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Return the invoice when requesting a refund
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channelmanager.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
11 //!
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
15 //!
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
19
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::Header;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
23 use bitcoin::key::constants::SECRET_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25
26 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
27 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
32 use bitcoin::{secp256k1, Sequence};
33
34 use crate::blinded_path::{BlindedPath, NodeIdLookUp};
35 use crate::blinded_path::payment::{PaymentConstraints, ReceiveTlvs};
36 use crate::chain;
37 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
38 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
39 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, WithChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
40 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
41 use crate::events;
42 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
43 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
44 // construct one themselves.
45 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
46 use crate::ln::channel::{self, Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, WithChannelContext};
47 pub use crate::ln::channel::{InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
48 use crate::ln::features::{Bolt12InvoiceFeatures, ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
49 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
50 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
51 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
52 use crate::ln::onion_payment::{check_incoming_htlc_cltv, create_recv_pending_htlc_info, create_fwd_pending_htlc_info, decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion, InboundHTLCErr, NextPacketDetails};
53 use crate::ln::msgs;
54 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
55 use crate::ln::onion_utils::{HTLCFailReason, INVALID_ONION_BLINDING};
56 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
57 #[cfg(test)]
58 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
59 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{Bolt12PaymentError, OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs, StaleExpiration};
60 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
61 use crate::offers::invoice::{BlindedPayInfo, Bolt12Invoice, DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY, DerivedSigningPubkey, ExplicitSigningPubkey, InvoiceBuilder, UnsignedBolt12Invoice};
62 use crate::offers::invoice_error::InvoiceError;
63 use crate::offers::invoice_request::{DerivedPayerId, InvoiceRequestBuilder};
64 use crate::offers::offer::{Offer, OfferBuilder};
65 use crate::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
66 use crate::offers::refund::{Refund, RefundBuilder};
67 use crate::onion_message::messenger::{Destination, MessageRouter, PendingOnionMessage, new_pending_onion_message};
68 use crate::onion_message::offers::{OffersMessage, OffersMessageHandler};
69 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider};
70 use crate::sign::ecdsa::WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner;
71 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
72 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
73 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
74 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
75 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
76 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger, WithContext};
77 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
78 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
79 use {
80         crate::offers::offer::DerivedMetadata,
81         crate::routing::router::DefaultRouter,
82         crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph,
83         crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters},
84         crate::sign::KeysManager,
85 };
86 #[cfg(c_bindings)]
87 use {
88         crate::offers::offer::OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
89         crate::offers::refund::RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder,
90 };
91
92 use alloc::collections::{btree_map, BTreeMap};
93
94 use crate::io;
95 use crate::prelude::*;
96 use core::{cmp, mem};
97 use core::cell::RefCell;
98 use crate::io::Read;
99 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
100 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
101 use core::time::Duration;
102 use core::ops::Deref;
103
104 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
105 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, ProbeSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
106 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
107
108 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
109 //
110 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
111 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
112 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
113 //
114 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
115 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
116 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
117 // before we forward it.
118 //
119 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
120 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
121 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
122 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
123 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
124
125 /// Information about where a received HTLC('s onion) has indicated the HTLC should go.
126 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
127 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
128 pub enum PendingHTLCRouting {
129         /// An HTLC which should be forwarded on to another node.
130         Forward {
131                 /// The onion which should be included in the forwarded HTLC, telling the next hop what to
132                 /// do with the HTLC.
133                 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
134                 /// The short channel ID of the channel which we were instructed to forward this HTLC to.
135                 ///
136                 /// This could be a real on-chain SCID, an SCID alias, or some other SCID which has meaning
137                 /// to the receiving node, such as one returned from
138                 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] or [`ChannelManager::get_phantom_scid`].
139                 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
140                 /// Set if this HTLC is being forwarded within a blinded path.
141                 blinded: Option<BlindedForward>,
142         },
143         /// The onion indicates that this is a payment for an invoice (supposedly) generated by us.
144         ///
145         /// Note that at this point, we have not checked that the invoice being paid was actually
146         /// generated by us, but rather it's claiming to pay an invoice of ours.
147         Receive {
148                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and (potential) proof that this
149                 /// is a payment for an invoice we generated. This proof of payment is is also used for
150                 /// linking MPP parts of a larger payment.
151                 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
152                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
153                 ///
154                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
155                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
156                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
157                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
158                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
159                 ///
160                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
161                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
162                 /// If the onion had forwarding instructions to one of our phantom node SCIDs, this will
163                 /// provide the onion shared secret used to decrypt the next level of forwarding
164                 /// instructions.
165                 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
166                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
167                 ///
168                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately be exposed in
169                 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::onion_fields`] as
170                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
171                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
172                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
173                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
174         },
175         /// The onion indicates that this is for payment to us but which contains the preimage for
176         /// claiming included, and is unrelated to any invoice we'd previously generated (aka a
177         /// "keysend" or "spontaneous" payment).
178         ReceiveKeysend {
179                 /// Information about the amount the sender intended to pay and possibly a token to
180                 /// associate MPP parts of a larger payment.
181                 ///
182                 /// This will only be filled in if receiving MPP keysend payments is enabled, and it being
183                 /// present will cause deserialization to fail on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.116.
184                 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
185                 /// Preimage for this onion payment. This preimage is provided by the sender and will be
186                 /// used to settle the spontaneous payment.
187                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
188                 /// Additional data which we (allegedly) instructed the sender to include in the onion.
189                 ///
190                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, this will ultimately bubble back up as
191                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::payment_metadata`].
192                 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
193                 /// CLTV expiry of the received HTLC.
194                 ///
195                 /// Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed.
196                 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32,
197                 /// Custom TLVs which were set by the sender.
198                 ///
199                 /// For HTLCs received by LDK, these will ultimately bubble back up as
200                 /// [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`].
201                 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
202                 /// Set if this HTLC is the final hop in a multi-hop blinded path.
203                 requires_blinded_error: bool,
204         },
205 }
206
207 /// Information used to forward or fail this HTLC that is being forwarded within a blinded path.
208 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
209 pub struct BlindedForward {
210         /// The `blinding_point` that was set in the inbound [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC`], or in the inbound
211         /// onion payload if we're the introduction node. Useful for calculating the next hop's
212         /// [`msgs::UpdateAddHTLC::blinding_point`].
213         pub inbound_blinding_point: PublicKey,
214         /// If needed, this determines how this HTLC should be failed backwards, based on whether we are
215         /// the introduction node.
216         pub failure: BlindedFailure,
217 }
218
219 impl PendingHTLCRouting {
220         // Used to override the onion failure code and data if the HTLC is blinded.
221         fn blinded_failure(&self) -> Option<BlindedFailure> {
222                 match self {
223                         Self::Forward { blinded: Some(BlindedForward { failure, .. }), .. } => Some(*failure),
224                         Self::Receive { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
225                         Self::ReceiveKeysend { requires_blinded_error: true, .. } => Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode),
226                         _ => None,
227                 }
228         }
229 }
230
231 /// Information about an incoming HTLC, including the [`PendingHTLCRouting`] describing where it
232 /// should go next.
233 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
234 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
235 pub struct PendingHTLCInfo {
236         /// Further routing details based on whether the HTLC is being forwarded or received.
237         pub routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
238         /// The onion shared secret we build with the sender used to decrypt the onion.
239         ///
240         /// This is later used to encrypt failure packets in the event that the HTLC is failed.
241         pub incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
242         /// Hash of the payment preimage, to lock the payment until the receiver releases the preimage.
243         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
244         /// Amount received in the incoming HTLC.
245         ///
246         /// This field was added in LDK 0.0.113 and will be `None` for objects written by prior
247         /// versions.
248         pub incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>,
249         /// The amount the sender indicated should be forwarded on to the next hop or amount the sender
250         /// intended for us to receive for received payments.
251         ///
252         /// If the received amount is less than this for received payments, an intermediary hop has
253         /// attempted to steal some of our funds and we should fail the HTLC (the sender should retry
254         /// it along another path).
255         ///
256         /// Because nodes can take less than their required fees, and because senders may wish to
257         /// improve their own privacy, this amount may be less than [`Self::incoming_amt_msat`] for
258         /// received payments. In such cases, recipients must handle this HTLC as if it had received
259         /// [`Self::outgoing_amt_msat`].
260         pub outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
261         /// The CLTV the sender has indicated we should set on the forwarded HTLC (or has indicated
262         /// should have been set on the received HTLC for received payments).
263         pub outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
264         /// The fee taken for this HTLC in addition to the standard protocol HTLC fees.
265         ///
266         /// If this is a payment for forwarding, this is the fee we are taking before forwarding the
267         /// HTLC.
268         ///
269         /// If this is a received payment, this is the fee that our counterparty took.
270         ///
271         /// This is used to allow LSPs to take fees as a part of payments, without the sender having to
272         /// shoulder them.
273         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
274 }
275
276 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
277 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
278         Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
279         Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
280 }
281
282 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
283 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
284 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
285         Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
286         Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
287 }
288
289 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
290 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
291         pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
292
293         // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
294         // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
295         // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
296         // HTLCs.
297         //
298         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
299         prev_short_channel_id: u64,
300         prev_htlc_id: u64,
301         prev_channel_id: ChannelId,
302         prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
303         prev_user_channel_id: u128,
304 }
305
306 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
307 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
308         AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
309         FailHTLC {
310                 htlc_id: u64,
311                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
312         },
313         FailMalformedHTLC {
314                 htlc_id: u64,
315                 failure_code: u16,
316                 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
317         },
318 }
319
320 /// Whether this blinded HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node or a blinded node,
321 /// which determines the failure message that should be used.
322 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
323 pub enum BlindedFailure {
324         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by the introduction node, and thus should be failed with
325         /// [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
326         FromIntroductionNode,
327         /// This HTLC is being failed backwards by a blinded node within the path, and thus should be
328         /// failed with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] and error code `0x8000|0x4000|24`.
329         FromBlindedNode,
330 }
331
332 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
333 #[derive(Clone, Debug, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
334 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
335         // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
336         short_channel_id: u64,
337         user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
338         htlc_id: u64,
339         incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
340         phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
341         blinded_failure: Option<BlindedFailure>,
342         channel_id: ChannelId,
343
344         // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
345         // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
346         outpoint: OutPoint,
347 }
348
349 enum OnionPayload {
350         /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
351         Invoice {
352                 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
353                 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
354                 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
355         },
356         /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
357         Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
358 }
359
360 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
361 struct ClaimableHTLC {
362         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
363         cltv_expiry: u32,
364         /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
365         value: u64,
366         /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
367         /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
368         sender_intended_value: u64,
369         onion_payload: OnionPayload,
370         timer_ticks: u8,
371         /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
372         /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
373         total_value_received: Option<u64>,
374         /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
375         total_msat: u64,
376         /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
377         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
378 }
379
380 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
381         fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
382                 events::ClaimedHTLC {
383                         channel_id: val.prev_hop.channel_id,
384                         user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
385                         cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
386                         value_msat: val.value,
387                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: val.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0),
388                 }
389         }
390 }
391
392 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
393 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
394 ///
395 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
396 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
397 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
398
399 impl PaymentId {
400         /// Number of bytes in the id.
401         pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
402 }
403
404 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
405         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
406                 self.0.write(w)
407         }
408 }
409
410 impl Readable for PaymentId {
411         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
412                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
413                 Ok(PaymentId(buf))
414         }
415 }
416
417 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
418         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
419                 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
420         }
421 }
422
423 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
424 ///
425 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
426 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
427 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
428
429 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
430         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
431                 self.0.write(w)
432         }
433 }
434
435 impl Readable for InterceptId {
436         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
437                 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
438                 Ok(InterceptId(buf))
439         }
440 }
441
442 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
443 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
444 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
445         PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
446         OutboundRoute { session_priv: [u8; SECRET_KEY_SIZE] },
447 }
448 impl SentHTLCId {
449         pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
450                 match source {
451                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
452                                 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
453                                 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
454                         },
455                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
456                                 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: session_priv.secret_bytes() },
457                 }
458         }
459 }
460 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
461         (0, PreviousHopData) => {
462                 (0, short_channel_id, required),
463                 (2, htlc_id, required),
464         },
465         (2, OutboundRoute) => {
466                 (0, session_priv, required),
467         };
468 );
469
470
471 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
472 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
473 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
474 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
475         PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
476         OutboundRoute {
477                 path: Path,
478                 session_priv: SecretKey,
479                 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
480                 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
481                 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
482                 payment_id: PaymentId,
483         },
484 }
485 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
486 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
487         fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
488                 match self {
489                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
490                                 0u8.hash(hasher);
491                                 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
492                         },
493                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
494                                 1u8.hash(hasher);
495                                 path.hash(hasher);
496                                 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
497                                 payment_id.hash(hasher);
498                                 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
499                         },
500                 }
501         }
502 }
503 impl HTLCSource {
504         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
505         #[cfg(test)]
506         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
507                 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
508                         path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
509                         session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
510                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
511                         payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
512                 }
513         }
514
515         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
516         /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
517         /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
518         pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
519                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
520                         *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
521                 } else {
522                         // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
523                         true
524                 }
525         }
526 }
527
528 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
529 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
530 ///
531 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
532 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
533 pub enum FailureCode {
534         /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
535         /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
536         TemporaryNodeFailure,
537         /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
538         /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
539         RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
540         /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
541         /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
542         /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
543         /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
544         IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
545         /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
546         /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
547         ///
548         /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
549         /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
550         InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
551 }
552
553 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
554     fn into(self) -> u16 {
555                 match self {
556                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
557                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
558                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
559                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
560                 }
561         }
562 }
563
564 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
565 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
566 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
567 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
568 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
569
570 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
571         err: msgs::LightningError,
572         closes_channel: bool,
573         shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
574 }
575 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
576         #[inline]
577         fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
578                 Self {
579                         err: LightningError {
580                                 err: err.clone(),
581                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
582                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
583                                                 channel_id,
584                                                 data: err
585                                         },
586                                 },
587                         },
588                         closes_channel: false,
589                         shutdown_finish: None,
590                 }
591         }
592         #[inline]
593         fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
594                 Self { err, closes_channel: false, shutdown_finish: None }
595         }
596         #[inline]
597         fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>) -> Self {
598                 let err_msg = msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id, data: err.clone() };
599                 let action = if shutdown_res.monitor_update.is_some() {
600                         // We have a closing `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, which means the channel was funded and we
601                         // should disconnect our peer such that we force them to broadcast their latest
602                         // commitment upon reconnecting.
603                         msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer { msg: Some(err_msg) }
604                 } else {
605                         msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: err_msg }
606                 };
607                 Self {
608                         err: LightningError { err, action },
609                         closes_channel: true,
610                         shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
611                 }
612         }
613         #[inline]
614         fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
615                 Self {
616                         err: match err {
617                                 ChannelError::Warn(msg) =>  LightningError {
618                                         err: msg.clone(),
619                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
620                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
621                                                         channel_id,
622                                                         data: msg
623                                                 },
624                                                 log_level: Level::Warn,
625                                         },
626                                 },
627                                 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
628                                         err: msg,
629                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
630                                 },
631                                 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
632                                         err: msg.clone(),
633                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
634                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
635                                                         channel_id,
636                                                         data: msg
637                                                 },
638                                         },
639                                 },
640                         },
641                         closes_channel: false,
642                         shutdown_finish: None,
643                 }
644         }
645
646         fn closes_channel(&self) -> bool {
647                 self.closes_channel
648         }
649 }
650
651 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
652 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
653 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
654 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
655 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
656
657 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
658 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
659 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
660 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
661 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
662 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
663         /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
664         CommitmentFirst,
665         /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
666         RevokeAndACKFirst,
667 }
668
669 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
670 struct ClaimingPayment {
671         amount_msat: u64,
672         payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
673         receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
674         htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
675         sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
676 }
677 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
678         (0, amount_msat, required),
679         (2, payment_purpose, required),
680         (4, receiver_node_id, required),
681         (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
682         (7, sender_intended_value, option),
683 });
684
685 struct ClaimablePayment {
686         purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
687         onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
688         htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
689 }
690
691 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
692 struct ClaimablePayments {
693         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
694         /// failed/claimed by the user.
695         ///
696         /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
697         /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
698         ///
699         /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
700         /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
701         claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
702
703         /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
704         /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
705         /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
706         pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
707 }
708
709 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
710 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
711 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
712 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
713 #[derive(Debug)]
714 enum BackgroundEvent {
715         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
716         /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
717         /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
718         /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
719         ///
720         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
721         /// are regenerated on startup.
722         ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
723         /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
724         /// channel to continue normal operation.
725         ///
726         /// In general this should be used rather than
727         /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
728         /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
729         /// error the other variant is acceptable.
730         ///
731         /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
732         /// are regenerated on startup.
733         MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
734                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
735                 funding_txo: OutPoint,
736                 channel_id: ChannelId,
737                 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
738         },
739         /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
740         /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
741         /// on a channel.
742         MonitorUpdatesComplete {
743                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
744                 channel_id: ChannelId,
745         },
746 }
747
748 #[derive(Debug)]
749 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
750         /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
751         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
752         /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
753         /// event can be generated.
754         PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
755         /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
756         /// operation of another channel.
757         ///
758         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
759         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
760         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
761         /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
762         /// outbound edge.
763         EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
764                 event: events::Event,
765                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
766         },
767         /// Indicates we should immediately resume the operation of another channel, unless there is
768         /// some other reason why the channel is blocked. In practice this simply means immediately
769         /// removing the [`RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction`] provided from the blocking set.
770         ///
771         /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
772         /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
773         /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. However, we use this variant
774         /// instead of [`Self::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel`] when we discover that the claim was in
775         /// fact duplicative and we simply want to resume the outbound edge channel immediately.
776         ///
777         /// This variant should thus never be written to disk, as it is processed inline rather than
778         /// stored for later processing.
779         FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
780                 downstream_counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
781                 downstream_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
782                 blocking_action: RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
783                 downstream_channel_id: ChannelId,
784         },
785 }
786
787 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
788         (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
789         // Note that FreeOtherChannelImmediately should never be written - we were supposed to free
790         // *immediately*. However, for simplicity we implement read/write here.
791         (1, FreeOtherChannelImmediately) => {
792                 (0, downstream_counterparty_node_id, required),
793                 (2, downstream_funding_outpoint, required),
794                 (4, blocking_action, required),
795                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, downstream_funding_outpoint will be
796                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
797                 (5, downstream_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(downstream_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
798         },
799         (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
800                 (0, event, upgradable_required),
801                 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
802                 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
803                 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
804                 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
805                 // downgrades to prior versions.
806                 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
807         },
808 );
809
810 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
811 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
812         ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
813                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
814                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
815                 channel_id: ChannelId,
816         },
817 }
818 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
819         (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
820                 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
821                 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
822                 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, channel_funding_outpoint will be
823                 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
824                 (3, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(channel_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
825         };
826 );
827
828 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
829 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
830 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
831 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
832         /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
833         /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
834         /// durably to disk.
835         ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
836                 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
837                 channel_id: ChannelId,
838                 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
839                 htlc_id: u64,
840         },
841 }
842
843 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
844         fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
845                 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
846                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
847                         htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
848                 }
849         }
850 }
851
852 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
853         (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
854 ;);
855
856
857 /// State we hold per-peer.
858 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
859         /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
860         ///
861         /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
862         pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
863         /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
864         ///
865         /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
866         /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
867         /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
868         /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
869         pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
870         /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
871         latest_features: InitFeatures,
872         /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
873         /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
874         pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
875         /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
876         /// user but which have not yet completed.
877         ///
878         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
879         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
880         /// for a missing channel.
881         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
882         /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
883         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
884         ///
885         /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
886         /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
887         /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
888         /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
889         ///
890         /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
891         /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
892         /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
893         /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
894         /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
895         /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
896         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
897         /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
898         /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
899         /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
900         /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
901         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
902         /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
903         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
904         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
905         pub is_connected: bool,
906 }
907
908 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
909         /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
910         /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
911         /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
912         fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
913                 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
914                         return false
915                 }
916                 !self.channel_by_id.iter().any(|(_, phase)|
917                         match phase {
918                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => true,
919                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => false,
920                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
921                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => true,
922                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
923                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => false,
924                         }
925                 )
926                         && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
927                         && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
928         }
929
930         // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
931         fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
932                 self.channel_by_id.len() + self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
933         }
934
935         // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
936         fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
937                 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(channel_id) ||
938                         self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(channel_id)
939         }
940 }
941
942 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
943 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
944 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
945         /// The original OpenChannel message.
946         pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
947         /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
948         pub ticks_remaining: i32,
949 }
950
951 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
952 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
953 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
954
955 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
956 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
957 ///
958 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
959 /// here.
960 ///
961 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
962 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
963 struct PendingInboundPayment {
964         /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
965         payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
966         /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
967         /// this payment being removed.
968         expiry_time: u64,
969         /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
970         user_payment_id: u64,
971         // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
972         payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
973         min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
974 }
975
976 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
977 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
978 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
979 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
980 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
981 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
982 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
983 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
984 ///
985 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
986 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
987 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
988         Arc<M>,
989         Arc<T>,
990         Arc<KeysManager>,
991         Arc<KeysManager>,
992         Arc<KeysManager>,
993         Arc<F>,
994         Arc<DefaultRouter<
995                 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
996                 Arc<L>,
997                 Arc<KeysManager>,
998                 Arc<RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
999                 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1000                 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
1001         >>,
1002         Arc<L>
1003 >;
1004
1005 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
1006 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
1007 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
1008 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
1009 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
1010 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
1011 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
1012 /// or, respectively, [`Router`]  for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
1013 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
1014 ///
1015 /// This is not exported to bindings users as type aliases aren't supported in most languages.
1016 #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
1017 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
1018         ChannelManager<
1019                 &'a M,
1020                 &'b T,
1021                 &'c KeysManager,
1022                 &'c KeysManager,
1023                 &'c KeysManager,
1024                 &'d F,
1025                 &'e DefaultRouter<
1026                         &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
1027                         &'g L,
1028                         &'c KeysManager,
1029                         &'h RwLock<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
1030                         ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
1031                         ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
1032                 >,
1033                 &'g L
1034         >;
1035
1036 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`].
1037 ///
1038 /// This is not exported to bindings users as general cover traits aren't useful in other
1039 /// languages.
1040 pub trait AChannelManager {
1041         /// A type implementing [`chain::Watch`].
1042         type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1043         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Watch`].
1044         type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
1045         /// A type implementing [`BroadcasterInterface`].
1046         type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
1047         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Broadcaster`].
1048         type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
1049         /// A type implementing [`EntropySource`].
1050         type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
1051         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::EntropySource`].
1052         type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
1053         /// A type implementing [`NodeSigner`].
1054         type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
1055         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::NodeSigner`].
1056         type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
1057         /// A type implementing [`WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner`].
1058         type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
1059         /// A type implementing [`SignerProvider`] for [`Self::Signer`].
1060         type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<EcdsaSigner= Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
1061         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::SignerProvider`].
1062         type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
1063         /// A type implementing [`FeeEstimator`].
1064         type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
1065         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::FeeEstimator`].
1066         type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
1067         /// A type implementing [`Router`].
1068         type Router: Router + ?Sized;
1069         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Router`].
1070         type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
1071         /// A type implementing [`Logger`].
1072         type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
1073         /// A type that may be dereferenced to [`Self::Logger`].
1074         type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
1075         /// Returns a reference to the actual [`ChannelManager`] object.
1076         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
1077 }
1078
1079 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
1080 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
1081 where
1082         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1083         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1084         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1085         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1086         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1087         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1088         R::Target: Router,
1089         L::Target: Logger,
1090 {
1091         type Watch = M::Target;
1092         type M = M;
1093         type Broadcaster = T::Target;
1094         type T = T;
1095         type EntropySource = ES::Target;
1096         type ES = ES;
1097         type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
1098         type NS = NS;
1099         type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner;
1100         type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
1101         type SP = SP;
1102         type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
1103         type F = F;
1104         type Router = R::Target;
1105         type R = R;
1106         type Logger = L::Target;
1107         type L = L;
1108         fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
1109 }
1110
1111 /// A lightning node's channel state machine and payment management logic, which facilitates
1112 /// sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through lightning channels.
1113 ///
1114 /// [`ChannelManager`] is parameterized by a number of components to achieve this.
1115 /// - [`chain::Watch`] (typically [`ChainMonitor`]) for on-chain monitoring and enforcement of each
1116 ///   channel
1117 /// - [`BroadcasterInterface`] for broadcasting transactions related to opening, funding, and
1118 ///   closing channels
1119 /// - [`EntropySource`] for providing random data needed for cryptographic operations
1120 /// - [`NodeSigner`] for cryptographic operations scoped to the node
1121 /// - [`SignerProvider`] for providing signers whose operations are scoped to individual channels
1122 /// - [`FeeEstimator`] to determine transaction fee rates needed to have a transaction mined in a
1123 ///   timely manner
1124 /// - [`Router`] for finding payment paths when initiating and retrying payments
1125 /// - [`Logger`] for logging operational information of varying degrees
1126 ///
1127 /// Additionally, it implements the following traits:
1128 /// - [`ChannelMessageHandler`] to handle off-chain channel activity from peers
1129 /// - [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] to similarly send such messages to peers
1130 /// - [`OffersMessageHandler`] for BOLT 12 message handling and sending
1131 /// - [`EventsProvider`] to generate user-actionable [`Event`]s
1132 /// - [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for notification of on-chain activity
1133 ///
1134 /// Thus, [`ChannelManager`] is typically used to parameterize a [`MessageHandler`] and an
1135 /// [`OnionMessenger`]. The latter is required to support BOLT 12 functionality.
1136 ///
1137 /// # `ChannelManager` vs `ChannelMonitor`
1138 ///
1139 /// It's important to distinguish between the *off-chain* management and *on-chain* enforcement of
1140 /// lightning channels. [`ChannelManager`] exchanges messages with peers to manage the off-chain
1141 /// state of each channel. During this process, it generates a [`ChannelMonitor`] for each channel
1142 /// and a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] for each relevant change, notifying its parameterized
1143 /// [`chain::Watch`] of them.
1144 ///
1145 /// An implementation of [`chain::Watch`], such as [`ChainMonitor`], is responsible for aggregating
1146 /// these [`ChannelMonitor`]s and applying any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to them. It then monitors
1147 /// for any pertinent on-chain activity, enforcing claims as needed.
1148 ///
1149 /// This division of off-chain management and on-chain enforcement allows for interesting node
1150 /// setups. For instance, on-chain enforcement could be moved to a separate host or have added
1151 /// redundancy, possibly as a watchtower. See [`chain::Watch`] for the relevant interface.
1152 ///
1153 /// # Initialization
1154 ///
1155 /// Use [`ChannelManager::new`] with the most recent [`BlockHash`] when creating a fresh instance.
1156 /// Otherwise, if restarting, construct [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] with the necessary parameters and
1157 /// references to any deserialized [`ChannelMonitor`]s that were previously persisted. Use this to
1158 /// deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] and feed it any new chain data since it was last online, as
1159 /// detailed in the [`ChannelManagerReadArgs`] documentation.
1160 ///
1161 /// ```
1162 /// use bitcoin::BlockHash;
1163 /// use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
1164 /// use lightning::chain::BestBlock;
1165 /// # use lightning::chain::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
1166 /// use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelManager, ChannelManagerReadArgs};
1167 /// # use lightning::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
1168 /// use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
1169 /// use lightning::util::ser::ReadableArgs;
1170 ///
1171 /// # fn read_channel_monitors() -> Vec<ChannelMonitor<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>> { vec![] }
1172 /// # fn example<
1173 /// #     'a,
1174 /// #     L: lightning::util::logger::Logger,
1175 /// #     ES: lightning::sign::EntropySource,
1176 /// #     S: for <'b> lightning::routing::scoring::LockableScore<'b, ScoreLookUp = SL>,
1177 /// #     SL: lightning::routing::scoring::ScoreLookUp<ScoreParams = SP>,
1178 /// #     SP: Sized,
1179 /// #     R: lightning::io::Read,
1180 /// # >(
1181 /// #     fee_estimator: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::FeeEstimator,
1182 /// #     chain_monitor: &dyn lightning::chain::Watch<lightning::sign::InMemorySigner>,
1183 /// #     tx_broadcaster: &dyn lightning::chain::chaininterface::BroadcasterInterface,
1184 /// #     router: &lightning::routing::router::DefaultRouter<&NetworkGraph<&'a L>, &'a L, &ES, &S, SP, SL>,
1185 /// #     logger: &L,
1186 /// #     entropy_source: &ES,
1187 /// #     node_signer: &dyn lightning::sign::NodeSigner,
1188 /// #     signer_provider: &lightning::sign::DynSignerProvider,
1189 /// #     best_block: lightning::chain::BestBlock,
1190 /// #     current_timestamp: u32,
1191 /// #     mut reader: R,
1192 /// # ) -> Result<(), lightning::ln::msgs::DecodeError> {
1193 /// // Fresh start with no channels
1194 /// let params = ChainParameters {
1195 ///     network: Network::Bitcoin,
1196 ///     best_block,
1197 /// };
1198 /// let default_config = UserConfig::default();
1199 /// let channel_manager = ChannelManager::new(
1200 ///     fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, entropy_source, node_signer,
1201 ///     signer_provider, default_config, params, current_timestamp
1202 /// );
1203 ///
1204 /// // Restart from deserialized data
1205 /// let mut channel_monitors = read_channel_monitors();
1206 /// let args = ChannelManagerReadArgs::new(
1207 ///     entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster,
1208 ///     router, logger, default_config, channel_monitors.iter_mut().collect()
1209 /// );
1210 /// let (block_hash, channel_manager) =
1211 ///     <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<_, _, _, _, _, _, _, _>)>::read(&mut reader, args)?;
1212 ///
1213 /// // Update the ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors with the latest chain data
1214 /// // ...
1215 ///
1216 /// // Move the monitors to the ChannelManager's chain::Watch parameter
1217 /// for monitor in channel_monitors {
1218 ///     chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
1219 /// }
1220 /// # Ok(())
1221 /// # }
1222 /// ```
1223 ///
1224 /// # Operation
1225 ///
1226 /// The following is required for [`ChannelManager`] to function properly:
1227 /// - Handle messages from peers using its [`ChannelMessageHandler`] implementation (typically
1228 ///   called by [`PeerManager::read_event`] when processing network I/O)
1229 /// - Send messages to peers obtained via its [`MessageSendEventsProvider`] implementation
1230 ///   (typically initiated when [`PeerManager::process_events`] is called)
1231 /// - Feed on-chain activity using either its [`chain::Listen`] or [`chain::Confirm`] implementation
1232 ///   as documented by those traits
1233 /// - Perform any periodic channel and payment checks by calling [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly
1234 ///   every minute
1235 /// - Persist to disk whenever [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`] returns `true` using a
1236 ///   [`Persister`] such as a [`KVStore`] implementation
1237 /// - Handle [`Event`]s obtained via its [`EventsProvider`] implementation
1238 ///
1239 /// The [`Future`] returned by [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] is useful in determining
1240 /// when the last two requirements need to be checked.
1241 ///
1242 /// The [`lightning-block-sync`] and [`lightning-transaction-sync`] crates provide utilities that
1243 /// simplify feeding in on-chain activity using the [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] traits,
1244 /// respectively. The remaining requirements can be met using the [`lightning-background-processor`]
1245 /// crate. For languages other than Rust, the availability of similar utilities may vary.
1246 ///
1247 /// # Channels
1248 ///
1249 /// [`ChannelManager`]'s primary function involves managing a channel state. Without channels,
1250 /// payments can't be sent. Use [`list_channels`] or [`list_usable_channels`] for a snapshot of the
1251 /// currently open channels.
1252 ///
1253 /// ```
1254 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1255 /// #
1256 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1257 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1258 /// let channels = channel_manager.list_usable_channels();
1259 /// for details in channels {
1260 ///     println!("{:?}", details);
1261 /// }
1262 /// # }
1263 /// ```
1264 ///
1265 /// Each channel is identified using a [`ChannelId`], which will change throughout the channel's
1266 /// life cycle. Additionally, channels are assigned a `user_channel_id`, which is given in
1267 /// [`Event`]s associated with the channel and serves as a fixed identifier but is otherwise unused
1268 /// by [`ChannelManager`].
1269 ///
1270 /// ## Opening Channels
1271 ///
1272 /// To an open a channel with a peer, call [`create_channel`]. This will initiate the process of
1273 /// opening an outbound channel, which requires self-funding when handling
1274 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
1275 ///
1276 /// ```
1277 /// # use bitcoin::{ScriptBuf, Transaction};
1278 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1279 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1280 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1281 /// #
1282 /// # trait Wallet {
1283 /// #     fn create_funding_transaction(
1284 /// #         &self, _amount_sats: u64, _output_script: ScriptBuf
1285 /// #     ) -> Transaction;
1286 /// # }
1287 /// #
1288 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager, W: Wallet>(channel_manager: T, wallet: W, peer_id: PublicKey) {
1289 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1290 /// let value_sats = 1_000_000;
1291 /// let push_msats = 10_000_000;
1292 /// match channel_manager.create_channel(peer_id, value_sats, push_msats, 42, None, None) {
1293 ///     Ok(channel_id) => println!("Opening channel {}", channel_id),
1294 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error opening channel: {:?}", e),
1295 /// }
1296 ///
1297 /// // On the event processing thread once the peer has responded
1298 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1299 ///     Event::FundingGenerationReady {
1300 ///         temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script,
1301 ///         user_channel_id, ..
1302 ///     } => {
1303 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1304 ///         let funding_transaction = wallet.create_funding_transaction(
1305 ///             channel_value_satoshis, output_script
1306 ///         );
1307 ///         match channel_manager.funding_transaction_generated(
1308 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction
1309 ///         ) {
1310 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Funding channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1311 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error funding channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1312 ///         }
1313 ///     },
1314 ///     Event::ChannelPending { channel_id, user_channel_id, former_temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
1315 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1316 ///         println!(
1317 ///             "Channel {} now {} pending (funding transaction has been broadcasted)", channel_id,
1318 ///             former_temporary_channel_id.unwrap()
1319 ///         );
1320 ///     },
1321 ///     Event::ChannelReady { channel_id, user_channel_id, .. } => {
1322 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1323 ///         println!("Channel {} ready", channel_id);
1324 ///     },
1325 ///     // ...
1326 /// #     _ => {},
1327 /// });
1328 /// # }
1329 /// ```
1330 ///
1331 /// ## Accepting Channels
1332 ///
1333 /// Inbound channels are initiated by peers and are automatically accepted unless [`ChannelManager`]
1334 /// has [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] set. In that case, the channel may be
1335 /// either accepted or rejected when handling [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
1336 ///
1337 /// ```
1338 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1339 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1340 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1341 /// #
1342 /// # fn is_trusted(counterparty_node_id: PublicKey) -> bool {
1343 /// #     // ...
1344 /// #     unimplemented!()
1345 /// # }
1346 /// #
1347 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1348 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1349 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1350 ///     Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, ..  } => {
1351 ///         if !is_trusted(counterparty_node_id) {
1352 ///             match channel_manager.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(
1353 ///                 &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id
1354 ///             ) {
1355 ///                 Ok(()) => println!("Rejecting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1356 ///                 Err(e) => println!("Error rejecting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1357 ///             }
1358 ///             return;
1359 ///         }
1360 ///
1361 ///         let user_channel_id = 43;
1362 ///         match channel_manager.accept_inbound_channel(
1363 ///             &temporary_channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, user_channel_id
1364 ///         ) {
1365 ///             Ok(()) => println!("Accepting channel {}", temporary_channel_id),
1366 ///             Err(e) => println!("Error accepting channel {}: {:?}", temporary_channel_id, e),
1367 ///         }
1368 ///     },
1369 ///     // ...
1370 /// #     _ => {},
1371 /// });
1372 /// # }
1373 /// ```
1374 ///
1375 /// ## Closing Channels
1376 ///
1377 /// There are two ways to close a channel: either cooperatively using [`close_channel`] or
1378 /// unilaterally using [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]. The former is ideal as it makes for
1379 /// lower fees and immediate access to funds. However, the latter may be necessary if the
1380 /// counterparty isn't behaving properly or has gone offline. [`Event::ChannelClosed`] is generated
1381 /// once the channel has been closed successfully.
1382 ///
1383 /// ```
1384 /// # use bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey;
1385 /// # use lightning::ln::ChannelId;
1386 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1387 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1388 /// #
1389 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1390 /// #     channel_manager: T, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
1391 /// # ) {
1392 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1393 /// match channel_manager.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id) {
1394 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Closing channel {}", channel_id),
1395 ///     Err(e) => println!("Error closing channel {}: {:?}", channel_id, e),
1396 /// }
1397 ///
1398 /// // On the event processing thread
1399 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1400 ///     Event::ChannelClosed { channel_id, user_channel_id, ..  } => {
1401 ///         assert_eq!(user_channel_id, 42);
1402 ///         println!("Channel {} closed", channel_id);
1403 ///     },
1404 ///     // ...
1405 /// #     _ => {},
1406 /// });
1407 /// # }
1408 /// ```
1409 ///
1410 /// # Payments
1411 ///
1412 /// [`ChannelManager`] is responsible for sending, forwarding, and receiving payments through its
1413 /// channels. A payment is typically initiated from a [BOLT 11] invoice or a [BOLT 12] offer, though
1414 /// spontaneous (i.e., keysend) payments are also possible. Incoming payments don't require
1415 /// maintaining any additional state as [`ChannelManager`] can reconstruct the [`PaymentPreimage`]
1416 /// from the [`PaymentSecret`]. Sending payments, however, require tracking in order to retry failed
1417 /// HTLCs.
1418 ///
1419 /// After a payment is initiated, it will appear in [`list_recent_payments`] until a short time
1420 /// after either an [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is handled. Failed HTLCs
1421 /// for a payment will be retried according to the payment's [`Retry`] strategy or until
1422 /// [`abandon_payment`] is called.
1423 ///
1424 /// ## BOLT 11 Invoices
1425 ///
1426 /// The [`lightning-invoice`] crate is useful for creating BOLT 11 invoices. Specifically, use the
1427 /// functions in its `utils` module for constructing invoices that are compatible with
1428 /// [`ChannelManager`]. These functions serve as a convenience for building invoices with the
1429 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentSecret`] returned from [`create_inbound_payment`]. To provide your
1430 /// own [`PaymentHash`], use [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] or the corresponding functions in
1431 /// the [`lightning-invoice`] `utils` module.
1432 ///
1433 /// [`ChannelManager`] generates an [`Event::PaymentClaimable`] once the full payment has been
1434 /// received. Call [`claim_funds`] to release the [`PaymentPreimage`], which in turn will result in
1435 /// an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`].
1436 ///
1437 /// ```
1438 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1439 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1440 /// #
1441 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) {
1442 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1443 /// // Or use utils::create_invoice_from_channelmanager
1444 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.create_inbound_payment(
1445 ///     Some(10_000_000), 3600, None
1446 /// ) {
1447 ///     Ok((payment_hash, _payment_secret)) => {
1448 ///         println!("Creating inbound payment {}", payment_hash);
1449 ///         payment_hash
1450 ///     },
1451 ///     Err(()) => panic!("Error creating inbound payment"),
1452 /// };
1453 ///
1454 /// // On the event processing thread
1455 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1456 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1457 ///         PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1458 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1459 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1460 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1461 ///         },
1462 ///         PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1463 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1464 ///         },
1465 ///         PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(payment_preimage) => {
1466 ///             assert_ne!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1467 ///             println!("Claiming spontaneous payment {}", payment_hash);
1468 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1469 ///         },
1470 ///     },
1471 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1472 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1473 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1474 ///     },
1475 ///     // ...
1476 /// #     _ => {},
1477 /// });
1478 /// # }
1479 /// ```
1480 ///
1481 /// For paying an invoice, [`lightning-invoice`] provides a `payment` module with convenience
1482 /// functions for use with [`send_payment`].
1483 ///
1484 /// ```
1485 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1486 /// # use lightning::ln::PaymentHash;
1487 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
1488 /// # use lightning::routing::router::RouteParameters;
1489 /// #
1490 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1491 /// #     channel_manager: T, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields,
1492 /// #     route_params: RouteParameters, retry: Retry
1493 /// # ) {
1494 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1495 /// // let (payment_hash, recipient_onion, route_params) =
1496 /// //     payment::payment_parameters_from_invoice(&invoice);
1497 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1498 /// match channel_manager.send_payment(
1499 ///     payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route_params, retry
1500 /// ) {
1501 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Sending payment with hash {}", payment_hash),
1502 ///     Err(e) => println!("Failed sending payment with hash {}: {:?}", payment_hash, e),
1503 /// }
1504 ///
1505 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1506 /// let expected_payment_hash = payment_hash;
1507 /// assert!(
1508 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1509 ///         details,
1510 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
1511 ///             payment_id: expected_payment_id,
1512 ///             payment_hash: expected_payment_hash,
1513 ///             ..
1514 ///         }
1515 ///     )).is_some()
1516 /// );
1517 ///
1518 /// // On the event processing thread
1519 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1520 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_hash),
1521 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_hash, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_hash),
1522 ///     // ...
1523 /// #     _ => {},
1524 /// });
1525 /// # }
1526 /// ```
1527 ///
1528 /// ## BOLT 12 Offers
1529 ///
1530 /// The [`offers`] module is useful for creating BOLT 12 offers. An [`Offer`] is a precursor to a
1531 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`], which must first be requested by the payer. The interchange of these messages
1532 /// as defined in the specification is handled by [`ChannelManager`] and its implementation of
1533 /// [`OffersMessageHandler`]. However, this only works with an [`Offer`] created using a builder
1534 /// returned by [`create_offer_builder`]. With this approach, BOLT 12 offers and invoices are
1535 /// stateless just as BOLT 11 invoices are.
1536 ///
1537 /// ```
1538 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1539 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1540 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1541 /// #
1542 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1543 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1544 /// let offer = channel_manager
1545 ///     .create_offer_builder("coffee".to_string())?
1546 /// # ;
1547 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1548 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::offer::OfferBuilder<_, _> = offer.into();
1549 /// # let offer = builder
1550 ///     .amount_msats(10_000_000)
1551 ///     .build()?;
1552 /// let bech32_offer = offer.to_string();
1553 ///
1554 /// // On the event processing thread
1555 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1556 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1557 ///         PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1558 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1559 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1560 ///         },
1561 ///         PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1562 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1563 ///         },
1564 ///         // ...
1565 /// #         _ => {},
1566 ///     },
1567 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1568 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1569 ///     },
1570 ///     // ...
1571 /// #     _ => {},
1572 /// });
1573 /// # Ok(())
1574 /// # }
1575 /// ```
1576 ///
1577 /// Use [`pay_for_offer`] to initiated payment, which sends an [`InvoiceRequest`] for an [`Offer`]
1578 /// and pays the [`Bolt12Invoice`] response. In addition to success and failure events,
1579 /// [`ChannelManager`] may also generate an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
1580 ///
1581 /// ```
1582 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1583 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1584 /// # use lightning::offers::offer::Offer;
1585 /// #
1586 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1587 /// #     channel_manager: T, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
1588 /// #     payer_note: Option<String>, retry: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1589 /// # ) {
1590 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1591 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1592 /// match channel_manager.pay_for_offer(
1593 ///     offer, quantity, amount_msats, payer_note, payment_id, retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat
1594 /// ) {
1595 ///     Ok(()) => println!("Requesting invoice for offer"),
1596 ///     Err(e) => println!("Unable to request invoice for offer: {:?}", e),
1597 /// }
1598 ///
1599 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1600 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1601 /// assert!(
1602 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1603 ///         details,
1604 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1605 ///     )).is_some()
1606 /// );
1607 ///
1608 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1609 /// assert!(
1610 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1611 ///         details,
1612 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1613 ///     )).is_some()
1614 /// );
1615 ///
1616 /// // On the event processing thread
1617 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1618 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1619 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1620 ///     Event::InvoiceRequestFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1621 ///     // ...
1622 /// #     _ => {},
1623 /// });
1624 /// # }
1625 /// ```
1626 ///
1627 /// ## BOLT 12 Refunds
1628 ///
1629 /// A [`Refund`] is a request for an invoice to be paid. Like *paying* for an [`Offer`], *creating*
1630 /// a [`Refund`] involves maintaining state since it represents a future outbound payment.
1631 /// Therefore, use [`create_refund_builder`] when creating one, otherwise [`ChannelManager`] will
1632 /// refuse to pay any corresponding [`Bolt12Invoice`] that it receives.
1633 ///
1634 /// ```
1635 /// # use core::time::Duration;
1636 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider};
1637 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{AChannelManager, PaymentId, RecentPaymentDetails, Retry};
1638 /// # use lightning::offers::parse::Bolt12SemanticError;
1639 /// #
1640 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(
1641 /// #     channel_manager: T, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration, retry: Retry,
1642 /// #     max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
1643 /// # ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
1644 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1645 /// let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
1646 /// let refund = channel_manager
1647 ///     .create_refund_builder(
1648 ///         "coffee".to_string(), amount_msats, absolute_expiry, payment_id, retry,
1649 ///         max_total_routing_fee_msat
1650 ///     )?
1651 /// # ;
1652 /// # // Needed for compiling for c_bindings
1653 /// # let builder: lightning::offers::refund::RefundBuilder<_> = refund.into();
1654 /// # let refund = builder
1655 ///     .payer_note("refund for order 1234".to_string())
1656 ///     .build()?;
1657 /// let bech32_refund = refund.to_string();
1658 ///
1659 /// // First the payment will be waiting on an invoice
1660 /// let expected_payment_id = payment_id;
1661 /// assert!(
1662 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1663 ///         details,
1664 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: expected_payment_id }
1665 ///     )).is_some()
1666 /// );
1667 ///
1668 /// // Once the invoice is received, a payment will be sent
1669 /// assert!(
1670 ///     channel_manager.list_recent_payments().iter().find(|details| matches!(
1671 ///         details,
1672 ///         RecentPaymentDetails::Pending { payment_id: expected_payment_id, ..  }
1673 ///     )).is_some()
1674 /// );
1675 ///
1676 /// // On the event processing thread
1677 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1678 ///     Event::PaymentSent { payment_id: Some(payment_id), .. } => println!("Paid {}", payment_id),
1679 ///     Event::PaymentFailed { payment_id, .. } => println!("Failed paying {}", payment_id),
1680 ///     // ...
1681 /// #     _ => {},
1682 /// });
1683 /// # Ok(())
1684 /// # }
1685 /// ```
1686 ///
1687 /// Use [`request_refund_payment`] to send a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for receiving the refund. Similar to
1688 /// *creating* an [`Offer`], this is stateless as it represents an inbound payment.
1689 ///
1690 /// ```
1691 /// # use lightning::events::{Event, EventsProvider, PaymentPurpose};
1692 /// # use lightning::ln::channelmanager::AChannelManager;
1693 /// # use lightning::offers::refund::Refund;
1694 /// #
1695 /// # fn example<T: AChannelManager>(channel_manager: T, refund: &Refund) {
1696 /// # let channel_manager = channel_manager.get_cm();
1697 /// let known_payment_hash = match channel_manager.request_refund_payment(refund) {
1698 ///     Ok(invoice) => {
1699 ///         let payment_hash = invoice.payment_hash();
1700 ///         println!("Requesting refund payment {}", payment_hash);
1701 ///         payment_hash
1702 ///     },
1703 ///     Err(e) => panic!("Unable to request payment for refund: {:?}", e),
1704 /// };
1705 ///
1706 /// // On the event processing thread
1707 /// channel_manager.process_pending_events(&|event| match event {
1708 ///     Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, purpose, .. } => match purpose {
1709 ///             PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: Some(payment_preimage), .. } => {
1710 ///             assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1711 ///             println!("Claiming payment {}", payment_hash);
1712 ///             channel_manager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
1713 ///         },
1714 ///             PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { payment_preimage: None, .. } => {
1715 ///             println!("Unknown payment hash: {}", payment_hash);
1716 ///             },
1717 ///         // ...
1718 /// #         _ => {},
1719 ///     },
1720 ///     Event::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash, amount_msat, .. } => {
1721 ///         assert_eq!(payment_hash, known_payment_hash);
1722 ///         println!("Claimed {} msats", amount_msat);
1723 ///     },
1724 ///     // ...
1725 /// #     _ => {},
1726 /// });
1727 /// # }
1728 /// ```
1729 ///
1730 /// # Persistence
1731 ///
1732 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
1733 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
1734 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
1735 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
1736 ///
1737 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
1738 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST durably write each
1739 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] before returning from
1740 /// [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`] or before completing async writes. With
1741 /// `ChannelManager`s, writing updates happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other
1742 /// `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during the serialization process). If the
1743 /// deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to
1744 /// [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds
1745 /// will be lost (modulo on-chain transaction fees).
1746 ///
1747 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
1748 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
1749 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
1750 ///
1751 /// # `ChannelUpdate` Messages
1752 ///
1753 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
1754 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
1755 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
1756 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
1757 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
1758 ///
1759 /// # DoS Mitigation
1760 ///
1761 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
1762 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
1763 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
1764 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
1765 ///
1766 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
1767 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
1768 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
1769 ///
1770 /// # Type Aliases
1771 ///
1772 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
1773 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
1774 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
1775 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
1776 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
1777 ///
1778 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1779 /// [`MessageHandler`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::MessageHandler
1780 /// [`OnionMessenger`]: crate::onion_message::messenger::OnionMessenger
1781 /// [`PeerManager::read_event`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::read_event
1782 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
1783 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
1784 /// [`get_and_clear_needs_persistence`]: Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence
1785 /// [`Persister`]: crate::util::persist::Persister
1786 /// [`KVStore`]: crate::util::persist::KVStore
1787 /// [`get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`]: Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future
1788 /// [`lightning-block-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_block_sync/latest/lightning_block_sync
1789 /// [`lightning-transaction-sync`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_transaction_sync/latest/lightning_transaction_sync
1790 /// [`lightning-background-processor`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_background_processor/lightning_background_processor
1791 /// [`list_channels`]: Self::list_channels
1792 /// [`list_usable_channels`]: Self::list_usable_channels
1793 /// [`create_channel`]: Self::create_channel
1794 /// [`close_channel`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1795 /// [`force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn`]: Self::force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn
1796 /// [BOLT 11]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/11-payment-encoding.md
1797 /// [BOLT 12]: https://github.com/rustyrussell/lightning-rfc/blob/guilt/offers/12-offer-encoding.md
1798 /// [`list_recent_payments`]: Self::list_recent_payments
1799 /// [`abandon_payment`]: Self::abandon_payment
1800 /// [`lightning-invoice`]: https://docs.rs/lightning_invoice/latest/lightning_invoice
1801 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
1802 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
1803 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
1804 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
1805 /// [`offers`]: crate::offers
1806 /// [`create_offer_builder`]: Self::create_offer_builder
1807 /// [`pay_for_offer`]: Self::pay_for_offer
1808 /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
1809 /// [`create_refund_builder`]: Self::create_refund_builder
1810 /// [`request_refund_payment`]: Self::request_refund_payment
1811 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
1812 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
1813 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
1814 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
1815 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
1816 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
1817 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
1818 //
1819 // Lock order:
1820 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
1821 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
1822 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
1823 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
1824 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
1825 //
1826 // Lock order tree:
1827 //
1828 // `pending_offers_messages`
1829 //
1830 // `total_consistency_lock`
1831 //  |
1832 //  |__`forward_htlcs`
1833 //  |   |
1834 //  |   |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
1835 //  |
1836 //  |__`decode_update_add_htlcs`
1837 //  |
1838 //  |__`per_peer_state`
1839 //      |
1840 //      |__`pending_inbound_payments`
1841 //          |
1842 //          |__`claimable_payments`
1843 //          |
1844 //          |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
1845 //              |
1846 //              |__`peer_state`
1847 //                  |
1848 //                  |__`outpoint_to_peer`
1849 //                  |
1850 //                  |__`short_to_chan_info`
1851 //                  |
1852 //                  |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
1853 //                  |
1854 //                  |__`best_block`
1855 //                  |
1856 //                  |__`pending_events`
1857 //                      |
1858 //                      |__`pending_background_events`
1859 //
1860 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1861 where
1862         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
1863         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1864         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1865         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1866         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1867         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1868         R::Target: Router,
1869         L::Target: Logger,
1870 {
1871         default_configuration: UserConfig,
1872         chain_hash: ChainHash,
1873         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1874         chain_monitor: M,
1875         tx_broadcaster: T,
1876         #[allow(unused)]
1877         router: R,
1878
1879         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1880         #[cfg(test)]
1881         pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1882         #[cfg(not(test))]
1883         best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1884         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1885
1886         /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1887         /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1888         /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1889         /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1890         ///
1891         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1892         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1893
1894         /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1895         /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1896         /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1897         /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1898         /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1899         /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1900         /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1901         /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1902         ///
1903         /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1904         ///
1905         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1906         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1907
1908         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1909         ///
1910         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1911         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1912         /// and via the classic SCID.
1913         ///
1914         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1915         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1916         ///
1917         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1918         #[cfg(test)]
1919         pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1920         #[cfg(not(test))]
1921         forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1922         /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1923         /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1924         ///
1925         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1926         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1927
1928         /// SCID/SCID Alias -> pending `update_add_htlc`s to decode.
1929         ///
1930         /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1931         /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1932         /// and via the classic SCID.
1933         ///
1934         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1935         /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `channel_id` in `UpdateAddHTLC`!
1936         ///
1937         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1938         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>>,
1939
1940         /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1941         /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1942         ///
1943         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1944         claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1945
1946         /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1947         /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1948         /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1949         /// active channel list on load.
1950         ///
1951         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1952         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1953
1954         /// Channel funding outpoint -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1955         ///
1956         /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1957         /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1958         /// the handling of the events.
1959         ///
1960         /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1961         /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1962         ///
1963         /// TODO:
1964         /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1965         /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1966         /// would break backwards compatability.
1967         /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1968         /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1969         /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1970         ///
1971         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1972         #[cfg(not(test))]
1973         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1974         #[cfg(test)]
1975         pub(crate) outpoint_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<OutPoint, PublicKey>>,
1976
1977         /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1978         ///
1979         /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1980         /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1981         /// confirmation depth.
1982         ///
1983         /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1984         /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1985         /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1986         ///
1987         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1988         #[cfg(test)]
1989         pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1990         #[cfg(not(test))]
1991         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1992
1993         our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1994
1995         inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1996
1997         /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1998         /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1999         /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
2000         ///
2001         /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
2002         fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
2003
2004         /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
2005         /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
2006         /// keeping additional state.
2007         probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
2008
2009         /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
2010         /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
2011         /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
2012         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
2013
2014         /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
2015         /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
2016         ///
2017         /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
2018         /// are currently open with that peer.
2019         ///
2020         /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
2021         /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
2022         /// channels.
2023         ///
2024         /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
2025         ///
2026         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2027         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2028         per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2029         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2030         pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
2031
2032         /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
2033         /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
2034         /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
2035         /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
2036         /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
2037         ///
2038         /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
2039         /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
2040         ///
2041         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2042         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
2043         pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2044         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
2045         pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
2046
2047         /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
2048         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
2049
2050         /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
2051         /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
2052         /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
2053         /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
2054         /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
2055         ///
2056         /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
2057         ///
2058         /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
2059         ///
2060         /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
2061         pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
2062         /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
2063         /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
2064         /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
2065         /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
2066         /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
2067         /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
2068         total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
2069         /// Tracks the progress of channels going through batch funding by whether funding_signed was
2070         /// received and the monitor has been persisted.
2071         ///
2072         /// This information does not need to be persisted as funding nodes can forget
2073         /// unfunded channels upon disconnection.
2074         funding_batch_states: Mutex<BTreeMap<Txid, Vec<(ChannelId, PublicKey, bool)>>>,
2075
2076         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
2077
2078         event_persist_notifier: Notifier,
2079         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool,
2080
2081         pending_offers_messages: Mutex<Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>>>,
2082
2083         /// Tracks the message events that are to be broadcasted when we are connected to some peer.
2084         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex<Vec<MessageSendEvent>>,
2085
2086         entropy_source: ES,
2087         node_signer: NS,
2088         signer_provider: SP,
2089
2090         logger: L,
2091 }
2092
2093 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
2094 ///
2095 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
2096 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
2097 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
2098 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
2099 pub struct ChainParameters {
2100         /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
2101         pub network: Network,
2102
2103         /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
2104         ///
2105         /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
2106         pub best_block: BestBlock,
2107 }
2108
2109 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
2110 #[must_use]
2111 enum NotifyOption {
2112         DoPersist,
2113         SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2114         SkipPersistNoEvents,
2115 }
2116
2117 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
2118 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
2119 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
2120 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
2121 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
2122 /// updates are ready for persistence).
2123 ///
2124 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
2125 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
2126 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
2127 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2128         event_persist_notifier: &'a Notifier,
2129         needs_persist_flag: &'a AtomicBool,
2130         should_persist: F,
2131         // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
2132         _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
2133 }
2134
2135 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
2136         /// Notifies any waiters and indicates that we need to persist, in addition to possibly having
2137         /// events to handle.
2138         ///
2139         /// This must always be called if the changes included a `ChannelMonitorUpdate`, as well as in
2140         /// other cases where losing the changes on restart may result in a force-close or otherwise
2141         /// isn't ideal.
2142         fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2143                 Self::optionally_notify(cm, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist })
2144         }
2145
2146         fn optionally_notify<F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C, mut persist_check: F)
2147         -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl FnMut() -> NotifyOption> {
2148                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2149                 let force_notify = cm.get_cm().process_background_events();
2150
2151                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2152                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2153                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2154                         should_persist: move || {
2155                                 // Pick the "most" action between `persist_check` and the background events
2156                                 // processing and return that.
2157                                 let notify = persist_check();
2158                                 match (notify, force_notify) {
2159                                         (NotifyOption::DoPersist, _) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2160                                         (_, NotifyOption::DoPersist) => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
2161                                         (NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents, _) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2162                                         (_, NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
2163                                         _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
2164                                 }
2165                         },
2166                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2167                 }
2168         }
2169
2170         /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
2171         /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first (or
2172         /// [`Self::optionally_notify`] used).
2173         fn optionally_notify_skipping_background_events<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption, C: AChannelManager>
2174         (cm: &'a C, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2175                 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2176
2177                 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
2178                         event_persist_notifier: &cm.get_cm().event_persist_notifier,
2179                         needs_persist_flag: &cm.get_cm().needs_persist_flag,
2180                         should_persist: persist_check,
2181                         _read_guard: read_guard,
2182                 }
2183         }
2184 }
2185
2186 impl<'a, F: FnMut() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
2187         fn drop(&mut self) {
2188                 match (self.should_persist)() {
2189                         NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
2190                                 self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
2191                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify()
2192                         },
2193                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
2194                                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
2195                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
2196                 }
2197         }
2198 }
2199
2200 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
2201 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
2202 ///
2203 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
2204 ///
2205 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
2206 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
2207 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
2208 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
2209 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
2210
2211 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
2212 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
2213 ///
2214 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
2215 ///
2216 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
2217 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
2218 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
2219 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
2220 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
2221 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
2222 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
2223 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
2224 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
2225 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
2226 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
2227 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
2228 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
2229
2230 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
2231 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
2232 /// this value.
2233 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
2234 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
2235 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
2236 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
2237
2238 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
2239 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
2240 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
2241 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
2242 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
2243 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
2244 #[allow(dead_code)]
2245 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
2246
2247 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
2248 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
2249 #[allow(dead_code)]
2250 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
2251
2252 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
2253 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
2254
2255 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
2256 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
2257 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
2258
2259 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
2260 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
2261 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
2262
2263 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
2264 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
2265 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
2266 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
2267
2268 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
2269 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
2270 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
2271
2272 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
2273 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
2274 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
2275
2276 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
2277 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2278 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
2279         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
2280         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
2281         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
2282         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
2283         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
2284         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
2285         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
2286         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
2287 }
2288
2289 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
2290 /// to better separate parameters.
2291 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2292 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
2293         /// The node_id of our counterparty
2294         pub node_id: PublicKey,
2295         /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
2296         /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
2297         /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
2298         pub features: InitFeatures,
2299         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
2300         /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
2301         /// claiming at least this value on chain.
2302         ///
2303         /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2304         ///
2305         /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
2306         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
2307         /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
2308         /// payments to us through this channel.
2309         pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
2310         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
2311         /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
2312         /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
2313         pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2314         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
2315         pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2316 }
2317
2318 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
2319 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
2320 pub struct ChannelDetails {
2321         /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
2322         /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
2323         /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
2324         /// lifetime of the channel.
2325         pub channel_id: ChannelId,
2326         /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
2327         pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
2328         /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
2329         /// our counterparty already.
2330         pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
2331         /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
2332         ///
2333         /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
2334         pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
2335         /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
2336         /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
2337         ///
2338         /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
2339         /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
2340         ///
2341         /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
2342         /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
2343         ///
2344         /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
2345         /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
2346         /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
2347         /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
2348         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2349         pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
2350         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
2351         /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
2352         /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
2353         /// `Some(0)`).
2354         ///
2355         /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
2356         ///
2357         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2358         /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
2359         pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2360         /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
2361         /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
2362         /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
2363         /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
2364         ///
2365         /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
2366         /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
2367         ///
2368         /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
2369         pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
2370         /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
2371         pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
2372         /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
2373         /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
2374         /// this value on chain.
2375         ///
2376         /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
2377         ///
2378         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2379         ///
2380         /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
2381         pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
2382         /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
2383         /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
2384         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
2385         /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel.  This may be zero for objects
2386         /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2387         ///
2388         /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
2389         /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
2390         /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
2391         pub user_channel_id: u128,
2392         /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
2393         /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
2394         ///
2395         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
2396         pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
2397         /// Our total balance.  This is the amount we would get if we close the channel.
2398         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes and feerate changes, exactly this
2399         /// amount is not likely to be recoverable on close.
2400         ///
2401         /// This does not include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose
2402         /// balance is not available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include
2403         /// any pending outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2404         /// This does not consider any on-chain fees.
2405         ///
2406         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`]
2407         pub balance_msat: u64,
2408         /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
2409         /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2410         /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
2411         /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
2412         ///
2413         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`]
2414         ///
2415         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2416         /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
2417         /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2418         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2419         /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
2420         /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
2421         /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
2422         /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
2423         ///
2424         /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`],
2425         /// [`ChannelDetails::balance_msat`], and [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
2426         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
2427         /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
2428         /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
2429         /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
2430         /// route which is valid.
2431         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
2432         /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
2433         /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
2434         /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
2435         /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
2436         /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
2437         ///
2438         /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
2439         /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
2440         /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
2441         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
2442         /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
2443         /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
2444         /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
2445         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
2446         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
2447         ///
2448         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2449         ///
2450         /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
2451         /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
2452         /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
2453         pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
2454         /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2455         ///
2456         /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
2457         pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
2458         /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
2459         /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
2460         /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
2461         /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
2462         /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
2463         ///
2464         /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
2465         pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
2466         /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
2467         pub is_outbound: bool,
2468         /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
2469         /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
2470         /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
2471         /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
2472         /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
2473         ///
2474         /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
2475         pub is_channel_ready: bool,
2476         /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
2477         /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
2478         pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
2479         /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
2480         /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
2481         ///
2482         /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
2483         pub is_usable: bool,
2484         /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
2485         pub is_public: bool,
2486         /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
2487         /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
2488         pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
2489         /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
2490         pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
2491         /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
2492         ///
2493         /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
2494         pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
2495         /// Pending inbound HTLCs.
2496         ///
2497         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2498         pub pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCDetails>,
2499         /// Pending outbound HTLCs.
2500         ///
2501         /// This field is empty for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.122.
2502         pub pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails>,
2503 }
2504
2505 impl ChannelDetails {
2506         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
2507         /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
2508         /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
2509         ///
2510         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
2511         /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
2512         pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2513                 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
2514         }
2515
2516         /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
2517         /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
2518         /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
2519         ///
2520         /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
2521         /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
2522         pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2523                 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
2524         }
2525
2526         fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
2527                 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
2528                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
2529         ) -> Self
2530         where
2531                 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2532                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
2533         {
2534                 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
2535                 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
2536                         context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
2537                 ChannelDetails {
2538                         channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2539                         counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
2540                                 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2541                                 features: latest_features,
2542                                 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
2543                                 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
2544                                 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
2545                                 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
2546                                 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
2547                                 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
2548                                 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
2549                                 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
2550                                         Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
2551                                 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2552                         },
2553                         funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
2554                         // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
2555                         // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
2556                         channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
2557                         short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
2558                         outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
2559                         inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
2560                         channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
2561                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
2562                         unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
2563                         balance_msat: balance.balance_msat,
2564                         inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
2565                         outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
2566                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
2567                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2568                         user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2569                         confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
2570                         confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
2571                         force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
2572                         is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
2573                         is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
2574                         is_usable: context.is_live(),
2575                         is_public: context.should_announce(),
2576                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
2577                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
2578                         config: Some(context.config()),
2579                         channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
2580                         pending_inbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(),
2581                         pending_outbound_htlcs: context.get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(),
2582                 }
2583         }
2584 }
2585
2586 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
2587 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
2588 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
2589 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
2590 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
2591 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
2592 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
2593 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
2594         /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
2595         NotShuttingDown,
2596         /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
2597         ShutdownInitiated,
2598         /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
2599         /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
2600         ResolvingHTLCs,
2601         /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
2602         NegotiatingClosingFee,
2603         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
2604         /// to drop the channel.
2605         ShutdownComplete,
2606 }
2607
2608 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
2609 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2610 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
2611 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
2612         /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
2613         AwaitingInvoice {
2614                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2615                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2616                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2617         },
2618         /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
2619         Pending {
2620                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2621                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2622                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2623                 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
2624                 /// abandoned.
2625                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2626                 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
2627                 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
2628                 total_msat: u64,
2629         },
2630         /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
2631         /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
2632         /// payment is removed from tracking.
2633         Fulfilled {
2634                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2635                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2636                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2637                 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
2638                 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
2639                 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
2640         },
2641         /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
2642         /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
2643         /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
2644         Abandoned {
2645                 /// A user-provided identifier in [`ChannelManager::send_payment`] used to uniquely identify
2646                 /// a payment and ensure idempotency in LDK.
2647                 payment_id: PaymentId,
2648                 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
2649                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2650         },
2651 }
2652
2653 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
2654 ///
2655 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
2656 #[derive(Clone)]
2657 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
2658         /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
2659         pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
2660         /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
2661         /// route hints.
2662         pub phantom_scid: u64,
2663         /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
2664         pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
2665 }
2666
2667 macro_rules! handle_error {
2668         ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
2669                 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
2670                 // entering the macro.
2671                 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2672                 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2673
2674                 match $internal {
2675                         Ok(msg) => Ok(msg),
2676                         Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, shutdown_finish, .. }) => {
2677                                 let mut msg_event = None;
2678
2679                                 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
2680                                         let counterparty_node_id = shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id;
2681                                         let channel_id = shutdown_res.channel_id;
2682                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
2683                                                 &$self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
2684                                         );
2685                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel: {}", err.err);
2686
2687                                         $self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
2688                                         if let Some(update) = update_option {
2689                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = $self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
2690                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2691                                                         msg: update
2692                                                 });
2693                                         }
2694                                 } else {
2695                                         log_error!($self.logger, "Got non-closing error: {}", err.err);
2696                                 }
2697
2698                                 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
2699                                 } else {
2700                                         msg_event = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2701                                                 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
2702                                                 action: err.action.clone()
2703                                         });
2704                                 }
2705
2706                                 if let Some(msg_event) = msg_event {
2707                                         let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2708                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
2709                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2710                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(msg_event);
2711                                         }
2712                                 }
2713
2714                                 // Return error in case higher-API need one
2715                                 Err(err)
2716                         },
2717                 }
2718         } };
2719 }
2720
2721 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
2722         ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
2723                 if let Some(outpoint) = $channel_context.get_funding_txo() {
2724                         $self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&outpoint);
2725                 }
2726                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2727                 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
2728                         short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
2729                 } else {
2730                         // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
2731                         // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
2732                         // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
2733                         // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
2734                         // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
2735                         // stage.
2736                         let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2737                         debug_assert!(alias_removed);
2738                 }
2739                 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
2740         }}
2741 }
2742
2743 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
2744 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
2745         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
2746                 match $err {
2747                         ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
2748                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
2749                         },
2750                         ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
2751                                 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
2752                         },
2753                         ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
2754                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$channel.context);
2755                                 log_error!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
2756                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
2757                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
2758                                 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason);
2759                                 let err =
2760                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, shutdown_res, $channel_update);
2761                                 (true, err)
2762                         },
2763                 }
2764         };
2765         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2766                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
2767         };
2768         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
2769                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
2770         };
2771         ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
2772                 match $channel_phase {
2773                         ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
2774                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
2775                         },
2776                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
2777                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2778                         },
2779                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
2780                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2781                         },
2782                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2783                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(channel) => {
2784                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2785                         },
2786                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
2787                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
2788                                 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
2789                         },
2790                 }
2791         };
2792 }
2793
2794 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
2795         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2796                 match $res {
2797                         Ok(res) => res,
2798                         Err(e) => {
2799                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2800                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2801                                 if drop {
2802                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2803                                 }
2804                                 break Err(res);
2805                         }
2806                 }
2807         }
2808 }
2809
2810 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
2811         ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2812                 match $res {
2813                         Ok(res) => res,
2814                         Err(e) => {
2815                                 let key = *$entry.key();
2816                                 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
2817                                 if drop {
2818                                         $entry.remove_entry();
2819                                 }
2820                                 return Err(res);
2821                         }
2822                 }
2823         }
2824 }
2825
2826 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
2827         ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
2828                 {
2829                         let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
2830                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
2831                         channel
2832                 }
2833         }
2834 }
2835
2836 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
2837         ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
2838                 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
2839                         node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2840                         msg: $channel_ready_msg,
2841                 });
2842                 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
2843                 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
2844                 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
2845                 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2846                 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2847                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2848                 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
2849                         let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
2850                         assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
2851                                 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
2852                 }
2853         }}
2854 }
2855
2856 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
2857         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2858                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
2859                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
2860                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2861                                 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
2862                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2863                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2864                                 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
2865                                 channel_type: Some($channel.context.get_channel_type().clone()),
2866                         }, None));
2867                         $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
2868                 }
2869         }
2870 }
2871
2872 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
2873         ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
2874                 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
2875                         debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
2876                         $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
2877                                 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
2878                                 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
2879                                 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
2880                                 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
2881                         }, None));
2882                         $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
2883                 }
2884         }
2885 }
2886
2887 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
2888         ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
2889                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2890                 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&&logger,
2891                         &$self.node_signer, $self.chain_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
2892                         $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height);
2893                 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2894                 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2895                         // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2896                         // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2897                         // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2898                         // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2899                         // now.
2900                         if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2901                                 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2902                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2903                                         msg,
2904                                 })
2905                         } else { None }
2906                 } else { None };
2907
2908                 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2909                         .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2910
2911                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2912                         &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2913                         updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs, updates.pending_update_adds,
2914                         updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2915                         updates.announcement_sigs);
2916                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2917                         $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2918                 }
2919
2920                 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2921                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = $chan.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2922                 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2923                 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2924
2925                 // If the channel belongs to a batch funding transaction, the progress of the batch
2926                 // should be updated as we have received funding_signed and persisted the monitor.
2927                 if let Some(txid) = unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
2928                         let mut funding_batch_states = $self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
2929                         let mut batch_completed = false;
2930                         if let Some(batch_state) = funding_batch_states.get_mut(&txid) {
2931                                 let channel_state = batch_state.iter_mut().find(|(chan_id, pubkey, _)| (
2932                                         *chan_id == channel_id &&
2933                                         *pubkey == counterparty_node_id
2934                                 ));
2935                                 if let Some(channel_state) = channel_state {
2936                                         channel_state.2 = true;
2937                                 } else {
2938                                         debug_assert!(false, "Missing channel batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2939                                 }
2940                                 batch_completed = batch_state.iter().all(|(_, _, completed)| *completed);
2941                         } else {
2942                                 debug_assert!(false, "Missing batch state for channel which completed initial monitor update");
2943                         }
2944
2945                         // When all channels in a batched funding transaction have become ready, it is not necessary
2946                         // to track the progress of the batch anymore and the state of the channels can be updated.
2947                         if batch_completed {
2948                                 let removed_batch_state = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
2949                                 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2950                                 let mut batch_funding_tx = None;
2951                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, _) in removed_batch_state {
2952                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2953                                                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2954                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
2955                                                         batch_funding_tx = batch_funding_tx.or_else(|| chan.context.unbroadcasted_funding());
2956                                                         chan.set_batch_ready();
2957                                                         let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2958                                                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, chan);
2959                                                 }
2960                                         }
2961                                 }
2962                                 if let Some(tx) = batch_funding_tx {
2963                                         log_info!($self.logger, "Broadcasting batch funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
2964                                         $self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
2965                                 }
2966                         }
2967                 }
2968
2969                 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2970
2971                 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2972                         $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2973                 }
2974                 if let Some(decode) = decode_update_add_htlcs {
2975                         $self.push_decode_update_add_htlcs(decode);
2976                 }
2977                 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2978                 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2979                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2980                         $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2981                 }
2982         } }
2983 }
2984
2985 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2986         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $completed: expr) => { {
2987                 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2988                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&$self.logger, &$chan.context);
2989                 match $update_res {
2990                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::UnrecoverableError => {
2991                                 let err_str = "ChannelMonitor[Update] persistence failed unrecoverably. This indicates we cannot continue normal operation and must shut down.";
2992                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
2993                                 panic!("{}", err_str);
2994                         },
2995                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2996                                 log_debug!(logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2997                                         &$chan.context.channel_id());
2998                                 false
2999                         },
3000                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
3001                                 $completed;
3002                                 true
3003                         },
3004                 }
3005         } };
3006         ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
3007                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $chan, _internal,
3008                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
3009         };
3010         ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
3011                 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
3012                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
3013                 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
3014                 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
3015                 // filter for uniqueness here.
3016                 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
3017                         .unwrap_or_else(|| {
3018                                 in_flight_updates.push($update);
3019                                 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
3020                         });
3021                 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
3022                 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $chan, _internal,
3023                         {
3024                                 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
3025                                 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
3026                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
3027                                 }
3028                         })
3029         } };
3030 }
3031
3032 macro_rules! process_events_body {
3033         ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
3034                 let mut processed_all_events = false;
3035                 while !processed_all_events {
3036                         if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
3037                                 return;
3038                         }
3039
3040                         let mut result;
3041
3042                         {
3043                                 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
3044                                 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
3045                                 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3046
3047                                 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
3048                                 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
3049                                 result = $self.process_background_events();
3050
3051                                 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
3052                                 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
3053                                 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
3054                                         result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3055                                 }
3056                         }
3057
3058                         let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
3059                         let num_events = pending_events.len();
3060                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
3061                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
3062                         }
3063
3064                         let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
3065
3066                         for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
3067                                 $event_to_handle = event;
3068                                 $handle_event;
3069                                 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
3070                                         post_event_actions.push(action);
3071                                 }
3072                         }
3073
3074                         {
3075                                 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3076                                 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
3077                                 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
3078                                 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
3079                                 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
3080                                 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
3081                         }
3082
3083                         if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
3084                                 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
3085                                 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
3086                                 processed_all_events = false;
3087                         }
3088
3089                         match result {
3090                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist => {
3091                                         $self.needs_persist_flag.store(true, Ordering::Release);
3092                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify();
3093                                 },
3094                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents =>
3095                                         $self.event_persist_notifier.notify(),
3096                                 NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents => {},
3097                         }
3098                 }
3099         }
3100 }
3101
3102 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
3103 where
3104         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
3105         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
3106         ES::Target: EntropySource,
3107         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3108         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3109         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
3110         R::Target: Router,
3111         L::Target: Logger,
3112 {
3113         /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
3114         ///
3115         /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
3116         ///
3117         /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
3118         /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
3119         ///
3120         /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
3121         ///
3122         /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
3123         /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
3124         /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
3125         /// more details.
3126         ///
3127         /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
3128         /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
3129         /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
3130         pub fn new(
3131                 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
3132                 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
3133                 current_timestamp: u32,
3134         ) -> Self {
3135                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
3136                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
3137                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
3138                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
3139                 ChannelManager {
3140                         default_configuration: config.clone(),
3141                         chain_hash: ChainHash::using_genesis_block(params.network),
3142                         fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
3143                         chain_monitor,
3144                         tx_broadcaster,
3145                         router,
3146
3147                         best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
3148
3149                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(new_hash_set()),
3150                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3151                         pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
3152                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3153                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3154                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: new_hash_map(), pending_claiming_payments: new_hash_map() }),
3155                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3156                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(new_hash_map()),
3157                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3158
3159                         our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
3160                         secp_ctx,
3161
3162                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
3163                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3164
3165                         probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
3166
3167                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
3168
3169                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(new_hash_map()),
3170
3171                         pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
3172                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
3173                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3174                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
3175                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
3176                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
3177                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
3178                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
3179
3180                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3181                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
3182
3183                         entropy_source,
3184                         node_signer,
3185                         signer_provider,
3186
3187                         logger,
3188                 }
3189         }
3190
3191         /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
3192         pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
3193                 &self.default_configuration
3194         }
3195
3196         fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
3197                 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3198                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
3199                 let mut i = 0;
3200                 loop {
3201                         if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
3202                                 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
3203                         } else {
3204                                 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
3205                         }
3206                         if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
3207                                 break;
3208                         }
3209                         i += 1;
3210                         if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
3211                 }
3212                 outbound_scid_alias
3213         }
3214
3215         /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
3216         ///
3217         /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
3218         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
3219         /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
3220         /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
3221         /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
3222         ///
3223         /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
3224         /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
3225         ///
3226         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
3227         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3228         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
3229         ///
3230         /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
3231         /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
3232         /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
3233         ///
3234         /// If `temporary_channel_id` is specified, it will be used as the temporary channel ID of the
3235         /// channel. Otherwise, a random one will be generated for you.
3236         ///
3237         /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
3238         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
3239         /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
3240         /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
3241         /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
3242         /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
3243         ///
3244         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
3245         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
3246         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
3247         pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
3248                 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
3249                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
3250                 }
3251
3252                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3253                 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
3254                 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3255
3256                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3257
3258                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
3259                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
3260
3261                 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3262
3263                 if let Some(temporary_channel_id) = temporary_channel_id {
3264                         if peer_state.channel_by_id.contains_key(&temporary_channel_id) {
3265                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Channel with temporary channel ID {} already exists!", temporary_channel_id)});
3266                         }
3267                 }
3268
3269                 let channel = {
3270                         let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
3271                         let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3272                         let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
3273                         match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
3274                                 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
3275                                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height, outbound_scid_alias, temporary_channel_id)
3276                         {
3277                                 Ok(res) => res,
3278                                 Err(e) => {
3279                                         self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
3280                                         return Err(e);
3281                                 },
3282                         }
3283                 };
3284                 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash);
3285
3286                 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
3287                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
3288                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3289                                 if cfg!(fuzzing) {
3290                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
3291                                 } else {
3292                                         panic!("RNG is bad???");
3293                                 }
3294                         },
3295                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel)); }
3296                 }
3297
3298                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
3299                         node_id: their_network_key,
3300                         msg: res,
3301                 });
3302                 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
3303         }
3304
3305         fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3306                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3307                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3308                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3309                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3310                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3311                 // the same channel.
3312                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3313                 {
3314                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3315                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3316                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3317                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3318                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3319                                 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
3320                                         .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
3321                                                 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
3322                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
3323                                                 _ => None,
3324                                         })
3325                                         .filter(f)
3326                                         .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
3327                                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
3328                                                         peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3329                                         })
3330                                 );
3331                         }
3332                 }
3333                 res
3334         }
3335
3336         /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
3337         /// more information.
3338         pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3339                 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
3340                 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
3341                 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `outpoint_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
3342                 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
3343                 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
3344                 // the same channel.
3345                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
3346                 {
3347                         let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3348                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3349                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
3350                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3351                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3352                                 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
3353                                         let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
3354                                                 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
3355                                         res.push(details);
3356                                 }
3357                         }
3358                 }
3359                 res
3360         }
3361
3362         /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
3363         /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
3364         ///
3365         /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
3366         /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
3367         /// are.
3368         pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3369                 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
3370                 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
3371                 // really wanted anyway.
3372                 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
3373         }
3374
3375         /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
3376         pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
3377                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3378                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3379
3380                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
3381                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3382                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3383                         let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3384                         let context_to_details = |context| {
3385                                 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
3386                         };
3387                         return peer_state.channel_by_id
3388                                 .iter()
3389                                 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
3390                                 .map(context_to_details)
3391                                 .collect();
3392                 }
3393                 vec![]
3394         }
3395
3396         /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
3397         /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
3398         ///
3399         /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
3400         /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
3401         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
3402         ///
3403         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3404         pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
3405                 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
3406                         .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
3407                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
3408                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3409                                 },
3410                                 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
3411                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
3412                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
3413                                 },
3414                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
3415                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
3416                                                 payment_id: *payment_id,
3417                                                 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
3418                                                 total_msat: *total_msat,
3419                                         })
3420                                 },
3421                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
3422                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3423                                 },
3424                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
3425                                         Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_id: *payment_id, payment_hash: *payment_hash })
3426                                 },
3427                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
3428                         })
3429                         .collect()
3430         }
3431
3432         fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3433                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3434
3435                 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
3436                 let mut shutdown_result = None;
3437
3438                 {
3439                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3440
3441                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3442                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3443
3444                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3445                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3446
3447                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3448                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
3449                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3450                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
3451                                                 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
3452                                                 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
3453                                                         chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
3454                                                 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
3455
3456                                                 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
3457                                                 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
3458                                                 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
3459                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
3460                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
3461                                                         msg: shutdown_msg,
3462                                                 });
3463
3464                                                 debug_assert!(monitor_update_opt.is_none() || !chan.is_shutdown(),
3465                                                         "We can't both complete shutdown and generate a monitor update");
3466
3467                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
3468                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
3469                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
3470                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
3471                                                 }
3472                                         } else {
3473                                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3474                                                 shutdown_result = Some(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
3475                                         }
3476                                 },
3477                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
3478                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3479                                                 err: format!(
3480                                                         "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3481                                                         channel_id, counterparty_node_id,
3482                                                 )
3483                                         });
3484                                 },
3485                         }
3486                 }
3487
3488                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3489                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3490                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
3491                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
3492                 }
3493
3494                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
3495                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3496                 }
3497
3498                 Ok(())
3499         }
3500
3501         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3502         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3503         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3504         ///
3505         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] and
3506         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3507         ///    fee estimate.
3508         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
3509         ///    transaction feerate of at least our [`ChannelCloseMinimum`] feerate or the feerate which
3510         ///    would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
3511         ///    counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
3512         ///
3513         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3514         ///
3515         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3516         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3517         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3518         /// channel.
3519         ///
3520         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3521         /// [`ChannelCloseMinimum`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum
3522         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3523         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3524         pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3525                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
3526         }
3527
3528         /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
3529         /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
3530         /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
3531         ///
3532         /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
3533         /// the channel being closed or not:
3534         ///  * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
3535         ///    transaction. The upper-bound is set by
3536         ///    [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]
3537         ///    fee estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
3538         ///  * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
3539         ///    transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
3540         ///    will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
3541         ///
3542         /// The `shutdown_script` provided  will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
3543         /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
3544         /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
3545         /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
3546         ///
3547         /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
3548         ///
3549         /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
3550         /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
3551         /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
3552         /// channel.
3553         ///
3554         /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
3555         /// [`NonAnchorChannelFee`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee
3556         /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
3557         pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3558                 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
3559         }
3560
3561         fn finish_close_channel(&self, mut shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
3562                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3563                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
3564                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
3565                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
3566                 }
3567
3568                 let logger = WithContext::from(
3569                         &self.logger, Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id), Some(shutdown_res.channel_id),
3570                 );
3571
3572                 log_debug!(logger, "Finishing closure of channel due to {} with {} HTLCs to fail",
3573                         shutdown_res.closure_reason, shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.len());
3574                 for htlc_source in shutdown_res.dropped_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3575                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
3576                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
3577                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
3578                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
3579                 }
3580                 if let Some((_, funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)) = shutdown_res.monitor_update {
3581                         // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
3582                         // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
3583                         // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
3584                         // ignore the result here.
3585                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
3586                 }
3587                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
3588                 if let Some(txid) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid {
3589                         let mut funding_batch_states = self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap();
3590                         let affected_channels = funding_batch_states.remove(&txid).into_iter().flatten();
3591                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3592                         let mut has_uncompleted_channel = None;
3593                         for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id, state) in affected_channels {
3594                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3595                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3596                                         if let Some(mut chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id) {
3597                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
3598                                                 shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::FundingBatchClosure));
3599                                         }
3600                                 }
3601                                 has_uncompleted_channel = Some(has_uncompleted_channel.map_or(!state, |v| v || !state));
3602                         }
3603                         debug_assert!(
3604                                 has_uncompleted_channel.unwrap_or(true),
3605                                 "Closing a batch where all channels have completed initial monitor update",
3606                         );
3607                 }
3608
3609                 {
3610                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
3611                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
3612                                 channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id,
3613                                 user_channel_id: shutdown_res.user_channel_id,
3614                                 reason: shutdown_res.closure_reason,
3615                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(shutdown_res.counterparty_node_id),
3616                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(shutdown_res.channel_capacity_satoshis),
3617                                 channel_funding_txo: shutdown_res.channel_funding_txo,
3618                         }, None));
3619
3620                         if let Some(transaction) = shutdown_res.unbroadcasted_funding_tx {
3621                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
3622                                         channel_id: shutdown_res.channel_id, transaction
3623                                 }, None));
3624                         }
3625                 }
3626                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
3627                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
3628                 }
3629         }
3630
3631         /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
3632         /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
3633         fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
3634         -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
3635                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3636                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
3637                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
3638                 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
3639                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3640                         let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
3641                                 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
3642                         } else {
3643                                 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
3644                         };
3645                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*peer_node_id), Some(*channel_id));
3646                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
3647                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
3648                                 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
3649                                 mem::drop(peer_state);
3650                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3651                                 match chan_phase {
3652                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
3653                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast, closure_reason));
3654                                                 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
3655                                         },
3656                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
3657                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3658                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3659                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3660                                         },
3661                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
3662                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3663                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => {
3664                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
3665                                                 // Unfunded channel has no update
3666                                                 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
3667                                         },
3668                                 }
3669                         } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
3670                                 log_error!(logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
3671                                 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
3672                                 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
3673                                 // events anyway.
3674                                 (None, *peer_node_id)
3675                         } else {
3676                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
3677                         }
3678                 };
3679                 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
3680                         // If we have some Channel Update to broadcast, we cache it and broadcast it later.
3681                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
3682                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
3683                                 msg: update
3684                         });
3685                 }
3686
3687                 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
3688         }
3689
3690         fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3691                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3692                 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
3693                         Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
3694                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3695                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
3696                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3697                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
3698                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
3699                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
3700                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
3701                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() })
3702                                                         },
3703                                                 }
3704                                         );
3705                                 }
3706                                 Ok(())
3707                         },
3708                         Err(e) => Err(e)
3709                 }
3710         }
3711
3712         /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
3713         /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
3714         /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
3715         /// channel.
3716         pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3717         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3718                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
3719         }
3720
3721         /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
3722         /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
3723         /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
3724         ///
3725         /// You can always broadcast the latest local transaction(s) via
3726         /// [`ChannelMonitor::broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
3727         pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
3728         -> Result<(), APIError> {
3729                 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
3730         }
3731
3732         /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
3733         /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
3734         pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
3735                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3736                         let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3737                 }
3738         }
3739
3740         /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
3741         /// local transaction(s).
3742         pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
3743                 for chan in self.list_channels() {
3744                         let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
3745                 }
3746         }
3747
3748         fn can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(
3749                 &self, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet: &NextPacketDetails
3750         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3751                 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3752                         // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3753                         // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3754                         // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3755                         return Err(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3756                 }
3757                 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && next_packet.outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3758                         // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3759                         // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3760                         // we don't have the channel here.
3761                         return Err(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3762                 }
3763
3764                 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3765                 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3766                 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3767                 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3768                 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3769                 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3770                         // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3771                         // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3772                         // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3773                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3774                         if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3775                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3776                         } else {
3777                                 return Err(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3778                         }
3779                 }
3780                 if next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3781                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3782                         return Err(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3783                 }
3784                 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(msg, next_packet.outgoing_amt_msat, next_packet.outgoing_cltv_value) {
3785                         let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet.outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3786                         return Err((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3787                 }
3788
3789                 Ok(())
3790         }
3791
3792         /// Executes a callback `C` that returns some value `X` on the channel found with the given
3793         /// `scid`. `None` is returned when the channel is not found.
3794         fn do_funded_channel_callback<X, C: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> X>(
3795                 &self, scid: u64, callback: C,
3796         ) -> Option<X> {
3797                 let (counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&scid).cloned() {
3798                         None => return None,
3799                         Some((cp_id, id)) => (cp_id, id),
3800                 };
3801                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3802                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3803                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3804                         return None;
3805                 }
3806                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3807                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3808                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id).and_then(
3809                         |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3810                 ) {
3811                         None => None,
3812                         Some(chan) => Some(callback(chan)),
3813                 }
3814         }
3815
3816         fn can_forward_htlc(
3817                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, next_packet_details: &NextPacketDetails
3818         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
3819                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3820                         self.can_forward_htlc_to_outgoing_channel(chan, msg, next_packet_details)
3821                 }) {
3822                         Some(Ok(())) => {},
3823                         Some(Err(e)) => return Err(e),
3824                         None => {
3825                                 // If we couldn't find the channel info for the scid, it may be a phantom or
3826                                 // intercept forward.
3827                                 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3828                                         fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)) ||
3829                                         fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, &self.chain_hash)
3830                                 {} else {
3831                                         return Err(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3832                                 }
3833                         }
3834                 }
3835
3836                 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + 1;
3837                 if let Err((err_msg, err_code)) = check_incoming_htlc_cltv(
3838                         cur_height, next_packet_details.outgoing_cltv_value, msg.cltv_expiry
3839                 ) {
3840                         let chan_update_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
3841                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(next_packet_details.outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
3842                         }).flatten();
3843                         return Err((err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt));
3844                 }
3845
3846                 Ok(())
3847         }
3848
3849         fn htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3850                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, err_msg: &'static str,
3851                 mut err_code: u16, chan_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, is_intro_node_blinded_forward: bool,
3852                 shared_secret: &[u8; 32]
3853         ) -> HTLCFailureMsg {
3854                 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3855                 if chan_update.is_some() && err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3856                         let chan_update = chan_update.unwrap();
3857                         if err_code == 0x1000 | 11 || err_code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3858                                 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3859                         }
3860                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3861                                 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3862                         }
3863                         else if err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3864                                 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3865                                 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3866                         }
3867                         (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3868                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3869                         chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3870                 } else if err_code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3871                         // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3872                         // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3873                         // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3874                         // instead.
3875                         err_code = 0x2000 | 2;
3876                 }
3877
3878                 log_info!(
3879                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id)),
3880                         "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", err_msg
3881                 );
3882                 // If `msg.blinding_point` is set, we must always fail with malformed.
3883                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3884                         return HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3885                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3886                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3887                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3888                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3889                         });
3890                 }
3891
3892                 let (err_code, err_data) = if is_intro_node_blinded_forward {
3893                         (INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, &[0; 32][..])
3894                 } else {
3895                         (err_code, &res.0[..])
3896                 };
3897                 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3898                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3899                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3900                         reason: HTLCFailReason::reason(err_code, err_data.to_vec())
3901                                 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(shared_secret, &None),
3902                 })
3903         }
3904
3905         fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
3906                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey,
3907         ) -> Result<
3908                 (onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg
3909         > {
3910                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
3911                         msg, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
3912                 )?;
3913
3914                 let next_packet_details = match next_packet_details_opt {
3915                         Some(next_packet_details) => next_packet_details,
3916                         // it is a receive, so no need for outbound checks
3917                         None => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3918                 };
3919
3920                 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3921                 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3922                 self.can_forward_htlc(&msg, &next_packet_details).map_err(|e| {
3923                         let (err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt) = e;
3924                         self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
3925                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, err_msg, err_code, chan_update_opt,
3926                                 next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward(), &shared_secret
3927                         )
3928                 })?;
3929
3930                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, Some(next_packet_details.next_packet_pubkey)))
3931         }
3932
3933         fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3934                 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, shared_secret: [u8; 32],
3935                 decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop, allow_underpay: bool,
3936                 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>,
3937         ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3938                 macro_rules! return_err {
3939                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3940                                 {
3941                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
3942                                         log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3943                                         if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
3944                                                 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
3945                                                         msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3946                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3947                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3948                                                                 sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
3949                                                                 failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
3950                                                         }
3951                                                 ))
3952                                         }
3953                                         return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3954                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3955                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3956                                                 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3957                                                         .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3958                                         }));
3959                                 }
3960                         }
3961                 }
3962                 match decoded_hop {
3963                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3964                                 // OUR PAYMENT!
3965                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
3966                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3967                                         msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat,
3968                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
3969                                 {
3970                                         Ok(info) => {
3971                                                 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3972                                                 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3973                                                 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3974                                                 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3975                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3976                                         },
3977                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3978                                 }
3979                         },
3980                         onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3981                                 match create_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3982                                         new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3983                                         Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3984                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3985                                 }
3986                         }
3987                 }
3988         }
3989
3990         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3991         /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3992         /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3993         ///
3994         /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3995         /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3996         /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3997         ///
3998         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3999         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4000         fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4001                 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
4002                         return Err(LightningError {
4003                                 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
4004                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
4005                         });
4006                 }
4007                 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
4008                         return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
4009                 }
4010                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4011                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
4012                 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
4013         }
4014
4015         /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
4016         /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
4017         /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
4018         /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
4019         ///
4020         /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
4021         /// `peer_state`  corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
4022         /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
4023         ///
4024         /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4025         /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
4026         fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4027                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4028                 log_trace!(logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4029                 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
4030                         None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
4031                         Some(id) => id,
4032                 };
4033
4034                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
4035         }
4036
4037         fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
4038                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4039                 log_trace!(logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
4040                 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
4041
4042                 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
4043                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
4044                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
4045                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
4046                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
4047                 };
4048
4049                 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
4050                         chain_hash: self.chain_hash,
4051                         short_channel_id,
4052                         timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
4053                         flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
4054                         cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
4055                         htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
4056                         htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
4057                         fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
4058                         fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
4059                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
4060                 };
4061                 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
4062                 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
4063                 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
4064                 // channel.
4065                 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
4066
4067                 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
4068                         signature: sig,
4069                         contents: unsigned
4070                 })
4071         }
4072
4073         #[cfg(test)]
4074         pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4075                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4076                 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
4077                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4078                         session_priv_bytes
4079                 })
4080         }
4081
4082         fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4083                 let SendAlongPathArgs {
4084                         path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
4085                         session_priv_bytes
4086                 } = args;
4087                 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
4088                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
4089                 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
4090                 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
4091
4092                 let (onion_packet, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::create_payment_onion(
4093                         &self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height,
4094                         payment_hash, keysend_preimage, prng_seed
4095                 ).map_err(|e| {
4096                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4097                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to build an onion for path for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4098                         e
4099                 })?;
4100
4101                 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
4102                         let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
4103                                 None => {
4104                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey), None);
4105                                         log_error!(logger, "Failed to find first-hop for payment hash {}", payment_hash);
4106                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()})
4107                                 },
4108                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4109                         };
4110
4111                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(id));
4112                         log_trace!(logger,
4113                                 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
4114                                 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
4115
4116                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4117                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4118                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
4119                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4120                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4121                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
4122                                 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
4123                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4124                                                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4125                                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
4126                                                 }
4127                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4128                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4129                                                 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
4130                                                         htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
4131                                                                 path: path.clone(),
4132                                                                 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
4133                                                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
4134                                                                 payment_id,
4135                                                         }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
4136                                                 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
4137                                                         Some(monitor_update) => {
4138                                                                 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan) {
4139                                                                         false => {
4140                                                                                 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
4141                                                                                 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
4142                                                                                 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
4143                                                                                 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
4144                                                                                 // which we do in the send_payment check for
4145                                                                                 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
4146                                                                                 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
4147                                                                         },
4148                                                                         true => {},
4149                                                                 }
4150                                                         },
4151                                                         None => {},
4152                                                 }
4153                                         },
4154                                         _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
4155                                 };
4156                         } else {
4157                                 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
4158                                 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
4159                                 // `channel_by_id` map.
4160                                 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
4161                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
4162                         }
4163                         return Ok(());
4164                 };
4165                 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
4166                         Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
4167                         Err(e) => {
4168                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
4169                         },
4170                 }
4171         }
4172
4173         /// Sends a payment along a given route.
4174         ///
4175         /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
4176         /// fields for more info.
4177         ///
4178         /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
4179         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
4180         ///
4181         /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
4182         ///
4183         /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
4184         /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
4185         /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
4186         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
4187         /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
4188         ///
4189         /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
4190         /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
4191         /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
4192         /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
4193         /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
4194         ///
4195         /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
4196         /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
4197         /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
4198         /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
4199         ///
4200         /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
4201         ///
4202         /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
4203         /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
4204         /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
4205         ///
4206         /// In general, a path may raise:
4207         ///  * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
4208         ///    node public key) is specified.
4209         ///  * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available as it has been
4210         ///    closed, doesn't exist, or the peer is currently disconnected.
4211         ///  * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
4212         ///    relevant updates.
4213         ///
4214         /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
4215         /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
4216         /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
4217         ///
4218         /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
4219         /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
4220         /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
4221         /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
4222         /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
4223         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4224         pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4225                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4226                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4227                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4228                         .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
4229                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4230                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4231         }
4232
4233         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
4234         /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4235         pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
4236                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4237                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4238                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4239                         .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
4240                                 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
4241                                 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
4242                                 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4243         }
4244
4245         #[cfg(test)]
4246         pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
4247                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4248                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4249                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
4250                         keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
4251                         best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4252         }
4253
4254         #[cfg(test)]
4255         pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
4256                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4257                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
4258         }
4259
4260         #[cfg(test)]
4261         pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
4262                 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
4263         }
4264
4265         pub(super) fn send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&self, invoice: &Bolt12Invoice, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), Bolt12PaymentError> {
4266                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4267                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4268                 self.pending_outbound_payments
4269                         .send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(
4270                                 invoice, payment_id, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4271                                 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer,
4272                                 best_block_height, &self.logger, &self.pending_events,
4273                                 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args)
4274                         )
4275         }
4276
4277         /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
4278         /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
4279         /// retries are exhausted.
4280         ///
4281         /// # Event Generation
4282         ///
4283         /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
4284         /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
4285         ///
4286         /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
4287         /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
4288         /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
4289         ///
4290         /// # Requested Invoices
4291         ///
4292         /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`] via [`ChannelManager::pay_for_offer`], abandoning
4293         /// the payment prior to receiving the invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`]
4294         /// and prevent any attempts at paying it once received. The other events may only be generated
4295         /// once the invoice has been received.
4296         ///
4297         /// # Restart Behavior
4298         ///
4299         /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
4300         /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
4301         /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
4302         ///
4303         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
4304         pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
4305                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4306                 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
4307         }
4308
4309         /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
4310         /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
4311         /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
4312         /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
4313         /// never reach the recipient.
4314         ///
4315         /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
4316         /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
4317         ///
4318         /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
4319         /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
4320         ///
4321         /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
4322         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
4323                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4324                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4325                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
4326                         route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
4327                         &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4328         }
4329
4330         /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
4331         /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
4332         ///
4333         /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
4334         /// payments.
4335         ///
4336         /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
4337         pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
4338                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4339                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4340                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
4341                         payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
4342                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),  &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4343                         &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4344         }
4345
4346         /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
4347         /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
4348         /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
4349         pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
4350                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4351                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4352                 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
4353                         &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4354                         |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
4355         }
4356
4357         /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
4358         /// payment probe.
4359         #[cfg(test)]
4360         pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
4361                 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
4362         }
4363
4364         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay the given
4365         /// amount to the given `node_id`.
4366         ///
4367         /// See [`ChannelManager::send_preflight_probes`] for more information.
4368         pub fn send_spontaneous_preflight_probes(
4369                 &self, node_id: PublicKey, amount_msat: u64, final_cltv_expiry_delta: u32,
4370                 liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4371         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4372                 let payment_params =
4373                         PaymentParameters::from_node_id(node_id, final_cltv_expiry_delta);
4374
4375                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, amount_msat);
4376
4377                 self.send_preflight_probes(route_params, liquidity_limit_multiplier)
4378         }
4379
4380         /// Sends payment probes over all paths of a route that would be used to pay a route found
4381         /// according to the given [`RouteParameters`].
4382         ///
4383         /// This may be used to send "pre-flight" probes, i.e., to train our scorer before conducting
4384         /// the actual payment. Note this is only useful if there likely is sufficient time for the
4385         /// probe to settle before sending out the actual payment, e.g., when waiting for user
4386         /// confirmation in a wallet UI.
4387         ///
4388         /// Otherwise, there is a chance the probe could take up some liquidity needed to complete the
4389         /// actual payment. Users should therefore be cautious and might avoid sending probes if
4390         /// liquidity is scarce and/or they don't expect the probe to return before they send the
4391         /// payment. To mitigate this issue, channels with available liquidity less than the required
4392         /// amount times the given `liquidity_limit_multiplier` won't be used to send pre-flight
4393         /// probes. If `None` is given as `liquidity_limit_multiplier`, it defaults to `3`.
4394         pub fn send_preflight_probes(
4395                 &self, route_params: RouteParameters, liquidity_limit_multiplier: Option<u64>,
4396         ) -> Result<Vec<(PaymentHash, PaymentId)>, ProbeSendFailure> {
4397                 let liquidity_limit_multiplier = liquidity_limit_multiplier.unwrap_or(3);
4398
4399                 let payer = self.get_our_node_id();
4400                 let usable_channels = self.list_usable_channels();
4401                 let first_hops = usable_channels.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>();
4402                 let inflight_htlcs = self.compute_inflight_htlcs();
4403
4404                 let route = self
4405                         .router
4406                         .find_route(&payer, &route_params, Some(&first_hops), inflight_htlcs)
4407                         .map_err(|e| {
4408                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to find path for payment probe: {:?}", e);
4409                                 ProbeSendFailure::RouteNotFound
4410                         })?;
4411
4412                 let mut used_liquidity_map = hash_map_with_capacity(first_hops.len());
4413
4414                 let mut res = Vec::new();
4415
4416                 for mut path in route.paths {
4417                         // If the last hop is probably an unannounced channel we refrain from probing all the
4418                         // way through to the end and instead probe up to the second-to-last channel.
4419                         while let Some(last_path_hop) = path.hops.last() {
4420                                 if last_path_hop.maybe_announced_channel {
4421                                         // We found a potentially announced last hop.
4422                                         break;
4423                                 } else {
4424                                         // Drop the last hop, as it's likely unannounced.
4425                                         log_debug!(
4426                                                 self.logger,
4427                                                 "Avoided sending payment probe all the way to last hop {} as it is likely unannounced.",
4428                                                 last_path_hop.short_channel_id
4429                                         );
4430                                         let final_value_msat = path.final_value_msat();
4431                                         path.hops.pop();
4432                                         if let Some(new_last) = path.hops.last_mut() {
4433                                                 new_last.fee_msat += final_value_msat;
4434                                         }
4435                                 }
4436                         }
4437
4438                         if path.hops.len() < 2 {
4439                                 log_debug!(
4440                                         self.logger,
4441                                         "Skipped sending payment probe over path with less than two hops."
4442                                 );
4443                                 continue;
4444                         }
4445
4446                         if let Some(first_path_hop) = path.hops.first() {
4447                                 if let Some(first_hop) = first_hops.iter().find(|h| {
4448                                         h.get_outbound_payment_scid() == Some(first_path_hop.short_channel_id)
4449                                 }) {
4450                                         let path_value = path.final_value_msat() + path.fee_msat();
4451                                         let used_liquidity =
4452                                                 used_liquidity_map.entry(first_path_hop.short_channel_id).or_insert(0);
4453
4454                                         if first_hop.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat
4455                                                 < (*used_liquidity + path_value) * liquidity_limit_multiplier
4456                                         {
4457                                                 log_debug!(self.logger, "Skipped sending payment probe to avoid putting channel {} under the liquidity limit.", first_path_hop.short_channel_id);
4458                                                 continue;
4459                                         } else {
4460                                                 *used_liquidity += path_value;
4461                                         }
4462                                 }
4463                         }
4464
4465                         res.push(self.send_probe(path).map_err(|e| {
4466                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to send pre-flight probe: {:?}", e);
4467                                 ProbeSendFailure::SendingFailed(e)
4468                         })?);
4469                 }
4470
4471                 Ok(res)
4472         }
4473
4474         /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
4475         /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
4476         fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: FnMut(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
4477                 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, is_batch_funding: bool,
4478                 mut find_funding_output: FundingOutput,
4479         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4480                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4481                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4482                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4483
4484                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4485                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4486                 let funding_txo;
4487                 let (mut chan, msg_opt) = match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
4488                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(mut chan)) => {
4489                                 funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
4490
4491                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
4492                                 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, is_batch_funding, &&logger)
4493                                         .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
4494                                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4495                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: msg.clone() };
4496                                                 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason);
4497                                                 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, shutdown_res, None))
4498                                         } else { unreachable!(); });
4499                                 match funding_res {
4500                                         Ok(funding_msg) => (chan, funding_msg),
4501                                         Err((chan, err)) => {
4502                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4503                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4504                                                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4505                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4506                                                         err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
4507                                                 });
4508                                         },
4509                                 }
4510                         },
4511                         Some(phase) => {
4512                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(*temporary_channel_id, phase);
4513                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4514                                         err: format!(
4515                                                 "Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is not an unfunded, outbound V1 channel",
4516                                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4517                                 })
4518                         },
4519                         None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {err: format!(
4520                                 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4521                                 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4522                                 }),
4523                 };
4524
4525                 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
4526                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
4527                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4528                                 msg,
4529                         });
4530                 }
4531                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
4532                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4533                                 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
4534                         },
4535                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
4536                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
4537                                 match outpoint_to_peer.entry(funding_txo) {
4538                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()); },
4539                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(o) => {
4540                                                 let err = format!(
4541                                                         "An existing channel using outpoint {} is open with peer {}",
4542                                                         funding_txo, o.get()
4543                                                 );
4544                                                 mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer);
4545                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4546                                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4547                                                 let reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.clone() };
4548                                                 self.finish_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
4549                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err });
4550                                         }
4551                                 }
4552                                 e.insert(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan));
4553                         }
4554                 }
4555                 Ok(())
4556         }
4557
4558         #[cfg(test)]
4559         pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4560                 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, false, |_, tx| {
4561                         Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
4562                 })
4563         }
4564
4565         /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
4566         ///
4567         /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
4568         /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
4569         ///
4570         /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
4571         /// across the p2p network.
4572         ///
4573         /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
4574         /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
4575         ///
4576         /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
4577         /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
4578         /// keys per-channel).
4579         ///
4580         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
4581         /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
4582         /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
4583         ///
4584         /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
4585         /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
4586         /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
4587         ///
4588         /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
4589         /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
4590         /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
4591         /// for more details.
4592         ///
4593         /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
4594         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
4595         pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4596                 self.batch_funding_transaction_generated(&[(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id)], funding_transaction)
4597         }
4598
4599         /// Call this upon creation of a batch funding transaction for the given channels.
4600         ///
4601         /// Return values are identical to [`Self::funding_transaction_generated`], respective to
4602         /// each individual channel and transaction output.
4603         ///
4604         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. This batch funding transaction
4605         /// will only be broadcast when we have safely received and persisted the counterparty's
4606         /// signature for each channel.
4607         ///
4608         /// If there is an error, all channels in the batch are to be considered closed.
4609         pub fn batch_funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channels: &[(&ChannelId, &PublicKey)], funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4610                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4611                 let mut result = Ok(());
4612
4613                 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
4614                         for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
4615                                 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
4616                                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4617                                                 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
4618                                         }));
4619                                 }
4620                         }
4621                 }
4622                 if funding_transaction.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
4623                         result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4624                                 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
4625                         }));
4626                 }
4627                 {
4628                         let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
4629                         // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
4630                         // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
4631                         // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
4632                         // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
4633                         if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) &&
4634                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.is_block_height() &&
4635                                 funding_transaction.lock_time.to_consensus_u32() > height + 1
4636                         {
4637                                 result = result.and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4638                                         err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
4639                                 }));
4640                         }
4641                 }
4642
4643                 let txid = funding_transaction.txid();
4644                 let is_batch_funding = temporary_channels.len() > 1;
4645                 let mut funding_batch_states = if is_batch_funding {
4646                         Some(self.funding_batch_states.lock().unwrap())
4647                 } else {
4648                         None
4649                 };
4650                 let mut funding_batch_state = funding_batch_states.as_mut().and_then(|states| {
4651                         match states.entry(txid) {
4652                                 btree_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
4653                                         result = result.clone().and(Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4654                                                 err: "Batch funding transaction with the same txid already exists".to_owned()
4655                                         }));
4656                                         None
4657                                 },
4658                                 btree_map::Entry::Vacant(vacant) => Some(vacant.insert(Vec::new())),
4659                         }
4660                 });
4661                 for &(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in temporary_channels {
4662                         result = result.and_then(|_| self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(
4663                                 temporary_channel_id,
4664                                 counterparty_node_id,
4665                                 funding_transaction.clone(),
4666                                 is_batch_funding,
4667                                 |chan, tx| {
4668                                         let mut output_index = None;
4669                                         let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
4670                                         for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
4671                                                 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
4672                                                         if output_index.is_some() {
4673                                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4674                                                                         err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
4675                                                                 });
4676                                                         }
4677                                                         output_index = Some(idx as u16);
4678                                                 }
4679                                         }
4680                                         if output_index.is_none() {
4681                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4682                                                         err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
4683                                                 });
4684                                         }
4685                                         let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() };
4686                                         if let Some(funding_batch_state) = funding_batch_state.as_mut() {
4687                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): We only do batch funding for V1 channels at the moment, but we'll probably
4688                                                 // need to fix this somehow to not rely on using the outpoint for the channel ID if we
4689                                                 // want to support V2 batching here as well.
4690                                                 funding_batch_state.push((ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint), *counterparty_node_id, false));
4691                                         }
4692                                         Ok(outpoint)
4693                                 })
4694                         );
4695                 }
4696                 if let Err(ref e) = result {
4697                         // Remaining channels need to be removed on any error.
4698                         let e = format!("Error in transaction funding: {:?}", e);
4699                         let mut channels_to_remove = Vec::new();
4700                         channels_to_remove.extend(funding_batch_states.as_mut()
4701                                 .and_then(|states| states.remove(&txid))
4702                                 .into_iter().flatten()
4703                                 .map(|(chan_id, node_id, _state)| (chan_id, node_id))
4704                         );
4705                         channels_to_remove.extend(temporary_channels.iter()
4706                                 .map(|(&chan_id, &node_id)| (chan_id, node_id))
4707                         );
4708                         let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
4709                         {
4710                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4711                                 for (channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in channels_to_remove {
4712                                         per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
4713                                                 .map(|peer_state_mutex| peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap())
4714                                                 .and_then(|mut peer_state| peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id))
4715                                                 .map(|mut chan| {
4716                                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context());
4717                                                         let closure_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: e.clone() };
4718                                                         shutdown_results.push(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, closure_reason));
4719                                                 });
4720                                 }
4721                         }
4722                         mem::drop(funding_batch_states);
4723                         for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
4724                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
4725                         }
4726                 }
4727                 result
4728         }
4729
4730         /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
4731         ///
4732         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4733         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4734         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4735         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4736         ///
4737         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4738         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4739         ///
4740         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4741         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4742         ///
4743         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4744         ///
4745         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4746         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4747         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4748         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4749         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4750         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4751         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4752         pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
4753                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
4754         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4755                 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
4756                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
4757                                 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
4758                         });
4759                 }
4760
4761                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4762                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4763                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
4764                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
4765                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4766                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4767
4768                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4769                         if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
4770                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4771                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4772                                 });
4773                         };
4774                 }
4775                 for channel_id in channel_ids {
4776                         if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
4777                                 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
4778                                 config.apply(config_update);
4779                                 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
4780                                         continue;
4781                                 }
4782                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
4783                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
4784                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
4785                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
4786                                         } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
4787                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
4788                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
4789                                                         msg,
4790                                                 });
4791                                         }
4792                                 }
4793                                 continue;
4794                         } else {
4795                                 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
4796                                 debug_assert!(false);
4797                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4798                                         err: format!(
4799                                                 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
4800                                                 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
4801                                 });
4802                         };
4803                 }
4804                 Ok(())
4805         }
4806
4807         /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
4808         ///
4809         /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
4810         /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
4811         /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
4812         /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
4813         ///
4814         /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
4815         /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
4816         ///
4817         /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
4818         /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
4819         ///
4820         /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
4821         ///
4822         /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4823         /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
4824         /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
4825         /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
4826         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4827         /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
4828         /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
4829         pub fn update_channel_config(
4830                 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
4831         ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4832                 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
4833         }
4834
4835         /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
4836         /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
4837         ///
4838         /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
4839         /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
4840         ///
4841         /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
4842         /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
4843         /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
4844         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
4845         /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
4846         ///
4847         /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
4848         /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
4849         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
4850         /// than expected.
4851         ///
4852         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4853         /// backwards.
4854         ///
4855         /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
4856         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4857         /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
4858         // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
4859         // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
4860         pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4861                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4862
4863                 let next_hop_scid = {
4864                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4865                         let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
4866                                 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
4867                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4868                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4869                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
4870                                 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
4871                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
4872                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4873                                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
4874                                                 })
4875                                         }
4876                                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
4877                                 },
4878                                 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4879                                         err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
4880                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
4881                                 }),
4882                                 None => {
4883                                         let error = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
4884                                                 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id);
4885                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(next_node_id), Some(*next_hop_channel_id));
4886                                         log_error!(logger, "{} when attempting to forward intercepted HTLC", error);
4887                                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
4888                                                 err: error
4889                                         })
4890                                 }
4891                         }
4892                 };
4893
4894                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4895                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4896                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4897                         })?;
4898
4899                 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
4900                         PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, blinded, .. } => {
4901                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
4902                                         onion_packet, blinded, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid
4903                                 }
4904                         },
4905                         _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4906                 };
4907                 let skimmed_fee_msat =
4908                         payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
4909                 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
4910                         skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
4911                         outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
4912                 };
4913
4914                 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
4915                         payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4916                         payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4917                         payment.prev_channel_id,
4918                         payment.prev_user_channel_id,
4919                         vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
4920                 )];
4921                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
4922                 Ok(())
4923         }
4924
4925         /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
4926         /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
4927         ///
4928         /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
4929         /// backwards.
4930         ///
4931         /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
4932         pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
4933                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4934
4935                 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
4936                         .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
4937                                 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
4938                         })?;
4939
4940                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
4941                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4942                                 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
4943                                 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
4944                                 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
4945                                 channel_id: payment.prev_channel_id,
4946                                 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
4947                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
4948                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4949                                 blinded_failure: payment.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
4950                         });
4951
4952                         let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
4953                         let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
4954                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4955                 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
4956
4957                 Ok(())
4958         }
4959
4960         fn process_pending_update_add_htlcs(&self) {
4961                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = new_hash_map();
4962                 mem::swap(&mut decode_update_add_htlcs, &mut self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
4963
4964                 let get_failed_htlc_destination = |outgoing_scid_opt: Option<u64>, payment_hash: PaymentHash| {
4965                         if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt {
4966                                 match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid) {
4967                                         Some((outgoing_counterparty_node_id, outgoing_channel_id)) =>
4968                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel {
4969                                                         node_id: Some(*outgoing_counterparty_node_id),
4970                                                         channel_id: *outgoing_channel_id,
4971                                                 },
4972                                         None => HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop {
4973                                                 requested_forward_scid: outgoing_scid,
4974                                         },
4975                                 }
4976                         } else {
4977                                 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }
4978                         }
4979                 };
4980
4981                 'outer_loop: for (incoming_scid, update_add_htlcs) in decode_update_add_htlcs {
4982                         let incoming_channel_details_opt = self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
4983                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
4984                                 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
4985                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
4986                                 let user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
4987                                 let accept_underpaying_htlcs = chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs;
4988                                 (counterparty_node_id, channel_id, funding_txo, user_channel_id, accept_underpaying_htlcs)
4989                         });
4990                         let (
4991                                 incoming_counterparty_node_id, incoming_channel_id, incoming_funding_txo,
4992                                 incoming_user_channel_id, incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs
4993                          ) = if let Some(incoming_channel_details) = incoming_channel_details_opt {
4994                                 incoming_channel_details
4995                         } else {
4996                                 // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
4997                                 continue;
4998                         };
4999
5000                         let mut htlc_forwards = Vec::new();
5001                         let mut htlc_fails = Vec::new();
5002                         for update_add_htlc in &update_add_htlcs {
5003                                 let (next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_details_opt) = match decode_incoming_update_add_htlc_onion(
5004                                         &update_add_htlc, &self.node_signer, &self.logger, &self.secp_ctx
5005                                 ) {
5006                                         Ok(decoded_onion) => decoded_onion,
5007                                         Err(htlc_fail) => {
5008                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, HTLCDestination::InvalidOnion));
5009                                                 continue;
5010                                         },
5011                                 };
5012
5013                                 let is_intro_node_blinded_forward = next_hop.is_intro_node_blinded_forward();
5014                                 let outgoing_scid_opt = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref().map(|d| d.outgoing_scid);
5015
5016                                 // Process the HTLC on the incoming channel.
5017                                 match self.do_funded_channel_callback(incoming_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5018                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5019                                         chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(
5020                                                 update_add_htlc, &self.fee_estimator, &logger,
5021                                         )
5022                                 }) {
5023                                         Some(Ok(_)) => {},
5024                                         Some(Err((err, code))) => {
5025                                                 let outgoing_chan_update_opt = if let Some(outgoing_scid) = outgoing_scid_opt.as_ref() {
5026                                                         self.do_funded_channel_callback(*outgoing_scid, |chan: &mut Channel<SP>| {
5027                                                                 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(*outgoing_scid, chan).ok()
5028                                                         }).flatten()
5029                                                 } else {
5030                                                         None
5031                                                 };
5032                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5033                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5034                                                         outgoing_chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5035                                                 );
5036                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5037                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5038                                                 continue;
5039                                         },
5040                                         // The incoming channel no longer exists, HTLCs should be resolved onchain instead.
5041                                         None => continue 'outer_loop,
5042                                 }
5043
5044                                 // Now process the HTLC on the outgoing channel if it's a forward.
5045                                 if let Some(next_packet_details) = next_packet_details_opt.as_ref() {
5046                                         if let Err((err, code, chan_update_opt)) = self.can_forward_htlc(
5047                                                 &update_add_htlc, next_packet_details
5048                                         ) {
5049                                                 let htlc_fail = self.htlc_failure_from_update_add_err(
5050                                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, err, code,
5051                                                         chan_update_opt, is_intro_node_blinded_forward, &shared_secret,
5052                                                 );
5053                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5054                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5055                                                 continue;
5056                                         }
5057                                 }
5058
5059                                 match self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
5060                                         &update_add_htlc, &incoming_counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
5061                                         incoming_accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_details_opt.map(|d| d.next_packet_pubkey),
5062                                 ) {
5063                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(htlc_forward) => {
5064                                                 htlc_forwards.push((htlc_forward, update_add_htlc.htlc_id));
5065                                         },
5066                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(htlc_fail) => {
5067                                                 let htlc_destination = get_failed_htlc_destination(outgoing_scid_opt, update_add_htlc.payment_hash);
5068                                                 htlc_fails.push((htlc_fail, htlc_destination));
5069                                         },
5070                                 }
5071                         }
5072
5073                         // Process all of the forwards and failures for the channel in which the HTLCs were
5074                         // proposed to as a batch.
5075                         let pending_forwards = (incoming_scid, incoming_funding_txo, incoming_channel_id,
5076                                 incoming_user_channel_id, htlc_forwards.drain(..).collect());
5077                         self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&mut [pending_forwards]);
5078                         for (htlc_fail, htlc_destination) in htlc_fails.drain(..) {
5079                                 let failure = match htlc_fail {
5080                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(fail_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC {
5081                                                 htlc_id: fail_htlc.htlc_id,
5082                                                 err_packet: fail_htlc.reason,
5083                                         },
5084                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(fail_malformed_htlc) => HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
5085                                                 htlc_id: fail_malformed_htlc.htlc_id,
5086                                                 sha256_of_onion: fail_malformed_htlc.sha256_of_onion,
5087                                                 failure_code: fail_malformed_htlc.failure_code,
5088                                         },
5089                                 };
5090                                 self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().entry(incoming_scid).or_insert(vec![]).push(failure);
5091                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
5092                                         prev_channel_id: incoming_channel_id,
5093                                         failed_next_destination: htlc_destination,
5094                                 }, None));
5095                         }
5096                 }
5097         }
5098
5099         /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
5100         ///
5101         /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
5102         /// Will likely generate further events.
5103         pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
5104                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5105
5106                 self.process_pending_update_add_htlcs();
5107
5108                 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
5109                 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
5110                 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
5111                 {
5112                         let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
5113                         mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
5114
5115                         for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
5116                                 if short_chan_id != 0 {
5117                                         let mut forwarding_counterparty = None;
5118                                         macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
5119                                                 () => {
5120                                                         for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5121                                                                 match forward_info {
5122                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5123                                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5124                                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5125                                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5126                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, ..
5127                                                                                 }
5128                                                                         }) => {
5129                                                                                 macro_rules! failure_handler {
5130                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
5131                                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, forwarding_counterparty, Some(prev_channel_id));
5132                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
5133
5134                                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5135                                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5136                                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5137                                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5138                                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5139                                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5140                                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5141                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
5142                                                                                                         blinded_failure: routing.blinded_failure(),
5143                                                                                                 });
5144
5145                                                                                                 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
5146                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
5147                                                                                                 } else {
5148                                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
5149                                                                                                 };
5150
5151                                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5152                                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
5153                                                                                                         reason
5154                                                                                                 ));
5155                                                                                                 continue;
5156                                                                                         }
5157                                                                                 }
5158                                                                                 macro_rules! fail_forward {
5159                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5160                                                                                                 {
5161                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
5162                                                                                                 }
5163                                                                                         }
5164                                                                                 }
5165                                                                                 macro_rules! failed_payment {
5166                                                                                         ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
5167                                                                                                 {
5168                                                                                                         failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
5169                                                                                                 }
5170                                                                                         }
5171                                                                                 }
5172                                                                                 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { ref onion_packet, .. } = routing {
5173                                                                                         let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
5174                                                                                         if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.chain_hash) {
5175                                                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5176                                                                                                 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(
5177                                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac,
5178                                                                                                         payment_hash, None, &self.node_signer
5179                                                                                                 ) {
5180                                                                                                         Ok(res) => res,
5181                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5182                                                                                                                 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).to_byte_array();
5183                                                                                                                 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
5184                                                                                                                 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
5185                                                                                                                 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
5186                                                                                                                 // of the onion.
5187                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
5188                                                                                                         },
5189                                                                                                         Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
5190                                                                                                                 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
5191                                                                                                         },
5192                                                                                                 };
5193                                                                                                 match next_hop {
5194                                                                                                         onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
5195                                                                                                                 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5196                                                                                                                 match create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
5197                                                                                                                         incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
5198                                                                                                                         outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None,
5199                                                                                                                         current_height, self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
5200                                                                                                                 {
5201                                                                                                                         Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
5202                                                                                                                         Err(InboundHTLCErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
5203                                                                                                                 }
5204                                                                                                         },
5205                                                                                                         _ => panic!(),
5206                                                                                                 }
5207                                                                                         } else {
5208                                                                                                 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5209                                                                                         }
5210                                                                                 } else {
5211                                                                                         fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
5212                                                                                 }
5213                                                                         },
5214                                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5215                                                                                 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
5216                                                                                 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
5217                                                                                 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
5218                                                                                 // problem, not ours.
5219                                                                         }
5220                                                                 }
5221                                                         }
5222                                                 }
5223                                         }
5224                                         let chan_info_opt = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id).cloned();
5225                                         let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match chan_info_opt {
5226                                                 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id, chan_id),
5227                                                 None => {
5228                                                         forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5229                                                         continue;
5230                                                 }
5231                                         };
5232                                         forwarding_counterparty = Some(counterparty_node_id);
5233                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5234                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5235                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
5236                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5237                                                 continue;
5238                                         }
5239                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5240                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5241                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
5242                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5243                                                 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5244                                                         let queue_fail_htlc_res = match forward_info {
5245                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5246                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5247                                                                         prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5248                                                                                 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
5249                                                                                 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
5250                                                                                         onion_packet, blinded, ..
5251                                                                                 }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5252                                                                         },
5253                                                                 }) => {
5254                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
5255                                                                         let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5256                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5257                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5258                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5259                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5260                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5261                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5262                                                                                 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
5263                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
5264                                                                                 blinded_failure: blinded.map(|b| b.failure),
5265                                                                         });
5266                                                                         let next_blinding_point = blinded.and_then(|b| {
5267                                                                                 let encrypted_tlvs_ss = self.node_signer.ecdh(
5268                                                                                         Recipient::Node, &b.inbound_blinding_point, None
5269                                                                                 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
5270                                                                                 onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(
5271                                                                                         &self.secp_ctx, b.inbound_blinding_point, &encrypted_tlvs_ss
5272                                                                                 ).ok()
5273                                                                         });
5274                                                                         if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
5275                                                                                 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
5276                                                                                 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, next_blinding_point, &self.fee_estimator,
5277                                                                                 &&logger)
5278                                                                         {
5279                                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5280                                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
5281                                                                                 } else {
5282                                                                                         panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
5283                                                                                 }
5284                                                                                 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
5285                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
5286                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
5287                                                                                         HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
5288                                                                                 ));
5289                                                                                 continue;
5290                                                                         }
5291                                                                         None
5292                                                                 },
5293                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
5294                                                                         panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
5295                                                                 },
5296                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
5297                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5298                                                                         Some((chan.queue_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet, &&logger), htlc_id))
5299                                                                 },
5300                                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
5301                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing malformed HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
5302                                                                         let res = chan.queue_fail_malformed_htlc(
5303                                                                                 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion, &&logger
5304                                                                         );
5305                                                                         Some((res, htlc_id))
5306                                                                 },
5307                                                         };
5308                                                         if let Some((queue_fail_htlc_res, htlc_id)) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5309                                                                 if let Err(e) = queue_fail_htlc_res {
5310                                                                         if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
5311                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
5312                                                                         } else {
5313                                                                                 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_{{malformed_}}htlc() were not met");
5314                                                                         }
5315                                                                         // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
5316                                                                         // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
5317                                                                         // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
5318                                                                         continue;
5319                                                                 }
5320                                                         }
5321                                                 }
5322                                         } else {
5323                                                 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
5324                                                 continue;
5325                                         }
5326                                 } else {
5327                                         'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
5328                                                 match forward_info {
5329                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
5330                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint,
5331                                                                 prev_user_channel_id, forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
5332                                                                         routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
5333                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat, ..
5334                                                                 }
5335                                                         }) => {
5336                                                                 let blinded_failure = routing.blinded_failure();
5337                                                                 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
5338                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
5339                                                                                 payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret,
5340                                                                                 custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5341                                                                         } => {
5342                                                                                 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
5343                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
5344                                                                                                 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
5345                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
5346                                                                                         Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
5347                                                                         },
5348                                                                         PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
5349                                                                                 payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata,
5350                                                                                 incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs, requires_blinded_error: _
5351                                                                         } => {
5352                                                                                 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
5353                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
5354                                                                                         payment_metadata,
5355                                                                                         custom_tlvs,
5356                                                                                 };
5357                                                                                 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
5358                                                                                         payment_data, None, onion_fields)
5359                                                                         },
5360                                                                         _ => {
5361                                                                                 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
5362                                                                         }
5363                                                                 };
5364                                                                 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
5365                                                                         prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
5366                                                                                 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
5367                                                                                 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5368                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5369                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5370                                                                                 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
5371                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
5372                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5373                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5374                                                                         },
5375                                                                         // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
5376                                                                         // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
5377                                                                         // if routing nodes overpay
5378                                                                         value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
5379                                                                         sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
5380                                                                         timer_ticks: 0,
5381                                                                         total_value_received: None,
5382                                                                         total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
5383                                                                         cltv_expiry,
5384                                                                         onion_payload,
5385                                                                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
5386                                                                 };
5387
5388                                                                 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
5389
5390                                                                 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
5391                                                                         ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
5392                                                                                 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
5393                                                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5394                                                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
5395                                                                                         &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes(),
5396                                                                                 );
5397                                                                                 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
5398                                                                                                 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
5399                                                                                                 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
5400                                                                                                 channel_id: prev_channel_id,
5401                                                                                                 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
5402                                                                                                 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
5403                                                                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
5404                                                                                                 phantom_shared_secret,
5405                                                                                                 blinded_failure,
5406                                                                                         }), payment_hash,
5407                                                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
5408                                                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
5409                                                                                 ));
5410                                                                                 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
5411                                                                         }
5412                                                                 }
5413                                                                 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
5414                                                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5415                                                                 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5416                                                                         receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5417                                                                                 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5418                                                                 }
5419
5420                                                                 macro_rules! check_total_value {
5421                                                                         ($purpose: expr) => {{
5422                                                                                 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
5423                                                                                 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
5424                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
5425                                                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
5426                                                                                 };
5427                                                                                 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5428                                                                                 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
5429                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5430                                                                                 }
5431                                                                                 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
5432                                                                                         .entry(payment_hash)
5433                                                                                         // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
5434                                                                                         .or_insert_with(|| {
5435                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5436                                                                                                 ClaimablePayment {
5437                                                                                                         purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
5438                                                                                                 }
5439                                                                                         });
5440                                                                                 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
5441                                                                                         let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
5442                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
5443                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5444                                                                                 }
5445                                                                                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5446                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
5447                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5448                                                                                 }
5449                                                                                 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
5450                                                                                         if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
5451                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5452                                                                                         }
5453                                                                                 } else {
5454                                                                                         claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
5455                                                                                 }
5456                                                                                 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
5457                                                                                 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
5458                                                                                 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
5459                                                                                 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
5460                                                                                         total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
5461                                                                                         earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
5462                                                                                         if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5463                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
5464                                                                                                         &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
5465                                                                                                 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
5466                                                                                         }
5467                                                                                         if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
5468                                                                                 }
5469                                                                                 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
5470                                                                                 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
5471                                                                                 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
5472                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5473                                                                                 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5474                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
5475                                                                                                 &payment_hash);
5476                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5477                                                                                 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
5478                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5479                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5480                                                                                         }
5481                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5482                                                                                         let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
5483                                                                                         htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
5484                                                                                         let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
5485                                                                                                 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
5486                                                                                         debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
5487                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
5488                                                                                         new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
5489                                                                                                 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5490                                                                                                 payment_hash,
5491                                                                                                 purpose: $purpose,
5492                                                                                                 amount_msat,
5493                                                                                                 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
5494                                                                                                 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
5495                                                                                                 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
5496                                                                                                 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
5497                                                                                                 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
5498                                                                                         }, None));
5499                                                                                         payment_claimable_generated = true;
5500                                                                                 } else {
5501                                                                                         // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
5502                                                                                         // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
5503                                                                                         // MPP parts.
5504                                                                                         htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
5505                                                                                         #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
5506                                                                                                 committed_to_claimable = true;
5507                                                                                         }
5508                                                                                 }
5509                                                                                 payment_claimable_generated
5510                                                                         }}
5511                                                                 }
5512
5513                                                                 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
5514                                                                 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
5515                                                                 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
5516                                                                 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
5517                                                                 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
5518                                                                 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
5519                                                                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
5520                                                                 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
5521                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5522                                                                                 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5523                                                                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
5524                                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5525                                                                                                 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
5526                                                                                                         Ok(result) => result,
5527                                                                                                         Err(()) => {
5528                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
5529                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5530                                                                                                         }
5531                                                                                                 };
5532                                                                                                 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
5533                                                                                                         let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
5534                                                                                                         if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
5535                                                                                                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
5536                                                                                                                         &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
5537                                                                                                                 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5538                                                                                                         }
5539                                                                                                 }
5540                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5541                                                                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5542                                                                                                         payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5543                                                                                                 };
5544                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5545                                                                                         },
5546                                                                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
5547                                                                                                 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
5548                                                                                                 check_total_value!(purpose);
5549                                                                                         }
5550                                                                                 }
5551                                                                         },
5552                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
5553                                                                                 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
5554                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
5555                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5556                                                                                 }
5557                                                                                 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
5558                                                                                 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
5559                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
5560                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5561                                                                                 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
5562                                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
5563                                                                                                 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
5564                                                                                         fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
5565                                                                                 } else {
5566                                                                                         let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
5567                                                                                                 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
5568                                                                                                 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
5569                                                                                         };
5570                                                                                         let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
5571                                                                                         if payment_claimable_generated {
5572                                                                                                 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
5573                                                                                         }
5574                                                                                 }
5575                                                                         },
5576                                                                 };
5577                                                         },
5578                                                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } | HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { .. } => {
5579                                                                 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
5580                                                         }
5581                                                 }
5582                                         }
5583                                 }
5584                         }
5585                 }
5586
5587                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
5588                 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
5589                         || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
5590                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
5591
5592                 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
5593                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
5594                 }
5595                 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
5596
5597                 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
5598                 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
5599                 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
5600                 // network stack.
5601                 self.check_free_holding_cells();
5602
5603                 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
5604                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5605                 events.append(&mut new_events);
5606         }
5607
5608         /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
5609         ///
5610         /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
5611         fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
5612                 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
5613
5614                 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
5615
5616                 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
5617                 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
5618                 if background_events.is_empty() {
5619                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5620                 }
5621
5622                 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
5623                         match event {
5624                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, _channel_id, update)) => {
5625                                         // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
5626                                         // monitor updating completing.
5627                                         let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5628                                 },
5629                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update } => {
5630                                         let mut updated_chan = false;
5631                                         {
5632                                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5633                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5634                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5635                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5636                                                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
5637                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
5638                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase.get_mut() {
5639                                                                                 updated_chan = true;
5640                                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
5641                                                                                         peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5642                                                                         } else {
5643                                                                                 debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't have an update for a non-funded channel");
5644                                                                         }
5645                                                                 },
5646                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {},
5647                                                         }
5648                                                 }
5649                                         }
5650                                         if !updated_chan {
5651                                                 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
5652                                                 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
5653                                         }
5654                                 },
5655                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
5656                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5657                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
5658                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5659                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5660                                                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
5661                                                         handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
5662                                                 } else {
5663                                                         let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5664                                                                 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5665                                                         mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5666                                                         mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5667                                                         self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5668                                                 }
5669                                         }
5670                                 },
5671                         }
5672                 }
5673                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5674         }
5675
5676         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
5677         /// Process background events, for functional testing
5678         pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
5679                 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
5680                 let _ = self.process_background_events();
5681         }
5682
5683         fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
5684                 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
5685
5686                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5687
5688                 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
5689                 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
5690                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5691                 }
5692                 if !chan.context.is_live() {
5693                         log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
5694                                 chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5695                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5696                 }
5697                 log_trace!(logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
5698                         &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
5699
5700                 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger);
5701                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
5702         }
5703
5704         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
5705         /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
5706         /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
5707         /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
5708         /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
5709         pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
5710                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5711                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5712
5713                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5714                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5715
5716                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5717                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5718                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5719                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5720                                 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
5721                                         |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
5722                                 ) {
5723                                         let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5724                                                 anchor_feerate
5725                                         } else {
5726                                                 non_anchor_feerate
5727                                         };
5728                                         let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5729                                         if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5730                                 }
5731                         }
5732
5733                         should_persist
5734                 });
5735         }
5736
5737         /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
5738         ///
5739         /// This currently includes:
5740         ///  * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
5741         ///  * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
5742         ///    than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
5743         ///    the channel.
5744         ///  * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
5745         ///    with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
5746         ///  * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
5747         ///  * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
5748         ///  * Forgetting about stale outbound payments, either those that have already been fulfilled
5749         ///    or those awaiting an invoice that hasn't been delivered in the necessary amount of time.
5750         ///    The latter is determined using the system clock in `std` and the highest seen block time
5751         ///    minus two hours in `no-std`.
5752         ///
5753         /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
5754         /// estimate fetches.
5755         ///
5756         /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
5757         /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
5758         pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
5759                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
5760                         let mut should_persist = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
5761
5762                         let non_anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5763                         let anchor_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee);
5764
5765                         let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
5766                         let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
5767                         let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
5768                         let mut shutdown_channels = Vec::new();
5769
5770                         let mut process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
5771                                 chan_id: &ChannelId,
5772                                 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
5773                                 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
5774                                 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5775                                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
5776                         | {
5777                                 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5778                                 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
5779                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
5780                                         log_error!(logger,
5781                                                 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
5782                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
5783                                         shutdown_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed));
5784                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5785                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5786                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5787                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
5788                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5789                                                                 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
5790                                                         },
5791                                                 },
5792                                         });
5793                                         false
5794                                 } else {
5795                                         true
5796                                 }
5797                         };
5798
5799                         {
5800                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5801                                 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
5802                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5803                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5804                                         let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
5805                                         let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
5806                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
5807                                                 match phase {
5808                                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
5809                                                                 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5810                                                                         anchor_feerate
5811                                                                 } else {
5812                                                                         non_anchor_feerate
5813                                                                 };
5814                                                                 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
5815                                                                 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
5816
5817                                                                 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
5818                                                                         let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
5819                                                                         handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
5820                                                                         if needs_close { return false; }
5821                                                                 }
5822
5823                                                                 match chan.channel_update_status() {
5824                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
5825                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
5826                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
5827                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
5828                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
5829                                                                                 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
5830                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
5831                                                                                 n += 1;
5832                                                                                 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5833                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
5834                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5835                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5836                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5837                                                                                                         msg: update
5838                                                                                                 });
5839                                                                                         }
5840                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5841                                                                                 } else {
5842                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
5843                                                                                 }
5844                                                                         },
5845                                                                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
5846                                                                                 n += 1;
5847                                                                                 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
5848                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
5849                                                                                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
5850                                                                                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
5851                                                                                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
5852                                                                                                         msg: update
5853                                                                                                 });
5854                                                                                         }
5855                                                                                         should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
5856                                                                                 } else {
5857                                                                                         chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
5858                                                                                 }
5859                                                                         },
5860                                                                         _ => {},
5861                                                                 }
5862
5863                                                                 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
5864
5865                                                                 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
5866                                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
5867                                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
5868                                                                                         counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
5869                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5870                                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5871                                                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
5872                                                                                         msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
5873                                                                                                 channel_id: *chan_id,
5874                                                                                                 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
5875                                                                                         },
5876                                                                                 },
5877                                                                         });
5878                                                                 }
5879
5880                                                                 true
5881                                                         },
5882                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
5883                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5884                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5885                                                         },
5886                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
5887                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5888                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5889                                                         },
5890                                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5891                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
5892                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5893                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5894                                                         },
5895                                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
5896                                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
5897                                                                 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
5898                                                                         pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
5899                                                         },
5900                                                 }
5901                                         });
5902
5903                                         for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
5904                                                 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
5905                                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(*chan_id));
5906                                                         log_error!(logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
5907                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
5908                                                                 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5909                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5910                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
5911                                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
5912                                                                         },
5913                                                                 }
5914                                                         );
5915                                                 }
5916                                         }
5917                                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
5918
5919                                         if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
5920                                                 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
5921                                         }
5922                                 }
5923                         }
5924
5925                         // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
5926                         // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
5927                         // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
5928                         // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
5929                         // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
5930                         // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
5931                         // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
5932                         if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
5933                                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
5934                                 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
5935                                         match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
5936                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
5937                                                         // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
5938                                                         // have no channels to the peer.
5939                                                         let remove_entry = {
5940                                                                 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
5941                                                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
5942                                                         };
5943                                                         if remove_entry {
5944                                                                 entry.remove_entry();
5945                                                         }
5946                                                 },
5947                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
5948                                         }
5949                                 }
5950                         }
5951
5952                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
5953                                 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
5954                                         // This should be unreachable
5955                                         debug_assert!(false);
5956                                         return false;
5957                                 }
5958                                 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
5959                                         // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
5960                                         // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
5961                                         // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
5962                                         // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
5963                                         if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
5964                                                 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
5965                                         {
5966                                                 return true;
5967                                         } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
5968                                                 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
5969                                                 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
5970                                         }) {
5971                                                 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
5972                                                         .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
5973                                                 return false;
5974                                         }
5975                                 }
5976                                 true
5977                         });
5978
5979                         for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
5980                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
5981                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
5982                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
5983                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5984                         }
5985
5986                         for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
5987                                 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
5988                         }
5989
5990                         for shutdown_res in shutdown_channels {
5991                                 self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
5992                         }
5993
5994                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
5995                         let duration_since_epoch = std::time::SystemTime::now()
5996                                 .duration_since(std::time::SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
5997                                 .expect("SystemTime::now() should come after SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH");
5998                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
5999                         let duration_since_epoch = Duration::from_secs(
6000                                 self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire).saturating_sub(7200) as u64
6001                         );
6002
6003                         self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(
6004                                 duration_since_epoch, &self.pending_events
6005                         );
6006
6007                         // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
6008                         // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
6009                         // than block the message queueing pipeline.
6010                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
6011                                 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
6012                         }
6013
6014                         should_persist
6015                 });
6016         }
6017
6018         /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
6019         /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
6020         /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
6021         ///
6022         /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
6023         /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
6024         /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
6025         /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
6026         ///
6027         /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
6028         /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
6029         /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
6030         /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
6031         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
6032                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
6033         }
6034
6035         /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
6036         /// reason for the failure.
6037         ///
6038         /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
6039         pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
6040                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6041
6042                 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
6043                 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
6044                         for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6045                                 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
6046                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6047                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
6048                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6049                         }
6050                 }
6051         }
6052
6053         /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
6054         fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
6055                 match failure_code {
6056                         FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6057                         FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
6058                         FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
6059                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6060                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6061                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
6062                         },
6063                         FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
6064                                 let fail_data = match data {
6065                                         Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
6066                                         None => Vec::new(),
6067                                 };
6068                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
6069                         }
6070                 }
6071         }
6072
6073         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6074         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6075         ///
6076         /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
6077         /// forwarding
6078         fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6079                 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
6080                 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
6081                 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
6082                 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
6083                 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
6084                         chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
6085                 } else {
6086                         chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
6087                 };
6088                 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
6089                         self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
6090                 } else {
6091                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6092                 }
6093         }
6094
6095
6096         /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
6097         /// that we want to return and a channel.
6098         fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
6099                 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
6100                 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
6101                         let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
6102                         if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
6103                                 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
6104                                 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
6105                                 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6106                         }
6107                         (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6108                         msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6109                         upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
6110                         (desired_err_code, enc.0)
6111                 } else {
6112                         // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
6113                         // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
6114                         // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
6115                         // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
6116                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6117                 }
6118         }
6119
6120         // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
6121         // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
6122         // be surfaced to the user.
6123         fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
6124                 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
6125                 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
6126         ) {
6127                 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
6128                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6129                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
6130                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6131                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6132                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
6133                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
6134                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
6135                                                         self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
6136                                                 } else {
6137                                                         // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
6138                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6139                                                         (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6140                                                 }
6141                                         },
6142                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
6143                                 }
6144                         } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
6145                 };
6146
6147                 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
6148                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
6149                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
6150                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6151                 }
6152         }
6153
6154         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
6155                 let push_forward_event = self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(source, payment_hash, onion_error, destination);
6156                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
6157         }
6158
6159         /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
6160         /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
6161         fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) -> bool {
6162                 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
6163                 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
6164                 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
6165                 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
6166                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6167                 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
6168                         debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6169                 }
6170
6171                 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
6172                 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
6173                 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
6174                 //timer handling.
6175
6176                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
6177                 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
6178                 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6179                 let mut push_forward_event;
6180                 match source {
6181                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
6182                                 push_forward_event = self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
6183                                         session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
6184                                         &self.pending_events, &self.logger);
6185                         },
6186                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6187                                 ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret,
6188                                 ref phantom_shared_secret, outpoint: _, ref blinded_failure, ref channel_id, ..
6189                         }) => {
6190                                 log_trace!(
6191                                         WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(*channel_id)),
6192                                         "Failing {}HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us: {:?}",
6193                                         if blinded_failure.is_some() { "blinded " } else { "" }, &payment_hash, onion_error
6194                                 );
6195                                 let failure = match blinded_failure {
6196                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode) => {
6197                                                 let blinded_onion_error = HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32]);
6198                                                 let err_packet = blinded_onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6199                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6200                                                 );
6201                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6202                                         },
6203                                         Some(BlindedFailure::FromBlindedNode) => {
6204                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC {
6205                                                         htlc_id: *htlc_id,
6206                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
6207                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32]
6208                                                 }
6209                                         },
6210                                         None => {
6211                                                 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(
6212                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret
6213                                                 );
6214                                                 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }
6215                                         }
6216                                 };
6217
6218                                 push_forward_event = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
6219                                 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6220                                 push_forward_event &= forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6221                                 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
6222                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6223                                                 entry.get_mut().push(failure);
6224                                         },
6225                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6226                                                 entry.insert(vec!(failure));
6227                                         }
6228                                 }
6229                                 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
6230                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6231                                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
6232                                         prev_channel_id: *channel_id,
6233                                         failed_next_destination: destination,
6234                                 }, None));
6235                         },
6236                 }
6237                 push_forward_event
6238         }
6239
6240         /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
6241         /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
6242         ///
6243         /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
6244         /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
6245         /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
6246         /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
6247         ///
6248         /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
6249         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
6250         /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
6251         /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
6252         ///
6253         /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
6254         /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
6255         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
6256         ///
6257         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6258         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
6259         /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
6260         /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
6261         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6262         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6263         /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
6264         pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6265                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
6266         }
6267
6268         /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
6269         /// even type numbers.
6270         ///
6271         /// # Note
6272         ///
6273         /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
6274         /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
6275         ///
6276         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6277         pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
6278                 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
6279         }
6280
6281         fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
6282                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
6283
6284                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6285
6286                 let mut sources = {
6287                         let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
6288                         if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
6289                                 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
6290                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
6291                                         if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
6292                                                 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
6293                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
6294                                                 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
6295                                                 break;
6296                                         }
6297                                 }
6298
6299                                 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
6300                                 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
6301                                 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
6302                                         ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
6303                                         payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
6304                                 });
6305                                 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
6306                                         debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
6307                                         log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
6308                                                 &payment_hash);
6309                                 }
6310
6311                                 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
6312                                         if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
6313                                                 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
6314                                                         &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
6315                                                 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6316                                                 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
6317                                                 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
6318                                                         let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
6319                                                         let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6320                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6321                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6322                                                 }
6323                                                 return;
6324                                         }
6325                                 }
6326
6327                                 payment.htlcs
6328                         } else { return; }
6329                 };
6330                 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
6331
6332                 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
6333                 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
6334                 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
6335                 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
6336                 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
6337                 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
6338                 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
6339                 let mut valid_mpp = true;
6340                 let mut errs = Vec::new();
6341                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6342                 for htlc in sources.iter() {
6343                         if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
6344                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6345                                 debug_assert!(false);
6346                                 valid_mpp = false;
6347                                 break;
6348                         }
6349                         prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
6350
6351                         if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
6352                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
6353                                 debug_assert!(false);
6354                                 valid_mpp = false;
6355                                 break;
6356                         }
6357                         expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
6358                         claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
6359                 }
6360                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6361                 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
6362                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6363                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
6364                         return;
6365                 }
6366                 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
6367                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6368                         log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
6369                                 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
6370                         return;
6371                 }
6372                 if valid_mpp {
6373                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6374                                 let prev_hop_chan_id = htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
6375                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
6376                                         htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
6377                                         |_, definitely_duplicate| {
6378                                                 debug_assert!(!definitely_duplicate, "We shouldn't claim duplicatively from a payment");
6379                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash })
6380                                         }
6381                                 ) {
6382                                         if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
6383                                                 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
6384                                                 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
6385                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop_chan_id));
6386                                                 log_error!(logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
6387                                         } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
6388                                 }
6389                         }
6390                 }
6391                 if !valid_mpp {
6392                         for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
6393                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
6394                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height.to_be_bytes());
6395                                 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
6396                                 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
6397                                 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
6398                                 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6399                         }
6400                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6401                 }
6402
6403                 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
6404                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
6405                         let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6406                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
6407                 }
6408         }
6409
6410         fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>, bool) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
6411                 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
6412         -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
6413                 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
6414
6415                 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
6416                 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
6417                 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
6418                 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6419
6420                 // As we may call handle_monitor_update_completion_actions in rather rare cases, check that
6421                 // the required mutexes are not held before we start.
6422                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6423                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6424
6425                 {
6426                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6427                         let chan_id = prev_hop.channel_id;
6428                         let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
6429                                 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
6430                                 None => None
6431                         };
6432
6433                         let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
6434                                 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6435                                         .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
6436                         ).unwrap_or(None);
6437
6438                         if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
6439                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
6440                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6441                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6442                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6443                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6444                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
6445                                                 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
6446
6447                                                 match fulfill_res {
6448                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } => {
6449                                                                 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat), false) {
6450                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
6451                                                                                 chan_id, action);
6452                                                                         peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
6453                                                                 }
6454                                                                 if !during_init {
6455                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6456                                                                                 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
6457                                                                 } else {
6458                                                                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
6459                                                                         // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
6460                                                                         // monitor update as a background event.
6461                                                                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6462                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6463                                                                                         counterparty_node_id,
6464                                                                                         funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
6465                                                                                         channel_id: prev_hop.channel_id,
6466                                                                                         update: monitor_update.clone(),
6467                                                                                 });
6468                                                                 }
6469                                                         }
6470                                                         UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => {
6471                                                                 let action = if let Some(action) = completion_action(None, true) {
6472                                                                         action
6473                                                                 } else {
6474                                                                         return Ok(());
6475                                                                 };
6476                                                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6477
6478                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Completing monitor update completion action for channel {} as claim was redundant: {:?}",
6479                                                                         chan_id, action);
6480                                                                 let (node_id, _funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker) =
6481                                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6482                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: node_id,
6483                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: funding_outpoint,
6484                                                                         blocking_action: blocker, downstream_channel_id: channel_id,
6485                                                                 } = action {
6486                                                                         (node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)
6487                                                                 } else {
6488                                                                         debug_assert!(false,
6489                                                                                 "Duplicate claims should always free another channel immediately");
6490                                                                         return Ok(());
6491                                                                 };
6492                                                                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
6493                                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6494                                                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state
6495                                                                                 .actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6496                                                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
6497                                                                         {
6498                                                                                 let mut found_blocker = false;
6499                                                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| {
6500                                                                                         // Note that we could actually be blocked, in
6501                                                                                         // which case we need to only remove the one
6502                                                                                         // blocker which was added duplicatively.
6503                                                                                         let first_blocker = !found_blocker;
6504                                                                                         if *iter == blocker { found_blocker = true; }
6505                                                                                         *iter != blocker || !first_blocker
6506                                                                                 });
6507                                                                                 debug_assert!(found_blocker);
6508                                                                         }
6509                                                                 } else {
6510                                                                         debug_assert!(false);
6511                                                                 }
6512                                                         }
6513                                                 }
6514                                         }
6515                                         return Ok(());
6516                                 }
6517                         }
6518                 }
6519                 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6520                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
6521                         counterparty_node_id: None,
6522                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6523                                 payment_preimage,
6524                         }],
6525                         channel_id: Some(prev_hop.channel_id),
6526                 };
6527
6528                 if !during_init {
6529                         // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
6530                         // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
6531                         let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
6532                         if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
6533                                 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
6534                                 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
6535                                 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
6536                                 // again on restart.
6537                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_hop.channel_id)),
6538                                         "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
6539                                         payment_preimage, update_res);
6540                         }
6541                 } else {
6542                         // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
6543                         // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
6544                         // event.
6545                         // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
6546                         // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
6547                         // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
6548                         // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
6549                         // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
6550                         // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
6551                         // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
6552                         self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6553                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
6554                                         prev_hop.outpoint, prev_hop.channel_id, preimage_update,
6555                                 )));
6556                 }
6557                 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
6558                 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
6559                 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
6560                 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
6561                 // `PaymentForwarded`).
6562                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None, false));
6563                 Ok(())
6564         }
6565
6566         fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
6567                 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
6568         }
6569
6570         fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
6571                 forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool,
6572                 startup_replay: bool, next_channel_counterparty_node_id: Option<PublicKey>,
6573                 next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint, next_channel_id: ChannelId, next_user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
6574         ) {
6575                 match source {
6576                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
6577                                 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
6578                                         "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
6579                                 if let Some(pubkey) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6580                                         debug_assert_eq!(pubkey, path.hops[0].pubkey);
6581                                 }
6582                                 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6583                                         channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint, channel_id: next_channel_id,
6584                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
6585                                 };
6586                                 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
6587                                         session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
6588                                         &self.logger);
6589                         },
6590                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
6591                                 let prev_channel_id = hop_data.channel_id;
6592                                 let prev_user_channel_id = hop_data.user_channel_id;
6593                                 let completed_blocker = RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&hop_data);
6594                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6595                                 let claiming_chan_funding_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
6596                                 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
6597                                         |htlc_claim_value_msat, definitely_duplicate| {
6598                                                 let chan_to_release =
6599                                                         if let Some(node_id) = next_channel_counterparty_node_id {
6600                                                                 Some((node_id, next_channel_outpoint, next_channel_id, completed_blocker))
6601                                                         } else {
6602                                                                 // We can only get `None` here if we are processing a
6603                                                                 // `ChannelMonitor`-originated event, in which case we
6604                                                                 // don't care about ensuring we wake the downstream
6605                                                                 // channel's monitor updating - the channel is already
6606                                                                 // closed.
6607                                                                 None
6608                                                         };
6609
6610                                                 if definitely_duplicate && startup_replay {
6611                                                         // On startup we may get redundant claims which are related to
6612                                                         // monitor updates still in flight. In that case, we shouldn't
6613                                                         // immediately free, but instead let that monitor update complete
6614                                                         // in the background.
6615                                                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
6616                                                                 let background_events = self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap();
6617                                                                 // There should be a `BackgroundEvent` pending...
6618                                                                 assert!(background_events.iter().any(|ev| {
6619                                                                         match ev {
6620                                                                                 // to apply a monitor update that blocked the claiming channel,
6621                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6622                                                                                         funding_txo, update, ..
6623                                                                                 } => {
6624                                                                                         if *funding_txo == claiming_chan_funding_outpoint {
6625                                                                                                 assert!(update.updates.iter().any(|upd|
6626                                                                                                         if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
6627                                                                                                                 payment_preimage: update_preimage
6628                                                                                                         } = upd {
6629                                                                                                                 payment_preimage == *update_preimage
6630                                                                                                         } else { false }
6631                                                                                                 ), "{:?}", update);
6632                                                                                                 true
6633                                                                                         } else { false }
6634                                                                                 },
6635                                                                                 // or the channel we'd unblock is already closed,
6636                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup(
6637                                                                                         (funding_txo, _channel_id, monitor_update)
6638                                                                                 ) => {
6639                                                                                         if *funding_txo == next_channel_outpoint {
6640                                                                                                 assert_eq!(monitor_update.updates.len(), 1);
6641                                                                                                 assert!(matches!(
6642                                                                                                         monitor_update.updates[0],
6643                                                                                                         ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { .. }
6644                                                                                                 ));
6645                                                                                                 true
6646                                                                                         } else { false }
6647                                                                                 },
6648                                                                                 // or the monitor update has completed and will unblock
6649                                                                                 // immediately once we get going.
6650                                                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
6651                                                                                         channel_id, ..
6652                                                                                 } =>
6653                                                                                         *channel_id == prev_channel_id,
6654                                                                         }
6655                                                                 }), "{:?}", *background_events);
6656                                                         }
6657                                                         None
6658                                                 } else if definitely_duplicate {
6659                                                         if let Some(other_chan) = chan_to_release {
6660                                                                 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6661                                                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id: other_chan.0,
6662                                                                         downstream_funding_outpoint: other_chan.1,
6663                                                                         downstream_channel_id: other_chan.2,
6664                                                                         blocking_action: other_chan.3,
6665                                                                 })
6666                                                         } else { None }
6667                                                 } else {
6668                                                         let total_fee_earned_msat = if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
6669                                                                 if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
6670                                                                         Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
6671                                                                 } else { None }
6672                                                         } else { None };
6673                                                         debug_assert!(skimmed_fee_msat <= total_fee_earned_msat,
6674                                                                 "skimmed_fee_msat must always be included in total_fee_earned_msat");
6675                                                         Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6676                                                                 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
6677                                                                         prev_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
6678                                                                         next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_id),
6679                                                                         prev_user_channel_id,
6680                                                                         next_user_channel_id,
6681                                                                         total_fee_earned_msat,
6682                                                                         skimmed_fee_msat,
6683                                                                         claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
6684                                                                         outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
6685                                                                 },
6686                                                                 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: chan_to_release,
6687                                                         })
6688                                                 }
6689                                         });
6690                                 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
6691                                         let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
6692                                         let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
6693                                 }
6694                         },
6695                 }
6696         }
6697
6698         /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
6699         pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
6700                 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
6701         }
6702
6703         fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
6704                 debug_assert_ne!(self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6705                 debug_assert_ne!(self.claimable_payments.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6706                 debug_assert_ne!(self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
6707
6708                 for action in actions.into_iter() {
6709                         match action {
6710                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
6711                                         let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
6712                                         if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
6713                                                 amount_msat,
6714                                                 payment_purpose: purpose,
6715                                                 receiver_node_id,
6716                                                 htlcs,
6717                                                 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
6718                                         }) = payment {
6719                                                 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
6720                                                         payment_hash,
6721                                                         purpose,
6722                                                         amount_msat,
6723                                                         receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
6724                                                         htlcs,
6725                                                         sender_intended_total_msat,
6726                                                 }, None));
6727                                         }
6728                                 },
6729                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
6730                                         event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
6731                                 } => {
6732                                         self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
6733                                         if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
6734                                                 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, Some(blocker));
6735                                         }
6736                                 },
6737                                 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately {
6738                                         downstream_counterparty_node_id, downstream_funding_outpoint, downstream_channel_id, blocking_action,
6739                                 } => {
6740                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(
6741                                                 downstream_counterparty_node_id,
6742                                                 downstream_funding_outpoint,
6743                                                 downstream_channel_id,
6744                                                 Some(blocking_action),
6745                                         );
6746                                 },
6747                         }
6748                 }
6749         }
6750
6751         /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
6752         /// update completion.
6753         fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
6754                 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
6755                 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
6756                 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
6757                 funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
6758                 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
6759         -> (Option<(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)>, Option<(u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)>) {
6760                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6761                 log_trace!(logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {} pending update_add_htlcs, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
6762                         &channel.context.channel_id(),
6763                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
6764                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
6765                         pending_forwards.len(), pending_update_adds.len(),
6766                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
6767                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
6768                         if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
6769
6770                 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6771                 let short_channel_id = channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias());
6772
6773                 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
6774                 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6775                         htlc_forwards = Some((short_channel_id, channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(),
6776                                 channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
6777                 }
6778                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = None;
6779                 if !pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
6780                         decode_update_add_htlcs = Some((short_channel_id, pending_update_adds));
6781                 }
6782
6783                 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
6784                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
6785                 }
6786                 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
6787                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
6788                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6789                                 msg,
6790                         });
6791                 }
6792
6793                 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
6794                         if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
6795                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
6796                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6797                                         updates: update,
6798                                 });
6799                         }
6800                 } }
6801                 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
6802                         if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
6803                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
6804                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id,
6805                                         msg: revoke_and_ack,
6806                                 });
6807                         }
6808                 } }
6809                 match order {
6810                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
6811                                 handle_cs!();
6812                                 handle_raa!();
6813                         },
6814                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
6815                                 handle_raa!();
6816                                 handle_cs!();
6817                         },
6818                 }
6819
6820                 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
6821                         log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
6822                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6823                 }
6824
6825                 {
6826                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6827                         emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
6828                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
6829                 }
6830
6831                 (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs)
6832         }
6833
6834         fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, channel_id: &ChannelId, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
6835                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6836
6837                 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
6838                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6839                         None => {
6840                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6841                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
6842                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6843                                 match outpoint_to_peer.get(funding_txo) {
6844                                         Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
6845                                         None => return,
6846                                 }
6847                         }
6848                 };
6849                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6850                 let mut peer_state_lock;
6851                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
6852                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
6853                 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6854                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6855                 let channel =
6856                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
6857                                 chan
6858                         } else {
6859                                 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
6860                                         .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
6861                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6862                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6863                                 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
6864                                 return;
6865                         };
6866                 let remaining_in_flight =
6867                         if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
6868                                 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
6869                                 pending.len()
6870                         } else { 0 };
6871                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
6872                 log_trace!(logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
6873                         highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
6874                         remaining_in_flight);
6875                 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
6876                         return;
6877                 }
6878                 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
6879         }
6880
6881         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
6882         ///
6883         /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
6884         /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
6885         /// the channel.
6886         ///
6887         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6888         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6889         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6890         ///
6891         /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
6892         /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
6893         /// used to accept such channels.
6894         ///
6895         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6896         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6897         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6898                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
6899         }
6900
6901         /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
6902         /// it as confirmed immediately.
6903         ///
6904         /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
6905         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
6906         /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
6907         ///
6908         /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
6909         /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
6910         ///
6911         /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
6912         /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
6913         ///
6914         /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
6915         /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
6916         ///
6917         /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
6918         /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
6919         pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6920                 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
6921         }
6922
6923         fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
6924
6925                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(*temporary_channel_id));
6926                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6927
6928                 let peers_without_funded_channels =
6929                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
6930                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6931                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6932                 .ok_or_else(|| {
6933                         let err_str = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
6934                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6935
6936                         APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: err_str }
6937                 })?;
6938                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6939                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6940                 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
6941
6942                 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
6943                 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
6944                 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
6945                 // succeed.
6946                 let res = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
6947                         Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
6948                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
6949                                 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
6950                                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
6951                                         &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
6952                                         &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|err| MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(err, *temporary_channel_id))
6953                         },
6954                         _ => {
6955                                 let err_str = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned();
6956                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6957
6958                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6959                         }
6960                 };
6961
6962                 match res {
6963                         Err(err) => {
6964                                 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
6965                                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
6966                                 match handle_error!(self, Result::<(), MsgHandleErrInternal>::Err(err), *counterparty_node_id) {
6967                                         Ok(_) => unreachable!("`handle_error` only returns Err as we've passed in an Err"),
6968                                         Err(e) => {
6969                                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err });
6970                                         },
6971                                 }
6972                         }
6973                         Ok(mut channel) => {
6974                                 if accept_0conf {
6975                                         // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
6976                                         debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
6977                                 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
6978                                         let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6979                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6980                                                 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6981                                                         msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
6982                                                 }
6983                                         };
6984                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
6985                                         let err_str = "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned();
6986                                         log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
6987
6988                                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
6989                                 } else {
6990                                         // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
6991                                         // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
6992                                         // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
6993                                         if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
6994                                                 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6995                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6996                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
6997                                                                 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
6998                                                         }
6999                                                 };
7000                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
7001                                                 let err_str = "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned();
7002                                                 log_error!(logger, "{}", err_str);
7003
7004                                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: err_str });
7005                                         }
7006                                 }
7007
7008                                 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
7009                                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7010                                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7011
7012                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7013                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7014                                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7015                                 });
7016
7017                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7018
7019                                 Ok(())
7020                         },
7021                 }
7022         }
7023
7024         /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
7025         /// or 0-conf channels.
7026         ///
7027         /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
7028         /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
7029         fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
7030         where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
7031                 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
7032                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7033                 {
7034                         let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7035                         for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
7036                                 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7037                                 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
7038                                 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
7039                                 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
7040                                         peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
7041                                 }
7042                         }
7043                 }
7044                 return peers_without_funded_channels;
7045         }
7046
7047         fn unfunded_channel_count(
7048                 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
7049         ) -> usize {
7050                 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
7051                 for (_, phase) in peer.channel_by_id.iter() {
7052                         match phase {
7053                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7054                                         // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
7055                                         // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
7056                                         if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7057                                                 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
7058                                         {
7059                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7060                                         }
7061                                 },
7062                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7063                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
7064                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7065                                         }
7066                                 },
7067                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
7068                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7069                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
7070                                         // Only inbound V2 channels that are not 0conf and that we do not contribute to will be
7071                                         // included in the unfunded count.
7072                                         if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
7073                                                 chan.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis == 0 {
7074                                                 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
7075                                         }
7076                                 },
7077                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7078                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7079                                         continue;
7080                                 },
7081                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
7082                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7083                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7084                                         // Outbound channels don't contribute to the unfunded count in the DoS context.
7085                                         continue;
7086                                 }
7087                         }
7088                 }
7089                 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
7090         }
7091
7092         fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7093                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7094                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7095                 if msg.common_fields.chain_hash != self.chain_hash {
7096                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(),
7097                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7098                 }
7099
7100                 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
7101                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(),
7102                                  msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7103                 }
7104
7105                 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
7106                 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
7107                 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
7108                 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
7109                         self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
7110
7111                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7112                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7113                     .ok_or_else(|| {
7114                                 debug_assert!(false);
7115                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7116                                         format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
7117                                         msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())
7118                         })?;
7119                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7120                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7121
7122                 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
7123                 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
7124                 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
7125                 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
7126                         channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
7127                         !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
7128                 {
7129                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7130                                 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
7131                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7132                 }
7133
7134                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
7135                 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
7136                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7137                                 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
7138                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7139                 }
7140
7141                 let channel_id = msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id;
7142                 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
7143                 if channel_exists {
7144                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7145                                 "temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(),
7146                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7147                 }
7148
7149                 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
7150                 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
7151                         let channel_type = channel::channel_type_from_open_channel(
7152                                         &msg.common_fields, &peer_state.latest_features, &self.channel_type_features()
7153                                 ).map_err(|e|
7154                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7155                                 )?;
7156                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7157                         pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
7158                                 temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
7159                                 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7160                                 funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
7161                                 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
7162                                 channel_type,
7163                         }, None));
7164                         peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
7165                                 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
7166                                 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
7167                         });
7168                         return Ok(());
7169                 }
7170
7171                 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
7172                 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
7173                 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
7174                 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
7175                 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
7176                         counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
7177                         &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
7178                 {
7179                         Err(e) => {
7180                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7181                         },
7182                         Ok(res) => res
7183                 };
7184
7185                 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
7186                 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
7187                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7188                                 "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(),
7189                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7190                 }
7191                 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7192                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7193                                 "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(),
7194                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
7195                 }
7196
7197                 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
7198                 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
7199
7200                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
7201                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7202                         msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
7203                 });
7204                 peer_state.channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel));
7205                 Ok(())
7206         }
7207
7208         fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7209                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this, so any changes are
7210                 // likely to be lost on restart!
7211                 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
7212                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7213                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7214                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7215                                         debug_assert!(false);
7216                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)
7217                                 })?;
7218                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7219                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7220                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id) {
7221                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut phase) => {
7222                                         match phase.get_mut() {
7223                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7224                                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), phase);
7225                                                         (chan.context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.context.get_user_id())
7226                                                 },
7227                                                 _ => {
7228                                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got an unexpected accept_channel message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7229                                                 }
7230                                         }
7231                                 },
7232                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id))
7233                         }
7234                 };
7235                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7236                 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
7237                         temporary_channel_id: msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id,
7238                         counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7239                         channel_value_satoshis: value,
7240                         output_script,
7241                         user_channel_id: user_id,
7242                 }, None));
7243                 Ok(())
7244         }
7245
7246         fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7247                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7248
7249                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7250                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7251                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7252                                 debug_assert!(false);
7253                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
7254                         })?;
7255
7256                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7257                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7258                 let (mut chan, funding_msg_opt, monitor) =
7259                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
7260                                 Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan)) => {
7261                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &inbound_chan.context);
7262                                         match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger) {
7263                                                 Ok(res) => res,
7264                                                 Err((inbound_chan, err)) => {
7265                                                         // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
7266                                                         // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
7267                                                         // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7268                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(err, ChannelError::Close(_)));
7269                                                         // Really we should be returning the channel_id the peer expects based
7270                                                         // on their funding info here, but they're horribly confused anyway, so
7271                                                         // there's not a lot we can do to save them.
7272                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(inbound_chan), &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7273                                                 },
7274                                         }
7275                                 },
7276                                 Some(mut phase) => {
7277                                         let err_msg = format!("Got an unexpected funding_created message from peer with counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id);
7278                                         let err = ChannelError::Close(err_msg);
7279                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, &mut phase, &msg.temporary_channel_id).1);
7280                                 },
7281                                 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
7282                         };
7283
7284                 let funded_channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
7285
7286                 macro_rules! fail_chan { ($err: expr) => { {
7287                         // Note that at this point we've filled in the funding outpoint on our
7288                         // channel, but its actually in conflict with another channel. Thus, if
7289                         // we call `convert_chan_phase_err` immediately (thus calling
7290                         // `update_maps_on_chan_removal`), we'll remove the existing channel
7291                         // from `outpoint_to_peer`. Thus, we must first unset the funding outpoint
7292                         // on the channel.
7293                         let err = ChannelError::Close($err.to_owned());
7294                         chan.unset_funding_info(msg.temporary_channel_id);
7295                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, err, chan, &funded_channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL).1);
7296                 } } }
7297
7298                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funded_channel_id) {
7299                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7300                                 fail_chan!("Already had channel with the new channel_id");
7301                         },
7302                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7303                                 let mut outpoint_to_peer_lock = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
7304                                 match outpoint_to_peer_lock.entry(monitor.get_funding_txo().0) {
7305                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7306                                                 fail_chan!("The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible");
7307                                         },
7308                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
7309                                                 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
7310                                                 if let Ok(persist_state) = monitor_res {
7311                                                         i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
7312                                                         mem::drop(outpoint_to_peer_lock);
7313
7314                                                         // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
7315                                                         // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
7316                                                         // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
7317                                                         // until we have persisted our monitor.
7318                                                         if let Some(msg) = funding_msg_opt {
7319                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
7320                                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7321                                                                         msg,
7322                                                                 });
7323                                                         }
7324
7325                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
7326                                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_state, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
7327                                                                         per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7328                                                         } else {
7329                                                                 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
7330                                                         }
7331                                                         Ok(())
7332                                                 } else {
7333                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7334                                                         log_error!(logger, "Persisting initial ChannelMonitor failed, implying the funding outpoint was duplicated");
7335                                                         fail_chan!("Duplicate funding outpoint");
7336                                                 }
7337                                         }
7338                                 }
7339                         }
7340                 }
7341         }
7342
7343         fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7344                 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7345                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7346                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7347                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7348                                 debug_assert!(false);
7349                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7350                         })?;
7351
7352                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7353                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7354                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7355                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
7356                                 if matches!(chan_phase_entry.get(), ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_)) {
7357                                         let chan = if let ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) = chan_phase_entry.remove() { chan } else { unreachable!() };
7358                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
7359                                                 &self.logger,
7360                                                 Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
7361                                                 Some(chan.context.channel_id())
7362                                         );
7363                                         let res =
7364                                                 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &&logger);
7365                                         match res {
7366                                                 Ok((mut chan, monitor)) => {
7367                                                         if let Ok(persist_status) = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor) {
7368                                                                 // We really should be able to insert here without doing a second
7369                                                                 // lookup, but sadly rust stdlib doesn't currently allow keeping
7370                                                                 // the original Entry around with the value removed.
7371                                                                 let mut chan = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id).or_insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
7372                                                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) = &mut chan {
7373                                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, persist_status, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, INITIAL_MONITOR);
7374                                                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
7375                                                                 Ok(())
7376                                                         } else {
7377                                                                 let e = ChannelError::Close("Channel funding outpoint was a duplicate".to_owned());
7378                                                                 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no
7379                                                                 // updates should be made on it. Previously, full_stack_target
7380                                                                 // found an (unreachable) panic when the monitor update contained
7381                                                                 // within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
7382                                                                 chan.unset_funding_info(msg.channel_id);
7383                                                                 return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::Funded(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7384                                                         }
7385                                                 },
7386                                                 Err((chan, e)) => {
7387                                                         debug_assert!(matches!(e, ChannelError::Close(_)),
7388                                                                 "We don't have a channel anymore, so the error better have expected close");
7389                                                         // We've already removed this outbound channel from the map in
7390                                                         // `PeerState` above so at this point we just need to clean up any
7391                                                         // lingering entries concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
7392                                                         return Err(convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, &mut ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan), &msg.channel_id).1);
7393                                                 }
7394                                         }
7395                                 } else {
7396                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
7397                                 }
7398                         },
7399                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
7400                 }
7401         }
7402
7403         fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7404                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7405                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7406                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7407                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7408                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7409                                 debug_assert!(false);
7410                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7411                         })?;
7412                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7413                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7414                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7415                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7416                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7417                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7418                                         let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
7419                                                 self.chain_hash, &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7420                                         if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
7421                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7422                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7423                                                         node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7424                                                         msg: announcement_sigs,
7425                                                 });
7426                                         } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
7427                                                 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
7428                                                 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
7429                                                 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
7430                                                 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
7431                                                 // announcement_signatures.
7432                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
7433                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
7434                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7435                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7436                                                                 msg,
7437                                                         });
7438                                                 }
7439                                         }
7440
7441                                         {
7442                                                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7443                                                 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
7444                                         }
7445
7446                                         Ok(())
7447                                 } else {
7448                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7449                                                 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
7450                                 }
7451                         },
7452                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
7453                                 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7454                         }
7455                 }
7456         }
7457
7458         fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7459                 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> = Vec::new();
7460                 let mut finish_shutdown = None;
7461                 {
7462                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7463                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7464                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7465                                         debug_assert!(false);
7466                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7467                                 })?;
7468                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7469                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7470                         if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7471                                 let phase = chan_phase_entry.get_mut();
7472                                 match phase {
7473                                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7474                                                 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
7475                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7476                                                         log_info!(logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
7477                                                                 msg.channel_id,
7478                                                                 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
7479                                                 }
7480
7481                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7482                                                 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7483                                                         chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7484                                                 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
7485
7486                                                 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
7487                                                         // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
7488                                                         // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
7489                                                         // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
7490                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7491                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7492                                                                 msg,
7493                                                         });
7494                                                 }
7495                                                 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
7496                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7497                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
7498                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7499                                                 }
7500                                         },
7501                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
7502                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7503                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, context);
7504                                                 log_error!(logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7505                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7506                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7507                                         },
7508                                         // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
7509                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7510                                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) => {
7511                                                 let context = phase.context_mut();
7512                                                 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
7513                                                 let mut chan = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
7514                                                 finish_shutdown = Some(chan.context_mut().force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel));
7515                                         },
7516                                 }
7517                         } else {
7518                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7519                         }
7520                 }
7521                 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
7522                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
7523                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
7524                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
7525                 }
7526                 if let Some(shutdown_res) = finish_shutdown {
7527                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_res);
7528                 }
7529
7530                 Ok(())
7531         }
7532
7533         fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7534                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7535                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7536                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7537                                 debug_assert!(false);
7538                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7539                         })?;
7540                 let (tx, chan_option, shutdown_result) = {
7541                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7542                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7543                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
7544                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7545                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7546                                                 let (closing_signed, tx, shutdown_result) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
7547                                                 debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
7548                                                 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
7549                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
7550                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
7551                                                                 msg,
7552                                                         });
7553                                                 }
7554                                                 if tx.is_some() {
7555                                                         // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
7556                                                         // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
7557                                                         // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
7558                                                         // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
7559                                                         // watch for old state broadcasts)!
7560                                                         (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)), shutdown_result)
7561                                                 } else { (tx, None, shutdown_result) }
7562                                         } else {
7563                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7564                                                         "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7565                                         }
7566                                 },
7567                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7568                         }
7569                 };
7570                 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
7571                         let channel_id = chan_option.as_ref().map(|channel| channel.context().channel_id());
7572                         log_info!(WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id), "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
7573                         self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
7574                 }
7575                 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
7576                         if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
7577                                 let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
7578                                 pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7579                                         msg: update
7580                                 });
7581                         }
7582                 }
7583                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7584                 if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result {
7585                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
7586                 }
7587                 Ok(())
7588         }
7589
7590         fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7591                 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
7592                 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
7593                 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
7594                 //
7595                 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
7596                 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
7597                 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
7598                 //but we should prevent it anyway.
7599
7600                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7601                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7602
7603                 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg, counterparty_node_id);
7604                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7605                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7606                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7607                                 debug_assert!(false);
7608                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7609                         })?;
7610                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7611                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7612                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7613                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7614                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7615                                         let mut pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
7616                                                 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
7617                                                         self.construct_pending_htlc_status(
7618                                                                 msg, counterparty_node_id, shared_secret, next_hop,
7619                                                                 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt,
7620                                                         ),
7621                                                 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
7622                                         };
7623                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7624                                         // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
7625                                         // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
7626                                         // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
7627                                         if let Err((_, error_code)) = chan.can_accept_incoming_htlc(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &logger) {
7628                                                 if msg.blinding_point.is_some() {
7629                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(
7630                                                                 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
7631                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7632                                                                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7633                                                                         sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
7634                                                                         failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING,
7635                                                                 }
7636                                                         ))
7637                                                 } else {
7638                                                         match pending_forward_info {
7639                                                                 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo {
7640                                                                         ref incoming_shared_secret, ref routing, ..
7641                                                                 }) => {
7642                                                                         let reason = if routing.blinded_failure().is_some() {
7643                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, vec![0; 32])
7644                                                                         } else if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
7645                                                                                 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
7646                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
7647                                                                         } else {
7648                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
7649                                                                         }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
7650                                                                         let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
7651                                                                                 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7652                                                                                 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
7653                                                                                 reason
7654                                                                         };
7655                                                                         pending_forward_info = PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg));
7656                                                                 },
7657                                                                 _ => {},
7658                                                         }
7659                                                 }
7660                                         }
7661                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info), chan_phase_entry);
7662                                 } else {
7663                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7664                                                 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7665                                 }
7666                         },
7667                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7668                 }
7669                 Ok(())
7670         }
7671
7672         fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7673                 let funding_txo;
7674                 let next_user_channel_id;
7675                 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value, skimmed_fee_msat) = {
7676                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7677                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7678                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7679                                         debug_assert!(false);
7680                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7681                                 })?;
7682                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7683                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7684                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7685                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7686                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7687                                                 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
7688                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop) = &res.0 {
7689                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7690                                                         log_trace!(logger,
7691                                                                 "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
7692                                                                 msg.channel_id);
7693                                                         peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates.entry(msg.channel_id)
7694                                                                 .or_insert_with(Vec::new)
7695                                                                 .push(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction::from_prev_hop_data(&prev_hop));
7696                                                 }
7697                                                 // Note that we do not need to push an `actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates`
7698                                                 // entry here, even though we *do* need to block the next RAA monitor update.
7699                                                 // We do this instead in the `claim_funds_internal` by attaching a
7700                                                 // `ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate` action to the event generated when the
7701                                                 // outbound HTLC is claimed. This is guaranteed to all complete before we
7702                                                 // process the RAA as messages are processed from single peers serially.
7703                                                 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
7704                                                 next_user_channel_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
7705                                                 res
7706                                         } else {
7707                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7708                                                         "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7709                                         }
7710                                 },
7711                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7712                         }
7713                 };
7714                 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(),
7715                         Some(forwarded_htlc_value), skimmed_fee_msat, false, false, Some(*counterparty_node_id),
7716                         funding_txo, msg.channel_id, Some(next_user_channel_id),
7717                 );
7718
7719                 Ok(())
7720         }
7721
7722         fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7723                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7724                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7725                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7726                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7727                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7728                                 debug_assert!(false);
7729                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7730                         })?;
7731                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7732                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7733                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7734                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7735                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7736                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
7737                                 } else {
7738                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7739                                                 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7740                                 }
7741                         },
7742                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7743                 }
7744                 Ok(())
7745         }
7746
7747         fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7748                 // Note that the ChannelManager is NOT re-persisted on disk after this (unless we error
7749                 // closing a channel), so any changes are likely to be lost on restart!
7750                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7751                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7752                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7753                                 debug_assert!(false);
7754                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7755                         })?;
7756                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7757                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7758                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7759                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7760                                 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
7761                                         let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
7762                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
7763                                 }
7764                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7765                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
7766                                 } else {
7767                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7768                                                 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7769                                 }
7770                                 Ok(())
7771                         },
7772                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7773                 }
7774         }
7775
7776         fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7777                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7778                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7779                         .ok_or_else(|| {
7780                                 debug_assert!(false);
7781                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7782                         })?;
7783                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7784                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7785                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7786                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7787                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7788                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7789                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7790                                         let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
7791                                         if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7792                                                 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
7793                                                         peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7794                                         }
7795                                         Ok(())
7796                                 } else {
7797                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7798                                                 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7799                                 }
7800                         },
7801                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7802                 }
7803         }
7804
7805         fn push_decode_update_add_htlcs(&self, mut update_add_htlcs: (u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>)) {
7806                 let mut push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7807                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7808                 push_forward_event &= decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty();
7809                 let scid = update_add_htlcs.0;
7810                 match decode_update_add_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7811                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut e) => { e.get_mut().append(&mut update_add_htlcs.1); },
7812                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => { e.insert(update_add_htlcs.1); },
7813                 }
7814                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
7815         }
7816
7817         #[inline]
7818         fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
7819                 let push_forward_event = self.forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(per_source_pending_forwards);
7820                 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
7821         }
7822
7823         #[inline]
7824         fn forward_htlcs_without_forward_event(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, ChannelId, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) -> bool {
7825                 let mut push_forward_event = false;
7826                 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
7827                         let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
7828                         let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
7829                         if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
7830                                 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
7831                                         let scid = match forward_info.routing {
7832                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7833                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
7834                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
7835                                         };
7836                                         // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
7837                                         let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
7838
7839                                         let decode_update_add_htlcs_empty = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap().is_empty();
7840                                         let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7841                                         let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
7842                                         match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
7843                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
7844                                                         entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7845                                                                 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
7846                                                 },
7847                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7848                                                         if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
7849                                                            fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.chain_hash)
7850                                                         {
7851                                                                 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).to_byte_array());
7852                                                                 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7853                                                                 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
7854                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
7855                                                                                 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
7856                                                                                         requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
7857                                                                                         payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
7858                                                                                         inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
7859                                                                                         expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
7860                                                                                         intercept_id
7861                                                                                 }, None));
7862                                                                                 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7863                                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
7864                                                                         },
7865                                                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
7866                                                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, None, Some(prev_channel_id));
7867                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
7868                                                                                 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7869                                                                                         short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
7870                                                                                         user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
7871                                                                                         outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
7872                                                                                         channel_id: prev_channel_id,
7873                                                                                         htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
7874                                                                                         incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7875                                                                                         phantom_shared_secret: None,
7876                                                                                         blinded_failure: forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
7877                                                                                 });
7878
7879                                                                                 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
7880                                                                                                 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
7881                                                                                                 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
7882                                                                                 ));
7883                                                                         }
7884                                                                 }
7885                                                         } else {
7886                                                                 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
7887                                                                 // payments are being processed.
7888                                                                 push_forward_event |= forward_htlcs_empty && decode_update_add_htlcs_empty;
7889                                                                 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
7890                                                                         prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
7891                                                         }
7892                                                 }
7893                                         }
7894                                 }
7895                         }
7896
7897                         for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
7898                                 push_forward_event |= self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal_without_forward_event(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
7899                         }
7900
7901                         if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
7902                                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7903                                 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
7904                         }
7905                 }
7906                 push_forward_event
7907         }
7908
7909         fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
7910                 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7911                 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7912                 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
7913                         if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
7914                 ).count();
7915                 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
7916                 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
7917                 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
7918                 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
7919                 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
7920                 // real by taking more time.
7921                 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
7922                         pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
7923                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
7924                         }, None));
7925                 }
7926         }
7927
7928         /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
7929         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
7930         /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
7931         /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
7932         fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7933                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
7934                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
7935         ) -> bool {
7936                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
7937                         .get(&channel_id).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
7938                 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
7939                         action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7940                                 channel_funding_outpoint,
7941                                 channel_id,
7942                                 counterparty_node_id,
7943                         })
7944                 })
7945         }
7946
7947         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7948         pub(crate) fn test_raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
7949                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_id: ChannelId
7950         ) -> bool {
7951                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7952                 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
7953                         let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
7954                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
7955
7956                         if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&channel_id) {
7957                                 return self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
7958                                         chan.context().get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
7959                         }
7960                 }
7961                 false
7962         }
7963
7964         fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
7965                 let htlcs_to_fail = {
7966                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7967                         let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
7968                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
7969                                         debug_assert!(false);
7970                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
7971                                 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
7972                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7973                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
7974                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
7975                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7976                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
7977                                                 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
7978                                                 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
7979                                                         self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
7980                                                                 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo, msg.channel_id,
7981                                                                 *counterparty_node_id)
7982                                                 } else { false };
7983                                                 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
7984                                                         chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &&logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
7985                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
7986                                                         let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
7987                                                                 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
7988                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
7989                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
7990                                                 }
7991                                                 htlcs_to_fail
7992                                         } else {
7993                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
7994                                                         "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
7995                                         }
7996                                 },
7997                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
7998                         }
7999                 };
8000                 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
8001                 Ok(())
8002         }
8003
8004         fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8005                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8006                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8007                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8008                                 debug_assert!(false);
8009                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8010                         })?;
8011                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8012                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8013                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8014                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8015                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8016                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8017                                         try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &&logger), chan_phase_entry);
8018                                 } else {
8019                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8020                                                 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8021                                 }
8022                         },
8023                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8024                 }
8025                 Ok(())
8026         }
8027
8028         fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8029                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8030                 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8031                         .ok_or_else(|| {
8032                                 debug_assert!(false);
8033                                 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8034                         })?;
8035                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8036                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8037                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8038                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8039                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8040                                         if !chan.context.is_usable() {
8041                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
8042                                         }
8043
8044                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
8045                                                 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
8046                                                         &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, self.best_block.read().unwrap().height,
8047                                                         msg, &self.default_configuration
8048                                                 ), chan_phase_entry),
8049                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
8050                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
8051                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
8052                                         });
8053                                 } else {
8054                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8055                                                 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8056                                 }
8057                         },
8058                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
8059                 }
8060                 Ok(())
8061         }
8062
8063         /// Returns DoPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersistNoEvents or an Err.
8064         fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8065                 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
8066                         Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
8067                         None => {
8068                                 // It's not a local channel
8069                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8070                         }
8071                 };
8072                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8073                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
8074                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
8075                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8076                 }
8077                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
8078                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8079                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
8080                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8081                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8082                                         if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
8083                                                 if chan.context.should_announce() {
8084                                                         // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
8085                                                         // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
8086                                                         // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
8087                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8088                                                 }
8089                                                 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
8090                                         }
8091                                         let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
8092                                         let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
8093                                         if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
8094                                                 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8095                                         } else {
8096                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8097                                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received channel_update {:?} for channel {}.", msg, chan_id);
8098                                                 let did_change = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
8099                                                 // If nothing changed after applying their update, we don't need to bother
8100                                                 // persisting.
8101                                                 if !did_change {
8102                                                         return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents);
8103                                                 }
8104                                         }
8105                                 } else {
8106                                         return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8107                                                 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8108                                 }
8109                         },
8110                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents)
8111                 }
8112                 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
8113         }
8114
8115         fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
8116                 let need_lnd_workaround = {
8117                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8118
8119                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
8120                                 .ok_or_else(|| {
8121                                         debug_assert!(false);
8122                                         MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8123                                                 format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id),
8124                                                 msg.channel_id
8125                                         )
8126                                 })?;
8127                         let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.channel_id));
8128                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8129                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8130                         match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
8131                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
8132                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
8133                                                 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
8134                                                 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
8135                                                 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
8136                                                 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
8137                                                 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
8138                                                         msg, &&logger, &self.node_signer, self.chain_hash,
8139                                                         &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
8140                                                 let mut channel_update = None;
8141                                                 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
8142                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
8143                                                                 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
8144                                                                 msg,
8145                                                         });
8146                                                 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
8147                                                         // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
8148                                                         // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
8149                                                         // they have the latest channel parameters.
8150                                                         if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
8151                                                                 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
8152                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8153                                                                         msg,
8154                                                                 });
8155                                                         }
8156                                                 }
8157                                                 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
8158                                                 let (htlc_forwards, decode_update_add_htlcs) = self.handle_channel_resumption(
8159                                                         &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
8160                                                         Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
8161                                                 debug_assert!(htlc_forwards.is_none());
8162                                                 debug_assert!(decode_update_add_htlcs.is_none());
8163                                                 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
8164                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
8165                                                 }
8166                                                 need_lnd_workaround
8167                                         } else {
8168                                                 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
8169                                                         "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
8170                                         }
8171                                 },
8172                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
8173                                         log_debug!(logger, "Sending bogus ChannelReestablish for unknown channel {} to force channel closure",
8174                                                 msg.channel_id);
8175                                         // Unfortunately, lnd doesn't force close on errors
8176                                         // (https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/blob/abb1e3463f3a83bbb843d5c399869dbe930ad94f/htlcswitch/link.go#L2119).
8177                                         // One of the few ways to get an lnd counterparty to force close is by
8178                                         // replicating what they do when restoring static channel backups (SCBs). They
8179                                         // send an invalid `ChannelReestablish` with `0` commitment numbers and an
8180                                         // invalid `your_last_per_commitment_secret`.
8181                                         //
8182                                         // Since we received a `ChannelReestablish` for a channel that doesn't exist, we
8183                                         // can assume it's likely the channel closed from our point of view, but it
8184                                         // remains open on the counterparty's side. By sending this bogus
8185                                         // `ChannelReestablish` message now as a response to theirs, we trigger them to
8186                                         // force close broadcasting their latest state. If the closing transaction from
8187                                         // our point of view remains unconfirmed, it'll enter a race with the
8188                                         // counterparty's to-be-broadcast latest commitment transaction.
8189                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
8190                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
8191                                                 msg: msgs::ChannelReestablish {
8192                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
8193                                                         next_local_commitment_number: 0,
8194                                                         next_remote_commitment_number: 0,
8195                                                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: [1u8; 32],
8196                                                         my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_slice(&[2u8; 33]).unwrap(),
8197                                                         next_funding_txid: None,
8198                                                 },
8199                                         });
8200                                         return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
8201                                                 format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}",
8202                                                         counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
8203                                         )
8204                                 }
8205                         }
8206                 };
8207
8208                 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
8209                         self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
8210                 }
8211                 Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents)
8212         }
8213
8214         /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
8215         fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
8216                 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
8217
8218                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
8219                 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
8220                 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
8221                 for (funding_outpoint, channel_id, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
8222                         for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
8223                                 match monitor_event {
8224                                         MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
8225                                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, counterparty_node_id, Some(channel_id));
8226                                                 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
8227                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", preimage);
8228                                                         self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage,
8229                                                                 htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), None, true,
8230                                                                 false, counterparty_node_id, funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
8231                                                 } else {
8232                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
8233                                                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id };
8234                                                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
8235                                                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
8236                                                 }
8237                                         },
8238                                         MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosed(_) | MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { .. } => {
8239                                                 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
8240                                                         Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
8241                                                         None => {
8242                                                                 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
8243                                                                 // monitor event, this and the outpoint_to_peer map should be removed.
8244                                                                 let outpoint_to_peer = self.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
8245                                                                 outpoint_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint).cloned()
8246                                                         }
8247                                                 };
8248                                                 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
8249                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8250                                                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8251                                                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8252                                                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8253                                                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8254                                                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
8255                                                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
8256                                                                                 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::HolderForceClosedWithInfo { reason, .. } = monitor_event {
8257                                                                                         reason
8258                                                                                 } else {
8259                                                                                         ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
8260                                                                                 };
8261                                                                                 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false, reason.clone()));
8262                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8263                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8264                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8265                                                                                                 msg: update
8266                                                                                         });
8267                                                                                 }
8268                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
8269                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
8270                                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
8271                                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: reason.to_string() })
8272                                                                                         },
8273                                                                                 });
8274                                                                         }
8275                                                                 }
8276                                                         }
8277                                                 }
8278                                         },
8279                                         MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update_id } => {
8280                                                 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, &channel_id, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
8281                                         },
8282                                 }
8283                         }
8284                 }
8285
8286                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8287                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8288                 }
8289
8290                 has_pending_monitor_events
8291         }
8292
8293         /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
8294         /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
8295         /// update events as a separate process method here.
8296         #[cfg(fuzzing)]
8297         pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
8298                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8299                 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
8300         }
8301
8302         /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
8303         /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
8304         /// update was applied.
8305         fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
8306                 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
8307                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8308
8309                 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
8310                 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
8311                 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
8312                 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
8313                 'peer_loop: loop {
8314                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8315                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8316                                 'chan_loop: loop {
8317                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8318                                         let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8319                                         for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
8320                                                 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
8321                                         ) {
8322                                                 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
8323                                                 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
8324                                                 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
8325                                                         chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context));
8326                                                 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
8327                                                         failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
8328                                                 }
8329                                                 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
8330                                                         has_monitor_update = true;
8331
8332                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
8333                                                                 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
8334                                                         continue 'peer_loop;
8335                                                 }
8336                                         }
8337                                         break 'chan_loop;
8338                                 }
8339                         }
8340                         break 'peer_loop;
8341                 }
8342
8343                 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty();
8344                 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
8345                         self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
8346                 }
8347
8348                 has_update
8349         }
8350
8351         /// When a call to a [`ChannelSigner`] method returns an error, this indicates that the signer
8352         /// is (temporarily) unavailable, and the operation should be retried later.
8353         ///
8354         /// This method allows for that retry - either checking for any signer-pending messages to be
8355         /// attempted in every channel, or in the specifically provided channel.
8356         ///
8357         /// [`ChannelSigner`]: crate::sign::ChannelSigner
8358         #[cfg(async_signing)]
8359         pub fn signer_unblocked(&self, channel_opt: Option<(PublicKey, ChannelId)>) {
8360                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8361
8362                 let unblock_chan = |phase: &mut ChannelPhase<SP>, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>| {
8363                         let node_id = phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id();
8364                         match phase {
8365                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8366                                         let msgs = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger);
8367                                         if let Some(updates) = msgs.commitment_update {
8368                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
8369                                                         node_id,
8370                                                         updates,
8371                                                 });
8372                                         }
8373                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.funding_signed {
8374                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
8375                                                         node_id,
8376                                                         msg,
8377                                                 });
8378                                         }
8379                                         if let Some(msg) = msgs.channel_ready {
8380                                                 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, chan, msg);
8381                                         }
8382                                 }
8383                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
8384                                         if let Some(msg) = chan.signer_maybe_unblocked(&self.logger) {
8385                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
8386                                                         node_id,
8387                                                         msg,
8388                                                 });
8389                                         }
8390                                 }
8391                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {},
8392                         }
8393                 };
8394
8395                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8396                 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, channel_id)) = channel_opt {
8397                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
8398                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8399                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8400                                 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
8401                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8402                                 }
8403                         }
8404                 } else {
8405                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8406                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8407                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8408                                 for (_, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
8409                                         unblock_chan(chan, &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
8410                                 }
8411                         }
8412                 }
8413         }
8414
8415         /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
8416         /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
8417         /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
8418         fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
8419                 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
8420                 let mut has_update = false;
8421                 let mut shutdown_results = Vec::new();
8422                 {
8423                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8424
8425                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8426                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8427                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8428                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
8429                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
8430                                         match phase {
8431                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
8432                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
8433                                                         match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &&logger) {
8434                                                                 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt, shutdown_result_opt)) => {
8435                                                                         if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
8436                                                                                 has_update = true;
8437                                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
8438                                                                                         node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
8439                                                                                 });
8440                                                                         }
8441                                                                         debug_assert_eq!(shutdown_result_opt.is_some(), chan.is_shutdown());
8442                                                                         if let Some(shutdown_result) = shutdown_result_opt {
8443                                                                                 shutdown_results.push(shutdown_result);
8444                                                                         }
8445                                                                         if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
8446                                                                                 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
8447                                                                                 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
8448                                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
8449                                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
8450                                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
8451                                                                                                 msg: update
8452                                                                                         });
8453                                                                                 }
8454
8455                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
8456                                                                                 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
8457                                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
8458                                                                                 false
8459                                                                         } else { true }
8460                                                                 },
8461                                                                 Err(e) => {
8462                                                                         has_update = true;
8463                                                                         let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
8464                                                                         handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
8465                                                                         !close_channel
8466                                                                 }
8467                                                         }
8468                                                 },
8469                                                 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
8470                                         }
8471                                 });
8472                         }
8473                 }
8474
8475                 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
8476                         let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
8477                 }
8478
8479                 for shutdown_result in shutdown_results.drain(..) {
8480                         self.finish_close_channel(shutdown_result);
8481                 }
8482
8483                 has_update
8484         }
8485
8486         /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
8487         /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
8488         /// Channel object.
8489         fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
8490                 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
8491                         // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
8492                         // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
8493                         // reorganized out of the main chain.
8494                         // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
8495                         // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
8496                         // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
8497                         // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
8498                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = failure.monitor_update.take() {
8499                                 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
8500                                 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
8501                                         assert!(should_broadcast);
8502                                 } else { unreachable!(); }
8503                                 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
8504                                         BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8505                                                 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update, channel_id,
8506                                         });
8507                         }
8508                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
8509                 }
8510         }
8511 }
8512
8513 macro_rules! create_offer_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8514         /// Creates an [`OfferBuilder`] such that the [`Offer`] it builds is recognized by the
8515         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`InvoiceRequest`] messages for the offer. The offer will
8516         /// not have an expiration unless otherwise set on the builder.
8517         ///
8518         /// # Privacy
8519         ///
8520         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the offer.
8521         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8522         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8523         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8524         /// order to send the [`InvoiceRequest`].
8525         ///
8526         /// Also, uses a derived signing pubkey in the offer for recipient privacy.
8527         ///
8528         /// # Limitations
8529         ///
8530         /// Requires a direct connection to the introduction node in the responding [`InvoiceRequest`]'s
8531         /// reply path.
8532         ///
8533         /// # Errors
8534         ///
8535         /// Errors if the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the offer.
8536         ///
8537         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8538         ///
8539         /// [`Offer`]: crate::offers::offer::Offer
8540         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8541         pub fn create_offer_builder(
8542                 &$self, description: String
8543         ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8544                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8545                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8546                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8547                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8548
8549                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8550                 let builder = OfferBuilder::deriving_signing_pubkey(
8551                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx
8552                 )
8553                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8554                         .path(path);
8555
8556                 Ok(builder.into())
8557         }
8558 } }
8559
8560 macro_rules! create_refund_builder { ($self: ident, $builder: ty) => {
8561         /// Creates a [`RefundBuilder`] such that the [`Refund`] it builds is recognized by the
8562         /// [`ChannelManager`] when handling [`Bolt12Invoice`] messages for the refund.
8563         ///
8564         /// # Payment
8565         ///
8566         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the refund.
8567         /// See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has been sent.
8568         ///
8569         /// The builder will have the provided expiration set. Any changes to the expiration on the
8570         /// returned builder will not be honored by [`ChannelManager`]. For `no-std`, the highest seen
8571         /// block time minus two hours is used for the current time when determining if the refund has
8572         /// expired.
8573         ///
8574         /// To revoke the refund, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8575         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received before expiration, the payment will fail
8576         /// with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8577         ///
8578         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8579         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8580         ///
8581         /// # Privacy
8582         ///
8583         /// Uses [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`] to construct a [`BlindedPath`] for the refund.
8584         /// However, if one is not found, uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] with
8585         /// [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`] as the introduction node instead. In the latter case,
8586         /// the node must be announced, otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction in
8587         /// order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8588         ///
8589         /// Also, uses a derived payer id in the refund for payer privacy.
8590         ///
8591         /// # Limitations
8592         ///
8593         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in the responding
8594         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8595         ///
8596         /// # Errors
8597         ///
8598         /// Errors if:
8599         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8600         /// - `amount_msats` is invalid, or
8601         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded path for the refund.
8602         ///
8603         /// This is not exported to bindings users as builder patterns don't map outside of move semantics.
8604         ///
8605         /// [`Refund`]: crate::offers::refund::Refund
8606         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8607         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8608         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8609         pub fn create_refund_builder(
8610                 &$self, description: String, amount_msats: u64, absolute_expiry: Duration,
8611                 payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry, max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8612         ) -> Result<$builder, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8613                 let node_id = $self.get_our_node_id();
8614                 let expanded_key = &$self.inbound_payment_key;
8615                 let entropy = &*$self.entropy_source;
8616                 let secp_ctx = &$self.secp_ctx;
8617
8618                 let path = $self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8619                 let builder = RefundBuilder::deriving_payer_id(
8620                         description, node_id, expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, amount_msats, payment_id
8621                 )?
8622                         .chain_hash($self.chain_hash)
8623                         .absolute_expiry(absolute_expiry)
8624                         .path(path);
8625
8626                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop($self);
8627
8628                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::AbsoluteTimeout(absolute_expiry);
8629                 $self.pending_outbound_payments
8630                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8631                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat,
8632                         )
8633                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8634
8635                 Ok(builder.into())
8636         }
8637 } }
8638
8639 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8640 where
8641         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
8642         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8643         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8644         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8645         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8646         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8647         R::Target: Router,
8648         L::Target: Logger,
8649 {
8650         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8651         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferBuilder<DerivedMetadata, secp256k1::All>);
8652         #[cfg(not(c_bindings))]
8653         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundBuilder<secp256k1::All>);
8654
8655         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8656         create_offer_builder!(self, OfferWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8657         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
8658         create_refund_builder!(self, RefundMaybeWithDerivedMetadataBuilder);
8659
8660         /// Pays for an [`Offer`] using the given parameters by creating an [`InvoiceRequest`] and
8661         /// enqueuing it to be sent via an onion message. [`ChannelManager`] will pay the actual
8662         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`] once it is received.
8663         ///
8664         /// Uses [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`] such that the [`InvoiceRequest`] it builds is recognized by
8665         /// the [`ChannelManager`] when handling a [`Bolt12Invoice`] message in response to the request.
8666         /// The optional parameters are used in the builder, if `Some`:
8667         /// - `quantity` for [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`] which must be set if
8668         ///   [`Offer::expects_quantity`] is `true`.
8669         /// - `amount_msats` if overpaying what is required for the given `quantity` is desired, and
8670         /// - `payer_note` for [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`].
8671         ///
8672         /// If `max_total_routing_fee_msat` is not specified, The default from
8673         /// [`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`] is applied.
8674         ///
8675         /// # Payment
8676         ///
8677         /// The provided `payment_id` is used to ensure that only one invoice is paid for the request
8678         /// when received. See [Avoiding Duplicate Payments] for other requirements once the payment has
8679         /// been sent.
8680         ///
8681         /// To revoke the request, use [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`] prior to receiving the
8682         /// invoice. If abandoned, or an invoice isn't received in a reasonable amount of time, the
8683         /// payment will fail with an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
8684         ///
8685         /// # Privacy
8686         ///
8687         /// Uses a one-hop [`BlindedPath`] for the reply path with [`ChannelManager::get_our_node_id`]
8688         /// as the introduction node and a derived payer id for payer privacy. As such, currently, the
8689         /// node must be announced. Otherwise, there is no way to find a path to the introduction node
8690         /// in order to send the [`Bolt12Invoice`].
8691         ///
8692         /// # Limitations
8693         ///
8694         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Offer::paths`] or to
8695         /// [`Offer::signing_pubkey`], if empty. A similar restriction applies to the responding
8696         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`].
8697         ///
8698         /// # Errors
8699         ///
8700         /// Errors if:
8701         /// - a duplicate `payment_id` is provided given the caveats in the aforementioned link,
8702         /// - the provided parameters are invalid for the offer,
8703         /// - the offer is for an unsupported chain, or
8704         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded reply path for the invoice
8705         ///   request.
8706         ///
8707         /// [`InvoiceRequest`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest
8708         /// [`InvoiceRequest::quantity`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::quantity
8709         /// [`InvoiceRequest::payer_note`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequest::payer_note
8710         /// [`InvoiceRequestBuilder`]: crate::offers::invoice_request::InvoiceRequestBuilder
8711         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8712         /// [`Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice::payment_paths
8713         /// [Avoiding Duplicate Payments]: #avoiding-duplicate-payments
8714         pub fn pay_for_offer(
8715                 &self, offer: &Offer, quantity: Option<u64>, amount_msats: Option<u64>,
8716                 payer_note: Option<String>, payment_id: PaymentId, retry_strategy: Retry,
8717                 max_total_routing_fee_msat: Option<u64>
8718         ) -> Result<(), Bolt12SemanticError> {
8719                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8720                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8721                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8722
8723                 let builder: InvoiceRequestBuilder<DerivedPayerId, secp256k1::All> = offer
8724                         .request_invoice_deriving_payer_id(expanded_key, entropy, secp_ctx, payment_id)?
8725                         .into();
8726                 let builder = builder.chain_hash(self.chain_hash)?;
8727
8728                 let builder = match quantity {
8729                         None => builder,
8730                         Some(quantity) => builder.quantity(quantity)?,
8731                 };
8732                 let builder = match amount_msats {
8733                         None => builder,
8734                         Some(amount_msats) => builder.amount_msats(amount_msats)?,
8735                 };
8736                 let builder = match payer_note {
8737                         None => builder,
8738                         Some(payer_note) => builder.payer_note(payer_note),
8739                 };
8740                 let invoice_request = builder.build_and_sign()?;
8741                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path().map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8742
8743                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8744
8745                 let expiration = StaleExpiration::TimerTicks(1);
8746                 self.pending_outbound_payments
8747                         .add_new_awaiting_invoice(
8748                                 payment_id, expiration, retry_strategy, max_total_routing_fee_msat
8749                         )
8750                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::DuplicatePaymentId)?;
8751
8752                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8753                 if offer.paths().is_empty() {
8754                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8755                                 OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request),
8756                                 Destination::Node(offer.signing_pubkey()),
8757                                 Some(reply_path),
8758                         );
8759                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8760                 } else {
8761                         // Send as many invoice requests as there are paths in the offer (with an upper bound).
8762                         // Using only one path could result in a failure if the path no longer exists. But only
8763                         // one invoice for a given payment id will be paid, even if more than one is received.
8764                         const REQUEST_LIMIT: usize = 10;
8765                         for path in offer.paths().into_iter().take(REQUEST_LIMIT) {
8766                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8767                                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request.clone()),
8768                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8769                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8770                                 );
8771                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8772                         }
8773                 }
8774
8775                 Ok(())
8776         }
8777
8778         /// Creates a [`Bolt12Invoice`] for a [`Refund`] and enqueues it to be sent via an onion
8779         /// message.
8780         ///
8781         /// The resulting invoice uses a [`PaymentHash`] recognized by the [`ChannelManager`] and a
8782         /// [`BlindedPath`] containing the [`PaymentSecret`] needed to reconstruct the corresponding
8783         /// [`PaymentPreimage`]. It is returned purely for informational purposes.
8784         ///
8785         /// # Limitations
8786         ///
8787         /// Requires a direct connection to an introduction node in [`Refund::paths`] or to
8788         /// [`Refund::payer_id`], if empty. This request is best effort; an invoice will be sent to each
8789         /// node meeting the aforementioned criteria, but there's no guarantee that they will be
8790         /// received and no retries will be made.
8791         ///
8792         /// # Errors
8793         ///
8794         /// Errors if:
8795         /// - the refund is for an unsupported chain, or
8796         /// - the parameterized [`Router`] is unable to create a blinded payment path or reply path for
8797         ///   the invoice.
8798         ///
8799         /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
8800         pub fn request_refund_payment(
8801                 &self, refund: &Refund
8802         ) -> Result<Bolt12Invoice, Bolt12SemanticError> {
8803                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
8804                 let entropy = &*self.entropy_source;
8805                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8806
8807                 let amount_msats = refund.amount_msats();
8808                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
8809
8810                 if refund.chain() != self.chain_hash {
8811                         return Err(Bolt12SemanticError::UnsupportedChain);
8812                 }
8813
8814                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
8815
8816                 match self.create_inbound_payment(Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None) {
8817                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => {
8818                                 let payment_paths = self.create_blinded_payment_paths(amount_msats, payment_secret)
8819                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8820
8821                                 #[cfg(feature = "std")]
8822                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys(
8823                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, expanded_key, entropy
8824                                 )?;
8825                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8826                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
8827                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
8828                                 );
8829                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
8830                                 let builder = refund.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
8831                                         payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at, expanded_key, entropy
8832                                 )?;
8833                                 let builder: InvoiceBuilder<DerivedSigningPubkey> = builder.into();
8834                                 let invoice = builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx)?;
8835                                 let reply_path = self.create_blinded_path()
8836                                         .map_err(|_| Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths)?;
8837
8838                                 let mut pending_offers_messages = self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap();
8839                                 if refund.paths().is_empty() {
8840                                         let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8841                                                 OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8842                                                 Destination::Node(refund.payer_id()),
8843                                                 Some(reply_path),
8844                                         );
8845                                         pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8846                                 } else {
8847                                         for path in refund.paths() {
8848                                                 let message = new_pending_onion_message(
8849                                                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice.clone()),
8850                                                         Destination::BlindedPath(path.clone()),
8851                                                         Some(reply_path.clone()),
8852                                                 );
8853                                                 pending_offers_messages.push(message);
8854                                         }
8855                                 }
8856
8857                                 Ok(invoice)
8858                         },
8859                         Err(()) => Err(Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount),
8860                 }
8861         }
8862
8863         /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
8864         /// to pay us.
8865         ///
8866         /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
8867         /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
8868         ///
8869         /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
8870         /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
8871         /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
8872         /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
8873         ///
8874         /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
8875         ///
8876         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8877         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8878         ///
8879         /// # Note
8880         ///
8881         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8882         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8883         ///
8884         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8885         ///
8886         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8887         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8888         ///
8889         /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
8890         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8891         /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
8892         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
8893         /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
8894         /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
8895         pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
8896                 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
8897                 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
8898                         &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8899                         min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
8900         }
8901
8902         /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
8903         /// stored external to LDK.
8904         ///
8905         /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
8906         /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
8907         /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
8908         ///
8909         /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
8910         /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
8911         /// payments.
8912         ///
8913         /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
8914         /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
8915         /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
8916         /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
8917         ///
8918         /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
8919         /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
8920         /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
8921         /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
8922         /// invoices when no timeout is set.
8923         ///
8924         /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
8925         /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
8926         /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
8927         /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
8928         /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
8929         ///
8930         /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
8931         /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
8932         ///
8933         /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
8934         /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
8935         ///
8936         /// # Note
8937         ///
8938         /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
8939         /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
8940         ///
8941         /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
8942         ///
8943         /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
8944         /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
8945         ///
8946         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8947         /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
8948         pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
8949                 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
8950                 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
8951                         invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
8952                         min_final_cltv_expiry)
8953         }
8954
8955         /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
8956         /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
8957         ///
8958         /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
8959         pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
8960                 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
8961         }
8962
8963         /// Creates a blinded path by delegating to [`MessageRouter::create_blinded_paths`].
8964         ///
8965         /// Errors if the `MessageRouter` errors or returns an empty `Vec`.
8966         fn create_blinded_path(&self) -> Result<BlindedPath, ()> {
8967                 let recipient = self.get_our_node_id();
8968                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8969
8970                 let peers = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap()
8971                         .iter()
8972                         .filter(|(_, peer)| peer.lock().unwrap().latest_features.supports_onion_messages())
8973                         .map(|(node_id, _)| *node_id)
8974                         .collect::<Vec<_>>();
8975
8976                 self.router
8977                         .create_blinded_paths(recipient, peers, secp_ctx)
8978                         .and_then(|paths| paths.into_iter().next().ok_or(()))
8979         }
8980
8981         /// Creates multi-hop blinded payment paths for the given `amount_msats` by delegating to
8982         /// [`Router::create_blinded_payment_paths`].
8983         fn create_blinded_payment_paths(
8984                 &self, amount_msats: u64, payment_secret: PaymentSecret
8985         ) -> Result<Vec<(BlindedPayInfo, BlindedPath)>, ()> {
8986                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
8987
8988                 let first_hops = self.list_usable_channels();
8989                 let payee_node_id = self.get_our_node_id();
8990                 let max_cltv_expiry = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY
8991                         + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
8992                 let payee_tlvs = ReceiveTlvs {
8993                         payment_secret,
8994                         payment_constraints: PaymentConstraints {
8995                                 max_cltv_expiry,
8996                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 1,
8997                         },
8998                 };
8999                 self.router.create_blinded_payment_paths(
9000                         payee_node_id, first_hops, payee_tlvs, amount_msats, secp_ctx
9001                 )
9002         }
9003
9004         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
9005         /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
9006         ///
9007         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9008         pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9009                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9010                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9011                 loop {
9012                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9013                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9014                         match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
9015                                 Some(_) => continue,
9016                                 None => return scid_candidate
9017                         }
9018                 }
9019         }
9020
9021         /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
9022         ///
9023         /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
9024         pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
9025                 PhantomRouteHints {
9026                         channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
9027                         phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
9028                         real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
9029                 }
9030         }
9031
9032         /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
9033         /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
9034         /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
9035         ///
9036         /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
9037         /// times to get a unique scid.
9038         pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
9039                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9040                 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
9041                 loop {
9042                         let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.chain_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
9043                         // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
9044                         if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
9045                         return scid_candidate
9046                 }
9047         }
9048
9049         /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
9050         /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
9051         pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
9052                 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
9053
9054                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9055                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9056                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9057                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9058                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
9059                                 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
9060                         ) {
9061                                 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
9062                                         if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
9063                                                 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
9064                                         }
9065                                 }
9066                         }
9067                 }
9068
9069                 inflight_htlcs
9070         }
9071
9072         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9073         pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
9074                 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9075                 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
9076                 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
9077                 events.into_inner()
9078         }
9079
9080         #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
9081         pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
9082                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9083                 events.push_back((event, None));
9084         }
9085
9086         #[cfg(test)]
9087         pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
9088                 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9089                 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
9090         }
9091
9092         #[cfg(test)]
9093         pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
9094                 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
9095         }
9096
9097         #[cfg(test)]
9098         pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
9099                 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
9100         }
9101
9102         /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
9103         /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
9104         /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
9105         /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
9106         fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
9107                 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, channel_id: ChannelId,
9108                 mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
9109
9110                 let logger = WithContext::from(
9111                         &self.logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(channel_id),
9112                 );
9113                 loop {
9114                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9115                         if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
9116                                 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9117                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
9118                                 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
9119                                         // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
9120                                         if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9121                                                 .get_mut(&channel_id)
9122                                         {
9123                                                 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
9124                                         }
9125                                 }
9126
9127                                 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
9128                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) {
9129                                         // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
9130                                         // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
9131                                         // update(s) when those blockers complete.
9132                                         log_trace!(logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
9133                                                 &channel_id);
9134                                         break;
9135                                 }
9136
9137                                 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(
9138                                         channel_id) {
9139                                         if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
9140                                                 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
9141                                                 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
9142                                                         log_debug!(logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
9143                                                                 channel_id);
9144                                                         handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
9145                                                                 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
9146                                                         if further_update_exists {
9147                                                                 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
9148                                                                 // top of the loop.
9149                                                                 continue;
9150                                                         }
9151                                                 } else {
9152                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
9153                                                                 channel_id);
9154                                                 }
9155                                         }
9156                                 }
9157                         } else {
9158                                 log_debug!(logger,
9159                                         "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
9160                                         log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
9161                         }
9162                         break;
9163                 }
9164         }
9165
9166         fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
9167                 for action in actions {
9168                         match action {
9169                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9170                                         channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, counterparty_node_id
9171                                 } => {
9172                                         self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, channel_id, None);
9173                                 }
9174                         }
9175                 }
9176         }
9177
9178         /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
9179         /// using the given event handler.
9180         ///
9181         /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
9182         pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
9183                 &self, handler: H
9184         ) {
9185                 let mut ev;
9186                 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
9187         }
9188 }
9189
9190 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9191 where
9192         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9193         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9194         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9195         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9196         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9197         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9198         R::Target: Router,
9199         L::Target: Logger,
9200 {
9201         /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
9202         /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
9203         /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
9204         /// is always placed next to each other.
9205         ///
9206         /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
9207         /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
9208         /// `MessageSendEvent`s  for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
9209         /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
9210         ///
9211         /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
9212         /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be placed among
9213         /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
9214         fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
9215                 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
9216                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9217                         let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
9218
9219                         // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
9220                         // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
9221                         if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
9222                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9223                         }
9224
9225                         if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
9226                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9227                         }
9228                         if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
9229                                 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
9230                         }
9231
9232                         let mut is_any_peer_connected = false;
9233                         let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
9234                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9235                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9236                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9237                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9238                                 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
9239                                         pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
9240                                 }
9241                                 if peer_state.is_connected {
9242                                         is_any_peer_connected = true
9243                                 }
9244                         }
9245
9246                         // Ensure that we are connected to some peers before getting broadcast messages.
9247                         if is_any_peer_connected {
9248                                 let mut broadcast_msgs = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9249                                 pending_events.append(&mut broadcast_msgs);
9250                         }
9251
9252                         if !pending_events.is_empty() {
9253                                 events.replace(pending_events);
9254                         }
9255
9256                         result
9257                 });
9258                 events.into_inner()
9259         }
9260 }
9261
9262 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9263 where
9264         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9265         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9266         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9267         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9268         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9269         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9270         R::Target: Router,
9271         L::Target: Logger,
9272 {
9273         /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
9274         ///
9275         /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
9276         /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
9277         fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
9278                 let mut ev;
9279                 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
9280         }
9281 }
9282
9283 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9284 where
9285         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9286         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9287         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9288         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9289         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9290         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9291         R::Target: Router,
9292         L::Target: Logger,
9293 {
9294         fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9295                 {
9296                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
9297                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.prev_blockhash,
9298                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
9299                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height - 1,
9300                                 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
9301                 }
9302
9303                 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
9304                 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
9305         }
9306
9307         fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9308                 let _persistence_guard =
9309                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9310                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9311                 let new_height = height - 1;
9312                 {
9313                         let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
9314                         assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash, header.block_hash(),
9315                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
9316                         assert_eq!(best_block.height, height,
9317                                 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
9318                         *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
9319                 }
9320
9321                 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9322         }
9323 }
9324
9325 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9326 where
9327         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9328         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9329         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9330         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9331         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9332         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9333         R::Target: Router,
9334         L::Target: Logger,
9335 {
9336         fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &Header, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
9337                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9338                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9339                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9340
9341                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9342                 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
9343
9344                 let _persistence_guard =
9345                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9346                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9347                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context))
9348                         .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
9349
9350                 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
9351                 if height < last_best_block_height {
9352                         let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9353                         self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9354                 }
9355         }
9356
9357         fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &Header, height: u32) {
9358                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9359                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9360                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9361
9362                 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
9363                 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
9364
9365                 let _persistence_guard =
9366                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9367                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9368                 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
9369
9370                 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.chain_hash, &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)));
9371
9372                 macro_rules! max_time {
9373                         ($timestamp: expr) => {
9374                                 loop {
9375                                         // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
9376                                         // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
9377                                         // having an explicit local time source.
9378                                         // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
9379                                         // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
9380                                         let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
9381                                         if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
9382                                         if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
9383                                                 break;
9384                                         }
9385                                 }
9386                         }
9387                 }
9388                 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
9389                 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
9390                 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
9391                         inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
9392                 });
9393         }
9394
9395         fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, u32, Option<BlockHash>)> {
9396                 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
9397                 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
9398                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9399                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9400                         for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
9401                                 let txid_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
9402                                 let height_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmation_height();
9403                                 let hash_opt = chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in();
9404                                 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(conf_height), Some(block_hash)) = (txid_opt, height_opt, hash_opt) {
9405                                         res.push((funding_txo.txid, conf_height, Some(block_hash)));
9406                                 }
9407                         }
9408                 }
9409                 res
9410         }
9411
9412         fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
9413                 let _persistence_guard =
9414                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify_skipping_background_events(
9415                                 self, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
9416                 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
9417                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
9418                                 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
9419                                         channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&&WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context)).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
9420                                 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9421                         } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
9422                 });
9423         }
9424 }
9425
9426 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9427 where
9428         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9429         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9430         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9431         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9432         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9433         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9434         R::Target: Router,
9435         L::Target: Logger,
9436 {
9437         /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
9438         /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
9439         /// the function.
9440         fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
9441                         (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
9442                 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
9443                 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
9444                 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
9445
9446                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9447                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
9448                 {
9449                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
9450                         for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
9451                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9452                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9453                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9454
9455                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9456                                         match phase {
9457                                                 // Retain unfunded channels.
9458                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
9459                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above.
9460                                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9461                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_) => true,
9462                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
9463                                                         let res = f(channel);
9464                                                         if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
9465                                                                 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
9466                                                                         let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
9467                                                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
9468                                                                                 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
9469                                                                 }
9470                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &channel.context);
9471                                                                 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
9472                                                                         send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
9473                                                                         if channel.context.is_usable() {
9474                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9475                                                                                 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
9476                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
9477                                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9478                                                                                                 msg,
9479                                                                                         });
9480                                                                                 }
9481                                                                         } else {
9482                                                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9483                                                                         }
9484                                                                 }
9485
9486                                                                 {
9487                                                                         let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
9488                                                                         emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
9489                                                                 }
9490
9491                                                                 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
9492                                                                         log_trace!(logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
9493                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
9494                                                                                 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9495                                                                                 msg: announcement_sigs,
9496                                                                         });
9497                                                                         if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9498                                                                                 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.chain_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
9499                                                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
9500                                                                                                 msg: announcement,
9501                                                                                                 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
9502                                                                                                 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
9503                                                                                                 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
9504                                                                                         });
9505                                                                                 }
9506                                                                         }
9507                                                                 }
9508                                                                 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
9509                                                                         if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
9510                                                                                 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
9511                                                                                 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
9512                                                                                 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
9513                                                                                 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
9514                                                                                 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
9515                                                                                 // is always consistent.
9516                                                                                 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
9517                                                                                 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
9518                                                                                 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
9519                                                                                         "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
9520                                                                                         fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
9521                                                                         }
9522                                                                 }
9523                                                         } else if let Err(reason) = res {
9524                                                                 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
9525                                                                 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
9526                                                                 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
9527                                                                 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
9528                                                                 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true, reason));
9529                                                                 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
9530                                                                         let mut pending_broadcast_messages = self.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
9531                                                                         pending_broadcast_messages.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
9532                                                                                 msg: update
9533                                                                         });
9534                                                                 }
9535                                                                 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
9536                                                                         node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
9537                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeer {
9538                                                                                 msg: Some(msgs::ErrorMessage {
9539                                                                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
9540                                                                                         data: reason_message,
9541                                                                                 })
9542                                                                         },
9543                                                                 });
9544                                                                 return false;
9545                                                         }
9546                                                         true
9547                                                 }
9548                                         }
9549                                 });
9550                         }
9551                 }
9552
9553                 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
9554                         self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
9555                                 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
9556                                         // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
9557                                         // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
9558                                         // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
9559                                         // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
9560                                         if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9561                                                 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
9562                                                 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
9563
9564                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
9565                                                         HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
9566                                                         HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
9567                                                 false
9568                                         } else { true }
9569                                 });
9570                                 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
9571                         });
9572
9573                         let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
9574                         intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
9575                                 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
9576                                         let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
9577                                                 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
9578                                                 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
9579                                                 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
9580                                                 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
9581                                                 phantom_shared_secret: None,
9582                                                 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
9583                                                 channel_id: htlc.prev_channel_id,
9584                                                 blinded_failure: htlc.forward_info.routing.blinded_failure(),
9585                                         });
9586
9587                                         let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
9588                                                 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
9589                                                 _ => unreachable!(),
9590                                         };
9591                                         timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
9592                                                         HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
9593                                                         HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
9594                                         let logger = WithContext::from(
9595                                                 &self.logger, None, Some(htlc.prev_channel_id)
9596                                         );
9597                                         log_trace!(logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
9598                                         false
9599                                 } else { true }
9600                         });
9601                 }
9602
9603                 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
9604
9605                 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
9606                         self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
9607                 }
9608         }
9609
9610         /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] may need to be persisted or
9611         /// may have events that need processing.
9612         ///
9613         /// In order to check if this [`ChannelManager`] needs persisting, call
9614         /// [`Self::get_and_clear_needs_persistence`].
9615         ///
9616         /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
9617         /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
9618         pub fn get_event_or_persistence_needed_future(&self) -> Future {
9619                 self.event_persist_notifier.get_future()
9620         }
9621
9622         /// Returns true if this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
9623         ///
9624         /// See [`Self::get_event_or_persistence_needed_future`] for retrieving a [`Future`] that
9625         /// indicates this should be checked.
9626         pub fn get_and_clear_needs_persistence(&self) -> bool {
9627                 self.needs_persist_flag.swap(false, Ordering::AcqRel)
9628         }
9629
9630         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
9631         pub fn get_event_or_persist_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
9632                 self.event_persist_notifier.notify_pending()
9633         }
9634
9635         /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
9636         /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
9637         pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
9638                 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
9639         }
9640
9641         /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9642         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9643         pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
9644                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
9645         }
9646
9647         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9648         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9649         ///
9650         /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
9651         /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
9652         #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
9653         pub fn bolt11_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
9654                 provided_bolt11_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9655         }
9656
9657         /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9658         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9659         fn bolt12_invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
9660                 provided_bolt12_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
9661         }
9662
9663         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9664         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9665         pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
9666                 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
9667         }
9668
9669         /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9670         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9671         pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
9672                 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
9673         }
9674
9675         /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
9676         /// [`ChannelManager`].
9677         pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
9678                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
9679         }
9680 }
9681
9682 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
9683         ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
9684 where
9685         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
9686         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
9687         ES::Target: EntropySource,
9688         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
9689         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
9690         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
9691         R::Target: Router,
9692         L::Target: Logger,
9693 {
9694         fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
9695                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9696                 // open_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9697                 // change to the contents.
9698                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9699                         let res = self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9700                         let persist = match &res {
9701                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => {
9702                                         debug_assert!(false, "We shouldn't close a new channel");
9703                                         NotifyOption::DoPersist
9704                                 },
9705                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9706                         };
9707                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9708                         persist
9709                 });
9710         }
9711
9712         fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
9713                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9714                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9715                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9716         }
9717
9718         fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
9719                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9720                 // accept_channel message - pre-funded channels are never written so there should be no
9721                 // change to the contents.
9722                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9723                         let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9724                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents
9725                 });
9726         }
9727
9728         fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
9729                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9730                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
9731                          msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9732         }
9733
9734         fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
9735                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9736                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9737         }
9738
9739         fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
9740                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9741                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9742         }
9743
9744         fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
9745                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9746                 // channel_ready message - while the channel's state will change, any channel_ready message
9747                 // will ultimately be re-sent on startup and the `ChannelMonitor` won't be updated so we
9748                 // will not force-close the channel on startup.
9749                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9750                         let res = self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9751                         let persist = match &res {
9752                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9753                                 _ => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9754                         };
9755                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9756                         persist
9757                 });
9758         }
9759
9760         fn handle_stfu(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Stfu) {
9761                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9762                         "Quiescence not supported".to_owned(),
9763                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9764         }
9765
9766         fn handle_splice(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Splice) {
9767                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9768                         "Splicing not supported".to_owned(),
9769                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9770         }
9771
9772         fn handle_splice_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceAck) {
9773                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9774                         "Splicing not supported (splice_ack)".to_owned(),
9775                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9776         }
9777
9778         fn handle_splice_locked(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::SpliceLocked) {
9779                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
9780                         "Splicing not supported (splice_locked)".to_owned(),
9781                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
9782         }
9783
9784         fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
9785                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9786                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9787         }
9788
9789         fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
9790                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9791                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9792         }
9793
9794         fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
9795                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9796                 // update_add_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9797                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9798                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9799                         let res = self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9800                         let persist = match &res {
9801                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9802                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9803                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9804                         };
9805                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9806                         persist
9807                 });
9808         }
9809
9810         fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
9811                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9812                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9813         }
9814
9815         fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
9816                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9817                 // update_fail_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9818                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9819                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9820                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9821                         let persist = match &res {
9822                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9823                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9824                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9825                         };
9826                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9827                         persist
9828                 });
9829         }
9830
9831         fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
9832                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9833                 // update_fail_malformed_htlc message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state
9834                 // only the `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9835                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9836                         let res = self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9837                         let persist = match &res {
9838                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9839                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9840                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9841                         };
9842                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9843                         persist
9844                 });
9845         }
9846
9847         fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
9848                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9849                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9850         }
9851
9852         fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
9853                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9854                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9855         }
9856
9857         fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
9858                 // Note that we never need to persist the updated ChannelManager for an inbound
9859                 // update_fee message - the message itself doesn't change our channel state only the
9860                 // `commitment_signed` message afterwards will.
9861                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9862                         let res = self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9863                         let persist = match &res {
9864                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9865                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9866                                 Ok(()) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents,
9867                         };
9868                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9869                         persist
9870                 });
9871         }
9872
9873         fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
9874                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
9875                 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
9876         }
9877
9878         fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
9879                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9880                         if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
9881                                 persist
9882                         } else {
9883                                 NotifyOption::DoPersist
9884                         }
9885                 });
9886         }
9887
9888         fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
9889                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
9890                         let res = self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg);
9891                         let persist = match &res {
9892                                 Err(e) if e.closes_channel() => NotifyOption::DoPersist,
9893                                 Err(_) => NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents,
9894                                 Ok(persist) => *persist,
9895                         };
9896                         let _ = handle_error!(self, res, *counterparty_node_id);
9897                         persist
9898                 });
9899         }
9900
9901         fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
9902                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
9903                         self, || NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents);
9904                 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
9905                 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
9906                 let remove_peer = {
9907                         log_debug!(
9908                                 WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None),
9909                                 "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
9910                                 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id)
9911                         );
9912                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
9913                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9914                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9915                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
9916                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
9917                                         let context = match phase {
9918                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
9919                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
9920                                                         if chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok() {
9921                                                                 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
9922                                                                 return true;
9923                                                         }
9924                                                         &mut chan.context
9925                                                 },
9926                                                 // We retain UnfundedOutboundV1 channel for some time in case
9927                                                 // peer unexpectedly disconnects, and intends to reconnect again.
9928                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) => {
9929                                                         return true;
9930                                                 },
9931                                                 // Unfunded inbound channels will always be removed.
9932                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
9933                                                         &mut chan.context
9934                                                 },
9935                                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9936                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
9937                                                         &mut chan.context
9938                                                 },
9939                                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9940                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => {
9941                                                         &mut chan.context
9942                                                 },
9943                                         };
9944                                         // Clean up for removal.
9945                                         update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
9946                                         failed_channels.push(context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer));
9947                                         false
9948                                 });
9949                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
9950                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
9951                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
9952                                 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
9953                                         match msg {
9954                                                 // V1 Channel Establishment
9955                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
9956                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
9957                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
9958                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
9959                                                 // V2 Channel Establishment
9960                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9961                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
9962                                                 // Common Channel Establishment
9963                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
9964                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
9965                                                 // Quiescence
9966                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendStfu { .. } => false,
9967                                                 // Splicing
9968                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSplice { .. } => false,
9969                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceAck { .. } => false,
9970                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendSpliceLocked { .. } => false,
9971                                                 // Interactive Transaction Construction
9972                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
9973                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
9974                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
9975                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
9976                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
9977                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
9978                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
9979                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
9980                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
9981                                                 // Channel Operations
9982                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
9983                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
9984                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
9985                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
9986                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
9987                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
9988                                                 // Gossip
9989                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
9990                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9991                                                 // [`ChannelManager::pending_broadcast_events`] holds the [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]
9992                                                 // This check here is to ensure exhaustivity.
9993                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {
9994                                                         debug_assert!(false, "This event shouldn't have been here");
9995                                                         false
9996                                                 },
9997                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
9998                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
9999                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
10000                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
10001                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
10002                                                 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
10003                                         }
10004                                 });
10005                                 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
10006                                 peer_state.is_connected = false;
10007                                 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
10008                         } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
10009                 };
10010                 if remove_peer {
10011                         per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
10012                 }
10013                 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
10014
10015                 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
10016                         self.finish_close_channel(failure);
10017                 }
10018         }
10019
10020         fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
10021                 let logger = WithContext::from(&self.logger, Some(*counterparty_node_id), None);
10022                 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
10023                         log_debug!(logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10024                         return Err(());
10025                 }
10026
10027                 let mut res = Ok(());
10028
10029                 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(self, || {
10030                         // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
10031                         // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
10032                         // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
10033                         // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
10034                         let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
10035                         let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
10036
10037                         {
10038                                 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
10039                                 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
10040                                         hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
10041                                                 if inbound_peer_limited {
10042                                                         res = Err(());
10043                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10044                                                 }
10045                                                 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
10046                                                         channel_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10047                                                         inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
10048                                                         latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
10049                                                         pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
10050                                                         in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10051                                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
10052                                                         actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
10053                                                         is_connected: true,
10054                                                 }));
10055                                         },
10056                                         hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
10057                                                 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
10058                                                 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
10059
10060                                                 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
10061                                                 if inbound_peer_limited &&
10062                                                         Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
10063                                                         peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
10064                                                 {
10065                                                         res = Err(());
10066                                                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents;
10067                                                 }
10068
10069                                                 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
10070                                                 peer_state.is_connected = true;
10071                                         },
10072                                 }
10073                         }
10074
10075                         log_debug!(logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
10076
10077                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10078                         if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
10079                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
10080                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10081                                 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
10082
10083                                 for (_, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
10084                                         match phase {
10085                                                 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
10086                                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&self.logger, &chan.context);
10087                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
10088                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10089                                                                 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger),
10090                                                         });
10091                                                 }
10092
10093                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
10094                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10095                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10096                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel(self.chain_hash),
10097                                                         });
10098                                                 }
10099
10100                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
10101                                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10102                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => {
10103                                                         pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10104                                                                 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
10105                                                                 msg: chan.get_open_channel_v2(self.chain_hash),
10106                                                         });
10107                                                 },
10108
10109                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
10110                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10111                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10112                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10113                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10114                                                 }
10115
10116                                                 // TODO(dual_funding): Combine this match arm with above once #[cfg(dual_funding)] is removed.
10117                                                 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10118                                                 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(channel) => {
10119                                                         // Since unfunded inbound channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer,
10120                                                         // they are not persisted and won't be recovered after a crash.
10121                                                         // Therefore, they shouldn't exist at this point.
10122                                                         debug_assert!(false);
10123                                                 },
10124                                         }
10125                                 }
10126                         }
10127
10128                         return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10129                         //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
10130                 });
10131                 res
10132         }
10133
10134         fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
10135                 match &msg.data as &str {
10136                         "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
10137                         "link failed to shutdown" =>
10138                         {
10139                                 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
10140                                 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
10141                                 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
10142                                 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
10143                                 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
10144                                 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
10145                                 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
10146                                 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10147                                         PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(
10148                                                 self,
10149                                                 || -> NotifyOption {
10150                                                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10151                                                         let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10152                                                         if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents; }
10153                                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10154                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
10155                                                                 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
10156                                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
10157                                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10158                                                                                 msg,
10159                                                                         });
10160                                                                 }
10161                                                                 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
10162                                                                         node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10163                                                                         action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
10164                                                                                 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
10165                                                                                         channel_id: msg.channel_id,
10166                                                                                         data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
10167                                                                                 },
10168                                                                                 log_level: Level::Trace,
10169                                                                         }
10170                                                                 });
10171                                                                 // This can happen in a fairly tight loop, so we absolutely cannot trigger
10172                                                                 // a `ChannelManager` write here.
10173                                                                 return NotifyOption::SkipPersistHandleEvents;
10174                                                         }
10175                                                         NotifyOption::SkipPersistNoEvents
10176                                                 }
10177                                         );
10178                                 }
10179                                 return;
10180                         }
10181                         _ => {}
10182                 }
10183
10184                 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
10185
10186                 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
10187                         let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
10188                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10189                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10190                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10191                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10192                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10193                                 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
10194                                 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
10195                                 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
10196                                 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned().collect()
10197                         };
10198                         for channel_id in channel_ids {
10199                                 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10200                                 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10201                         }
10202                 } else {
10203                         {
10204                                 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
10205                                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10206                                 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
10207                                 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
10208                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
10209                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
10210                                 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
10211                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan)) => {
10212                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10213                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
10214                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10215                                                                 msg,
10216                                                         });
10217                                                         return;
10218                                                 }
10219                                         },
10220                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10221                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan)) => {
10222                                                 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.chain_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
10223                                                         peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 {
10224                                                                 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
10225                                                                 msg,
10226                                                         });
10227                                                         return;
10228                                                 }
10229                                         },
10230                                         None | Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::Funded(_)) => (),
10231                                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
10232                                         Some(ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(_)) => (),
10233                                 }
10234                         }
10235
10236                         // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
10237                         let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
10238                 }
10239         }
10240
10241         fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
10242                 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
10243         }
10244
10245         fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
10246                 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
10247         }
10248
10249         fn get_chain_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
10250                 Some(vec![self.chain_hash])
10251         }
10252
10253         fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
10254                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10255                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10256                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10257         }
10258
10259         fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
10260                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10261                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10262                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10263         }
10264
10265         fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
10266                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10267                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10268                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10269         }
10270
10271         fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
10272                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10273                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10274                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10275         }
10276
10277         fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
10278                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10279                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10280                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10281         }
10282
10283         fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
10284                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10285                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10286                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10287         }
10288
10289         fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
10290                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10291                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10292                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10293         }
10294
10295         fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
10296                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10297                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10298                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10299         }
10300
10301         fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
10302                 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
10303                         "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
10304                          msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
10305         }
10306 }
10307
10308 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10309 OffersMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10310 where
10311         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10312         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10313         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10314         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10315         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10316         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10317         R::Target: Router,
10318         L::Target: Logger,
10319 {
10320         fn handle_message(&self, message: OffersMessage) -> Option<OffersMessage> {
10321                 let secp_ctx = &self.secp_ctx;
10322                 let expanded_key = &self.inbound_payment_key;
10323
10324                 match message {
10325                         OffersMessage::InvoiceRequest(invoice_request) => {
10326                                 let amount_msats = match InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::amount_msats(
10327                                         &invoice_request
10328                                 ) {
10329                                         Ok(amount_msats) => amount_msats,
10330                                         Err(error) => return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10331                                 };
10332                                 let invoice_request = match invoice_request.verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx) {
10333                                         Ok(invoice_request) => invoice_request,
10334                                         Err(()) => {
10335                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidMetadata;
10336                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10337                                         },
10338                                 };
10339
10340                                 let relative_expiry = DEFAULT_RELATIVE_EXPIRY.as_secs() as u32;
10341                                 let (payment_hash, payment_secret) = match self.create_inbound_payment(
10342                                         Some(amount_msats), relative_expiry, None
10343                                 ) {
10344                                         Ok((payment_hash, payment_secret)) => (payment_hash, payment_secret),
10345                                         Err(()) => {
10346                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::InvalidAmount;
10347                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10348                                         },
10349                                 };
10350
10351                                 let payment_paths = match self.create_blinded_payment_paths(
10352                                         amount_msats, payment_secret
10353                                 ) {
10354                                         Ok(payment_paths) => payment_paths,
10355                                         Err(()) => {
10356                                                 let error = Bolt12SemanticError::MissingPaths;
10357                                                 return Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into()));
10358                                         },
10359                                 };
10360
10361                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10362                                 let created_at = Duration::from_secs(
10363                                         self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64
10364                                 );
10365
10366                                 let response = if invoice_request.keys.is_some() {
10367                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10368                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys(
10369                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash
10370                                         );
10371                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10372                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_using_derived_keys_no_std(
10373                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10374                                         );
10375                                         builder
10376                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<DerivedSigningPubkey>::from)
10377                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build_and_sign(secp_ctx))
10378                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10379                                 } else {
10380                                         #[cfg(feature = "std")]
10381                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with(payment_paths, payment_hash);
10382                                         #[cfg(not(feature = "std"))]
10383                                         let builder = invoice_request.respond_with_no_std(
10384                                                 payment_paths, payment_hash, created_at
10385                                         );
10386                                         builder
10387                                                 .map(InvoiceBuilder::<ExplicitSigningPubkey>::from)
10388                                                 .and_then(|builder| builder.allow_mpp().build())
10389                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10390                                                 .and_then(|invoice| {
10391                                                         #[cfg(c_bindings)]
10392                                                         let mut invoice = invoice;
10393                                                         invoice
10394                                                                 .sign(|invoice: &UnsignedBolt12Invoice|
10395                                                                         self.node_signer.sign_bolt12_invoice(invoice)
10396                                                                 )
10397                                                                 .map_err(InvoiceError::from)
10398                                                 })
10399                                 };
10400
10401                                 match response {
10402                                         Ok(invoice) => Some(OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice)),
10403                                         Err(error) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(error.into())),
10404                                 }
10405                         },
10406                         OffersMessage::Invoice(invoice) => {
10407                                 let response = invoice
10408                                         .verify(expanded_key, secp_ctx)
10409                                         .map_err(|()| InvoiceError::from_string("Unrecognized invoice".to_owned()))
10410                                         .and_then(|payment_id| {
10411                                                 let features = self.bolt12_invoice_features();
10412                                                 if invoice.invoice_features().requires_unknown_bits_from(&features) {
10413                                                         Err(InvoiceError::from(Bolt12SemanticError::UnknownRequiredFeatures))
10414                                                 } else {
10415                                                         self.send_payment_for_bolt12_invoice(&invoice, payment_id)
10416                                                                 .map_err(|e| {
10417                                                                         log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed paying invoice: {:?}", e);
10418                                                                         InvoiceError::from_string(format!("{:?}", e))
10419                                                                 })
10420                                                 }
10421                                         });
10422
10423                                 match response {
10424                                         Ok(()) => None,
10425                                         Err(e) => Some(OffersMessage::InvoiceError(e)),
10426                                 }
10427                         },
10428                         OffersMessage::InvoiceError(invoice_error) => {
10429                                 log_trace!(self.logger, "Received invoice_error: {}", invoice_error);
10430                                 None
10431                         },
10432                 }
10433         }
10434
10435         fn release_pending_messages(&self) -> Vec<PendingOnionMessage<OffersMessage>> {
10436                 core::mem::take(&mut self.pending_offers_messages.lock().unwrap())
10437         }
10438 }
10439
10440 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
10441 NodeIdLookUp for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
10442 where
10443         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
10444         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
10445         ES::Target: EntropySource,
10446         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
10447         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
10448         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
10449         R::Target: Router,
10450         L::Target: Logger,
10451 {
10452         fn next_node_id(&self, short_channel_id: u64) -> Option<PublicKey> {
10453                 self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_channel_id).map(|(pubkey, _)| *pubkey)
10454         }
10455 }
10456
10457 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10458 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10459 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
10460         let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
10461         node_features.set_keysend_optional();
10462         node_features
10463 }
10464
10465 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10466 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10467 ///
10468 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
10469 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
10470 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
10471 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt11_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
10472         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10473 }
10474
10475 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt12InvoiceFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10476 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10477 pub(crate) fn provided_bolt12_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt12InvoiceFeatures {
10478         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10479 }
10480
10481 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10482 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10483 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
10484         provided_init_features(config).to_context()
10485 }
10486
10487 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10488 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10489 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
10490         ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
10491 }
10492
10493 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags that are provided by or required by
10494 /// [`ChannelManager`].
10495 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
10496         // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
10497         // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
10498         // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
10499         let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
10500         features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
10501         features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
10502         features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
10503         features.set_static_remote_key_required();
10504         features.set_payment_secret_required();
10505         features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
10506         features.set_wumbo_optional();
10507         features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
10508         features.set_channel_type_optional();
10509         features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
10510         features.set_zero_conf_optional();
10511         features.set_route_blinding_optional();
10512         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
10513                 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
10514         }
10515         features
10516 }
10517
10518 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10519 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
10520
10521 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
10522         (2, fee_base_msat, required),
10523         (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
10524         (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
10525 });
10526
10527 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
10528         (2, node_id, required),
10529         (4, features, required),
10530         (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
10531         (8, forwarding_info, option),
10532         (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10533         (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10534 });
10535
10536 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
10537         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10538                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10539                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10540                 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
10541                 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
10542                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10543                         (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
10544                         (2, self.channel_id, required),
10545                         (3, self.channel_type, option),
10546                         (4, self.counterparty, required),
10547                         (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
10548                         (6, self.funding_txo, option),
10549                         (7, self.config, option),
10550                         (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
10551                         (9, self.confirmations, option),
10552                         (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
10553                         (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10554                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10555                         (16, self.balance_msat, required),
10556                         (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10557                         (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
10558                         (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10559                         (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
10560                         (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
10561                         (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
10562                         (26, self.is_outbound, required),
10563                         (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
10564                         (30, self.is_usable, required),
10565                         (32, self.is_public, required),
10566                         (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10567                         (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10568                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10569                         (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10570                         (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
10571                         (43, self.pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10572                         (45, self.pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10573                 });
10574                 Ok(())
10575         }
10576 }
10577
10578 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
10579         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10580                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10581                         (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
10582                         (2, channel_id, required),
10583                         (3, channel_type, option),
10584                         (4, counterparty, required),
10585                         (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
10586                         (6, funding_txo, option),
10587                         (7, config, option),
10588                         (8, short_channel_id, option),
10589                         (9, confirmations, option),
10590                         (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
10591                         (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
10592                         (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
10593                         (16, balance_msat, required),
10594                         (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
10595                         // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
10596                         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10597                         (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
10598                         (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
10599                         (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
10600                         (22, confirmations_required, option),
10601                         (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
10602                         (26, is_outbound, required),
10603                         (28, is_channel_ready, required),
10604                         (30, is_usable, required),
10605                         (32, is_public, required),
10606                         (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
10607                         (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
10608                         (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
10609                         (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
10610                         (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
10611                         (43, pending_inbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10612                         (45, pending_outbound_htlcs, optional_vec),
10613                 });
10614
10615                 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
10616                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
10617                 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
10618                 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
10619                         ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
10620
10621                 Ok(Self {
10622                         inbound_scid_alias,
10623                         channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
10624                         channel_type,
10625                         counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
10626                         outbound_scid_alias,
10627                         funding_txo,
10628                         config,
10629                         short_channel_id,
10630                         channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
10631                         unspendable_punishment_reserve,
10632                         user_channel_id,
10633                         balance_msat: balance_msat.0.unwrap(),
10634                         outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10635                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
10636                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
10637                         inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
10638                         confirmations_required,
10639                         confirmations,
10640                         force_close_spend_delay,
10641                         is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
10642                         is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
10643                         is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
10644                         is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
10645                         inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
10646                         inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
10647                         feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
10648                         channel_shutdown_state,
10649                         pending_inbound_htlcs: pending_inbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10650                         pending_outbound_htlcs: pending_outbound_htlcs.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
10651                 })
10652         }
10653 }
10654
10655 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
10656         (2, channels, required_vec),
10657         (4, phantom_scid, required),
10658         (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
10659 });
10660
10661 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BlindedForward, {
10662         (0, inbound_blinding_point, required),
10663         (1, failure, (default_value, BlindedFailure::FromIntroductionNode)),
10664 });
10665
10666 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
10667         (0, Forward) => {
10668                 (0, onion_packet, required),
10669                 (1, blinded, option),
10670                 (2, short_channel_id, required),
10671         },
10672         (1, Receive) => {
10673                 (0, payment_data, required),
10674                 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10675                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10676                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10677                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10678                 (7, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10679         },
10680         (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
10681                 (0, payment_preimage, required),
10682                 (1, requires_blinded_error, (default_value, false)),
10683                 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
10684                 (3, payment_metadata, option),
10685                 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
10686                 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
10687         },
10688 ;);
10689
10690 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
10691         (0, routing, required),
10692         (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
10693         (4, payment_hash, required),
10694         (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
10695         (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
10696         (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
10697         (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10698 });
10699
10700
10701 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10702         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10703                 match self {
10704                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
10705                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10706                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10707                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10708                                 reason.write(writer)?;
10709                         },
10710                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10711                                 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
10712                         }) => {
10713                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10714                                 channel_id.write(writer)?;
10715                                 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
10716                                 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
10717                                 failure_code.write(writer)?;
10718                         },
10719                 }
10720                 Ok(())
10721         }
10722 }
10723
10724 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
10725         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10726                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10727                 match id {
10728                         0 => {
10729                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
10730                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10731                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10732                                         reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
10733                                 }))
10734                         },
10735                         1 => {
10736                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
10737                                         channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10738                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
10739                                         sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
10740                                         failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
10741                                 }))
10742                         },
10743                         // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
10744                         // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
10745                         // messages contained in the variants.
10746                         // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
10747                         // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
10748                         // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
10749                         2 => {
10750                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10751                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10752                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10753                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10754                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
10755                         },
10756                         3 => {
10757                                 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
10758                                 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
10759                                 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
10760                                 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
10761                                 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
10762                         },
10763                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10764                 }
10765         }
10766 }
10767
10768 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
10769         (0, Forward),
10770         (1, Fail),
10771 );
10772
10773 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(BlindedFailure,
10774         (0, FromIntroductionNode) => {},
10775         (2, FromBlindedNode) => {}, ;
10776 );
10777
10778 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
10779         (0, short_channel_id, required),
10780         (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
10781         (2, outpoint, required),
10782         (3, blinded_failure, option),
10783         (4, htlc_id, required),
10784         (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
10785         (7, user_channel_id, option),
10786         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 2 above, outpoint will be
10787         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10788         (9, channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10789 });
10790
10791 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
10792         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10793                 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
10794                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
10795                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
10796                 };
10797                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10798                         (0, self.prev_hop, required),
10799                         (1, self.total_msat, required),
10800                         (2, self.value, required),
10801                         (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
10802                         (4, payment_data, option),
10803                         (5, self.total_value_received, option),
10804                         (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
10805                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10806                         (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10807                 });
10808                 Ok(())
10809         }
10810 }
10811
10812 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
10813         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10814                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10815                         (0, prev_hop, required),
10816                         (1, total_msat, option),
10817                         (2, value_ser, required),
10818                         (3, sender_intended_value, option),
10819                         (4, payment_data_opt, option),
10820                         (5, total_value_received, option),
10821                         (6, cltv_expiry, required),
10822                         (8, keysend_preimage, option),
10823                         (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
10824                 });
10825                 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
10826                 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
10827                 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
10828                         Some(p) => {
10829                                 if payment_data.is_some() {
10830                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10831                                 }
10832                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10833                                         total_msat = Some(value);
10834                                 }
10835                                 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
10836                         },
10837                         None => {
10838                                 if total_msat.is_none() {
10839                                         if payment_data.is_none() {
10840                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
10841                                         }
10842                                         total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
10843                                 }
10844                                 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
10845                         },
10846                 };
10847                 Ok(Self {
10848                         prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
10849                         timer_ticks: 0,
10850                         value,
10851                         sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
10852                         total_value_received,
10853                         total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
10854                         onion_payload,
10855                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
10856                         counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
10857                 })
10858         }
10859 }
10860
10861 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
10862         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10863                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
10864                 match id {
10865                         0 => {
10866                                 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
10867                                 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
10868                                 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
10869                                 let mut payment_id = None;
10870                                 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
10871                                 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
10872                                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
10873                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10874                                         (1, payment_id, option),
10875                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10876                                         (4, path_hops, required_vec),
10877                                         (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
10878                                         (6, blinded_tail, option),
10879                                 });
10880                                 if payment_id.is_none() {
10881                                         // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
10882                                         // instead.
10883                                         payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
10884                                 }
10885                                 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
10886                                 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
10887                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
10888                                 }
10889                                 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
10890                                         if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
10891                                                 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
10892                                                         *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
10893                                                 }
10894                                         }
10895                                 }
10896                                 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10897                                         session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
10898                                         first_hop_htlc_msat,
10899                                         path,
10900                                         payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
10901                                 })
10902                         }
10903                         1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
10904                         _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
10905                 }
10906         }
10907 }
10908
10909 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
10910         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
10911                 match self {
10912                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
10913                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
10914                                 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
10915                                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
10916                                         (0, session_priv, required),
10917                                         (1, payment_id_opt, option),
10918                                         (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
10919                                         // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
10920                                         (4, path.hops, required_vec),
10921                                         (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
10922                                         (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
10923                                  });
10924                         }
10925                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
10926                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
10927                                 field.write(writer)?;
10928                         }
10929                 }
10930                 Ok(())
10931         }
10932 }
10933
10934 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
10935         (0, forward_info, required),
10936         (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
10937         (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
10938         (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
10939         (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
10940         // Note that by the time we get past the required read for type 6 above, prev_funding_outpoint will be
10941         // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
10942         (7, prev_channel_id, (default_value, ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(prev_funding_outpoint.0.unwrap()))),
10943 });
10944
10945 impl Writeable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10946         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
10947                 const FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID: u8 = 1;
10948                 match self {
10949                         Self::AddHTLC(info) => {
10950                                 0u8.write(w)?;
10951                                 info.write(w)?;
10952                         },
10953                         Self::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
10954                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10955                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10956                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
10957                                         (2, err_packet, required),
10958                                 });
10959                         },
10960                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
10961                                 // Since this variant was added in 0.0.119, write this as `::FailHTLC` with an empty error
10962                                 // packet so older versions have something to fail back with, but serialize the real data as
10963                                 // optional TLVs for the benefit of newer versions.
10964                                 FAIL_HTLC_VARIANT_ID.write(w)?;
10965                                 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
10966                                 write_tlv_fields!(w, {
10967                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
10968                                         (1, failure_code, required),
10969                                         (2, dummy_err_packet, required),
10970                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, required),
10971                                 });
10972                         },
10973                 }
10974                 Ok(())
10975         }
10976 }
10977
10978 impl Readable for HTLCForwardInfo {
10979         fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
10980                 let id: u8 = Readable::read(r)?;
10981                 Ok(match id {
10982                         0 => Self::AddHTLC(Readable::read(r)?),
10983                         1 => {
10984                                 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(r, {
10985                                         (0, htlc_id, required),
10986                                         (1, malformed_htlc_failure_code, option),
10987                                         (2, err_packet, required),
10988                                         (3, sha256_of_onion, option),
10989                                 });
10990                                 if let Some(failure_code) = malformed_htlc_failure_code {
10991                                         Self::FailMalformedHTLC {
10992                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10993                                                 failure_code,
10994                                                 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?,
10995                                         }
10996                                 } else {
10997                                         Self::FailHTLC {
10998                                                 htlc_id: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(htlc_id, required),
10999                                                 err_packet: _init_tlv_based_struct_field!(err_packet, required),
11000                                         }
11001                                 }
11002                         },
11003                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11004                 })
11005         }
11006 }
11007
11008 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
11009         (0, payment_secret, required),
11010         (2, expiry_time, required),
11011         (4, user_payment_id, required),
11012         (6, payment_preimage, required),
11013         (8, min_value_msat, required),
11014 });
11015
11016 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11017 where
11018         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11019         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11020         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11021         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11022         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11023         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11024         R::Target: Router,
11025         L::Target: Logger,
11026 {
11027         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11028                 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
11029
11030                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11031
11032                 self.chain_hash.write(writer)?;
11033                 {
11034                         let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
11035                         best_block.height.write(writer)?;
11036                         best_block.block_hash.write(writer)?;
11037                 }
11038
11039                 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
11040                 {
11041                         let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
11042                         let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
11043                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11044                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11045                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11046                                 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11047                                         serializable_peer_count += 1;
11048                                 }
11049
11050                                 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
11051                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_broadcast() } else { false }
11052                                 ).count();
11053                         }
11054
11055                         (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
11056
11057                         for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11058                                 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11059                                 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11060                                 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
11061                                         |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
11062                                                 if channel.context.is_funding_broadcast() { Some(channel) } else { None }
11063                                         } else { None }
11064                                 ) {
11065                                         channel.write(writer)?;
11066                                 }
11067                         }
11068                 }
11069
11070                 {
11071                         let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11072                         (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11073                         for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
11074                                 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
11075                                 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11076                                 for forward in pending_forwards {
11077                                         forward.write(writer)?;
11078                                 }
11079                         }
11080                 }
11081
11082                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = None;
11083                 let decode_update_add_htlcs = self.decode_update_add_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11084                 if !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() {
11085                         decode_update_add_htlcs_opt = Some(decode_update_add_htlcs);
11086                 }
11087
11088                 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
11089
11090                 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11091                 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
11092                 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
11093
11094                 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
11095                 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
11096                 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11097                 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
11098                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
11099                         (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11100                         for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
11101                                 htlc.write(writer)?;
11102                         }
11103                         htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
11104                         htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
11105                 }
11106
11107                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
11108                 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
11109                 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
11110                         // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
11111                         // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
11112                         // per_peer_state lock at all.
11113                         peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
11114                 }
11115
11116                 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
11117                 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11118                         // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
11119                         // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
11120                         // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
11121                         // no channels.
11122                         if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
11123                                 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
11124                                 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
11125                                 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
11126                                         monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
11127                                                 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
11128                                                 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
11129                                 }
11130                         }
11131                 }
11132
11133                 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
11134                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
11135                 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
11136                 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
11137                 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
11138                 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
11139                         // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
11140                         // well save the space and not write any events here.
11141                         0u64.write(writer)?;
11142                 } else {
11143                         (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11144                         for (event, _) in events.iter() {
11145                                 event.write(writer)?;
11146                         }
11147                 }
11148
11149                 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
11150                 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
11151                 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
11152                 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
11153                 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
11154                 0u64.write(writer)?;
11155
11156                 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
11157                 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
11158                 // likely to be identical.
11159                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11160                 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
11161
11162                 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
11163                 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
11164                         hash.write(writer)?;
11165                         pending_payment.write(writer)?;
11166                 }
11167
11168                 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
11169                 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
11170                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11171                         if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
11172                                 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
11173                         }
11174                 }
11175                 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
11176                 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11177                         match outbound {
11178                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11179                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11180                                         for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
11181                                                 session_priv.write(writer)?;
11182                                         }
11183                                 }
11184                                 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
11185                                 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
11186                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
11187                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
11188                         }
11189                 }
11190
11191                 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
11192                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = new_hash_map();
11193                 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
11194                         match outbound {
11195                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
11196                                 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
11197                                         pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
11198                                 },
11199                                 _ => {},
11200                         }
11201                 }
11202
11203                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
11204                 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
11205                 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
11206                         pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
11207                 }
11208
11209                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
11210                 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
11211                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
11212                         // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
11213                         pending_claiming_payments = None;
11214                 }
11215
11216                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11217                 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
11218                         for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
11219                                 if !updates.is_empty() {
11220                                         if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(new_hash_map()); }
11221                                         in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
11222                                 }
11223                         }
11224                 }
11225
11226                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
11227                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
11228                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11229                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
11230                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11231                         (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
11232                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11233                         (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
11234                         (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
11235                         (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
11236                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11237                         (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
11238                         (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11239                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs_opt, option),
11240                 });
11241
11242                 Ok(())
11243         }
11244 }
11245
11246 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11247         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
11248                 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
11249                 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
11250                         event.write(w)?;
11251                         action.write(w)?;
11252                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
11253                                 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
11254                                 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
11255                                 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
11256                                 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
11257                                 // check that the event is sane here.
11258                                 let event_encoded = event.encode();
11259                                 let event_read: Option<Event> =
11260                                         MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
11261                                 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
11262                         }
11263                 }
11264                 Ok(())
11265         }
11266 }
11267 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
11268         fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11269                 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11270                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
11271                 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
11272                         MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
11273                         len) as usize);
11274                 for _ in 0..len {
11275                         let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
11276                         let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
11277                         if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
11278                                 events.push_back((ev, action));
11279                         } else if action.is_some() {
11280                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11281                         }
11282                 }
11283                 Ok(events)
11284         }
11285 }
11286
11287 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
11288         (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
11289         (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
11290         (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
11291         (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
11292         (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
11293 );
11294
11295 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
11296 ///
11297 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
11298 /// is:
11299 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11300 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
11301 ///    `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
11302 ///    This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
11303 ///    [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
11304 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
11305 ///    same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
11306 ///    [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
11307 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
11308 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
11309 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
11310 ///    Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
11311 ///    will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
11312 ///    the next step.
11313 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
11314 ///    [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
11315 ///
11316 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
11317 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
11318 ///
11319 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
11320 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
11321 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
11322 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
11323 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
11324 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
11325 ///
11326 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
11327 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11328 where
11329         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11330         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11331         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11332         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11333         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11334         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11335         R::Target: Router,
11336         L::Target: Logger,
11337 {
11338         /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
11339         pub entropy_source: ES,
11340
11341         /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
11342         pub node_signer: NS,
11343
11344         /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
11345         /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
11346         /// signing data.
11347         pub signer_provider: SP,
11348
11349         /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11350         ///
11351         /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
11352         pub fee_estimator: F,
11353         /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
11354         ///
11355         /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
11356         /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
11357         /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
11358         pub chain_monitor: M,
11359
11360         /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
11361         /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
11362         /// force-closed during deserialization.
11363         pub tx_broadcaster: T,
11364         /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
11365         /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
11366         ///
11367         /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
11368         pub router: R,
11369         /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
11370         /// deserialization.
11371         pub logger: L,
11372         /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
11373         /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
11374         pub default_config: UserConfig,
11375
11376         /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
11377         /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
11378         ///
11379         /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
11380         /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
11381         /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
11382         /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
11383         ///
11384         /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
11385         /// this struct.
11386         ///
11387         /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
11388         pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>,
11389 }
11390
11391 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11392                 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
11393 where
11394         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11395         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11396         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11397         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11398         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11399         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11400         R::Target: Router,
11401         L::Target: Logger,
11402 {
11403         /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
11404         /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
11405         /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
11406         pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
11407                         mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>>) -> Self {
11408                 Self {
11409                         entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
11410                         channel_monitors: hash_map_from_iter(
11411                                 channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) })
11412                         ),
11413                 }
11414         }
11415 }
11416
11417 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
11418 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
11419 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11420         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
11421 where
11422         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11423         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11424         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11425         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11426         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11427         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11428         R::Target: Router,
11429         L::Target: Logger,
11430 {
11431         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11432                 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
11433                 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
11434         }
11435 }
11436
11437 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
11438         ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
11439 where
11440         M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
11441         T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
11442         ES::Target: EntropySource,
11443         NS::Target: NodeSigner,
11444         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
11445         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
11446         R::Target: Router,
11447         L::Target: Logger,
11448 {
11449         fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
11450                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
11451
11452                 let chain_hash: ChainHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11453                 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11454                 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11455
11456                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
11457
11458                 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11459                 let mut funding_txo_set = hash_set_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11460                 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11461                 let mut outpoint_to_peer = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11462                 let mut short_to_chan_info = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
11463                 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
11464                 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
11465                 let mut funding_txo_to_channel_id = hash_map_with_capacity(channel_count as usize);
11466                 for _ in 0..channel_count {
11467                         let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
11468                                 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
11469                         ))?;
11470                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
11471                         let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11472                         funding_txo_to_channel_id.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.channel_id());
11473                         funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
11474                         if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
11475                                 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
11476                                                 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
11477                                                 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
11478                                                 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11479                                         // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
11480                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
11481                                         log_error!(logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
11482                                         if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
11483                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
11484                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
11485                                         }
11486                                         if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
11487                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
11488                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
11489                                         }
11490                                         if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
11491                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
11492                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11493                                         }
11494                                         if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
11495                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
11496                                                         &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
11497                                         }
11498                                         let mut shutdown_result = channel.context.force_shutdown(true, ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager);
11499                                         if shutdown_result.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid.is_some() {
11500                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11501                                         }
11502                                         if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update)) = shutdown_result.monitor_update {
11503                                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11504                                                         counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, channel_id, update
11505                                                 });
11506                                         }
11507                                         failed_htlcs.append(&mut shutdown_result.dropped_outbound_htlcs);
11508                                         channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11509                                                 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11510                                                 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11511                                                 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
11512                                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11513                                                 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11514                                                 channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11515                                         }, None));
11516                                         for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
11517                                                 let mut found_htlc = false;
11518                                                 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11519                                                         if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
11520                                                 }
11521                                                 if !found_htlc {
11522                                                         // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
11523                                                         // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
11524                                                         // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
11525                                                         // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
11526                                                         // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
11527                                                         // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
11528                                                         // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
11529                                                         log_info!(logger,
11530                                                                 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
11531                                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
11532                                                         failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11533                                                 }
11534                                         }
11535                                 } else {
11536                                         log_info!(logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
11537                                                 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
11538                                                 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11539                                         if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
11540                                                 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
11541                                         }
11542                                         if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
11543                                                 outpoint_to_peer.insert(funding_txo, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
11544                                         }
11545                                         match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
11546                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11547                                                         let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
11548                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11549                                                 },
11550                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11551                                                         let mut by_id_map = new_hash_map();
11552                                                         by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
11553                                                         entry.insert(by_id_map);
11554                                                 }
11555                                         }
11556                                 }
11557                         } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
11558                                 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
11559                                 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
11560                                 // safely discard the channel.
11561                                 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
11562                                 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
11563                                         channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
11564                                         user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
11565                                         reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
11566                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
11567                                         channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
11568                                         channel_funding_txo: channel.context.get_funding_txo(),
11569                                 }, None));
11570                         } else {
11571                                 log_error!(logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
11572                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11573                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11574                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11575                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11576                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11577                         }
11578                 }
11579
11580                 for (funding_txo, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11581                         if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
11582                                 let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11583                                 let channel_id = monitor.channel_id();
11584                                 log_info!(logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
11585                                         &channel_id);
11586                                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
11587                                         update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
11588                                         counterparty_node_id: None,
11589                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
11590                                         channel_id: Some(monitor.channel_id()),
11591                                 };
11592                                 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, channel_id, monitor_update)));
11593                         }
11594                 }
11595
11596                 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
11597                 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11598                 let mut forward_htlcs = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11599                 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
11600                         let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
11601                         let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11602                         let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
11603                         for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
11604                                 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
11605                         }
11606                         forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
11607                 }
11608
11609                 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11610                 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
11611                 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
11612                         let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
11613                         let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11614                         let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
11615                         for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
11616                                 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
11617                         }
11618                         claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
11619                 }
11620
11621                 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
11622                         PeerState {
11623                                 channel_by_id,
11624                                 inbound_channel_request_by_id: new_hash_map(),
11625                                 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
11626                                 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
11627                                 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11628                                 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
11629                                 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
11630                                 is_connected: false,
11631                         }
11632                 };
11633
11634                 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11635                 let mut per_peer_state = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
11636                 for _ in 0..peer_count {
11637                         let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
11638                         let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(new_hash_map());
11639                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
11640                         peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
11641                         per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
11642                 }
11643
11644                 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11645                 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
11646                         VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
11647                 for _ in 0..event_count {
11648                         match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
11649                                 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
11650                                 None => continue,
11651                         }
11652                 }
11653
11654                 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11655                 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
11656                         match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
11657                                 0 => {
11658                                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
11659                                         // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
11660                                         // on-startup monitor updates.
11661                                         let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
11662                                         let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
11663                                 }
11664                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
11665                         }
11666                 }
11667
11668                 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
11669                 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11670
11671                 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11672                 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
11673                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
11674                         if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
11675                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11676                         }
11677                 }
11678
11679                 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
11680                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
11681                         hash_map_with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
11682                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
11683                         let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
11684                         let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
11685                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv]),
11686                         };
11687                         if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
11688                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
11689                         };
11690                 }
11691
11692                 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
11693                 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
11694                 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
11695                 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(new_hash_map());
11696                 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
11697                 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11698                 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
11699                 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
11700                 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
11701                 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(new_hash_map());
11702                 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
11703                 let mut events_override = None;
11704                 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
11705                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs: Option<HashMap<u64, Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>>> = None;
11706                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
11707                         (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
11708                         (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
11709                         (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
11710                         (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
11711                         (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
11712                         (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
11713                         (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
11714                         (8, events_override, option),
11715                         (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
11716                         (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
11717                         (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
11718                         (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
11719                         (14, decode_update_add_htlcs, option),
11720                 });
11721                 let mut decode_update_add_htlcs = decode_update_add_htlcs.unwrap_or_else(|| new_hash_map());
11722                 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
11723                         fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11724                 }
11725
11726                 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
11727                         probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
11728                 }
11729
11730                 if let Some(events) = events_override {
11731                         pending_events_read = events;
11732                 }
11733
11734                 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
11735                         pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
11736                 }
11737
11738                 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
11739                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
11740                 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
11741                         let mut outbounds = new_hash_map();
11742                         for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
11743                                 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
11744                         }
11745                         pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
11746                 }
11747                 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
11748                         pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
11749                         retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
11750                 };
11751
11752                 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
11753                 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
11754                 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
11755                 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
11756                 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
11757                 //
11758                 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
11759                 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
11760                 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
11761                 //
11762                 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
11763                 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
11764                 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
11765                         ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
11766                          $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $logger: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
11767                         ) => { {
11768                                 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
11769                                 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
11770                                 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
11771                                         log_trace!($logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
11772                                                 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$monitor.channel_id());
11773                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
11774                                         pending_background_events.push(
11775                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
11776                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11777                                                         funding_txo: $funding_txo,
11778                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11779                                                         update: update.clone(),
11780                                                 });
11781                                 }
11782                                 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
11783                                         // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
11784                                         // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
11785                                         // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
11786                                         pending_background_events.push(
11787                                                 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
11788                                                         counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
11789                                                         channel_id: $monitor.channel_id(),
11790                                                 });
11791                                 }
11792                                 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
11793                                         log_error!($logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
11794                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11795                                 }
11796                                 max_in_flight_update_id
11797                         } }
11798                 }
11799
11800                 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
11801                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
11802                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
11803                         for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
11804                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
11805                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
11806
11807                                         // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
11808                                         // discarded.
11809                                         let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
11810                                         let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
11811                                                 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
11812                                         let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
11813                                         if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
11814                                                 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
11815                                                         max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
11816                                                                 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
11817                                                                         funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, ""));
11818                                                 }
11819                                         }
11820                                         if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
11821                                                 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return DangerousValue:
11822                                                 log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11823                                                 log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
11824                                                         chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
11825                                                 log_error!(logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
11826                                                 log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11827                                                 log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11828                                                 log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11829                                                 log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11830                                                 return Err(DecodeError::DangerousValue);
11831                                         }
11832                                 } else {
11833                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
11834                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
11835                                         debug_assert!(false);
11836                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11837                                 }
11838                         }
11839                 }
11840
11841                 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
11842                         for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
11843                                 let channel_id = funding_txo_to_channel_id.get(&funding_txo).copied();
11844                                 let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(counterparty_id), channel_id);
11845                                 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
11846                                         // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
11847                                         // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
11848                                         // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
11849                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
11850                                                 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(new_hash_map()))
11851                                         });
11852                                         let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
11853                                         handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
11854                                                 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, logger, "closed ");
11855                                 } else {
11856                                         log_error!(logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
11857                                         log_error!(logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.", if let Some(channel_id) =
11858                                                 channel_id { channel_id.to_string() } else { format!("with outpoint {}", funding_txo) } );
11859                                         log_error!(logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
11860                                         log_error!(logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
11861                                         log_error!(logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
11862                                         log_error!(logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
11863                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11864                                 }
11865                         }
11866                 }
11867
11868                 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
11869                 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
11870
11871                 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
11872                 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
11873                 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
11874                 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
11875
11876                 {
11877                         // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
11878                         // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
11879                         // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
11880                         // corresponding `Channel` at all).
11881                         // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
11882                         // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
11883                         // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
11884                         // 0.0.102+
11885                         for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
11886                                 let counterparty_opt = outpoint_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0);
11887                                 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
11888                                         let logger = WithChannelMonitor::from(&args.logger, monitor);
11889                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
11890                                                 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
11891                                                         if path.hops.is_empty() {
11892                                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
11893                                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
11894                                                         }
11895
11896                                                         let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
11897                                                         let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
11898                                                         session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
11899                                                         match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
11900                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
11901                                                                         let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
11902                                                                         log_info!(logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
11903                                                                                 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), htlc.payment_hash);
11904                                                                 },
11905                                                                 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
11906                                                                         let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
11907                                                                         entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
11908                                                                                 retry_strategy: None,
11909                                                                                 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
11910                                                                                 payment_params: None,
11911                                                                                 session_privs: hash_set_from_iter([session_priv_bytes]),
11912                                                                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
11913                                                                                 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11914                                                                                 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11915                                                                                 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11916                                                                                 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11917                                                                                 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
11918                                                                                 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
11919                                                                                 total_msat: path_amt,
11920                                                                                 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
11921                                                                                 remaining_max_total_routing_fee_msat: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
11922                                                                         });
11923                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
11924                                                                                 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash,  log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
11925                                                                 }
11926                                                         }
11927                                                 }
11928                                         }
11929                                         for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
11930                                                 match htlc_source {
11931                                                         HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
11932                                                                 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
11933                                                                         info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
11934                                                                                 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
11935                                                                 };
11936                                                                 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
11937                                                                 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
11938                                                                 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
11939                                                                 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
11940                                                                 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
11941                                                                 decode_update_add_htlcs.retain(|scid, update_add_htlcs| {
11942                                                                         update_add_htlcs.retain(|update_add_htlc| {
11943                                                                                 let matches = *scid == prev_hop_data.short_channel_id &&
11944                                                                                         update_add_htlc.htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id;
11945                                                                                 if matches {
11946                                                                                         log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-decode HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11947                                                                                                 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11948                                                                                 }
11949                                                                                 !matches
11950                                                                         });
11951                                                                         !update_add_htlcs.is_empty()
11952                                                                 });
11953                                                                 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
11954                                                                         forwards.retain(|forward| {
11955                                                                                 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
11956                                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11957                                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11958                                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11959                                                                                                 false
11960                                                                                         } else { true }
11961                                                                                 } else { true }
11962                                                                         });
11963                                                                         !forwards.is_empty()
11964                                                                 });
11965                                                                 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
11966                                                                         if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
11967                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
11968                                                                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.channel_id());
11969                                                                                 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
11970                                                                                         if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
11971                                                                                                 intercepted_id != ev_id
11972                                                                                         } else { true }
11973                                                                                 });
11974                                                                                 false
11975                                                                         } else { true }
11976                                                                 });
11977                                                         },
11978                                                         HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
11979                                                                 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
11980                                                                         let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
11981                                                                         // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
11982                                                                         // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
11983                                                                         // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
11984                                                                         // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
11985                                                                         // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
11986                                                                         // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
11987                                                                         // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
11988                                                                         // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
11989                                                                         let compl_action =
11990                                                                                 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
11991                                                                                         channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
11992                                                                                         channel_id: monitor.channel_id(),
11993                                                                                         counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
11994                                                                                 };
11995                                                                         pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
11996                                                                                 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &&logger);
11997                                                                         pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
11998                                                                 }
11999                                                         },
12000                                                 }
12001                                         }
12002                                 }
12003
12004                                 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
12005                                 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
12006                                 // payments.
12007                                 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
12008                                         .into_iter()
12009                                         .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
12010                                                 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
12011                                                         if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
12012                                                                 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
12013                                                                         // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
12014                                                                         // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
12015                                                                         // channel_id -> peer map entry).
12016                                                                         counterparty_opt.is_none(),
12017                                                                         counterparty_opt.cloned().or(monitor.get_counterparty_node_id()),
12018                                                                         monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor.channel_id()))
12019                                                         } else { None }
12020                                                 } else {
12021                                                         // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
12022                                                         // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
12023                                                         // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
12024                                                         // channel still live case here.
12025                                                         None
12026                                                 }
12027                                         });
12028                                 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
12029                                         pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
12030                                 }
12031                         }
12032                 }
12033
12034                 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || !decode_update_add_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
12035                         // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
12036                         // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
12037                         // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
12038                         // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
12039                         // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
12040                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
12041                                 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
12042                         }, None));
12043                 }
12044
12045                 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
12046                 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
12047
12048                 let mut claimable_payments = hash_map_with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
12049                 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
12050                         if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12051                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12052                         }
12053                         if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
12054                                 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
12055                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12056                                 }
12057                                 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
12058                                         purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
12059                                 {
12060                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12061                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
12062                                         });
12063                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12064                                 }
12065                         } else {
12066                                 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
12067                                         let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12068                                                 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12069                                         });
12070                                         if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12071                                 }
12072                         }
12073                 } else {
12074                         // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
12075                         // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
12076                         for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
12077                                 if htlcs.is_empty() {
12078                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12079                                 }
12080                                 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
12081                                         OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
12082                                                 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
12083                                                         events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
12084                                                                 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
12085                                                                         Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
12086                                                                         None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
12087                                                                                 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
12088                                                                                 Err(()) => {
12089                                                                                         log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
12090                                                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12091                                                                                 }
12092                                                                         }
12093                                                                 },
12094                                                                 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
12095                                                         }
12096                                                 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
12097                                         },
12098                                         OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
12099                                                 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
12100                                 };
12101                                 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
12102                                         purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
12103                                 });
12104                         }
12105                 }
12106
12107                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
12108                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
12109
12110                 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
12111                         Ok(key) => key,
12112                         Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
12113                 };
12114                 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
12115                         if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
12116                                 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
12117                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12118                         }
12119                 }
12120
12121                 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = new_hash_set();
12122                 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
12123                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12124                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12125                         for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
12126                                 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
12127                                         let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &chan.context);
12128                                         if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
12129                                                 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
12130                                                 loop {
12131                                                         outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
12132                                                                 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &chain_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
12133                                                         if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
12134                                                 }
12135                                                 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
12136                                         } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
12137                                                 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12138                                                 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12139                                                 log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12140                                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12141                                         }
12142                                         if chan.context.is_usable() {
12143                                                 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
12144                                                         // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
12145                                                         // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
12146                                                         log_error!(logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
12147                                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12148                                                 }
12149                                         }
12150                                 } else {
12151                                         // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
12152                                         // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
12153                                         debug_assert!(false);
12154                                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12155                                 }
12156                         }
12157                 }
12158
12159                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
12160
12161                 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
12162                         for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
12163                                 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
12164                                         log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
12165                                         let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
12166                                         let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
12167                                         let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
12168                                         if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
12169                                                 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
12170                                                         .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
12171                                                 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
12172                                         }
12173                                         for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
12174                                                 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
12175
12176                                                 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
12177                                                 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
12178                                                 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
12179                                                 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
12180                                                 //
12181                                                 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
12182                                                 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
12183                                                 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
12184                                                 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
12185                                                 // reason to.
12186                                                 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
12187                                                 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
12188                                                 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
12189                                                 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
12190                                                 // restart.
12191                                                 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.channel_id;
12192                                                 if let Some(peer_node_id) = outpoint_to_peer.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12193                                                         let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
12194                                                         let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
12195                                                         let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
12196                                                         if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
12197                                                                 let logger = WithChannelContext::from(&args.logger, &channel.context);
12198                                                                 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &&logger);
12199                                                         }
12200                                                 }
12201                                                 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
12202                                                         previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
12203                                                 }
12204                                         }
12205                                         pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
12206                                                 receiver_node_id,
12207                                                 payment_hash,
12208                                                 purpose: payment.purpose,
12209                                                 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
12210                                                 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
12211                                                 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
12212                                         }, None));
12213                                 }
12214                         }
12215                 }
12216
12217                 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
12218                         if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
12219                                 for (channel_id, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
12220                                         let logger = WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), Some(*channel_id));
12221                                         for action in actions.iter() {
12222                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
12223                                                         downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
12224                                                                 Some((blocked_node_id, _blocked_channel_outpoint, blocked_channel_id, blocking_action)), ..
12225                                                 } = action {
12226                                                         if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(blocked_node_id) {
12227                                                                 log_trace!(logger,
12228                                                                         "Holding the next revoke_and_ack from {} until the preimage is durably persisted in the inbound edge's ChannelMonitor",
12229                                                                         blocked_channel_id);
12230                                                                 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
12231                                                                         .entry(*blocked_channel_id)
12232                                                                         .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
12233                                                         } else {
12234                                                                 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
12235                                                                 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
12236                                                                 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
12237                                                                 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
12238                                                                 // anymore.
12239                                                         }
12240                                                 }
12241                                                 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::FreeOtherChannelImmediately { .. } = action {
12242                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Non-event-generating channel freeing should not appear in our queue");
12243                                                 }
12244                                         }
12245                                 }
12246                                 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
12247                         } else {
12248                                 log_error!(WithContext::from(&args.logger, Some(node_id), None), "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
12249                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
12250                         }
12251                 }
12252
12253                 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
12254                         chain_hash,
12255                         fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
12256                         chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
12257                         tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
12258                         router: args.router,
12259
12260                         best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
12261
12262                         inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
12263                         pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
12264                         pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
12265                         pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
12266
12267                         forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
12268                         decode_update_add_htlcs: Mutex::new(decode_update_add_htlcs),
12269                         claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
12270                         outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
12271                         outpoint_to_peer: Mutex::new(outpoint_to_peer),
12272                         short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
12273                         fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
12274
12275                         probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
12276
12277                         our_network_pubkey,
12278                         secp_ctx,
12279
12280                         highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
12281
12282                         per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
12283
12284                         pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
12285                         pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
12286                         pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
12287                         total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
12288                         background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
12289
12290                         event_persist_notifier: Notifier::new(),
12291                         needs_persist_flag: AtomicBool::new(false),
12292
12293                         funding_batch_states: Mutex::new(BTreeMap::new()),
12294
12295                         pending_offers_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12296
12297                         pending_broadcast_messages: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
12298
12299                         entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
12300                         node_signer: args.node_signer,
12301                         signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
12302
12303                         logger: args.logger,
12304                         default_configuration: args.default_config,
12305                 };
12306
12307                 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
12308                         let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
12309                         let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
12310                         let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
12311                         channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
12312                 }
12313
12314                 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding, downstream_channel_id) in pending_claims_to_replay {
12315                         // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
12316                         // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
12317                         // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
12318                         channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value), None,
12319                                 downstream_closed, true, downstream_node_id, downstream_funding,
12320                                 downstream_channel_id, None
12321                         );
12322                 }
12323
12324                 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
12325                 //connection or two.
12326
12327                 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
12328         }
12329 }
12330
12331 #[cfg(test)]
12332 mod tests {
12333         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
12334         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
12335         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
12336         use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
12337         use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
12338         use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
12339         use crate::ln::ChannelId;
12340         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{create_recv_pending_htlc_info, HTLCForwardInfo, inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
12341         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
12342         use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
12343         use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
12344         use crate::prelude::*;
12345         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
12346         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
12347         use crate::util::ser::Writeable;
12348         use crate::util::test_utils;
12349         use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
12350         use crate::sign::EntropySource;
12351
12352         #[test]
12353         fn test_notify_limits() {
12354                 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
12355                 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
12356                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12357                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12358                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12359                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12360
12361                 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
12362                 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
12363                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12364                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12365                 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12366
12367                 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12368
12369                 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
12370                 // to connect messages with new values
12371                 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12372                 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
12373                 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12374                         &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12375                 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
12376                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
12377
12378                 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
12379                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12380                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12381                 // ... but the last node should not.
12382                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12383                 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
12384                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12385                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12386
12387                 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
12388                 // about the channel.
12389                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12390                 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12391                 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12392
12393                 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
12394                 // parties.
12395                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12396                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12397                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
12398                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
12399                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12400                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12401
12402                 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
12403                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12404                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12405
12406                 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
12407                 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
12408                 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
12409                 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
12410                 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
12411                 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
12412
12413                 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
12414                 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
12415                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12416                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12417                 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12418                 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12419                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12420                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12421
12422                 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
12423                 // the channel info has updated.
12424                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
12425                 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
12426                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12427                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_event_or_persistence_needed_future().poll_is_complete());
12428                 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
12429                 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
12430         }
12431
12432         #[test]
12433         fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
12434                 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
12435                 // expected.
12436                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12437                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12438                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12439                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12440                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12441
12442                 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
12443                 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
12444                 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
12445                 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
12446
12447                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
12448                 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
12449                 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
12450                 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
12451                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
12452                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
12453                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
12454                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
12455                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12456                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12457                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12458                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
12459
12460                 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
12461                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12462                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12463                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12464                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12465                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12466                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12467                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12468                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12469                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12470                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12471                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12472                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
12473                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12474                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12475                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12476                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12477                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12478                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12479                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12480                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12481                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12482                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
12483
12484                 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
12485                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
12486                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
12487                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12488                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12489                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12490                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
12491
12492                 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
12493                 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
12494                 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
12495                 // lightning messages manually.
12496                 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
12497                 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
12498                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
12499
12500                 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12501                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12502                 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
12503                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
12504                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12505                 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12506                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
12507                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12508                 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12509                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
12510                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12511                 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12512                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
12513                 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12514                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12515                 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12516                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
12517                 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12518                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12519                 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
12520                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12521                 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
12522                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12523                 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12524                 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
12525                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12526
12527                 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
12528                 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
12529                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
12530                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
12531                 match events[0] {
12532                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12533                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12534                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12535                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12536                         },
12537                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12538                 }
12539                 match events[1] {
12540                         Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
12541                                 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
12542                                 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
12543                                 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
12544                         },
12545                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12546                 }
12547         }
12548
12549         #[test]
12550         fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
12551                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
12552                 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
12553         }
12554
12555         fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
12556                 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
12557                 //      outbound regular payment fails as expected.
12558                 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
12559                 //      fails as expected.
12560                 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
12561                 //      payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
12562                 //      reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
12563                 //      secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
12564                 //      `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
12565                 //      payment secrets and reject otherwise.
12566                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12567                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12568                 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12569                 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
12570                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12571                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12572                 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12573                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12574                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12575
12576                 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
12577                 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
12578                 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, ..) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
12579
12580                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12581                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12582                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
12583                         TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
12584                 let route = find_route(
12585                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12586                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12587                 ).unwrap();
12588                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12589                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12590                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12591                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12592                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12593                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12594                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12595                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12596                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12597                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12598                 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
12599                 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
12600                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12601                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12602                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12603                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12604                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12605                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12606                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12607                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12608                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12609                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12610                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12611                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12612
12613                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12614                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12615
12616                 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12617                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12618                 let route = find_route(
12619                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12620                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12621                 ).unwrap();
12622                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12623                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
12624                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12625                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12626                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12627                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12628                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12629                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12630
12631                 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
12632                 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12633                 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12634                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
12635                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12636                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12637                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12638                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12639                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12640                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12641                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12642                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12643                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12644                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12645                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12646                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12647                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12648                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12649                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12650                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12651                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12652                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12653                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12654                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12655
12656                 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
12657                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12658
12659                 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
12660                 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
12661                 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12662                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
12663                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12664                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12665                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12666                 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
12667                 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
12668                 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
12669
12670                 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
12671                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12672                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
12673                         100_000
12674                 );
12675                 let route = find_route(
12676                         &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
12677                         None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12678                 ).unwrap();
12679                 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
12680                 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
12681                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
12682                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12683                 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12684                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
12685                 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
12686                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
12687                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
12688                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
12689                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
12690                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
12691                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
12692                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
12693                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12694                 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
12695                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12696                 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
12697                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12698                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12699                 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
12700                 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
12701                 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
12702
12703                 // Finally, claim the original payment.
12704                 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
12705         }
12706
12707         #[test]
12708         fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
12709                 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
12710                 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
12711                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12712                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12713                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12714                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12715
12716                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12717                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12718
12719                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12720                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12721                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12722                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12723                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12724                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12725                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12726                 let route = find_route(
12727                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12728                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12729                 ).unwrap();
12730
12731                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12732                 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
12733                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
12734                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12735                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
12736                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12737                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12738
12739                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12740                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12741                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12742                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12743                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12744                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12745                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12746
12747                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
12748         }
12749
12750         #[test]
12751         fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
12752                 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
12753                 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
12754                 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
12755                 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
12756                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12757                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12758                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
12759                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12760
12761                 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
12762                 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12763
12764                 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
12765                 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
12766                         PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
12767                 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph;
12768                 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
12769                 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
12770                 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
12771                 let route = find_route(
12772                         &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
12773                         nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &Default::default(), &random_seed_bytes
12774                 ).unwrap();
12775
12776                 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
12777                 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
12778                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).to_byte_array());
12779                 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
12780                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
12781                 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
12782                         RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
12783                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
12784                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12785
12786                 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12787                 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
12788                 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
12789                 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
12790                 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
12791                 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
12792                 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
12793
12794                 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
12795         }
12796
12797         #[test]
12798         fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
12799                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
12800                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
12801                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
12802                 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12803
12804                 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12805                 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12806                 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12807                 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
12808
12809                 // Marshall an MPP route.
12810                 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
12811                 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
12812                 route.paths.push(path);
12813                 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
12814                 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
12815                 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
12816                 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
12817                 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
12818                 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
12819
12820                 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
12821                         RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
12822                 .unwrap_err() {
12823                         PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
12824                                 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
12825                         },
12826                         _ => panic!("unexpected error")
12827                 }
12828         }
12829
12830         #[test]
12831         fn test_channel_update_cached() {
12832                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
12833                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
12834                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
12835                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12836
12837                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12838
12839                 nodes[0].node.force_close_channel_with_peer(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), None, true).unwrap();
12840                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12841                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12842
12843                 // Confirm that the channel_update was not sent immediately to node[1] but was cached.
12844                 let node_1_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12845                 assert_eq!(node_1_events.len(), 0);
12846
12847                 {
12848                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been added to node[0] pending broadcast messages
12849                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12850                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 1);
12851                 }
12852
12853                 // Test that we do not retrieve the pending broadcast messages when we are not connected to any peer
12854                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12855                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12856
12857                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id());
12858                 nodes[2].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12859
12860                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12861                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 0);
12862
12863                 // Now we reconnect to a peer
12864                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12865                         features: nodes[2].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12866                 }, true).unwrap();
12867                 nodes[2].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
12868                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
12869                 }, false).unwrap();
12870
12871                 // Confirm that get_and_clear_pending_msg_events correctly captures pending broadcast messages
12872                 let node_0_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
12873                 assert_eq!(node_0_events.len(), 1);
12874                 match &node_0_events[0] {
12875                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => (),
12876                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
12877                 }
12878                 {
12879                         // Assert that ChannelUpdate message has been cleared from nodes[0] pending broadcast messages
12880                         let pending_broadcast_messages= nodes[0].node.pending_broadcast_messages.lock().unwrap();
12881                         assert_eq!(pending_broadcast_messages.len(), 0);
12882                 }
12883         }
12884
12885         #[test]
12886         fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
12887                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12888                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12889                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12890                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12891
12892                 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
12893
12894                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12895                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12896
12897                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
12898                 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
12899                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
12900                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
12901
12902                 {
12903                         // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
12904                         // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
12905                         let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
12906                         // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
12907                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
12908                         assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
12909                 }
12910
12911                 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
12912
12913                 {
12914                         // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
12915                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
12916                 }
12917         }
12918
12919         #[test]
12920         fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
12921                 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
12922                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12923                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12924                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12925                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12926
12927                 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
12928                 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
12929                         payment_secret,
12930                         total_msat: 100_000,
12931                 };
12932
12933                 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
12934                 // payment verification fails as expected.
12935                 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
12936                 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
12937                 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
12938                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
12939                         Err(()) => {
12940                                 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
12941                         }
12942                 }
12943
12944                 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
12945                 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
12946         }
12947
12948         #[test]
12949         fn test_outpoint_to_peer_coverage() {
12950                 // Test that the `ChannelManager:outpoint_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
12951                 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
12952                 // the channel is successfully closed.
12953                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
12954                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
12955                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
12956                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
12957
12958                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
12959                 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12960                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
12961                 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12962                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
12963
12964                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
12965                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().to_byte_array());
12966                 {
12967                         // Ensure that the `outpoint_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
12968                         // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
12969                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12970                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12971                 }
12972
12973                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
12974                 {
12975                         // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
12976                         // as it has the funding transaction.
12977                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12978                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12979                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12980                 }
12981
12982                 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
12983
12984                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
12985
12986                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
12987                 {
12988                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12989                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
12990                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
12991                 }
12992                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
12993
12994                 {
12995                         // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as
12996                         // soon as it has the funding transaction.
12997                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
12998                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
12999                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13000                 }
13001                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13002                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13003                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13004                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13005                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13006                 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
13007                 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
13008                 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
13009
13010                 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13011                 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
13012                 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13013                 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
13014
13015                 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13016                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
13017                 {
13018                         // Assert that the channel is kept in the `outpoint_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
13019                         // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
13020                         // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
13021                         // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
13022                         let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13023                         assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
13024                         assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13025                 }
13026
13027                 {
13028                         // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
13029                         // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
13030                         // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
13031                         // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map.
13032                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13033                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13034                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13035                 }
13036
13037                 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
13038                 {
13039                         // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
13040                         // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
13041                         // closing transaction).
13042                         // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `outpoint_to_peer` map as it can be
13043                         // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
13044                         assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13045
13046                         // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s  `outpoint_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
13047                         // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
13048                         let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
13049                         assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
13050                         assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&funding_output));
13051                 }
13052
13053                 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13054
13055                 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
13056                 {
13057                         // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `outpoint_to_peer` map once
13058                         // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
13059                         assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.outpoint_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
13060                 }
13061                 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13062
13063                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13064                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
13065         }
13066
13067         fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13068                 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
13069                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13070         }
13071
13072         fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
13073                 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
13074                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13075         }
13076
13077         fn check_channel_unavailable_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_channel_id: ChannelId, peer_node_id: PublicKey) {
13078                 let expected_message = format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_channel_id, peer_node_id);
13079                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13080         }
13081
13082         fn check_api_misuse_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13083                 let expected_message = "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_string();
13084                 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
13085         }
13086
13087         fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
13088                 match res_err {
13089                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
13090                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13091                         },
13092                         Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
13093                                 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
13094                         },
13095                         Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
13096                         Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
13097                 }
13098         }
13099
13100         #[test]
13101         fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
13102                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
13103                 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
13104                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
13105                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13106                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13107                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13108                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13109
13110                 // Dummy values
13111                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13112                 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
13113                 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
13114
13115                 // Test the API functions.
13116                 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None, None), unkown_public_key);
13117
13118                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
13119
13120                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13121
13122                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13123
13124                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
13125
13126                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
13127
13128                 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
13129         }
13130
13131         #[test]
13132         fn test_api_calls_with_unavailable_channel() {
13133                 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` and a `channel_id`
13134                 // as input, behaves as expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is a known peer in the
13135                 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map, but the peer state doesn't contain a channel with
13136                 // the given `channel_id`.
13137                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13138                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13139                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
13140                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13141
13142                 let counterparty_node_id = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
13143
13144                 // Dummy values
13145                 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
13146
13147                 // Test the API functions.
13148                 check_api_misuse_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id, 42));
13149
13150                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13151
13152                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13153
13154                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &counterparty_node_id), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13155
13156                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(InterceptId([0; 32]), &channel_id, counterparty_node_id, 1_000_000), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13157
13158                 check_channel_unavailable_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&counterparty_node_id, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
13159         }
13160
13161         #[test]
13162         fn test_connection_limiting() {
13163                 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
13164                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13165                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13166                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13167                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13168
13169                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13170
13171                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13172                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13173
13174                 let mut funding_tx = None;
13175                 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13176                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13177                         let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13178
13179                         if idx == 0 {
13180                                 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
13181                                 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
13182                                 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
13183                                 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
13184                                 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13185
13186                                 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
13187                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
13188                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13189
13190                                 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13191
13192                                 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
13193                                 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
13194                                 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13195                         }
13196                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13197                 }
13198
13199                 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
13200                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(
13201                         &nodes[0].keys_manager);
13202                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13203                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13204                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13205
13206                 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
13207                 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
13208                 // limit.
13209                 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
13210                 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
13211                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13212                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13213                         peer_pks.push(random_pk);
13214                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13215                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13216                         }, true).unwrap();
13217                 }
13218                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13219                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13220                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13221                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13222                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13223
13224                 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
13225                 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
13226                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13227                 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13228                 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
13229                 for ev in chan_closed_events {
13230                         if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
13231                 }
13232                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13233                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13234                 }, true).unwrap();
13235                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13236                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13237                 }, true).unwrap_err();
13238
13239                 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
13240                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13241                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13242                 }, false).unwrap();
13243                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13244
13245                 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
13246                 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
13247                 // open channels.
13248                 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
13249                 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13250                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
13251                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
13252                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13253                 }
13254                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13255                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13256                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13257
13258                 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
13259                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13260                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
13261
13262                 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
13263                 // "protected" and can connect again.
13264                 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
13265                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13266                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13267                 }, true).unwrap();
13268                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13269
13270                 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
13271                 // last_random_pk.
13272                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13273                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13274         }
13275
13276         #[test]
13277         fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
13278                 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
13279                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13280                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13281                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
13282                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13283
13284                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13285
13286                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13287                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13288
13289                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
13290                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13291                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13292                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13293                 }
13294
13295                 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
13296                 // rejected.
13297                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13298                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13299                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13300
13301                 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
13302                 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13303                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13304
13305                 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
13306                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13307                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
13308                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13309         }
13310
13311         #[test]
13312         fn test_0conf_limiting() {
13313                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13314                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13315                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13316                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13317                 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
13318                 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13319                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
13320                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13321
13322                 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
13323
13324                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13325                 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13326
13327                 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
13328                 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
13329                         let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13330                                 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13331                         nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13332                                 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13333                         }, true).unwrap();
13334
13335                         nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13336                         let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13337                         match events[0] {
13338                                 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13339                                         nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13340                                 }
13341                                 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13342                         }
13343                         get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
13344                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
13345                 }
13346
13347                 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
13348                 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
13349                         &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
13350                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
13351                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13352                 }, true).unwrap();
13353                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13354                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13355                 match events[0] {
13356                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13357                                 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
13358                                         Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
13359                                                 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
13360                                         _ => panic!(),
13361                                 }
13362                         }
13363                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13364                 }
13365                 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
13366                         open_channel_msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id);
13367
13368                 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
13369                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
13370                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13371                 match events[0] {
13372                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13373                                 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
13374                         }
13375                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13376                 }
13377                 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
13378         }
13379
13380         #[test]
13381         fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
13382                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13383                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13384                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13385                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13386                 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
13387                 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
13388                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13389                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13390                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13391                         payment_metadata: None,
13392                         keysend_preimage: None,
13393                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13394                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13395                         }),
13396                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13397                 };
13398                 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
13399                 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
13400                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13401                 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundHTLCErr { err_code, .. }) =
13402                         create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13403                                 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13404                                 current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend)
13405                 {
13406                         assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
13407                 } else { panic!(); }
13408
13409                 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
13410                 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
13411                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13412                         cltv_expiry_height: 42,
13413                         payment_metadata: None,
13414                         keysend_preimage: None,
13415                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13416                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
13417                         }),
13418                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13419                 };
13420                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13421                 assert!(create_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
13422                         sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat),
13423                         current_height, node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend).is_ok());
13424         }
13425
13426         #[test]
13427         fn test_final_incorrect_cltv(){
13428                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13429                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13430                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13431                 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13432
13433                 let current_height: u32 = node[0].node.best_block.read().unwrap().height;
13434                 let result = create_recv_pending_htlc_info(msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
13435                         sender_intended_htlc_amt_msat: 100,
13436                         cltv_expiry_height: 22,
13437                         payment_metadata: None,
13438                         keysend_preimage: None,
13439                         payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
13440                                 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: 100,
13441                         }),
13442                         custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
13443                 }, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]), 100, 23, None, true, None, current_height,
13444                         node[0].node.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend);
13445
13446                 // Should not return an error as this condition:
13447                 // https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/4dcc377209509b13cf89a4b91fde7d478f5b46d8/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L334
13448                 // is not satisfied.
13449                 assert!(result.is_ok());
13450         }
13451
13452         #[test]
13453         fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
13454                 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
13455                 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
13456                 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
13457                 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13458
13459                 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
13460                 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13461
13462                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
13463                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
13464                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
13465                         &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
13466                 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13467
13468                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13469                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13470
13471                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13472                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13473                 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13474                 match &msg_events[0] {
13475                         MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
13476                                 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13477                                 match action {
13478                                         ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
13479                                                 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
13480                                         _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
13481                                 }
13482                         }
13483                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13484                 }
13485
13486                 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13487                 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13488                 match events[0] {
13489                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
13490                                 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
13491                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13492                 }
13493                 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13494         }
13495
13496         #[test]
13497         fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
13498                 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
13499                 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
13500                 // the channel without the anchors feature.
13501                 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13502                 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
13503                 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
13504                 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
13505                 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
13506                 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
13507                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
13508
13509                 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None, None).unwrap();
13510                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13511                 assert!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13512
13513                 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
13514                 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13515                 match events[0] {
13516                         Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
13517                                 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13518                         }
13519                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13520                 }
13521
13522                 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13523                 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
13524
13525                 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13526                 assert!(!open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
13527
13528                 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
13529                 // not have generated any events.
13530                 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
13531         }
13532
13533         #[test]
13534         fn test_update_channel_config() {
13535                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13536                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13537                 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13538                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13539                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13540                 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13541                 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
13542
13543                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13544                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13545                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13546
13547                 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
13548                 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
13549                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
13550                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13551                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13552                 match &events[0] {
13553                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13554                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13555                 }
13556
13557                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
13558                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13559                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13560
13561                 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
13562                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13563                         cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
13564                         ..Default::default()
13565                 }).unwrap();
13566                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13567                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13568                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13569                 match &events[0] {
13570                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13571                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13572                 }
13573
13574                 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
13575                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13576                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13577                         ..Default::default()
13578                 }).unwrap();
13579                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
13580                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
13581                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13582                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
13583                 match &events[0] {
13584                         MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13585                         _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
13586                 }
13587
13588                 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
13589                 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
13590                 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
13591                 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
13592                 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
13593                 assert!(
13594                         matches!(
13595                                 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
13596                                         forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
13597                                         ..Default::default()
13598                                 }),
13599                                 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
13600                         )
13601                 );
13602                 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
13603                 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
13604                 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13605                 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
13606         }
13607
13608         #[test]
13609         fn test_payment_display() {
13610                 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
13611                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13612                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
13613                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13614                 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
13615                 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
13616         }
13617
13618         #[test]
13619         fn test_trigger_lnd_force_close() {
13620                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
13621                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
13622                 let user_config = test_default_channel_config();
13623                 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
13624                 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
13625
13626                 // Open a channel, immediately disconnect each other, and broadcast Alice's latest state.
13627                 let (_, _, chan_id, funding_tx) = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
13628                 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13629                 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
13630                 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
13631                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[0], 1, true);
13632                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[0], 1);
13633                 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13634                 {
13635                         let txn = nodes[0].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13636                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13637                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13638                 }
13639
13640                 // Since they're disconnected, Bob won't receive Alice's `Error` message. Reconnect them
13641                 // such that Bob sends a `ChannelReestablish` to Alice since the channel is still open from
13642                 // their side.
13643                 nodes[0].node.peer_connected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13644                         features: nodes[1].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13645                 }, true).unwrap();
13646                 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
13647                         features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13648                 }, false).unwrap();
13649                 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().is_empty());
13650                 let channel_reestablish = get_event_msg!(
13651                         nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()
13652                 );
13653                 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &channel_reestablish);
13654
13655                 // Alice should respond with an error since the channel isn't known, but a bogus
13656                 // `ChannelReestablish` should be sent first, such that we actually trigger Bob to force
13657                 // close even if it was an lnd node.
13658                 let msg_events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13659                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13660                 if let MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { node_id, msg } = &msg_events[0] {
13661                         assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
13662                         assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 0);
13663                         assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0);
13664                         nodes[1].node.handle_channel_reestablish(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msg);
13665                 } else { panic!() };
13666                 check_closed_broadcast(&nodes[1], 1, true);
13667                 check_added_monitors(&nodes[1], 1);
13668                 let expected_close_reason = ClosureReason::ProcessingError {
13669                         err: "Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_string()
13670                 };
13671                 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, expected_close_reason, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
13672                 {
13673                         let txn = nodes[1].tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcast();
13674                         assert_eq!(txn.len(), 1);
13675                         check_spends!(txn[0], funding_tx);
13676                 }
13677         }
13678
13679         #[test]
13680         fn test_malformed_forward_htlcs_ser() {
13681                 // Ensure that `HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC`s are (de)serialized properly.
13682                 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
13683                 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
13684                 let persister;
13685                 let chain_monitor;
13686                 let chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
13687                 let deserialized_chanmgr;
13688                 let mut nodes = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &chanmgrs);
13689
13690                 let dummy_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13691                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }, }
13692                 };
13693                 let dummy_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| {
13694                         HTLCForwardInfo::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code: 0x4000, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32] }
13695                 };
13696
13697                 let dummy_htlcs_1: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13698                         if htlc_id % 2 == 0 {
13699                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13700                         } else {
13701                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13702                         }
13703                 }).collect();
13704
13705                 let dummy_htlcs_2: Vec<HTLCForwardInfo> = (1..10).map(|htlc_id| {
13706                         if htlc_id % 2 == 1 {
13707                                 dummy_failed_htlc(htlc_id)
13708                         } else {
13709                                 dummy_malformed_htlc(htlc_id)
13710                         }
13711                 }).collect();
13712
13713
13714                 let (scid_1, scid_2) = (42, 43);
13715                 let mut forward_htlcs = new_hash_map();
13716                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_1, dummy_htlcs_1.clone());
13717                 forward_htlcs.insert(scid_2, dummy_htlcs_2.clone());
13718
13719                 let mut chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13720                 *chanmgr_fwd_htlcs = forward_htlcs.clone();
13721                 core::mem::drop(chanmgr_fwd_htlcs);
13722
13723                 reload_node!(nodes[0], nodes[0].node.encode(), &[], persister, chain_monitor, deserialized_chanmgr);
13724
13725                 let mut deserialized_fwd_htlcs = nodes[0].node.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
13726                 for scid in [scid_1, scid_2].iter() {
13727                         let deserialized_htlcs = deserialized_fwd_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap();
13728                         assert_eq!(forward_htlcs.remove(scid).unwrap(), deserialized_htlcs);
13729                 }
13730                 assert!(deserialized_fwd_htlcs.is_empty());
13731                 core::mem::drop(deserialized_fwd_htlcs);
13732
13733                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[0]);
13734         }
13735 }
13736
13737 #[cfg(ldk_bench)]
13738 pub mod bench {
13739         use crate::chain::Listen;
13740         use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
13741         use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
13742         use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
13743         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
13744         use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
13745         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
13746         use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
13747         use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
13748         use crate::util::test_utils;
13749         use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
13750
13751         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
13752         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
13753         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
13754         use bitcoin::{Transaction, TxOut};
13755
13756         use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
13757
13758         use criterion::Criterion;
13759
13760         type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
13761                 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
13762                         &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
13763                         &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
13764                 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
13765                 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
13766                 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
13767
13768         struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
13769                 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
13770         }
13771         impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
13772                 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
13773                 #[inline]
13774                 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
13775                 #[inline]
13776                 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
13777         }
13778
13779         pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
13780                 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
13781         }
13782
13783         pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
13784                 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
13785                 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
13786                 // calls per node.
13787                 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
13788                 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
13789
13790                 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
13791                 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
13792                 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13793                 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
13794                 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &logger_a, &scorer);
13795
13796                 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
13797                 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
13798                 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
13799
13800                 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
13801                 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
13802                 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
13803                 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13804                         network,
13805                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13806                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13807                 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
13808
13809                 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
13810                 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
13811                 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
13812                 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
13813                 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
13814                         network,
13815                         best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
13816                 }, genesis_block.header.time);
13817                 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
13818
13819                 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13820                         features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13821                 }, true).unwrap();
13822                 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
13823                         features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
13824                 }, false).unwrap();
13825                 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None, None).unwrap();
13826                 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13827                 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13828
13829                 let tx;
13830                 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
13831                         tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
13832                                 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
13833                         }]};
13834                         node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
13835                 } else { panic!(); }
13836
13837                 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13838                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13839                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13840                 match events_b[0] {
13841                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13842                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13843                         },
13844                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13845                 }
13846
13847                 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13848                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13849                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13850                 match events_a[0] {
13851                         Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13852                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13853                         },
13854                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13855                 }
13856
13857                 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
13858
13859                 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash, 42, vec![tx]);
13860                 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
13861                 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
13862
13863                 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13864                 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
13865                 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
13866                 match msg_events[0] {
13867                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
13868                                 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
13869                                 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13870                         },
13871                         _ => panic!(),
13872                 }
13873                 match msg_events[1] {
13874                         MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
13875                         _ => panic!(),
13876                 }
13877
13878                 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13879                 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
13880                 match events_a[0] {
13881                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13882                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
13883                         },
13884                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13885                 }
13886
13887                 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
13888                 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
13889                 match events_b[0] {
13890                         Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
13891                                 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
13892                         },
13893                         _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
13894                 }
13895
13896                 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
13897                 macro_rules! send_payment {
13898                         ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
13899                                 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
13900                                         .with_bolt11_features($node_b.bolt11_invoice_features()).unwrap();
13901                                 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
13902                                 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
13903                                 payment_count += 1;
13904                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
13905                                 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
13906
13907                                 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
13908                                         PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
13909                                         RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
13910                                         Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
13911                                 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
13912                                 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
13913                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
13914                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
13915                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13916                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13917                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
13918
13919                                 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
13920                                 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
13921                                 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
13922                                 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
13923
13924                                 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
13925                                         MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
13926                                                 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
13927                                                 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
13928                                                 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
13929                                         },
13930                                         _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
13931                                 }
13932
13933                                 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
13934                                 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
13935                                 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
13936                                 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
13937
13938                                 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
13939                         }
13940                 }
13941
13942                 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
13943                         send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
13944                         send_payment!(node_b, node_a);
13945                 }));
13946         }
13947 }