1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The ChannelManager is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see routing::router::get_route for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::{Block, BlockHeader};
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
23 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
27 use bitcoin::hashes::hmac::{Hmac, HmacEngine};
28 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
29 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
30 use bitcoin::hashes::cmp::fixed_time_eq;
31 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
34 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
35 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
36 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
39 use chain::{Confirm, Watch, BestBlock};
40 use chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
41 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
42 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch};
47 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 use routing::router::{Route, RouteHop};
50 use ln::msgs::NetAddress;
52 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError, OptionalField};
53 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface, KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
54 use util::config::UserConfig;
55 use util::events::{EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureDescriptor};
56 use util::{byte_utils, events};
57 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer};
58 use util::chacha20::{ChaCha20, ChaChaReader};
59 use util::logger::{Logger, Level};
60 use util::errors::APIError;
65 use core::cell::RefCell;
66 use io::{Cursor, Read};
67 use sync::{Arc, Condvar, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard};
68 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
69 use core::time::Duration;
70 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
71 use std::time::Instant;
74 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
76 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
77 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
78 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
80 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
81 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
82 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
83 // before we forward it.
85 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
86 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
87 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
88 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
89 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
91 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
92 enum PendingHTLCRouting {
94 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
95 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
98 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
99 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
102 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
103 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
107 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
108 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
109 routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
110 incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
111 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
112 pub(super) amt_to_forward: u64,
113 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
116 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
117 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
118 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
119 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
122 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
123 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
124 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
125 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
126 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
129 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
131 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
133 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
134 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
135 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
137 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
139 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
143 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
147 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
148 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
149 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
150 short_channel_id: u64,
152 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
154 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
155 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
160 /// Contains a total_msat (which may differ from value if this is a Multi-Path Payment) and a
161 /// payment_secret which prevents path-probing attacks and can associate different HTLCs which
162 /// are part of the same payment.
163 Invoice(msgs::FinalOnionHopData),
164 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
165 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
168 struct ClaimableHTLC {
169 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
172 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
175 /// A payment identifier used to correlate an MPP payment's per-path HTLC sources internally.
176 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
177 pub(crate) struct MppId(pub [u8; 32]);
179 impl Writeable for MppId {
180 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
185 impl Readable for MppId {
186 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
187 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
191 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
192 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
193 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
194 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
197 session_priv: SecretKey,
198 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
199 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
200 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
206 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
207 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
209 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
210 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
211 mpp_id: MppId([2; 32]),
216 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
217 pub(super) enum HTLCFailReason {
219 err: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
227 /// Return value for claim_funds_from_hop
228 enum ClaimFundsFromHop {
230 MonitorUpdateFail(PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal, Option<u64>),
235 type ShutdownResult = (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>);
237 /// Error type returned across the channel_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
238 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
239 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
240 /// channel_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
241 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
243 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
244 err: msgs::LightningError,
245 chan_id: Option<[u8; 32]>,
246 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
248 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
250 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
252 err: LightningError {
254 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
255 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
261 chan_id: Some(channel_id),
262 shutdown_finish: None,
266 fn ignore_no_close(err: String) -> Self {
268 err: LightningError {
270 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
273 shutdown_finish: None,
277 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
278 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None }
281 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: [u8; 32], shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
283 err: LightningError {
285 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
286 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
292 chan_id: Some(channel_id),
293 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
297 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
300 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
302 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
304 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
306 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
308 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
310 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
311 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
317 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => LightningError {
319 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
320 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
327 chan_id: Some(channel_id),
328 shutdown_finish: None,
333 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
334 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
335 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
336 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
337 const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
339 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
340 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
341 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
342 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
343 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
344 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
345 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
347 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
351 // Note this is only exposed in cfg(test):
352 pub(super) struct ChannelHolder<Signer: Sign> {
353 pub(super) by_id: HashMap<[u8; 32], Channel<Signer>>,
354 pub(super) short_to_id: HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>,
355 /// short channel id -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received
356 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
357 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the short id here, nor the short
358 /// ids in the PendingHTLCInfo!
359 pub(super) forward_htlcs: HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>,
360 /// Map from payment hash to any HTLCs which are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user.
361 /// Note that while this is held in the same mutex as the channels themselves, no consistency
362 /// guarantees are made about the channels given here actually existing anymore by the time you
364 claimable_htlcs: HashMap<PaymentHash, Vec<ClaimableHTLC>>,
365 /// Messages to send to peers - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
366 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
367 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
370 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be procsesed immediately at the generation site
371 /// for some reason. They are handled in timer_tick_occurred, so may be processed with
372 /// quite some time lag.
373 enum BackgroundEvent {
374 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate that closes a channel, broadcasting its current latest holder
375 /// commitment transaction.
376 ClosingMonitorUpdate((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
379 /// State we hold per-peer. In the future we should put channels in here, but for now we only hold
380 /// the latest Init features we heard from the peer.
382 latest_features: InitFeatures,
385 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
386 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
388 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
390 struct PendingInboundPayment {
391 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
392 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
393 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
394 /// this payment being removed.
396 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
397 user_payment_id: u64,
398 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
399 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
400 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
403 /// SimpleArcChannelManager is useful when you need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, e.g.
404 /// when you're using lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static
405 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
406 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
407 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
408 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
409 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
410 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, Arc<M>, Arc<T>, Arc<KeysManager>, Arc<F>, Arc<L>>;
412 /// SimpleRefChannelManager is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
413 /// counterpart to the SimpleArcChannelManager type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
414 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
415 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since tokio::spawn requires parameters with static lifetimes).
416 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
417 /// helps with issues such as long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any
418 /// type that implements KeysInterface for its keys manager, but this type alias chooses the
419 /// concrete type of the KeysManager.
420 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<InMemorySigner, &'a M, &'b T, &'c KeysManager, &'d F, &'e L>;
422 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
423 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
425 /// Implements ChannelMessageHandler, handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
426 /// to individual Channels.
428 /// Implements Writeable to write out all channel state to disk. Implies peer_disconnected() for
429 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
430 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged funding_created (ie
431 /// called funding_transaction_generated for outbound channels).
433 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out ChannelManager than you can be with
434 /// ChannelMonitors. With ChannelMonitors you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
435 /// returning from chain::Watch::watch_/update_channel, with ChannelManagers, writing updates
436 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other ChannelManager operations from occurring during
437 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
438 /// ChannelMonitors passed by reference to read(), those channels will be force-closed based on the
439 /// ChannelMonitor state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
441 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for (BlockHash, ChannelManager), which
442 /// tells you the last block hash which was block_connect()ed. You MUST rescan any blocks along
443 /// the "reorg path" (ie call block_disconnected() until you get to a common block and then call
444 /// block_connected() to step towards your best block) upon deserialization before using the
447 /// Note that ChannelManager is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
448 /// ChannelUpdate messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
449 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
450 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
451 /// timer_tick_occurred roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
453 /// Rather than using a plain ChannelManager, it is preferable to use either a SimpleArcChannelManager
454 /// a SimpleRefChannelManager, for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
455 /// essentially you should default to using a SimpleRefChannelManager, and use a
456 /// SimpleArcChannelManager when you require a ChannelManager with a static lifetime, such as when
457 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
458 pub struct ChannelManager<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
459 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
460 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
461 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
462 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
465 default_configuration: UserConfig,
466 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
472 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
474 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
475 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
477 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
478 pub(super) channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
479 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
480 channel_state: Mutex<ChannelHolder<Signer>>,
482 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
483 /// expose them to users via a PaymentReceived event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
484 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
485 /// after we generate a PaymentReceived upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
486 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
487 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
489 /// The session_priv bytes of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
490 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
491 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
492 /// PaymentSent/PaymentFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
493 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
494 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
495 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
496 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
498 /// Each payment has each of its MPP part's session_priv bytes in the HashSet of the map (even
499 /// payments over a single path).
501 /// Locked *after* channel_state.
502 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>>,
504 our_network_key: SecretKey,
505 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
507 /// Used to track the last value sent in a node_announcement "timestamp" field. We ensure this
508 /// value increases strictly since we don't assume access to a time source.
509 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize,
511 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
512 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
513 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
514 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
516 /// The bulk of our storage will eventually be here (channels and message queues and the like).
517 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
518 /// are currently open with that peer.
519 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
520 /// operate on the inner value freely. Sadly, this prevents parallel operation when opening a
523 /// If also holding `channel_state` lock, must lock `channel_state` prior to `per_peer_state`.
524 per_peer_state: RwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>>>,
526 pending_events: Mutex<Vec<events::Event>>,
527 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
528 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
529 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
530 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
531 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
532 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
533 /// PersistenceNotifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
534 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
536 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier,
543 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
545 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
546 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
547 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
548 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
549 pub struct ChainParameters {
550 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
551 pub network: Network,
553 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
555 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
556 pub best_block: BestBlock,
559 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
565 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
566 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
567 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
568 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
569 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
570 /// updates are ready for persistence).
572 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
573 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
574 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
575 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
576 persistence_notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier,
578 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
579 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
582 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
583 fn notify_on_drop(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
584 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(lock, notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
587 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a PersistenceNotifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
588 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
590 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
591 persistence_notifier: notifier,
592 should_persist: persist_check,
593 _read_guard: read_guard,
598 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
600 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
601 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
606 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
607 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
609 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
611 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
612 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
613 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
614 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
615 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
617 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
618 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
620 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
622 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
623 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
624 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
625 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
626 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
627 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
628 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 6 * 24 * 7; //TODO?
630 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
631 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry` field to at least
633 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
634 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
635 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
636 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY: u32 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 3;
638 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
639 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
640 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
641 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
642 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
643 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
646 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
648 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
649 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
652 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
654 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
655 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
656 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
657 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
658 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
659 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
660 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
661 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
662 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
663 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
664 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
667 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
668 /// to better separate parameters.
669 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
670 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
671 /// The node_id of our counterparty
672 pub node_id: PublicKey,
673 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
674 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
675 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
676 pub features: InitFeatures,
677 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
678 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
679 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
681 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
683 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
684 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
685 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
686 /// payments to us through this channel.
687 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
690 /// Details of a channel, as returned by ChannelManager::list_channels and ChannelManager::list_usable_channels
691 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
692 pub struct ChannelDetails {
693 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
694 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
695 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
696 /// lifetime of the channel.
697 pub channel_id: [u8; 32],
698 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
699 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
700 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
701 /// our counterparty already.
703 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
704 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
705 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
706 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
707 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
708 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
709 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
710 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
711 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
712 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
713 /// this value on chain.
715 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
717 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
719 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
720 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
721 /// The user_id passed in to create_channel, or 0 if the channel was inbound.
723 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
724 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
725 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
726 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
728 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
729 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
730 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
731 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
732 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
733 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, who's balance is not
734 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
735 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
736 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
738 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
739 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
740 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
741 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
742 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
743 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
744 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
745 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
746 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
748 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
750 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
751 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
752 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
753 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
754 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
755 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
756 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
757 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
758 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
760 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
761 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
762 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
763 pub is_outbound: bool,
764 /// True if the channel is confirmed, funding_locked messages have been exchanged, and the
765 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `funding_locked` message exchange implies the
766 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
767 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
768 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
770 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
771 pub is_funding_locked: bool,
772 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and funding_locked messages have been exchanged, (b)
773 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
775 /// This is a strict superset of `is_funding_locked`.
777 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
781 /// If a payment fails to send, it can be in one of several states. This enum is returned as the
782 /// Err() type describing which state the payment is in, see the description of individual enum
784 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
785 pub enum PaymentSendFailure {
786 /// A parameter which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us from attempting to
787 /// send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages sent to peers, and
788 /// once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the payment in full.
789 ParameterError(APIError),
790 /// A parameter in a single path which was passed to send_payment was invalid, preventing us
791 /// from attempting to send the payment at all. No channel state has been changed or messages
792 /// sent to peers, and once you've changed the parameter at error, you can freely retry the
795 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
797 PathParameterError(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
798 /// All paths which were attempted failed to send, with no channel state change taking place.
799 /// You can freely retry the payment in full (though you probably want to do so over different
800 /// paths than the ones selected).
801 AllFailedRetrySafe(Vec<APIError>),
802 /// Some paths which were attempted failed to send, though possibly not all. At least some
803 /// paths have irrevocably committed to the HTLC and retrying the payment in full would result
804 /// in over-/re-payment.
806 /// The results here are ordered the same as the paths in the route object which was passed to
807 /// send_payment, and any Errs which are not APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed can be safely
808 /// retried (though there is currently no API with which to do so).
810 /// Any entries which contain Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) or Ok(()) MUST NOT be retried
811 /// as they will result in over-/re-payment. These HTLCs all either successfully sent (in the
812 /// case of Ok(())) or will send once channel_monitor_updated is called on the next-hop channel
813 /// with the latest update_id.
814 PartialFailure(Vec<Result<(), APIError>>),
817 macro_rules! handle_error {
818 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => {
821 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish }) => {
822 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
824 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
825 // entering the macro.
826 assert!($self.channel_state.try_lock().is_ok());
829 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
831 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
832 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
833 if let Some(update) = update_option {
834 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
838 if let Some(channel_id) = chan_id {
839 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, err: ClosureDescriptor::ProcessingError });
843 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
844 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
846 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
847 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
848 action: err.action.clone()
852 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
853 $self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
856 // Return error in case higher-API need one
863 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
864 macro_rules! convert_chan_err {
865 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
867 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
868 //TODO: Once warning messages are merged, we should send a `warning` message to our
870 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
872 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
873 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
875 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
876 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
877 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
878 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
880 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(true);
881 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
883 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(msg) => {
884 log_error!($self.logger, "Channel {} need to be shutdown but closing transactions not broadcast due to {}", log_bytes!($channel_id[..]), msg);
885 if let Some(short_id) = $channel.get_short_channel_id() {
886 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
888 let shutdown_res = $channel.force_shutdown(false);
889 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$channel).ok()))
895 macro_rules! break_chan_entry {
896 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
900 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
902 $entry.remove_entry();
910 macro_rules! try_chan_entry {
911 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
915 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!($self, e, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
917 $entry.remove_entry();
925 macro_rules! remove_channel {
926 ($channel_state: expr, $entry: expr) => {
928 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
929 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
930 $channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
937 macro_rules! handle_monitor_err {
938 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
939 handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, Vec::new(), Vec::new())
941 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $short_to_id: expr, $chan: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr, $chan_id: expr) => {
943 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
944 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure", log_bytes!($chan_id[..]));
945 if let Some(short_id) = $chan.get_short_channel_id() {
946 $short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
948 // TODO: $failed_fails is dropped here, which will cause other channels to hit the
949 // chain in a confused state! We need to move them into the ChannelMonitor which
950 // will be responsible for failing backwards once things confirm on-chain.
951 // It's ok that we drop $failed_forwards here - at this point we'd rather they
952 // broadcast HTLC-Timeout and pay the associated fees to get their funds back than
953 // us bother trying to claim it just to forward on to another peer. If we're
954 // splitting hairs we'd prefer to claim payments that were to us, but we haven't
955 // given up the preimage yet, so might as well just wait until the payment is
956 // retried, avoiding the on-chain fees.
957 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), *$chan_id,
958 $chan.force_shutdown(true), $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok() ));
961 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
962 log_info!($self.logger, "Disabling channel {} due to monitor update TemporaryFailure. On restore will send {} and process {} forwards and {} fails",
963 log_bytes!($chan_id[..]),
964 if $resend_commitment && $resend_raa {
966 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => { "commitment then RAA" },
967 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => { "RAA then commitment" },
969 } else if $resend_commitment { "commitment" }
970 else if $resend_raa { "RAA" }
972 (&$failed_forwards as &Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>).len(),
973 (&$failed_fails as &Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>).len());
974 if !$resend_commitment {
975 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst || !$resend_raa);
978 debug_assert!($action_type == RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst || !$resend_commitment);
980 $chan.monitor_update_failed($resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
981 (Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to update ChannelMonitor".to_owned()), *$chan_id)), false)
985 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => { {
986 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state.short_to_id, $entry.get_mut(), $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails, $entry.key());
988 $entry.remove_entry();
994 macro_rules! return_monitor_err {
995 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
996 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment);
998 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr, $failed_forwards: expr, $failed_fails: expr) => {
999 return handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment, $failed_forwards, $failed_fails);
1003 // Does not break in case of TemporaryFailure!
1004 macro_rules! maybe_break_monitor_err {
1005 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_state: expr, $entry: expr, $action_type: path, $resend_raa: expr, $resend_commitment: expr) => {
1006 match (handle_monitor_err!($self, $err, $channel_state, $entry, $action_type, $resend_raa, $resend_commitment), $err) {
1007 (e, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure) => {
1010 (_, ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure) => { },
1015 macro_rules! handle_chan_restoration_locked {
1016 ($self: ident, $channel_lock: expr, $channel_state: expr, $channel_entry: expr,
1017 $raa: expr, $commitment_update: expr, $order: expr, $chanmon_update: expr,
1018 $pending_forwards: expr, $funding_broadcastable: expr, $funding_locked: expr) => { {
1019 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
1020 let counterparty_node_id = $channel_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1022 let chanmon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> = $chanmon_update; // Force type-checking to resolve
1023 let chanmon_update_is_none = chanmon_update.is_none();
1025 let forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)> = $pending_forwards; // Force type-checking to resolve
1026 if !forwards.is_empty() {
1027 htlc_forwards = Some(($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("We can't have pending forwards before funding confirmation"),
1028 $channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), forwards));
1031 if chanmon_update.is_some() {
1032 // On reconnect, we, by definition, only resend a funding_locked if there have been
1033 // no commitment updates, so the only channel monitor update which could also be
1034 // associated with a funding_locked would be the funding_created/funding_signed
1035 // monitor update. That monitor update failing implies that we won't send
1036 // funding_locked until it's been updated, so we can't have a funding_locked and a
1037 // monitor update here (so we don't bother to handle it correctly below).
1038 assert!($funding_locked.is_none());
1039 // A channel monitor update makes no sense without either a funding_locked or a
1040 // commitment update to process after it. Since we can't have a funding_locked, we
1041 // only bother to handle the monitor-update + commitment_update case below.
1042 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1045 if let Some(msg) = $funding_locked {
1046 // Similar to the above, this implies that we're letting the funding_locked fly
1047 // before it should be allowed to.
1048 assert!(chanmon_update.is_none());
1049 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
1050 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1053 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = $self.get_announcement_sigs($channel_entry.get()) {
1054 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
1055 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1056 msg: announcement_sigs,
1059 $channel_state.short_to_id.insert($channel_entry.get().get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), $channel_entry.get().channel_id());
1062 let funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction> = $funding_broadcastable; // Force type-checking to resolve
1063 if let Some(monitor_update) = chanmon_update {
1064 // We only ever broadcast a funding transaction in response to a funding_signed
1065 // message and the resulting monitor update. Thus, on channel_reestablish
1066 // message handling we can't have a funding transaction to broadcast. When
1067 // processing a monitor update finishing resulting in a funding broadcast, we
1068 // cannot have a second monitor update, thus this case would indicate a bug.
1069 assert!(funding_broadcastable.is_none());
1070 // Given we were just reconnected or finished updating a channel monitor, the
1071 // only case where we can get a new ChannelMonitorUpdate would be if we also
1072 // have some commitment updates to send as well.
1073 assert!($commitment_update.is_some());
1074 if let Err(e) = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($channel_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1075 // channel_reestablish doesn't guarantee the order it returns is sensical
1076 // for the messages it returns, but if we're setting what messages to
1077 // re-transmit on monitor update success, we need to make sure it is sane.
1078 let mut order = $order;
1080 order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1082 break handle_monitor_err!($self, e, $channel_state, $channel_entry, order, $raa.is_some(), true);
1086 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
1087 if let Some(update) = $commitment_update {
1088 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1089 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1094 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
1095 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = $raa {
1096 $channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
1097 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1098 msg: revoke_and_ack,
1103 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
1107 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
1112 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
1113 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
1114 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
1119 if chanmon_update_is_none {
1120 // If there was no ChannelMonitorUpdate, we should never generate an Err in the res loop
1121 // above. Doing so would imply calling handle_err!() from channel_monitor_updated() which
1122 // should *never* end up calling back to `chain_monitor.update_channel()`.
1123 assert!(res.is_ok());
1126 (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id)
1130 macro_rules! post_handle_chan_restoration {
1131 ($self: ident, $locked_res: expr) => { {
1132 let (htlc_forwards, res, counterparty_node_id) = $locked_res;
1134 let _ = handle_error!($self, res, counterparty_node_id);
1136 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
1137 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
1142 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
1143 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
1144 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1145 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1146 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1149 /// Constructs a new ChannelManager to hold several channels and route between them.
1151 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
1152 /// ChannelMessageHandler.
1154 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
1156 /// panics if channel_value_satoshis is >= `MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS`!
1158 /// Users need to notify the new ChannelManager when a new block is connected or
1159 /// disconnected using its `block_connected` and `block_disconnected` methods, starting
1160 /// from after `params.latest_hash`.
1161 pub fn new(fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, keys_manager: K, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters) -> Self {
1162 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1163 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
1166 default_configuration: config.clone(),
1167 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
1168 fee_estimator: fee_est,
1172 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
1174 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder{
1175 by_id: HashMap::new(),
1176 short_to_id: HashMap::new(),
1177 forward_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1178 claimable_htlcs: HashMap::new(),
1179 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
1181 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1182 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
1184 our_network_key: keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
1185 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
1188 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1189 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(0),
1191 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
1193 pending_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1194 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
1195 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
1196 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
1204 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels, as
1205 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
1206 &self.default_configuration
1209 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
1211 /// user_id will be provided back as user_channel_id in FundingGenerationReady events to allow
1212 /// tracking of which events correspond with which create_channel call. Note that the
1213 /// user_channel_id defaults to 0 for inbound channels, so you may wish to avoid using 0 for
1214 /// user_id here. user_id has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply copied to events and
1215 /// otherwise ignored.
1217 /// If successful, will generate a SendOpenChannel message event, so you should probably poll
1218 /// PeerManager::process_events afterwards.
1220 /// Raises APIError::APIMisuseError when channel_value_satoshis > 2**24 or push_msat is
1221 /// greater than channel_value_satoshis * 1k or channel_value_satoshis is < 1000.
1223 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
1224 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
1225 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten.
1226 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1227 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
1228 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
1232 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1233 match per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key) {
1234 Some(peer_state) => {
1235 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1236 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1237 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
1238 Channel::new_outbound(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, their_network_key, their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_id, config)?
1240 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) }),
1243 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
1245 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1246 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
1247 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
1249 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1250 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
1251 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
1252 if cfg!(feature = "fuzztarget") {
1253 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
1255 panic!("RNG is bad???");
1258 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
1260 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
1261 node_id: their_network_key,
1267 fn list_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&[u8; 32], &Channel<Signer>)) -> bool>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1268 let mut res = Vec::new();
1270 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1271 res.reserve(channel_state.by_id.len());
1272 for (channel_id, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter().filter(f) {
1273 let (inbound_capacity_msat, outbound_capacity_msat) = channel.get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat();
1274 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1275 channel.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1276 res.push(ChannelDetails {
1277 channel_id: (*channel_id).clone(),
1278 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1279 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1280 features: InitFeatures::empty(),
1281 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1282 forwarding_info: channel.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1284 funding_txo: channel.get_funding_txo(),
1285 short_channel_id: channel.get_short_channel_id(),
1286 channel_value_satoshis: channel.get_value_satoshis(),
1287 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1288 inbound_capacity_msat,
1289 outbound_capacity_msat,
1290 user_id: channel.get_user_id(),
1291 confirmations_required: channel.minimum_depth(),
1292 force_close_spend_delay: channel.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1293 is_outbound: channel.is_outbound(),
1294 is_funding_locked: channel.is_usable(),
1295 is_usable: channel.is_live(),
1296 is_public: channel.should_announce(),
1300 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1301 for chan in res.iter_mut() {
1302 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&chan.counterparty.node_id) {
1303 chan.counterparty.features = peer_state.lock().unwrap().latest_features.clone();
1309 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See ChannelDetail field documentation for
1310 /// more information.
1311 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1312 self.list_channels_with_filter(|_| true)
1315 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
1316 /// get_route to ensure non-announced channels are used.
1318 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
1319 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
1321 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
1322 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
1323 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
1324 // really wanted anyway.
1325 self.list_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.is_live())
1328 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1329 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1331 let counterparty_node_id;
1332 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
1333 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
1334 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1335 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1336 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1337 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
1338 counterparty_node_id = chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
1339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1340 let (shutdown_msg, monitor_update, htlcs) = match per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
1341 Some(peer_state) => {
1342 let peer_state = peer_state.lock().unwrap();
1343 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
1344 chan_entry.get_mut().get_shutdown(&self.keys_manager, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight)?
1346 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", counterparty_node_id) }),
1348 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
1350 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
1351 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
1352 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1353 let (result, is_permanent) =
1354 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
1356 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1362 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
1363 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1367 if chan_entry.get().is_shutdown() {
1368 let channel = remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
1369 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
1370 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1377 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()})
1381 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1382 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1385 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, counterparty_node_id);
1389 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1390 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1391 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1393 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
1394 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1396 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
1397 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
1398 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
1399 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
1401 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1403 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1404 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1405 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1406 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1407 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, None)
1410 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
1411 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
1412 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
1414 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
1415 /// the channel being closed or not:
1416 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
1417 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
1418 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
1419 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
1420 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
1421 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
1422 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
1424 /// May generate a SendShutdown message event on success, which should be relayed.
1426 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
1427 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
1428 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
1429 pub fn close_channel_with_target_feerate(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: u32) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1430 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, Some(target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight))
1434 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
1435 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
1436 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
1437 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
1438 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
1440 if let Some((funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
1441 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
1442 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
1443 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
1444 // ignore the result here.
1445 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, monitor_update);
1449 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32], peer_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
1451 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1452 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
1453 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
1454 if let Some(node_id) = peer_node_id {
1455 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *node_id {
1456 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1459 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get().get_short_channel_id() {
1460 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
1462 chan.remove_entry().1
1464 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No such channel".to_owned()});
1467 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", log_bytes!(channel_id[..]));
1468 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.force_shutdown(true));
1469 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
1470 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1471 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1475 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: *channel_id, err: ClosureDescriptor::ForceClosed });
1477 Ok(chan.get_counterparty_node_id())
1480 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction to
1481 /// the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if channel_id is unknown to the manager.
1482 pub fn force_close_channel(&self, channel_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1483 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1484 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, None) {
1485 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
1486 self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().pending_msg_events.push(
1487 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1488 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
1489 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
1490 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
1500 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
1501 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
1502 pub fn force_close_all_channels(&self) {
1503 for chan in self.list_channels() {
1504 let _ = self.force_close_channel(&chan.channel_id);
1508 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(&self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> (PendingHTLCStatus, MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>) {
1509 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
1510 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
1512 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1513 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
1514 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1515 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1516 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
1517 failure_code: $err_code,
1518 })), self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1523 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
1524 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
1527 let shared_secret = {
1528 let mut arr = [0; 32];
1529 arr.copy_from_slice(&SharedSecret::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &self.our_network_key)[..]);
1532 let (rho, mu) = onion_utils::gen_rho_mu_from_shared_secret(&shared_secret);
1534 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
1535 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
1536 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
1537 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
1538 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
1539 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
1540 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
1541 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
1544 let mut hmac = HmacEngine::<Sha256>::new(&mu);
1545 hmac.input(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data);
1546 hmac.input(&msg.payment_hash.0[..]);
1547 if !fixed_time_eq(&Hmac::from_engine(hmac).into_inner(), &msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac) {
1548 return_malformed_err!("HMAC Check failed", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 5);
1551 let mut channel_state = None;
1552 macro_rules! return_err {
1553 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
1555 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
1556 if channel_state.is_none() {
1557 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1559 return (PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1560 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
1561 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1562 reason: onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(&shared_secret, $err_code, $data),
1563 })), channel_state.unwrap());
1568 let mut chacha = ChaCha20::new(&rho, &[0u8; 8]);
1569 let mut chacha_stream = ChaChaReader { chacha: &mut chacha, read: Cursor::new(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..]) };
1570 let (next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac): (msgs::OnionHopData, _) = {
1571 match <msgs::OnionHopData as Readable>::read(&mut chacha_stream) {
1573 let error_code = match err {
1574 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownVersion => 0x4000 | 1, // unknown realm byte
1575 msgs::DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature|
1576 msgs::DecodeError::InvalidValue|
1577 msgs::DecodeError::ShortRead => 0x4000 | 22, // invalid_onion_payload
1578 _ => 0x2000 | 2, // Should never happen
1580 return_err!("Unable to decode our hop data", error_code, &[0;0]);
1583 let mut hmac = [0; 32];
1584 if let Err(_) = chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut hmac[..]) {
1585 return_err!("Unable to decode hop data", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1592 let pending_forward_info = if next_hop_hmac == [0; 32] {
1595 // In tests, make sure that the initial onion pcket data is, at least, non-0.
1596 // We could do some fancy randomness test here, but, ehh, whatever.
1597 // This checks for the issue where you can calculate the path length given the
1598 // onion data as all the path entries that the originator sent will be here
1599 // as-is (and were originally 0s).
1600 // Of course reverse path calculation is still pretty easy given naive routing
1601 // algorithms, but this fixes the most-obvious case.
1602 let mut next_bytes = [0; 32];
1603 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1604 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1605 chacha_stream.read_exact(&mut next_bytes).unwrap();
1606 assert_ne!(next_bytes[..], [0; 32][..]);
1610 // final_expiry_too_soon
1611 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
1612 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
1613 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
1614 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
1615 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
1616 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) <= self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
1617 return_err!("The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle", 17, &[0;0]);
1619 // final_incorrect_htlc_amount
1620 if next_hop_data.amt_to_forward > msg.amount_msat {
1621 return_err!("Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment", 19, &byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1623 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
1624 if next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value != msg.cltv_expiry {
1625 return_err!("Upstream node set CLTV to the wrong value", 18, &byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1628 let routing = match next_hop_data.format {
1629 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { .. } => return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]),
1630 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { .. } => return_err!("Got non final data with an HMAC of 0", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]),
1631 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { payment_data, keysend_preimage } => {
1632 if payment_data.is_some() && keysend_preimage.is_some() {
1633 return_err!("We don't support MPP keysend payments", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1634 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
1635 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
1637 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1639 } else if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
1640 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
1641 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
1642 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
1643 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
1644 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
1645 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
1646 if hashed_preimage != msg.payment_hash {
1647 return_err!("Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 0x4000|22, &[0;0]);
1650 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
1652 incoming_cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1655 return_err!("We require payment_secrets", 0x4000|0x2000|3, &[0;0]);
1660 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
1661 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
1662 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
1663 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
1665 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1667 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1668 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1669 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1670 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1673 let mut new_packet_data = [0; 20*65];
1674 let read_pos = chacha_stream.read(&mut new_packet_data).unwrap();
1675 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1677 // Check two things:
1678 // a) that the behavior of our stream here will return Ok(0) even if the TLV
1679 // read above emptied out our buffer and the unwrap() wont needlessly panic
1680 // b) that we didn't somehow magically end up with extra data.
1682 debug_assert!(chacha_stream.read(&mut t).unwrap() == 0);
1684 // Once we've emptied the set of bytes our peer gave us, encrypt 0 bytes until we
1685 // fill the onion hop data we'll forward to our next-hop peer.
1686 chacha_stream.chacha.process_in_place(&mut new_packet_data[read_pos..]);
1688 let mut new_pubkey = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap();
1690 let blinding_factor = {
1691 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1692 sha.input(&new_pubkey.serialize()[..]);
1693 sha.input(&shared_secret);
1694 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
1697 let public_key = if let Err(e) = new_pubkey.mul_assign(&self.secp_ctx, &blinding_factor[..]) {
1699 } else { Ok(new_pubkey) };
1701 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
1704 hop_data: new_packet_data,
1705 hmac: next_hop_hmac.clone(),
1708 let short_channel_id = match next_hop_data.format {
1709 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::Legacy { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1710 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::NonFinalNode { short_channel_id } => short_channel_id,
1711 msgs::OnionHopDataFormat::FinalNode { .. } => {
1712 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0;0]);
1716 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
1717 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
1718 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
1721 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash.clone(),
1722 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
1723 amt_to_forward: next_hop_data.amt_to_forward,
1724 outgoing_cltv_value: next_hop_data.outgoing_cltv_value,
1728 channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
1729 if let &PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref routing, ref amt_to_forward, ref outgoing_cltv_value, .. }) = &pending_forward_info {
1730 // If short_channel_id is 0 here, we'll reject the HTLC as there cannot be a channel
1731 // with a short_channel_id of 0. This is important as various things later assume
1732 // short_channel_id is non-0 in any ::Forward.
1733 if let &PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref short_channel_id, .. } = routing {
1734 let id_option = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&short_channel_id).cloned();
1735 if let Some((err, code, chan_update)) = loop {
1736 let forwarding_id = match id_option {
1737 None => { // unknown_next_peer
1738 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1740 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1743 let chan = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).unwrap();
1745 if !chan.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
1746 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
1747 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
1748 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
1749 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
1752 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
1753 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
1754 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
1755 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
1756 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
1757 if !chan.is_live() { // channel_disabled
1758 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 20, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1760 if *amt_to_forward < chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
1761 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1763 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths() as u64)
1764 .and_then(|prop_fee| { (prop_fee / 1000000)
1765 .checked_add(chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat() as u64) });
1766 if fee.is_none() || msg.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() || (msg.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < *amt_to_forward { // fee_insufficient
1767 break Some(("Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones", 0x1000 | 12, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1769 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta() as u64 { // incorrect_cltv_expiry
1770 break Some(("Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta", 0x1000 | 13, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1772 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
1773 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now, but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty
1774 // packet sanitization (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rational)
1775 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
1776 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1778 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
1779 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
1781 // In theory, we would be safe against unintentional channel-closure, if we only required a margin of LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1782 // But, to be safe against policy reception, we use a longer delay.
1783 if (*outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER) as u64 {
1784 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, Some(self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan).unwrap())));
1790 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
1791 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
1792 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
1793 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(msg.amount_msat));
1795 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
1796 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(msg.cltv_expiry));
1798 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
1799 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
1800 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
1802 res.extend_from_slice(&chan_update.encode_with_len()[..]);
1804 return_err!(err, code, &res[..]);
1809 (pending_forward_info, channel_state.unwrap())
1812 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
1813 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
1814 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
1816 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1817 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1818 if !chan.should_announce() {
1819 return Err(LightningError {
1820 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
1821 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
1824 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1825 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
1828 /// Gets the current channel_update for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
1829 /// is public (only returning an Err if the channel does not yet have an assigned short_id),
1830 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
1831 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
1832 /// May be called with channel_state already locked!
1833 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
1834 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
1835 let short_channel_id = match chan.get_short_channel_id() {
1836 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
1840 let were_node_one = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.our_network_key).serialize()[..] < chan.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
1842 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
1843 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
1845 timestamp: chan.get_update_time_counter(),
1846 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!chan.is_live() as u8) << 1),
1847 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
1848 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
1849 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Present(chan.get_announced_htlc_max_msat()),
1850 fee_base_msat: chan.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
1851 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
1852 excess_data: Vec::new(),
1855 let msg_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned.encode()[..]);
1856 let sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&hash_to_message!(&msg_hash[..]), &self.our_network_key);
1858 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
1864 // Only public for testing, this should otherwise never be called direcly
1865 pub(crate) fn send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Vec<RouteHop>, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, mpp_id: MppId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
1866 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to send payment for path with next hop {}", path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
1867 let prng_seed = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1868 let session_priv_bytes = self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
1869 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
1871 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
1872 .map_err(|_| APIError::RouteError{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected"})?;
1873 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, payment_secret, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
1874 if onion_utils::route_size_insane(&onion_payloads) {
1875 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Route size too large considering onion data"});
1877 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash);
1879 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
1880 let mut pending_outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
1881 let sessions = pending_outbounds.entry(mpp_id).or_insert(HashSet::new());
1882 assert!(sessions.insert(session_priv_bytes));
1884 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
1885 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
1886 let id = match channel_lock.short_to_id.get(&path.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
1887 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
1888 Some(id) => id.clone(),
1891 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
1892 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(id) {
1894 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != path.first().unwrap().pubkey {
1895 return Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Node ID mismatch on first hop!"});
1897 if !chan.get().is_live() {
1898 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected/pending monitor update!".to_owned()});
1900 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(), htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
1902 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
1903 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
1905 }, onion_packet, &self.logger), channel_state, chan)
1907 Some((update_add, commitment_signed, monitor_update)) => {
1908 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
1909 maybe_break_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true);
1910 // Note that MonitorUpdateFailed here indicates (per function docs)
1911 // that we will resend the commitment update once monitor updating
1912 // is restored. Therefore, we must return an error indicating that
1913 // it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale, which we do in the
1914 // send_payment check for MonitorUpdateFailed, below.
1915 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed);
1918 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending payment along path resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
1919 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
1920 node_id: path.first().unwrap().pubkey,
1921 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1922 update_add_htlcs: vec![update_add],
1923 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1924 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1925 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1933 } else { unreachable!(); }
1937 match handle_error!(self, err, path.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
1938 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
1940 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
1945 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
1947 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for RouteHop
1948 /// fields for more info.
1950 /// Note that if the payment_hash already exists elsewhere (eg you're sending a duplicative
1951 /// payment), we don't do anything to stop you! We always try to ensure that if the provided
1952 /// next hop knows the preimage to payment_hash they can claim an additional amount as
1953 /// specified in the last hop in the route! Thus, you should probably do your own
1954 /// payment_preimage tracking (which you should already be doing as they represent "proof of
1955 /// payment") and prevent double-sends yourself.
1957 /// May generate SendHTLCs message(s) event on success, which should be relayed.
1959 /// Each path may have a different return value, and PaymentSendValue may return a Vec with
1960 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
1961 /// PaymentSendFailure for more info.
1963 /// In general, a path may raise:
1964 /// * APIError::RouteError when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
1965 /// node public key) is specified.
1966 /// * APIError::ChannelUnavailable if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
1967 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
1969 /// * APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
1970 /// relevant updates.
1972 /// Note that depending on the type of the PaymentSendFailure the HTLC may have been
1973 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
1974 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
1976 /// payment_secret is unrelated to payment_hash (or PaymentPreimage) and exists to authenticate
1977 /// the sender to the recipient and prevent payment-probing (deanonymization) attacks. For
1978 /// newer nodes, it will be provided to you in the invoice. If you do not have one, the Route
1979 /// must not contain multiple paths as multi-path payments require a recipient-provided
1981 /// If a payment_secret *is* provided, we assume that the invoice had the payment_secret feature
1982 /// bit set (either as required or as available). If multiple paths are present in the Route,
1983 /// we assume the invoice had the basic_mpp feature set.
1984 pub fn send_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1985 self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, payment_secret, None)
1988 fn send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: &Option<PaymentSecret>, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
1989 if route.paths.len() < 1 {
1990 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "There must be at least one path to send over"}));
1992 if route.paths.len() > 10 {
1993 // This limit is completely arbitrary - there aren't any real fundamental path-count
1994 // limits. After we support retrying individual paths we should likely bump this, but
1995 // for now more than 10 paths likely carries too much one-path failure.
1996 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::RouteError{err: "Sending over more than 10 paths is not currently supported"}));
1998 if payment_secret.is_none() && route.paths.len() > 1 {
1999 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Payment secret is required for multi-path payments".to_string()}));
2001 let mut total_value = 0;
2002 let our_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
2003 let mut path_errs = Vec::with_capacity(route.paths.len());
2004 let mpp_id = MppId(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
2005 'path_check: for path in route.paths.iter() {
2006 if path.len() < 1 || path.len() > 20 {
2007 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path didn't go anywhere/had bogus size"}));
2008 continue 'path_check;
2010 for (idx, hop) in path.iter().enumerate() {
2011 if idx != path.len() - 1 && hop.pubkey == our_node_id {
2012 path_errs.push(Err(APIError::RouteError{err: "Path went through us but wasn't a simple rebalance loop to us"}));
2013 continue 'path_check;
2016 total_value += path.last().unwrap().fee_msat;
2017 path_errs.push(Ok(()));
2019 if path_errs.iter().any(|e| e.is_err()) {
2020 return Err(PaymentSendFailure::PathParameterError(path_errs));
2023 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
2024 let mut results = Vec::new();
2025 for path in route.paths.iter() {
2026 results.push(self.send_payment_along_path(&path, &payment_hash, payment_secret, total_value, cur_height, mpp_id, &keysend_preimage));
2028 let mut has_ok = false;
2029 let mut has_err = false;
2030 for res in results.iter() {
2031 if res.is_ok() { has_ok = true; }
2032 if res.is_err() { has_err = true; }
2033 if let &Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateFailed) = res {
2034 // MonitorUpdateFailed is inherently unsafe to retry, so we call it a
2041 if has_err && has_ok {
2042 Err(PaymentSendFailure::PartialFailure(results))
2044 Err(PaymentSendFailure::AllFailedRetrySafe(results.drain(..).map(|r| r.unwrap_err()).collect()))
2050 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
2051 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
2052 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
2053 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
2054 /// never reach the recipient.
2056 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function.
2058 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
2059 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
2061 /// Note that `route` must have exactly one path.
2063 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
2064 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
2065 let preimage = match payment_preimage {
2067 None => PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()),
2069 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&preimage.0).into_inner());
2070 match self.send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, &None, Some(preimage)) {
2071 Ok(()) => Ok(payment_hash),
2076 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
2077 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
2078 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&Channel<Signer>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>
2079 (&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2081 let (res, chan) = match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
2083 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
2085 (chan.get_outbound_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
2086 .map_err(|e| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
2087 MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, chan.channel_id(), chan.force_shutdown(true), None)
2088 } else { unreachable!(); })
2091 None => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "No such channel".to_owned() }) },
2093 match handle_error!(self, res, chan.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
2094 Ok(funding_msg) => {
2097 Err(_) => { return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2098 err: "Error deriving keys or signing initial commitment transactions - either our RNG or our counterparty's RNG is broken or the Signer refused to sign".to_owned()
2103 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2104 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
2105 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2108 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan.channel_id()) {
2109 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2110 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
2112 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2120 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2121 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
2122 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
2126 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
2128 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
2129 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
2131 /// Panics if a funding transaction has already been provided for this channel.
2133 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
2134 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
2135 /// keys per-channel).
2137 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
2138 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
2139 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
2141 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
2142 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
2143 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
2145 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::util::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
2146 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &[u8; 32], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2147 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2149 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
2150 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
2151 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2152 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
2156 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
2157 let mut output_index = None;
2158 let expected_spk = chan.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
2159 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
2160 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.get_value_satoshis() {
2161 if output_index.is_some() {
2162 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2163 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
2166 if idx > u16::max_value() as usize {
2167 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2168 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
2171 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
2174 if output_index.is_none() {
2175 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
2176 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
2179 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
2183 fn get_announcement_sigs(&self, chan: &Channel<Signer>) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> {
2184 if !chan.should_announce() {
2185 log_trace!(self.logger, "Can't send announcement_signatures for private channel {}", log_bytes!(chan.channel_id()));
2189 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match chan.get_channel_announcement(self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2191 Err(_) => return None, // Only in case of state precondition violations eg channel is closing
2193 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2194 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2196 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
2197 channel_id: chan.channel_id(),
2198 short_channel_id: chan.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
2199 node_signature: our_node_sig,
2200 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
2205 // Messages of up to 64KB should never end up more than half full with addresses, as that would
2206 // be absurd. We ensure this by checking that at least 500 (our stated public contract on when
2207 // broadcast_node_announcement panics) of the maximum-length addresses would fit in a 64KB
2209 const HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS: u32 = ::core::u16::MAX as u32 / (NetAddress::MAX_LEN as u32 + 1) / 2;
2212 // ...by failing to compile if the number of addresses that would be half of a message is
2213 // smaller than 500:
2214 const STATIC_ASSERT: u32 = Self::HALF_MESSAGE_IS_ADDRS - 500;
2216 /// Regenerates channel_announcements and generates a signed node_announcement from the given
2217 /// arguments, providing them in corresponding events via
2218 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`], if at least one public channel has been confirmed
2219 /// on-chain. This effectively re-broadcasts all channel announcements and sends our node
2220 /// announcement to ensure that the lightning P2P network is aware of the channels we have and
2221 /// our network addresses.
2223 /// `rgb` is a node "color" and `alias` is a printable human-readable string to describe this
2224 /// node to humans. They carry no in-protocol meaning.
2226 /// `addresses` represent the set (possibly empty) of socket addresses on which this node
2227 /// accepts incoming connections. These will be included in the node_announcement, publicly
2228 /// tying these addresses together and to this node. If you wish to preserve user privacy,
2229 /// addresses should likely contain only Tor Onion addresses.
2231 /// Panics if `addresses` is absurdly large (more than 500).
2233 /// [`get_and_clear_pending_msg_events`]: MessageSendEventsProvider::get_and_clear_pending_msg_events
2234 pub fn broadcast_node_announcement(&self, rgb: [u8; 3], alias: [u8; 32], mut addresses: Vec<NetAddress>) {
2235 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2237 if addresses.len() > 500 {
2238 panic!("More than half the message size was taken up by public addresses!");
2241 // While all existing nodes handle unsorted addresses just fine, the spec requires that
2242 // addresses be sorted for future compatibility.
2243 addresses.sort_by_key(|addr| addr.get_id());
2245 let announcement = msgs::UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
2246 features: NodeFeatures::known(),
2247 timestamp: self.last_node_announcement_serial.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel) as u32,
2248 node_id: self.get_our_node_id(),
2249 rgb, alias, addresses,
2250 excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
2251 excess_data: Vec::new(),
2253 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
2254 let node_announce_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, &self.our_network_key);
2256 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2257 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2259 let mut announced_chans = false;
2260 for (_, chan) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
2261 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone()) {
2262 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
2264 update_msg: match self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan) {
2269 announced_chans = true;
2271 // If the channel is not public or has not yet reached funding_locked, check the
2272 // next channel. If we don't yet have any public channels, we'll skip the broadcast
2273 // below as peers may not accept it without channels on chain first.
2277 if announced_chans {
2278 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement {
2279 msg: msgs::NodeAnnouncement {
2280 signature: node_announce_sig,
2281 contents: announcement
2287 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
2289 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
2290 /// Will likely generate further events.
2291 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
2292 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2294 let mut new_events = Vec::new();
2295 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
2296 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2298 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2299 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2301 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.drain() {
2302 if short_chan_id != 0 {
2303 let forward_chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&short_chan_id) {
2304 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
2306 failed_forwards.reserve(pending_forwards.len());
2307 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2308 match forward_info {
2309 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info,
2310 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2311 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2312 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2313 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2314 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2315 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
2317 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
2318 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 10, data: Vec::new() }
2321 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2322 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
2323 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
2324 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
2325 // problem, not ours.
2332 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(forward_chan_id) {
2333 let mut add_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2334 let mut fail_htlc_msgs = Vec::new();
2335 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2336 match forward_info {
2337 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2338 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2340 }, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value },
2341 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), short_chan_id);
2343 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2344 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2345 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2346 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2347 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2349 match chan.get_mut().send_htlc(amt_to_forward, payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(), onion_packet) {
2351 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2352 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2354 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
2356 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap();
2357 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
2358 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x1000 | 7, data: chan_update.encode_with_len() }
2364 Some(msg) => { add_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2366 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2367 // revoke_and_ack before we can add anymore HTLCs. The Channel
2368 // will automatically handle building the update_add_htlc and
2369 // commitment_signed messages when we can.
2370 // TODO: Do some kind of timer to set the channel as !is_live()
2371 // as we don't really want others relying on us relaying through
2372 // this channel currently :/.
2378 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
2379 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
2381 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
2382 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
2383 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger) {
2385 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
2386 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
2388 panic!("Stated return value requirements in get_update_fail_htlc() were not met");
2390 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
2391 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
2392 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
2395 Ok(Some(msg)) => { fail_htlc_msgs.push(msg); },
2397 // Nothing to do here...we're waiting on a remote
2398 // revoke_and_ack before we can update the commitment
2399 // transaction. The Channel will automatically handle
2400 // building the update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed
2401 // messages when we can.
2402 // We don't need any kind of timer here as they should fail
2403 // the channel onto the chain if they can't get our
2404 // update_fail_htlc in time, it's not our problem.
2411 if !add_htlc_msgs.is_empty() || !fail_htlc_msgs.is_empty() {
2412 let (commitment_msg, monitor_update) = match chan.get_mut().send_commitment(&self.logger) {
2415 // We surely failed send_commitment due to bad keys, in that case
2416 // close channel and then send error message to peer.
2417 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
2418 let err: Result<(), _> = match e {
2419 ChannelError::Ignore(_) | ChannelError::Warn(_) => {
2420 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_commitment() were not met");
2422 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to Close-required error: {}", log_bytes!(chan.key()[..]), msg);
2424 let (channel_id, mut channel) = chan.remove_entry();
2425 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
2426 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
2428 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_errors for us.
2429 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, channel.force_shutdown(true), self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel).ok()))
2431 ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_) => { panic!("Wait is only generated on receipt of channel_reestablish, which is handled by try_chan_entry, we don't bother to support it here"); }
2433 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, err));
2437 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2438 handle_errors.push((chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(), handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true)));
2441 log_debug!(self.logger, "Forwarding HTLCs resulted in a commitment update with {} HTLCs added and {} HTLCs failed for channel {}",
2442 add_htlc_msgs.len(), fail_htlc_msgs.len(), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
2443 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2444 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
2445 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2446 update_add_htlcs: add_htlc_msgs,
2447 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2448 update_fail_htlcs: fail_htlc_msgs,
2449 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2451 commitment_signed: commitment_msg,
2459 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
2460 match forward_info {
2461 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
2462 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, amt_to_forward, .. },
2463 prev_funding_outpoint } => {
2464 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload) = match routing {
2465 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2466 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data)),
2467 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_preimage, incoming_cltv_expiry } =>
2468 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage)),
2470 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
2473 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
2474 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
2475 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
2476 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2477 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
2478 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
2480 value: amt_to_forward,
2485 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
2487 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc.value).to_vec();
2488 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
2489 &byte_utils::be32_to_array(self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()),
2491 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
2492 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
2493 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
2494 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
2495 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
2497 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data }
2502 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
2503 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
2504 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
2505 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
2506 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
2507 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
2508 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2509 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
2510 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2511 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2512 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => {
2513 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we didn't have a corresponding inbound payment.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2514 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2516 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
2517 match channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash) {
2518 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
2519 e.insert(vec![claimable_htlc]);
2520 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2522 amt: amt_to_forward,
2523 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage),
2526 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2527 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} for a duplicative payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2528 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2534 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
2536 if let OnionPayload::Invoice(ref data) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
2539 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2540 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2543 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
2544 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2545 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2546 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
2547 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
2548 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
2549 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2551 let mut total_value = 0;
2552 let htlcs = channel_state.claimable_htlcs.entry(payment_hash)
2553 .or_insert(Vec::new());
2554 if htlcs.len() == 1 {
2555 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = htlcs[0].onion_payload {
2556 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2557 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc);
2561 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
2562 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2563 total_value += htlc.value;
2564 match &htlc.onion_payload {
2565 OnionPayload::Invoice(htlc_payment_data) => {
2566 if htlc_payment_data.total_msat != payment_data.total_msat {
2567 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
2568 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), payment_data.total_msat, htlc_payment_data.total_msat);
2569 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
2571 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
2573 _ => unreachable!(),
2576 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT || total_value > payment_data.total_msat {
2577 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the total value {} ran over expected value {} (or HTLCs were inconsistent)",
2578 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), total_value, payment_data.total_msat);
2579 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
2582 } else if total_value == payment_data.total_msat {
2583 new_events.push(events::Event::PaymentReceived {
2585 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
2586 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
2587 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
2588 user_payment_id: inbound_payment.get().user_payment_id,
2592 // Only ever generate at most one PaymentReceived
2593 // per registered payment_hash, even if it isn't
2595 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
2597 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
2598 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
2605 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
2606 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
2614 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
2615 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source, &payment_hash, failure_reason);
2618 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2619 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2622 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
2623 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2624 events.append(&mut new_events);
2627 /// Free the background events, generally called from timer_tick_occurred.
2629 /// Exposed for testing to allow us to process events quickly without generating accidental
2630 /// BroadcastChannelUpdate events in timer_tick_occurred.
2632 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
2633 fn process_background_events(&self) -> bool {
2634 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
2635 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
2636 if background_events.is_empty() {
2640 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
2642 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)) => {
2643 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
2644 // monitor updating completing.
2645 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, update);
2652 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2653 /// Process background events, for functional testing
2654 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
2655 self.process_background_events();
2658 fn update_channel_fee(&self, short_to_id: &mut HashMap<u64, [u8; 32]>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<events::MessageSendEvent>, chan_id: &[u8; 32], chan: &mut Channel<Signer>, new_feerate: u32) -> (bool, NotifyOption, Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>) {
2659 if !chan.is_outbound() { return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(())); }
2660 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
2661 if new_feerate <= chan.get_feerate() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.get_feerate() {
2662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2663 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2664 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2666 if !chan.is_live() {
2667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
2668 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2669 return (true, NotifyOption::SkipPersist, Ok(()));
2671 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
2672 log_bytes!(chan_id[..]), chan.get_feerate(), new_feerate);
2674 let mut retain_channel = true;
2675 let res = match chan.send_update_fee_and_commit(new_feerate, &self.logger) {
2678 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2679 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2683 let ret_err = match res {
2684 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update))) => {
2685 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
2686 let (res, drop) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_id);
2687 if drop { retain_channel = false; }
2690 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
2691 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2692 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2693 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2694 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2695 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2696 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2697 update_fee: Some(update_fee),
2707 (retain_channel, NotifyOption::DoPersist, ret_err)
2711 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
2712 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
2713 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
2714 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
2715 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
2716 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2717 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2719 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2721 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2723 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2724 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2725 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2726 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2727 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2728 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2729 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2731 handle_errors.push(err);
2741 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
2743 /// This currently includes:
2744 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
2745 /// * Broadcasting `ChannelUpdate` messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
2746 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
2749 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through `chain::Watch::update_channel` calls or feerate
2750 /// estimate fetches.
2751 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
2752 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
2753 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2754 if self.process_background_events() { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2756 let new_feerate = self.fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2758 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
2760 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2761 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
2762 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
2763 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
2764 channel_state.by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| {
2765 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
2766 let (retain_channel, chan_needs_persist, err) = self.update_channel_fee(short_to_id, pending_msg_events, chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
2767 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2769 handle_errors.push((err, counterparty_node_id));
2771 if !retain_channel { return false; }
2773 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
2774 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, chan_id);
2775 handle_errors.push((Err(err), chan.get_counterparty_node_id()));
2776 if needs_close { return false; }
2779 match chan.channel_update_status() {
2780 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged),
2781 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged),
2782 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
2783 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
2784 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged if !chan.is_live() => {
2785 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2786 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2790 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2791 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
2793 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged if chan.is_live() => {
2794 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2795 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2799 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2800 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
2809 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
2810 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
2816 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
2817 /// after a PaymentReceived event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
2818 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
2819 /// Returns false if no payment was found to fail backwards, true if the process of failing the
2820 /// HTLC backwards has been started.
2821 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) -> bool {
2822 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
2824 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
2825 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(payment_hash);
2826 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
2827 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
2828 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
2829 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
2830 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
2831 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
2832 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
2833 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), payment_hash,
2834 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
2840 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
2841 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
2842 // be surfaced to the user.
2843 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(&self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: [u8; 32]) {
2844 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
2846 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { .. }) => {
2847 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) =
2848 match self.channel_state.lock().unwrap().by_id.entry(channel_id) {
2849 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) => {
2850 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&chan_entry.get()) {
2851 (0x1000|7, upd.encode_with_len())
2853 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2856 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
2858 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
2859 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state,
2860 htlc_src, &payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data: onion_failure_data});
2862 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
2863 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2864 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2865 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2866 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
2867 if sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2868 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2869 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2871 rejected_by_dest: false,
2872 network_update: None,
2873 all_paths_failed: sessions.get().len() == 0,
2880 if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2885 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2892 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
2893 /// Note that while we take a channel_state lock as input, we do *not* assume consistency here.
2894 /// There are several callsites that do stupid things like loop over a list of payment_hashes
2895 /// to fail and take the channel_state lock for each iteration (as we take ownership and may
2896 /// drop it). In other words, no assumptions are made that entries in claimable_htlcs point to
2897 /// still-available channels.
2898 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: HTLCFailReason) {
2899 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
2900 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
2901 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
2904 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
2905 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
2906 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2908 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
2909 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
2910 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
2911 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
2912 let mut all_paths_failed = false;
2913 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut sessions) = outbounds.entry(mpp_id) {
2914 if !sessions.get_mut().remove(&session_priv_bytes) {
2915 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2918 if sessions.get().len() == 0 {
2919 all_paths_failed = true;
2923 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fail for HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2926 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing outbound payment HTLC with payment_hash {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2927 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
2928 match &onion_error {
2929 &HTLCFailReason::LightningError { ref err } => {
2931 let (network_update, payment_retryable, onion_error_code, onion_error_data) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2933 let (network_update, payment_retryable, _, _) = onion_utils::process_onion_failure(&self.secp_ctx, &self.logger, &source, err.data.clone());
2934 // TODO: If we decided to blame ourselves (or one of our channels) in
2935 // process_onion_failure we should close that channel as it implies our
2936 // next-hop is needlessly blaming us!
2937 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2938 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2939 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2940 rejected_by_dest: !payment_retryable,
2944 error_code: onion_error_code,
2946 error_data: onion_error_data
2950 &HTLCFailReason::Reason {
2956 // we get a fail_malformed_htlc from the first hop
2957 // TODO: We'd like to generate a NetworkUpdate for temporary
2958 // failures here, but that would be insufficient as get_route
2959 // generally ignores its view of our own channels as we provide them via
2961 // TODO: For non-temporary failures, we really should be closing the
2962 // channel here as we apparently can't relay through them anyway.
2963 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
2964 events::Event::PaymentFailed {
2965 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
2966 rejected_by_dest: path.len() == 1,
2967 network_update: None,
2970 error_code: Some(*failure_code),
2972 error_data: Some(data.clone()),
2978 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { short_channel_id, htlc_id, incoming_packet_shared_secret, .. }) => {
2979 let err_packet = match onion_error {
2980 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code, data } => {
2981 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with code {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), failure_code);
2982 let packet = onion_utils::build_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, failure_code, &data[..]).encode();
2983 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &packet)
2985 HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err } => {
2986 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards with pre-built LightningError", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
2987 onion_utils::encrypt_failure_packet(&incoming_packet_shared_secret, &err.data)
2991 let mut forward_event = None;
2992 if channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
2993 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS));
2995 match channel_state_lock.forward_htlcs.entry(short_channel_id) {
2996 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
2997 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet });
2999 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3000 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet }));
3003 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3004 if let Some(time) = forward_event {
3005 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3006 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3007 time_forwardable: time
3014 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to a PaymentReceived event, returning true and
3015 /// generating message events for the net layer to claim the payment, if possible. Thus, you
3016 /// should probably kick the net layer to go send messages if this returns true!
3018 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
3019 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentReceived`
3020 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
3021 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
3023 /// May panic if called except in response to a PaymentReceived event.
3025 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
3026 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
3027 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> bool {
3028 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3030 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3032 let mut channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap());
3033 let removed_source = channel_state.as_mut().unwrap().claimable_htlcs.remove(&payment_hash);
3034 if let Some(mut sources) = removed_source {
3035 assert!(!sources.is_empty());
3037 // If we are claiming an MPP payment, we have to take special care to ensure that each
3038 // channel exists before claiming all of the payments (inside one lock).
3039 // Note that channel existance is sufficient as we should always get a monitor update
3040 // which will take care of the real HTLC claim enforcement.
3042 // If we find an HTLC which we would need to claim but for which we do not have a
3043 // channel, we will fail all parts of the MPP payment. While we could wait and see if
3044 // the sender retries the already-failed path(s), it should be a pretty rare case where
3045 // we got all the HTLCs and then a channel closed while we were waiting for the user to
3046 // provide the preimage, so worrying too much about the optimal handling isn't worth
3048 let mut valid_mpp = true;
3049 for htlc in sources.iter() {
3050 if let None = channel_state.as_ref().unwrap().short_to_id.get(&htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3056 let mut errs = Vec::new();
3057 let mut claimed_any_htlcs = false;
3058 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
3060 if channel_state.is_none() { channel_state = Some(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap()); }
3061 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
3062 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(
3063 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height()));
3064 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_state.take().unwrap(),
3065 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop), &payment_hash,
3066 HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000|15, data: htlc_msat_height_data });
3068 match self.claim_funds_from_hop(channel_state.as_mut().unwrap(), htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage) {
3069 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) => {
3070 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
3071 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
3072 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
3073 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
3074 claimed_any_htlcs = true;
3075 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
3077 ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed => unreachable!("We already checked for channel existence, we can't fail here!"),
3078 ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim => {
3079 // While we should never get here in most cases, if we do, it likely
3080 // indicates that the HTLC was timed out some time ago and is no longer
3081 // available to be claimed. Thus, it does not make sense to set
3082 // `claimed_any_htlcs`.
3084 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(_) => claimed_any_htlcs = true,
3089 // Now that we've done the entire above loop in one lock, we can handle any errors
3090 // which were generated.
3091 channel_state.take();
3093 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
3094 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3095 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
3102 fn claim_funds_from_hop(&self, channel_state_lock: &mut MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> ClaimFundsFromHop {
3103 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
3104 let channel_state = &mut **channel_state_lock;
3105 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
3106 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3108 return ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed
3112 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) = channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3113 match chan.get_mut().get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger) {
3114 Ok(msgs_monitor_option) => {
3115 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { msgs, htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = msgs_monitor_option {
3116 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3117 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Debug },
3118 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3119 payment_preimage, e);
3120 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(
3121 chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3122 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, msgs.is_some()).unwrap_err(),
3123 Some(htlc_value_msat)
3126 if let Some((msg, commitment_signed)) = msgs {
3127 log_debug!(self.logger, "Claiming funds for HTLC with preimage {} resulted in a commitment_signed for channel {}",
3128 log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0), log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3129 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3130 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3131 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3132 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3133 update_fulfill_htlcs: vec![msg],
3134 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3135 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3141 return ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(htlc_value_msat);
3143 return ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim;
3146 Err((e, monitor_update)) => {
3147 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3148 log_given_level!(self.logger, if e == ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure { Level::Error } else { Level::Info },
3149 "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?} immediately prior to force-close: {:?}",
3150 payment_preimage, e);
3152 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id();
3153 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan.get_mut(), &chan_id);
3155 chan.remove_entry();
3157 return ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(counterparty_node_id, res, None);
3160 } else { unreachable!(); }
3163 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, mut channel_state_lock: MutexGuard<ChannelHolder<Signer>>, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool) {
3165 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, mpp_id, .. } => {
3166 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3167 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
3168 session_priv_bytes.copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
3169 let mut outbounds = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
3170 let found_payment = if let Some(mut sessions) = outbounds.remove(&mpp_id) {
3171 sessions.remove(&session_priv_bytes)
3174 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(
3175 events::Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage }
3178 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received duplicative fulfill for HTLC with payment_preimage {}", log_bytes!(payment_preimage.0));
3181 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
3182 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
3183 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(&mut channel_state_lock, hop_data, payment_preimage);
3184 let claimed_htlc = if let ClaimFundsFromHop::DuplicateClaim = res { false } else { true };
3185 let htlc_claim_value_msat = match res {
3186 ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(_, _, amt_opt) => amt_opt,
3187 ClaimFundsFromHop::Success(amt) => Some(amt),
3190 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::PrevHopForceClosed = res {
3191 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3192 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
3193 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3194 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3197 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
3198 // receiving an offchain preimage event from the forward link (the
3199 // event being update_fulfill_htlc).
3200 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_outpoint, preimage_update) {
3201 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
3202 payment_preimage, e);
3204 // Note that we do *not* set `claimed_htlc` to false here. In fact, this
3205 // totally could be a duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing
3206 // without interrogating the `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above
3207 // update to. Instead, we simply document in `PaymentForwarded` that this
3210 mem::drop(channel_state_lock);
3211 if let ClaimFundsFromHop::MonitorUpdateFail(pk, err, _) = res {
3212 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
3213 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
3217 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
3218 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
3219 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
3222 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3223 pending_events.push(events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
3225 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
3233 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
3234 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3235 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
3238 /// Restores a single, given channel to normal operation after a
3239 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure was returned from a channel monitor update
3242 /// All ChannelMonitor updates up to and including highest_applied_update_id must have been
3243 /// fully committed in every copy of the given channels' ChannelMonitors.
3245 /// Note that there is no effect to calling with a highest_applied_update_id other than the
3246 /// current latest ChannelMonitorUpdate and one call to this function after multiple
3247 /// ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures is fine. The highest_applied_update_id field
3248 /// exists largely only to prevent races between this and concurrent update_monitor calls.
3250 /// Thus, the anticipated use is, at a high level:
3251 /// 1) You register a chain::Watch with this ChannelManager,
3252 /// 2) it stores each update to disk, and begins updating any remote (eg watchtower) copies of
3253 /// said ChannelMonitors as it can, returning ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailures
3254 /// any time it cannot do so instantly,
3255 /// 3) update(s) are applied to each remote copy of a ChannelMonitor,
3256 /// 4) once all remote copies are updated, you call this function with the update_id that
3257 /// completed, and once it is the latest the Channel will be re-enabled.
3258 pub fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64) {
3259 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
3261 let chan_restoration_res;
3262 let mut pending_failures = {
3263 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3264 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3265 let mut channel = match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
3266 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) => chan,
3267 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return,
3269 if !channel.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.get().get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
3273 let (raa, commitment_update, order, pending_forwards, pending_failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked) = channel.get_mut().monitor_updating_restored(&self.logger);
3274 let channel_update = if funding_locked.is_some() && channel.get().is_usable() && !channel.get().should_announce() {
3275 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
3276 // funding_locked and the channel is in a usable state. Further, we rely on the
3277 // normal announcement_signatures process to send a channel_update for public
3278 // channels, only generating a unicast channel_update if this is a private channel.
3279 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3280 node_id: channel.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3281 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel.get()).unwrap(),
3284 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_lock, channel_state, channel, raa, commitment_update, order, None, pending_forwards, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3285 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3286 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3290 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3291 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3292 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3296 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3297 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
3298 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
3301 let channel = Channel::new_from_req(&self.fee_estimator, &self.keys_manager, counterparty_node_id.clone(), &their_features, msg, 0, &self.default_configuration)
3302 .map_err(|e| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id))?;
3303 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3304 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3305 match channel_state.by_id.entry(channel.channel_id()) {
3306 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())),
3307 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3308 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
3309 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3310 msg: channel.get_accept_channel(),
3312 entry.insert(channel);
3318 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3319 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
3320 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3321 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3322 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
3323 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3324 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3325 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3327 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration, &their_features), channel_state, chan);
3328 (chan.get().get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().get_user_id())
3330 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3333 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3334 pending_events.push(events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
3335 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
3336 channel_value_satoshis: value,
3338 user_channel_id: user_id,
3343 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3344 let ((funding_msg, monitor), mut chan) = {
3345 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3346 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3347 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3348 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()) {
3349 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3350 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3351 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id));
3353 (try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.logger), channel_state, chan), chan.remove())
3355 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id))
3358 // Because we have exclusive ownership of the channel here we can release the channel_state
3359 // lock before watch_channel
3360 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) {
3362 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure => {
3363 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
3364 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
3365 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
3366 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
3367 // We do not do a force-close here as that would generate a monitor update for
3368 // a monitor that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we
3369 // don't respond with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
3370 let (_monitor_update, failed_htlcs) = chan.force_shutdown(true);
3371 assert!(failed_htlcs.is_empty());
3372 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id));
3374 ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::TemporaryFailure => {
3375 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
3376 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
3377 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our funding_locked
3378 // until we have persisted our monitor.
3379 chan.monitor_update_failed(false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3383 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3384 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3385 match channel_state.by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
3386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3387 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
3389 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3390 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
3391 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3400 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3402 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
3403 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3404 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3405 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3406 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3407 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3408 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3410 let (monitor, funding_tx) = match chan.get_mut().funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.logger) {
3411 Ok(update) => update,
3412 Err(e) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3414 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
3415 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, false, false);
3419 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3422 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", funding_tx.txid());
3423 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&funding_tx);
3427 fn internal_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3428 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3429 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3430 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3431 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3432 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3433 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3435 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().funding_locked(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3436 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(chan.get()) {
3437 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for {} in response to funding_locked", log_bytes!(chan.get().channel_id()));
3438 // If we see locking block before receiving remote funding_locked, we broadcast our
3439 // announcement_sigs at remote funding_locked reception. If we receive remote
3440 // funding_locked before seeing locking block, we broadcast our announcement_sigs at locking
3441 // block connection. We should guanrantee to broadcast announcement_sigs to our peer whatever
3442 // the order of the events but our peer may not receive it due to disconnection. The specs
3443 // lacking an acknowledgement for announcement_sigs we may have to re-send them at peer
3444 // connection in the future if simultaneous misses by both peers due to network/hardware
3445 // failures is an issue. Note, to achieve its goal, only one of the announcement_sigs needs
3446 // to be received, from then sigs are going to be flood to the whole network.
3447 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
3448 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3449 msg: announcement_sigs,
3451 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3452 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3453 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3454 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3459 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3463 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3464 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
3465 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
3466 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3467 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3469 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3470 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3471 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3472 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3475 if !chan_entry.get().received_shutdown() {
3476 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
3477 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id),
3478 if chan_entry.get().sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
3481 let (shutdown, monitor_update, htlcs) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().shutdown(&self.keys_manager, &their_features, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3482 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
3484 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3485 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update {
3486 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan_entry.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3487 let (result, is_permanent) =
3488 handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state.short_to_id, chan_entry.get_mut(), RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), chan_entry.key());
3490 remove_channel!(channel_state, chan_entry);
3496 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3497 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3498 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3505 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3508 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
3509 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3512 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
3516 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3517 let (tx, chan_option) = {
3518 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3519 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3520 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
3521 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_entry) => {
3522 if chan_entry.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3523 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3525 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_entry!(self, chan_entry.get_mut().closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan_entry);
3526 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
3527 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
3528 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3533 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
3534 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
3535 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
3536 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
3537 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
3538 if let Some(short_id) = chan_entry.get().get_short_channel_id() {
3539 channel_state.short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3541 (tx, Some(chan_entry.remove_entry().1))
3542 } else { (tx, None) }
3544 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3547 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
3548 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
3549 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&broadcast_tx);
3551 if let Some(chan) = chan_option {
3552 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3553 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3554 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3558 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: msg.channel_id, err: ClosureDescriptor::CooperativeClosure });
3563 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3564 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
3565 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
3566 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
3568 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
3569 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
3570 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
3571 //but we should prevent it anyway.
3573 let (pending_forward_info, mut channel_state_lock) = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
3574 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3576 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3577 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3578 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3579 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3582 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<Signer>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
3583 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
3584 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
3585 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
3586 match pending_forward_info {
3587 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
3588 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
3589 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
3590 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &{
3591 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(8 + 128);
3592 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/791
3593 res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(0));
3594 res.extend_from_slice(&upd.encode_with_len()[..]);
3598 // The only case where we'd be unable to
3599 // successfully get a channel update is if the
3600 // channel isn't in the fully-funded state yet,
3601 // implying our counterparty is trying to route
3602 // payments over the channel back to themselves
3603 // (because no one else should know the short_id
3604 // is a lightning channel yet). We should have
3605 // no problem just calling this
3606 // unknown_next_peer (0x4000|10).
3607 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, 0x4000|10, &[])
3610 onion_utils::build_first_hop_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, error_code, &[])
3612 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3613 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3614 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3617 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
3619 _ => pending_forward_info
3622 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3624 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3629 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3630 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3631 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
3632 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3633 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3634 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3635 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3636 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3638 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), channel_state, chan)
3640 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3643 self.claim_funds_internal(channel_lock, htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false);
3647 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3648 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3649 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3650 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3651 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3652 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3653 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3655 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::LightningError { err: msg.reason.clone() }), channel_state, chan);
3657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3662 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3663 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3664 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3665 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3666 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3667 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3668 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3670 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
3671 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
3672 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), channel_state, chan);
3674 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: msg.failure_code, data: Vec::new() }), channel_state, chan);
3677 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3681 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3682 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3683 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3684 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3685 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3686 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3687 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3689 let (revoke_and_ack, commitment_signed, monitor_update) =
3690 match chan.get_mut().commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger) {
3691 Err((None, e)) => try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan),
3692 Err((Some(update), e)) => {
3693 assert!(chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update());
3694 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), update);
3695 try_chan_entry!(self, Err(e), channel_state, chan);
3700 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3701 return_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, true, commitment_signed.is_some());
3703 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
3704 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3705 msg: revoke_and_ack,
3707 if let Some(msg) = commitment_signed {
3708 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3709 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3710 updates: msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3711 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3712 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3713 update_fail_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3714 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3716 commitment_signed: msg,
3722 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3727 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
3728 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
3729 let mut forward_event = None;
3730 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
3731 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3732 if channel_state.forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
3733 forward_event = Some(Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS))
3735 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3736 match channel_state.forward_htlcs.entry(match forward_info.routing {
3737 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
3738 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
3739 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
3741 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
3742 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3743 prev_htlc_id, forward_info });
3745 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
3746 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
3747 prev_htlc_id, forward_info }));
3752 match forward_event {
3754 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3755 pending_events.push(events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
3756 time_forwardable: time
3764 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3765 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3767 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3768 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3769 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3770 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3771 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3772 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3774 let was_frozen_for_monitor = chan.get().is_awaiting_monitor_update();
3775 let (commitment_update, pending_forwards, pending_failures, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail_in) =
3776 break_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3777 htlcs_to_fail = htlcs_to_fail_in;
3778 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
3779 if was_frozen_for_monitor {
3780 assert!(commitment_update.is_none() && pending_forwards.is_empty() && pending_failures.is_empty());
3781 break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::ignore_no_close("Previous monitor update failure prevented responses to RAA".to_owned()));
3783 if let Err(e) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, channel_state, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, commitment_update.is_some(), pending_forwards, pending_failures) {
3785 } else { unreachable!(); }
3788 if let Some(updates) = commitment_update {
3789 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
3790 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3794 break Ok((pending_forwards, pending_failures, chan.get().get_short_channel_id().expect("RAA should only work on a short-id-available channel"), chan.get().get_funding_txo().unwrap()))
3796 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => break Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3799 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id);
3801 Ok((pending_forwards, mut pending_failures, short_channel_id, channel_outpoint)) => {
3802 for failure in pending_failures.drain(..) {
3803 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), failure.0, &failure.1, failure.2);
3805 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [(short_channel_id, channel_outpoint, pending_forwards)]);
3812 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3813 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3814 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3815 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3816 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3817 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3818 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3820 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), channel_state, chan);
3822 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3827 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3828 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3829 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3831 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3832 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3833 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3834 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3836 if !chan.get().is_usable() {
3837 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
3840 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
3841 msg: try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().announcement_signatures(&self.our_network_key, self.get_our_node_id(), self.genesis_hash.clone(), msg), channel_state, chan),
3842 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
3843 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
3844 update_msg: self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3847 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3852 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
3853 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3854 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3855 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3856 let chan_id = match channel_state.short_to_id.get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
3857 Some(chan_id) => chan_id.clone(),
3859 // It's not a local channel
3860 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
3863 match channel_state.by_id.entry(chan_id) {
3864 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3865 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3866 if chan.get().should_announce() {
3867 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
3868 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
3869 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
3870 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3872 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
3874 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3875 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
3876 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
3877 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
3879 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_update(&msg), channel_state, chan);
3882 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => unreachable!()
3884 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
3887 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
3888 let chan_restoration_res;
3889 let (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround) = {
3890 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3891 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
3893 match channel_state.by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
3894 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
3895 if chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
3896 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node!".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
3898 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
3899 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
3900 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
3901 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3902 let (funding_locked, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, monitor_update_opt, order, htlcs_failed_forward, shutdown) =
3903 try_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().channel_reestablish(msg, &self.logger), channel_state, chan);
3904 let mut channel_update = None;
3905 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
3906 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3907 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
3910 } else if chan.get().is_usable() {
3911 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
3912 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
3913 // they have the latest channel parameters.
3914 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3915 node_id: chan.get().get_counterparty_node_id(),
3916 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan.get()).unwrap(),
3919 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.get_mut().workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
3920 chan_restoration_res = handle_chan_restoration_locked!(self, channel_state_lock, channel_state, chan, revoke_and_ack, commitment_update, order, monitor_update_opt, Vec::new(), None, funding_locked);
3921 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
3922 channel_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
3924 (htlcs_failed_forward, need_lnd_workaround)
3926 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
3929 post_handle_chan_restoration!(self, chan_restoration_res);
3930 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_failed_forward, msg.channel_id);
3932 if let Some(funding_locked_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
3933 self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, &funding_locked_msg)?;
3938 /// Process pending events from the `chain::Watch`, returning whether any events were processed.
3939 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
3940 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
3941 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
3942 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
3943 for monitor_event in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
3944 match monitor_event {
3945 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
3946 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
3947 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(preimage.0));
3948 self.claim_funds_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.onchain_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true);
3950 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", log_bytes!(htlc_update.payment_hash.0));
3951 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
3954 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxBroadcasted(funding_outpoint) => {
3955 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
3956 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
3957 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
3958 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
3959 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
3960 if let Some(mut chan) = by_id.remove(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
3961 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
3962 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
3964 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(false));
3965 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
3966 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3970 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), err: ClosureDescriptor::UnknownOnchainCommitment });
3971 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3972 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3973 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
3974 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
3982 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
3983 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
3986 has_pending_monitor_events
3989 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
3990 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
3991 /// update was applied.
3993 /// This should only apply to HTLCs which were added to the holding cell because we were
3994 /// waiting on a monitor update to finish. In that case, we don't want to free the holding cell
3995 /// directly in `channel_monitor_updated` as it may introduce deadlocks calling back into user
3996 /// code to inform them of a channel monitor update.
3997 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
3998 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
3999 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4000 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
4002 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4003 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4004 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4005 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4006 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4008 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4009 match chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.logger) {
4010 Ok((commitment_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4011 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
4012 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id));
4014 if let Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)) = commitment_opt {
4015 if let Err(e) = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(chan.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor_update) {
4016 has_monitor_update = true;
4017 let (res, close_channel) = handle_monitor_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, false, true, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), channel_id);
4018 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), res));
4019 if close_channel { return false; }
4021 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
4022 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4023 updates: commitment_update,
4030 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4031 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4032 // ChannelClosed event is generated by handle_error for us
4039 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
4040 for (failures, channel_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
4041 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id);
4044 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4045 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4051 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
4052 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
4053 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
4054 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
4055 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
4056 let mut has_update = false;
4058 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4059 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4060 let by_id = &mut channel_state.by_id;
4061 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4062 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4064 by_id.retain(|channel_id, chan| {
4065 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
4066 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
4067 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4069 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
4070 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
4073 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
4074 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
4075 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
4076 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4077 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4080 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4081 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4086 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
4087 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
4093 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_err!(self, e, short_to_id, chan, channel_id);
4094 handle_errors.push((chan.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
4101 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4102 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4108 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
4109 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
4111 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
4112 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4113 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
4114 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
4115 // reorganized out of the main chain.
4116 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
4117 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
4118 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
4119 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
4120 if let Some((funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
4121 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
4122 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
4123 assert!(should_broadcast);
4124 } else { unreachable!(); }
4125 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, update)));
4127 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4131 fn set_payment_hash_secret_map(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4132 assert!(invoice_expiry_delta_secs <= 60*60*24*365); // Sadly bitcoin timestamps are u32s, so panic before 2106
4134 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4136 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4137 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4138 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4139 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4140 e.insert(PendingInboundPayment {
4141 payment_secret, min_value_msat, user_payment_id, payment_preimage,
4142 // We assume that highest_seen_timestamp is pretty close to the current time -
4143 // its updated when we receive a new block with the maximum time we've seen in
4144 // a header. It should never be more than two hours in the future.
4145 // Thus, we add two hours here as a buffer to ensure we absolutely
4146 // never fail a payment too early.
4147 // Note that we assume that received blocks have reasonably up-to-date
4149 expiry_time: self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64 + invoice_expiry_delta_secs as u64 + 7200,
4152 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Duplicate payment hash".to_owned() }),
4157 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
4160 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
4161 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you, returning the first and storing the second.
4163 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentReceived`], which
4164 /// will have the [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
4165 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
4167 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
4169 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
4170 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4171 /// [`PaymentReceived::payment_preimage`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived::payment_preimage
4172 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
4173 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> (PaymentHash, PaymentSecret) {
4174 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(self.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
4175 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
4178 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, Some(payment_preimage), min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4179 .expect("RNG Generated Duplicate PaymentHash"))
4182 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
4183 /// stored external to LDK.
4185 /// A [`PaymentReceived`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
4186 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
4187 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
4189 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) must be globally unique. This
4190 /// method may return an Err if another payment with the same payment_hash is still pending.
4192 /// `user_payment_id` will be provided back in [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`] events to
4193 /// allow tracking of which events correspond with which calls to this and
4194 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]. `user_payment_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it is simply
4195 /// copied to events and otherwise ignored. It may be used to correlate PaymentReceived events
4196 /// with invoice metadata stored elsewhere.
4198 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
4199 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
4200 /// before a [`PaymentReceived`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
4201 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
4203 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
4204 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
4205 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
4206 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
4207 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
4209 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
4210 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
4211 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentReceived`] event for some time after the expiry.
4212 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
4213 /// [`PaymentReceived`].
4215 /// Pending inbound payments are stored in memory and in serialized versions of this
4216 /// [`ChannelManager`]. If potentially unbounded numbers of inbound payments may exist and
4217 /// space is limited, you may wish to rate-limit inbound payment creation.
4219 /// May panic if `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` is greater than one year.
4221 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry`
4222 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY`].
4224 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
4225 /// [`PaymentReceived`]: events::Event::PaymentReceived
4226 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::user_payment_id
4227 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, user_payment_id: u64) -> Result<PaymentSecret, APIError> {
4228 self.set_payment_hash_secret_map(payment_hash, None, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs, user_payment_id)
4231 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", feature = "_test_utils"))]
4232 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
4233 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4234 let event_handler = |event: &events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event.clone());
4235 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
4240 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4241 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4242 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4243 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4244 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4247 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
4248 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
4249 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4250 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4252 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4253 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4254 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4255 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4258 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4259 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4261 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
4262 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4265 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
4266 let mut channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4267 mem::swap(&mut pending_events, &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events);
4269 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4270 events.replace(pending_events);
4279 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4281 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4282 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4283 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4284 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4287 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
4289 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
4290 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
4292 /// Pending events are persisted as part of [`ChannelManager`]. While these events are cleared
4293 /// when processed, an [`EventHandler`] must be able to handle previously seen events when
4294 /// restarting from an old state.
4295 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
4296 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4297 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4299 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
4300 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
4301 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
4302 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4305 let mut pending_events = mem::replace(&mut *self.pending_events.lock().unwrap(), vec![]);
4306 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
4307 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4310 for event in pending_events.drain(..) {
4311 handler.handle_event(&event);
4319 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4321 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4322 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4323 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4324 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4327 fn block_connected(&self, block: &Block, height: u32) {
4329 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
4330 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), block.header.prev_blockhash,
4331 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
4332 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
4333 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
4336 let txdata: Vec<_> = block.txdata.iter().enumerate().collect();
4337 self.transactions_confirmed(&block.header, &txdata, height);
4338 self.best_block_updated(&block.header, height);
4341 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4342 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4343 let new_height = height - 1;
4345 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
4346 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
4347 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
4348 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
4349 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
4350 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
4353 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, &self.logger));
4357 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4359 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4360 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4361 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4362 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4365 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
4366 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4367 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4368 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4370 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4371 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
4373 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4374 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, &self.logger).map(|a| (a, Vec::new())));
4377 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
4378 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4379 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4380 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4382 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
4383 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
4385 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4387 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
4389 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, &self.logger));
4391 macro_rules! max_time {
4392 ($timestamp: expr) => {
4394 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
4395 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
4396 // having an explicit local time source.
4397 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
4398 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
4399 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
4400 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
4401 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
4407 max_time!(self.last_node_announcement_serial);
4408 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
4409 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4410 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
4411 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
4415 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<Txid> {
4416 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4417 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(channel_state.short_to_id.len());
4418 for chan in channel_state.by_id.values() {
4419 if let Some(funding_txo) = chan.get_funding_txo() {
4420 res.push(funding_txo.txid);
4426 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
4427 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4428 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
4429 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.get_funding_txo() {
4430 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
4431 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|_| (None, Vec::new()))
4432 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4433 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
4438 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4440 M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4441 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4442 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4443 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4446 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
4447 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
4449 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<Signer>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage>>
4450 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
4451 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4452 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
4453 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4455 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4456 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4458 let mut channel_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4459 let channel_state = &mut *channel_lock;
4460 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4461 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4462 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, channel| {
4463 let res = f(channel);
4464 if let Ok((chan_res, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs)) = res {
4465 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
4466 let chan_update = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(&channel).map(|u| u.encode_with_len()).unwrap(); // Cannot add/recv HTLCs before we have a short_id so unwrap is safe
4467 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4468 failure_code: 0x1000 | 14, // expiry_too_soon, or at least it is now
4472 if let Some(funding_locked) = chan_res {
4473 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked {
4474 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4475 msg: funding_locked,
4477 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = self.get_announcement_sigs(channel) {
4478 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked and announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4479 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
4480 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4481 msg: announcement_sigs,
4483 } else if channel.is_usable() {
4484 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures but with private channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4485 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4486 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4487 msg: self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel).unwrap(),
4490 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending funding_locked WITHOUT announcement_signatures for {}", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
4492 short_to_id.insert(channel.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(), channel.channel_id());
4494 } else if let Err(e) = res {
4495 if let Some(short_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
4496 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4498 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
4499 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
4500 failed_channels.push(channel.force_shutdown(true));
4501 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
4502 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4506 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: channel.channel_id(), err: ClosureDescriptor::UnknownOnchainCommitment });
4507 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4508 node_id: channel.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4509 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: e },
4516 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
4517 channel_state.claimable_htlcs.retain(|payment_hash, htlcs| {
4518 htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4519 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
4520 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
4521 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
4522 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
4523 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
4524 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc.value).to_vec();
4525 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array(height));
4526 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(), HTLCFailReason::Reason {
4527 failure_code: 0x4000 | 15,
4528 data: htlc_msat_height_data
4533 !htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
4538 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
4540 for (source, payment_hash, reason) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
4541 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(self.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), source, &payment_hash, reason);
4545 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted or a timeout is reached. It returns a bool
4546 /// indicating whether persistence is necessary. Only one listener on
4547 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4549 /// Note that the feature `allow_wallclock_use` must be enabled to use this function.
4550 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4551 pub fn await_persistable_update_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4552 self.persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(max_wait)
4555 /// Blocks until ChannelManager needs to be persisted. Only one listener on
4556 /// `await_persistable_update` or `await_persistable_update_timeout` is guaranteed to be woken
4558 pub fn await_persistable_update(&self) {
4559 self.persistence_notifier.wait()
4562 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4563 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
4564 let mutcond = &self.persistence_notifier.persistence_lock;
4565 let &(ref mtx, _) = mutcond;
4566 let guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4570 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
4571 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
4572 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
4573 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
4577 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref , T: Deref , K: Deref , F: Deref , L: Deref >
4578 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
4579 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
4580 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
4581 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
4582 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
4585 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
4586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4587 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4590 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
4591 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4592 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4595 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
4596 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4597 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4600 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
4601 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4602 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4605 fn handle_funding_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) {
4606 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4607 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_locked(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4610 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
4611 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4612 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, their_features, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4615 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
4616 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4617 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4620 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
4621 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4622 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4625 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
4626 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4627 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4630 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
4631 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4632 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4635 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
4636 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4637 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4640 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
4641 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4642 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4645 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
4646 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4647 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4650 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
4651 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4652 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4655 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
4656 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4657 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4660 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
4661 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4662 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
4665 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
4670 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
4671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4672 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
4675 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, no_connection_possible: bool) {
4676 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4677 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
4678 let mut no_channels_remain = true;
4680 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4681 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4682 let short_to_id = &mut channel_state.short_to_id;
4683 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4684 if no_connection_possible {
4685 log_debug!(self.logger, "Failing all channels with {} due to no_connection_possible", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4686 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4687 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4688 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4689 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4691 failed_channels.push(chan.force_shutdown(true));
4692 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4693 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4697 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), err: ClosureDescriptor::DisconnectedPeer });
4704 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4705 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4706 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4707 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
4708 if chan.is_shutdown() {
4709 if let Some(short_id) = chan.get_short_channel_id() {
4710 short_to_id.remove(&short_id);
4712 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push(events::Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id: chan.channel_id(), err: ClosureDescriptor::ProcessingError });
4715 no_channels_remain = false;
4721 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
4723 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4724 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4725 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4726 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4727 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4728 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4729 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4730 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4731 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4732 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4733 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4734 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4735 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
4736 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
4737 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4738 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { ref node_id, .. } => node_id != counterparty_node_id,
4739 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
4740 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
4741 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
4745 if no_channels_remain {
4746 self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap().remove(counterparty_node_id);
4749 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
4750 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
4754 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init) {
4755 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
4757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4760 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4761 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
4762 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4763 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
4764 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
4767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
4768 e.get().lock().unwrap().latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
4773 let mut channel_state_lock = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
4774 let channel_state = &mut *channel_state_lock;
4775 let pending_msg_events = &mut channel_state.pending_msg_events;
4776 channel_state.by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
4777 if chan.get_counterparty_node_id() == *counterparty_node_id {
4778 if !chan.have_received_message() {
4779 // If we created this (outbound) channel while we were disconnected from the
4780 // peer we probably failed to send the open_channel message, which is now
4781 // lost. We can't have had anything pending related to this channel, so we just
4785 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
4786 node_id: chan.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4787 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
4793 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
4796 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
4797 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier);
4799 if msg.channel_id == [0; 32] {
4800 for chan in self.list_channels() {
4801 if chan.counterparty.node_id == *counterparty_node_id {
4802 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4803 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4807 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
4808 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, Some(counterparty_node_id));
4813 /// Used to signal to the ChannelManager persister that the manager needs to be re-persisted to
4814 /// disk/backups, through `await_persistable_update_timeout` and `await_persistable_update`.
4815 struct PersistenceNotifier {
4816 /// Users won't access the persistence_lock directly, but rather wait on its bool using
4817 /// `wait_timeout` and `wait`.
4818 persistence_lock: (Mutex<bool>, Condvar),
4821 impl PersistenceNotifier {
4824 persistence_lock: (Mutex::new(false), Condvar::new()),
4830 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4831 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4836 guard = cvar.wait(guard).unwrap();
4837 let result = *guard;
4845 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "allow_wallclock_use"))]
4846 fn wait_timeout(&self, max_wait: Duration) -> bool {
4847 let current_time = Instant::now();
4849 let &(ref mtx, ref cvar) = &self.persistence_lock;
4850 let mut guard = mtx.lock().unwrap();
4855 guard = cvar.wait_timeout(guard, max_wait).unwrap().0;
4856 // Due to spurious wakeups that can happen on `wait_timeout`, here we need to check if the
4857 // desired wait time has actually passed, and if not then restart the loop with a reduced wait
4858 // time. Note that this logic can be highly simplified through the use of
4859 // `Condvar::wait_while` and `Condvar::wait_timeout_while`, if and when our MSRV is raised to
4861 let elapsed = current_time.elapsed();
4862 let result = *guard;
4863 if result || elapsed >= max_wait {
4867 match max_wait.checked_sub(elapsed) {
4868 None => return result,
4874 // Signal to the ChannelManager persister that there are updates necessitating persisting to disk.
4876 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &self.persistence_lock;
4877 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
4878 *persistence_lock = true;
4879 mem::drop(persistence_lock);
4884 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4885 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4887 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
4889 (0, onion_packet, required),
4890 (2, short_channel_id, required),
4893 (0, payment_data, required),
4894 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4896 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
4897 (0, payment_preimage, required),
4898 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
4902 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
4903 (0, routing, required),
4904 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
4905 (4, payment_hash, required),
4906 (6, amt_to_forward, required),
4907 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required)
4910 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailureMsg, ;
4914 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
4919 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
4920 (0, short_channel_id, required),
4921 (2, outpoint, required),
4922 (4, htlc_id, required),
4923 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required)
4926 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
4927 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4928 let payment_data = match &self.onion_payload {
4929 OnionPayload::Invoice(data) => Some(data.clone()),
4932 let keysend_preimage = match self.onion_payload {
4933 OnionPayload::Invoice(_) => None,
4934 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => Some(preimage.clone()),
4939 (0, self.prev_hop, required), (2, self.value, required),
4940 (4, payment_data, option), (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
4941 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
4947 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
4948 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4949 let mut prev_hop = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4951 let mut payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = None;
4952 let mut cltv_expiry = 0;
4953 let mut keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4957 (0, prev_hop, required), (2, value, required),
4958 (4, payment_data, option), (6, cltv_expiry, required),
4959 (8, keysend_preimage, option)
4961 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
4963 if payment_data.is_some() {
4964 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4966 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
4969 if payment_data.is_none() {
4970 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
4972 OnionPayload::Invoice(payment_data.unwrap())
4976 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
4984 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
4985 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4986 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4989 let mut session_priv: ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper<SecretKey> = ::util::ser::OptionDeserWrapper(None);
4990 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
4991 let mut path = Some(Vec::new());
4992 let mut mpp_id = None;
4993 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
4994 (0, session_priv, required),
4995 (1, mpp_id, option),
4996 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
4997 (4, path, vec_type),
4999 if mpp_id.is_none() {
5000 // For backwards compat, if there was no mpp_id written, use the session_priv bytes
5002 mpp_id = Some(MppId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
5004 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5005 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
5006 first_hop_htlc_msat: first_hop_htlc_msat,
5007 path: path.unwrap(),
5008 mpp_id: mpp_id.unwrap(),
5011 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5012 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
5017 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
5018 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::io::Error> {
5020 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, mpp_id } => {
5022 let mpp_id_opt = Some(mpp_id);
5023 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5024 (0, session_priv, required),
5025 (1, mpp_id_opt, option),
5026 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
5027 (4, path, vec_type),
5030 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
5032 field.write(writer)?;
5039 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCFailReason,
5040 (0, LightningError) => {
5044 (0, failure_code, required),
5045 (2, data, vec_type),
5049 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
5051 (0, forward_info, required),
5052 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
5053 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
5054 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
5057 (0, htlc_id, required),
5058 (2, err_packet, required),
5062 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
5063 (0, payment_secret, required),
5064 (2, expiry_time, required),
5065 (4, user_payment_id, required),
5066 (6, payment_preimage, required),
5067 (8, min_value_msat, required),
5070 impl<Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5071 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5072 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5073 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5074 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5077 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5078 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
5080 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5082 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
5084 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5085 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
5086 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
5089 let channel_state = self.channel_state.lock().unwrap();
5090 let mut unfunded_channels = 0;
5091 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5092 if !channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5093 unfunded_channels += 1;
5096 ((channel_state.by_id.len() - unfunded_channels) as u64).write(writer)?;
5097 for (_, channel) in channel_state.by_id.iter() {
5098 if channel.is_funding_initiated() {
5099 channel.write(writer)?;
5103 (channel_state.forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5104 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in channel_state.forward_htlcs.iter() {
5105 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5106 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5107 for forward in pending_forwards {
5108 forward.write(writer)?;
5112 (channel_state.claimable_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5113 for (payment_hash, previous_hops) in channel_state.claimable_htlcs.iter() {
5114 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5115 (previous_hops.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5116 for htlc in previous_hops.iter() {
5117 htlc.write(writer)?;
5121 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5122 (per_peer_state.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5123 for (peer_pubkey, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5124 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
5125 let peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5126 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
5129 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5130 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5131 for event in events.iter() {
5132 event.write(writer)?;
5135 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5136 (background_events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5137 for event in background_events.iter() {
5139 BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((funding_txo, monitor_update)) => {
5141 funding_txo.write(writer)?;
5142 monitor_update.write(writer)?;
5147 (self.last_node_announcement_serial.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5148 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
5150 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5151 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5152 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
5153 hash.write(writer)?;
5154 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
5157 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5158 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
5159 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
5160 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5161 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbounds.len() as u64;
5163 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
5164 for (_, outbounds) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
5165 for outbound in outbounds.iter() {
5166 outbound.write(writer)?;
5170 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5171 (1, pending_outbound_payments, required),
5178 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
5180 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
5182 /// 1) Deserialize all stored ChannelMonitors.
5183 /// 2) Deserialize the ChannelManager by filling in this struct and calling:
5184 /// <(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)
5185 /// This may result in closing some Channels if the ChannelMonitor is newer than the stored
5186 /// ChannelManager state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
5187 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant ChannelMonitor outpoints the same
5188 /// way you would handle a `chain::Filter` call using ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch() and
5189 /// ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo().
5190 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your ChannelMonitors.
5191 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the ChannelManager.
5192 /// 6) Move the ChannelMonitors into your local chain::Watch.
5194 /// Note that the ordering of #4-6 is not of importance, however all three must occur before you
5195 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized ChannelManager.
5197 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
5198 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
5199 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
5200 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
5201 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
5202 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
5203 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5204 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5205 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5206 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5207 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5210 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
5211 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
5213 pub keys_manager: K,
5215 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5217 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
5218 pub fee_estimator: F,
5219 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
5221 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
5222 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
5223 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
5224 pub chain_monitor: M,
5226 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
5227 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
5228 /// force-closed during deserialization.
5229 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
5230 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
5231 /// deserialization.
5233 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
5234 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
5235 pub default_config: UserConfig,
5237 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
5238 /// value.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
5240 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
5241 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
5242 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
5243 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
5245 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
5248 /// (C-not exported) because we have no HashMap bindings
5249 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>,
5252 impl<'a, Signer: 'a + Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5253 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>
5254 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5255 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5256 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5257 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5260 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
5261 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
5262 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
5263 pub fn new(keys_manager: K, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
5264 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<Signer>>) -> Self {
5266 keys_manager, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, logger, default_config,
5267 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
5272 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
5273 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
5274 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5275 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>>)
5276 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5277 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5278 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5279 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5282 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5283 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
5284 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
5288 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, M: Deref, T: Deref, K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>
5289 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<Signer, M, T, K, F, L>)
5290 where M::Target: chain::Watch<Signer>,
5291 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
5292 K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
5293 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5296 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, Signer, M, T, K, F, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5297 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5299 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5300 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5301 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5303 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5305 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5306 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5307 let mut by_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5308 let mut short_to_id = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
5309 for _ in 0..channel_count {
5310 let mut channel: Channel<Signer> = Channel::read(reader, &args.keys_manager)?;
5311 let funding_txo = channel.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
5312 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
5313 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
5314 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5315 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5316 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() < monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5317 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() > monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5318 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
5319 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
5320 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5321 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5322 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5323 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5324 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5325 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5326 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5327 } else if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
5328 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
5329 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
5330 channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
5331 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
5332 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
5333 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
5334 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
5335 log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
5336 let (_, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.force_shutdown(true);
5337 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
5338 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5340 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.get_short_channel_id() {
5341 short_to_id.insert(short_channel_id, channel.channel_id());
5343 by_id.insert(channel.channel_id(), channel);
5346 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", log_bytes!(channel.channel_id()));
5347 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
5348 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
5349 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
5350 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/rust-bitcoin/rust-lightning");
5351 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5355 for (ref funding_txo, ref mut monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter_mut() {
5356 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
5357 monitor.broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn(&args.tx_broadcaster, &args.logger);
5361 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
5362 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5363 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5364 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
5365 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5366 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5367 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
5368 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
5369 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5371 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
5374 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5375 let mut claimable_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
5376 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
5377 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
5378 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5379 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
5380 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
5381 previous_hops.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
5383 claimable_htlcs.insert(payment_hash, previous_hops);
5386 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5387 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState>)>()));
5388 for _ in 0..peer_count {
5389 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5390 let peer_state = PeerState {
5391 latest_features: Readable::read(reader)?,
5393 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
5396 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5397 let mut pending_events_read: Vec<events::Event> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<events::Event>()));
5398 for _ in 0..event_count {
5399 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
5400 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push(event),
5405 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5406 let mut pending_background_events_read: Vec<BackgroundEvent> = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(background_event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<BackgroundEvent>()));
5407 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
5408 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5409 0 => pending_background_events_read.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosingMonitorUpdate((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?))),
5410 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5414 let last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5415 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5417 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5418 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
5419 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
5420 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
5421 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
5425 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5426 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<MppId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> =
5427 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
5428 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
5429 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
5430 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(MppId(session_priv), [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()).is_some() {
5431 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
5435 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
5436 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5437 (1, pending_outbound_payments, option),
5439 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
5440 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
5443 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5444 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
5446 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
5448 fee_estimator: args.fee_estimator,
5449 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
5450 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
5452 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
5454 channel_state: Mutex::new(ChannelHolder {
5459 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
5461 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
5462 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
5464 our_network_key: args.keys_manager.get_node_secret(),
5465 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &args.keys_manager.get_node_secret()),
5468 last_node_announcement_serial: AtomicUsize::new(last_node_announcement_serial as usize),
5469 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
5471 per_peer_state: RwLock::new(per_peer_state),
5473 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
5474 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events_read),
5475 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
5476 persistence_notifier: PersistenceNotifier::new(),
5478 keys_manager: args.keys_manager,
5479 logger: args.logger,
5480 default_configuration: args.default_config,
5483 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
5484 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(channel_manager.channel_state.lock().unwrap(), htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, HTLCFailReason::Reason { failure_code: 0x4000 | 8, data: Vec::new() });
5487 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
5488 //connection or two.
5490 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
5496 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5497 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5498 use core::time::Duration;
5499 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
5500 use ln::channelmanager::{MppId, PaymentSendFailure};
5501 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5502 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5504 use ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
5505 use routing::router::{get_keysend_route, get_route};
5506 use util::errors::APIError;
5507 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
5508 use util::test_utils;
5510 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5512 fn test_wait_timeout() {
5513 use ln::channelmanager::PersistenceNotifier;
5515 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
5518 let persistence_notifier = Arc::new(PersistenceNotifier::new());
5519 let thread_notifier = Arc::clone(&persistence_notifier);
5521 let exit_thread = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
5522 let exit_thread_clone = exit_thread.clone();
5523 thread::spawn(move || {
5525 let &(ref persist_mtx, ref cnd) = &thread_notifier.persistence_lock;
5526 let mut persistence_lock = persist_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5527 *persistence_lock = true;
5530 if exit_thread_clone.load(Ordering::SeqCst) {
5536 // Check that we can block indefinitely until updates are available.
5537 let _ = persistence_notifier.wait();
5539 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration if updates are
5542 if persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5547 exit_thread.store(true, Ordering::SeqCst);
5549 // Check that the PersistenceNotifier will return after the given duration even if no updates
5552 if !persistence_notifier.wait_timeout(Duration::from_millis(100)) {
5559 fn test_notify_limits() {
5560 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
5561 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
5562 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
5563 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
5564 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
5565 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5567 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
5568 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
5569 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5570 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5571 assert!(nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5573 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5575 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
5576 // to connect messages with new values
5577 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5578 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
5579 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5580 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0].clone();
5582 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
5583 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5584 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5585 // ... but the last node should not.
5586 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5587 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
5588 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5589 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5591 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
5592 // about the channel.
5593 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5594 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5595 assert!(!nodes[2].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5597 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
5599 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5600 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5601 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
5602 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
5603 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5604 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5606 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
5607 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5608 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5610 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
5611 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
5612 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
5613 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
5614 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
5615 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
5617 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
5618 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
5619 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5620 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5621 assert!(!nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5622 assert!(!nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5623 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5624 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5626 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
5627 // the channel info has updated.
5628 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
5629 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
5630 assert!(nodes[0].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5631 assert!(nodes[1].node.await_persistable_update_timeout(Duration::from_millis(1)));
5632 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
5633 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
5637 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
5638 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
5640 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5641 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5642 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5643 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5644 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5645 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5647 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
5648 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5649 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5650 let (payment_preimage, our_payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[1]);
5651 let mpp_id = MppId([42; 32]);
5652 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
5653 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
5654 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
5655 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5656 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5657 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5658 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5659 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
5661 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
5662 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5663 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5664 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5665 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5666 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5667 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5668 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5669 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5670 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5671 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5672 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5673 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5674 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5675 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5676 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5677 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5678 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5679 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5680 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5681 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5682 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5683 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5684 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5685 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, our_payment_hash, true);
5687 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
5688 nodes[0].node.send_payment_along_path(&route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, mpp_id, &None).unwrap();
5689 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5690 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5691 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5692 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
5694 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
5695 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
5696 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
5697 // lightning messages manually.
5698 assert!(nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
5699 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
5700 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5701 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5702 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
5703 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5704 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5705 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
5706 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5707 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5708 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
5709 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5710 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5711 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
5712 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5713 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5714 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5715 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
5716 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5717 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5718 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
5719 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5720 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
5721 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5722 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5723 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
5724 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5726 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate 1 event upon the first path's success. No
5727 // further events will be generated for subsequence path successes.
5728 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5730 Event::PaymentSent { payment_preimage: ref preimage } => {
5731 assert_eq!(payment_preimage, *preimage);
5733 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
5738 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
5739 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
5740 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
5741 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
5742 // fails as expected.
5743 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5744 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5745 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5746 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5747 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5748 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5750 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
5751 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
5752 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
5754 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
5755 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5756 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5757 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5758 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5759 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5760 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5761 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5762 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5763 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5764 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5765 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5766 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5767 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5768 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5769 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5770 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5771 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5772 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5773 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5774 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5775 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5776 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5777 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5778 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5779 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, payment_hash, true);
5781 // Finally, claim the original payment.
5782 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5784 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
5785 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5786 let route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &Vec::new(), 100_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5787 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage)).unwrap();
5788 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5789 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5790 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5791 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
5792 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
5793 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
5795 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
5796 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5797 nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
5798 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5799 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
5800 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
5801 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
5802 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
5803 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
5804 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
5805 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
5806 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5807 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5808 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5809 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1], events);
5810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
5811 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
5812 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
5813 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5814 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
5815 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5816 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5817 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
5818 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
5819 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
5820 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], events, payment_hash, true);
5822 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
5823 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
5827 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
5828 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
5829 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
5830 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5831 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5832 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5833 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5835 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5836 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5837 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5838 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5840 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5841 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5842 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5843 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5844 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5845 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5847 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5848 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
5849 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash, &None, Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5850 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5852 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5853 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5854 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5855 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5856 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5857 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5858 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5860 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash".to_string(), 1);
5864 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
5865 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment secret.
5866 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
5867 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
5868 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
5869 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5871 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
5872 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5873 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&payee_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5874 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&payer_pubkey, &msgs::Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
5876 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known());
5877 let network_graph = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph;
5878 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
5879 let route = get_keysend_route(&payer_pubkey, network_graph, &payee_pubkey,
5880 Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()), &vec![], 10000, 40,
5881 nodes[0].logger).unwrap();
5883 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
5884 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
5885 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
5886 let _ = nodes[0].node.send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash, &Some(test_secret), Some(test_preimage)).unwrap();
5887 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
5889 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
5890 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
5891 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
5892 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
5893 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
5894 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
5895 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
5897 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager".to_string(), "We don't support MPP keysend payments".to_string(), 1);
5901 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
5902 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
5903 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
5904 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
5905 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
5907 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5908 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5909 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5910 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3, InitFeatures::known(), InitFeatures::known()).0.contents.short_channel_id;
5911 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5913 // Marshall an MPP route.
5914 let (_, payment_hash, _) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[3]);
5915 let net_graph_msg_handler = &nodes[0].net_graph_msg_handler;
5916 let mut route = get_route(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph, &nodes[3].node.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()), None, &[], 100000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger).unwrap();
5917 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
5918 route.paths.push(path);
5919 route.paths[0][0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
5920 route.paths[0][0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
5921 route.paths[0][1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
5922 route.paths[1][0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
5923 route.paths[1][0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
5924 route.paths[1][1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
5926 match nodes[0].node.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None).unwrap_err() {
5927 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
5928 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err)) },
5929 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
5934 #[cfg(all(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"), feature = "unstable"))]
5937 use chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor;
5938 use chain::channelmonitor::Persist;
5939 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
5940 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
5941 use ln::features::{InitFeatures, InvoiceFeatures};
5942 use ln::functional_test_utils::*;
5943 use ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
5944 use routing::network_graph::NetworkGraph;
5945 use routing::router::get_route;
5946 use util::test_utils;
5947 use util::config::UserConfig;
5948 use util::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
5950 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5951 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5952 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, Transaction, TxOut};
5954 use sync::{Arc, Mutex};
5958 struct NodeHolder<'a, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
5959 node: &'a ChannelManager<InMemorySigner,
5960 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
5961 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
5962 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
5963 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager,
5964 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestLogger>
5969 fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Bencher) {
5970 bench_two_sends(bench, test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
5973 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Bencher, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
5974 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
5975 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
5977 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
5978 let genesis_hash = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5980 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster{txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()), blocks: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Vec::new()))};
5981 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
5983 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
5984 config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth = 1;
5986 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5987 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
5988 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
5989 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
5990 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
5992 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
5994 let node_a_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_a };
5996 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
5997 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
5998 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
5999 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
6000 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
6002 best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
6004 let node_b_holder = NodeHolder { node: &node_b };
6006 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6007 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init { features: InitFeatures::known() });
6008 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
6009 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6010 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), InitFeatures::known(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6013 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
6014 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
6015 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
6017 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, tx.clone()).unwrap();
6018 } else { panic!(); }
6020 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6021 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6023 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
6026 header: BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: genesis_hash, merkle_root: Default::default(), time: 42, bits: 42, nonce: 42 },
6029 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
6030 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
6032 node_a.handle_funding_locked(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6033 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
6034 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
6035 match msg_events[0] {
6036 MessageSendEvent::SendFundingLocked { ref msg, .. } => {
6037 node_b.handle_funding_locked(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
6038 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
6042 match msg_events[1] {
6043 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
6047 let dummy_graph = NetworkGraph::new(genesis_hash);
6049 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
6050 macro_rules! send_payment {
6051 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
6052 let usable_channels = $node_a.list_usable_channels();
6053 let route = get_route(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &dummy_graph, &$node_b.get_our_node_id(), Some(InvoiceFeatures::known()),
6054 Some(&usable_channels.iter().map(|r| r).collect::<Vec<_>>()), &[], 10_000, TEST_FINAL_CLTV, &logger_a).unwrap();
6056 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
6057 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
6059 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
6060 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, 0).unwrap();
6062 $node_a.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret)).unwrap();
6063 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
6064 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
6065 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
6066 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6067 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6068 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6069 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
6071 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
6072 expect_payment_received!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
6073 assert!($node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage));
6075 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
6076 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
6077 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
6078 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
6079 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
6081 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
6084 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, $node_b.get_our_node_id());
6085 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
6086 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
6087 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
6089 expect_payment_sent!(NodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
6094 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
6095 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);