 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5884 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5885 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5886 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5892 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5893 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5894 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5897 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5898 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5899 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5900 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5902 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5904 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5905 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5906 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5908 payment_purpose: purpose,
5911 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5913 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5917 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5919 sender_intended_total_msat,
5923 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5924 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5926 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5927 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5928 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
5931 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5932 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
5934 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5935 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5936 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5937 downstream_channel_id,
5938 Some(blocking_action),
5945 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5946 /// update completion.
5947 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5948 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5949 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5950 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
5951 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5952 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5953 -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
5954 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5955 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5956 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5957 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5958 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5959 pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
5960 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5961 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5962 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5964 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5965 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
5967 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5968 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5969 htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
5970 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5972 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
5973 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
5974 decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
5977 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5978 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5980 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5981 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5982 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5987 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5988 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5989 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5990 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5995 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5996 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5997 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5998 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5999 msg: revoke_and_ack,
6004 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6008 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6014 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6015 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6016 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6020 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6021 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6022 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6025 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6028 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6029 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6031 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6032 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6034 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6035 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6036 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6037 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6038 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6043 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6044 let mut peer_state_lock;
6045 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6046 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6047 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6048 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6050 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6053 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6054 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6055 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6056 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6057 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6060 let remaining_in_flight =
6061 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6062 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6065 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6066 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6067 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6068 remaining_in_flight);
6069 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6072 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6075 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6077 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6078 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6081 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6082 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6083 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6085 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6086 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6087 /// used to accept such channels.
6089 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6090 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6091 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6092 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6095 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6096 /// it as confirmed immediately.
6098 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6099 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6100 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6102 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6103 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6105 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6106 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6108 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6109 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6111 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6112 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6113 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6114 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6117 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6119 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6120 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6122 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6123 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6124 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6125 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6127 let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6128 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6130 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6132 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6133 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6134 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6136 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6137 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6138 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6140 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6141 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6142 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6143 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6144 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6145 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6146 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6149 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6150 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6152 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6158 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6159 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6160 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6161 Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6163 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6167 Ok(mut channel) => {
6169 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6170 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6171 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6172 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6173 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6174 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6175 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6178 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6179 let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6180 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6182 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6184 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6185 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6186 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6187 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6188 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6189 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6190 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6191 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6194 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6195 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6196 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6198 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6202 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6203 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6204 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6206 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6207 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6208 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6211 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6218 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6219 /// or 0-conf channels.
6221 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6222 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6223 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6224 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6225 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6226 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6228 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6229 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6230 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6231 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6232 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6233 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6234 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6238 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6241 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6242 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6244 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6245 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6247 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6248 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6249 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6250 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6251 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6253 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6256 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6257 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6258 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6261 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6262 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6263 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
6264 // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
6265 // included in the unfunded count.
6266 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6267 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
6268 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6271 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6272 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6275 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
6276 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6277 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6278 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6283 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6286 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6287 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6288 // likely to be lost on restart!
6289 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6290 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
6291 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6294 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6295 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
6296 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6299 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6300 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6301 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6302 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6303 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6305 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6306 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6308 debug_assert!(false);
6309 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6310 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
6311 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6313 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6314 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6316 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6317 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6318 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6319 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6320 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6321 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6323 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6324 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6325 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6328 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6329 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6330 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6331 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6332 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6335 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
6336 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6338 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6339 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
6340 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6343 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6344 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6345 let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6346 &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6348 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6350 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6351 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6352 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6353 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6354 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
6355 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6358 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6359 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6360 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6365 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6366 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6367 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6368 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6369 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6370 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6371 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6374 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6379 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6380 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6381 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6382 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
6383 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6385 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6387 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
6388 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6391 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6392 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6394 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6395 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6396 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6398 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6402 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6403 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6404 // likely to be lost on restart!
6405 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6406 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6407 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6409 debug_assert!(false);
6410 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
6412 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6413 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6414 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
6415 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6416 match phase.get_mut() {
6417 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6418 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6419 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6422 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
6426 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
6429 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6430 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6431 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
6432 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6433 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6435 user_channel_id: user_id,
6440 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6441 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6443 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6444 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6446 debug_assert!(false);
6447 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6450 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6451 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6452 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6453 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6454 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6455 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6456 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6458 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6459 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6460 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6461 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6462 debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6463 // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6464 // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6465 // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6466 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6470 Some(mut phase) => {
6471 let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6472 let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6473 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6475 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6478 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6480 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6481 // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6482 // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6483 // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6484 // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6485 // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6487 let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6488 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6489 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6492 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6494 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6496 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6497 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6498 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6499 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6500 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6502 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6503 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6504 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6505 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6506 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6508 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6509 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6510 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6511 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6512 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6513 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6514 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6519 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6520 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6521 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6523 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6527 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6528 log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6529 fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6537 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6538 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6539 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6540 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6542 debug_assert!(false);
6543 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6546 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6547 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6548 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6549 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6550 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6551 let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6552 let logger = WithContext::from(
6554 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6555 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6558 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6560 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6561 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6562 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6563 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6564 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6565 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6566 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6567 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6568 } else { unreachable!(); }
6571 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6572 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6573 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6574 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6575 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6576 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6577 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6581 debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6582 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6583 // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6584 // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6585 // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6586 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6590 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6593 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6597 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6598 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6599 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6600 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6601 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6603 debug_assert!(false);
6604 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6606 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6607 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6608 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6609 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6610 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6611 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6612 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6613 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6614 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6615 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6616 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6617 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6618 msg: announcement_sigs,
6620 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6621 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6622 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6623 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6624 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6625 // announcement_signatures.
6626 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6627 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6628 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6629 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6636 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6637 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6642 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6643 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6646 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6647 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6652 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6653 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6654 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6656 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6657 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6659 debug_assert!(false);
6660 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6662 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6663 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6664 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6665 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6667 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6668 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6669 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6670 log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6672 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6675 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6676 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6677 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6678 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6680 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6681 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6682 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6683 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6684 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6685 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6689 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6690 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6691 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6692 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6695 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6696 let context = phase.context_mut();
6697 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6698 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6699 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6700 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6702 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
6703 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
6704 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
6705 let context = phase.context_mut();
6706 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6707 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6708 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6712 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6715 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6716 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6717 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6718 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6720 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6721 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6727 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6729 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6731 debug_assert!(false);
6732 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6734 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6735 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6736 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6737 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6738 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6739 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6740 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6741 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6742 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6743 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6744 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6749 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6750 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6751 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6752 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6753 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6754 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6755 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6757 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6758 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6761 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6764 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6765 let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6766 log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6767 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6769 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6770 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6771 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6772 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6773 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6778 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6779 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6780 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6785 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6786 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6787 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6788 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6790 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6791 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6792 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6793 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6795 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6796 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6798 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6800 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6802 debug_assert!(false);
6803 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6805 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6806 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6807 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6808 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6809 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6810 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6811 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6812 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6813 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6814 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6816 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6818 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6819 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6820 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6821 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6822 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6823 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6824 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6825 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6829 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6830 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6831 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6832 match pending_forward_info {
6833 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6834 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6836 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6837 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6838 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6839 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6840 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6842 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6843 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6844 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6845 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6846 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6849 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6851 _ => pending_forward_info
6854 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6855 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6857 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6858 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6861 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6866 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6868 let next_user_channel_id;
6869 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
6870 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6871 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6873 debug_assert!(false);
6874 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6876 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6877 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6878 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6879 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6880 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6881 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6882 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6883 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6885 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6887 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6888 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6889 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6891 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6892 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6893 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6894 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6895 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6896 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6897 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6898 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
6901 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6902 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6905 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6908 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
6909 Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
6910 funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
6916 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6917 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6918 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6919 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6920 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6922 debug_assert!(false);
6923 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6925 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6926 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6927 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6928 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6929 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6930 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6932 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6933 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6936 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6941 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6942 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6943 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6944 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6945 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6947 debug_assert!(false);
6948 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6950 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6951 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6952 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6953 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6954 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6955 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6956 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6958 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6959 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6961 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6962 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6966 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6970 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6971 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6972 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6974 debug_assert!(false);
6975 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6977 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6978 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6979 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6980 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6981 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6982 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6983 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6984 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6985 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6986 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6987 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6991 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6992 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6995 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6999 fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7000 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7001 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7002 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7003 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7004 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7009 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7010 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7011 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7012 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7013 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7014 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7015 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7016 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7017 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7018 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7019 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7021 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7022 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7024 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7025 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7026 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7027 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7028 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7029 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7031 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7032 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7033 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7035 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7036 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7037 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7038 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7039 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7040 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7041 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7042 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7043 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7046 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7047 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7049 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7050 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7051 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7052 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7053 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7054 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7055 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7056 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7057 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7058 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7059 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7060 blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7063 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7064 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7065 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7070 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7071 // payments are being processed.
7072 if forward_htlcs_empty {
7073 push_forward_event = true;
7075 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7076 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7083 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7084 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7087 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7088 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7089 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7091 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7095 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7096 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7097 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7098 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7099 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7101 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7102 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7103 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7104 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7105 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7106 // real by taking more time.
7107 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7108 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7109 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7114 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7115 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7116 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7117 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7118 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7119 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7120 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7122 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7123 .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7124 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7125 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7126 channel_funding_outpoint,
7128 counterparty_node_id,
7133 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7134 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7135 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7137 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7138 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7139 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7140 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7142 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7143 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7144 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7150 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7151 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7152 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7153 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7155 debug_assert!(false);
7156 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7157 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7158 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7159 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7160 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7161 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7162 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7163 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7164 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7165 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7166 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7167 *counterparty_node_id)
7169 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7170 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7171 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7172 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7173 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7174 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7175 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7179 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7180 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7183 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7186 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7190 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7191 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7192 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7194 debug_assert!(false);
7195 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7197 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7198 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7199 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7200 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7201 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7202 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7203 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7205 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7206 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7209 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7214 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7215 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7216 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7218 debug_assert!(false);
7219 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7221 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7222 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7223 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7224 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7225 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7226 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7227 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7230 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7231 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7232 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
7233 msg, &self.default_configuration
7234 ), chan_phase_entry),
7235 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7236 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7237 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7240 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7241 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7244 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7249 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7250 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7251 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7252 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7254 // It's not a local channel
7255 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7258 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7259 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7260 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7261 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7263 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7264 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7265 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7266 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7267 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7268 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7269 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7270 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7271 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7272 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7273 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7275 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7277 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7278 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7279 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7280 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7282 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7283 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7284 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7285 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7288 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7292 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7293 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7296 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7298 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7301 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7302 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7303 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7305 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7307 debug_assert!(false);
7308 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7309 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7313 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7314 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7315 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7316 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7317 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7318 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7319 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7320 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7321 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7322 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7323 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7324 msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7325 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7326 let mut channel_update = None;
7327 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7328 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7329 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7332 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7333 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7334 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7335 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7336 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7337 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7338 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7343 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7344 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7345 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7346 Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7347 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
7348 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
7349 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7350 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7354 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7355 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7358 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7359 log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7361 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7362 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7363 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7364 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7365 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7366 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7368 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7369 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7370 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7371 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7372 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7373 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7374 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7375 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7376 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7377 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7378 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7379 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7380 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7381 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7382 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7383 next_funding_txid: None,
7386 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7387 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7388 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7394 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7395 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7397 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
7400 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7401 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7402 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7404 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7405 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7406 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7407 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7408 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7409 match monitor_event {
7410 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7411 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
7412 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7413 log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7414 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
7415 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
7416 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
7418 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7419 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
7420 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7421 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7424 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
7425 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7426 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7428 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7429 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7430 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7431 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7434 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7435 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7436 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7437 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7438 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7439 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7440 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
7441 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7442 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
7445 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
7447 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
7448 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7449 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7453 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7454 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7455 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7456 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
7464 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
7465 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7471 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7472 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7475 has_pending_monitor_events
7478 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7479 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7480 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7482 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7484 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7487 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7488 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7489 /// update was applied.
7490 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7491 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7492 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7494 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7495 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7496 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7497 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7499 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7500 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7502 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7503 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7504 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7505 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7507 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7508 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7509 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7510 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7511 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7512 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7514 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7515 has_monitor_update = true;
7517 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7518 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7519 continue 'peer_loop;
7528 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7529 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7530 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7536 /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7537 /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7539 /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7540 /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7542 /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7543 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7544 pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7547 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7548 let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7550 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7551 let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7552 if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7553 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7558 if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7559 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7564 if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7565 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7568 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7569 if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7570 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7576 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7580 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7581 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7582 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7583 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7584 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7585 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7586 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7590 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7591 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7592 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7593 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7594 unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7600 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7601 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7602 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7603 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7604 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7605 let mut has_update = false;
7606 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7608 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7610 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7611 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7612 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7613 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7614 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7616 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7617 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7618 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7619 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7620 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7622 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7623 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7626 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7627 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7628 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7630 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7631 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7632 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7633 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7634 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7639 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7640 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7641 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7647 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7648 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7653 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7659 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7660 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7663 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7664 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7670 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7671 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7673 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7674 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7675 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7676 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7677 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7678 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7679 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7680 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7681 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7682 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7683 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7684 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7685 assert!(should_broadcast);
7686 } else { unreachable!(); }
7687 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7688 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7689 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
7692 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7697 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7698 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7699 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7700 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7704 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7705 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7706 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7707 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7708 /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7710 /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7714 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7719 /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7721 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7723 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7724 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7725 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7726 &$self, description: String
7727 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7728 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7729 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7730 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7731 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7733 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7734 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7735 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7737 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7744 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
7745 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7746 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7750 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7751 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7753 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7754 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7755 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7758 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7759 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7760 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7762 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7763 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7767 /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7768 /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7769 /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7770 /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7771 /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7773 /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7777 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7778 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7783 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7784 /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7785 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7787 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7789 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7790 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7791 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7792 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7793 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7794 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7795 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7796 ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7797 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
7798 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
7799 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
7800 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
7802 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7803 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7804 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7806 .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
7807 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7810 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
7812 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7813 $self.pending_outbound_payments
7814 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7815 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7817 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7823 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7825 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
7826 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7827 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7828 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7829 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7830 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7834 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7835 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
7836 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
7837 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
7840 create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7842 create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
7844 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7845 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7846 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7848 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7849 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7850 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7851 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7852 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7853 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7854 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7856 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7857 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7861 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7862 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7865 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7866 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7867 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7871 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7872 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7873 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7874 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7878 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7879 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7880 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7885 /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7886 /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7887 /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
7888 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7891 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7892 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7893 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7894 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7895 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7896 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7897 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7898 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7899 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7900 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7901 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7902 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7903 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7904 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7905 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7907 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
7908 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7910 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7912 let builder = match quantity {
7914 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7916 let builder = match amount_msats {
7918 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7920 let builder = match payer_note {
7922 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7924 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7925 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7927 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7929 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7930 self.pending_outbound_payments
7931 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7932 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7934 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7936 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7937 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7938 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7939 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7940 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7943 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7945 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7946 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7947 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7948 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7949 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7950 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7951 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7952 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7953 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7955 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7962 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7965 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7966 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7967 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7971 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7972 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7973 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7974 /// received and no retries will be made.
7979 /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
7980 /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
7983 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7984 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7985 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7986 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7987 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7989 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7990 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7992 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
7993 return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
7996 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7998 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7999 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8000 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8001 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8003 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8004 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8005 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8007 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8008 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8009 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8011 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8012 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8013 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8015 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8016 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8017 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8018 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8020 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8021 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8022 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8023 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
8024 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8027 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8029 for path in refund.paths() {
8030 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8031 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8032 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8033 Some(reply_path.clone()),
8035 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8041 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8045 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8048 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8049 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8051 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8052 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8053 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8054 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8056 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8058 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8059 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8063 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8064 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8066 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8068 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8069 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8071 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8072 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8073 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8074 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8075 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8076 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8077 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8078 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8079 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8080 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8081 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8084 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8085 /// stored external to LDK.
8087 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8088 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8089 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8091 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8092 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8095 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8096 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8097 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8098 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8100 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8101 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8102 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8103 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8104 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8106 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8107 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8108 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8109 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8110 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8112 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8113 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8115 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8116 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8120 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8121 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8123 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8125 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8126 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8128 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8129 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8130 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8131 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8132 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8133 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8134 min_final_cltv_expiry)
8137 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8138 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8140 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8141 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8142 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8145 /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8147 /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8148 fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8149 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8150 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8152 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8154 .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8155 .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8156 .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8159 .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8160 .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8163 /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8164 /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8165 fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8166 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8167 ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8168 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8170 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8171 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8172 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8173 + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8174 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8176 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8178 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8181 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
8182 payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
8186 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
8187 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
8189 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8190 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8191 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8192 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8194 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8195 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8196 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
8197 Some(_) => continue,
8198 None => return scid_candidate
8203 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
8205 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
8206 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
8208 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
8209 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
8210 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
8214 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8215 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8216 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8218 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8219 /// times to get a unique scid.
8220 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8221 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8222 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8224 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8225 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8226 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8227 return scid_candidate
8231 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8232 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8233 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8234 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8236 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8237 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8238 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8239 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8240 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8241 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8243 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8244 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8245 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8254 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8255 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8256 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8257 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8258 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8262 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8263 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8264 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8265 events.push_back((event, None));
8269 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8270 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8271 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8275 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8276 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8280 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8281 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8284 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8285 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8286 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8287 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8288 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
8289 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
8290 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8292 let logger = WithContext::from(
8293 &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
8296 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8297 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8298 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8299 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8300 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8301 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8302 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8303 .get_mut(&channel_id)
8305 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8309 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8310 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
8311 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8312 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8313 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8314 log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8319 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
8321 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8322 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8323 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8324 log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8326 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8327 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8328 if further_update_exists {
8329 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8334 log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8341 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8342 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8348 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8349 for action in actions {
8351 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8352 channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
8354 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8360 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8361 /// using the given event handler.
8363 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8364 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8368 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8372 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8374 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8375 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8376 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8377 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8378 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8379 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8383 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8384 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8385 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8386 /// is always placed next to each other.
8388 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8389 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8390 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8391 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8393 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8394 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8395 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8396 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8397 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8398 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8399 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8401 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8402 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8403 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8404 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8407 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8408 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8410 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8411 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8414 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8415 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8416 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8417 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8418 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8419 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8420 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8424 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8425 events.replace(pending_events);
8434 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8436 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8437 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8438 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8439 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8440 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8441 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8445 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8447 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8448 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8449 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8451 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8455 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8457 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8458 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8459 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8460 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8461 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8466 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8468 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8469 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
8470 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8471 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
8472 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8475 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8476 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8479 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8480 let _persistence_guard =
8481 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8482 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8483 let new_height = height - 1;
8485 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8486 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
8487 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8488 assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
8489 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8490 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8493 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8497 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8499 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8500 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8501 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8502 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8503 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8504 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8508 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8509 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8510 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8511 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8513 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8514 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8516 let _persistence_guard =
8517 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8518 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8519 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8520 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8522 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
8523 if height < last_best_block_height {
8524 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8525 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8529 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8530 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8531 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8532 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8534 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8535 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8537 let _persistence_guard =
8538 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8539 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8540 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8542 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8544 macro_rules! max_time {
8545 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8547 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8548 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8549 // having an explicit local time source.
8550 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8551 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8552 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8553 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8554 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8560 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8561 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8562 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8563 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8567 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8568 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8569 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8570 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8571 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8572 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8573 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8574 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8575 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8576 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8577 res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8584 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8585 let _persistence_guard =
8586 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8587 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8588 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8589 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8590 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8591 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8592 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8593 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8598 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8600 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8601 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8602 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8603 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8604 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8605 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8609 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8610 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8612 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8613 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8614 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8615 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8616 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8618 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8619 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8621 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8622 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8623 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8624 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8625 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8626 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8628 // Retain unfunded channels.
8629 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8630 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
8631 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8632 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
8633 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8634 let res = f(channel);
8635 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8636 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8637 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8638 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8639 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8641 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8642 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8643 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8644 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8645 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8646 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8647 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8648 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8653 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8658 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8659 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8662 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8663 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8664 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8665 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8666 msg: announcement_sigs,
8668 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8669 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8670 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8672 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8673 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8674 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8679 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8680 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8681 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8682 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8683 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8684 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8685 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8686 // is always consistent.
8687 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8688 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8689 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8690 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8691 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8694 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8695 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8696 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8697 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8698 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8699 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8700 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8701 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8705 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8706 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8707 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8708 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8709 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8710 data: reason_message,
8723 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8724 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8725 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8726 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8727 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8728 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8729 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8730 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8731 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8732 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8734 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8735 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8736 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8740 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8743 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8744 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8745 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8746 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8747 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8748 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8749 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8750 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8751 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8752 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8753 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
8754 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8757 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8758 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8759 _ => unreachable!(),
8761 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8762 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8763 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8764 let logger = WithContext::from(
8765 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
8767 log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8773 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8775 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8776 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8780 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8781 /// may have events that need processing.
8783 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8784 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8786 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8787 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8788 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8789 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8792 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8793 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8794 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8797 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8798 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8799 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8802 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8803 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8804 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8805 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8808 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8809 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8810 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8811 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8814 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8815 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8817 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8818 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8819 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8820 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8821 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8824 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8825 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8826 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8827 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8830 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8831 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8832 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8833 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8836 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8837 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8838 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8839 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8842 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8843 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8844 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8845 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8849 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8850 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8852 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8853 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8854 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8855 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8856 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8857 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8861 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8862 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8863 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8864 // change to the contents.
8865 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8866 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8867 let persist = match &res {
8868 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8869 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8870 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8872 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8874 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8879 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8880 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8881 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8882 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8885 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8886 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8887 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8888 // change to the contents.
8889 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8890 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8891 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8895 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8896 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8897 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8898 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8901 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8902 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8903 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8906 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8907 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8908 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8911 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8912 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8913 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8914 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8915 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8916 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8917 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8918 let persist = match &res {
8919 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8920 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8922 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8927 fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8928 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8929 "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8930 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8933 fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8934 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8935 "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8936 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8939 fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8940 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8941 "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8942 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8945 fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8946 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8947 "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8948 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8951 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8952 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8953 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8956 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8957 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8958 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8961 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8962 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8963 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8964 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8965 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8966 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8967 let persist = match &res {
8968 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8969 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8970 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8972 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8977 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8978 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8979 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8982 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8983 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8984 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8985 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8986 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8987 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8988 let persist = match &res {
8989 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8990 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8991 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8993 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8998 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8999 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9000 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9001 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9002 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9003 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9004 let persist = match &res {
9005 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9006 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9007 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9009 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9014 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9015 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9016 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9019 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9020 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9021 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9024 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9025 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9026 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9027 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9028 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9029 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9030 let persist = match &res {
9031 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9032 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9033 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9035 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9040 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9041 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9042 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9045 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9046 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9047 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9050 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9055 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9056 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9057 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9058 let persist = match &res {
9059 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9060 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9061 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9063 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9068 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9069 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9070 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9071 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9072 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9075 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9076 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9077 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9079 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9080 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9081 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9082 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9083 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9084 let context = match phase {
9085 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9086 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9087 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9088 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9093 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9094 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9095 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9098 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9099 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9102 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9103 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9106 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9107 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9111 // Clean up for removal.
9112 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9113 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9116 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9117 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9118 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9119 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9121 // V1 Channel Establishment
9122 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9123 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9124 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9125 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9126 // V2 Channel Establishment
9127 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9128 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9129 // Common Channel Establishment
9130 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9131 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9133 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9135 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9136 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9137 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9138 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9139 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9140 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9141 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9142 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9143 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9144 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9145 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9146 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9147 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9148 // Channel Operations
9149 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9150 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9151 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9152 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9153 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9154 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9156 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9157 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9158 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
9159 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9160 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9161 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
9162 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
9163 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
9164 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
9167 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
9168 peer_state.is_connected = false;
9169 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
9170 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
9173 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
9175 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
9177 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
9178 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
9182 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
9183 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
9184 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
9185 log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9189 let mut res = Ok(());
9191 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9192 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
9193 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
9194 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
9195 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
9196 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
9197 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
9200 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9201 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
9202 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
9203 if inbound_peer_limited {
9205 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9207 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
9208 channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9209 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
9210 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
9211 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9212 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9213 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9214 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9218 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
9219 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
9220 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
9222 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9223 if inbound_peer_limited &&
9224 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
9225 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
9228 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9231 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9232 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9237 log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9239 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9240 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9241 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9242 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9243 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9245 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9247 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9248 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9249 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9250 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9251 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9255 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
9256 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9257 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9258 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
9262 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9263 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9264 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9265 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9266 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9267 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
9271 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
9272 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9273 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9274 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9275 debug_assert!(false);
9278 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
9279 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9280 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
9281 // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
9282 // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
9283 // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
9284 debug_assert!(false);
9290 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9291 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9296 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9297 match &msg.data as &str {
9298 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9299 "link failed to shutdown" =>
9301 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9302 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9303 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9304 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9305 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9306 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9307 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9308 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9309 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9311 || -> NotifyOption {
9312 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9313 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9314 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
9315 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9316 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9317 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9318 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9319 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9323 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9324 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9325 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9326 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9327 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9328 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9330 log_level: Level::Trace,
9333 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
9334 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
9335 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9337 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
9346 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9348 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9349 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9350 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9351 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9352 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9353 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9354 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9355 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9356 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9357 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9358 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9360 for channel_id in channel_ids {
9361 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9362 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9366 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9367 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9368 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9369 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9370 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9371 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9372 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9373 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
9374 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9375 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9376 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9382 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9383 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
9384 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9385 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
9386 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9392 None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
9393 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9394 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
9398 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9399 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9403 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9404 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9407 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9408 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9411 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9412 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9415 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9416 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9417 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9418 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9421 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9422 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9423 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9424 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9427 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9428 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9429 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9430 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9433 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9434 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9435 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9436 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9439 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9440 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9441 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9442 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9445 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9446 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9447 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9448 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9451 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9452 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9453 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9454 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9457 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9458 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9459 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9460 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9463 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9464 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9465 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9466 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9470 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9471 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9473 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9474 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9475 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9476 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9477 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9478 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9482 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9483 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9484 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9487 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9488 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9491 Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9492 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9494 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9495 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9497 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9498 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9502 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9503 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9504 Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9506 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9508 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9509 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9513 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9514 amount_msats, payment_secret
9516 Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9518 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9519 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9523 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9524 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9525 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9528 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9529 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9530 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9531 payment_paths, payment_hash
9533 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9534 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9535 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9537 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey>, _> =
9538 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9539 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9540 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9541 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9544 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
9545 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9546 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
9547 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9548 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9550 let builder: Result<InvoiceBuilder<ExplicitSigningPubkey>, _> =
9551 builder.map(|b| b.into());
9552 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9553 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9554 .and_then(|invoice| {
9556 let mut invoice = invoice;
9557 match invoice.sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
9558 self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
9560 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9561 Err(SignError::Signing) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9562 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9564 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9565 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9570 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9571 Err(error) => Some(error),
9575 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9576 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9578 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9580 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9581 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9584 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9585 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9586 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9593 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9594 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9600 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9601 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9605 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9606 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9607 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9608 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9609 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9613 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9614 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9616 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9617 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9618 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9619 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9620 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9623 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9624 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9625 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9626 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9629 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9630 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9631 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9632 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9635 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9636 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9637 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9638 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9641 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9642 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9643 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9644 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9645 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9646 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9647 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9648 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9649 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9650 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9651 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9652 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9653 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9654 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9655 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9656 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9657 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9658 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9659 features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9660 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9661 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9666 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9667 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9669 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9670 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9671 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9672 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9675 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9676 (2, node_id, required),
9677 (4, features, required),
9678 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9679 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9680 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9681 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9684 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9685 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9686 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9687 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9688 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9689 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9690 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9691 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9692 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9693 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9694 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9695 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9696 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9697 (7, self.config, option),
9698 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9699 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9700 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9701 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9702 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9703 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9704 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9705 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9706 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9707 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9708 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9709 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9710 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9711 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9712 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9713 (32, self.is_public, required),
9714 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9715 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9716 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9717 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9718 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9719 (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9720 (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9726 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9727 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9728 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9729 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9730 (2, channel_id, required),
9731 (3, channel_type, option),
9732 (4, counterparty, required),
9733 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9734 (6, funding_txo, option),
9735 (7, config, option),
9736 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9737 (9, confirmations, option),
9738 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9739 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9740 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9741 (16, balance_msat, required),
9742 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9743 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9744 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9745 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9746 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9747 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9748 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9749 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9750 (26, is_outbound, required),
9751 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9752 (30, is_usable, required),
9753 (32, is_public, required),
9754 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9755 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9756 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9757 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9758 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9759 (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9760 (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
9763 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9764 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9765 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9766 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9767 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9771 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9773 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9774 outbound_scid_alias,
9778 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9779 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9781 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9782 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9783 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9784 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9785 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9786 confirmations_required,
9788 force_close_spend_delay,
9789 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9790 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9791 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9792 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9793 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9794 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9795 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9796 channel_shutdown_state,
9797 pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9798 pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9803 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9804 (2, channels, required_vec),
9805 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9806 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9809 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9810 (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9811 (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9814 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9816 (0, onion_packet, required),
9817 (1, blinded, option),
9818 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9821 (0, payment_data, required),
9822 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9823 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9824 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9825 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9826 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9828 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9829 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9830 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9831 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9832 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9833 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9834 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9838 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9839 (0, routing, required),
9840 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9841 (4, payment_hash, required),
9842 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9843 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9844 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9845 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9849 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9850 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9852 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9854 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9855 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9856 reason.write(writer)?;
9858 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9859 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9862 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9863 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9864 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9865 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9872 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9873 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9874 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9877 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9878 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9879 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9880 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9884 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9885 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9886 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9887 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9888 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9891 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9892 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9893 // messages contained in the variants.
9894 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9895 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9896 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9898 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9899 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9900 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9901 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9902 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9905 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9906 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9907 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9908 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9909 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9911 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9916 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9921 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9922 (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9923 (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9926 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9927 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9928 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9929 (2, outpoint, required),
9930 (3, blinded_failure, option),
9931 (4, htlc_id, required),
9932 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9933 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9934 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
9935 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9936 (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
9939 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9940 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9941 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9942 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9943 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9945 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9946 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9947 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9948 (2, self.value, required),
9949 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9950 (4, payment_data, option),
9951 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9952 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9953 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9954 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9960 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9961 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9962 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9963 (0, prev_hop, required),
9964 (1, total_msat, option),
9965 (2, value_ser, required),
9966 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9967 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9968 (5, total_value_received, option),
9969 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9970 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9971 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9973 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9974 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9975 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9977 if payment_data.is_some() {
9978 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9980 if total_msat.is_none() {
9981 total_msat = Some(value);
9983 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9986 if total_msat.is_none() {
9987 if payment_data.is_none() {
9988 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9990 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9992 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9996 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9999 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10000 total_value_received,
10001 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10003 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10004 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10009 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10010 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10011 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10014 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10015 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10016 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10017 let mut payment_id = None;
10018 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10019 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10020 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10021 (0, session_priv, required),
10022 (1, payment_id, option),
10023 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10024 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10025 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10026 (6, blinded_tail, option),
10028 if payment_id.is_none() {
10029 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10031 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10033 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10034 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10035 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10037 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10038 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10039 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10040 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10044 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10045 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10046 first_hop_htlc_msat,
10048 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10051 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10052 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10057 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10058 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10060 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10061 0u8.write(writer)?;
10062 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10063 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10064 (0, session_priv, required),
10065 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10066 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10067 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10068 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10069 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10070 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10073 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10074 1u8.write(writer)?;
10075 field.write(writer)?;
10082 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10083 (0, forward_info, required),
10084 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10085 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10086 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10087 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10088 // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10089 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10090 (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10093 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10094 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10095 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10097 Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10101 Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10102 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10103 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10104 (0, htlc_id, required),
10105 (2, err_packet, required),
10108 Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10109 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10110 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10111 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10112 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10113 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10114 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10115 (0, htlc_id, required),
10116 (1, failure_code, required),
10117 (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10118 (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10126 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10127 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10128 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10130 0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10132 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10133 (0, htlc_id, required),
10134 (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10135 (2, err_packet, required),
10136 (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10138 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10139 Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10140 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10142 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10146 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10147 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
10151 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10156 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
10157 (0, payment_secret, required),
10158 (2, expiry_time, required),
10159 (4, user_payment_id, required),
10160 (6, payment_preimage, required),
10161 (8, min_value_msat, required),
10164 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10166 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10167 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10168 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10169 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10170 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10171 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10175 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10176 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
10178 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10180 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
10182 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
10183 best_block.height.write(writer)?;
10184 best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
10187 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
10189 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10190 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
10191 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10192 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10193 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10194 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10195 serializable_peer_count += 1;
10198 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
10199 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
10203 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
10205 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10206 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10207 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10208 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
10209 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
10210 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
10213 channel.write(writer)?;
10219 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10220 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10221 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
10222 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
10223 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10224 for forward in pending_forwards {
10225 forward.write(writer)?;
10230 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
10231 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10232 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
10233 decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
10236 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10238 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10239 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
10240 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
10242 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
10243 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
10244 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10245 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
10246 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
10247 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10248 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
10249 htlc.write(writer)?;
10251 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
10252 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
10255 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
10256 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
10257 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
10258 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
10259 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
10260 // per_peer_state lock at all.
10261 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
10264 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
10265 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10266 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
10267 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
10268 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
10270 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
10271 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
10272 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
10273 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
10274 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
10275 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
10276 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
10281 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
10282 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
10283 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
10284 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
10285 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
10286 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
10287 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
10288 // well save the space and not write any events here.
10289 0u64.write(writer)?;
10291 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10292 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
10293 event.write(writer)?;
10297 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
10298 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
10299 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
10300 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
10301 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
10302 0u64.write(writer)?;
10304 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
10305 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
10306 // likely to be identical.
10307 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10308 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
10310 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
10311 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
10312 hash.write(writer)?;
10313 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
10316 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10317 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10318 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10319 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10320 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10323 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10324 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10326 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10327 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10328 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10329 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10332 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10333 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10334 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10335 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10339 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10340 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
10341 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10343 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10344 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10345 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10351 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10352 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10353 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10354 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10357 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10358 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10359 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10360 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10361 pending_claiming_payments = None;
10364 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10365 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10366 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10367 if !updates.is_empty() {
10368 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
10369 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10374 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10375 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10376 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10377 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10378 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10379 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10380 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10381 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10382 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10383 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10384 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10385 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10386 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10387 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
10394 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10395 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10396 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10397 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10400 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10401 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10402 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10403 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10404 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10405 // check that the event is sane here.
10406 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10407 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10408 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10409 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10415 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10416 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10417 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10418 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10419 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10420 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10423 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10424 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10425 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10426 events.push_back((ev, action));
10427 } else if action.is_some() {
10428 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10435 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10436 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10437 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10438 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10439 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10440 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10443 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10445 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10447 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10448 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10449 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10450 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10451 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10452 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10453 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10454 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10455 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10456 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10457 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10458 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10459 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10461 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10462 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10464 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10465 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10467 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10468 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10469 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10470 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10471 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10472 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10474 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10475 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10477 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10478 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10479 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10480 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10481 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10482 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10486 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10487 pub entropy_source: ES,
10489 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10490 pub node_signer: NS,
10492 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10493 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10495 pub signer_provider: SP,
10497 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10499 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10500 pub fee_estimator: F,
10501 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10503 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10504 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10505 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10506 pub chain_monitor: M,
10508 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10509 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10510 /// force-closed during deserialization.
10511 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10512 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10513 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10515 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10517 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10518 /// deserialization.
10520 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10521 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10522 pub default_config: UserConfig,
10524 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10525 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10527 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10528 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10529 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10530 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10532 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10535 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10536 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10539 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10540 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10542 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10543 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10544 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10545 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10546 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10547 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10551 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10552 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10553 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10554 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10555 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10557 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10558 channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
10559 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
10565 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10566 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10567 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10568 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10570 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10571 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10572 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10573 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10574 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10575 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10579 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10580 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10581 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10585 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10586 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10588 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10589 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10590 ES::Target: EntropySource,
10591 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10592 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10593 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10597 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10598 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10600 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10601 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10602 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10604 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10606 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10607 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10608 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10609 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10610 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10611 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10612 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10613 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
10614 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10615 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10616 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10618 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10619 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10620 funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
10621 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10622 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10623 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10624 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10625 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10626 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10627 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10628 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10629 log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10630 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10631 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10632 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10634 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10635 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10636 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10638 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10639 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10640 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10642 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10643 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10644 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10646 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10647 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10648 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10650 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10651 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10652 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
10655 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10656 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10657 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10658 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10659 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10660 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10661 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10662 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10664 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10665 let mut found_htlc = false;
10666 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10667 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10670 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10671 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10672 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10673 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10674 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10675 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10676 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10678 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10679 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10680 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10684 log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10685 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10686 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10687 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10688 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10690 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10691 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10693 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10695 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10696 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10698 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10699 let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
10700 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10701 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10705 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10706 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10707 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10708 // safely discard the channel.
10709 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10710 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10711 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10712 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10713 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10714 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10715 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10716 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10719 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10720 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10721 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10722 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10723 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10724 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10728 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10729 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10730 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10731 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
10732 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10734 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10735 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10736 counterparty_node_id: None,
10737 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10738 channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
10740 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
10744 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10745 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10746 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10747 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10748 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10749 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10750 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10751 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10752 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10754 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10757 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10758 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10759 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10760 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10761 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10762 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10763 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10764 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10766 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10769 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10772 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10773 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10774 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10775 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10776 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10777 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10778 is_connected: false,
10782 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10783 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10784 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10785 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10786 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
10787 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10788 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10789 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10792 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10793 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10794 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10795 for _ in 0..event_count {
10796 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10797 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10802 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10803 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10804 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10806 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10807 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10808 // on-startup monitor updates.
10809 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10810 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10812 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10816 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10817 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10819 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10820 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10821 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10822 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10823 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10827 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10828 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10829 hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10830 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10831 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10832 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10833 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
10835 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10836 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10840 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10841 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10842 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10843 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
10844 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10845 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10846 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10847 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10848 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10849 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
10850 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10851 let mut events_override = None;
10852 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10853 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
10854 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10855 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10856 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10857 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10858 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10859 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10860 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10861 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10862 (8, events_override, option),
10863 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10864 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10865 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10866 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10867 (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
10869 let decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
10870 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10871 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10874 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10875 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10878 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10879 pending_events_read = events;
10882 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10883 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10886 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10887 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10888 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10889 let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
10890 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10891 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10893 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10895 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10896 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10897 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10900 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10901 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10902 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10903 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10904 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10906 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10907 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10908 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10910 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10911 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10912 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10913 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10914 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10916 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10917 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10918 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10919 log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10920 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
10921 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10922 pending_background_events.push(
10923 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10924 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10925 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10926 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10927 update: update.clone(),
10930 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10931 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10932 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10933 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10934 pending_background_events.push(
10935 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10936 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10937 channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
10940 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10941 log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10942 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10944 max_in_flight_update_id
10948 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10949 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10950 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10951 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10952 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10953 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10955 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10957 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10958 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10959 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10960 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10961 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10962 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10963 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10964 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10965 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10968 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10969 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10970 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10971 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10972 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10973 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10974 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10975 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10976 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10977 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10978 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10981 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10982 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10983 debug_assert!(false);
10984 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10989 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10990 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10991 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
10992 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
10993 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10994 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10995 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10996 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10997 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10998 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11000 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11001 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11002 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11004 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11005 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11006 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11007 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11008 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11009 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11010 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11011 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11016 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11017 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11019 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11020 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11021 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11022 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11025 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11026 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11027 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11028 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11029 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11030 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11031 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11033 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11034 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11035 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11036 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11037 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11038 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11039 if path.hops.is_empty() {
11040 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11041 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11044 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11045 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11046 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11047 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11048 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11049 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11050 log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11051 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11053 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11054 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11055 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11056 retry_strategy: None,
11057 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11058 payment_params: None,
11059 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11060 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11061 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11062 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11063 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11064 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11065 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11066 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11067 total_msat: path_amt,
11068 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11069 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11071 log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11072 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11077 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11078 match htlc_source {
11079 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11080 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11081 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11082 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11084 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11085 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11086 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11087 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11088 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11089 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11090 forwards.retain(|forward| {
11091 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11092 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11093 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11094 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11099 !forwards.is_empty()
11101 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11102 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11103 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11104 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11105 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11106 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11107 intercepted_id != ev_id
11114 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11115 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11116 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11117 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11118 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11119 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11120 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11121 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11122 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11123 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11124 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11126 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11127 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11128 channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11129 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11131 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11132 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11133 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11140 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
11141 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
11143 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
11145 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
11146 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
11147 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
11148 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
11149 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
11150 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
11151 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
11152 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
11153 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11154 monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
11157 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
11158 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
11159 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
11160 // channel still live case here.
11164 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
11165 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
11170 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
11171 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
11172 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
11173 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
11174 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
11175 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
11176 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
11177 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
11181 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
11182 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
11184 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
11185 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
11186 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11187 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11189 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
11190 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
11191 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11193 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
11194 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
11196 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11197 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
11199 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11202 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
11203 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11204 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11206 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11210 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
11211 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
11212 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
11213 if htlcs.is_empty() {
11214 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11216 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
11217 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
11218 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
11219 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
11220 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
11221 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
11222 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
11223 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
11225 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
11226 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11230 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
11232 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
11234 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
11235 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
11237 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
11238 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
11243 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11244 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11246 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
11248 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11250 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
11251 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
11252 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
11253 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11257 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
11258 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11259 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11260 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11261 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
11262 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11263 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11264 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
11265 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
11267 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
11268 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
11269 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
11271 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
11272 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
11273 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11274 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11275 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11276 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11278 if chan.context.is_usable() {
11279 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
11280 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
11281 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
11282 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
11283 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11287 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11288 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11289 debug_assert!(false);
11290 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11295 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
11297 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11298 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
11299 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
11300 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
11301 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
11302 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
11303 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
11304 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
11305 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
11306 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
11307 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
11309 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
11310 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
11312 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
11313 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
11314 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
11315 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
11317 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
11318 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
11319 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
11320 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
11322 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
11323 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
11324 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
11325 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
11327 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
11328 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11329 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11330 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11331 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11332 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11333 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11334 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11337 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11338 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11341 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11344 purpose: payment.purpose,
11345 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11346 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11347 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11353 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11354 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11355 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11356 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11357 for action in actions.iter() {
11358 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11359 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11360 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
11362 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
11364 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11365 blocked_channel_id);
11366 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11367 .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
11368 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11370 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11371 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11372 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11373 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11377 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11378 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11382 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11384 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11385 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11389 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11391 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11392 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11393 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11394 router: args.router,
11396 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11398 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11399 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11400 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11401 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11403 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11404 decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
11405 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11406 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11407 outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11408 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11409 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11411 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11413 our_network_pubkey,
11416 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11418 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11420 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11421 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11422 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11423 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11424 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11426 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11427 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11429 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11431 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11433 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11434 node_signer: args.node_signer,
11435 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11437 logger: args.logger,
11438 default_configuration: args.default_config,
11441 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11442 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11443 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11444 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11445 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11448 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11449 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11450 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11451 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11452 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
11453 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
11454 downstream_channel_id, None
11458 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11459 //connection or two.
11461 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11467 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11468 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11469 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11470 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11471 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11472 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11473 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11474 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11475 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11476 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11477 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11478 use crate::prelude::*;
11479 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11480 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11481 use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11482 use crate::util::test_utils;
11483 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11484 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11487 fn test_notify_limits() {
11488 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11489 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11490 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11491 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11492 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11493 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11495 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11496 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11497 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11498 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11499 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11501 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11503 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11504 // to connect messages with new values
11505 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11506 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11507 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11508 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11509 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11510 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11512 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11513 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11514 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11515 // ... but the last node should not.
11516 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11517 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11518 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11519 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11521 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11522 // about the channel.
11523 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11524 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11525 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11527 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11529 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11530 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11531 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11532 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11533 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11534 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11536 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11537 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11538 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11540 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11541 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11542 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11543 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11544 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11545 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11547 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11548 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11549 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11550 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11551 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11552 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11553 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11554 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11556 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11557 // the channel info has updated.
11558 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11559 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11560 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11561 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11562 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11563 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11567 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11568 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11570 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11571 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11572 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11573 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11574 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11576 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11577 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11578 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11579 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11581 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11582 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11583 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11584 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11585 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11586 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11587 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11588 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11589 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11590 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11591 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11592 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11594 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11595 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11596 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11597 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11598 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11599 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11600 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11601 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11602 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11603 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11604 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11605 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11606 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11607 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11608 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11609 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11610 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11611 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11612 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11613 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11614 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11615 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11616 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11618 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11619 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11620 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11621 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11622 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11623 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11624 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11626 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11627 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11628 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11629 // lightning messages manually.
11630 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11631 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11632 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11634 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11635 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11636 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11637 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11638 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11639 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11640 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11641 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11642 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11643 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11644 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11645 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11646 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11647 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11648 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11649 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11650 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11651 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11652 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11653 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11654 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11655 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11657 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11658 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11659 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11661 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11662 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11663 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11664 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11666 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11667 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11668 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11669 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11671 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11674 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11675 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11676 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11677 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11679 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11684 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11685 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11686 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11689 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11690 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11691 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11692 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11693 // fails as expected.
11694 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11695 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11696 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11697 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11698 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11699 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11700 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11701 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11702 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11703 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11704 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11705 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11706 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11707 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11708 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11710 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11711 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11712 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11714 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11715 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11716 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11717 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11718 let route = find_route(
11719 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11720 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11722 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11723 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11725 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11726 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11727 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11728 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11729 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11730 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11731 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11732 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11733 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11734 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11735 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11736 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11737 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11738 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11739 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11740 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11741 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11742 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11743 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11744 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11745 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11747 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11748 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11750 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11751 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11752 let route = find_route(
11753 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11754 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11756 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11757 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11758 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11759 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11760 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11761 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11762 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11763 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11765 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11766 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11767 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11768 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11770 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11771 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11772 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11773 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11774 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11775 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11776 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11777 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11778 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11779 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11780 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11781 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11782 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11783 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11784 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11785 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11786 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11787 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11788 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11790 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11791 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11793 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11794 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11795 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11796 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11797 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11798 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11799 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11800 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11801 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11802 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11804 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11805 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11806 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11809 let route = find_route(
11810 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11811 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11813 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11814 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11815 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11816 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11817 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11818 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11819 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11820 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11821 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11822 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11823 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11824 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11825 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11826 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11827 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11828 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11829 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11830 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11831 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11832 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11833 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11834 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11835 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11837 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11838 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11842 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11843 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11844 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11845 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11846 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11847 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11848 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11850 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11851 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11853 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11854 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11855 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11856 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11857 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11858 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11859 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11860 let route = find_route(
11861 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11862 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11865 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11866 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11867 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11868 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11869 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11870 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11871 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11873 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11874 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11875 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11876 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11877 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11878 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11879 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11881 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11885 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11886 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11887 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11888 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11889 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11890 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11891 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11892 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11893 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11895 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11896 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11898 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11899 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11900 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11901 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11902 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11903 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11904 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11905 let route = find_route(
11906 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11907 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11910 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11911 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11912 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11913 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11914 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11915 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11916 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11917 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11918 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11920 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11921 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11922 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11923 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11924 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11925 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11926 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11928 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11932 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11933 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11934 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11935 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11936 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11938 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11939 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11940 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11941 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11943 // Marshall an MPP route.
11944 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11945 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11946 route.paths.push(path);
11947 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11948 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11949 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11950 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11951 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11952 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11954 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11955 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11957 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11958 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11960 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11965 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11966 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11967 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11968 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11969 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11971 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11973 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11974 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11976 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11977 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11978 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11979 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11982 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11983 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11984 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11985 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11986 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11987 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11990 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11993 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11994 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11999 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12000 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12001 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12002 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12003 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12004 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12006 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12007 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12009 total_msat: 100_000,
12012 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12013 // payment verification fails as expected.
12014 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12015 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12016 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12017 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12019 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12023 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12024 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12028 fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12029 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12030 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12031 // the channel is successfully closed.
12032 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12033 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12034 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12035 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12037 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12038 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12039 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12040 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12041 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12043 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12044 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12046 // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12047 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12048 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12049 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12052 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12054 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12055 // as it has the funding transaction.
12056 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12057 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12058 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12061 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12063 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12065 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12067 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12068 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12069 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12071 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12074 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12075 // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12076 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12077 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12078 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12080 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12081 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12082 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12084 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12085 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
12086 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
12087 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
12089 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12090 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
12091 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12092 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
12094 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12095 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
12097 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
12098 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
12099 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
12100 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
12101 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12102 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12103 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12107 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
12108 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
12109 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
12110 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
12111 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12112 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12113 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12116 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
12118 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
12119 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
12120 // closing transaction).
12121 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
12122 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
12123 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12125 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
12126 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
12127 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12128 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12129 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12132 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12134 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
12136 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
12137 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
12138 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12140 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12142 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12143 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
12146 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12147 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
12148 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12151 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
12152 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
12153 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12156 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
12157 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
12158 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12161 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12162 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
12163 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
12166 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
12168 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
12169 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12171 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
12172 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
12174 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
12175 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
12180 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
12181 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
12182 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
12183 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
12184 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12185 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12186 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12187 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12190 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12191 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
12192 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
12194 // Test the API functions.
12195 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
12197 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
12199 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12201 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12203 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
12205 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
12207 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
12211 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
12212 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
12213 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
12214 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
12215 // the given `channel_id`.
12216 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12217 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12218 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
12219 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12221 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12224 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
12226 // Test the API functions.
12227 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
12229 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12231 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12233 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12235 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12237 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
12241 fn test_connection_limiting() {
12242 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
12243 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12244 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12245 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12246 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12248 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12250 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12251 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12253 let mut funding_tx = None;
12254 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12255 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12256 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12259 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12260 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
12261 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
12262 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
12263 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12265 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12266 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12267 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12269 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12271 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
12272 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12273 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12275 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12278 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
12279 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
12280 &nodes[0].keys_manager);
12281 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12282 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12283 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12285 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
12286 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
12288 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
12289 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
12290 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12291 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12292 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
12293 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12294 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12297 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12298 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12299 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12300 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12301 }, true).unwrap_err();
12303 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
12304 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
12305 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12306 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12307 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
12308 for ev in chan_closed_events {
12309 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
12311 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12312 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12314 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12315 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12316 }, true).unwrap_err();
12318 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
12319 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12320 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12321 }, false).unwrap();
12322 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12324 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
12325 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
12327 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
12328 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12329 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
12330 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
12331 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12333 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12334 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12335 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12337 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12338 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12339 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12341 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12342 // "protected" and can connect again.
12343 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12344 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12345 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12347 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12349 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12351 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12352 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12356 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12357 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12358 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12359 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12360 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12361 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12363 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12365 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12366 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12368 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12369 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12370 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12371 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12374 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12376 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12377 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12378 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12380 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12381 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12382 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12384 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12385 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12386 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12387 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12391 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12392 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12393 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12394 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12395 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12396 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12397 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12398 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12399 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12401 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12403 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12404 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12406 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12407 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12408 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12409 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12410 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12411 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12414 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12415 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12417 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12418 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12420 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12422 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12423 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12426 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12427 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12428 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12429 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12430 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12432 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12433 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12435 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12436 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12437 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12438 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12442 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12444 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12445 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
12447 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12448 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12449 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12451 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12452 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12454 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12456 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12460 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12461 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12462 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12463 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12464 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12465 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12466 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12467 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12468 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12469 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12470 payment_metadata: None,
12471 keysend_preimage: None,
12472 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12473 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12475 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12477 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12478 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12479 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12480 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12481 create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12482 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12483 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12485 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12486 } else { panic!(); }
12488 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12489 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12490 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12491 cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12492 payment_metadata: None,
12493 keysend_preimage: None,
12494 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12495 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12497 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12499 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12500 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12501 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12502 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12506 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12507 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12508 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12509 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12510 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12512 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
12513 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12514 sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12515 cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12516 payment_metadata: None,
12517 keysend_preimage: None,
12518 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12519 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12521 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12522 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12523 node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12525 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12526 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12527 // is not satisfied.
12528 assert!(result.is_ok());
12532 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12533 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12534 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12535 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12536 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12538 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12539 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12541 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12542 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12543 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12544 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12545 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12547 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12548 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12550 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12551 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12552 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12553 match &msg_events[0] {
12554 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12555 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12557 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12558 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12559 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12562 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12565 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12566 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12568 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12569 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12570 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12572 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12576 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12577 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12578 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12579 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12580 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12581 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12582 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12583 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12584 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12585 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12586 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12588 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12589 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12590 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12592 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12593 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12595 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12596 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12598 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12601 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12602 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12604 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12605 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12607 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12608 // not have generated any events.
12609 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12613 fn test_update_channel_config() {
12614 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12615 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12616 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12617 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12618 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12619 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12620 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12622 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12623 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12624 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12626 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12627 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12628 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12629 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12630 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12632 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12633 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12636 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12637 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12638 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12640 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12641 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12642 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12643 ..Default::default()
12645 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12646 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12647 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12649 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12650 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12653 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12654 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12655 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12656 ..Default::default()
12658 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12659 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12660 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12661 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12663 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12664 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12667 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12668 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12669 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12670 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12671 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12674 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12675 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12676 ..Default::default()
12678 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12681 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12682 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12683 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12684 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12688 fn test_payment_display() {
12689 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12690 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12691 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12692 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12693 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12694 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12698 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12699 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12700 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12701 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12702 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12703 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12705 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12706 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12707 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12708 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12709 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12710 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12711 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12712 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12714 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12715 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12716 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12719 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12720 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12722 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12723 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12725 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12726 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12727 }, false).unwrap();
12728 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12729 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12730 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12732 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12734 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12735 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12736 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12737 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12738 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12739 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12740 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12741 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12742 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12743 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12744 } else { panic!() };
12745 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12746 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12747 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12748 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12750 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12752 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12753 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12754 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12759 fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12760 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12761 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12762 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12765 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12766 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12767 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12769 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12770 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12772 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12773 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12776 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12777 if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12778 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12780 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12784 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12785 if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12786 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12788 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12793 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12794 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
12795 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12796 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12798 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12799 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12800 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12802 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12804 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12805 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12806 let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12807 assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12809 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12810 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12812 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12818 use crate::chain::Listen;
12819 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12820 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12821 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12822 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12823 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12824 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12825 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12826 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12827 use crate::util::test_utils;
12828 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12830 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12831 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12832 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12833 use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
12835 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12837 use criterion::Criterion;
12839 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12840 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12841 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12842 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12843 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12844 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12845 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12847 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12848 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12850 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12851 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12853 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12855 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12858 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12859 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12862 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12863 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12864 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12866 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12867 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12869 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12870 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12871 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12872 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12873 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
12875 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12876 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12877 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12879 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12880 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12881 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12882 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12884 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12885 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12886 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12888 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12889 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12890 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12891 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12892 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12894 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12895 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12896 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12898 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12899 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12901 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12902 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12903 }, false).unwrap();
12904 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12905 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12906 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12909 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12910 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12911 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12913 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12914 } else { panic!(); }
12916 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12917 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12918 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12919 match events_b[0] {
12920 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12921 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12923 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12926 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12927 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12928 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12929 match events_a[0] {
12930 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12931 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12933 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12936 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12938 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
12939 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12940 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12942 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12943 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12944 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12945 match msg_events[0] {
12946 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12947 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12948 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12952 match msg_events[1] {
12953 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12957 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12958 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12959 match events_a[0] {
12960 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12961 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12963 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12966 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12967 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12968 match events_b[0] {
12969 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12970 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12972 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12975 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12976 macro_rules! send_payment {
12977 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12978 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12979 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12980 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12981 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12982 payment_count += 1;
12983 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12984 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12986 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12987 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12988 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12989 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12990 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12991 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12992 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12993 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12994 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12995 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12996 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12998 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12999 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13000 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13001 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13003 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13004 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13005 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13006 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13007 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13009 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13012 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13013 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13014 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13015 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13017 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13021 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13022 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13023 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);