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Log pending in-flight updates when we are missing a monitor
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::BlindedPath;
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
48 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
49 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
50 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
51 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
52 use crate::ln::msgs;
53 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
55 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
56 #[cfg(test)]
57 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
59 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
60 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder};
61 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
62 use crate::offers::merkle::SignError;
63 use crate::offers::offer::{DerivedMetadata, Offer, OfferBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
65 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
66 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
67 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
68 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
69 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
70 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
71 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
72 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
73 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
74 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
75 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
76 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
77 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
78 use {
79         crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
80         crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
81         crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
82         crate::sign::KeysManager,
83 };
84
85 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
86
87 use crate::io;
88 use crate::prelude::*;
89 use core::{cmp, mem};
90 use core::cell::RefCell;
91 use crate::io::Read;
92 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
93 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
94 use core::time::Duration;
95 use core::ops::Deref;
96
97 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
98 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
99 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
100
101 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
102 //
103 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
104 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
105 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
106 //
107 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
108 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
109 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
110 // before we forward it.
111 //
112 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
113 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
114 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
115 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
116 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
117
118 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
119 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
120 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
121 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
122         /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
123         Forward {
124                 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
125                 /// do with the HTLC.
126                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
127                 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
128                 ///
129                 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
130                 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
131                 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
132                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
133                 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
134                 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
135         },
136         /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
137         ///
138         /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
139         /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
140         Receive {
141                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
142                 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
143                 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
144                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
145                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
146                 ///
147                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
148                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
149                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
150                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
151                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
152                 ///
153                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
154                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
155                 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
156                 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
157                 /// instructions.
158                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
159                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
160                 ///
161                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
162                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
163                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
164                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
165                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
166                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
167         },
168         /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
169         /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
170         /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
171         ReceiveKeysend {
172                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
173                 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
174                 ///
175                 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
176                 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
177                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
178                 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
179                 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
180                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
181                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
182                 ///
183                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
184                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
185                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
186                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
187                 ///
188                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
189                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
190                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
191                 ///
192                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
193                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
194                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
195         },
196 }
197
198 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
199 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
200 pub struct BlindedForward {
201         /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
202         /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
203         /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
204         pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
205         /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
206         /// the introduction node.
207         pub failure: BlindedFailure,
208 }
209
210 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
211         // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
212         fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
213                 match self {
214                         Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
215                         Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
216                         _ => None,
217                 }
218         }
219 }
220
221 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
222 /// should go next.
223 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
224 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
225 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
226         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
227         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
228         /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
229         ///
230         /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
231         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
232         /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
233         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234         /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
235         ///
236         /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
237         /// versions.
238         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
239         /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
240         /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
241         ///
242         /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
243         /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
244         /// it along another path).
245         ///
246         /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
247         /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
248         /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
249         /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
250         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
251         /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
252         /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
253         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
254         /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
255         ///
256         /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
257         /// HTLC.
258         ///
259         /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
260         ///
261         /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
262         /// shoulder them.
263         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
264 }
265
266 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
267 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
268         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
269         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
270 }
271
272 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
273 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
274 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
275         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
276         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
277 }
278
279 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
280 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
281         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
282
283         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
284         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
285         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
286         // HTLCs.
287         //
288         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
289         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
290         prev_htlc_id: u64,
291         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
292         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
293 }
294
295 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
296 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
297         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
298         FailHTLC {
299                 htlc_id: u64,
300                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
301         },
302         FailMalformedHTLC {
303                 htlc_id: u64,
304                 failure_code: u16,
305                 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
306         },
307 }
308
309 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
310 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
311 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
312 pub enum BlindedFailure {
313         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
314         /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
315         FromIntroductionNode,
316         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
317         /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
318         FromBlindedNode,
319 }
320
321 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
322 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
323 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
324         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
325         short_channel_id: u64,
326         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
327         htlc_id: u64,
328         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
329         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
330         blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
331
332         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
333         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
334         outpoint: OutPoint,
335 }
336
337 enum OnionPayload {
338         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
339         Invoice {
340                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
341                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
342                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
343         },
344         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
345         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
346 }
347
348 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
349 struct ClaimableHTLC {
350         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
351         cltv_expiry: u32,
352         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
353         value: u64,
354         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
355         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
356         sender_intended_value: u64,
357         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
358         timer_ticks: u8,
359         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
360         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
361         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
362         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
363         total_msat: u64,
364         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
365         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
366 }
367
368 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
369         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
370                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
371                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
372                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
373                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
374                         value_msat: val.value,
375                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
376                 }
377         }
378 }
379
380 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
381 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
382 ///
383 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
384 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
385 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
386
387 impl PaymentId {
388         /// Number of bytes in the id.
389         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
390 }
391
392 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
393         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
394                 self.0.write(w)
395         }
396 }
397
398 impl Readable for PaymentId {
399         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
400                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
401                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
402         }
403 }
404
405 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
406         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
407                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
408         }
409 }
410
411 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
412 ///
413 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
414 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
415 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
416
417 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
418         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
419                 self.0.write(w)
420         }
421 }
422
423 impl Readable for InterceptId {
424         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
425                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
426                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
427         }
428 }
429
430 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
431 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
432 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
433         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
434         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
435 }
436 impl SentHTLCId {
437         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
438                 match source {
439                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
440                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
441                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
442                         },
443                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
444                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
445                 }
446         }
447 }
448 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
449         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
450                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
451                 (2, htlc_id, required),
452         },
453         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
454                 (0, session_priv, required),
455         };
456 );
457
458
459 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
460 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
461 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
462 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
463         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
464         OutboundRoute {
465                 path: Path,
466                 session_priv: SecretKey,
467                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
468                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
469                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
470                 payment_id: PaymentId,
471         },
472 }
473 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
474 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
475         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
476                 match self {
477                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
478                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
479                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
480                         },
481                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
482                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
483                                 path.hash(hasher);
484                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
485                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
486                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
487                         },
488                 }
489         }
490 }
491 impl HTLCSource {
492         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
493         #[cfg(test)]
494         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
495                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
496                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
497                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
498                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
499                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
500                 }
501         }
502
503         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
504         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
505         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
506         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
507                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
508                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
509                 } else {
510                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
511                         true
512                 }
513         }
514 }
515
516 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
517 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
518 ///
519 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
520 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
521 pub enum FailureCode {
522         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
523         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
524         TemporaryNodeFailure,
525         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
526         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
527         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
528         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
529         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
530         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
531         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
532         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
533         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
534         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
535         ///
536         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
537         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
538         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
539 }
540
541 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
542     fn into(self) -> u16 {
543                 match self {
544                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
545                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
546                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
547                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
548                 }
549         }
550 }
551
552 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
553 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
554 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
555 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
556 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
557
558 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
559         err: msgs::LightningError,
560         closes_channel: bool,
561         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
562 }
563 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
564         #[inline]
565         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
566                 Self {
567                         err: LightningError {
568                                 err: err.clone(),
569                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
570                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
571                                                 channel_id,
572                                                 data: err
573                                         },
574                                 },
575                         },
576                         closes_channel: false,
577                         shutdown_finish: None,
578                 }
579         }
580         #[inline]
581         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
582                 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
583         }
584         #[inline]
585         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
586                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
587                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
588                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
589                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
590                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
591                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
592                 } else {
593                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
594                 };
595                 Self {
596                         err: LightningError { err, action },
597                         closes_channel: true,
598                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
599                 }
600         }
601         #[inline]
602         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
603                 Self {
604                         err: match err {
605                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
606                                         err: msg.clone(),
607                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
608                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
609                                                         channel_id,
610                                                         data: msg
611                                                 },
612                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
613                                         },
614                                 },
615                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
616                                         err: msg,
617                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
618                                 },
619                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
620                                         err: msg.clone(),
621                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
622                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
623                                                         channel_id,
624                                                         data: msg
625                                                 },
626                                         },
627                                 },
628                         },
629                         closes_channel: false,
630                         shutdown_finish: None,
631                 }
632         }
633
634         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
635                 self.closes_channel
636         }
637 }
638
639 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
640 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
641 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
642 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
643 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
644
645 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
646 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
647 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
648 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
649 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
650 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
651         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
652         CommitmentFirst,
653         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
654         RevokeAndACKFirst,
655 }
656
657 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
658 struct ClaimingPayment {
659         amount_msat: u64,
660         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
661         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
662         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
663         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
664 }
665 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
666         (0, amount_msat, required),
667         (2, payment_purpose, required),
668         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
669         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
670         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
671 });
672
673 struct ClaimablePayment {
674         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
675         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
676         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
677 }
678
679 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
680 struct ClaimablePayments {
681         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
682         /// failed/claimed by the user.
683         ///
684         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
685         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
686         ///
687         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
688         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
689         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
690
691         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
692         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
693         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
694         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
695 }
696
697 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
698 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
699 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
700 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
701 #[derive(Debug)]
702 enum BackgroundEvent {
703         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
704         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
705         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
706         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
707         ///
708         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
709         /// are regenerated on startup.
710         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
711         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
712         /// channel to continue normal operation.
713         ///
714         /// In general this should be used rather than
715         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
716         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
717         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
718         ///
719         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
720         /// are regenerated on startup.
721         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
722                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
723                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
724                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
725         },
726         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
727         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
728         /// on a channel.
729         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
730                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
731                 channel_id: ChannelId,
732         },
733 }
734
735 #[derive(Debug)]
736 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
737         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
738         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
739         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
740         /// event can be generated.
741         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
742         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
743         /// operation of another channel.
744         ///
745         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
746         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
747         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
748         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
749         /// outbound edge.
750         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
751                 event: events::Event,
752                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
753         },
754         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
755         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
756         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
757         ///
758         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
759         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
760         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
761         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
762         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
763         ///
764         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
765         /// stored for later processing.
766         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
767                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
768                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
769                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
770         },
771 }
772
773 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
774         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
775         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
776         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
777         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
778                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
779                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
780                 (4, blocking_action, required),
781         },
782         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
783                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
784                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
785                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
786                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
787                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
788                 // downgrades to prior versions.
789                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
790         },
791 );
792
793 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
794 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
795         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
796                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
797                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
798         },
799 }
800 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
801         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
802                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
803                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
804         };
805 );
806
807 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
808 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
809 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
810 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
811         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
812         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
813         /// durably to disk.
814         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
815                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
816                 channel_id: ChannelId,
817                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
818                 htlc_id: u64,
819         },
820 }
821
822 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
823         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
824                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
825                         channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
826                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
827                 }
828         }
829 }
830
831 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
832         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
833 ;);
834
835
836 /// State we hold per-peer.
837 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
838         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
839         ///
840         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
841         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
842         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
843         ///
844         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
845         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
846         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
847         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
848         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
849         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
850         latest_features: InitFeatures,
851         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
852         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
853         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
854         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
855         /// user but which have not yet completed.
856         ///
857         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
858         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
859         /// for a missing channel.
860         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
861         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
862         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
863         ///
864         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
865         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
866         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
867         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
868         ///
869         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
870         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
871         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
872         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
873         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
874         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
875         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
876         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
877         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
878         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
879         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
880         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
881         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
882         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
883         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
884         is_connected: bool,
885 }
886
887 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
888         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
889         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
890         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
891         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
892                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
893                         return false
894                 }
895                 self.channel_by_id.iter().filter(|(_, phase)| matches!(phase, ChannelPhase::Funded(_))).count() == 0
896                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
897                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
898         }
899
900         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
901         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
902                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
903         }
904
905         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
906         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
907                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
908                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
909         }
910 }
911
912 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
913 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
914 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
915         /// The original OpenChannel message.
916         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
917         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
918         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
919 }
920
921 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
922 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
923 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
924
925 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
926 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
927 ///
928 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
929 /// here.
930 ///
931 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
932 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
933 struct PendingInboundPayment {
934         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
935         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
936         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
937         /// this payment being removed.
938         expiry_time: u64,
939         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
940         user_payment_id: u64,
941         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
942         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
943         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
944 }
945
946 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
947 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
948 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
949 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
950 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
951 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
952 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
953 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
954 ///
955 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
956 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
957 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
958         Arc<M>,
959         Arc<T>,
960         Arc<KeysManager>,
961         Arc<KeysManager>,
962         Arc<KeysManager>,
963         Arc<F>,
964         Arc<DefaultRouter<
965                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
966                 Arc<L>,
967                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
968                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
969                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
970         >>,
971         Arc<L>
972 >;
973
974 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
975 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
976 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
977 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
978 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
979 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
980 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
981 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
982 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
983 ///
984 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
985 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
986 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
987         ChannelManager<
988                 &'a M,
989                 &'b T,
990                 &'c KeysManager,
991                 &'c KeysManager,
992                 &'c KeysManager,
993                 &'d F,
994                 &'e DefaultRouter<
995                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
996                         &'g L,
997                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
998                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
999                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1000                 >,
1001                 &'g L
1002         >;
1003
1004 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1005 ///
1006 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1007 /// languages.
1008 pub trait AChannelManager {
1009         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1010         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1011         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1012         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1013         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1014         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1015         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1016         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1017         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1018         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1019         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1020         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1021         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1022         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1023         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1024         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1025         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1026         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1027         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1028         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1029         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1030         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1031         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1032         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1033         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1034         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1035         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1036         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1037         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1038         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1039         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1040         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1041         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1042         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1043         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1044         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1045 }
1046
1047 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1048 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1049 where
1050         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1051         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1052         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1053         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1054         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1055         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1056         R::Target: Router,
1057         L::Target: Logger,
1058 {
1059         type Watch = M::Target;
1060         type M = M;
1061         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1062         type T = T;
1063         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1064         type ES = ES;
1065         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1066         type NS = NS;
1067         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1068         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1069         type SP = SP;
1070         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1071         type F = F;
1072         type Router = R::Target;
1073         type R = R;
1074         type Logger = L::Target;
1075         type L = L;
1076         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1077 }
1078
1079 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
1080 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
1081 ///
1082 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
1083 /// to individual Channels.
1084 ///
1085 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1086 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1087 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1088 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1089 ///
1090 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1091 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1092 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1093 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1094 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1095 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1096 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1097 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1098 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1099 ///
1100 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1101 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1102 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1103 ///
1104 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1105 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1106 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1107 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1108 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1109 ///
1110 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1111 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1112 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1113 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1114 ///
1115 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1116 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1117 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1118 ///
1119 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1120 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1121 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1122 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1123 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1124 ///
1125 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1126 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1127 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1128 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1129 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1130 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1131 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1132 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1133 //
1134 // Lock order:
1135 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1136 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1137 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1138 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1139 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1140 //
1141 // Lock order tree:
1142 //
1143 // `pending_offers_messages`
1144 //
1145 // `total_consistency_lock`
1146 //  |
1147 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1148 //  |   |
1149 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1150 //  |
1151 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1152 //      |
1153 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1154 //          |
1155 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1156 //          |
1157 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1158 //              |
1159 //              |__`peer_state`
1160 //                  |
1161 //                  |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1162 //                  |
1163 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1164 //                  |
1165 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1166 //                  |
1167 //                  |__`best_block`
1168 //                  |
1169 //                  |__`pending_events`
1170 //                      |
1171 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1172 //
1173 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1174 where
1175         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1176         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1177         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1178         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1179         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1180         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1181         R::Target: Router,
1182         L::Target: Logger,
1183 {
1184         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1185         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1186         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1187         chain_monitor: M,
1188         tx_broadcaster: T,
1189         #[allow(unused)]
1190         router: R,
1191
1192         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1193         #[cfg(test)]
1194         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1195         #[cfg(not(test))]
1196         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1197         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1198
1199         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1200         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1201         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1202         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1203         ///
1204         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1205         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1206
1207         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1208         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1209         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1210         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1211         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1212         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1213         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1214         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1215         ///
1216         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1217         ///
1218         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1219         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1220
1221         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1222         ///
1223         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1224         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1225         /// and via the classic SCID.
1226         ///
1227         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1228         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1229         ///
1230         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1231         #[cfg(test)]
1232         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1233         #[cfg(not(test))]
1234         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1235         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1236         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1237         ///
1238         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1239         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1240
1241         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1242         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1243         ///
1244         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1245         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1246
1247         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1248         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1249         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1250         /// active channel list on load.
1251         ///
1252         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1253         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1254
1255         /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1256         ///
1257         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1258         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1259         /// the handling of the events.
1260         ///
1261         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1262         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1263         ///
1264         /// TODO:
1265         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1266         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1267         /// would break backwards compatability.
1268         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1269         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1270         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1271         ///
1272         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1273         #[cfg(not(test))]
1274         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1275         #[cfg(test)]
1276         pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1277
1278         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1279         ///
1280         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1281         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1282         /// confirmation depth.
1283         ///
1284         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1285         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1286         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1287         ///
1288         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1289         #[cfg(test)]
1290         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1291         #[cfg(not(test))]
1292         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1293
1294         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1295
1296         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1297
1298         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1299         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1300         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1301         ///
1302         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1303         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1304
1305         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1306         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1307         /// keeping additional state.
1308         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1309
1310         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1311         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1312         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1313         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1314
1315         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1316         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1317         ///
1318         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1319         /// are currently open with that peer.
1320         ///
1321         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1322         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1323         /// channels.
1324         ///
1325         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1326         ///
1327         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1328         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1329         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1330         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1331         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1332
1333         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1334         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1335         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1336         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1337         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1338         ///
1339         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1340         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1341         ///
1342         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1343         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1344         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1345         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1346         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1347
1348         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1349         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1350
1351         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1352         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1353         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1354         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1355         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1356         ///
1357         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1358         ///
1359         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1360         ///
1361         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1362         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1363         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1364         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1365         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1366         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1367         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1368         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1369         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1370         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
1371         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
1372         ///
1373         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
1374         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
1375         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
1376
1377         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1378
1379         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
1380         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
1381
1382         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
1383
1384         entropy_source: ES,
1385         node_signer: NS,
1386         signer_provider: SP,
1387
1388         logger: L,
1389 }
1390
1391 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1392 ///
1393 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1394 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1395 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1396 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1397 pub struct ChainParameters {
1398         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1399         pub network: Network,
1400
1401         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1402         ///
1403         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1404         pub best_block: BestBlock,
1405 }
1406
1407 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1408 #[must_use]
1409 enum NotifyOption {
1410         DoPersist,
1411         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1412         SkipPersistNoEvents,
1413 }
1414
1415 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1416 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1417 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1418 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1419 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1420 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1421 ///
1422 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1423 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1424 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1425 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1426         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1427         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
1428         should_persist: F,
1429         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1430         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1431 }
1432
1433 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1434         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
1435         /// events to handle.
1436         ///
1437         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
1438         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
1439         /// isn't ideal.
1440         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1441                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
1442         }
1443
1444         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
1445         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
1446                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1447                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
1448
1449                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1450                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1451                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1452                         should_persist: move || {
1453                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
1454                                 // processing and return that.
1455                                 let notify = persist_check();
1456                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
1457                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1458                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
1459                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1460                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
1461                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
1462                                 }
1463                         },
1464                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1465                 }
1466         }
1467
1468         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1469         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
1470         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
1471         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
1472         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1473                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1474
1475                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1476                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
1477                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
1478                         should_persist: persist_check,
1479                         _read_guard: read_guard,
1480                 }
1481         }
1482 }
1483
1484 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1485         fn drop(&mut self) {
1486                 match (self.should_persist)() {
1487                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
1488                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
1489                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
1490                         },
1491                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
1492                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
1493                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
1494                 }
1495         }
1496 }
1497
1498 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1499 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1500 ///
1501 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1502 ///
1503 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1504 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1505 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1506 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1507 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1508
1509 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1510 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1511 ///
1512 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1513 ///
1514 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1515 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1516 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1517 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1518 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1519 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1520 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1521 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1522 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1523 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1524 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1525 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1526 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1527
1528 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1529 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1530 /// this value.
1531 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1532 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1533 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1534 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1535
1536 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1537 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1538 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1539 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1540 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1541 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1542 #[allow(dead_code)]
1543 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1544
1545 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1546 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1547 #[allow(dead_code)]
1548 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1549
1550 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1551 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1552
1553 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1554 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1555 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1556
1557 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1558 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1559 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1560
1561 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1562 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1563 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1564 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1565
1566 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1567 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1568 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1569
1570 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1571 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1572 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1573
1574 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1575 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1576 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1577         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1578         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1579         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1580         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1581         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1582         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1583         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1584         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1585 }
1586
1587 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1588 /// to better separate parameters.
1589 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1590 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1591         /// The node_id of our counterparty
1592         pub node_id: PublicKey,
1593         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1594         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1595         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1596         pub features: InitFeatures,
1597         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1598         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1599         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1600         ///
1601         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1602         ///
1603         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1604         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1605         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1606         /// payments to us through this channel.
1607         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1608         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1609         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1610         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1611         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1612         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1613         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1614 }
1615
1616 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1617 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1618 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1619         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1620         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1621         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1622         /// lifetime of the channel.
1623         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1624         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1625         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1626         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1627         /// our counterparty already.
1628         ///
1629         /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1630         /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1631         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1632         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1633         ///
1634         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1635         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1636         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1637         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1638         ///
1639         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1640         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1641         ///
1642         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1643         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1644         ///
1645         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1646         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1647         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1648         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1649         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1650         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1651         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1652         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1653         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1654         /// `Some(0)`).
1655         ///
1656         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1657         ///
1658         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1659         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1660         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1661         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1662         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1663         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1664         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1665         ///
1666         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1667         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1668         ///
1669         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1670         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1671         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1672         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1673         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1674         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1675         /// this value on chain.
1676         ///
1677         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1678         ///
1679         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1680         ///
1681         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1682         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1683         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1684         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1685         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1686         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
1687         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1688         ///
1689         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1690         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1691         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1692         pub user_channel_id: u128,
1693         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1694         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1695         ///
1696         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1697         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1698         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
1699         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
1700         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
1701         ///
1702         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
1703         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
1704         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1705         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
1706         ///
1707         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
1708         pub balance_msat: u64,
1709         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1710         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1711         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1712         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1713         ///
1714         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
1715         ///
1716         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1717         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1718         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1719         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1720         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1721         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1722         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1723         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1724         ///
1725         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
1726         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1727         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1728         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1729         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1730         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1731         /// route which is valid.
1732         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1733         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1734         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1735         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1736         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1737         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1738         ///
1739         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1740         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1741         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1742         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1743         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1744         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1745         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1746         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1747         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1748         ///
1749         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1750         ///
1751         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1752         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1753         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1754         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1755         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1756         ///
1757         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1758         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1759         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1760         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1761         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1762         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1763         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1764         ///
1765         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1766         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1767         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1768         pub is_outbound: bool,
1769         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1770         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1771         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1772         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1773         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1774         ///
1775         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1776         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1777         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1778         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1779         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1780         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1781         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1782         ///
1783         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1784         pub is_usable: bool,
1785         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1786         pub is_public: bool,
1787         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1788         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1789         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1790         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1791         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1792         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1793         ///
1794         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1795         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1796 }
1797
1798 impl ChannelDetails {
1799         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1800         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1801         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1802         ///
1803         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1804         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1805         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1806                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1807         }
1808
1809         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1810         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1811         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1812         ///
1813         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1814         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1815         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1816                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1817         }
1818
1819         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1820                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1821                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1822         ) -> Self
1823         where
1824                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1825                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1826         {
1827                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1828                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1829                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1830                 ChannelDetails {
1831                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1832                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1833                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1834                                 features: latest_features,
1835                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1836                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1837                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1838                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1839                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1840                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1841                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1842                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1843                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1844                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1845                         },
1846                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1847                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1848                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1849                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1850                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1851                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1852                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1853                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1854                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1855                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1856                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
1857                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1858                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1859                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1860                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1861                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1862                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1863                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1864                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1865                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1866                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1867                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
1868                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
1869                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1870                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1871                         config: Some(context.config()),
1872                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1873                 }
1874         }
1875 }
1876
1877 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1878 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1879 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1880 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1881 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1882 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1883 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1884 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1885         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1886         NotShuttingDown,
1887         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1888         ShutdownInitiated,
1889         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1890         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1891         ResolvingHTLCs,
1892         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1893         NegotiatingClosingFee,
1894         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1895         /// to drop the channel.
1896         ShutdownComplete,
1897 }
1898
1899 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1900 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1901 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1902 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1903         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1904         AwaitingInvoice {
1905                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1906                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1907                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1908         },
1909         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1910         Pending {
1911                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1912                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1913                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1914                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1915                 /// abandoned.
1916                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1917                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1918                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1919                 total_msat: u64,
1920         },
1921         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1922         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1923         /// payment is removed from tracking.
1924         Fulfilled {
1925                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1926                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1927                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1928                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1929                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1930                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1931         },
1932         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1933         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1934         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1935         Abandoned {
1936                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
1937                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
1938                 payment_id: PaymentId,
1939                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1940                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1941         },
1942 }
1943
1944 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1945 ///
1946 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1947 #[derive(Clone)]
1948 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1949         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1950         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1951         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1952         /// route hints.
1953         pub phantom_scid: u64,
1954         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1955         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1956 }
1957
1958 macro_rules! handle_error {
1959         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1960                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1961                 // entering the macro.
1962                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1963                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1964
1965                 match $internal {
1966                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
1967                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
1968                                 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1969
1970                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1971                                         let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
1972                                         let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
1973                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
1974                                                 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
1975                                         );
1976                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
1977
1978                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1979                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
1980                                                 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1981                                                         msg: update
1982                                                 });
1983                                         }
1984                                 } else {
1985                                         log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
1986                                 }
1987
1988                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1989                                 } else {
1990                                         msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1991                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1992                                                 action: err.action.clone()
1993                                         });
1994                                 }
1995
1996                                 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1997                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1998                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1999                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2000                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
2001                                         }
2002                                 }
2003
2004                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2005                                 Err(err)
2006                         },
2007                 }
2008         } };
2009 }
2010
2011 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2012         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2013                 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2014                         $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2015                 }
2016                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2017                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2018                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2019                 } else {
2020                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2021                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2022                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2023                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2024                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2025                         // stage.
2026                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2027                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2028                 }
2029                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2030         }}
2031 }
2032
2033 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2034 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2035         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2036                 match $err {
2037                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2038                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2039                         },
2040                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2041                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2042                         },
2043                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2044                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2045                                 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2046                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2047                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2048                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2049                                 let err =
2050                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2051                                 (true, err)
2052                         },
2053                 }
2054         };
2055         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2056                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2057         };
2058         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2059                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2060         };
2061         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2062                 match $channel_phase {
2063                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2064                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2065                         },
2066                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2067                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2068                         },
2069                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2070                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2071                         },
2072                 }
2073         };
2074 }
2075
2076 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2077         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2078                 match $res {
2079                         Ok(res) => res,
2080                         Err(e) => {
2081                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2082                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2083                                 if drop {
2084                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2085                                 }
2086                                 break Err(res);
2087                         }
2088                 }
2089         }
2090 }
2091
2092 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2093         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2094                 match $res {
2095                         Ok(res) => res,
2096                         Err(e) => {
2097                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2098                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2099                                 if drop {
2100                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2101                                 }
2102                                 return Err(res);
2103                         }
2104                 }
2105         }
2106 }
2107
2108 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2109         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2110                 {
2111                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2112                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2113                         channel
2114                 }
2115         }
2116 }
2117
2118 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2119         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2120                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2121                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2122                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2123                 });
2124                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2125                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2126                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2127                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2128                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2129                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2130                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2131                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2132                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2133                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2134                 }
2135         }}
2136 }
2137
2138 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2139         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2140                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2141                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2142                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2143                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2144                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2145                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2146                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2147                         }, None));
2148                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2149                 }
2150         }
2151 }
2152
2153 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2154         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2155                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2156                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2157                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2158                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2159                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2160                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2161                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2162                         }, None));
2163                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2164                 }
2165         }
2166 }
2167
2168 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2169         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2170                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2171                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2172                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2173                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2174                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2175                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2176                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2177                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2178                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2179                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2180                         // now.
2181                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2182                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2183                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2184                                         msg,
2185                                 })
2186                         } else { None }
2187                 } else { None };
2188
2189                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2190                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2191
2192                 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2193                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2194                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2195                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2196                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2197                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2198                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2199                 }
2200
2201                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2202                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2203                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2204                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2205
2206                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2207                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2208                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2209                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2210                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2211                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2212                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2213                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2214                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2215                                 ));
2216                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2217                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2218                                 } else {
2219                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2220                                 }
2221                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2222                         } else {
2223                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2224                         }
2225
2226                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2227                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2228                         if batch_completed {
2229                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2230                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2231                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2232                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2233                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2234                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2235                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2236                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2237                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2238                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2239                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2240                                                 }
2241                                         }
2242                                 }
2243                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2244                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2245                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2246                                 }
2247                         }
2248                 }
2249
2250                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2251
2252                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2253                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2254                 }
2255                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2256                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2257                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2258                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2259                 }
2260         } }
2261 }
2262
2263 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2264         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2265                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2266                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2267                 match $update_res {
2268                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2269                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2270                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2271                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2272                         },
2273                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2274                                 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2275                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2276                                 false
2277                         },
2278                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2279                                 $completed;
2280                                 true
2281                         },
2282                 }
2283         } };
2284         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2285                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
2286                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2287         };
2288         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2289                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2290                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2291                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2292                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2293                 // filter for uniqueness here.
2294                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2295                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2296                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2297                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2298                         });
2299                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2300                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
2301                         {
2302                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2303                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2304                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2305                                 }
2306                         })
2307         } };
2308 }
2309
2310 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2311         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2312                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2313                 while !processed_all_events {
2314                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2315                                 return;
2316                         }
2317
2318                         let mut result;
2319
2320                         {
2321                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2322                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2323                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2324
2325                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2326                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2327                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
2328
2329                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2330                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2331                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2332                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2333                                 }
2334                         }
2335
2336                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2337                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
2338                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2339                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2340                         }
2341
2342                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2343
2344                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2345                                 $event_to_handle = event;
2346                                 $handle_event;
2347                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2348                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
2349                                 }
2350                         }
2351
2352                         {
2353                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2354                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2355                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2356                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2357                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2358                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2359                         }
2360
2361                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2362                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2363                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2364                                 processed_all_events = false;
2365                         }
2366
2367                         match result {
2368                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2369                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2370                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
2371                                 },
2372                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2373                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2374                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2375                         }
2376                 }
2377         }
2378 }
2379
2380 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2381 where
2382         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
2383         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2384         ES::Target: EntropySource,
2385         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2386         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2387         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2388         R::Target: Router,
2389         L::Target: Logger,
2390 {
2391         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2392         ///
2393         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2394         ///
2395         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2396         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2397         ///
2398         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2399         ///
2400         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2401         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2402         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2403         /// more details.
2404         ///
2405         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2406         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2407         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2408         pub fn new(
2409                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2410                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2411                 current_timestamp: u32,
2412         ) -> Self {
2413                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2414                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2415                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2416                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2417                 ChannelManager {
2418                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
2419                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
2420                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2421                         chain_monitor,
2422                         tx_broadcaster,
2423                         router,
2424
2425                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2426
2427                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2428                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2429                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2430                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2431                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2432                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2433                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2434                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2435
2436                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2437                         secp_ctx,
2438
2439                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2440                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2441
2442                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2443
2444                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2445
2446                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2447
2448                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2449                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2450                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2451                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2452                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2453                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2454                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
2455                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
2456
2457                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2458
2459                         entropy_source,
2460                         node_signer,
2461                         signer_provider,
2462
2463                         logger,
2464                 }
2465         }
2466
2467         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2468         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2469                 &self.default_configuration
2470         }
2471
2472         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2473                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2474                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2475                 let mut i = 0;
2476                 loop {
2477                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2478                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2479                         } else {
2480                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2481                         }
2482                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2483                                 break;
2484                         }
2485                         i += 1;
2486                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2487                 }
2488                 outbound_scid_alias
2489         }
2490
2491         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2492         ///
2493         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2494         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2495         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2496         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2497         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2498         ///
2499         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2500         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2501         ///
2502         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2503         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2504         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2505         ///
2506         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2507         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2508         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2509         ///
2510         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
2511         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
2512         ///
2513         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2514         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2515         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2516         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2517         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2518         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2519         ///
2520         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2521         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2522         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2523         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2524                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2525                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2526                 }
2527
2528                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2529                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2530                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2531
2532                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2533
2534                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2535                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2536
2537                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2538
2539                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
2540                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
2541                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
2542                         }
2543                 }
2544
2545                 let channel = {
2546                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2547                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2548                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2549                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2550                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2551                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
2552                         {
2553                                 Ok(res) => res,
2554                                 Err(e) => {
2555                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2556                                         return Err(e);
2557                                 },
2558                         }
2559                 };
2560                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
2561
2562                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2563                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2564                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2565                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
2566                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2567                                 } else {
2568                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
2569                                 }
2570                         },
2571                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
2572                 }
2573
2574                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2575                         node_id: their_network_key,
2576                         msg: res,
2577                 });
2578                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2579         }
2580
2581         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2582                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2583                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2584                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2585                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2586                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2587                 // the same channel.
2588                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2589                 {
2590                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2591                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2592                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2593                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2594                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2595                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2596                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2597                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2598                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2599                                                 _ => None,
2600                                         })
2601                                         .filter(f)
2602                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2603                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2604                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2605                                         })
2606                                 );
2607                         }
2608                 }
2609                 res
2610         }
2611
2612         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2613         /// more information.
2614         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2615                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2616                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2617                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2618                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2619                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2620                 // the same channel.
2621                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2622                 {
2623                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2624                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2625                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2626                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2627                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2628                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2629                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2630                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2631                                         res.push(details);
2632                                 }
2633                         }
2634                 }
2635                 res
2636         }
2637
2638         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2639         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2640         ///
2641         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2642         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2643         /// are.
2644         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2645                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2646                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2647                 // really wanted anyway.
2648                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2649         }
2650
2651         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2652         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2653                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2654                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2655
2656                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2657                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2658                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2659                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2660                         let context_to_details = |context| {
2661                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2662                         };
2663                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
2664                                 .iter()
2665                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2666                                 .map(context_to_details)
2667                                 .collect();
2668                 }
2669                 vec![]
2670         }
2671
2672         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2673         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2674         ///
2675         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2676         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2677         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2678         ///
2679         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2680         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2681                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2682                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2683                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2684                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2685                                 },
2686                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2687                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2688                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2689                                 },
2690                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2691                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2692                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
2693                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2694                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
2695                                         })
2696                                 },
2697                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2698                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2699                                 },
2700                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2701                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2702                                 },
2703                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2704                         })
2705                         .collect()
2706         }
2707
2708         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2709                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2710
2711                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
2712                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
2713
2714                 {
2715                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2716
2717                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2718                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2719
2720                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2721                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2722
2723                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2724                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2725                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2726                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2727                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2728                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2729                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2730                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2731
2732                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2733                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2734                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2735                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2736                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2737                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
2738                                                 });
2739
2740                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
2741                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
2742
2743                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2744                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2745                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2746                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
2747                                                 }
2748                                         } else {
2749                                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2750                                                 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
2751                                         }
2752                                 },
2753                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
2754                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
2755                                                 err: format!(
2756                                                         "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
2757                                                         channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
2758                                                 )
2759                                         });
2760                                 },
2761                         }
2762                 }
2763
2764                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2765                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2766                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2767                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2768                 }
2769
2770                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
2771                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2772                 }
2773
2774                 Ok(())
2775         }
2776
2777         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2778         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2779         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2780         ///
2781         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
2782         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2783         ///    fee estimate.
2784         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2785         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
2786         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2787         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2788         ///
2789         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2790         ///
2791         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2792         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2793         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2794         /// channel.
2795         ///
2796         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2797         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
2798         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2799         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2800         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2801                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2802         }
2803
2804         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2805         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2806         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2807         ///
2808         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2809         /// the channel being closed or not:
2810         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2811         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2812         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
2813         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2814         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2815         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2816         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2817         ///
2818         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2819         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2820         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2821         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2822         ///
2823         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2824         ///
2825         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2826         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2827         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2828         /// channel.
2829         ///
2830         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2831         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
2832         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2833         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2834                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2835         }
2836
2837         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2838                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2839                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2840                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
2841                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2842                 }
2843
2844                 let logger = WithContext::from(
2845                         &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
2846                 );
2847
2848                 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
2849                         shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
2850                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
2851                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2852                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2853                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2854                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2855                 }
2856                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
2857                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2858                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2859                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2860                         // ignore the result here.
2861                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2862                 }
2863                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
2864                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2865                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2866                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2867                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2868                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
2869                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
2870                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2871                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2872                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
2873                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
2874                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
2875                                         }
2876                                 }
2877                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
2878                         }
2879                         debug_assert!(
2880                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
2881                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
2882                         );
2883                 }
2884
2885                 {
2886                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2887                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2888                                 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
2889                                 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
2890                                 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
2891                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
2892                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
2893                                 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
2894                         }, None));
2895
2896                         if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
2897                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2898                                         channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
2899                                 }, None));
2900                         }
2901                 }
2902                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
2903                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
2904                 }
2905         }
2906
2907         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2908         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2909         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2910         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2911                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2912                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2913                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2914                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2915                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2916                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2917                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2918                         } else {
2919                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2920                         };
2921                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
2922                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2923                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2924                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2925                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
2926                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
2927                                 match chan_phase {
2928                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2929                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
2930                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2931                                         },
2932                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2933                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
2934                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
2935                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2936                                         },
2937                                 }
2938                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2939                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2940                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2941                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2942                                 // events anyway.
2943                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
2944                         } else {
2945                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2946                         }
2947                 };
2948                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2949                         // Try to send the `BroadcastChannelUpdate` to the peer we just force-closed on, but if
2950                         // not try to broadcast it via whatever peer we have.
2951                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2952                         let a_peer_state_opt = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2953                                 .ok_or(per_peer_state.values().next());
2954                         if let Ok(a_peer_state_mutex) = a_peer_state_opt {
2955                                 let mut a_peer_state = a_peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2956                                 a_peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2957                                         msg: update
2958                                 });
2959                         }
2960                 }
2961
2962                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2963         }
2964
2965         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2966                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2967                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2968                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2969                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2970                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2971                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2972                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2973                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2974                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2975                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
2976                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
2977                                                         },
2978                                                 }
2979                                         );
2980                                 }
2981                                 Ok(())
2982                         },
2983                         Err(e) => Err(e)
2984                 }
2985         }
2986
2987         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2988         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2989         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2990         /// channel.
2991         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2992         -> Result<(), APIError> {
2993                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2994         }
2995
2996         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2997         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2998         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2999         ///
3000         /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
3001         /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3002         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3003         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3004                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3005         }
3006
3007         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3008         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3009         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3010                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3011                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3012                 }
3013         }
3014
3015         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3016         /// local transaction(s).
3017         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3018                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3019                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3020                 }
3021         }
3022
3023         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3024                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3025         ) -> Result<
3026                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3027         > {
3028                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3029                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3030                 )?;
3031
3032                 let is_intro_node_forward = match next_hop {
3033                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3034                                 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::BlindedForward {
3035                                         intro_node_blinding_point: Some(_), ..
3036                                 }, ..
3037                         } => true,
3038                         _ => false,
3039                 };
3040
3041                 macro_rules! return_err {
3042                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3043                                 {
3044                                         log_info!(
3045                                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3046                                                 "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg
3047                                         );
3048                                         // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3049                                         if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3050                                                 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3051                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3052                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3053                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3054                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3055                                                 }));
3056                                         }
3057
3058                                         let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_forward {
3059                                                 (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3060                                         } else { ($err_code, $data) };
3061                                         return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3062                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3063                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3064                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3065                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3066                                         }));
3067                                 }
3068                         }
3069                 }
3070
3071                 let NextPacketDetails {
3072                         next_packet_pubkey, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_scid, outgoing_cltv_value
3073                 } = match next_packet_details_opt {
3074                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3075                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3076                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3077                 };
3078
3079                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3080                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3081                 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3082                         let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3083                         let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3084                                 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3085                                         // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3086                                         // phantom or an intercept.
3087                                         if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3088                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3089                                                 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3090                                         {
3091                                                 None
3092                                         } else {
3093                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3094                                         }
3095                                 },
3096                                 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3097                         };
3098                         let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3099                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3100                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3101                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3102                                         break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3103                                 }
3104                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3105                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3106                                 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3107                                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3108                                 ).flatten() {
3109                                         None => {
3110                                                 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3111                                                 // have no consistency guarantees.
3112                                                 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3113                                         },
3114                                         Some(chan) => chan
3115                                 };
3116                                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3117                                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3118                                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3119                                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3120                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3121                                 }
3122                                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3123                                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3124                                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3125                                         // we don't have the channel here.
3126                                         break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3127                                 }
3128                                 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3129
3130                                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3131                                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3132                                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3133                                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3134                                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3135                                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3136                                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3137                                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3138                                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3139                                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3140                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3141                                         } else {
3142                                                 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3143                                         }
3144                                 }
3145                                 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3146                                         break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3147                                 }
3148                                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3149                                         break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3150                                 }
3151                                 chan_update_opt
3152                         } else {
3153                                 None
3154                         };
3155
3156                         let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3157
3158                         if let Err((err_msg, code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3159                                 cur_height, outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3160                         ) {
3161                                 if code & 0x1000 != 0 && chan_update_opt.is_none() {
3162                                         // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3163                                         // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3164                                         // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3165                                         break Some((err_msg, 0x2000 | 2, None))
3166                                 }
3167                                 let chan_update_opt = if code & 0x1000 != 0 { chan_update_opt } else { None };
3168                                 break Some((err_msg, code, chan_update_opt));
3169                         }
3170
3171                         break None;
3172                 }
3173                 {
3174                         let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3175                         if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3176                                 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3177                                         msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3178                                 }
3179                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3180                                         msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3181                                 }
3182                                 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3183                                         // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3184                                         0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3185                                 }
3186                                 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3187                                 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3188                                 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3189                         } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3190                                 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3191                                 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3192                                 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3193                                 // instead.
3194                                 code = 0x2000 | 2;
3195                         }
3196                         return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3197                 }
3198                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_pubkey)))
3199         }
3200
3201         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3202                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3203                 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3204                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3205         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3206                 macro_rules! return_err {
3207                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3208                                 {
3209                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3210                                         log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3211                                         if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3212                                                 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3213                                                         msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3214                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3215                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3216                                                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3217                                                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3218                                                         }
3219                                                 ))
3220                                         }
3221                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3222                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3223                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3224                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3225                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3226                                         }));
3227                                 }
3228                         }
3229                 }
3230                 match decoded_hop {
3231                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3232                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3233                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3234                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3235                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3236                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3237                                 {
3238                                         Ok(info) => {
3239                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3240                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3241                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3242                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3243                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3244                                         },
3245                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3246                                 }
3247                         },
3248                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3249                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3250                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3251                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3252                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3253                                 }
3254                         }
3255                 }
3256         }
3257
3258         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3259         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3260         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3261         ///
3262         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3263         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3264         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3265         ///
3266         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3267         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3268         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3269                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3270                         return Err(LightningError {
3271                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3272                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3273                         });
3274                 }
3275                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3276                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3277                 }
3278                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3279                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3280                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3281         }
3282
3283         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3284         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3285         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3286         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3287         ///
3288         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3289         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3290         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3291         ///
3292         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3293         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3294         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3295                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3296                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3297                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3298                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3299                         Some(id) => id,
3300                 };
3301
3302                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3303         }
3304
3305         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3306                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3307                 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
3308                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3309
3310                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3311                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3312                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3313                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3314                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3315                 };
3316
3317                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3318                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
3319                         short_channel_id,
3320                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3321                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3322                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3323                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3324                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3325                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3326                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3327                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3328                 };
3329                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3330                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3331                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3332                 // channel.
3333                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3334
3335                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3336                         signature: sig,
3337                         contents: unsigned
3338                 })
3339         }
3340
3341         #[cfg(test)]
3342         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3343                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3344                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3345                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3346                         session_priv_bytes
3347                 })
3348         }
3349
3350         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3351                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3352                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3353                         session_priv_bytes
3354                 } = args;
3355                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3356                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3357                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3358                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3359
3360                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
3361                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
3362                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
3363                 ).map_err(|e| {
3364                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3365                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3366                         e
3367                 })?;
3368
3369                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3370                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3371                                 None => {
3372                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
3373                                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
3374                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
3375                                 },
3376                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3377                         };
3378
3379                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
3380                         log_trace!(logger,
3381                                 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3382                                 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3383
3384                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3385                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3386                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3387                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3388                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3389                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3390                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3391                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3392                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3393                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3394                                                 }
3395                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3396                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3397                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3398                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3399                                                                 path: path.clone(),
3400                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3401                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3402                                                                 payment_id,
3403                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
3404                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3405                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
3406                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
3407                                                                         false => {
3408                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3409                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3410                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3411                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3412                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3413                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3414                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3415                                                                         },
3416                                                                         true => {},
3417                                                                 }
3418                                                         },
3419                                                         None => {},
3420                                                 }
3421                                         },
3422                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3423                                 };
3424                         } else {
3425                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3426                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3427                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
3428                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3429                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3430                         }
3431                         return Ok(());
3432                 };
3433                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3434                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3435                         Err(e) => {
3436                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3437                         },
3438                 }
3439         }
3440
3441         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3442         ///
3443         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3444         /// fields for more info.
3445         ///
3446         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3447         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3448         ///
3449         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3450         ///
3451         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3452         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3453         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3454         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3455         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3456         ///
3457         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3458         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3459         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3460         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3461         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3462         ///
3463         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3464         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3465         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3466         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3467         ///
3468         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3469         ///
3470         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3471         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3472         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3473         ///
3474         /// In general, a path may raise:
3475         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3476         ///    node public key) is specified.
3477         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
3478         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
3479         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3480         ///    relevant updates.
3481         ///
3482         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3483         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3484         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3485         ///
3486         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3487         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3488         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3489         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3490         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3491         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3492         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3493                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3494                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3495                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3496                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3497                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3498                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3499         }
3500
3501         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3502         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3503         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3504                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3505                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3506                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3507                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3508                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3509                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3510                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3511         }
3512
3513         #[cfg(test)]
3514         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3515                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3516                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3517                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3518                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3519                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3520         }
3521
3522         #[cfg(test)]
3523         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3524                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3525                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3526         }
3527
3528         #[cfg(test)]
3529         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3530                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3531         }
3532
3533         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
3534                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3535                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3536                 self.pending_outbound_payments
3537                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
3538                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3539                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
3540                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
3541                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
3542                         )
3543         }
3544
3545         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3546         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3547         /// retries are exhausted.
3548         ///
3549         /// # Event Generation
3550         ///
3551         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3552         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3553         ///
3554         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3555         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3556         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3557         ///
3558         /// # Requested Invoices
3559         ///
3560         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
3561         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
3562         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
3563         /// once the invoice has been received.
3564         ///
3565         /// # Restart Behavior
3566         ///
3567         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3568         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3569         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3570         ///
3571         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3572         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3573                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3574                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3575         }
3576
3577         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3578         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3579         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3580         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3581         /// never reach the recipient.
3582         ///
3583         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3584         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3585         ///
3586         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3587         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3588         ///
3589         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3590         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3591                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3592                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3593                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3594                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3595                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3596         }
3597
3598         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3599         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3600         ///
3601         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3602         /// payments.
3603         ///
3604         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3605         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3606                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3607                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3608                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3609                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3610                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3611                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3612         }
3613
3614         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3615         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3616         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3617         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3618                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3619                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3620                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3621                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3622                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3623         }
3624
3625         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3626         /// payment probe.
3627         #[cfg(test)]
3628         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3629                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3630         }
3631
3632         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
3633         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
3634         ///
3635         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
3636         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
3637                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
3638                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3639         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3640                 let payment_params =
3641                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
3642
3643                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
3644
3645                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
3646         }
3647
3648         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
3649         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
3650         ///
3651         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
3652         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
3653         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
3654         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
3655         ///
3656         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
3657         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
3658         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
3659         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
3660         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
3661         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
3662         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
3663                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
3664         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
3665                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
3666
3667                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
3668                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
3669                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
3670                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
3671
3672                 let route = self
3673                         .router
3674                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
3675                         .map_err(|e| {
3676                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
3677                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
3678                         })?;
3679
3680                 let mut used_liquidity_map = HashMap::with_capacity(first_hops.len());
3681
3682                 let mut res = Vec::new();
3683
3684                 for mut path in route.paths {
3685                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
3686                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
3687                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
3688                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
3689                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
3690                                         break;
3691                                 } else {
3692                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
3693                                         log_debug!(
3694                                                 self.logger,
3695                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
3696                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
3697                                         );
3698                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
3699                                         path.hops.pop();
3700                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
3701                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
3702                                         }
3703                                 }
3704                         }
3705
3706                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
3707                                 log_debug!(
3708                                         self.logger,
3709                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
3710                                 );
3711                                 continue;
3712                         }
3713
3714                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
3715                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
3716                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
3717                                 }) {
3718                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
3719                                         let used_liquidity =
3720                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
3721
3722                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
3723                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
3724                                         {
3725                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
3726                                                 continue;
3727                                         } else {
3728                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
3729                                         }
3730                                 }
3731                         }
3732
3733                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
3734                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
3735                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
3736                         })?);
3737                 }
3738
3739                 Ok(res)
3740         }
3741
3742         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3743         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3744         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3745                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
3746                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
3747         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3748                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3749                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3750                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3751
3752                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3753                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3754                 let funding_txo;
3755                 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
3756                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
3757                                 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3758
3759                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
3760                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
3761                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3762                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3763                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
3764                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
3765                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
3766                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
3767                                 match funding_res {
3768                                         Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
3769                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
3770                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3771                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3772                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3773                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3774                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3775                                                 });
3776                                         },
3777                                 }
3778                         },
3779                         Some(phase) => {
3780                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
3781                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3782                                         err: format!(
3783                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
3784                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3785                                 })
3786                         },
3787                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
3788                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3789                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3790                                 }),
3791                 };
3792
3793                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
3794                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3795                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3796                                 msg,
3797                         });
3798                 }
3799                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3800                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3801                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3802                         },
3803                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3804                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3805                                 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
3806                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
3807                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
3808                                                 let err = format!(
3809                                                         "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
3810                                                         funding_txo, o.get()
3811                                                 );
3812                                                 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
3813                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3814                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3815                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
3816                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
3817                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
3818                                         }
3819                                 }
3820                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
3821                         }
3822                 }
3823                 Ok(())
3824         }
3825
3826         #[cfg(test)]
3827         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3828                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
3829                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3830                 })
3831         }
3832
3833         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3834         ///
3835         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3836         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3837         ///
3838         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3839         /// across the p2p network.
3840         ///
3841         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3842         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3843         ///
3844         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3845         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3846         /// keys per-channel).
3847         ///
3848         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3849         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3850         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3851         ///
3852         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3853         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3854         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3855         ///
3856         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3857         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3858         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3859         /// for more details.
3860         ///
3861         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3862         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3863         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3864                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
3865         }
3866
3867         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
3868         ///
3869         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
3870         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
3871         ///
3872         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
3873         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
3874         /// signature for each channel.
3875         ///
3876         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
3877         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3878                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3879                 let mut result = Ok(());
3880
3881                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3882                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3883                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3884                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3885                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3886                                         }));
3887                                 }
3888                         }
3889                 }
3890                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3891                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3892                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3893                         }));
3894                 }
3895                 {
3896                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3897                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3898                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3899                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3900                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3901                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
3902                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
3903                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
3904                         {
3905                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3906                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3907                                 }));
3908                         }
3909                 }
3910
3911                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
3912                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
3913                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
3914                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
3915                 } else {
3916                         None
3917                 };
3918                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
3919                         match states.entry(txid) {
3920                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3921                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3922                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
3923                                         }));
3924                                         None
3925                                 },
3926                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
3927                         }
3928                 });
3929                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
3930                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
3931                                 temporary_channel_id,
3932                                 counterparty_node_id,
3933                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
3934                                 is_batch_funding,
3935                                 |chan, tx| {
3936                                         let mut output_index = None;
3937                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3938                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3939                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3940                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
3941                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3942                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3943                                                                 });
3944                                                         }
3945                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3946                                                 }
3947                                         }
3948                                         if output_index.is_none() {
3949                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3950                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3951                                                 });
3952                                         }
3953                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
3954                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
3955                                                 funding_batch_state.push((outpoint.to_channel_id(), *counterparty_node_id, false));
3956                                         }
3957                                         Ok(outpoint)
3958                                 })
3959                         );
3960                 }
3961                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
3962                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
3963                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
3964                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
3965                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
3966                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
3967                                 .into_iter().flatten()
3968                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
3969                         );
3970                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
3971                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
3972                         );
3973                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3974                         {
3975                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3976                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
3977                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3978                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
3979                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
3980                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
3981                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3982                                                         let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
3983                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3984                                                 });
3985                                 }
3986                         }
3987                         mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
3988                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3989                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3990                         }
3991                 }
3992                 result
3993         }
3994
3995         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3996         ///
3997         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3998         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3999         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4000         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4001         ///
4002         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4003         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4004         ///
4005         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4006         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4007         ///
4008         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4009         ///
4010         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4011         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4012         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4013         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4014         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4015         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4016         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4017         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4018                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4019         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4020                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4021                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4022                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4023                         });
4024                 }
4025
4026                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4027                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4028                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4029                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4030                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4031                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4032                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4033                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4034                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4035                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4036                                 });
4037                         };
4038                 }
4039                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4040                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4041                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4042                                 config.apply(config_update);
4043                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4044                                         continue;
4045                                 }
4046                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4047                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4048                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4049                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4050                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4051                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4052                                                         msg,
4053                                                 });
4054                                         }
4055                                 }
4056                                 continue;
4057                         } else {
4058                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4059                                 debug_assert!(false);
4060                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4061                                         err: format!(
4062                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4063                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4064                                 });
4065                         };
4066                 }
4067                 Ok(())
4068         }
4069
4070         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4071         ///
4072         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4073         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4074         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4075         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4076         ///
4077         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4078         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4079         ///
4080         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4081         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4082         ///
4083         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4084         ///
4085         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4086         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4087         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4088         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4089         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4090         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4091         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4092         pub fn update_channel_config(
4093                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4094         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4095                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4096         }
4097
4098         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4099         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4100         ///
4101         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4102         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4103         ///
4104         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4105         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4106         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4107         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4108         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4109         ///
4110         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4111         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4112         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4113         /// than expected.
4114         ///
4115         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4116         /// backwards.
4117         ///
4118         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4119         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4120         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4121         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4122         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4123         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4124                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4125
4126                 let next_hop_scid = {
4127                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4128                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4129                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4130                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4131                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4132                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4133                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4134                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4135                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4136                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4137                                                 })
4138                                         }
4139                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4140                                 },
4141                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4142                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4143                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4144                                 }),
4145                                 None => {
4146                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4147                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4148                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4149                                         log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4150                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4151                                                 err: error
4152                                         })
4153                                 }
4154                         }
4155                 };
4156
4157                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4158                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4159                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4160                         })?;
4161
4162                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4163                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4164                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4165                                         onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4166                                 }
4167                         },
4168                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4169                 };
4170                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4171                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4172                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4173                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4174                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4175                 };
4176
4177                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4178                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4179                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4180                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4181                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4182                 )];
4183                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4184                 Ok(())
4185         }
4186
4187         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4188         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4189         ///
4190         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4191         /// backwards.
4192         ///
4193         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4194         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4195                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4196
4197                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4198                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4199                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4200                         })?;
4201
4202                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4203                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4204                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4205                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4206                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4207                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4208                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4209                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4210                                 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4211                         });
4212
4213                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4214                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4215                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4216                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4217
4218                 Ok(())
4219         }
4220
4221         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
4222         ///
4223         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
4224         /// Will likely generate further events.
4225         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
4226                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4227
4228                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
4229                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
4230                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
4231                 {
4232                         let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
4233                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4234
4235                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
4236                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
4237                                         let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
4238                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
4239                                                 () => {
4240                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4241                                                                 match forward_info {
4242                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4243                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4244                                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4245                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4246                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
4247                                                                                 }
4248                                                                         }) => {
4249                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
4250                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
4251                                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
4252                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
4253
4254                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4255                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4256                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4257                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4258                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4259                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4260                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
4261                                                                                                         blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
4262                                                                                                 });
4263
4264                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
4265                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
4266                                                                                                 } else {
4267                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
4268                                                                                                 };
4269
4270                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4271                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4272                                                                                                         reason
4273                                                                                                 ));
4274                                                                                                 continue;
4275                                                                                         }
4276                                                                                 }
4277                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4278                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4279                                                                                                 {
4280                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4281                                                                                                 }
4282                                                                                         }
4283                                                                                 }
4284                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4285                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4286                                                                                                 {
4287                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4288                                                                                                 }
4289                                                                                         }
4290                                                                                 }
4291                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4292                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4293                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
4294                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4295                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
4296                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
4297                                                                                                         payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
4298                                                                                                 ) {
4299                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
4300                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4301                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
4302                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4303                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4304                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4305                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
4306                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4307                                                                                                         },
4308                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4309                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4310                                                                                                         },
4311                                                                                                 };
4312                                                                                                 match next_hop {
4313                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4314                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4315                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4316                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4317                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
4318                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
4319                                                                                                                 {
4320                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4321                                                                                                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4322                                                                                                                 }
4323                                                                                                         },
4324                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
4325                                                                                                 }
4326                                                                                         } else {
4327                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4328                                                                                         }
4329                                                                                 } else {
4330                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4331                                                                                 }
4332                                                                         },
4333                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4334                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4335                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4336                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4337                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
4338                                                                         }
4339                                                                 }
4340                                                         }
4341                                                 }
4342                                         }
4343                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
4344                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
4345                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
4346                                                 None => {
4347                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4348                                                         continue;
4349                                                 }
4350                                         };
4351                                         forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
4352                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4353                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4354                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4355                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4356                                                 continue;
4357                                         }
4358                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4359                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4360                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4361                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4362                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4363                                                         let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
4364                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4365                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4366                                                                         forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4367                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4368                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4369                                                                                         onion_packet, blinded, ..
4370                                                                                 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4371                                                                         },
4372                                                                 }) => {
4373                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4374                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4375                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4376                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4377                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4378                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4379                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4380                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4381                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4382                                                                                 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
4383                                                                         });
4384                                                                         let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
4385                                                                                 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
4386                                                                                         Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
4387                                                                                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4388                                                                                 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
4389                                                                                         &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
4390                                                                                 ).ok()
4391                                                                         });
4392                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4393                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4394                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
4395                                                                                 &&logger)
4396                                                                         {
4397                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4398                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4399                                                                                 } else {
4400                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4401                                                                                 }
4402                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4403                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4404                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4405                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4406                                                                                 ));
4407                                                                                 continue;
4408                                                                         }
4409                                                                         None
4410                                                                 },
4411                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4412                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4413                                                                 },
4414                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4415                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4416                                                                         Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
4417                                                                 },
4418                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4419                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4420                                                                         let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
4421                                                                                 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
4422                                                                         );
4423                                                                         Some((res, htlc_id))
4424                                                                 },
4425                                                         };
4426                                                         if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4427                                                                 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
4428                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4429                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4430                                                                         } else {
4431                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
4432                                                                         }
4433                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4434                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4435                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4436                                                                         continue;
4437                                                                 }
4438                                                         }
4439                                                 }
4440                                         } else {
4441                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4442                                                 continue;
4443                                         }
4444                                 } else {
4445                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4446                                                 match forward_info {
4447                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4448                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4449                                                                 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4450                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4451                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4452                                                                 }
4453                                                         }) => {
4454                                                                 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
4455                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4456                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
4457                                                                                 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
4458                                                                                 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
4459                                                                         } => {
4460                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4461                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4462                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4463                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4464                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4465                                                                         },
4466                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4467                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4468                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4469                                                                                         payment_metadata,
4470                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
4471                                                                                 };
4472                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4473                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4474                                                                         },
4475                                                                         _ => {
4476                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4477                                                                         }
4478                                                                 };
4479                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4480                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4481                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4482                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4483                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4484                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4485                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4486                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4487                                                                                 blinded_failure,
4488                                                                         },
4489                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4490                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4491                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
4492                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4493                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4494                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
4495                                                                         total_value_received: None,
4496                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4497                                                                         cltv_expiry,
4498                                                                         onion_payload,
4499                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4500                                                                 };
4501
4502                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4503
4504                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4505                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4506                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4507                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4508                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4509                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4510                                                                                 );
4511                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4512                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4513                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4514                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4515                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4516                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4517                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
4518                                                                                                 blinded_failure,
4519                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
4520                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4521                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4522                                                                                 ));
4523                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4524                                                                         }
4525                                                                 }
4526                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4527                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4528                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4529                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4530                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4531                                                                 }
4532
4533                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4534                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
4535                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4536                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4537                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4538                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4539                                                                                 };
4540                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4541                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4542                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4543                                                                                 }
4544                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4545                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
4546                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4547                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
4548                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4549                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
4550                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4551                                                                                                 }
4552                                                                                         });
4553                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4554                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4555                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4556                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4557                                                                                 }
4558                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4559                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4560                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4561                                                                                 }
4562                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4563                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4564                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4565                                                                                         }
4566                                                                                 } else {
4567                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4568                                                                                 }
4569                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4570                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4571                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4572                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4573                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4574                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4575                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4576                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4577                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4578                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4579                                                                                         }
4580                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4581                                                                                 }
4582                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4583                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4584                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4585                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4586                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4587                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4588                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
4589                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4590                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4591                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4592                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4593                                                                                         }
4594                                                                                         let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4595                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4596                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4597                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4598                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4599                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4600                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4601                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4602                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4603                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4604                                                                                                 payment_hash,
4605                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
4606                                                                                                 amount_msat,
4607                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4608                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4609                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4610                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4611                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4612                                                                                         }, None));
4613                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
4614                                                                                 } else {
4615                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4616                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4617                                                                                         // MPP parts.
4618                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4619                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4620                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
4621                                                                                         }
4622                                                                                 }
4623                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
4624                                                                         }}
4625                                                                 }
4626
4627                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4628                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4629                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4630                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4631                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4632                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4633                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4634                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4635                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4636                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4637                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4638                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4639                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4640                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
4641                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
4642                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4643                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4644                                                                                                         }
4645                                                                                                 };
4646                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4647                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4648                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4649                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4650                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4651                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4652                                                                                                         }
4653                                                                                                 }
4654                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4655                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4656                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4657                                                                                                 };
4658                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4659                                                                                         },
4660                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4661                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4662                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
4663                                                                                         }
4664                                                                                 }
4665                                                                         },
4666                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4667                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4668                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4669                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4670                                                                                 }
4671                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4672                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4673                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4674                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4675                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4676                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4677                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4678                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4679                                                                                 } else {
4680                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4681                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4682                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4683                                                                                         };
4684                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4685                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
4686                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4687                                                                                         }
4688                                                                                 }
4689                                                                         },
4690                                                                 };
4691                                                         },
4692                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
4693                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4694                                                         }
4695                                                 }
4696                                         }
4697                                 }
4698                         }
4699                 }
4700
4701                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4702                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4703                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4704                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4705
4706                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4707                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4708                 }
4709                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4710
4711                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4712                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4713                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4714                 // network stack.
4715                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4716
4717                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4718                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4719                 events.append(&mut new_events);
4720         }
4721
4722         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4723         ///
4724         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4725         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4726                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4727
4728                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4729
4730                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4731                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4732                 if background_events.is_empty() {
4733                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4734                 }
4735
4736                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4737                         match event {
4738                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4739                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4740                                         // monitor updating completing.
4741                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4742                                 },
4743                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4744                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
4745                                         {
4746                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4747                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4748                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4749                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4750                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4751                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4752                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
4753                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
4754                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4755                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4756                                                                         } else {
4757                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
4758                                                                         }
4759                                                                 },
4760                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
4761                                                         }
4762                                                 }
4763                                         }
4764                                         if !updated_chan {
4765                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4766                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4767                                         }
4768                                 },
4769                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4770                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4771                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4772                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4773                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4774                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4775                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4776                                                 } else {
4777                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4778                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4779                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4780                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4781                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4782                                                 }
4783                                         }
4784                                 },
4785                         }
4786                 }
4787                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4788         }
4789
4790         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4791         /// Process background events, for functional testing
4792         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4793                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4794                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4795         }
4796
4797         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4798                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
4799
4800                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4801
4802                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4803                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4804                         if new_feerate != chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4805                                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4806                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4807                         }
4808                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4809                 }
4810                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4811                         log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4812                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4813                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4814                 }
4815                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4816                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4817
4818                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4819                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4820         }
4821
4822         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
4823         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4824         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4825         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4826         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4827         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4828                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4829                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4830
4831                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4832                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4833
4834                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4835                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4836                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4837                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4838                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4839                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4840                                 ) {
4841                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4842                                                 anchor_feerate
4843                                         } else {
4844                                                 non_anchor_feerate
4845                                         };
4846                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4847                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4848                                 }
4849                         }
4850
4851                         should_persist
4852                 });
4853         }
4854
4855         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4856         ///
4857         /// This currently includes:
4858         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4859         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4860         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4861         ///    the channel.
4862         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4863         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4864         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4865         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4866         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
4867         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
4868         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
4869         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
4870         ///
4871         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4872         /// estimate fetches.
4873         ///
4874         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4875         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4876         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4877                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
4878                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
4879
4880                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4881                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
4882
4883                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4884                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4885                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4886                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
4887
4888                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4889                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4890                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4891                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4892                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4893                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4894                         | {
4895                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4896                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4897                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
4898                                         log_error!(logger,
4899                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4900                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4901                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
4902                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4903                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4904                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4905                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4906                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4907                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4908                                                         },
4909                                                 },
4910                                         });
4911                                         false
4912                                 } else {
4913                                         true
4914                                 }
4915                         };
4916
4917                         {
4918                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4919                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4920                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4921                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4922                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4923                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4924                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4925                                                 match phase {
4926                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4927                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4928                                                                         anchor_feerate
4929                                                                 } else {
4930                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
4931                                                                 };
4932                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4933                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4934
4935                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4936                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4937                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4938                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
4939                                                                 }
4940
4941                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4942                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4943                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4944                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4945                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4946                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4947                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4948                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4949                                                                                 n += 1;
4950                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4951                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4952                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4953                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4954                                                                                                         msg: update
4955                                                                                                 });
4956                                                                                         }
4957                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4958                                                                                 } else {
4959                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4960                                                                                 }
4961                                                                         },
4962                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4963                                                                                 n += 1;
4964                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4965                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4966                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4967                                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4968                                                                                                         msg: update
4969                                                                                                 });
4970                                                                                         }
4971                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4972                                                                                 } else {
4973                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4974                                                                                 }
4975                                                                         },
4976                                                                         _ => {},
4977                                                                 }
4978
4979                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4980
4981                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4982                                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4983                                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4984                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4985                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4986                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4987                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4988                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4989                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
4990                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4991                                                                                         },
4992                                                                                 },
4993                                                                         });
4994                                                                 }
4995
4996                                                                 true
4997                                                         },
4998                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4999                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5000                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5001                                                         },
5002                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5003                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5004                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5005                                                         },
5006                                                 }
5007                                         });
5008
5009                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5010                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5011                                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5012                                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5013                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5014                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5015                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5016                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5017                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5018                                                                         },
5019                                                                 }
5020                                                         );
5021                                                 }
5022                                         }
5023                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5024
5025                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5026                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5027                                         }
5028                                 }
5029                         }
5030
5031                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5032                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5033                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5034                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5035                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5036                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5037                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5038                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5039                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5040                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5041                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5042                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5043                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5044                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
5045                                                         let remove_entry = {
5046                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5047                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5048                                                         };
5049                                                         if remove_entry {
5050                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
5051                                                         }
5052                                                 },
5053                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5054                                         }
5055                                 }
5056                         }
5057
5058                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5059                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5060                                         // This should be unreachable
5061                                         debug_assert!(false);
5062                                         return false;
5063                                 }
5064                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5065                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5066                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5067                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5068                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5069                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5070                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5071                                         {
5072                                                 return true;
5073                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5074                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5075                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5076                                         }) {
5077                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5078                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5079                                                 return false;
5080                                         }
5081                                 }
5082                                 true
5083                         });
5084
5085                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5086                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5087                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5088                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5089                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5090                         }
5091
5092                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5093                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5094                         }
5095
5096                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5097                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5098                         }
5099
5100                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5101                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5102                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5103                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5104                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5105                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
5106                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
5107                         );
5108
5109                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
5110                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
5111                         );
5112
5113                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
5114                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
5115                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
5116                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
5117                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5118                         }
5119
5120                         should_persist
5121                 });
5122         }
5123
5124         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
5125         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
5126         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
5127         ///
5128         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
5129         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
5130         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
5131         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
5132         ///
5133         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
5134         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
5135         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
5136         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
5137         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
5138                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
5139         }
5140
5141         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
5142         /// reason for the failure.
5143         ///
5144         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
5145         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
5146                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5147
5148                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
5149                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
5150                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5151                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
5152                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5153                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
5154                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5155                         }
5156                 }
5157         }
5158
5159         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
5160         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
5161                 match failure_code {
5162                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5163                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
5164                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
5165                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5166                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5167                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
5168                         },
5169                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
5170                                 let fail_data = match data {
5171                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
5172                                         None => Vec::new(),
5173                                 };
5174                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
5175                         }
5176                 }
5177         }
5178
5179         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5180         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5181         ///
5182         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
5183         /// forwarding
5184         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5185                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
5186                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
5187                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
5188                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
5189                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
5190                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
5191                 } else {
5192                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
5193                 };
5194                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
5195                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
5196                 } else {
5197                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5198                 }
5199         }
5200
5201
5202         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
5203         /// that we want to return and a channel.
5204         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
5205                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
5206                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
5207                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
5208                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
5209                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
5210                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
5211                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5212                         }
5213                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5214                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5215                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
5216                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
5217                 } else {
5218                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
5219                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
5220                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
5221                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
5222                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5223                 }
5224         }
5225
5226         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
5227         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
5228         // be surfaced to the user.
5229         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
5230                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
5231                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
5232         ) {
5233                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
5234                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5235                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
5236                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5237                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5238                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5239                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
5240                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
5241                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
5242                                                 } else {
5243                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
5244                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5245                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5246                                                 }
5247                                         },
5248                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
5249                                 }
5250                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
5251                 };
5252
5253                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
5254                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
5255                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
5256                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5257                 }
5258         }
5259
5260         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
5261         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
5262         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
5263                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
5264                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
5265                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
5266                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
5267                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5268                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
5269                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5270                 }
5271
5272                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
5273                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
5274                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
5275                 //timer handling.
5276
5277                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
5278                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
5279                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5280                 match source {
5281                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
5282                                 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
5283                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
5284                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
5285                                 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5286                         },
5287                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5288                                 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5289                                 ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, ref blinded_failure, ..
5290                         }) => {
5291                                 log_trace!(
5292                                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(outpoint.to_channel_id())),
5293                                         "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
5294                                         if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
5295                                 );
5296                                 let failure = match blinded_failure {
5297                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
5298                                                 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
5299                                                 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5300                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5301                                                 );
5302                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5303                                         },
5304                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
5305                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5306                                                         htlc_id: *htlc_id,
5307                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
5308                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
5309                                                 }
5310                                         },
5311                                         None => {
5312                                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
5313                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
5314                                                 );
5315                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
5316                                         }
5317                                 };
5318
5319                                 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
5320                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
5321                                 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
5322                                         push_forward_ev = true;
5323                                 }
5324                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
5325                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
5326                                                 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
5327                                         },
5328                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
5329                                                 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
5330                                         }
5331                                 }
5332                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
5333                                 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
5334                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5335                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5336                                         prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5337                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
5338                                 }, None));
5339                         },
5340                 }
5341         }
5342
5343         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
5344         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
5345         ///
5346         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
5347         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
5348         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
5349         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
5350         ///
5351         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5352         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5353         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5354         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5355         ///
5356         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5357         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5358         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5359         ///
5360         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5361         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5362         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5363         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5364         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5365         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5366         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5367         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5368                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5369         }
5370
5371         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5372         /// even type numbers.
5373         ///
5374         /// # Note
5375         ///
5376         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5377         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5378         ///
5379         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5380         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5381                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5382         }
5383
5384         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5385                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
5386
5387                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5388
5389                 let mut sources = {
5390                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5391                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5392                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5393                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5394                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5395                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5396                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5397                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5398                                                 break;
5399                                         }
5400                                 }
5401
5402                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5403                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5404                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5405                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5406                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5407                                 });
5408                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5409                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5410                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5411                                                 &payment_hash);
5412                                 }
5413
5414                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5415                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5416                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5417                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5418                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5419                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5420                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5421                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5422                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5423                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5424                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5425                                                 }
5426                                                 return;
5427                                         }
5428                                 }
5429
5430                                 payment.htlcs
5431                         } else { return; }
5432                 };
5433                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5434
5435                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5436                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5437                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5438                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5439                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5440                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5441                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5442                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5443                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5444                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5445                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5446                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5447                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5448                                 debug_assert!(false);
5449                                 valid_mpp = false;
5450                                 break;
5451                         }
5452                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5453
5454                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5455                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5456                                 debug_assert!(false);
5457                                 valid_mpp = false;
5458                                 break;
5459                         }
5460                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5461                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5462                 }
5463                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5464                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5465                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5466                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5467                         return;
5468                 }
5469                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5470                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5471                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5472                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5473                         return;
5474                 }
5475                 if valid_mpp {
5476                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5477                                 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5478                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5479                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5480                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
5481                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
5482                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
5483                                         }
5484                                 ) {
5485                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5486                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5487                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5488                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
5489                                                 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5490                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5491                                 }
5492                         }
5493                 }
5494                 if !valid_mpp {
5495                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5496                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5497                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5498                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5499                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5500                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5501                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5502                         }
5503                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5504                 }
5505
5506                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5507                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5508                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5509                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5510                 }
5511         }
5512
5513         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5514                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5515         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5516                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5517
5518                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5519                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5520                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5521                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5522
5523                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
5524                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
5525                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5526                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5527
5528                 {
5529                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5530                         let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5531                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5532                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5533                                 None => None
5534                         };
5535
5536                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5537                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5538                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5539                         ).unwrap_or(None);
5540
5541                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5542                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5543                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5544                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5545                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5546                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5547                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5548                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
5549
5550                                                 match fulfill_res {
5551                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
5552                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
5553                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5554                                                                                 chan_id, action);
5555                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5556                                                                 }
5557                                                                 if !during_init {
5558                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5559                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5560                                                                 } else {
5561                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5562                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5563                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
5564                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5565                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5566                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
5567                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5568                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
5569                                                                                 });
5570                                                                 }
5571                                                         }
5572                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
5573                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
5574                                                                         action
5575                                                                 } else {
5576                                                                         return Ok(());
5577                                                                 };
5578                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5579
5580                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
5581                                                                         chan_id, action);
5582                                                                 let (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker) =
5583                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5584                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
5585                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
5586                                                                         blocking_action: blocker,
5587                                                                 } = action {
5588                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)
5589                                                                 } else {
5590                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
5591                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
5592                                                                         return Ok(());
5593                                                                 };
5594                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
5595                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5596                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
5597                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
5598                                                                                 .get_mut(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
5599                                                                         {
5600                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
5601                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
5602                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
5603                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
5604                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
5605                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
5606                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
5607                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
5608                                                                                 });
5609                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
5610                                                                         }
5611                                                                 } else {
5612                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
5613                                                                 }
5614                                                         }
5615                                                 }
5616                                         }
5617                                         return Ok(());
5618                                 }
5619                         }
5620                 }
5621                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5622                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5623                         counterparty_node_id: None,
5624                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5625                                 payment_preimage,
5626                         }],
5627                 };
5628
5629                 if !during_init {
5630                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5631                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5632                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5633                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5634                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5635                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5636                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5637                                 // again on restart.
5638                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id())), "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5639                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
5640                         }
5641                 } else {
5642                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5643                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5644                         // event.
5645                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5646                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5647                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5648                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5649                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5650                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5651                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5652                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5653                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5654                                         prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5655                                 )));
5656                 }
5657                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5658                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5659                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5660                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5661                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5662                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
5663                 Ok(())
5664         }
5665
5666         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5667                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5668         }
5669
5670         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
5671                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, startup_replay: bool,
5672                 next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint
5673         ) {
5674                 match source {
5675                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5676                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5677                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5678                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5679                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
5680                                 }
5681                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5682                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5683                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5684                                 };
5685                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5686                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5687                                         &self.logger);
5688                         },
5689                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5690                                 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5691                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
5692                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5693                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5694                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5695                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
5696                                                 let chan_to_release =
5697                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
5698                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, completed_blocker))
5699                                                         } else {
5700                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
5701                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
5702                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
5703                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
5704                                                                 // closed.
5705                                                                 None
5706                                                         };
5707
5708                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
5709                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
5710                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
5711                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
5712                                                         // in the background.
5713                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
5714                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
5715                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
5716                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
5717                                                                         match ev {
5718                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
5719                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5720                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
5721                                                                                 } => {
5722                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
5723                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
5724                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5725                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
5726                                                                                                         } = upd {
5727                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
5728                                                                                                         } else { false }
5729                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
5730                                                                                                 true
5731                                                                                         } else { false }
5732                                                                                 },
5733                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
5734                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
5735                                                                                         (funding_txo, monitor_update)
5736                                                                                 ) => {
5737                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
5738                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
5739                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
5740                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
5741                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
5742                                                                                                 ));
5743                                                                                                 true
5744                                                                                         } else { false }
5745                                                                                 },
5746                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
5747                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
5748                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
5749                                                                                         channel_id, ..
5750                                                                                 } =>
5751                                                                                         *channel_id == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id(),
5752                                                                         }
5753                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
5754                                                         }
5755                                                         None
5756                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
5757                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
5758                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5759                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
5760                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
5761                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.2,
5762                                                                 })
5763                                                         } else { None }
5764                                                 } else {
5765                                                         let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5766                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5767                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5768                                                                 } else { None }
5769                                                         } else { None };
5770                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5771                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5772                                                                         fee_earned_msat,
5773                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5774                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5775                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5776                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5777                                                                 },
5778                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
5779                                                         })
5780                                                 }
5781                                         });
5782                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5783                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5784                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5785                                 }
5786                         },
5787                 }
5788         }
5789
5790         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5791         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5792                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5793         }
5794
5795         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5796                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5797                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5798                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
5799
5800                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5801                         match action {
5802                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5803                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5804                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5805                                                 amount_msat,
5806                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
5807                                                 receiver_node_id,
5808                                                 htlcs,
5809                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5810                                         }) = payment {
5811                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5812                                                         payment_hash,
5813                                                         purpose,
5814                                                         amount_msat,
5815                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5816                                                         htlcs,
5817                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
5818                                                 }, None));
5819                                         }
5820                                 },
5821                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5822                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5823                                 } => {
5824                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5825                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5826                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5827                                         }
5828                                 },
5829                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
5830                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, blocking_action,
5831                                 } => {
5832                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
5833                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
5834                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
5835                                                 Some(blocking_action),
5836                                         );
5837                                 },
5838                         }
5839                 }
5840         }
5841
5842         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5843         /// update completion.
5844         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5845                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5846                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5847                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5848                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5849         -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5850                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5851                 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5852                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
5853                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5854                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5855                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5856                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5857                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5858
5859                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5860
5861                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5862                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5863                         htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5864                                 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5865                 }
5866
5867                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5868                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5869                 }
5870                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5871                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5872                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5873                                 msg,
5874                         });
5875                 }
5876
5877                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5878                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5879                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5880                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5881                                         updates: update,
5882                                 });
5883                         }
5884                 } }
5885                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5886                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5887                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5888                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5889                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
5890                                 });
5891                         }
5892                 } }
5893                 match order {
5894                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5895                                 handle_cs!();
5896                                 handle_raa!();
5897                         },
5898                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5899                                 handle_raa!();
5900                                 handle_cs!();
5901                         },
5902                 }
5903
5904                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5905                         log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5906                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5907                 }
5908
5909                 {
5910                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5911                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5912                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5913                 }
5914
5915                 htlc_forwards
5916         }
5917
5918         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5919                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5920
5921                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5922                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5923                         None => {
5924                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5925                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
5926                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5927                                 match outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_txo) {
5928                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5929                                         None => return,
5930                                 }
5931                         }
5932                 };
5933                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5934                 let mut peer_state_lock;
5935                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5936                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5937                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5938                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5939                 let channel =
5940                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5941                                 chan
5942                         } else {
5943                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5944                                         .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5945                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5946                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5947                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5948                                 return;
5949                         };
5950                 let remaining_in_flight =
5951                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5952                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5953                                 pending.len()
5954                         } else { 0 };
5955                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
5956                 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5957                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5958                         remaining_in_flight);
5959                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5960                         return;
5961                 }
5962                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5963         }
5964
5965         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5966         ///
5967         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5968         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5969         /// the channel.
5970         ///
5971         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5972         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5973         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5974         ///
5975         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5976         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5977         /// used to accept such channels.
5978         ///
5979         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5980         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5981         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5982                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5983         }
5984
5985         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5986         /// it as confirmed immediately.
5987         ///
5988         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5989         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5990         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5991         ///
5992         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5993         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5994         ///
5995         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5996         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5997         ///
5998         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5999         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6000         ///
6001         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6002         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6003         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6004                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6005         }
6006
6007         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6008
6009                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6010                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6011
6012                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6013                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6014                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6015                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6016                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6017                         let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6018                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6019
6020                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6021                 })?;
6022                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6023                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6024                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6025
6026                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6027                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6028                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6029                 // succeed.
6030                 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6031                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6032                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6033                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6034                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6035                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6036                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| {
6037                                                 let err_str = e.to_string();
6038                                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6039
6040                                                 APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6041                                         })
6042                                 }
6043                         _ => {
6044                                 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6045                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6046
6047                                 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str })
6048                         }
6049                 }?;
6050
6051                 if accept_0conf {
6052                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6053                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6054                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6055                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6056                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6057                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6058                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6059                                 }
6060                         };
6061                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6062                         let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6063                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6064
6065                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6066                 } else {
6067                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6068                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6069                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6070                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6071                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6072                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6073                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6074                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6075                                         }
6076                                 };
6077                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6078                                 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
6079                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6080
6081                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6082                         }
6083                 }
6084
6085                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
6086                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6087                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6088
6089                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6090                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6091                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6092                 });
6093
6094                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6095
6096                 Ok(())
6097         }
6098
6099         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
6100         /// or 0-conf channels.
6101         ///
6102         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
6103         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
6104         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
6105         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
6106                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
6107                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6108                 {
6109                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6110                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
6111                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6112                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
6113                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
6114                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
6115                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
6116                                 }
6117                         }
6118                 }
6119                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
6120         }
6121
6122         fn unfunded_channel_count(
6123                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
6124         ) -> usize {
6125                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
6126                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
6127                         match phase {
6128                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6129                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
6130                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
6131                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
6132                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
6133                                         {
6134                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6135                                         }
6136                                 },
6137                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
6138                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
6139                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
6140                                         }
6141                                 },
6142                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6143                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
6144                                         continue;
6145                                 }
6146                         }
6147                 }
6148                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
6149         }
6150
6151         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6152                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6153                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6154                 if msg.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
6155                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6156                 }
6157
6158                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
6159                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6160                 }
6161
6162                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
6163                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
6164                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
6165                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
6166                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
6167
6168                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6169                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6170                     .ok_or_else(|| {
6171                                 debug_assert!(false);
6172                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
6173                         })?;
6174                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6175                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6176
6177                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6178                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6179                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6180                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
6181                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
6182                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
6183                 {
6184                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6185                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
6186                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6187                 }
6188
6189                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6190                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
6191                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
6192                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
6193                                 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6194                 }
6195
6196                 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
6197                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
6198                 if channel_exists {
6199                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6200                 }
6201
6202                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
6203                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
6204                         let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
6205                                         &msg, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
6206                                 ).map_err(|e|
6207                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id)
6208                                 )?;
6209                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6210                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
6211                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
6212                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6213                                 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6214                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
6215                                 channel_type,
6216                         }, None));
6217                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
6218                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
6219                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
6220                         });
6221                         return Ok(());
6222                 }
6223
6224                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
6225                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
6226                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
6227                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
6228                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6229                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
6230                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
6231                 {
6232                         Err(e) => {
6233                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
6234                         },
6235                         Ok(res) => res
6236                 };
6237
6238                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
6239                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
6240                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6241                 }
6242                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6243                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
6244                 }
6245
6246                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
6247                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
6248
6249                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
6250                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6251                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
6252                 });
6253                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
6254                 Ok(())
6255         }
6256
6257         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6258                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
6259                 // likely to be lost on restart!
6260                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
6261                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6262                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6263                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6264                                         debug_assert!(false);
6265                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6266                                 })?;
6267                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6268                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6269                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6270                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
6271                                         match phase.get_mut() {
6272                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
6273                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
6274                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
6275                                                 },
6276                                                 _ => {
6277                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id));
6278                                                 }
6279                                         }
6280                                 },
6281                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6282                         }
6283                 };
6284                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6285                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
6286                         temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6287                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6288                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
6289                         output_script,
6290                         user_channel_id: user_id,
6291                 }, None));
6292                 Ok(())
6293         }
6294
6295         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6296                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6297
6298                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6299                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6300                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6301                                 debug_assert!(false);
6302                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
6303                         })?;
6304
6305                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6306                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6307                 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
6308                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
6309                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
6310                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
6311                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
6312                                                 Ok(res) => res,
6313                                                 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
6314                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
6315                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
6316                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6317                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
6318                                                         // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
6319                                                         // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
6320                                                         // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
6321                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6322                                                 },
6323                                         }
6324                                 },
6325                                 Some(mut phase) => {
6326                                         let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6327                                         let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
6328                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
6329                                 },
6330                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
6331                         };
6332
6333                 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
6334
6335                 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
6336                         // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
6337                         // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
6338                         // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
6339                         // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
6340                         // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
6341                         // on the channel.
6342                         let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
6343                         chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
6344                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
6345                 } } }
6346
6347                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
6348                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6349                                 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
6350                         },
6351                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
6352                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6353                                 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
6354                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6355                                                 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
6356                                         },
6357                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
6358                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
6359                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
6360                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6361                                                         mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
6362
6363                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
6364                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
6365                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
6366                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
6367                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
6368                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
6369                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6370                                                                         msg,
6371                                                                 });
6372                                                         }
6373
6374                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
6375                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
6376                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6377                                                         } else {
6378                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
6379                                                         }
6380                                                         Ok(())
6381                                                 } else {
6382                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6383                                                         log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
6384                                                         fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
6385                                                 }
6386                                         }
6387                                 }
6388                         }
6389                 }
6390         }
6391
6392         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6393                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
6394                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6395                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6396                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6397                                 debug_assert!(false);
6398                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6399                         })?;
6400
6401                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6402                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6403                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6404                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6405                                 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
6406                                         let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
6407                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
6408                                                 &self.logger,
6409                                                 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
6410                                                 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
6411                                         );
6412                                         let res =
6413                                                 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
6414                                         match res {
6415                                                 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
6416                                                         if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
6417                                                                 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
6418                                                                 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
6419                                                                 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
6420                                                                 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
6421                                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
6422                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
6423                                                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
6424                                                                 Ok(())
6425                                                         } else {
6426                                                                 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
6427                                                                 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
6428                                                                 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
6429                                                                 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
6430                                                                 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
6431                                                                 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
6432                                                                 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6433                                                         }
6434                                                 },
6435                                                 Err((chan, e)) => {
6436                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
6437                                                                 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
6438                                                         // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
6439                                                         // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
6440                                                         // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
6441                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
6442                                                 }
6443                                         }
6444                                 } else {
6445                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
6446                                 }
6447                         },
6448                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
6449                 }
6450         }
6451
6452         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6453                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6454                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6455                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6456                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6457                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6458                                 debug_assert!(false);
6459                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6460                         })?;
6461                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6462                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6463                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6464                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6465                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6466                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6467                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
6468                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6469                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
6470                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6471                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6472                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6473                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
6474                                                 });
6475                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6476                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
6477                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
6478                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
6479                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
6480                                                 // announcement_signatures.
6481                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
6482                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6483                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6484                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6485                                                                 msg,
6486                                                         });
6487                                                 }
6488                                         }
6489
6490                                         {
6491                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6492                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
6493                                         }
6494
6495                                         Ok(())
6496                                 } else {
6497                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6498                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
6499                                 }
6500                         },
6501                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
6502                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6503                         }
6504                 }
6505         }
6506
6507         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6508                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
6509                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
6510                 {
6511                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6512                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6513                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6514                                         debug_assert!(false);
6515                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6516                                 })?;
6517                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6518                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6519                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6520                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
6521                                 match phase {
6522                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6523                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
6524                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6525                                                         log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
6526                                                                 msg.channel_id,
6527                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
6528                                                 }
6529
6530                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6531                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6532                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6533                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
6534
6535                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
6536                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
6537                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
6538                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
6539                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6540                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
6541                                                                 msg,
6542                                                         });
6543                                                 }
6544                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
6545                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6546                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6547                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6548                                                 }
6549                                         },
6550                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
6551                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
6552                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
6553                                                 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
6554                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
6555                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
6556                                         },
6557                                 }
6558                         } else {
6559                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6560                         }
6561                 }
6562                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
6563                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
6564                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6565                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
6566                 }
6567                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
6568                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
6569                 }
6570
6571                 Ok(())
6572         }
6573
6574         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6575                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6576                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6577                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6578                                 debug_assert!(false);
6579                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6580                         })?;
6581                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
6582                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6583                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6584                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6585                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6586                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6587                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6588                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
6589                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6590                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6591                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6592                                                                 msg,
6593                                                         });
6594                                                 }
6595                                                 if tx.is_some() {
6596                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6597                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6598                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6599                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6600                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6601                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
6602                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
6603                                         } else {
6604                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6605                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6606                                         }
6607                                 },
6608                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6609                         }
6610                 };
6611                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6612                         let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
6613                         log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6614                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6615                 }
6616                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6617                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6618                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6619                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6620                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6621                                         msg: update
6622                                 });
6623                         }
6624                 }
6625                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6626                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
6627                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
6628                 }
6629                 Ok(())
6630         }
6631
6632         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6633                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6634                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6635                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6636                 //
6637                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6638                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6639                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6640                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6641
6642                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6643                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6644
6645                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
6646                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6647                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6648                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6649                                 debug_assert!(false);
6650                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6651                         })?;
6652                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6653                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6654                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6655                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6656                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6657                                         let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6658                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6659                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
6660                                                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
6661                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
6662                                                         ),
6663                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6664                                         };
6665                                         let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6666                                                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
6667                                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
6668                                                                         msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
6669                                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6670                                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6671                                                                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
6672                                                                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6673                                                                         }
6674                                                         ))
6675                                                 }
6676                                                 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6677                                                 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6678                                                 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6679                                                 match pending_forward_info {
6680                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
6681                                                                 ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
6682                                                         }) => {
6683                                                                 let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
6684                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
6685                                                                 } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6686                                                                         let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6687                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6688                                                                 } else {
6689                                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6690                                                                 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6691                                                                 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6692                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6693                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6694                                                                         reason
6695                                                                 };
6696                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6697                                                         },
6698                                                         _ => pending_forward_info
6699                                                 }
6700                                         };
6701                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6702                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6703                                 } else {
6704                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6705                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6706                                 }
6707                         },
6708                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6709                 }
6710                 Ok(())
6711         }
6712
6713         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6714                 let funding_txo;
6715                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6716                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6717                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6718                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6719                                         debug_assert!(false);
6720                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6721                                 })?;
6722                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6723                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6724                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6725                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6726                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6727                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6728                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
6729                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6730                                                         log_trace!(logger,
6731                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
6732                                                                 msg.channel_id);
6733                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
6734                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
6735                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
6736                                                 }
6737                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
6738                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
6739                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
6740                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
6741                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
6742                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
6743                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6744                                                 res
6745                                         } else {
6746                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6747                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6748                                         }
6749                                 },
6750                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6751                         }
6752                 };
6753                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id), funding_txo);
6754                 Ok(())
6755         }
6756
6757         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6758                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6759                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6760                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6761                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6762                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6763                                 debug_assert!(false);
6764                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6765                         })?;
6766                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6767                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6768                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6769                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6770                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6771                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6772                                 } else {
6773                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6774                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6775                                 }
6776                         },
6777                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6778                 }
6779                 Ok(())
6780         }
6781
6782         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6783                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
6784                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
6785                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6786                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6787                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6788                                 debug_assert!(false);
6789                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6790                         })?;
6791                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6792                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6793                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6794                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6795                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6796                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6797                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6798                                 }
6799                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6800                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6801                                 } else {
6802                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6803                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6804                                 }
6805                                 Ok(())
6806                         },
6807                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6808                 }
6809         }
6810
6811         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6812                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6813                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6814                         .ok_or_else(|| {
6815                                 debug_assert!(false);
6816                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6817                         })?;
6818                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6819                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6820                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6821                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6822                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6823                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6824                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6825                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
6826                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6827                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6828                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6829                                         }
6830                                         Ok(())
6831                                 } else {
6832                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6833                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6834                                 }
6835                         },
6836                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6837                 }
6838         }
6839
6840         #[inline]
6841         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6842                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6843                         let mut push_forward_event = false;
6844                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6845                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6846                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6847                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6848                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6849                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6850                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6851                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6852                                         };
6853                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6854                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6855
6856                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6857                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6858                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6859                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6860                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6861                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6862                                                 },
6863                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6864                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6865                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
6866                                                         {
6867                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
6868                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6869                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6870                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6871                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6872                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6873                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6874                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6875                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6876                                                                                         intercept_id
6877                                                                                 }, None));
6878                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6879                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6880                                                                         },
6881                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6882                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
6883                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6884                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6885                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6886                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6887                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6888                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6889                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6890                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
6891                                                                                         blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
6892                                                                                 });
6893
6894                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6895                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6896                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6897                                                                                 ));
6898                                                                         }
6899                                                                 }
6900                                                         } else {
6901                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6902                                                                 // payments are being processed.
6903                                                                 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6904                                                                         push_forward_event = true;
6905                                                                 }
6906                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6907                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6908                                                         }
6909                                                 }
6910                                         }
6911                                 }
6912                         }
6913
6914                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6915                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6916                         }
6917
6918                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6919                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6920                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6921                         }
6922                         if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6923                 }
6924         }
6925
6926         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6927                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6928                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6929                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6930                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6931                 ).count();
6932                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6933                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6934                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6935                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6936                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6937                 // real by taking more time.
6938                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6939                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6940                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6941                         }, None));
6942                 }
6943         }
6944
6945         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6946         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6947         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6948         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6949         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6950                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6951                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6952         ) -> bool {
6953                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6954                         .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6955                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6956                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6957                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
6958                                 counterparty_node_id,
6959                         })
6960                 })
6961         }
6962
6963         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6964         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6965                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
6966         ) -> bool {
6967                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6968                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6969                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6970                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6971
6972                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
6973                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6974                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), counterparty_node_id);
6975                         }
6976                 }
6977                 false
6978         }
6979
6980         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6981                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
6982                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6983                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6984                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6985                                         debug_assert!(false);
6986                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6987                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6988                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6989                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6990                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6991                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6992                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6993                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6994                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6995                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6996                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6997                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
6998                                                 } else { false };
6999                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7000                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7001                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7002                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7003                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7004                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7005                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7006                                                 }
7007                                                 htlcs_to_fail
7008                                         } else {
7009                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7010                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7011                                         }
7012                                 },
7013                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7014                         }
7015                 };
7016                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7017                 Ok(())
7018         }
7019
7020         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7021                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7022                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7023                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7024                                 debug_assert!(false);
7025                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7026                         })?;
7027                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7028                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7029                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7030                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7031                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7032                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7033                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7034                                 } else {
7035                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7036                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7037                                 }
7038                         },
7039                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7040                 }
7041                 Ok(())
7042         }
7043
7044         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7045                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7046                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7047                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7048                                 debug_assert!(false);
7049                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7050                         })?;
7051                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7052                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7053                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7054                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7055                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7056                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
7057                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
7058                                         }
7059
7060                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7061                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
7062                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
7063                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
7064                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
7065                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7066                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7067                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
7068                                         });
7069                                 } else {
7070                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7071                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7072                                 }
7073                         },
7074                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7075                 }
7076                 Ok(())
7077         }
7078
7079         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
7080         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7081                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
7082                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
7083                         None => {
7084                                 // It's not a local channel
7085                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7086                         }
7087                 };
7088                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7089                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
7090                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
7091                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7092                 }
7093                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7094                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7095                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
7096                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7097                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7098                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
7099                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
7100                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
7101                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
7102                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
7103                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7104                                                 }
7105                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
7106                                         }
7107                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
7108                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
7109                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
7110                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7111                                         } else {
7112                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7113                                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
7114                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7115                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
7116                                                 // persisting.
7117                                                 if !did_change {
7118                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
7119                                                 }
7120                                         }
7121                                 } else {
7122                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7123                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7124                                 }
7125                         },
7126                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
7127                 }
7128                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
7129         }
7130
7131         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7132                 let htlc_forwards;
7133                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
7134                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7135
7136                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7137                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7138                                         debug_assert!(false);
7139                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7140                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7141                                                 msg.channel_id
7142                                         )
7143                                 })?;
7144                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
7145                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7146                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7147                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7148                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7149                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7150                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
7151                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
7152                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
7153                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
7154                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
7155                                                         msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
7156                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
7157                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
7158                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
7159                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7160                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7161                                                                 msg,
7162                                                         });
7163                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7164                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
7165                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
7166                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
7167                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7168                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7169                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7170                                                                         msg,
7171                                                                 });
7172                                                         }
7173                                                 }
7174                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
7175                                                 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
7176                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
7177                                                         Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
7178                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
7179                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
7180                                                 }
7181                                                 need_lnd_workaround
7182                                         } else {
7183                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7184                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7185                                         }
7186                                 },
7187                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7188                                         log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
7189                                                 msg.channel_id);
7190                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
7191                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
7192                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
7193                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
7194                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
7195                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
7196                                         //
7197                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
7198                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
7199                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
7200                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
7201                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
7202                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
7203                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
7204                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7205                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7206                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
7207                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7208                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
7209                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
7210                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
7211                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
7212                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
7213                                                 },
7214                                         });
7215                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7216                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
7217                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7218                                         )
7219                                 }
7220                         }
7221                 };
7222
7223                 let mut persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
7224                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
7225                         self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
7226                         persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7227                 }
7228
7229                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
7230                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
7231                 }
7232                 Ok(persist)
7233         }
7234
7235         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
7236         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
7237                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
7238
7239                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7240                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
7241                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
7242                 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
7243                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
7244                                 match monitor_event {
7245                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
7246                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()));
7247                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
7248                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
7249                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint);
7250                                                 } else {
7251                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
7252                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
7253                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7254                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
7255                                                 }
7256                                         },
7257                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(funding_outpoint) => {
7258                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
7259                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
7260                                                         None => {
7261                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
7262                                                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
7263                                                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7264                                                                 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
7265                                                         }
7266                                                 };
7267                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
7268                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7269                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7270                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7271                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7272                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7273                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7274                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
7275                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
7276                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7277                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7278                                                                                                 msg: update
7279                                                                                         });
7280                                                                                 }
7281                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7282                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7283                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
7284                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
7285                                                                                         },
7286                                                                                 });
7287                                                                         }
7288                                                                 }
7289                                                         }
7290                                                 }
7291                                         },
7292                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
7293                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
7294                                         },
7295                                 }
7296                         }
7297                 }
7298
7299                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7300                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7301                 }
7302
7303                 has_pending_monitor_events
7304         }
7305
7306         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
7307         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
7308         /// update events as a separate process method here.
7309         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
7310         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
7311                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7312                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
7313         }
7314
7315         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
7316         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
7317         /// update was applied.
7318         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
7319                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
7320                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
7321
7322                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
7323                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
7324                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
7325                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
7326                 'peer_loop: loop {
7327                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7328                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7329                                 'chan_loop: loop {
7330                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7331                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7332                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
7333                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
7334                                         ) {
7335                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
7336                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7337                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
7338                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
7339                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
7340                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
7341                                                 }
7342                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
7343                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
7344
7345                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7346                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7347                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
7348                                                 }
7349                                         }
7350                                         break 'chan_loop;
7351                                 }
7352                         }
7353                         break 'peer_loop;
7354                 }
7355
7356                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
7357                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
7358                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
7359                 }
7360
7361                 has_update
7362         }
7363
7364         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
7365         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
7366         ///
7367         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
7368         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
7369         ///
7370         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
7371         #[cfg(async_signing)]
7372         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
7373                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7374
7375                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
7376                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
7377                         match phase {
7378                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7379                                         let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
7380                                         if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
7381                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
7382                                                         node_id,
7383                                                         updates,
7384                                                 });
7385                                         }
7386                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
7387                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7388                                                         node_id,
7389                                                         msg,
7390                                                 });
7391                                         }
7392                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
7393                                                 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
7394                                         }
7395                                 }
7396                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7397                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
7398                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
7399                                                         node_id,
7400                                                         msg,
7401                                                 });
7402                                         }
7403                                 }
7404                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
7405                         }
7406                 };
7407
7408                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7409                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
7410                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7411                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7412                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7413                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
7414                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7415                                 }
7416                         }
7417                 } else {
7418                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7419                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7420                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7421                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
7422                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7423                                 }
7424                         }
7425                 }
7426         }
7427
7428         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
7429         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
7430         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
7431         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
7432                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
7433                 let mut has_update = false;
7434                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
7435                 {
7436                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7437
7438                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7439                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7440                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7441                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7442                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
7443                                         match phase {
7444                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7445                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7446                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
7447                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
7448                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
7449                                                                                 has_update = true;
7450                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7451                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
7452                                                                                 });
7453                                                                         }
7454                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7455                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
7456                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
7457                                                                         }
7458                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
7459                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
7460                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
7461                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7462                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7463                                                                                                 msg: update
7464                                                                                         });
7465                                                                                 }
7466
7467                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
7468                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
7469                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7470                                                                                 false
7471                                                                         } else { true }
7472                                                                 },
7473                                                                 Err(e) => {
7474                                                                         has_update = true;
7475                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
7476                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
7477                                                                         !close_channel
7478                                                                 }
7479                                                         }
7480                                                 },
7481                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
7482                                         }
7483                                 });
7484                         }
7485                 }
7486
7487                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
7488                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
7489                 }
7490
7491                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
7492                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7493                 }
7494
7495                 has_update
7496         }
7497
7498         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
7499         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
7500         /// Channel object.
7501         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
7502                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7503                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
7504                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
7505                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
7506                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
7507                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
7508                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
7509                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
7510                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
7511                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
7512                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
7513                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
7514                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7515                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
7516                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
7517                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
7518                                         });
7519                         }
7520                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
7521                 }
7522         }
7523
7524         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
7525         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
7526         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
7527         ///
7528         /// # Privacy
7529         ///
7530         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
7531         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7532         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7533         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7534         /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
7535         ///
7536         /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
7537         ///
7538         /// # Limitations
7539         ///
7540         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
7541         /// reply path.
7542         ///
7543         /// # Errors
7544         ///
7545         /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
7546         ///
7547         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7548         ///
7549         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
7550         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7551         pub fn create_offer_builder(
7552                 &self, description: String
7553         ) -> Result<OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7554                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7555                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7556                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7557                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7558
7559                 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7560                 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
7561                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
7562                 )
7563                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7564                         .path(path);
7565
7566                 Ok(builder)
7567         }
7568
7569         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
7570         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
7571         ///
7572         /// # Payment
7573         ///
7574         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
7575         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
7576         ///
7577         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
7578         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
7579         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
7580         /// expired.
7581         ///
7582         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7583         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
7584         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7585         ///
7586         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7587         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7588         ///
7589         /// # Privacy
7590         ///
7591         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
7592         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
7593         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
7594         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
7595         /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7596         ///
7597         /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
7598         ///
7599         /// # Limitations
7600         ///
7601         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
7602         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7603         ///
7604         /// # Errors
7605         ///
7606         /// Errors if:
7607         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7608         /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
7609         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
7610         ///
7611         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
7612         ///
7613         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
7614         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7615         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7616         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7617         pub fn create_refund_builder(
7618                 &self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
7619                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7620         ) -> Result<RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>, Bolt12SemanticError> {
7621                 let node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7622                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7623                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7624                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7625
7626                 let path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7627                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
7628                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
7629                 )?
7630                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)
7631                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
7632                         .path(path);
7633
7634                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
7635                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7636                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7637                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
7638                         )
7639                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7640
7641                 Ok(builder)
7642         }
7643
7644         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
7645         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
7646         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
7647         ///
7648         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
7649         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
7650         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
7651         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
7652         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
7653         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
7654         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
7655         ///
7656         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
7657         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
7658         ///
7659         /// # Payment
7660         ///
7661         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
7662         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
7663         /// been sent.
7664         ///
7665         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
7666         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
7667         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
7668         ///
7669         /// # Privacy
7670         ///
7671         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
7672         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
7673         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
7674         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
7675         ///
7676         /// # Limitations
7677         ///
7678         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
7679         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
7680         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
7681         ///
7682         /// # Errors
7683         ///
7684         /// Errors if:
7685         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
7686         /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
7687         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
7688         ///   request.
7689         ///
7690         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
7691         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
7692         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
7693         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
7694         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7695         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
7696         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
7697         pub fn pay_for_offer(
7698                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
7699                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
7700                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
7701         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7702                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7703                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7704                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7705
7706                 let builder = offer
7707                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
7708                         .chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
7709                 let builder = match quantity {
7710                         None => builder,
7711                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
7712                 };
7713                 let builder = match amount_msats {
7714                         None => builder,
7715                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
7716                 };
7717                 let builder = match payer_note {
7718                         None => builder,
7719                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
7720                 };
7721                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
7722                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7723
7724                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
7725                 self.pending_outbound_payments
7726                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
7727                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
7728                         )
7729                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
7730
7731                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7732                 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
7733                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7734                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
7735                                 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
7736                                 Some(reply_path),
7737                         );
7738                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7739                 } else {
7740                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
7741                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
7742                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
7743                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
7744                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
7745                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7746                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
7747                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7748                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7749                                 );
7750                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7751                         }
7752                 }
7753
7754                 Ok(())
7755         }
7756
7757         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
7758         /// message.
7759         ///
7760         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
7761         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
7762         /// [`PaymentPreimage`].
7763         ///
7764         /// # Limitations
7765         ///
7766         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
7767         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
7768         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
7769         /// received and no retries will be made.
7770         ///
7771         /// # Errors
7772         ///
7773         /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply
7774         /// path for the invoice.
7775         ///
7776         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
7777         pub fn request_refund_payment(&self, refund: &Refund) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
7778                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
7779                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
7780                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7781
7782                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
7783                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
7784
7785                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
7786                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
7787                                 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
7788                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7789
7790                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
7791                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
7792                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
7793                                 )?;
7794                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7795                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
7796                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
7797                                 );
7798                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
7799                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
7800                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
7801                                 )?;
7802                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
7803                                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
7804                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
7805
7806                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
7807                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
7808                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7809                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice),
7810                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
7811                                                 Some(reply_path),
7812                                         );
7813                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7814                                 } else {
7815                                         for path in refund.paths() {
7816                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
7817                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
7818                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
7819                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
7820                                                 );
7821                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
7822                                         }
7823                                 }
7824
7825                                 Ok(())
7826                         },
7827                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
7828                 }
7829         }
7830
7831         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
7832         /// to pay us.
7833         ///
7834         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
7835         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
7836         ///
7837         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
7838         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
7839         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
7840         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
7841         ///
7842         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
7843         ///
7844         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7845         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7846         ///
7847         /// # Note
7848         ///
7849         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7850         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7851         ///
7852         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7853         ///
7854         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7855         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7856         ///
7857         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
7858         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7859         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
7860         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
7861         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
7862         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
7863         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
7864                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
7865                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
7866                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7867                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
7868         }
7869
7870         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
7871         /// stored external to LDK.
7872         ///
7873         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
7874         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
7875         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
7876         ///
7877         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
7878         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
7879         /// payments.
7880         ///
7881         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
7882         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
7883         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
7884         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
7885         ///
7886         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
7887         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
7888         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
7889         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
7890         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
7891         ///
7892         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
7893         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
7894         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
7895         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
7896         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
7897         ///
7898         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
7899         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
7900         ///
7901         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
7902         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
7903         ///
7904         /// # Note
7905         ///
7906         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
7907         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
7908         ///
7909         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
7910         ///
7911         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
7912         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
7913         ///
7914         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7915         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
7916         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
7917                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
7918                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
7919                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
7920                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
7921         }
7922
7923         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
7924         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
7925         ///
7926         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
7927         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
7928                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
7929         }
7930
7931         /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
7932         ///
7933         /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
7934         fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
7935                 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
7936                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7937                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7938
7939                 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
7940                         .iter()
7941                         .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
7942                         .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
7943                         .collect::<Vec<_>>();
7944
7945                 self.router
7946                         .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, entropy_source, secp_ctx)
7947                         .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
7948         }
7949
7950         /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
7951         /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
7952         fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
7953                 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
7954         ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
7955                 let entropy_source = self.entropy_source.deref();
7956                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
7957
7958                 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
7959                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
7960                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
7961                         + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
7962                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
7963                         payment_secret,
7964                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
7965                                 max_cltv_expiry,
7966                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
7967                         },
7968                 };
7969                 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
7970                         payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, entropy_source, secp_ctx
7971                 )
7972         }
7973
7974         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
7975         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
7976         ///
7977         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7978         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
7979                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7980                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
7981                 loop {
7982                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
7983                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
7984                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
7985                                 Some(_) => continue,
7986                                 None => return scid_candidate
7987                         }
7988                 }
7989         }
7990
7991         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
7992         ///
7993         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
7994         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
7995                 PhantomRouteHints {
7996                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
7997                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
7998                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
7999                 }
8000         }
8001
8002         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
8003         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
8004         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
8005         ///
8006         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
8007         /// times to get a unique scid.
8008         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
8009                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8010                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
8011                 loop {
8012                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
8013                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
8014                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
8015                         return scid_candidate
8016                 }
8017         }
8018
8019         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
8020         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
8021         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
8022                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
8023
8024                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8025                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8026                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8027                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8028                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
8029                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
8030                         ) {
8031                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8032                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
8033                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
8034                                         }
8035                                 }
8036                         }
8037                 }
8038
8039                 inflight_htlcs
8040         }
8041
8042         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8043         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
8044                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8045                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
8046                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
8047                 events.into_inner()
8048         }
8049
8050         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
8051         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
8052                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8053                 events.push_back((event, None));
8054         }
8055
8056         #[cfg(test)]
8057         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
8058                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8059                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
8060         }
8061
8062         #[cfg(test)]
8063         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
8064                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
8065         }
8066
8067         #[cfg(test)]
8068         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
8069                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
8070         }
8071
8072         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
8073         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
8074         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
8075         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
8076         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
8077                 let logger = WithContext::from(
8078                         &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8079                 );
8080                 loop {
8081                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8082                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8083                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
8084                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
8085                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
8086                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
8087                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
8088                                                 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8089                                         {
8090                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
8091                                         }
8092                                 }
8093
8094                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
8095                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
8096                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
8097                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
8098                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
8099                                         log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
8100                                                 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8101                                         break;
8102                                 }
8103
8104                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
8105                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8106                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
8107                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
8108                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
8109                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8110                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
8111                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8112                                                         if further_update_exists {
8113                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
8114                                                                 // top of the loop.
8115                                                                 continue;
8116                                                         }
8117                                                 } else {
8118                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
8119                                                                 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
8120                                                 }
8121                                         }
8122                                 }
8123                         } else {
8124                                 log_debug!(logger,
8125                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
8126                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8127                         }
8128                         break;
8129                 }
8130         }
8131
8132         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
8133                 for action in actions {
8134                         match action {
8135                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
8136                                         channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
8137                                 } => {
8138                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
8139                                 }
8140                         }
8141                 }
8142         }
8143
8144         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
8145         /// using the given event handler.
8146         ///
8147         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
8148         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
8149                 &self, handler: H
8150         ) {
8151                 let mut ev;
8152                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
8153         }
8154 }
8155
8156 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8157 where
8158         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8159         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8160         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8161         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8162         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8163         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8164         R::Target: Router,
8165         L::Target: Logger,
8166 {
8167         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
8168         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
8169         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
8170         /// is always placed next to each other.
8171         ///
8172         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
8173         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
8174         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
8175         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
8176         ///
8177         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
8178         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
8179         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
8180         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
8181                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
8182                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8183                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8184
8185                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
8186                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
8187                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
8188                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8189                         }
8190
8191                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
8192                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8193                         }
8194                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
8195                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
8196                         }
8197
8198                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
8199                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8200                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8201                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8202                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8203                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
8204                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8205                                 }
8206                         }
8207
8208                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
8209                                 events.replace(pending_events);
8210                         }
8211
8212                         result
8213                 });
8214                 events.into_inner()
8215         }
8216 }
8217
8218 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8219 where
8220         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8221         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8222         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8223         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8224         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8225         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8226         R::Target: Router,
8227         L::Target: Logger,
8228 {
8229         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
8230         ///
8231         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
8232         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
8233         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
8234                 let mut ev;
8235                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
8236         }
8237 }
8238
8239 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8240 where
8241         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8242         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8243         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8244         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8245         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8246         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8247         R::Target: Router,
8248         L::Target: Logger,
8249 {
8250         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8251                 {
8252                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8253                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
8254                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
8255                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
8256                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
8257                 }
8258
8259                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
8260                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
8261         }
8262
8263         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8264                 let _persistence_guard =
8265                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8266                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8267                 let new_height = height - 1;
8268                 {
8269                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
8270                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
8271                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
8272                         assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
8273                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
8274                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
8275                 }
8276
8277                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8278         }
8279 }
8280
8281 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8282 where
8283         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8284         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8285         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8286         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8287         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8288         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8289         R::Target: Router,
8290         L::Target: Logger,
8291 {
8292         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
8293                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8294                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8295                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8296
8297                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8298                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
8299
8300                 let _persistence_guard =
8301                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8302                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8303                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
8304                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
8305
8306                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8307                 if height < last_best_block_height {
8308                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8309                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8310                 }
8311         }
8312
8313         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
8314                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8315                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8316                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8317
8318                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
8319                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
8320
8321                 let _persistence_guard =
8322                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8323                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8324                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
8325
8326                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
8327
8328                 macro_rules! max_time {
8329                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
8330                                 loop {
8331                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
8332                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
8333                                         // having an explicit local time source.
8334                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
8335                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
8336                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
8337                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
8338                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
8339                                                 break;
8340                                         }
8341                                 }
8342                         }
8343                 }
8344                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
8345                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8346                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
8347                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
8348                 });
8349         }
8350
8351         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
8352                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
8353                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
8354                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8355                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8356                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
8357                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8358                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
8359                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
8360                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
8361                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
8362                                 }
8363                         }
8364                 }
8365                 res
8366         }
8367
8368         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
8369                 let _persistence_guard =
8370                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
8371                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
8372                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
8373                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
8374                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
8375                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
8376                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8377                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
8378                 });
8379         }
8380 }
8381
8382 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8383 where
8384         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8385         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8386         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8387         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8388         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8389         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8390         R::Target: Router,
8391         L::Target: Logger,
8392 {
8393         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
8394         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
8395         /// the function.
8396         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
8397                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
8398                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
8399                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
8400                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
8401
8402                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8403                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
8404                 {
8405                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8406                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8407                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8408                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8409                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8410                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8411                                         match phase {
8412                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
8413                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
8414                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
8415                                                         let res = f(channel);
8416                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
8417                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
8418                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
8419                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
8420                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
8421                                                                 }
8422                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
8423                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
8424                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
8425                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
8426                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8427                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
8428                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8429                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8430                                                                                                 msg,
8431                                                                                         });
8432                                                                                 }
8433                                                                         } else {
8434                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8435                                                                         }
8436                                                                 }
8437
8438                                                                 {
8439                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8440                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
8441                                                                 }
8442
8443                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
8444                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
8445                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
8446                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8447                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
8448                                                                         });
8449                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8450                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
8451                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8452                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
8453                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8454                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8455                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
8456                                                                                         });
8457                                                                                 }
8458                                                                         }
8459                                                                 }
8460                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
8461                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8462                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
8463                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
8464                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
8465                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
8466                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
8467                                                                                 // is always consistent.
8468                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
8469                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8470                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
8471                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
8472                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
8473                                                                         }
8474                                                                 }
8475                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
8476                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
8477                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
8478                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
8479                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
8480                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
8481                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
8482                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8483                                                                                 msg: update
8484                                                                         });
8485                                                                 }
8486                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8487                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8488                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8489                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
8490                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8491                                                                                         data: reason_message,
8492                                                                                 })
8493                                                                         },
8494                                                                 });
8495                                                                 return false;
8496                                                         }
8497                                                         true
8498                                                 }
8499                                         }
8500                                 });
8501                         }
8502                 }
8503
8504                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
8505                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
8506                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
8507                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
8508                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
8509                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
8510                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
8511                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8512                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
8513                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
8514
8515                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
8516                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
8517                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
8518                                                 false
8519                                         } else { true }
8520                                 });
8521                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
8522                         });
8523
8524                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8525                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
8526                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
8527                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
8528                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
8529                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
8530                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
8531                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
8532                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
8533                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
8534                                                 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
8535                                         });
8536
8537                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
8538                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
8539                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
8540                                         };
8541                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
8542                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
8543                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
8544                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
8545                                                 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
8546                                         );
8547                                         log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
8548                                         false
8549                                 } else { true }
8550                         });
8551                 }
8552
8553                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
8554
8555                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
8556                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
8557                 }
8558         }
8559
8560         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
8561         /// may have events that need processing.
8562         ///
8563         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
8564         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
8565         ///
8566         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
8567         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
8568         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
8569                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
8570         }
8571
8572         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
8573         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
8574                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
8575         }
8576
8577         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
8578         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
8579                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
8580         }
8581
8582         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
8583         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
8584         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
8585                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
8586         }
8587
8588         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8589         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8590         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
8591                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
8592         }
8593
8594         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8595         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8596         ///
8597         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
8598         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
8599         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
8600         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
8601                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8602         }
8603
8604         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8605         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8606         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
8607                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
8608         }
8609
8610         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8611         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8612         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
8613                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
8614         }
8615
8616         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8617         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8618         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8619                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
8620         }
8621
8622         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
8623         /// [`ChannelManager`].
8624         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
8625                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
8626         }
8627 }
8628
8629 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8630         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8631 where
8632         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8633         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8634         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8635         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8636         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8637         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8638         R::Target: Router,
8639         L::Target: Logger,
8640 {
8641         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
8642                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8643                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8644                 // change to the contents.
8645                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8646                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8647                         let persist = match &res {
8648                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
8649                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
8650                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
8651                                 },
8652                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8653                         };
8654                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8655                         persist
8656                 });
8657         }
8658
8659         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
8660                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8661                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8662                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8663         }
8664
8665         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
8666                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8667                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
8668                 // change to the contents.
8669                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8670                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8671                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
8672                 });
8673         }
8674
8675         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
8676                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8677                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
8678                          msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8679         }
8680
8681         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
8682                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8683                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8684         }
8685
8686         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
8687                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8688                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8689         }
8690
8691         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
8692                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8693                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
8694                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
8695                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
8696                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8697                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8698                         let persist = match &res {
8699                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8700                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8701                         };
8702                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8703                         persist
8704                 });
8705         }
8706
8707         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
8708                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8709                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
8710                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8711         }
8712
8713         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
8714                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8715                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
8716                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8717         }
8718
8719         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
8720                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8721                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
8722                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8723         }
8724
8725         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
8726                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8727                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
8728                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
8729         }
8730
8731         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
8732                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8733                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8734         }
8735
8736         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
8737                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8738                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8739         }
8740
8741         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
8742                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8743                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8744                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8745                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8746                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8747                         let persist = match &res {
8748                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8749                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8750                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8751                         };
8752                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8753                         persist
8754                 });
8755         }
8756
8757         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
8758                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8759                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8760         }
8761
8762         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
8763                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8764                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8765                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8766                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8767                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8768                         let persist = match &res {
8769                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8770                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8771                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8772                         };
8773                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8774                         persist
8775                 });
8776         }
8777
8778         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
8779                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8780                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
8781                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8782                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8783                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8784                         let persist = match &res {
8785                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8786                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8787                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8788                         };
8789                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8790                         persist
8791                 });
8792         }
8793
8794         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
8795                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8796                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8797         }
8798
8799         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
8800                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8801                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8802         }
8803
8804         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
8805                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
8806                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
8807                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
8808                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8809                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8810                         let persist = match &res {
8811                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8812                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8813                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
8814                         };
8815                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8816                         persist
8817                 });
8818         }
8819
8820         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
8821                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8822                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
8823         }
8824
8825         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
8826                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8827                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
8828                                 persist
8829                         } else {
8830                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
8831                         }
8832                 });
8833         }
8834
8835         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
8836                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8837                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
8838                         let persist = match &res {
8839                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
8840                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
8841                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
8842                         };
8843                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
8844                         persist
8845                 });
8846         }
8847
8848         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
8849                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
8850                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
8851                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8852                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8853                 let remove_peer = {
8854                         log_debug!(
8855                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
8856                                 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
8857                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
8858                         );
8859                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
8860                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8861                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8862                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8863                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
8864                                         let context = match phase {
8865                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8866                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8867                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
8868                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
8869                                                                 return true;
8870                                                         }
8871                                                         &mut chan.context
8872                                                 },
8873                                                 // Unfunded channels will always be removed.
8874                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8875                                                         &mut chan.context
8876                                                 },
8877                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
8878                                                         &mut chan.context
8879                                                 },
8880                                         };
8881                                         // Clean up for removal.
8882                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
8883                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
8884                                         false
8885                                 });
8886                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
8887                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
8888                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
8889                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
8890                                         match msg {
8891                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
8892                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
8893                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
8894                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
8895                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
8896                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
8897                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8898                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
8899                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
8900                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
8901                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
8902                                                 // Quiescence
8903                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
8904                                                 // Splicing
8905                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
8906                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
8907                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
8908                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
8909                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
8910                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
8911                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
8912                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
8913                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
8914                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
8915                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
8916                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
8917                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
8918                                                 // Channel Operations
8919                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
8920                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
8921                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
8922                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
8923                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
8924                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
8925                                                 // Gossip
8926                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
8927                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8928                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
8929                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
8930                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
8931                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
8932                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
8933                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
8934                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
8935                                         }
8936                                 });
8937                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
8938                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
8939                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
8940                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
8941                 };
8942                 if remove_peer {
8943                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
8944                 }
8945                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
8946
8947                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8948                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8949                 }
8950         }
8951
8952         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
8953                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
8954                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
8955                         log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
8956                         return Err(());
8957                 }
8958
8959                 let mut res = Ok(());
8960
8961                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
8962                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
8963                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
8964                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
8965                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
8966                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
8967                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
8968
8969                         {
8970                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8971                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
8972                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
8973                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
8974                                                         res = Err(());
8975                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8976                                                 }
8977                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
8978                                                         channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8979                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
8980                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
8981                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
8982                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8983                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
8984                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
8985                                                         is_connected: true,
8986                                                 }));
8987                                         },
8988                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
8989                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
8990                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
8991
8992                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
8993                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
8994                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
8995                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
8996                                                 {
8997                                                         res = Err(());
8998                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
8999                                                 }
9000
9001                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
9002                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
9003                                         },
9004                                 }
9005                         }
9006
9007                         log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9008
9009                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9010                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9011                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9012                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9013                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9014
9015                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
9016                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9017                                 ).for_each(|chan| {
9018                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9019                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
9020                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9021                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
9022                                         });
9023                                 });
9024                         }
9025
9026                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
9027                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
9028                 });
9029                 res
9030         }
9031
9032         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
9033                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9034
9035                 match &msg.data as &str {
9036                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
9037                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
9038                         {
9039                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
9040                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
9041                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
9042                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
9043                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
9044                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
9045                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
9046                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9047                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9048                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9049                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9050                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9051                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
9052                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
9053                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
9054                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9055                                                                 msg,
9056                                                         });
9057                                                 }
9058                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9059                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9060                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
9061                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
9062                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
9063                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
9064                                                                 },
9065                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
9066                                                         }
9067                                                 });
9068                                         }
9069                                 }
9070                                 return;
9071                         }
9072                         _ => {}
9073                 }
9074
9075                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
9076                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
9077                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9078                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9079                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9080                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9081                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9082                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9083                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9084                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9085                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
9086                         };
9087                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
9088                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9089                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9090                         }
9091                 } else {
9092                         {
9093                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
9094                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9095                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
9096                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
9097                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
9098                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9099                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
9100                                         if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
9101                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
9102                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
9103                                                         msg,
9104                                                 });
9105                                                 return;
9106                                         }
9107                                 }
9108                         }
9109
9110                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
9111                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
9112                 }
9113         }
9114
9115         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9116                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9117         }
9118
9119         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
9120                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9121         }
9122
9123         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
9124                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
9125         }
9126
9127         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
9128                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9129                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9130                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9131         }
9132
9133         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
9134                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9135                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9136                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9137         }
9138
9139         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
9140                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9141                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9142                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9143         }
9144
9145         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
9146                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9147                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9148                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9149         }
9150
9151         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
9152                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9153                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9154                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9155         }
9156
9157         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
9158                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9159                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9160                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9161         }
9162
9163         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
9164                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9165                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9166                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9167         }
9168
9169         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
9170                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9171                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9172                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9173         }
9174
9175         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
9176                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9177                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9178                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9179         }
9180 }
9181
9182 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9183 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9184 where
9185         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9186         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9187         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9188         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9189         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9190         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9191         R::Target: Router,
9192         L::Target: Logger,
9193 {
9194         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
9195                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
9196                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
9197
9198                 match message {
9199                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
9200                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
9201                                         &invoice_request
9202                                 ) {
9203                                         Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
9204                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9205                                 };
9206                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9207                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
9208                                         Err(()) => {
9209                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
9210                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9211                                         },
9212                                 };
9213
9214                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
9215                                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
9216                                         Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
9217                                 ) {
9218                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
9219                                         Err(()) => {
9220                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
9221                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9222                                         },
9223                                 };
9224
9225                                 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9226                                         amount_msats, payment_secret
9227                                 ) {
9228                                         Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
9229                                         Err(()) => {
9230                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
9231                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
9232                                         },
9233                                 };
9234
9235                                 #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9236                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
9237                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
9238                                 );
9239
9240                                 if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
9241                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9242                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
9243                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash
9244                                         );
9245                                         #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9246                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
9247                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9248                                         );
9249                                         match builder.and_then(|b| b.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)) {
9250                                                 Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9251                                                 Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
9252                                         }
9253                                 } else {
9254                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "no-std"))]
9255                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
9256                                         #[cfg(feature = "no-std")]
9257                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
9258                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
9259                                         );
9260                                         let response = builder.and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
9261                                                 .map_err(|e| OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e.into()))
9262                                                 .and_then(|invoice|
9263                                                         match invoice.sign(|invoice| self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)) {
9264                                                                 Ok(invoice) => Ok(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
9265                                                                 Err(SignError::Signing(())) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9266                                                                                 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed signing invoice".to_string())
9267                                                                 )),
9268                                                                 Err(SignError::Verification(_)) => Err(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(
9269                                                                                 InvoiceError::from_string("Failed invoice signature verification".to_string())
9270                                                                 )),
9271                                                         });
9272                                         match response {
9273                                                 Ok(invoice) => Some(invoice),
9274                                                 Err(error) => Some(error),
9275                                         }
9276                                 }
9277                         },
9278                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
9279                                 match invoice.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
9280                                         Err(()) => {
9281                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned())))
9282                                         },
9283                                         Ok(_) if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&self.bolt12_invoice_features()) => {
9284                                                 Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures.into()))
9285                                         },
9286                                         Ok(payment_id) => {
9287                                                 if let Err(e) = self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id) {
9288                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
9289                                                         Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))))
9290                                                 } else {
9291                                                         None
9292                                                 }
9293                                         },
9294                                 }
9295                         },
9296                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
9297                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
9298                                 None
9299                         },
9300                 }
9301         }
9302
9303         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
9304                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
9305         }
9306 }
9307
9308 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9309 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9310 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
9311         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
9312         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
9313         node_features
9314 }
9315
9316 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9317 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9318 ///
9319 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9320 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9321 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9322 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9323         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9324 }
9325
9326 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9327 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9328 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9329         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9330 }
9331
9332 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9333 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9334 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
9335         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
9336 }
9337
9338 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9339 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9340 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9341         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
9342 }
9343
9344 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9345 /// [`ChannelManager`].
9346 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
9347         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
9348         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
9349         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
9350         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
9351         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
9352         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
9353         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
9354         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
9355         features.set_payment_secret_required();
9356         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
9357         features.set_wumbo_optional();
9358         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
9359         features.set_channel_type_optional();
9360         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
9361         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
9362         features.set_route_blinding_optional();
9363         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
9364                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
9365         }
9366         features
9367 }
9368
9369 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9370 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
9371
9372 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
9373         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
9374         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
9375         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
9376 });
9377
9378 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
9379         (2, node_id, required),
9380         (4, features, required),
9381         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
9382         (8, forwarding_info, option),
9383         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9384         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9385 });
9386
9387 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
9388         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9389                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9390                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9391                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
9392                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
9393                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9394                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
9395                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
9396                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
9397                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
9398                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
9399                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
9400                         (7, self.config, option),
9401                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
9402                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
9403                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
9404                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9405                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9406                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
9407                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9408                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
9409                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9410                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
9411                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
9412                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
9413                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
9414                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
9415                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
9416                         (32, self.is_public, required),
9417                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9418                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9419                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9420                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9421                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
9422                 });
9423                 Ok(())
9424         }
9425 }
9426
9427 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
9428         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9429                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9430                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
9431                         (2, channel_id, required),
9432                         (3, channel_type, option),
9433                         (4, counterparty, required),
9434                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9435                         (6, funding_txo, option),
9436                         (7, config, option),
9437                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
9438                         (9, confirmations, option),
9439                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
9440                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
9441                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
9442                         (16, balance_msat, required),
9443                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
9444                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
9445                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
9446                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
9447                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
9448                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
9449                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
9450                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
9451                         (26, is_outbound, required),
9452                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
9453                         (30, is_usable, required),
9454                         (32, is_public, required),
9455                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
9456                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
9457                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
9458                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
9459                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
9460                 });
9461
9462                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
9463                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
9464                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
9465                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
9466                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
9467
9468                 Ok(Self {
9469                         inbound_scid_alias,
9470                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
9471                         channel_type,
9472                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
9473                         outbound_scid_alias,
9474                         funding_txo,
9475                         config,
9476                         short_channel_id,
9477                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
9478                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
9479                         user_channel_id,
9480                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
9481                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9482                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
9483                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
9484                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
9485                         confirmations_required,
9486                         confirmations,
9487                         force_close_spend_delay,
9488                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
9489                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
9490                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
9491                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
9492                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
9493                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
9494                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
9495                         channel_shutdown_state,
9496                 })
9497         }
9498 }
9499
9500 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
9501         (2, channels, required_vec),
9502         (4, phantom_scid, required),
9503         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
9504 });
9505
9506 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
9507         (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
9508         (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
9509 });
9510
9511 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
9512         (0, Forward) => {
9513                 (0, onion_packet, required),
9514                 (1, blinded, option),
9515                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
9516         },
9517         (1, Receive) => {
9518                 (0, payment_data, required),
9519                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9520                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9521                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9522                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9523                 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
9524         },
9525         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
9526                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
9527                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
9528                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
9529                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
9530                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
9531         },
9532 ;);
9533
9534 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
9535         (0, routing, required),
9536         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
9537         (4, payment_hash, required),
9538         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
9539         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
9540         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
9541         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9542 });
9543
9544
9545 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9546         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9547                 match self {
9548                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
9549                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9550                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9551                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9552                                 reason.write(writer)?;
9553                         },
9554                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9555                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
9556                         }) => {
9557                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9558                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
9559                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
9560                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
9561                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
9562                         },
9563                 }
9564                 Ok(())
9565         }
9566 }
9567
9568 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
9569         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9570                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9571                 match id {
9572                         0 => {
9573                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
9574                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9575                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9576                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
9577                                 }))
9578                         },
9579                         1 => {
9580                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
9581                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9582                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9583                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
9584                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
9585                                 }))
9586                         },
9587                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
9588                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
9589                         // messages contained in the variants.
9590                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
9591                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
9592                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
9593                         2 => {
9594                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9595                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9596                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9597                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9598                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
9599                         },
9600                         3 => {
9601                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
9602                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
9603                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
9604                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
9605                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
9606                         },
9607                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9608                 }
9609         }
9610 }
9611
9612 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
9613         (0, Forward),
9614         (1, Fail),
9615 );
9616
9617 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
9618         (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
9619         (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
9620 );
9621
9622 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
9623         (0, short_channel_id, required),
9624         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
9625         (2, outpoint, required),
9626         (3, blinded_failure, option),
9627         (4, htlc_id, required),
9628         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
9629         (7, user_channel_id, option),
9630 });
9631
9632 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
9633         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9634                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
9635                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
9636                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
9637                 };
9638                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9639                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
9640                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
9641                         (2, self.value, required),
9642                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
9643                         (4, payment_data, option),
9644                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
9645                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
9646                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9647                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9648                 });
9649                 Ok(())
9650         }
9651 }
9652
9653 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
9654         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9655                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9656                         (0, prev_hop, required),
9657                         (1, total_msat, option),
9658                         (2, value_ser, required),
9659                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
9660                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
9661                         (5, total_value_received, option),
9662                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
9663                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
9664                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
9665                 });
9666                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
9667                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
9668                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
9669                         Some(p) => {
9670                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
9671                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9672                                 }
9673                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9674                                         total_msat = Some(value);
9675                                 }
9676                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
9677                         },
9678                         None => {
9679                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
9680                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
9681                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9682                                         }
9683                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
9684                                 }
9685                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
9686                         },
9687                 };
9688                 Ok(Self {
9689                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
9690                         timer_ticks: 0,
9691                         value,
9692                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
9693                         total_value_received,
9694                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
9695                         onion_payload,
9696                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
9697                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
9698                 })
9699         }
9700 }
9701
9702 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
9703         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9704                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9705                 match id {
9706                         0 => {
9707                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
9708                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
9709                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
9710                                 let mut payment_id = None;
9711                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
9712                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
9713                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9714                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9715                                         (1, payment_id, option),
9716                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9717                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
9718                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
9719                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
9720                                 });
9721                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
9722                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
9723                                         // instead.
9724                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
9725                                 }
9726                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
9727                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
9728                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9729                                 }
9730                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
9731                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
9732                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
9733                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9734                                                 }
9735                                         }
9736                                 }
9737                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9738                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
9739                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
9740                                         path,
9741                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
9742                                 })
9743                         }
9744                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9745                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
9746                 }
9747         }
9748 }
9749
9750 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
9751         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
9752                 match self {
9753                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
9754                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
9755                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
9756                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
9757                                         (0, session_priv, required),
9758                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
9759                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
9760                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
9761                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
9762                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
9763                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
9764                                  });
9765                         }
9766                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
9767                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
9768                                 field.write(writer)?;
9769                         }
9770                 }
9771                 Ok(())
9772         }
9773 }
9774
9775 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
9776         (0, forward_info, required),
9777         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
9778         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
9779         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
9780         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
9781 });
9782
9783 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9784         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9785                 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
9786                 match self {
9787                         Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
9788                                 0u8.write(w)?;
9789                                 info.write(w)?;
9790                         },
9791                         Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
9792                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9793                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9794                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
9795                                         (2, err_packet, required),
9796                                 });
9797                         },
9798                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
9799                                 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
9800                                 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
9801                                 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
9802                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
9803                                 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
9804                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
9805                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
9806                                         (1, failure_code, required),
9807                                         (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
9808                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
9809                                 });
9810                         },
9811                 }
9812                 Ok(())
9813         }
9814 }
9815
9816 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
9817         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
9818                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
9819                 Ok(match id {
9820                         0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
9821                         1 => {
9822                                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
9823                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
9824                                         (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
9825                                         (2, err_packet, required),
9826                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
9827                                 });
9828                                 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
9829                                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
9830                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9831                                                 failure_code,
9832                                                 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
9833                                         }
9834                                 } else {
9835                                         Self::FailHTLC {
9836                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
9837                                                 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
9838                                         }
9839                                 }
9840                         },
9841                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9842                 })
9843         }
9844 }
9845
9846 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
9847         (0, payment_secret, required),
9848         (2, expiry_time, required),
9849         (4, user_payment_id, required),
9850         (6, payment_preimage, required),
9851         (8, min_value_msat, required),
9852 });
9853
9854 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9855 where
9856         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9857         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9858         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9859         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9860         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9861         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9862         R::Target: Router,
9863         L::Target: Logger,
9864 {
9865         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
9866                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
9867
9868                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
9869
9870                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
9871                 {
9872                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9873                         best_block.height().write(writer)?;
9874                         best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
9875                 }
9876
9877                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
9878                 {
9879                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9880                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
9881                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9882                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9883                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9884                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9885                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
9886                                 }
9887
9888                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
9889                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
9890                                 ).count();
9891                         }
9892
9893                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
9894
9895                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9896                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9897                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9898                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
9899                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
9900                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
9901                                         } else { None }
9902                                 ) {
9903                                         channel.write(writer)?;
9904                                 }
9905                         }
9906                 }
9907
9908                 {
9909                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9910                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9911                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
9912                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
9913                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9914                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
9915                                         forward.write(writer)?;
9916                                 }
9917                         }
9918                 }
9919
9920                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9921
9922                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9923                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
9924                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9925
9926                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
9927                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
9928                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9929                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
9930                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
9931                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9932                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
9933                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
9934                         }
9935                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
9936                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
9937                 }
9938
9939                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
9940                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
9941                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9942                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
9943                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
9944                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
9945                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
9946                 }
9947
9948                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
9949                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
9950                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
9951                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
9952                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
9953                         // no channels.
9954                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
9955                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
9956                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
9957                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
9958                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
9959                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
9960                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
9961                                 }
9962                         }
9963                 }
9964
9965                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9966                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
9967                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
9968                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
9969                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
9970                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
9971                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
9972                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
9973                         0u64.write(writer)?;
9974                 } else {
9975                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9976                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
9977                                 event.write(writer)?;
9978                         }
9979                 }
9980
9981                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
9982                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
9983                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
9984                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
9985                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
9986                 0u64.write(writer)?;
9987
9988                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
9989                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
9990                 // likely to be identical.
9991                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9992                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
9993
9994                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
9995                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
9996                         hash.write(writer)?;
9997                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
9998                 }
9999
10000                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
10001                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
10002                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10003                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
10004                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
10005                         }
10006                 }
10007                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
10008                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10009                         match outbound {
10010                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10011                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10012                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
10013                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
10014                                         }
10015                                 }
10016                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
10017                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
10018                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
10019                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
10020                         }
10021                 }
10022
10023                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
10024                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
10025                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
10026                         match outbound {
10027                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
10028                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
10029                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
10030                                 },
10031                                 _ => {},
10032                         }
10033                 }
10034
10035                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
10036                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
10037                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
10038                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
10039                 }
10040
10041                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
10042                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
10043                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
10044                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
10045                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
10046                 }
10047
10048                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10049                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
10050                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
10051                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
10052                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
10053                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
10054                                 }
10055                         }
10056                 }
10057
10058                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10059                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
10060                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10061                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
10062                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10063                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
10064                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10065                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
10066                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
10067                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
10068                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10069                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
10070                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10071                 });
10072
10073                 Ok(())
10074         }
10075 }
10076
10077 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10078         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10079                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
10080                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
10081                         event.write(w)?;
10082                         action.write(w)?;
10083                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
10084                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
10085                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
10086                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
10087                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
10088                                 // check that the event is sane here.
10089                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
10090                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
10091                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
10092                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
10093                         }
10094                 }
10095                 Ok(())
10096         }
10097 }
10098 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
10099         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10100                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10101                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
10102                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
10103                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
10104                         len) as usize);
10105                 for _ in 0..len {
10106                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
10107                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
10108                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
10109                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
10110                         } else if action.is_some() {
10111                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10112                         }
10113                 }
10114                 Ok(events)
10115         }
10116 }
10117
10118 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
10119         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
10120         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
10121         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
10122         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
10123         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
10124 );
10125
10126 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
10127 ///
10128 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
10129 /// is:
10130 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10131 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
10132 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
10133 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
10134 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
10135 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
10136 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
10137 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
10138 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
10139 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
10140 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
10141 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
10142 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
10143 ///    the next step.
10144 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
10145 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
10146 ///
10147 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
10148 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
10149 ///
10150 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
10151 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
10152 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
10153 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
10154 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
10155 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
10156 ///
10157 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
10158 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10159 where
10160         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10161         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10162         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10163         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10164         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10165         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10166         R::Target: Router,
10167         L::Target: Logger,
10168 {
10169         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
10170         pub entropy_source: ES,
10171
10172         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
10173         pub node_signer: NS,
10174
10175         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
10176         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
10177         /// signing data.
10178         pub signer_provider: SP,
10179
10180         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10181         ///
10182         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
10183         pub fee_estimator: F,
10184         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
10185         ///
10186         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
10187         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
10188         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
10189         pub chain_monitor: M,
10190
10191         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
10192         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
10193         /// force-closed during deserialization.
10194         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
10195         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
10196         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
10197         ///
10198         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
10199         pub router: R,
10200         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
10201         /// deserialization.
10202         pub logger: L,
10203         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
10204         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
10205         pub default_config: UserConfig,
10206
10207         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
10208         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
10209         ///
10210         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
10211         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
10212         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
10213         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
10214         ///
10215         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
10216         /// this struct.
10217         ///
10218         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
10219         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
10220 }
10221
10222 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10223                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10224 where
10225         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10226         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10227         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10228         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10229         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10230         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10231         R::Target: Router,
10232         L::Target: Logger,
10233 {
10234         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
10235         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
10236         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
10237         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
10238                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
10239                 Self {
10240                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
10241                         channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
10242                 }
10243         }
10244 }
10245
10246 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
10247 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
10248 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10249         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
10250 where
10251         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10252         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10253         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10254         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10255         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10256         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10257         R::Target: Router,
10258         L::Target: Logger,
10259 {
10260         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10261                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
10262                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
10263         }
10264 }
10265
10266 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10267         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
10268 where
10269         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10270         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10271         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10272         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10273         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10274         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10275         R::Target: Router,
10276         L::Target: Logger,
10277 {
10278         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10279                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
10280
10281                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10282                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10283                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10284
10285                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
10286
10287                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10288                 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10289                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10290                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10291                 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
10292                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
10293                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
10294                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
10295                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
10296                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
10297                         ))?;
10298                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
10299                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10300                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
10301                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
10302                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
10303                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
10304                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
10305                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10306                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
10307                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
10308                                         log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
10309                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
10310                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
10311                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
10312                                         }
10313                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
10314                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
10315                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
10316                                         }
10317                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
10318                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
10319                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10320                                         }
10321                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
10322                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
10323                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
10324                                         }
10325                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
10326                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
10327                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10328                                         }
10329                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
10330                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10331                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
10332                                                 });
10333                                         }
10334                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
10335                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10336                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10337                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10338                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
10339                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10340                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10341                                                 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10342                                         }, None));
10343                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
10344                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
10345                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10346                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
10347                                                 }
10348                                                 if !found_htlc {
10349                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
10350                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
10351                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
10352                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
10353                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
10354                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
10355                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
10356                                                         log_info!(logger,
10357                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
10358                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
10359                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10360                                                 }
10361                                         }
10362                                 } else {
10363                                         log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
10364                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
10365                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10366                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
10367                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
10368                                         }
10369                                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
10370                                                 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
10371                                         }
10372                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
10373                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10374                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
10375                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10376                                                 },
10377                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10378                                                         let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
10379                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
10380                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
10381                                                 }
10382                                         }
10383                                 }
10384                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
10385                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
10386                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
10387                                 // safely discard the channel.
10388                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
10389                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
10390                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
10391                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
10392                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
10393                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10394                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
10395                                         channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
10396                                 }, None));
10397                         } else {
10398                                 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
10399                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10400                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10401                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10402                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10403                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10404                         }
10405                 }
10406
10407                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10408                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
10409                                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10410                                 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
10411                                         &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10412                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
10413                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
10414                                         counterparty_node_id: None,
10415                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
10416                                 };
10417                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
10418                         }
10419                 }
10420
10421                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
10422                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10423                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10424                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
10425                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
10426                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10427                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
10428                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
10429                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
10430                         }
10431                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
10432                 }
10433
10434                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10435                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
10436                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
10437                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
10438                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10439                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
10440                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
10441                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
10442                         }
10443                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
10444                 }
10445
10446                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
10447                         PeerState {
10448                                 channel_by_id,
10449                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
10450                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
10451                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10452                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10453                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10454                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10455                                 is_connected: false,
10456                         }
10457                 };
10458
10459                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10460                 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
10461                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
10462                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
10463                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
10464                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
10465                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
10466                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
10467                 }
10468
10469                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10470                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
10471                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
10472                 for _ in 0..event_count {
10473                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
10474                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
10475                                 None => continue,
10476                         }
10477                 }
10478
10479                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10480                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
10481                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
10482                                 0 => {
10483                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
10484                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
10485                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
10486                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
10487                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
10488                                 }
10489                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
10490                         }
10491                 }
10492
10493                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
10494                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10495
10496                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10497                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
10498                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
10499                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
10500                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10501                         }
10502                 }
10503
10504                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10505                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
10506                         HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
10507                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
10508                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
10509                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
10510                                 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
10511                         };
10512                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
10513                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10514                         };
10515                 }
10516
10517                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
10518                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
10519                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
10520                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
10521                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
10522                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10523                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
10524                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
10525                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
10526                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
10527                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
10528                 let mut events_override = None;
10529                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
10530                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10531                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
10532                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
10533                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
10534                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
10535                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
10536                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
10537                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
10538                         (8, events_override, option),
10539                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
10540                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
10541                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
10542                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
10543                 });
10544                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
10545                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10546                 }
10547
10548                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
10549                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10550                 }
10551
10552                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
10553                         pending_events_read = events;
10554                 }
10555
10556                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
10557                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
10558                 }
10559
10560                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
10561                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
10562                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
10563                         let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
10564                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
10565                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
10566                         }
10567                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
10568                 }
10569                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
10570                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
10571                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
10572                 };
10573
10574                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
10575                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
10576                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
10577                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
10578                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
10579                 //
10580                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
10581                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
10582                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
10583                 //
10584                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
10585                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
10586                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
10587                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
10588                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
10589                         ) => { {
10590                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
10591                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
10592                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
10593                                         log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
10594                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10595                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
10596                                         pending_background_events.push(
10597                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
10598                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10599                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
10600                                                         update: update.clone(),
10601                                                 });
10602                                 }
10603                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
10604                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
10605                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
10606                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
10607                                         pending_background_events.push(
10608                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
10609                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
10610                                                         channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
10611                                                 });
10612                                 }
10613                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
10614                                         log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
10615                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10616                                 }
10617                                 max_in_flight_update_id
10618                         } }
10619                 }
10620
10621                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10622                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
10623                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10624                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
10625                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10626                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10627
10628                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
10629                                         // discarded.
10630                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10631                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
10632                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
10633                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
10634                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
10635                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
10636                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
10637                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
10638                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
10639                                                 }
10640                                         }
10641                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
10642                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
10643                                                 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10644                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
10645                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
10646                                                 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
10647                                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10648                                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10649                                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10650                                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10651                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10652                                         }
10653                                 } else {
10654                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10655                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10656                                         debug_assert!(false);
10657                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10658                                 }
10659                         }
10660                 }
10661
10662                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
10663                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
10664                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), Some(funding_txo.to_channel_id()));
10665                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
10666                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
10667                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
10668                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
10669                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
10670                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
10671                                         });
10672                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10673                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
10674                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
10675                                 } else {
10676                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
10677                                         log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
10678                                                 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
10679                                         log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
10680                                         log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
10681                                         log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
10682                                         log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
10683                                         log_error!(logger, " Pending in-flight updates are: {:?}", chan_in_flight_updates);
10684                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10685                                 }
10686                         }
10687                 }
10688
10689                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
10690                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
10691
10692                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
10693                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
10694                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
10695                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
10696
10697                 {
10698                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
10699                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
10700                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
10701                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
10702                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
10703                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
10704                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
10705                         // 0.0.102+
10706                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10707                                 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
10708                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
10709                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
10710                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
10711                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
10712                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
10713                                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
10714                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10715                                                         }
10716
10717                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
10718                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
10719                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
10720                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
10721                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
10722                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
10723                                                                         log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
10724                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
10725                                                                 },
10726                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
10727                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
10728                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
10729                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
10730                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
10731                                                                                 payment_params: None,
10732                                                                                 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
10733                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
10734                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10735                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10736                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10737                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10738                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
10739                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
10740                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
10741                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
10742                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
10743                                                                         });
10744                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
10745                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
10746                                                                 }
10747                                                         }
10748                                                 }
10749                                         }
10750                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
10751                                                 match htlc_source {
10752                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
10753                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
10754                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
10755                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
10756                                                                 };
10757                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
10758                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
10759                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
10760                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
10761                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
10762                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
10763                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
10764                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
10765                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10766                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10767                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10768                                                                                                 false
10769                                                                                         } else { true }
10770                                                                                 } else { true }
10771                                                                         });
10772                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
10773                                                                 });
10774                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
10775                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
10776                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
10777                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
10778                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
10779                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
10780                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
10781                                                                                         } else { true }
10782                                                                                 });
10783                                                                                 false
10784                                                                         } else { true }
10785                                                                 });
10786                                                         },
10787                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
10788                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
10789                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
10790                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
10791                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
10792                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
10793                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
10794                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
10795                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
10796                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
10797                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
10798                                                                         let compl_action =
10799                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
10800                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
10801                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
10802                                                                                 };
10803                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
10804                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
10805                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
10806                                                                 }
10807                                                         },
10808                                                 }
10809                                         }
10810                                 }
10811
10812                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
10813                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
10814                                 // payments.
10815                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
10816                                         .into_iter()
10817                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
10818                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
10819                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
10820                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
10821                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
10822                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
10823                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
10824                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
10825                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
10826                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
10827                                                         } else { None }
10828                                                 } else {
10829                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
10830                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
10831                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
10832                                                         // channel still live case here.
10833                                                         None
10834                                                 }
10835                                         });
10836                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
10837                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
10838                                 }
10839                         }
10840                 }
10841
10842                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
10843                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
10844                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
10845                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
10846                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
10847                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
10848                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
10849                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
10850                         }, None));
10851                 }
10852
10853                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
10854                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
10855
10856                 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
10857                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
10858                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10859                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10860                         }
10861                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
10862                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
10863                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10864                                 }
10865                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
10866                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
10867                                 {
10868                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10869                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
10870                                         });
10871                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10872                                 }
10873                         } else {
10874                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
10875                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10876                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10877                                         });
10878                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10879                                 }
10880                         }
10881                 } else {
10882                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
10883                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
10884                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
10885                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
10886                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10887                                 }
10888                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
10889                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
10890                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
10891                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
10892                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
10893                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
10894                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
10895                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
10896                                                                                 Err(()) => {
10897                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
10898                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10899                                                                                 }
10900                                                                         }
10901                                                                 },
10902                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
10903                                                         }
10904                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
10905                                         },
10906                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
10907                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
10908                                 };
10909                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
10910                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
10911                                 });
10912                         }
10913                 }
10914
10915                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10916                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
10917
10918                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
10919                         Ok(key) => key,
10920                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10921                 };
10922                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
10923                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
10924                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
10925                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10926                         }
10927                 }
10928
10929                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
10930                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
10931                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10932                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10933                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10934                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
10935                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
10936                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
10937                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
10938                                                 loop {
10939                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
10940                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
10941                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
10942                                                 }
10943                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
10944                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
10945                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10946                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10947                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10948                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10949                                         }
10950                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
10951                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
10952                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
10953                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
10954                                                         log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
10955                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10956                                                 }
10957                                         }
10958                                 } else {
10959                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
10960                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
10961                                         debug_assert!(false);
10962                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10963                                 }
10964                         }
10965                 }
10966
10967                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
10968
10969                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
10970                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
10971                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
10972                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
10973                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
10974                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
10975                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
10976                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
10977                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
10978                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
10979                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
10980                                         }
10981                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
10982                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
10983
10984                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
10985                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
10986                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
10987                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
10988                                                 //
10989                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
10990                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
10991                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
10992                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
10993                                                 // reason to.
10994                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
10995                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
10996                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
10997                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
10998                                                 // restart.
10999                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
11000                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11001                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
11002                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11003                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11004                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
11005                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11006                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
11007                                                         }
11008                                                 }
11009                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
11010                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
11011                                                 }
11012                                         }
11013                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
11014                                                 receiver_node_id,
11015                                                 payment_hash,
11016                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
11017                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
11018                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
11019                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
11020                                         }, None));
11021                                 }
11022                         }
11023                 }
11024
11025                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
11026                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
11027                                 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
11028                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
11029                                         for action in actions.iter() {
11030                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
11031                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
11032                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
11033                                                 } = action {
11034                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
11035                                                                 log_trace!(logger,
11036                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
11037                                                                         blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id());
11038                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
11039                                                                         .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
11040                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
11041                                                         } else {
11042                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
11043                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
11044                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
11045                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
11046                                                                 // anymore.
11047                                                         }
11048                                                 }
11049                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
11050                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
11051                                                 }
11052                                         }
11053                                 }
11054                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
11055                         } else {
11056                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
11057                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11058                         }
11059                 }
11060
11061                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
11062                         chain_hash,
11063                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
11064                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
11065                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
11066                         router: args.router,
11067
11068                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
11069
11070                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
11071                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
11072                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
11073                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
11074
11075                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
11076                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
11077                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
11078                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
11079                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
11080                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
11081
11082                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
11083
11084                         our_network_pubkey,
11085                         secp_ctx,
11086
11087                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
11088
11089                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
11090
11091                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
11092                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
11093                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
11094                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
11095                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
11096
11097                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
11098                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
11099
11100                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
11101
11102                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
11103
11104                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
11105                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
11106                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
11107
11108                         logger: args.logger,
11109                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
11110                 };
11111
11112                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
11113                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
11114                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
11115                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
11116                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
11117                 }
11118
11119                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
11120                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
11121                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
11122                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
11123                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
11124                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding);
11125                 }
11126
11127                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
11128                 //connection or two.
11129
11130                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
11131         }
11132 }
11133
11134 #[cfg(test)]
11135 mod tests {
11136         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
11137         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11138         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
11139         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
11140         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
11141         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
11142         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
11143         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
11144         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
11145         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
11146         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
11147         use crate::prelude::*;
11148         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
11149         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
11150         use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
11151         use crate::util::test_utils;
11152         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
11153         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
11154
11155         #[test]
11156         fn test_notify_limits() {
11157                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
11158                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
11159                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
11160                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
11161                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
11162                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11163
11164                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
11165                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
11166                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11167                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11168                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11169
11170                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11171
11172                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
11173                 // to connect messages with new values
11174                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11175                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
11176                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11177                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11178                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
11179                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
11180
11181                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
11182                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11183                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11184                 // ... but the last node should not.
11185                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11186                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
11187                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11188                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11189
11190                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
11191                 // about the channel.
11192                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11193                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11194                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11195
11196                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
11197                 // parties.
11198                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11199                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11200                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
11201                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
11202                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11203                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11204
11205                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
11206                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11207                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11208
11209                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
11210                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
11211                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
11212                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
11213                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
11214                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
11215
11216                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
11217                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
11218                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11219                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11220                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11221                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11222                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11223                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11224
11225                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
11226                 // the channel info has updated.
11227                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
11228                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
11229                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11230                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
11231                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
11232                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
11233         }
11234
11235         #[test]
11236         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
11237                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
11238                 // expected.
11239                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11240                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11241                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11242                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11243                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11244
11245                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
11246                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
11247                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
11248                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
11249
11250                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
11251                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
11252                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
11253                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
11254                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
11255                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
11256                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
11257                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
11258                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11259                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11260                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11261                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
11262
11263                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
11264                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11265                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11266                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11267                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11268                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11269                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11270                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11271                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11272                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11273                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11274                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11275                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
11276                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11277                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11278                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11279                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11280                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11281                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11282                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11283                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11284                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11285                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
11286
11287                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
11288                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
11289                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
11290                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11291                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11292                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11293                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
11294
11295                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
11296                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
11297                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
11298                 // lightning messages manually.
11299                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11300                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
11301                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
11302
11303                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11304                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11305                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
11306                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
11307                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11308                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11309                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
11310                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11311                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11312                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
11313                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11314                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11315                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11316                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11317                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11318                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11319                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
11320                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11321                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11322                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
11323                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11324                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
11325                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11326                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11327                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
11328                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11329
11330                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
11331                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
11332                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11333                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
11334                 match events[0] {
11335                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11336                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11337                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11338                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11339                         },
11340                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11341                 }
11342                 match events[1] {
11343                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
11344                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
11345                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
11346                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
11347                         },
11348                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11349                 }
11350         }
11351
11352         #[test]
11353         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
11354                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
11355                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
11356         }
11357
11358         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
11359                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
11360                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
11361                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
11362                 //      fails as expected.
11363                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
11364                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
11365                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
11366                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
11367                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
11368                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
11369                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11370                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11371                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11372                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
11373                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11374                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11375                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11376                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11377                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11378
11379                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
11380                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
11381                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
11382
11383                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11384                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11385                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
11386                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
11387                 let route = find_route(
11388                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11389                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11390                 ).unwrap();
11391                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11392                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11393                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11394                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11395                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11396                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11397                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11398                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11399                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11400                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11401                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
11402                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
11403                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11404                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11405                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11406                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11407                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11408                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11409                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11410                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11411                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11412                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11413                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11414                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11415
11416                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11417                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11418
11419                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11420                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11421                 let route = find_route(
11422                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11423                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11424                 ).unwrap();
11425                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11426                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
11427                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11428                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11429                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11430                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11431                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11432                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11433
11434                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
11435                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11436                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11437                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
11438                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11439                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11440                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11441                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11442                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11443                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11444                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11445                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11446                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11447                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11448                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11449                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11450                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11451                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11452                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11453                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11454                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11455                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11456                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11457                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11458
11459                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
11460                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11461
11462                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
11463                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
11464                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11465                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
11466                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11467                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11468                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11469                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
11470                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
11471                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
11472
11473                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
11474                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11475                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
11476                         100_000
11477                 );
11478                 let route = find_route(
11479                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
11480                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11481                 ).unwrap();
11482                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
11483                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
11484                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
11485                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11486                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
11487                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
11488                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
11489                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
11490                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11491                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
11492                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
11493                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
11494                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
11495                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11496                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11497                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
11498                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11499                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
11500                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11501                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11502                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
11503                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
11504                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
11505
11506                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
11507                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
11508         }
11509
11510         #[test]
11511         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
11512                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
11513                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
11514                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11515                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11516                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11517                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11518
11519                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11520                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11521
11522                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11523                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11524                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11525                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11526                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11527                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11528                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11529                 let route = find_route(
11530                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11531                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11532                 ).unwrap();
11533
11534                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11535                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
11536                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
11537                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11538                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
11539                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11540                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11541
11542                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11543                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11544                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11545                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11546                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11547                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11548                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11549
11550                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
11551         }
11552
11553         #[test]
11554         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
11555                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
11556                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
11557                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
11558                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
11559                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11560                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11561                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
11562                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11563
11564                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
11565                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11566
11567                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
11568                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
11569                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
11570                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
11571                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
11572                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
11573                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
11574                 let route = find_route(
11575                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
11576                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
11577                 ).unwrap();
11578
11579                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
11580                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
11581                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
11582                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
11583                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
11584                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
11585                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
11586                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
11587                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11588
11589                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11590                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
11591                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
11592                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
11593                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
11594                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
11595                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
11596
11597                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
11598         }
11599
11600         #[test]
11601         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
11602                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
11603                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
11604                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
11605                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11606
11607                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11608                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11609                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11610                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
11611
11612                 // Marshall an MPP route.
11613                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
11614                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
11615                 route.paths.push(path);
11616                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11617                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
11618                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
11619                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
11620                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
11621                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
11622
11623                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
11624                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
11625                 .unwrap_err() {
11626                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
11627                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
11628                         },
11629                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
11630                 }
11631         }
11632
11633         #[test]
11634         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
11635                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11636                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11637                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11638                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11639
11640                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
11641
11642                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11643                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11644
11645                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11646                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
11647                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11648                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
11649
11650                 {
11651                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
11652                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
11653                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11654                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
11655                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
11656                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
11657                 }
11658
11659                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
11660
11661                 {
11662                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
11663                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
11664                 }
11665         }
11666
11667         #[test]
11668         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
11669                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
11670                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11671                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11672                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11673                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11674
11675                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
11676                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
11677                         payment_secret,
11678                         total_msat: 100_000,
11679                 };
11680
11681                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
11682                 // payment verification fails as expected.
11683                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
11684                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
11685                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
11686                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
11687                         Err(()) => {
11688                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
11689                         }
11690                 }
11691
11692                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
11693                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
11694         }
11695
11696         #[test]
11697         fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
11698                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
11699                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
11700                 // the channel is successfully closed.
11701                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11702                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11703                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11704                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11705
11706                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11707                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11708                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
11709                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11710                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11711
11712                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
11713                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
11714                 {
11715                         // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
11716                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
11717                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11718                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11719                 }
11720
11721                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
11722                 {
11723                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
11724                         // as it has the funding transaction.
11725                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11726                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11727                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11728                 }
11729
11730                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11731
11732                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11733
11734                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11735                 {
11736                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11737                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11738                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11739                 }
11740                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11741
11742                 {
11743                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
11744                         // soon as it has the funding transaction.
11745                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11746                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11747                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11748                 }
11749                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11750                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11751                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11752                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11753                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11754                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
11755                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
11756                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
11757
11758                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
11759                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
11760                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11761                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
11762
11763                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11764                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
11765                 {
11766                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
11767                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
11768                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
11769                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
11770                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11771                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
11772                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11773                 }
11774
11775                 {
11776                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
11777                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
11778                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
11779                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
11780                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11781                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11782                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11783                 }
11784
11785                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
11786                 {
11787                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
11788                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
11789                         // closing transaction).
11790                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
11791                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
11792                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11793
11794                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
11795                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
11796                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
11797                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
11798                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
11799                 }
11800
11801                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11802
11803                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
11804                 {
11805                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
11806                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
11807                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
11808                 }
11809                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11810
11811                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11812                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
11813         }
11814
11815         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11816                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
11817                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11818         }
11819
11820         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
11821                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
11822                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11823         }
11824
11825         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
11826                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
11827                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11828         }
11829
11830         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11831                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
11832                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
11833         }
11834
11835         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
11836                 match res_err {
11837                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
11838                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11839                         },
11840                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
11841                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
11842                         },
11843                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
11844                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
11845                 }
11846         }
11847
11848         #[test]
11849         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
11850                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
11851                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
11852                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
11853                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11854                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11855                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11856                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11857
11858                 // Dummy values
11859                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11860                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11861                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
11862
11863                 // Test the API functions.
11864                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
11865
11866                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
11867
11868                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11869
11870                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11871
11872                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
11873
11874                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
11875
11876                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
11877         }
11878
11879         #[test]
11880         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
11881                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
11882                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
11883                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
11884                 // the given `channel_id`.
11885                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11886                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
11887                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
11888                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
11889
11890                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
11891
11892                 // Dummy values
11893                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
11894
11895                 // Test the API functions.
11896                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
11897
11898                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11899
11900                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11901
11902                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11903
11904                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11905
11906                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
11907         }
11908
11909         #[test]
11910         fn test_connection_limiting() {
11911                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
11912                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
11913                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
11914                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
11915                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
11916
11917                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
11918
11919                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
11920                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11921
11922                 let mut funding_tx = None;
11923                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
11924                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11925                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11926
11927                         if idx == 0 {
11928                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
11929                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
11930                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
11931                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
11932                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11933
11934                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
11935                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
11936                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11937
11938                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11939
11940                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
11941                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
11942                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
11943                         }
11944                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11945                 }
11946
11947                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
11948                 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
11949                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
11950                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
11951                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
11952
11953                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
11954                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
11955                 // limit.
11956                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
11957                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
11958                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11959                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11960                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
11961                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11962                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11963                         }, true).unwrap();
11964                 }
11965                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
11966                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
11967                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11968                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11969                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11970
11971                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
11972                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
11973                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11974                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
11975                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
11976                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
11977                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
11978                 }
11979                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
11980                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11981                 }, true).unwrap();
11982                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11983                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11984                 }, true).unwrap_err();
11985
11986                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
11987                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
11988                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
11989                 }, false).unwrap();
11990                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
11991
11992                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
11993                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
11994                 // open channels.
11995                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
11996                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
11997                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
11998                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
11999                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12000                 }
12001                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12002                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12003                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12004
12005                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
12006                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12007                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
12008
12009                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
12010                 // "protected" and can connect again.
12011                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
12012                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12013                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12014                 }, true).unwrap();
12015                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12016
12017                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
12018                 // last_random_pk.
12019                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12020                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12021         }
12022
12023         #[test]
12024         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
12025                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
12026                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12027                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12028                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12029                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12030
12031                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12032
12033                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12034                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12035
12036                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
12037                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12038                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12039                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12040                 }
12041
12042                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
12043                 // rejected.
12044                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12045                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12046                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12047
12048                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
12049                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12050                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12051
12052                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
12053                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12054                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
12055                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12056         }
12057
12058         #[test]
12059         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
12060                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12061                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12062                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12063                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12064                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
12065                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12066                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
12067                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12068
12069                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
12070
12071                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12072                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12073
12074                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
12075                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
12076                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12077                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12078                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12079                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12080                         }, true).unwrap();
12081
12082                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12083                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12084                         match events[0] {
12085                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12086                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12087                                 }
12088                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12089                         }
12090                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
12091                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
12092                 }
12093
12094                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
12095                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
12096                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
12097                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
12098                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12099                 }, true).unwrap();
12100                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12101                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12102                 match events[0] {
12103                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12104                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
12105                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
12106                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
12107                                         _ => panic!(),
12108                                 }
12109                         }
12110                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12111                 }
12112                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
12113                         open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
12114
12115                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
12116                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
12117                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12118                 match events[0] {
12119                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12120                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
12121                         }
12122                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12123                 }
12124                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
12125         }
12126
12127         #[test]
12128         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
12129                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12130                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12131                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12132                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12133                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
12134                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
12135                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12136                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12137                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12138                         payment_metadata: None,
12139                         keysend_preimage: None,
12140                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12141                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12142                         }),
12143                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12144                 };
12145                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
12146                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
12147                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12148                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
12149                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12150                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12151                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
12152                 {
12153                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
12154                 } else { panic!(); }
12155
12156                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
12157                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
12158                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12159                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
12160                         payment_metadata: None,
12161                         keysend_preimage: None,
12162                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12163                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
12164                         }),
12165                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12166                 };
12167                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12168                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
12169                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
12170                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
12171         }
12172
12173         #[test]
12174         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
12175                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12176                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12177                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12178                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12179
12180                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
12181                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
12182                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
12183                         cltv_expiry_height: 22,
12184                         payment_metadata: None,
12185                         keysend_preimage: None,
12186                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12187                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
12188                         }),
12189                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
12190                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
12191                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
12192
12193                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
12194                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
12195                 // is not satisfied.
12196                 assert!(result.is_ok());
12197         }
12198
12199         #[test]
12200         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
12201                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
12202                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
12203                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12204                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12205
12206                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
12207                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12208
12209                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12210                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12211                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
12212                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
12213                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12214
12215                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12216                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12217
12218                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12219                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12220                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12221                 match &msg_events[0] {
12222                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
12223                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12224                                 match action {
12225                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
12226                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
12227                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
12228                                 }
12229                         }
12230                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12231                 }
12232
12233                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12234                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12235                 match events[0] {
12236                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
12237                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
12238                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12239                 }
12240                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12241         }
12242
12243         #[test]
12244         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
12245                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
12246                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
12247                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
12248                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12249                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12250                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
12251                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
12252                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
12253                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
12254                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12255
12256                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
12257                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12258                 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12259
12260                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
12261                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12262                 match events[0] {
12263                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
12264                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12265                         }
12266                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12267                 }
12268
12269                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12270                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
12271
12272                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12273                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
12274
12275                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
12276                 // not have generated any events.
12277                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
12278         }
12279
12280         #[test]
12281         fn test_update_channel_config() {
12282                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12283                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12284                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12285                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12286                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12287                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12288                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
12289
12290                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12291                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12292                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12293
12294                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
12295                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
12296                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
12297                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12298                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12299                 match &events[0] {
12300                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12301                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12302                 }
12303
12304                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
12305                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12306                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12307
12308                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
12309                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12310                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
12311                         ..Default::default()
12312                 }).unwrap();
12313                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12314                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12315                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12316                 match &events[0] {
12317                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12318                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12319                 }
12320
12321                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
12322                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12323                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12324                         ..Default::default()
12325                 }).unwrap();
12326                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
12327                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
12328                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12329                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12330                 match &events[0] {
12331                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12332                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
12333                 }
12334
12335                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
12336                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
12337                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
12338                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
12339                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
12340                 assert!(
12341                         matches!(
12342                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
12343                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
12344                                         ..Default::default()
12345                                 }),
12346                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
12347                         )
12348                 );
12349                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
12350                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
12351                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12352                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
12353         }
12354
12355         #[test]
12356         fn test_payment_display() {
12357                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12358                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12359                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
12360                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12361                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12362                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
12363         }
12364
12365         #[test]
12366         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
12367                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12368                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
12369                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
12370                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
12371                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
12372
12373                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
12374                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12375                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12376                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12377                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12378                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
12379                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
12380                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12381                 {
12382                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12383                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12384                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12385                 }
12386
12387                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
12388                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
12389                 // their side.
12390                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12391                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12392                 }, true).unwrap();
12393                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12394                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12395                 }, false).unwrap();
12396                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
12397                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
12398                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
12399                 );
12400                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
12401
12402                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
12403                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
12404                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
12405                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12406                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12407                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
12408                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12409                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
12410                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
12411                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
12412                 } else { panic!() };
12413                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
12414                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
12415                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
12416                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
12417                 };
12418                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12419                 {
12420                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
12421                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
12422                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
12423                 }
12424         }
12425
12426         #[test]
12427         fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
12428                 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
12429                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
12430                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
12431                 let persister;
12432                 let chain_monitor;
12433                 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
12434                 let deserialized_chanmgr;
12435                 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
12436
12437                 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12438                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
12439                 };
12440                 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
12441                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
12442                 };
12443
12444                 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12445                         if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
12446                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12447                         } else {
12448                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12449                         }
12450                 }).collect();
12451
12452                 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
12453                         if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
12454                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
12455                         } else {
12456                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
12457                         }
12458                 }).collect();
12459
12460
12461                 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
12462                 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
12463                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
12464                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
12465
12466                 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12467                 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
12468                 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
12469
12470                 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
12471
12472                 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
12473                 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
12474                         let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
12475                         assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
12476                 }
12477                 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
12478                 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
12479
12480                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
12481         }
12482 }
12483
12484 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
12485 pub mod bench {
12486         use crate::chain::Listen;
12487         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
12488         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
12489         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
12490         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
12491         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12492         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
12493         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
12494         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
12495         use crate::util::test_utils;
12496         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
12497
12498         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
12499         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12500         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12501         use bitcoin::{Block, Transaction, TxOut};
12502
12503         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
12504
12505         use criterion::Criterion;
12506
12507         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
12508                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
12509                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
12510                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
12511                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
12512                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
12513                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
12514
12515         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
12516                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
12517         }
12518         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
12519                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
12520                 #[inline]
12521                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
12522                 #[inline]
12523                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
12524         }
12525
12526         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
12527                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
12528         }
12529
12530         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
12531                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
12532                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
12533                 // calls per node.
12534                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
12535                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
12536
12537                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
12538                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
12539                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12540                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
12541                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
12542
12543                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
12544                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
12545                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
12546
12547                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
12548                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
12549                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
12550                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12551                         network,
12552                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12553                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12554                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
12555
12556                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
12557                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
12558                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
12559                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
12560                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
12561                         network,
12562                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
12563                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
12564                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
12565
12566                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12567                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12568                 }, true).unwrap();
12569                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
12570                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12571                 }, false).unwrap();
12572                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12573                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12574                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12575
12576                 let tx;
12577                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
12578                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
12579                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
12580                         }]};
12581                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12582                 } else { panic!(); }
12583
12584                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12585                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12586                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12587                 match events_b[0] {
12588                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12589                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12590                         },
12591                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12592                 }
12593
12594                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12595                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12596                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12597                 match events_a[0] {
12598                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12599                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12600                         },
12601                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12602                 }
12603
12604                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
12605
12606                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
12607                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
12608                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
12609
12610                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12611                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12612                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
12613                 match msg_events[0] {
12614                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
12615                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
12616                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12617                         },
12618                         _ => panic!(),
12619                 }
12620                 match msg_events[1] {
12621                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
12622                         _ => panic!(),
12623                 }
12624
12625                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12626                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
12627                 match events_a[0] {
12628                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12629                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
12630                         },
12631                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12632                 }
12633
12634                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12635                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
12636                 match events_b[0] {
12637                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
12638                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
12639                         },
12640                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12641                 }
12642
12643                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
12644                 macro_rules! send_payment {
12645                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
12646                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
12647                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
12648                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
12649                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
12650                                 payment_count += 1;
12651                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
12652                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
12653
12654                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
12655                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
12656                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
12657                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
12658                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
12659                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12660                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
12661                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
12662                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12663                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12664                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
12665
12666                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
12667                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
12668                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12669                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
12670
12671                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
12672                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
12673                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
12674                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12675                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
12676                                         },
12677                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
12678                                 }
12679
12680                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
12681                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
12682                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
12683                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
12684
12685                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
12686                         }
12687                 }
12688
12689                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
12690                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
12691                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
12692                 }));
12693         }
12694 }