1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
33 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
34 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
42 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
43 // construct one themselves.
44 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
45 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
46 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
47 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
48 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
49 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::{Destination, OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
68 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
69 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
70 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
71 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
72 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
73 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
74 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
76 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
79 use crate::prelude::*;
81 use core::cell::RefCell;
83 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
84 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
85 use core::time::Duration;
88 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
89 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
90 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
92 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
94 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
95 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
96 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
98 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
99 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
100 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
101 // before we forward it.
103 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
104 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
105 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
106 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
107 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
109 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
110 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
112 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
113 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
114 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
115 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
118 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
119 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
120 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
121 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
126 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
127 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
128 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
129 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
130 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
131 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
132 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
136 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
137 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
138 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
139 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
140 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
142 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
143 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
144 /// may overshoot this in either case)
145 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
146 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
147 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
148 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
149 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
152 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
153 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
154 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
155 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
158 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
159 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
160 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
161 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
162 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
165 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
166 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
168 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
169 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
170 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
173 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
174 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
176 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
177 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
180 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
181 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
184 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
188 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
189 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
190 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
191 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
192 short_channel_id: u64,
193 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
195 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
196 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
198 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
199 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
204 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
206 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
207 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
208 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
210 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
211 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
214 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
215 struct ClaimableHTLC {
216 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
218 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
220 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
221 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
222 sender_intended_value: u64,
223 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
225 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
226 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
227 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
228 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
230 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
231 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
234 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
235 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
236 events::ClaimedHTLC {
237 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
238 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
239 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
240 value_msat: val.value,
245 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
246 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
248 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
249 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
250 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
253 /// Number of bytes in the id.
254 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
257 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
258 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
263 impl Readable for PaymentId {
264 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
265 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
270 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
271 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
272 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
276 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
278 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
279 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
280 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
282 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
283 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
288 impl Readable for InterceptId {
289 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
290 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
295 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
296 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
297 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
298 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
299 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
302 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
304 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
305 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
306 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
308 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
309 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
313 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
314 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
315 (0, short_channel_id, required),
316 (2, htlc_id, required),
318 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
319 (0, session_priv, required),
324 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
325 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
326 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
327 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
328 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
331 session_priv: SecretKey,
332 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
333 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
334 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
335 payment_id: PaymentId,
338 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
339 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
340 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
342 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
344 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
346 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
349 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
350 payment_id.hash(hasher);
351 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
357 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
359 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
360 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
361 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
362 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
363 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
364 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
368 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
369 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
370 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
371 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
372 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
373 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
375 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
381 struct InboundOnionErr {
387 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
388 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
390 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
391 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
392 pub enum FailureCode {
393 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
394 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
395 TemporaryNodeFailure,
396 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
397 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
398 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
399 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
400 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
401 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
402 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
403 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
404 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
405 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
407 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
408 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
409 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
412 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
413 fn into(self) -> u16 {
415 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
416 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
417 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
418 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
423 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
424 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
425 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
426 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
427 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
429 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
430 err: msgs::LightningError,
431 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
432 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
433 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
435 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
437 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
439 err: LightningError {
441 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
442 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
449 shutdown_finish: None,
450 channel_capacity: None,
454 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
455 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
458 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
459 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
460 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
461 // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
462 // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
463 // commitment upon reconnecting.
464 msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
466 msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
469 err: LightningError { err, action },
470 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
471 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
472 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
476 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
479 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
481 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
482 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
486 log_level: Level::Warn,
489 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
491 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
493 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
495 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
496 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
504 shutdown_finish: None,
505 channel_capacity: None,
509 fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
510 self.chan_id.is_some()
514 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
515 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
516 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
517 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
518 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
520 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
521 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
522 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
523 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
524 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
525 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
526 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
528 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
532 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
533 struct ClaimingPayment {
535 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
536 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
537 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
538 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
540 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
541 (0, amount_msat, required),
542 (2, payment_purpose, required),
543 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
544 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
545 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
548 struct ClaimablePayment {
549 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
550 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
551 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
554 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
555 struct ClaimablePayments {
556 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
557 /// failed/claimed by the user.
559 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
560 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
562 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
563 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
564 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
566 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
567 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
568 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
569 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
572 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
573 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
574 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
575 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
577 enum BackgroundEvent {
578 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
579 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
580 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
581 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
583 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
584 /// are regenerated on startup.
585 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
586 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
587 /// channel to continue normal operation.
589 /// In general this should be used rather than
590 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
591 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
592 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
594 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
595 /// are regenerated on startup.
596 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
597 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
598 funding_txo: OutPoint,
599 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
601 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
602 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
604 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
605 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
606 channel_id: ChannelId,
611 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
612 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
613 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
614 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
615 /// event can be generated.
616 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
617 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
618 /// operation of another channel.
620 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
621 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
622 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
623 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
625 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
626 event: events::Event,
627 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
629 /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
630 /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
631 /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
633 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
634 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
635 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
636 /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
637 /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
639 /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
640 /// stored for later processing.
641 FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
642 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
643 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
644 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
648 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
649 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
650 // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
651 // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
652 (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
653 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
654 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
655 (4, blocking_action, required),
657 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
658 (0, event, upgradable_required),
659 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
660 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
661 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
662 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
663 // downgrades to prior versions.
664 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
668 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
669 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
670 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
671 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
672 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
675 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
676 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
677 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
678 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
682 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
683 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
684 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
685 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
686 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
687 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
689 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
690 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
691 channel_id: ChannelId,
692 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
697 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
698 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
699 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
700 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
701 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
706 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
707 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
711 /// State we hold per-peer.
712 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
713 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
715 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
716 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
717 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
719 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
720 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
721 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
722 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
723 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
724 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
725 latest_features: InitFeatures,
726 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
727 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
728 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
729 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
730 /// user but which have not yet completed.
732 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
733 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
734 /// for a missing channel.
735 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
736 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
737 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
739 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
740 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
741 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
742 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
744 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
745 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
746 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
747 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
748 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
749 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
750 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
751 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
752 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
753 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
754 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
755 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
756 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
757 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
758 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
762 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
763 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
764 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
765 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
766 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
767 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
770 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
771 && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
772 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
775 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
776 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
777 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
780 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
781 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
782 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
783 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
787 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
788 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
789 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
790 /// The original OpenChannel message.
791 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
792 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
793 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
796 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
797 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
798 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
800 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
801 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
803 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
806 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
807 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
808 struct PendingInboundPayment {
809 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
810 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
811 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
812 /// this payment being removed.
814 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
815 user_payment_id: u64,
816 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
817 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
818 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
821 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
822 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
823 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
824 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
825 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
826 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
827 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
828 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
830 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
831 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
832 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
840 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
842 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
843 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
844 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
849 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
850 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
851 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
852 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
853 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
854 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
855 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
856 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
857 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
859 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
860 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
861 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
870 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
872 &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
873 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
874 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
879 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
881 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
883 pub trait AChannelManager {
884 /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
885 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
886 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
887 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
888 /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
889 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
890 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
891 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
892 /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
893 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
894 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
895 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
896 /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
897 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
898 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
899 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
900 /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
901 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
902 /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
903 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
904 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
905 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
906 /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
907 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
908 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
909 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
910 /// A type implementing [`Router`].
911 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
912 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
913 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
914 /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
915 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
916 /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
917 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
918 /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
919 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
922 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
923 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
925 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
926 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
927 ES::Target: EntropySource,
928 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
929 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
930 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
934 type Watch = M::Target;
936 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
938 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
940 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
942 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
943 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
945 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
947 type Router = R::Target;
949 type Logger = L::Target;
951 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
954 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
955 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
957 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
958 /// to individual Channels.
960 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
961 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
962 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
963 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
965 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
966 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
967 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
968 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
969 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
970 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
971 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
972 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
973 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
975 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
976 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
977 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
979 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
980 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
981 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
982 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
983 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
985 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
986 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
987 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
988 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
990 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
991 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
992 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
994 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
995 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
996 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
997 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
998 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1000 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1001 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1002 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1003 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1004 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1005 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1006 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1007 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1010 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1011 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1012 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1013 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1014 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1018 // `pending_offers_messages`
1020 // `total_consistency_lock`
1022 // |__`forward_htlcs`
1024 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1026 // |__`per_peer_state`
1028 // |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1030 // |__`claimable_payments`
1032 // |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1038 // |__`short_to_chan_info`
1040 // |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1044 // |__`pending_events`
1046 // |__`pending_background_events`
1048 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1050 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1051 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1052 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1053 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1054 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1055 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1059 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1060 chain_hash: ChainHash,
1061 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1067 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1069 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1071 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1072 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1074 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1075 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1076 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1077 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1079 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1080 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1082 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1083 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1084 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1085 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1086 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1087 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1088 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1089 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1091 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1093 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1094 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1096 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1098 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1099 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1100 /// and via the classic SCID.
1102 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1103 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1105 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1107 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1109 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1110 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1111 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1113 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1114 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1116 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1117 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1119 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1120 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1122 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1123 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1124 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1125 /// active channel list on load.
1127 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1128 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1130 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1132 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1133 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1134 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1136 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1137 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1138 /// the handling of the events.
1140 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1141 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1144 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1145 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1146 /// would break backwards compatability.
1147 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1148 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1149 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1151 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1152 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1154 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1156 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1157 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1158 /// confirmation depth.
1160 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1161 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1162 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1164 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1166 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1168 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1170 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1172 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1174 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1175 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1176 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1178 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1179 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1181 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1182 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1183 /// keeping additional state.
1184 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1186 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1187 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1188 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1189 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1191 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1192 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1194 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1195 /// are currently open with that peer.
1197 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1198 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1201 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1203 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1204 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1205 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1206 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1207 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1209 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1210 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1211 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1212 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1213 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1215 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1216 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1218 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1219 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1220 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1221 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1222 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1224 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1225 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1227 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1228 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1229 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1230 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1231 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1233 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1235 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1237 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1238 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1239 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1240 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1241 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1242 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1243 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1244 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1245 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1246 /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1247 /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1249 /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1250 /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1251 funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1253 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1255 event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1256 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1258 pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1262 signer_provider: SP,
1267 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1269 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1270 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1271 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1272 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1273 pub struct ChainParameters {
1274 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1275 pub network: Network,
1277 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1279 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1280 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1283 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1287 SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1288 SkipPersistNoEvents,
1291 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1292 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1293 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1294 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1295 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1296 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1298 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1299 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1300 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1301 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1302 event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1303 needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1305 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1306 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1309 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1310 /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1311 /// events to handle.
1313 /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1314 /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1316 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1317 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1320 fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1321 -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1322 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1323 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1325 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1326 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1327 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1328 should_persist: move || {
1329 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1330 // processing and return that.
1331 let notify = persist_check();
1332 match (notify, force_notify) {
1333 (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1334 (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1335 (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1336 (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1337 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1340 _read_guard: read_guard,
1344 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1345 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1346 /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1347 fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1348 (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1349 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1351 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1352 event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1353 needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1354 should_persist: persist_check,
1355 _read_guard: read_guard,
1360 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1361 fn drop(&mut self) {
1362 match (self.should_persist)() {
1363 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1364 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1365 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1367 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1368 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1369 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1374 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1375 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1377 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1379 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1380 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1381 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1382 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1383 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1385 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1386 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1388 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1390 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1391 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1392 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1393 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1394 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1395 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1396 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1397 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1398 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1399 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1400 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1401 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1402 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1404 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1405 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1407 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1408 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1409 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1410 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1412 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1413 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1414 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1415 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1416 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1417 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1420 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1422 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1423 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1426 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1428 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1429 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1431 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1432 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1433 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1435 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1436 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1437 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1439 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1440 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1441 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1442 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1444 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1445 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1446 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1448 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1449 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1450 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1452 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1453 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1454 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1455 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1456 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1457 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1458 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1459 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1460 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1461 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1462 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1465 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1466 /// to better separate parameters.
1467 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1468 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1469 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1470 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1471 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1472 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1473 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1474 pub features: InitFeatures,
1475 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1476 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1477 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1479 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1481 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1482 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1483 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1484 /// payments to us through this channel.
1485 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1486 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1487 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1488 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1489 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1490 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1491 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1494 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1495 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1496 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1497 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1498 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1499 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1500 /// lifetime of the channel.
1501 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1502 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1503 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1504 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1505 /// our counterparty already.
1507 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1508 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1509 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1510 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1512 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1513 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1514 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1515 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1517 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1518 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1520 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1521 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1523 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1524 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1525 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1526 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1527 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1528 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1529 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1530 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1531 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1534 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1536 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1537 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1538 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1539 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1540 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1541 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1542 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1544 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1545 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1547 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1548 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1549 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1550 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1551 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1552 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1553 /// this value on chain.
1555 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1557 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1559 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1560 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1561 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1562 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1563 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1564 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1565 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1567 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1568 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1569 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1570 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1571 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1572 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1574 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1575 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1576 /// Our total balance. This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1577 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1578 /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1580 /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1581 /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1582 /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1583 /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1585 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1586 pub balance_msat: u64,
1587 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1588 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1589 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1590 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1592 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1594 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1595 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1596 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1597 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1598 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1599 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1600 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1601 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1603 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1604 /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1605 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1606 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1607 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1608 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1609 /// route which is valid.
1610 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1611 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1612 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1613 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1614 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1615 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1617 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1618 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1619 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1620 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1621 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1622 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1623 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1624 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1625 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1627 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1629 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1630 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1631 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1632 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1633 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1635 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1636 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1637 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1638 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1639 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1640 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1641 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1643 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1644 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1645 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1646 pub is_outbound: bool,
1647 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1648 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1649 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1650 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1651 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1653 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1654 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1655 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1656 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1657 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1658 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1659 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1661 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1662 pub is_usable: bool,
1663 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1664 pub is_public: bool,
1665 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1666 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1667 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1668 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1669 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1670 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1672 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1673 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1676 impl ChannelDetails {
1677 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1678 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1679 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1681 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1682 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1683 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1684 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1687 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1688 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1689 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1691 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1692 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1693 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1694 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1697 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1698 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1699 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1702 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1703 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1705 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1706 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1707 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1709 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1710 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1711 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1712 features: latest_features,
1713 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1714 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1715 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1716 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1717 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1718 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1719 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1720 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1721 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1722 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1724 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1725 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1726 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1727 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1728 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1729 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1730 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1731 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1732 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1733 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1734 balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1735 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1736 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1737 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1738 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1739 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1740 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1741 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1742 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1743 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1744 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1745 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1746 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1747 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1748 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1749 config: Some(context.config()),
1750 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1755 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1756 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1757 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1758 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1759 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1760 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1761 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1762 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1763 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1765 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1767 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1768 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1770 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1771 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1772 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1773 /// to drop the channel.
1777 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1778 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1779 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1780 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1781 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1783 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1784 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1785 payment_id: PaymentId,
1787 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1789 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1790 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1791 payment_id: PaymentId,
1792 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1794 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1795 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1796 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1799 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1800 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1801 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1803 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1804 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1805 payment_id: PaymentId,
1806 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1807 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1808 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1810 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1811 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1812 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1814 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1815 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1816 payment_id: PaymentId,
1817 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1818 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1822 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1824 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1826 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1827 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1828 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1829 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1831 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1832 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1833 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1836 macro_rules! handle_error {
1837 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1838 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1839 // entering the macro.
1840 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1841 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1845 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1846 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1848 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1849 $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1850 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1851 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1855 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1856 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1857 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1858 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1859 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1860 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1865 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1866 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1868 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1869 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1870 action: err.action.clone()
1874 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1875 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1876 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1877 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1878 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1882 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1887 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1890 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1891 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1892 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1898 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1899 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1900 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1901 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1902 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1903 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1905 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1906 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1907 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1908 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1909 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1911 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1912 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1914 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1918 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1919 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1920 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1922 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1923 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1925 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1926 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1928 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1929 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1930 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1931 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1932 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1933 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1935 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1936 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1940 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1941 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1943 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1944 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1946 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1947 match $channel_phase {
1948 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1949 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1951 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1952 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1954 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1955 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1961 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1962 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1966 let key = *$entry.key();
1967 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1969 $entry.remove_entry();
1977 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1978 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1982 let key = *$entry.key();
1983 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1985 $entry.remove_entry();
1993 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1994 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1996 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1997 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2003 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2004 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2005 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2006 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2007 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2009 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2010 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2011 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2012 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2013 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2014 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2015 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2016 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2017 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2018 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2023 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2024 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2025 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2026 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2027 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2028 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2029 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2030 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2031 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2033 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2038 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2039 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2040 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2041 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2042 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2043 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2044 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2045 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2046 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2048 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2053 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2054 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2055 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
2056 &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2057 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2058 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2059 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2060 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2061 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2062 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2063 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2065 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2066 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2067 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2073 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2074 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2076 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2077 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2078 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2079 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2080 updates.announcement_sigs);
2081 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2082 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2085 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2086 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2087 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2088 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2090 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2091 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2092 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2093 let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2094 let mut batch_completed = false;
2095 if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2096 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2097 *chan_id == channel_id &&
2098 *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2100 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2101 channel_state.2 = true;
2103 debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2105 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2107 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2110 // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2111 // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2112 if batch_completed {
2113 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2114 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2115 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2116 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2117 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2118 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2119 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2120 batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2121 chan.set_batch_ready();
2122 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2123 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2127 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2128 log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2129 $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2134 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2136 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2137 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2139 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2140 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2141 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2142 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2147 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2148 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2149 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2151 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2152 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2153 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err_str);
2154 panic!("{}", err_str);
2156 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2157 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2158 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2161 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2167 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2168 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2169 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2171 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2172 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2173 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2174 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2175 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2176 // filter for uniqueness here.
2177 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2178 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2179 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2180 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2182 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2183 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2185 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2186 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2187 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2193 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2194 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2195 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2196 while !processed_all_events {
2197 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2204 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2205 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2206 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2208 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2209 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2210 result = $self.process_background_events();
2212 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2213 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2214 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2215 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2219 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2220 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2221 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2222 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2225 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2227 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2228 $event_to_handle = event;
2230 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2231 post_event_actions.push(action);
2236 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2237 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2238 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2239 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2240 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2241 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2244 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2245 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2246 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2247 processed_all_events = false;
2251 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2252 $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2253 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2255 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2256 $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2257 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2263 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2265 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2266 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2267 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2268 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2269 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2270 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2274 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2276 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2278 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2279 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2281 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2283 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2284 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2285 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2288 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2289 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2290 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2292 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2293 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2294 current_timestamp: u32,
2296 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2297 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2298 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2299 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2301 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2302 chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2303 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2308 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2310 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2311 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2312 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2313 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2314 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2315 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2316 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2317 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2319 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2322 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2323 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2325 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2327 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2329 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2331 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2332 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2333 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2334 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2335 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2336 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2337 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2338 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2340 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2350 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2351 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2352 &self.default_configuration
2355 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2356 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2357 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2360 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2361 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2363 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2365 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2369 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2374 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2376 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2377 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2378 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2379 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2380 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2382 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2383 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2385 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2386 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2387 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2389 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2390 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2391 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2393 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2394 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2395 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2396 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2397 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2398 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2400 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2401 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2402 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2403 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2404 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2405 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2408 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2409 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2410 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2412 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2414 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2415 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2417 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2419 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2420 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2421 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2422 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2423 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2424 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2428 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2433 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2435 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2436 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2437 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2439 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2441 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2444 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2447 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2448 node_id: their_network_key,
2451 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2454 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2455 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2456 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2457 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2458 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2459 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2460 // the same channel.
2461 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2463 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2464 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2465 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2466 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2467 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2468 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2469 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2470 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2471 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2475 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2476 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2477 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2485 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2486 /// more information.
2487 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2488 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2489 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2490 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2491 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2492 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2493 // the same channel.
2494 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2496 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2497 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2498 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2499 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2500 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2501 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2502 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2503 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2511 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2512 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2514 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2515 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2517 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2518 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2519 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2520 // really wanted anyway.
2521 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2524 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2525 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2526 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2527 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2529 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2530 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2531 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2532 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2533 let context_to_details = |context| {
2534 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2536 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2538 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2539 .map(context_to_details)
2545 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2546 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2548 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2549 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2550 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2552 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2553 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2554 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2555 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2556 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2557 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2559 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2560 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2561 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2563 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2564 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2565 payment_id: *payment_id,
2566 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2567 total_msat: *total_msat,
2570 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2571 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2573 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2574 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2576 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2581 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2582 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2583 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2584 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2585 Some(transaction) => {
2586 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2587 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2592 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2593 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2594 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2595 reason: closure_reason,
2596 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2597 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2601 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2602 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2604 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2605 let shutdown_result;
2607 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2609 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2610 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2612 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2613 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2615 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2616 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2617 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2618 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2619 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2620 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs, local_shutdown_result) =
2621 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2622 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2623 shutdown_result = local_shutdown_result;
2624 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
2626 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2627 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2628 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2629 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2630 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2634 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2635 "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2637 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2638 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2639 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2640 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2644 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2645 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2646 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2647 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2651 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2657 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2658 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2659 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2661 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2662 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
2663 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2664 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2669 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2670 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2671 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2672 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2675 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2676 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2682 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2683 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2684 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2686 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2687 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2689 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2690 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2691 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2692 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2694 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2696 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2697 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2698 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2701 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2702 /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2703 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2704 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2705 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2706 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2709 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2710 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2711 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2713 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2714 /// the channel being closed or not:
2715 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2716 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2717 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2718 /// fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2719 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2720 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2721 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2723 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2724 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2725 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2726 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2728 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2730 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2731 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2732 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2735 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2736 /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2737 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2738 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2739 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2742 fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2743 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2744 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2745 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2746 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2749 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2750 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2751 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2752 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2753 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2754 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2756 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2757 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2758 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2759 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2760 // ignore the result here.
2761 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2763 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2764 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2765 let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2766 let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2767 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2768 let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2769 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2770 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2771 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2772 if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2773 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2774 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure);
2775 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2778 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2781 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2782 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2785 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2786 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2790 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2791 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2792 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2793 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2794 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2795 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2796 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2797 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2798 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2799 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2800 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2802 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2804 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2805 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2806 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2807 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2808 mem::drop(peer_state);
2809 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2811 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2812 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2813 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2815 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2816 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2817 // Unfunded channel has no update
2818 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2821 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2822 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2823 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2824 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2826 (None, *peer_node_id)
2828 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2831 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2832 // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2833 // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2834 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2835 let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2836 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2837 if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2838 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2839 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2845 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2848 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2849 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2850 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2851 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2853 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2854 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2855 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2856 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2857 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2858 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2859 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2870 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2871 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2872 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2874 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2875 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2876 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2879 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2880 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2881 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2883 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2884 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2885 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2886 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2887 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2890 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2891 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2892 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2893 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2894 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2898 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2899 /// local transaction(s).
2900 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2901 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2902 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2906 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2907 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2908 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2909 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2910 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2911 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2912 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2914 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2915 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2919 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2920 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2921 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2922 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } | msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. } =>
2923 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2924 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2925 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2926 err_data: Vec::new(),
2930 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2931 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2932 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2935 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2936 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2937 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2938 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2939 outgoing_cltv_value,
2940 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2944 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2945 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2946 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2947 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2948 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2949 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2950 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2951 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2953 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2954 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive {
2955 amt_msat, total_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_secret, ..
2957 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData { payment_secret, total_msat };
2958 (Some(payment_data), None, Vec::new(), amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, None)
2960 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { .. } => {
2961 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2962 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2963 err_data: Vec::new(),
2964 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2968 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2969 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2970 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2971 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2973 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2976 // final_expiry_too_soon
2977 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2978 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2980 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2981 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2982 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2983 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2984 if cltv_expiry <= current_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 {
2985 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2986 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2987 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2988 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2989 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2990 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2993 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2994 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2995 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2997 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2999 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
3000 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
3004 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
3005 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
3006 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
3007 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
3008 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
3009 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
3010 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
3011 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
3012 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3013 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3014 err_data: Vec::new(),
3015 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
3018 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
3019 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3020 err_code: 0x4000|22,
3021 err_data: Vec::new(),
3022 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
3025 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
3029 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3032 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
3033 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
3036 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
3037 phantom_shared_secret,
3041 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
3042 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
3043 err_data: Vec::new(),
3044 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
3047 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
3050 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
3051 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
3052 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
3053 outgoing_cltv_value,
3054 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
3058 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3059 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
3060 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
3061 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
3062 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
3064 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3065 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3066 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3067 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3068 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
3069 failure_code: $err_code,
3075 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
3076 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
3079 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
3080 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
3081 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
3083 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
3084 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
3085 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
3086 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
3087 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
3088 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
3089 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
3090 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
3092 macro_rules! return_err {
3093 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3095 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3096 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3097 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3098 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3099 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3100 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3106 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
3107 shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac,
3108 msg.payment_hash, &self.node_signer
3111 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3112 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3114 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3115 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3118 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3119 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3120 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3121 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3124 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3125 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3126 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3128 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3129 // inbound channel's state.
3130 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3131 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } |
3132 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedReceive { .. }, .. } =>
3134 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3138 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3139 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3140 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3141 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3142 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3143 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3144 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3145 // phantom or an intercept.
3146 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3147 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3148 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3152 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3155 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3157 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3158 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3159 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3160 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3161 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3163 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3164 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3165 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3166 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3169 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3170 // have no consistency guarantees.
3171 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3175 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3176 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3177 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3178 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3179 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3181 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3182 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3183 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3184 // we don't have the channel here.
3185 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3187 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3189 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3190 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3191 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3192 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3193 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3194 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3195 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3196 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3197 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3198 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3199 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3201 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3204 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3205 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3207 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3208 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3212 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3213 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3214 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3215 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3217 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3224 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3225 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3226 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3227 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3228 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3229 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3231 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3232 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3234 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3235 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3236 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3237 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3238 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3239 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3240 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3241 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3242 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3243 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3249 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3250 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3251 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3252 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3254 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3255 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3257 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3258 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3259 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3261 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3262 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3263 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3264 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3265 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3266 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3267 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3271 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3273 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3276 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3277 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3278 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3279 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3280 macro_rules! return_err {
3281 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3283 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3284 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3285 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3286 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3287 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3288 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3294 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3296 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3297 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3300 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3301 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3302 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3303 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3304 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3306 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3309 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3310 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3311 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3312 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3313 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3319 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3320 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3321 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3323 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3324 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3325 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3327 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3328 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3329 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3330 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3331 return Err(LightningError {
3332 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3333 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3336 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3337 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3339 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3340 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3343 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3344 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3345 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3346 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3348 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3349 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3350 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3352 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3353 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3354 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3355 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3356 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3357 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3361 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3364 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3365 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3366 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3368 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3369 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3370 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3371 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3372 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3375 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3376 chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3378 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3379 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3380 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3381 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3382 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3383 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3384 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3385 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3387 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3388 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3389 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3391 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3393 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3400 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3401 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3402 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3403 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3408 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3409 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3410 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3413 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3414 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3416 log_trace!(self.logger,
3417 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3418 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3419 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3420 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3422 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3423 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3424 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3426 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3427 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3429 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3430 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3431 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3432 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3435 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3436 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3437 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3438 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3439 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3440 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3441 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3442 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3443 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3444 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3446 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3447 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3448 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3450 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3451 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3453 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3454 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3455 Some(monitor_update) => {
3456 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3458 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3459 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3460 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3461 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3462 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3463 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3464 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3472 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3475 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3476 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3477 // `channel_by_id` map.
3478 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3479 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3484 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3485 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3487 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3492 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3494 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3495 /// fields for more info.
3497 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3498 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3500 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3502 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3503 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3504 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3505 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3506 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3508 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3509 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3510 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3511 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3512 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3514 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3515 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3516 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3517 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3519 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3521 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3522 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3523 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3525 /// In general, a path may raise:
3526 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3527 /// node public key) is specified.
3528 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3529 /// closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3530 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3531 /// relevant updates.
3533 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3534 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3535 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3537 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3538 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3539 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3540 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3541 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3542 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3543 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3544 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3545 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3546 self.pending_outbound_payments
3547 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3548 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3549 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3552 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3553 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3554 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3555 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3557 self.pending_outbound_payments
3558 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3559 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3560 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3561 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3565 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3566 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3567 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3568 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3569 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3570 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3574 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3575 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3576 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3580 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3581 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3584 pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3585 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3586 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3587 self.pending_outbound_payments
3588 .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3589 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3590 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3591 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3592 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3596 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3597 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3598 /// retries are exhausted.
3600 /// # Event Generation
3602 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3603 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3605 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3606 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3607 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3609 /// # Requested Invoices
3611 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3612 /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3613 /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3614 /// once the invoice has been received.
3616 /// # Restart Behavior
3618 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3619 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3620 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3622 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3623 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3624 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3625 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3628 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3629 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3630 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3631 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3632 /// never reach the recipient.
3634 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3635 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3637 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3638 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3640 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3641 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3642 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3643 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3644 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3645 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3646 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3649 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3650 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3652 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3655 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3656 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3657 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3658 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3659 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3660 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3661 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3662 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3665 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3666 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3667 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3668 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3669 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3670 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3671 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3672 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3673 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3676 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3679 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3680 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3683 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3684 /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3686 /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3687 pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3688 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3689 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3690 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3691 let payment_params =
3692 PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3694 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3696 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3699 /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3700 /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3702 /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3703 /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3704 /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3705 /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3707 /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3708 /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3709 /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3710 /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3711 /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3712 /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3713 pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3714 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3715 ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3716 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3718 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3719 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3720 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3721 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3725 .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3727 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3728 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3731 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3733 let mut res = Vec::new();
3735 for mut path in route.paths {
3736 // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3737 // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3738 while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3739 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3740 // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3743 // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3746 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3747 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3749 let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3751 if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3752 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3757 if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3760 "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3765 if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3766 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3767 h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3769 let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3770 let used_liquidity =
3771 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3773 if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3774 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3776 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3779 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3784 res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3785 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3786 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3793 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3794 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3795 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3796 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3797 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3798 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3799 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3800 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3801 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3803 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3804 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3805 let (chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3806 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) => {
3807 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3809 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &self.logger)
3810 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3811 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3812 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3813 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3814 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3815 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3816 } else { unreachable!(); });
3818 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3819 Err((chan, err)) => {
3820 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3821 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3823 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3824 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3825 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3831 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3832 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3834 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3835 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3838 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3839 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3840 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3844 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3845 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3846 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3850 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3851 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3852 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3854 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3855 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3856 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3857 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3859 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3866 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3867 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3868 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3872 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3874 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3875 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3877 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3878 /// across the p2p network.
3880 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3881 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3883 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3884 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3885 /// keys per-channel).
3887 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3888 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3889 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3891 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3892 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3893 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3895 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3896 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3897 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3898 /// for more details.
3900 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3901 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3902 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3903 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3906 /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3908 /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3909 /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3911 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3912 /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3913 /// signature for each channel.
3915 /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3916 pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3917 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3918 let mut result = Ok(());
3920 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3921 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3922 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3923 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3924 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3929 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3930 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3931 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3935 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3936 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3937 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3938 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3939 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3940 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3941 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3942 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3947 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3948 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3949 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3950 Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3954 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3955 match states.entry(txid) {
3956 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3957 result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3958 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3962 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3965 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3966 result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3967 temporary_channel_id,
3968 counterparty_node_id,
3969 funding_transaction.clone(),
3972 let mut output_index = None;
3973 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3974 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3975 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3976 if output_index.is_some() {
3977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3978 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3981 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3984 if output_index.is_none() {
3985 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3986 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3989 let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3990 if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3991 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3997 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3998 // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3999 let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4000 let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4001 channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4002 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4003 .into_iter().flatten()
4004 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4006 channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4007 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4009 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4011 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4012 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4013 per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4014 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4015 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4017 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4018 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context(), ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() });
4019 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
4023 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4024 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4030 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4032 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4033 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4034 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4035 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4037 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4038 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4040 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4041 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4043 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4045 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4046 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4047 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4048 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4049 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4050 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4051 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4052 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4053 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4054 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4055 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4056 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4057 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4061 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4062 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4063 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4064 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4065 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4066 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4067 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4068 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4069 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4070 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4074 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4075 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4076 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4077 config.apply(config_update);
4078 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4081 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4082 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4083 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4084 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4085 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4086 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4093 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4094 debug_assert!(false);
4095 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4097 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4098 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4105 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4107 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4108 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4109 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4110 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4112 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4113 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4115 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4116 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4118 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4120 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4121 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4122 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4123 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4124 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4125 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4126 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4127 pub fn update_channel_config(
4128 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4129 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4130 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4133 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4134 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4136 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4137 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4139 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4140 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4141 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4142 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4143 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4145 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4146 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4147 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4150 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4153 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4154 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4155 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4156 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4157 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4158 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4159 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4161 let next_hop_scid = {
4162 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4163 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4164 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4165 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4166 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4167 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4168 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4169 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4170 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4171 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4174 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4176 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4177 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4178 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4180 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4181 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4182 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4187 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4188 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4189 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4192 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4193 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
4194 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
4196 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4198 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4199 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4200 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4201 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4202 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4205 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4206 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4207 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4208 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4209 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4211 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4215 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4216 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4218 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4221 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4222 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4223 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4225 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4226 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4227 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4230 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4231 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4232 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4233 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4234 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4235 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4236 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4237 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4240 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4241 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4242 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4243 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4248 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4250 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4251 /// Will likely generate further events.
4252 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4253 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4255 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4256 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4257 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4259 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4260 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4262 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4263 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4264 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4266 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4267 match forward_info {
4268 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4269 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4270 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4271 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4272 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4275 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4276 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4277 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4279 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4280 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4281 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4282 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4283 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4284 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4285 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4288 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4289 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4291 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4294 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4295 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4301 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4302 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4304 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4308 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4309 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4311 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4315 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4316 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4317 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4318 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4319 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4320 phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4321 payment_hash, &self.node_signer
4324 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4325 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4326 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4327 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4328 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4330 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4332 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4333 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4337 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4338 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4339 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4340 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4342 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4343 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4349 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4352 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4355 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4356 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4357 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4358 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4359 // problem, not ours.
4365 let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4366 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4367 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4369 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4373 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4374 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4375 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4376 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4379 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4380 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4381 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4382 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4383 match forward_info {
4384 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4385 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4386 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4387 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4388 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4391 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4392 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4393 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4394 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4395 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4396 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4397 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4398 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4399 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4401 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4402 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4403 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4406 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4407 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4409 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4411 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4412 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4413 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4414 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4419 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4420 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4422 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4423 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4424 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4425 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4427 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4428 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4430 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4432 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4433 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4434 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4441 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4445 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4446 match forward_info {
4447 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4448 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4449 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4450 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4451 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4454 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4455 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4456 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4457 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4458 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4459 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4460 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4462 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4463 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4464 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4468 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4469 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4472 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4475 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4476 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4477 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4478 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4479 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4480 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4481 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4482 phantom_shared_secret,
4484 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4485 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4486 // if routing nodes overpay
4487 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4488 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4490 total_value_received: None,
4491 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4494 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4497 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4499 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4500 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4501 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4502 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4503 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4504 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4506 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4507 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4508 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4509 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4510 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4511 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4512 phantom_shared_secret,
4514 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4515 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4517 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4520 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4521 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4522 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4523 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4524 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4527 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4528 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4529 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4530 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4531 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4532 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4534 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4535 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4536 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4538 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4539 .entry(payment_hash)
4540 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4541 .or_insert_with(|| {
4542 committed_to_claimable = true;
4544 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4547 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4548 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4549 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4550 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4552 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4553 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4554 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4556 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4557 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4558 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4561 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4563 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4564 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4565 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4566 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4567 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4568 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4569 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4570 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4571 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4572 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4574 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4576 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4577 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4578 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4579 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4580 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4581 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4583 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4584 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4585 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4586 committed_to_claimable = true;
4588 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4589 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4590 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4591 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4592 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4593 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4594 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4595 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4596 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4597 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4601 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4602 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4603 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4604 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4605 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4607 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4609 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4610 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4612 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4613 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4614 committed_to_claimable = true;
4617 payment_claimable_generated
4621 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4622 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4623 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4624 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4625 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4626 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4627 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4628 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4629 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4630 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4631 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4632 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4633 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4634 Ok(result) => result,
4636 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4637 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4640 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4641 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4642 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4643 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4644 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4645 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4648 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4649 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4650 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4652 check_total_value!(purpose);
4654 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4655 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4656 check_total_value!(purpose);
4660 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4661 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4662 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4663 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4665 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4666 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4667 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4668 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4669 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4670 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4671 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4672 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4674 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4675 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4676 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4678 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4679 if payment_claimable_generated {
4680 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4686 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4687 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4695 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4696 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4697 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4698 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4700 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4701 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4703 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4705 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4706 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4707 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4709 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4711 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4712 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4713 events.append(&mut new_events);
4716 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4718 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4719 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4720 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4722 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4724 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4725 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4726 if background_events.is_empty() {
4727 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4730 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4732 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4733 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4734 // monitor updating completing.
4735 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4737 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4738 let mut updated_chan = false;
4740 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4741 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4742 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4743 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4744 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4745 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4746 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4747 updated_chan = true;
4748 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4749 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4751 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4754 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4759 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4760 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4763 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4764 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4765 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4766 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4767 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4768 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4769 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4771 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4772 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4773 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4774 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4775 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4781 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4784 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4785 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4786 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4787 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4788 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4791 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4792 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4793 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4794 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4795 if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4796 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4797 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4799 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4801 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4802 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4803 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4804 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4806 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4807 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4809 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4810 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4814 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4815 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4816 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4817 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4818 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4819 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4820 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4822 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4823 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4825 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4826 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4827 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4828 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4829 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4830 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4832 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4837 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4838 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4846 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4848 /// This currently includes:
4849 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4850 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4851 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4853 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4854 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4855 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4856 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4857 /// * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4858 /// or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4859 /// The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4860 /// minus two hours in `no-std`.
4862 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4863 /// estimate fetches.
4865 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4866 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4867 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4868 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4869 let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4871 let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4872 let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4874 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4875 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4876 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4877 let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4879 let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4880 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4881 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4882 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4883 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4884 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4886 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4887 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4888 log_error!(self.logger,
4889 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4890 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4891 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4892 shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
4893 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4894 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4895 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4896 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4897 channel_id: *chan_id,
4898 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4909 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4910 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4911 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4912 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4913 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4914 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4915 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4917 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4918 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4923 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4924 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4926 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4927 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4928 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4929 if needs_close { return false; }
4932 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4933 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4934 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4935 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4936 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4937 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4938 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4939 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4941 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4942 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4943 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4944 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4948 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4950 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4953 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4955 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4956 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4957 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4958 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4962 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4964 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4970 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4972 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4973 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4974 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4975 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4976 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4977 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4978 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4979 channel_id: *chan_id,
4980 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4988 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4989 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4990 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4992 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4993 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4994 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4999 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5000 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5001 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5002 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5003 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5004 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5005 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5006 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5012 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5014 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5015 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5020 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5021 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5022 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5023 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5024 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5025 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5026 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5027 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5028 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5029 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5030 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5031 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5032 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5033 // have no channels to the peer.
5034 let remove_entry = {
5035 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5036 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5039 entry.remove_entry();
5042 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5047 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5048 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5049 // This should be unreachable
5050 debug_assert!(false);
5053 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5054 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5055 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5056 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5057 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5058 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5059 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5062 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5063 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5064 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5066 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5067 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5074 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5075 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5076 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5077 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5078 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5081 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5082 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5085 for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5086 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5089 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5090 let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5091 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5092 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5093 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5094 let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5095 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5098 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5099 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5102 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5103 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5104 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5105 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5106 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5113 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5114 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5115 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5117 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5118 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5119 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5120 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5122 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5123 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5124 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5125 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5126 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5127 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5130 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5131 /// reason for the failure.
5133 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5134 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5135 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5137 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5138 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5139 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5140 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5141 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5142 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5143 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5148 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5149 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5150 match failure_code {
5151 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5152 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5153 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5154 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5155 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5156 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5158 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5159 let fail_data = match data {
5160 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5163 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5168 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5169 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5171 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5173 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5174 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5175 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5176 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5177 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5178 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5179 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5181 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5183 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5184 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5186 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5191 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5192 /// that we want to return and a channel.
5193 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5194 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5195 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5196 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5197 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5198 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5199 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5200 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5202 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5203 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5204 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5205 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5207 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5208 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5209 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5210 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5211 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5215 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5216 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5217 // be surfaced to the user.
5218 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5219 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5220 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5222 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5223 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5224 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5225 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5226 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5227 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5228 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5229 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5230 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5232 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5233 debug_assert!(false);
5234 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5237 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5239 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5242 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5243 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5244 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5245 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5249 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5250 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5251 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5252 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5253 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5254 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5255 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5256 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5257 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5258 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5261 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5262 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5263 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5266 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5267 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5268 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5270 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5271 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5272 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5273 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5274 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5276 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
5277 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
5278 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
5280 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5281 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5282 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5283 push_forward_ev = true;
5285 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5286 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5287 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
5289 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5290 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
5293 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5294 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5295 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5296 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5297 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5298 failed_next_destination: destination,
5304 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5305 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5307 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5308 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5309 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5310 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5312 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5313 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5314 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5315 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5317 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5318 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5319 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5321 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5322 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5323 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5324 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5325 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5326 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5327 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5328 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5329 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5332 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5333 /// even type numbers.
5337 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5338 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5340 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5341 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5342 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5345 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5346 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5348 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5351 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5352 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5353 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5354 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5355 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5356 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5357 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5358 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5363 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5364 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5365 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5366 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5367 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5369 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5370 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5371 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5375 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5376 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5377 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5378 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5379 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5380 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5381 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5382 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5383 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5384 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5385 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5394 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5396 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5397 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5398 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5399 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5400 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5401 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5402 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5403 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5404 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5405 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5406 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5407 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5408 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5409 debug_assert!(false);
5413 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5415 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5416 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5417 debug_assert!(false);
5421 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5422 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5424 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5425 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5426 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5427 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5430 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5431 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5432 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5433 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5437 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5438 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5439 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5440 |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5441 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5442 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5445 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5446 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5447 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5448 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5449 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5454 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5455 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5456 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5457 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5458 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5459 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5460 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5462 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5465 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5466 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5467 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5468 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5472 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5473 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5474 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5475 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5477 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5478 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5479 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5480 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5482 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5483 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5484 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5485 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5488 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5489 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5490 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5491 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5495 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5496 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5497 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5500 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5501 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5502 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5503 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5504 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5505 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5506 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5509 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5510 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5511 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5513 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5516 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5517 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5519 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5520 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5521 // monitor update as a background event.
5522 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5523 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5524 counterparty_node_id,
5525 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5526 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5530 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5531 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5536 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5538 log_trace!(self.logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5540 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5541 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5542 downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5543 downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5544 blocking_action: blocker,
5546 (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5548 debug_assert!(false,
5549 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5552 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5553 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5554 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5555 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5556 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5558 let mut found_blocker = false;
5559 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5560 // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5561 // which case we need to only remove the one
5562 // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5563 let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5564 if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5565 *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5567 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5570 debug_assert!(false);
5579 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5580 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5581 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5587 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5588 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5589 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5590 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5591 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5592 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5593 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5594 // again on restart.
5595 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5596 payment_preimage, update_res);
5599 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5600 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5602 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5603 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5604 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5605 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5606 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5607 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5608 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5609 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5610 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5611 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5614 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5615 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5616 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5617 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5618 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5619 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5623 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5624 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5627 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5628 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5629 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5632 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5633 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5634 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5635 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5636 debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5638 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5639 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5640 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5642 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5643 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5646 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5647 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5648 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5649 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5650 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5651 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5652 |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5653 let chan_to_release =
5654 if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5655 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5657 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5658 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5659 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5660 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5665 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5666 // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5667 // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5668 // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5669 // in the background.
5670 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5671 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5672 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5673 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5675 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5676 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5677 funding_txo, update, ..
5679 if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5680 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5681 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5682 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5684 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5690 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5691 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5692 (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5694 if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5695 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5697 monitor_update.updates[0],
5698 ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5703 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5704 // immediately once we get going.
5705 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5708 *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5710 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5713 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5714 if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5715 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5716 downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5717 downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5718 blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5722 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5723 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5724 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5727 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5728 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5730 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5731 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5732 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5733 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5735 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5739 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5740 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5741 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5747 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5748 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5749 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5752 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5753 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5754 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5755 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5757 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5759 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5760 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5761 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5763 payment_purpose: purpose,
5766 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5768 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5772 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5774 sender_intended_total_msat,
5778 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5779 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5781 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5782 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5783 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5786 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5787 downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5789 self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5790 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5791 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5792 Some(blocking_action),
5799 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5800 /// update completion.
5801 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5802 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5803 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5804 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5805 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5806 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5807 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5808 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5809 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5810 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5811 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5812 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5813 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5815 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5817 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5818 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5819 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5820 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5823 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5824 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5826 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5827 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5828 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5833 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5834 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5835 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5836 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5841 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5842 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5843 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5844 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5845 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5850 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5854 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5860 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5861 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5862 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5866 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5867 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5868 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5874 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5875 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5877 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5878 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5880 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5881 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5882 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5883 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5884 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5889 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5890 let mut peer_state_lock;
5891 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5892 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5893 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5894 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5896 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5899 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5900 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5901 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5902 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5903 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5906 let remaining_in_flight =
5907 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5908 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5911 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5912 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5913 remaining_in_flight);
5914 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5917 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5920 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5922 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5923 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5926 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5927 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5928 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5930 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5931 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5932 /// used to accept such channels.
5934 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5935 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5936 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5937 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5940 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5941 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5943 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5944 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5945 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5947 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5948 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5950 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5951 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5953 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5954 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5956 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5957 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5958 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5959 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5962 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5963 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5965 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5966 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5967 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5968 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5969 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5970 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5971 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5972 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5974 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5975 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5976 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5978 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5979 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5980 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5981 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5982 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5983 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5984 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5986 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5990 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5991 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5992 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5993 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5994 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5995 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5996 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5999 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6000 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
6002 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6003 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6004 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6005 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6006 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6007 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6008 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6009 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6012 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6013 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
6017 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6018 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6019 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6021 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6022 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6023 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6026 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6031 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6032 /// or 0-conf channels.
6034 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6035 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6036 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6037 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6038 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6039 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6041 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6042 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6043 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6044 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6045 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6046 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6047 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6051 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6054 fn unfunded_channel_count(
6055 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6057 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6058 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6060 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6061 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6062 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6063 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6064 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6066 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6069 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6070 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6071 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6074 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6075 // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6080 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6083 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6084 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6085 // likely to be lost on restart!
6086 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6087 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6090 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6091 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6094 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6095 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6096 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6097 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6098 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6100 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6101 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6103 debug_assert!(false);
6104 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6106 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6107 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6109 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6110 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6111 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6112 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6113 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6114 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6116 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6117 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6118 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6121 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6122 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6123 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6124 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6125 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6128 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6129 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6131 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6134 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6135 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6136 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6137 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6138 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6139 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6140 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6141 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6142 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
6144 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6145 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6146 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6151 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6152 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6153 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6154 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6155 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6156 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6157 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6160 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6165 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6166 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6167 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6169 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6170 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6173 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6174 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6176 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6177 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6178 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6180 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6184 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6185 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6186 // likely to be lost on restart!
6187 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6188 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6189 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6191 debug_assert!(false);
6192 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6194 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6195 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6196 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6197 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6198 match phase.get_mut() {
6199 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6200 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6201 (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6204 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6208 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6211 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6212 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6213 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6214 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6215 channel_value_satoshis: value,
6217 user_channel_id: user_id,
6222 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6223 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6225 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6226 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6228 debug_assert!(false);
6229 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6232 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6233 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6234 let (chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6235 match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6236 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6237 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
6239 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
6240 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6241 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6242 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6243 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
6244 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
6245 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
6246 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
6247 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
6251 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) => {
6252 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6254 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6257 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6258 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6259 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6260 "Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(),
6261 chan.context.channel_id()
6264 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6265 let mut id_to_peer_lock = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6266 match id_to_peer_lock.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
6267 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6268 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6269 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6270 chan.context.channel_id()))
6272 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6273 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6274 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6275 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6276 mem::drop(id_to_peer_lock);
6278 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6279 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6280 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6281 // until we have persisted our monitor.
6282 if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6283 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6284 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6289 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6290 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6291 per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6293 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6297 log_error!(self.logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6298 let channel_id = match funding_msg_opt {
6299 Some(msg) => msg.channel_id,
6300 None => chan.context.channel_id(),
6302 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6303 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
6312 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6313 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6314 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6315 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6317 debug_assert!(false);
6318 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6321 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6322 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6323 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6324 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6325 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6326 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
6327 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6328 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6329 if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6330 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6333 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned())), chan_phase_entry)
6337 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6341 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6345 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6346 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6347 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6348 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6349 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6351 debug_assert!(false);
6352 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6354 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6355 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6356 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6357 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6358 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6359 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6360 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6361 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6362 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6363 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6364 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6365 msg: announcement_sigs,
6367 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6368 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6369 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6370 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6371 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6372 // announcement_signatures.
6373 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6374 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6375 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6376 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6383 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6384 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6389 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6390 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6393 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6394 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6399 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6400 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6401 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6403 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6404 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6406 debug_assert!(false);
6407 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6409 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6410 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6411 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6412 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6414 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6415 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6416 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6418 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6421 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6422 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6423 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6424 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6426 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6427 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6428 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6429 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6430 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6431 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6435 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6436 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6437 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6438 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6441 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6442 let context = phase.context_mut();
6443 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6444 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
6445 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6446 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
6450 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6453 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6454 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6455 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6456 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6458 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6459 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6465 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6466 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6467 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6469 debug_assert!(false);
6470 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6472 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6473 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6474 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6475 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6476 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6477 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6478 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6479 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6480 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6481 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6482 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6487 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6488 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6489 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6490 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6491 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6492 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6493 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6495 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6496 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6499 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6502 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6503 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6504 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6506 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6507 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6508 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6509 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6510 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6514 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6516 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6517 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6518 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6523 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6524 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6525 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6526 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6528 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6529 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6530 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6531 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6533 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6534 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6536 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6537 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6538 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6540 debug_assert!(false);
6541 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6543 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6544 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6545 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6546 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6547 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6548 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6549 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6550 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6551 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6552 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6554 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6555 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6556 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6557 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6558 match pending_forward_info {
6559 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6560 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6561 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6562 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6564 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6565 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6566 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6567 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6568 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6571 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6573 _ => pending_forward_info
6576 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6578 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6579 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6582 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6587 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6589 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6590 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6591 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6593 debug_assert!(false);
6594 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6596 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6597 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6598 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6599 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6600 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6601 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6602 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6603 log_trace!(self.logger,
6604 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6606 peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6607 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6608 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6610 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6611 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6612 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6613 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6614 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6615 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6616 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6619 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6620 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6623 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6626 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6630 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6631 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6632 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6633 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6634 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6636 debug_assert!(false);
6637 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6639 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6640 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6641 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6642 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6643 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6644 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6646 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6647 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6650 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6655 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6656 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6657 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6658 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6659 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6661 debug_assert!(false);
6662 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6664 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6665 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6666 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6667 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6668 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6669 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6670 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6672 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6673 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6675 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6676 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6680 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6684 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6685 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6686 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6688 debug_assert!(false);
6689 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6691 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6692 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6693 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6694 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6695 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6696 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6697 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6698 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6699 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6700 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6704 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6705 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6708 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6713 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6714 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6715 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6716 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6717 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6718 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6719 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6720 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6721 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6722 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6723 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6725 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6726 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6728 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6729 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6730 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6731 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6732 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6733 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6735 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6736 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6737 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6739 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6740 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6741 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6742 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6743 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6744 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6745 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6746 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6747 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6750 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6751 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6753 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6754 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6755 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6756 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6757 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6758 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6759 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6760 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6761 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6764 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6765 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6766 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6771 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6772 // payments are being processed.
6773 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6774 push_forward_event = true;
6776 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6777 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6784 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6785 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6788 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6789 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6790 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6792 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6796 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6797 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6798 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6799 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6800 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6802 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6803 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6804 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6805 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6806 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6807 // real by taking more time.
6808 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6809 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6810 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6815 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6816 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6817 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6818 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6819 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6820 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6821 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6823 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6824 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6825 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6826 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6827 channel_funding_outpoint,
6828 counterparty_node_id,
6833 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6834 pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6835 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6837 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6838 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6839 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6840 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6842 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6843 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6844 chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6850 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6851 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6852 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6853 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6855 debug_assert!(false);
6856 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6857 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6858 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6859 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6860 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6861 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6862 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6863 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6864 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6865 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6866 *counterparty_node_id)
6868 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6869 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6870 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6871 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6872 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6873 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6874 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6878 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6879 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6882 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6885 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6889 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6890 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6891 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6893 debug_assert!(false);
6894 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6896 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6897 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6898 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6899 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6900 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6901 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6903 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6904 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6907 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6912 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6913 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6914 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6916 debug_assert!(false);
6917 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6919 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6920 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6921 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6922 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6923 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6924 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6925 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6928 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6929 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6930 &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6931 msg, &self.default_configuration
6932 ), chan_phase_entry),
6933 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6934 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6935 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6938 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6939 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6942 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6947 /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
6948 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6949 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6950 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6952 // It's not a local channel
6953 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6956 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6957 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6958 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6959 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6961 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6962 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6963 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6964 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6965 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6966 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6967 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6968 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6969 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6970 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6971 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6973 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6975 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6976 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6977 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6978 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6980 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
6981 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6982 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
6985 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
6989 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6990 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6993 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
6995 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6998 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7000 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7001 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7003 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7005 debug_assert!(false);
7006 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7007 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7011 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7012 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7013 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7014 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7015 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7016 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7017 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7018 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7019 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7020 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7021 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7022 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7023 let mut channel_update = None;
7024 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7025 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7026 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7029 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7030 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7031 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7032 // they have the latest channel parameters.
7033 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7034 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7035 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7040 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7041 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7042 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7043 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7044 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7045 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7049 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7050 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7053 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7054 log_debug!(self.logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7055 log_bytes!(msg.channel_id.0));
7056 // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7057 // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7058 // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7059 // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7060 // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7061 // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7063 // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7064 // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7065 // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7066 // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7067 // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7068 // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7069 // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7070 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7071 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7072 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7073 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7074 next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7075 next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7076 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7077 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7078 next_funding_txid: None,
7081 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7082 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7083 counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7089 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7090 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7091 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7092 persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7095 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7096 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7101 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7102 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7103 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7105 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7106 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7107 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7108 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7109 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7110 match monitor_event {
7111 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7112 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7113 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7114 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7116 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7117 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7118 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7119 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7122 MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7123 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7124 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7126 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7127 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
7128 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7129 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
7132 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7133 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7134 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7135 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7136 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7137 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7138 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7139 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7140 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
7141 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7142 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7146 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
7147 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7148 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7149 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7150 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7158 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7159 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7165 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7166 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7169 has_pending_monitor_events
7172 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7173 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7174 /// update events as a separate process method here.
7176 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7177 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7178 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7181 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7182 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7183 /// update was applied.
7184 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7185 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7186 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7188 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7189 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7190 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7191 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7193 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7194 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7196 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7197 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7198 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7199 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7201 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7202 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7203 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7204 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
7205 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7206 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7208 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7209 has_monitor_update = true;
7211 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7212 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7213 continue 'peer_loop;
7222 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7223 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7224 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7230 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7231 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7232 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7233 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7234 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7235 let mut has_update = false;
7236 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7238 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7240 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7241 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7242 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7243 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7244 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7246 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7247 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
7248 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7249 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7251 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7252 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7255 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7256 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7257 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7259 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7260 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7261 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7262 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7263 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7268 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
7270 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7271 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7272 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7278 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7279 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7284 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7290 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7291 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7294 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7295 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7301 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7302 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7304 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7305 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7306 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7307 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7308 // reorganized out of the main chain.
7309 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7310 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7311 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7312 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7313 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7314 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7315 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7316 assert!(should_broadcast);
7317 } else { unreachable!(); }
7318 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7319 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7320 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7323 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7327 /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7328 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7329 /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7333 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the offer with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the
7334 /// introduction node and a derived signing pubkey for recipient privacy. As such, currently,
7335 /// the node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction
7336 /// node in order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7340 /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7343 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7345 /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7346 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7347 pub fn create_offer_builder(
7348 &self, description: String
7349 ) -> OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All> {
7350 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7351 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7352 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7353 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7354 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7356 OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx)
7357 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7361 /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7362 /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7366 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7367 /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7369 /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7370 /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7371 /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7374 /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7375 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7376 /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7378 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7379 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7383 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the refund with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as
7384 /// the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7385 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7386 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7390 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7391 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7395 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7396 /// or if `amount_msats` is invalid.
7398 /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7400 /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7401 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7402 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7403 pub fn create_refund_builder(
7404 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7405 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7406 ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7407 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7408 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7409 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7410 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7411 let path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7413 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7414 description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7416 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7417 .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7420 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7421 self.pending_outbound_payments
7422 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7423 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7425 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7430 /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7431 /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7432 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7434 /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7435 /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7436 /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7437 /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7438 /// [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7439 /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7440 /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7442 /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7443 /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7447 /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7448 /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7451 /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7452 /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7453 /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7457 /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7458 /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7459 /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7460 /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7464 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7465 /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7466 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7470 /// Errors if a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link
7471 /// or if the provided parameters are invalid for the offer.
7473 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7474 /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7475 /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7476 /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7477 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7478 /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7479 /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7480 pub fn pay_for_offer(
7481 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7482 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7483 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7484 ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7485 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7486 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7487 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7490 .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7491 .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7492 let builder = match quantity {
7494 Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7496 let builder = match amount_msats {
7498 Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7500 let builder = match payer_note {
7502 Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7505 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7506 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7508 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7509 self.pending_outbound_payments
7510 .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7511 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7513 .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7515 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7516 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7517 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7518 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7519 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7522 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7524 // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7525 // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7526 // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7527 const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7528 for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7529 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7530 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7531 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7532 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7534 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7541 /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7544 /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7545 /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7546 /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7550 /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7551 /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7552 /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7553 /// received and no retries will be made.
7555 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7556 pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7557 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7558 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7559 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7561 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7562 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7564 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7565 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7566 let payment_paths = vec![
7567 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
7569 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7570 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7571 payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7573 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7574 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7575 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7577 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7578 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7579 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7581 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7582 let reply_path = self.create_one_hop_blinded_path();
7584 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7585 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7586 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7587 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7588 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7591 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7593 for path in refund.paths() {
7594 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7595 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7596 Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7597 Some(reply_path.clone()),
7599 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7605 Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7609 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7612 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7613 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7615 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7616 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7617 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7618 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7620 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7622 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7623 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7627 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7628 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7630 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7632 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7633 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7635 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7636 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7637 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7638 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7639 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7640 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7641 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7642 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7643 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7644 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7645 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7648 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7649 /// stored external to LDK.
7651 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7652 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7653 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7655 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7656 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7659 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7660 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7661 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7662 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7664 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7665 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7666 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7667 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7668 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7670 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7671 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7672 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7673 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7674 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7676 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7677 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7679 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7680 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7684 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7685 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7687 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7689 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7690 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7692 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7693 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7694 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7695 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7696 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7697 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7698 min_final_cltv_expiry)
7701 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7702 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7704 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7705 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7706 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7709 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7711 fn create_one_hop_blinded_path(&self) -> BlindedPath {
7712 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7713 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7714 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_message(self.get_our_node_id(), entropy_source, secp_ctx).unwrap()
7717 /// Creates a one-hop blinded path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction
7719 fn create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(
7720 &self, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7721 ) -> (BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath) {
7722 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7723 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7725 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7726 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7727 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7729 payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7731 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7734 // TODO: Err for overflow?
7735 BlindedPath::one_hop_for_payment(
7736 payee_node_id, payee_tlvs, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7740 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7741 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7743 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7744 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7745 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7746 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7748 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7749 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7750 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7751 Some(_) => continue,
7752 None => return scid_candidate
7757 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7759 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7760 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7762 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7763 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7764 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7768 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
7769 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
7770 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
7772 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
7773 /// times to get a unique scid.
7774 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7775 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7776 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7778 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7779 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7780 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
7781 return scid_candidate
7785 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
7786 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
7787 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
7788 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
7790 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7791 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7792 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7793 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7794 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
7795 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
7797 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
7798 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
7799 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
7808 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7809 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
7810 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7811 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
7812 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
7816 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
7817 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
7818 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7819 events.push_back((event, None));
7823 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
7824 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7825 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
7829 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
7830 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
7834 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
7835 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
7838 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
7839 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
7840 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
7841 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
7842 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
7844 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7845 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7846 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7847 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7849 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
7850 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
7851 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7852 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
7854 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
7858 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7859 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7860 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7861 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7862 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7863 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7864 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7868 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7869 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7870 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7871 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7872 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7873 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7874 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7875 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7876 if further_update_exists {
7877 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7882 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7883 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7888 log_debug!(self.logger,
7889 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7890 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7896 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7897 for action in actions {
7899 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7900 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7902 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7908 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7909 /// using the given event handler.
7911 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7912 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7916 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7920 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7922 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7923 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7924 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7925 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7926 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7927 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7931 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7932 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7933 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7934 /// is always placed next to each other.
7936 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7937 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7938 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7939 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7941 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7942 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7943 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7944 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7945 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7946 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
7947 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
7949 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7950 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7951 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7952 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7955 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7956 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7958 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7959 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7962 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7963 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7964 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7965 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7966 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7967 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7968 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7972 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7973 events.replace(pending_events);
7982 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7984 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7985 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7986 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7987 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7988 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7989 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7993 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7995 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7996 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7997 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7999 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8003 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8005 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8006 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8007 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8008 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8009 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8010 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8014 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8016 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8017 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8018 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8019 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8020 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8023 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8024 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8027 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8028 let _persistence_guard =
8029 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8030 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8031 let new_height = height - 1;
8033 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8034 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8035 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8036 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8037 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8038 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8041 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8045 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8047 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8048 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8049 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8050 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8051 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8052 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8056 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8057 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8058 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8059 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8061 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8062 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8064 let _persistence_guard =
8065 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8066 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8067 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
8068 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8070 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8071 if height < last_best_block_height {
8072 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8073 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8077 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
8078 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8079 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8080 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8082 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8083 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8085 let _persistence_guard =
8086 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8087 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8088 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8090 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
8092 macro_rules! max_time {
8093 ($timestamp: expr) => {
8095 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8096 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8097 // having an explicit local time source.
8098 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8099 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8100 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8101 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8102 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8108 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8109 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8110 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8111 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8115 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8116 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8117 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8118 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8119 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8120 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8121 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
8122 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
8129 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8130 let _persistence_guard =
8131 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8132 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8133 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8134 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8135 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8136 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8137 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8138 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8143 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8145 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8146 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8147 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8148 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8149 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8150 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8154 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8155 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8157 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8158 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8159 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8160 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8161 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8163 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8164 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8166 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8167 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8168 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8169 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8170 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8171 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8173 // Retain unfunded channels.
8174 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8175 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8176 let res = f(channel);
8177 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8178 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8179 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8180 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8181 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8183 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8184 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8185 if channel.context.is_usable() {
8186 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8187 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8188 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8189 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8194 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8199 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8200 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8203 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8204 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8205 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8206 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8207 msg: announcement_sigs,
8209 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8210 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8211 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8213 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8214 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8215 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8220 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8221 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8222 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8223 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8224 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8225 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8226 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8227 // is always consistent.
8228 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8229 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8230 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8231 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8232 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8235 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8236 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8237 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8238 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8239 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
8240 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8241 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8245 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8246 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
8247 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8248 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8249 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8250 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8251 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8252 data: reason_message,
8265 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8266 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8267 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8268 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8269 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8270 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8271 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8272 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8273 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8274 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8276 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8277 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8278 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8282 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8285 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8286 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8287 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8288 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8289 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8290 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8291 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8292 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8293 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8294 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8297 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8298 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8299 _ => unreachable!(),
8301 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8302 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8303 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8304 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8310 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8312 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8313 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8317 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8318 /// may have events that need processing.
8320 /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8321 /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8323 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8324 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8325 pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8326 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8329 /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8330 pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8331 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8334 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8335 pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8336 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8339 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8340 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8341 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8342 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8345 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8346 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8347 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8348 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8351 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8352 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8354 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8355 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8356 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8357 pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8358 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8361 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8362 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8363 fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8364 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8367 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8368 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8369 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8370 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8373 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8374 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8375 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8376 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8379 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8380 /// [`ChannelManager`].
8381 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8382 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8386 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8387 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8389 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8390 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8391 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8392 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8393 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8394 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8398 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8399 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8400 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8401 // change to the contents.
8402 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8403 let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8404 let persist = match &res {
8405 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8406 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8407 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8409 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8411 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8416 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8417 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8418 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8419 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8422 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8423 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8424 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8425 // change to the contents.
8426 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8427 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8428 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8432 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8433 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8434 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8435 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8438 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8439 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8440 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8443 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8444 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8445 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8448 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8449 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8450 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8451 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8452 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8453 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8454 let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8455 let persist = match &res {
8456 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8457 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8459 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8464 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8466 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8469 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8470 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8471 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8474 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8475 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8476 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8477 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8478 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8479 let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8480 let persist = match &res {
8481 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8482 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8483 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8485 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8490 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8491 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8492 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8495 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8496 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8497 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8498 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8499 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8500 let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8501 let persist = match &res {
8502 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8503 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8504 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8506 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8511 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8512 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8513 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8514 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8515 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8516 let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8517 let persist = match &res {
8518 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8519 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8520 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8522 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8527 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8528 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8529 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8532 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8533 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8534 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8537 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8538 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8539 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8540 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8541 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8542 let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8543 let persist = match &res {
8544 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8545 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8546 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8548 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8553 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8554 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8555 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8558 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8559 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8560 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8563 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8568 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8569 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8570 let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8571 let persist = match &res {
8572 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8573 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8574 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8576 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8581 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8582 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8583 self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8584 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8585 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8587 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8588 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8589 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8590 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8591 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8592 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8593 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8594 let context = match phase {
8595 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8596 if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger).is_ok() {
8597 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8602 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8603 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8606 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8610 // Clean up for removal.
8611 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8612 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
8613 failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false));
8616 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8617 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8618 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8619 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8621 // V1 Channel Establishment
8622 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8623 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8624 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8625 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8626 // V2 Channel Establishment
8627 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8628 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8629 // Common Channel Establishment
8630 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8631 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8632 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8633 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8634 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8635 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8636 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8637 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8638 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8639 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8640 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8641 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8642 // Channel Operations
8643 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8644 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8645 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8646 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8647 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8648 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8650 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8651 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8652 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8653 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8654 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8655 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8656 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8657 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8658 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8661 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8662 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8663 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8664 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8667 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8669 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8671 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8672 self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8676 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8677 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8678 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8682 let mut res = Ok(());
8684 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8685 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8686 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8687 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8688 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8689 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8690 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8693 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8694 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8695 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8696 if inbound_peer_limited {
8698 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8700 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8701 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8702 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8703 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8704 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8705 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8706 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8707 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8711 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8712 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8713 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8715 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8716 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8717 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8718 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8721 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8724 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
8725 peer_state.is_connected = true;
8730 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8732 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8733 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8734 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8735 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8736 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8738 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
8739 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
8740 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
8741 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
8742 // worry about closing and removing them.
8743 debug_assert!(false);
8747 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8748 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8749 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
8754 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
8755 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
8760 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
8761 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8763 match &msg.data as &str {
8764 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
8765 "link failed to shutdown" =>
8767 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
8768 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
8769 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
8770 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
8771 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
8772 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
8773 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
8774 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8775 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8776 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8777 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8778 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8779 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
8780 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
8781 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8782 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8786 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8787 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8788 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
8789 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
8790 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8791 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
8793 log_level: Level::Trace,
8803 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
8804 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
8805 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8806 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8807 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8808 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8809 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8810 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8811 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8812 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8813 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
8815 for channel_id in channel_ids {
8816 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8817 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8821 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
8822 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8823 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
8824 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
8825 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8826 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8827 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
8828 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
8829 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
8830 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8838 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
8839 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
8843 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8844 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8847 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
8848 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8851 fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
8852 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
8855 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
8856 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8857 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8858 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8861 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
8862 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8863 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8864 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8867 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
8868 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8869 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8870 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8873 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
8874 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8875 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8876 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8879 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
8880 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8881 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8882 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8885 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
8886 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8887 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8888 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8891 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
8892 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8893 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8894 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8897 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
8898 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8899 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8900 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8903 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
8904 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8905 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8906 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8910 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8911 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8913 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8914 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8915 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8916 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8917 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8918 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8922 fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
8923 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8924 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8927 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
8928 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
8931 Ok(amount_msats) => Some(amount_msats),
8932 Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8934 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
8935 Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
8937 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
8938 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
8941 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8943 match self.create_inbound_payment(amount_msats, relative_expiry, None) {
8944 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) if invoice_request.keys.is_some() => {
8945 let payment_paths = vec![
8946 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8948 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8949 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
8950 payment_paths, payment_hash
8952 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8953 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8954 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8956 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8957 let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8958 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8960 match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
8961 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8962 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
8965 Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8966 let payment_paths = vec![
8967 self.create_one_hop_blinded_payment_path(payment_secret),
8969 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
8970 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
8971 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8972 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8973 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8975 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
8976 let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
8977 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
8979 let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
8980 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
8982 match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
8983 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
8984 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8985 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
8987 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
8988 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
8992 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
8993 Err(error) => Some(error),
8997 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount.into()))
9001 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9002 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9004 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9006 Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9007 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9010 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9011 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9012 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9019 OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9020 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9026 fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9027 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9031 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9032 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9033 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9034 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9035 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9039 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9040 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9042 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9043 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9044 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9045 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9046 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9049 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9050 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9051 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9052 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9055 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9056 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9057 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9058 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9061 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9062 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9063 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9064 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9067 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9068 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9069 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9070 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9071 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9072 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9073 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9074 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9075 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9076 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9077 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9078 features.set_payment_secret_required();
9079 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9080 features.set_wumbo_optional();
9081 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9082 features.set_channel_type_optional();
9083 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9084 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9085 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9086 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9091 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9092 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9094 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9095 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9096 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9097 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9100 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9101 (2, node_id, required),
9102 (4, features, required),
9103 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9104 (8, forwarding_info, option),
9105 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9106 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9109 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9110 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9111 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9112 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9113 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9114 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9115 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9116 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9117 (2, self.channel_id, required),
9118 (3, self.channel_type, option),
9119 (4, self.counterparty, required),
9120 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9121 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9122 (7, self.config, option),
9123 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9124 (9, self.confirmations, option),
9125 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9126 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9127 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9128 (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9129 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9130 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9131 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9132 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9133 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9134 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9135 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9136 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9137 (30, self.is_usable, required),
9138 (32, self.is_public, required),
9139 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9140 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9141 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9142 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9143 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9149 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9150 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9151 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9152 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9153 (2, channel_id, required),
9154 (3, channel_type, option),
9155 (4, counterparty, required),
9156 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9157 (6, funding_txo, option),
9158 (7, config, option),
9159 (8, short_channel_id, option),
9160 (9, confirmations, option),
9161 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9162 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9163 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9164 (16, balance_msat, required),
9165 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9166 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9167 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9168 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9169 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9170 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9171 (22, confirmations_required, option),
9172 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9173 (26, is_outbound, required),
9174 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9175 (30, is_usable, required),
9176 (32, is_public, required),
9177 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9178 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9179 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9180 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9181 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9184 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9185 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9186 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9187 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9188 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9192 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9194 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9195 outbound_scid_alias,
9199 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9200 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9202 balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9203 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9204 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9205 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9206 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9207 confirmations_required,
9209 force_close_spend_delay,
9210 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9211 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9212 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9213 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9214 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9215 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9216 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9217 channel_shutdown_state,
9222 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9223 (2, channels, required_vec),
9224 (4, phantom_scid, required),
9225 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9228 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9230 (0, onion_packet, required),
9231 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9234 (0, payment_data, required),
9235 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9236 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9237 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9238 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9240 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9241 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9242 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9243 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9244 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9245 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9249 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9250 (0, routing, required),
9251 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9252 (4, payment_hash, required),
9253 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9254 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9255 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9256 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9260 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9261 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9263 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9265 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9266 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9267 reason.write(writer)?;
9269 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9270 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9273 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9274 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9275 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9276 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9283 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9284 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9285 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9288 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9289 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9290 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9291 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9295 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9296 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9297 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9298 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9299 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9302 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9303 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9304 // messages contained in the variants.
9305 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9306 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9307 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9309 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9310 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9311 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9312 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9313 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9316 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9317 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9318 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9319 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9320 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9322 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9327 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9332 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9333 (0, short_channel_id, required),
9334 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9335 (2, outpoint, required),
9336 (4, htlc_id, required),
9337 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9338 (7, user_channel_id, option),
9341 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9342 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9343 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9344 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9345 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9347 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9348 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9349 (1, self.total_msat, required),
9350 (2, self.value, required),
9351 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9352 (4, payment_data, option),
9353 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9354 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9355 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9356 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9362 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9363 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9364 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9365 (0, prev_hop, required),
9366 (1, total_msat, option),
9367 (2, value_ser, required),
9368 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9369 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9370 (5, total_value_received, option),
9371 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9372 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9373 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9375 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9376 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9377 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9379 if payment_data.is_some() {
9380 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9382 if total_msat.is_none() {
9383 total_msat = Some(value);
9385 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9388 if total_msat.is_none() {
9389 if payment_data.is_none() {
9390 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9392 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9394 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9398 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9401 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9402 total_value_received,
9403 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9405 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9406 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9411 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9412 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9413 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9416 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9417 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9418 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9419 let mut payment_id = None;
9420 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9421 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9422 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9423 (0, session_priv, required),
9424 (1, payment_id, option),
9425 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9426 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9427 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9428 (6, blinded_tail, option),
9430 if payment_id.is_none() {
9431 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9433 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9435 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9436 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9437 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9439 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9440 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9441 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9442 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9446 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9447 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9448 first_hop_htlc_msat,
9450 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9453 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9454 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9459 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9460 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9462 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9464 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9465 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9466 (0, session_priv, required),
9467 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9468 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9469 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9470 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9471 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9472 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9475 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9477 field.write(writer)?;
9484 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9485 (0, forward_info, required),
9486 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9487 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9488 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9489 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9492 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
9494 (0, htlc_id, required),
9495 (2, err_packet, required),
9500 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9501 (0, payment_secret, required),
9502 (2, expiry_time, required),
9503 (4, user_payment_id, required),
9504 (6, payment_preimage, required),
9505 (8, min_value_msat, required),
9508 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9510 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9511 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9512 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9513 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9514 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9515 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9519 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9520 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9522 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9524 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9526 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9527 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9528 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9531 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9533 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9534 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9535 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9536 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9537 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9538 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9539 serializable_peer_count += 1;
9542 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9543 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9547 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9549 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9550 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9551 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9552 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9553 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9554 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9557 channel.write(writer)?;
9563 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9564 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9565 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9566 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9567 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9568 for forward in pending_forwards {
9569 forward.write(writer)?;
9574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9576 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9577 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9578 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9580 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9581 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9582 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9583 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9584 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9585 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9586 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9587 htlc.write(writer)?;
9589 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9590 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9593 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9594 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9595 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9596 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9597 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9598 // per_peer_state lock at all.
9599 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9602 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9603 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9604 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9605 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9606 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9608 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9609 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9610 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9611 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9612 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9613 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9614 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9619 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9620 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9621 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9622 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9623 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9624 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9625 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9626 // well save the space and not write any events here.
9627 0u64.write(writer)?;
9629 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9630 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9631 event.write(writer)?;
9635 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9636 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9637 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9638 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9639 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9640 0u64.write(writer)?;
9642 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9643 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9644 // likely to be identical.
9645 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9646 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9648 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9649 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9650 hash.write(writer)?;
9651 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9654 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
9655 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
9656 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9657 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
9658 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
9661 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
9662 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9664 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9665 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9666 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
9667 session_priv.write(writer)?;
9670 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
9671 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
9672 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
9673 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
9677 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
9678 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
9679 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
9681 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
9682 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
9683 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
9689 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
9690 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9691 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
9692 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
9695 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
9696 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
9697 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
9698 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
9699 pending_claiming_payments = None;
9702 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9703 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9704 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
9705 if !updates.is_empty() {
9706 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
9707 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
9712 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9713 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
9714 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9715 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
9716 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9717 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
9718 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9719 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
9720 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
9721 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
9722 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9723 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
9724 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9731 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9732 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9733 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
9734 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
9737 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
9738 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
9739 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
9740 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
9741 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
9742 // check that the event is sane here.
9743 let event_encoded = event.encode();
9744 let event_read: Option<Event> =
9745 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
9746 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
9752 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
9753 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9754 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9755 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
9756 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
9757 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
9760 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
9761 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
9762 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
9763 events.push_back((ev, action));
9764 } else if action.is_some() {
9765 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9772 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
9773 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
9774 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
9775 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
9776 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
9777 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
9780 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
9782 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
9784 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9785 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
9786 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
9787 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
9788 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
9789 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
9790 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
9791 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
9792 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
9793 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
9794 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
9795 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
9796 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
9798 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
9799 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
9801 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
9802 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
9804 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
9805 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
9806 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
9807 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
9808 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
9809 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
9811 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
9812 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9814 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9815 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9816 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9817 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9818 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9819 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9823 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
9824 pub entropy_source: ES,
9826 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
9827 pub node_signer: NS,
9829 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
9830 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
9832 pub signer_provider: SP,
9834 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9836 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
9837 pub fee_estimator: F,
9838 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
9840 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
9841 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
9842 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
9843 pub chain_monitor: M,
9845 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
9846 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
9847 /// force-closed during deserialization.
9848 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
9849 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
9850 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
9852 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
9854 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
9855 /// deserialization.
9857 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
9858 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
9859 pub default_config: UserConfig,
9861 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
9862 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
9864 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
9865 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
9866 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
9867 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
9869 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
9872 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
9873 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
9876 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9877 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9879 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9880 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9881 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9882 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9883 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9884 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9888 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
9889 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
9890 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
9891 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
9892 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
9894 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
9895 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
9900 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
9901 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
9902 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9903 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
9905 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9906 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9907 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9908 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9909 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9910 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9914 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9915 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
9916 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
9920 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9921 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
9923 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
9924 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9925 ES::Target: EntropySource,
9926 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9927 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9928 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9932 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9933 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9935 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9936 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9937 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9939 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
9941 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9942 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9943 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9944 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9945 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
9946 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
9947 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
9948 for _ in 0..channel_count {
9949 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
9950 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
9952 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9953 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
9954 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
9955 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
9956 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
9957 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
9958 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9959 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
9960 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
9961 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
9962 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
9963 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
9964 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
9966 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
9967 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
9968 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
9970 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
9971 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
9972 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9974 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
9975 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
9976 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
9978 let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
9979 if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
9980 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9982 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
9983 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9984 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
9987 failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
9988 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
9989 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9990 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
9991 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
9992 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
9993 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
9995 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9996 let mut found_htlc = false;
9997 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9998 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10001 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10002 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10003 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10004 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10005 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10006 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10007 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10008 log_info!(args.logger,
10009 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10010 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10011 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10015 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10016 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10017 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10018 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10019 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10021 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() {
10022 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10024 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10025 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10026 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10027 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10030 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10031 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10032 entry.insert(by_id_map);
10036 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10037 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10038 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10039 // safely discard the channel.
10040 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
10041 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10042 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10043 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10044 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10045 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10046 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10049 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10050 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10051 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10052 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10053 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10054 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10058 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10059 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10060 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10061 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10062 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10063 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10064 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10066 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10070 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10071 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10072 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10073 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10074 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10075 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10076 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10077 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10078 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10080 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10083 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10084 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10085 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10086 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10087 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10088 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10089 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10090 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10092 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10095 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10098 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10099 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10100 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10101 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10102 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10103 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10104 is_connected: false,
10108 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10109 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10110 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10111 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10112 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10113 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10114 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10115 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10118 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10119 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10120 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10121 for _ in 0..event_count {
10122 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10123 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10128 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10129 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10130 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10132 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10133 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10134 // on-startup monitor updates.
10135 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10136 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10138 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10142 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10143 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10145 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10146 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10147 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10148 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10149 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10153 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10154 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10155 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10156 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10157 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10158 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10159 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10161 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10162 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10166 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10167 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10168 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10169 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10170 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10171 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10172 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10173 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10174 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10175 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10176 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10177 let mut events_override = None;
10178 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10179 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10180 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10181 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10182 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10183 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10184 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10185 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10186 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10187 (8, events_override, option),
10188 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10189 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10190 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10191 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10193 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10194 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10197 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10198 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10201 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10202 pending_events_read = events;
10205 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10206 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10209 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10210 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10211 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10212 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10213 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10214 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10216 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10218 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10219 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10220 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10223 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10224 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10225 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10226 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10227 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10229 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10230 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10231 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10233 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10234 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10235 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10236 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10237 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10239 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10240 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10241 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10242 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10243 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10244 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10245 pending_background_events.push(
10246 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10247 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10248 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10249 update: update.clone(),
10252 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10253 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10254 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10255 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10256 pending_background_events.push(
10257 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10258 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10259 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10262 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10263 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10264 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10266 max_in_flight_update_id
10270 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10271 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10272 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10273 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10274 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10275 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10277 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10278 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10279 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10280 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10281 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10282 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10283 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10284 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10285 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
10288 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10289 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10290 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10291 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10292 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10293 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10294 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10295 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10296 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10297 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10298 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10301 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10302 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10303 debug_assert!(false);
10304 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10309 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10310 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10311 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10312 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10313 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10314 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10315 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10316 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10318 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10319 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10320 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
10322 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10323 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10324 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10325 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10326 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10327 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10328 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10329 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10334 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10335 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10337 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10338 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10339 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10340 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10343 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10344 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10345 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10346 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10347 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10348 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10349 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10351 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10352 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10353 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10354 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10355 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10356 if path.hops.is_empty() {
10357 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10358 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10361 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10362 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10363 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10364 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10365 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10366 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10367 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10368 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
10370 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10371 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10372 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10373 retry_strategy: None,
10374 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10375 payment_params: None,
10376 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10377 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10378 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10379 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10380 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10381 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10382 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10383 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10384 total_msat: path_amt,
10385 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10386 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10388 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10389 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10394 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10395 match htlc_source {
10396 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10397 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10398 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10399 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10401 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10402 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10403 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10404 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10405 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10406 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10407 forwards.retain(|forward| {
10408 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10409 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10410 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10411 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10416 !forwards.is_empty()
10418 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10419 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10420 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10421 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10422 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10423 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10424 intercepted_id != ev_id
10431 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10432 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10433 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10434 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10435 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10436 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10437 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10438 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10439 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10440 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10441 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10443 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10444 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10445 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10447 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10448 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
10449 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10456 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10457 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10459 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10461 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10462 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10463 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10464 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10465 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10466 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10467 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10468 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10469 counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10470 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10473 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10474 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10475 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10476 // channel still live case here.
10480 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10481 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10486 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10487 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10488 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10489 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10490 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10491 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10492 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10493 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10497 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10498 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10500 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10501 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10502 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10503 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10505 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10506 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10507 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10509 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10510 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10512 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10513 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10515 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10518 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10519 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10520 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10522 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10526 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10527 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10528 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10529 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10530 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10532 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10533 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10534 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10535 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10536 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10537 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10538 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10539 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10541 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10542 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10546 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10548 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10550 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10551 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10553 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10554 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10559 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10560 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10562 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10564 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10566 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10567 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10568 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10569 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10573 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10574 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10575 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10576 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10577 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10578 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10579 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10580 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10582 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10583 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10584 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10586 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10587 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10588 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10589 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10590 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10591 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10593 if chan.context.is_usable() {
10594 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10595 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10596 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10597 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10598 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10602 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10603 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10604 debug_assert!(false);
10605 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10610 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10612 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10613 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10614 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10615 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10616 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10617 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10618 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10619 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10620 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10621 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10622 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10624 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10625 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10627 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10628 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10629 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10630 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10632 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10633 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10634 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10635 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10637 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10638 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10639 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10640 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10642 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
10643 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
10644 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
10645 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10646 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10647 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
10648 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
10651 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
10652 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
10655 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
10658 purpose: payment.purpose,
10659 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
10660 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
10661 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
10667 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
10668 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
10669 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
10670 for action in actions.iter() {
10671 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
10672 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
10673 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
10675 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
10676 log_trace!(args.logger,
10677 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
10678 blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
10679 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
10680 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
10681 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
10683 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
10684 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
10685 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
10686 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
10690 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
10691 debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
10695 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
10697 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
10698 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10702 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
10704 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
10705 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
10706 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
10707 router: args.router,
10709 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
10711 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
10712 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
10713 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
10714 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
10716 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
10717 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
10718 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
10719 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
10720 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
10721 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
10723 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
10725 our_network_pubkey,
10728 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
10730 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
10732 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
10733 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
10734 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
10735 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
10736 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
10738 event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
10739 needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
10741 funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
10743 pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
10745 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
10746 node_signer: args.node_signer,
10747 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
10749 logger: args.logger,
10750 default_configuration: args.default_config,
10753 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
10754 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
10755 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
10756 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
10757 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
10760 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
10761 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
10762 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
10763 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
10764 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
10765 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
10768 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
10769 //connection or two.
10771 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
10777 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10778 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10779 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
10780 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
10781 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
10782 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
10783 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
10784 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
10785 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10786 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
10787 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
10788 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
10789 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
10790 use crate::util::test_utils;
10791 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
10792 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
10795 fn test_notify_limits() {
10796 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
10797 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
10798 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10799 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10800 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
10801 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10803 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
10804 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
10805 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10806 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10807 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10809 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10811 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
10812 // to connect messages with new values
10813 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10814 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
10815 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10816 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10817 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
10818 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
10820 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
10821 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10822 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10823 // ... but the last node should not.
10824 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10825 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
10826 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10827 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10829 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
10830 // about the channel.
10831 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10832 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10833 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10835 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
10837 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10838 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10839 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
10840 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
10841 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10842 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10844 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
10845 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10846 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10848 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
10849 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
10850 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
10851 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
10852 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
10853 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
10855 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
10856 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
10857 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10858 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10859 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10860 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10861 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10862 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10864 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
10865 // the channel info has updated.
10866 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
10867 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
10868 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10869 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
10870 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
10871 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
10875 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
10876 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
10878 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10879 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10880 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10881 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10882 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10884 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
10885 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
10886 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
10887 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
10889 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10890 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
10891 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
10892 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
10893 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
10894 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
10895 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
10896 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
10897 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10898 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10899 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10900 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
10902 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
10903 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10904 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
10905 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10906 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10907 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10908 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10909 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10910 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10911 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10912 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10913 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10914 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
10915 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10916 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10917 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10918 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10919 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10920 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10921 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10922 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10923 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10924 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
10926 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
10927 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
10928 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
10929 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10930 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10931 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10932 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
10934 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
10935 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
10936 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
10937 // lightning messages manually.
10938 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
10939 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
10940 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
10942 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10943 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10944 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
10945 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
10946 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10947 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10948 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
10949 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10950 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10951 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
10952 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10953 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10954 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
10955 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10956 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10957 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10958 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
10959 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10960 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10961 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
10962 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10963 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
10964 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10965 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10966 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
10967 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10969 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
10970 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
10971 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10972 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
10974 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10975 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10976 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10977 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10979 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10982 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
10983 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
10984 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
10985 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
10987 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10992 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
10993 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
10994 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
10997 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
10998 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
10999 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11000 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11001 // fails as expected.
11002 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11003 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11004 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11005 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11006 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11007 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11008 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11009 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11010 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11011 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11012 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11013 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11014 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11015 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11016 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11018 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11019 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11020 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11022 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11023 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11024 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11025 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11026 let route = find_route(
11027 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11028 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11030 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11031 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11032 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11033 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11034 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11035 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11036 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11037 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11038 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11039 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11040 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11041 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11042 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11043 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11044 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11045 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11046 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11047 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11048 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11049 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11050 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11051 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11052 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11053 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11055 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11056 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11058 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11059 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11060 let route = find_route(
11061 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11062 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11064 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11065 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11066 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11067 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11068 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11069 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11070 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11071 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11073 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11074 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11075 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11076 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11077 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11078 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11079 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11080 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11081 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11082 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11083 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11084 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11085 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11086 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11087 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11088 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11089 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11090 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11091 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11092 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11093 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11094 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11095 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11096 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11098 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11099 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11101 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11102 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11103 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11104 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11105 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11106 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11107 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11108 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11109 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11110 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11112 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11113 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11114 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11117 let route = find_route(
11118 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11119 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11121 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11122 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11123 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11124 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11125 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11126 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11127 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11128 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11129 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11130 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11131 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11132 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11133 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11134 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11135 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11136 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11137 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11138 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11139 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11140 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11141 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11142 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11143 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11145 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11146 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11150 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11151 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11152 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11153 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11154 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11155 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11156 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11158 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11159 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11161 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11162 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11163 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11164 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11165 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11166 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11167 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11168 let route = find_route(
11169 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11170 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11173 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11174 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11175 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11176 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11177 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11178 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11179 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11181 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11182 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11183 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11184 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11185 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11186 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11187 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11189 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11193 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11194 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11195 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11196 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11197 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11198 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11199 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11200 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11201 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11203 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11204 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11206 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11207 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11208 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11209 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
11210 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11211 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11212 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11213 let route = find_route(
11214 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11215 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11218 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11219 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11220 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
11221 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11222 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11223 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11224 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11225 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11226 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11228 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11229 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11230 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11231 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11232 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11233 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11234 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11236 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11240 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11241 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11242 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11243 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11244 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11246 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11247 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11248 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11249 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11251 // Marshall an MPP route.
11252 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11253 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11254 route.paths.push(path);
11255 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11256 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11257 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11258 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11259 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11260 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11262 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11263 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11265 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11266 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11268 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11273 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11274 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11275 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11276 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11277 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11279 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11281 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11282 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11284 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11285 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11286 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11287 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11290 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11291 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11292 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11293 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11294 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11295 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11298 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11301 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11302 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11307 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11308 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11309 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11310 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11311 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11312 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11314 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11315 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11317 total_msat: 100_000,
11320 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11321 // payment verification fails as expected.
11322 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11323 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11324 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11325 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11327 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11331 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11332 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11336 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
11337 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11338 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11339 // the channel is successfully closed.
11340 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11341 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11342 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11343 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11345 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
11346 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11347 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11348 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11349 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11351 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11352 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
11354 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11355 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11356 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11357 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11360 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11362 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11363 // as it has the funding transaction.
11364 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11365 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11366 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11369 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11371 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11373 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11375 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11376 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11377 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11379 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11382 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11383 // as it has the funding transaction.
11384 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11385 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11386 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11388 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11389 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11390 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11391 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11392 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11393 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11394 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11395 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11397 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11398 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11399 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11400 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11402 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11403 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11405 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11406 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11407 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11408 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11409 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11410 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11411 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11415 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11416 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11417 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11418 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
11419 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11420 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11421 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11424 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11426 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11427 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11428 // closing transaction).
11429 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
11430 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11431 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11433 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11434 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11435 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11436 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11437 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
11440 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11442 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11444 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
11445 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11446 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11448 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11450 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11451 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11454 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11455 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11456 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11459 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11460 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11461 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11464 fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11465 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11466 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11469 fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11470 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11471 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11474 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11476 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11477 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11479 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11480 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11482 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11483 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11488 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11489 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11490 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11491 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11492 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11493 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11494 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11495 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11498 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11499 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11500 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11502 // Test the API functions.
11503 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
11505 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11507 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11509 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11511 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11513 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11515 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11519 fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11520 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11521 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11522 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11523 // the given `channel_id`.
11524 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11525 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11526 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11527 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11529 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11532 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11534 // Test the API functions.
11535 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11537 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11539 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11541 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11543 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11545 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11549 fn test_connection_limiting() {
11550 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11551 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11552 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11553 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11554 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11556 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11558 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11559 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11561 let mut funding_tx = None;
11562 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11563 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11564 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11567 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11568 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11569 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11570 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11571 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11573 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11574 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11575 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11577 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11579 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11580 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11581 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11583 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11586 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11587 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11588 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11589 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11590 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11592 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11593 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11595 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11596 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11597 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11598 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11599 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11600 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11601 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11604 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11605 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11606 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11607 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11608 }, true).unwrap_err();
11610 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11611 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11612 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11613 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11614 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11615 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11616 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11618 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11619 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11621 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11622 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11623 }, true).unwrap_err();
11625 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11626 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11627 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11628 }, false).unwrap();
11629 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11631 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11632 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11634 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11635 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11636 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11637 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11638 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11640 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11641 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11642 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11644 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
11645 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11646 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
11648 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
11649 // "protected" and can connect again.
11650 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
11651 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11652 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11654 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11656 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
11658 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11659 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11663 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
11664 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
11665 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11666 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11667 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11668 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11670 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11672 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11673 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11675 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11676 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11677 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11678 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11681 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
11683 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11684 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11685 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11687 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
11688 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11689 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11691 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
11692 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11693 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11694 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11698 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
11699 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11700 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11701 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11702 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11703 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
11704 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11705 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
11706 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11708 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11710 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11711 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11713 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
11714 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11715 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11716 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11717 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11718 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11721 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11722 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11724 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11725 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11727 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11729 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
11730 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11733 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
11734 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11735 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11736 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11737 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11739 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11740 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11742 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11743 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
11744 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
11745 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
11749 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11751 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
11752 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11754 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
11755 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
11756 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11758 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11759 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
11761 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11763 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
11767 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
11768 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11769 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11770 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11771 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11772 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
11773 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
11774 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11776 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11777 payment_metadata: None,
11778 keysend_preimage: None,
11779 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11780 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11782 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11784 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
11785 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
11786 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
11787 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11788 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
11790 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
11791 } else { panic!(); }
11793 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
11794 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
11796 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
11797 payment_metadata: None,
11798 keysend_preimage: None,
11799 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11800 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
11802 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11804 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
11805 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
11809 fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
11810 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
11811 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
11812 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
11813 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11815 let result = node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
11817 outgoing_cltv_value: 22,
11818 payment_metadata: None,
11819 keysend_preimage: None,
11820 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11821 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
11823 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
11824 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None);
11826 // Should not return an error as this condition:
11827 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
11828 // is not satisfied.
11829 assert!(result.is_ok());
11833 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
11834 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
11835 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
11836 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11837 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11839 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
11840 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11842 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11843 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11844 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
11845 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
11846 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11848 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
11849 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11851 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11852 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11853 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11854 match &msg_events[0] {
11855 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
11856 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11858 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
11859 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
11860 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
11863 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11866 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11867 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11869 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
11870 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
11871 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11873 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11877 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
11878 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
11879 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
11880 // the channel without the anchors feature.
11881 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11882 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11883 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
11884 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11885 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
11886 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
11887 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11889 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
11890 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11891 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11893 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11894 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11896 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
11897 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11899 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11902 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11903 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
11905 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11906 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11908 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
11909 // not have generated any events.
11910 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
11914 fn test_update_channel_config() {
11915 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11916 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11917 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
11918 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
11919 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11920 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11921 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
11923 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11924 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11925 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11927 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
11928 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
11929 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
11930 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11931 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11933 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11934 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11937 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
11938 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11939 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11941 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
11942 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11943 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
11944 ..Default::default()
11946 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11947 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11948 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11950 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11951 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11954 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
11955 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11956 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11957 ..Default::default()
11959 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
11960 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
11961 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11962 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11964 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
11965 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
11968 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
11969 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
11970 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
11971 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
11972 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
11975 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
11976 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
11977 ..Default::default()
11979 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
11982 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
11983 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
11984 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11985 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
11989 fn test_payment_display() {
11990 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11991 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11992 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
11993 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11994 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11995 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
11999 fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12000 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12001 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12002 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12003 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12004 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12006 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12007 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12008 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12009 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12010 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12011 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12012 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12013 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12015 let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12016 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12017 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12020 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12021 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12023 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12024 features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12026 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12027 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12028 }, false).unwrap();
12029 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12030 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12031 nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12033 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12035 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12036 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12037 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12038 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12039 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12040 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12041 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12042 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12043 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12044 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12045 } else { panic!() };
12046 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12047 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12048 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12049 err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12051 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12053 let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12054 assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12055 check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12062 use crate::chain::Listen;
12063 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12064 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12065 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12066 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12067 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12068 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12069 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12070 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12071 use crate::util::test_utils;
12072 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12074 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12075 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12076 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
12078 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12080 use criterion::Criterion;
12082 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12083 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12084 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12085 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12086 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12087 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12088 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12090 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12091 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12093 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12094 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12096 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12098 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12101 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12102 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12105 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12106 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12107 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12109 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12110 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12112 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12113 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12114 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12115 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12116 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12118 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12119 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12120 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12122 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12123 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12124 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12125 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12127 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12128 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12129 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12131 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12132 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12133 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12134 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12135 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12137 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12138 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12139 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12141 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12142 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12144 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12145 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12146 }, false).unwrap();
12147 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
12148 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12149 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12152 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12153 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12154 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12156 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12157 } else { panic!(); }
12159 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12160 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12161 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12162 match events_b[0] {
12163 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12164 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12166 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12169 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12170 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12171 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12172 match events_a[0] {
12173 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12174 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12176 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12179 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12181 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12182 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12183 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12185 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12186 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12187 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12188 match msg_events[0] {
12189 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12190 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12191 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12195 match msg_events[1] {
12196 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12200 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12201 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12202 match events_a[0] {
12203 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12204 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12206 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12209 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12210 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12211 match events_b[0] {
12212 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12213 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12215 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12218 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12219 macro_rules! send_payment {
12220 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12221 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12222 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12223 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12224 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12225 payment_count += 1;
12226 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
12227 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12229 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12230 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12231 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12232 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12233 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12234 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12235 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12236 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12237 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12238 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12239 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12241 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12242 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12243 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12244 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12246 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12247 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12248 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12249 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12250 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12252 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12255 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12256 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12257 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12258 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12260 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12264 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12265 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12266 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);