1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! The top-level channel management and payment tracking stuff lives here.
12 //! The [`ChannelManager`] is the main chunk of logic implementing the lightning protocol and is
13 //! responsible for tracking which channels are open, HTLCs are in flight and reestablishing those
14 //! upon reconnect to the relevant peer(s).
16 //! It does not manage routing logic (see [`Router`] for that) nor does it manage constructing
17 //! on-chain transactions (it only monitors the chain to watch for any force-closes that might
18 //! imply it needs to fail HTLCs/payments/channels it manages).
20 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
21 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
22 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::{genesis_block, ChainHash};
23 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
25 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
26 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
27 use bitcoin::hash_types::{BlockHash, Txid};
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
31 use bitcoin::{LockTime, secp256k1, Sequence};
34 use crate::chain::{Confirm, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Watch, BestBlock};
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER, CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, ANTI_REORG_DELAY, MonitorEvent, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::events::{Event, EventHandler, EventsProvider, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason, HTLCDestination, PaymentFailureReason};
40 // Since this struct is returned in `list_channels` methods, expose it here in case users want to
41 // construct one themselves.
42 use crate::ln::{inbound_payment, ChannelId, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
43 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelPhase, ChannelContext, ChannelError, ChannelUpdateStatus, ShutdownResult, UnfundedChannelContext, UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel};
44 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures, NodeFeatures};
45 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
46 use crate::ln::features::Bolt11InvoiceFeatures;
47 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
48 use crate::routing::router::{BlindedTail, DefaultRouter, InFlightHtlcs, Path, Payee, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteParameters, Router};
49 use crate::routing::scoring::{ProbabilisticScorer, ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters};
51 use crate::ln::onion_utils;
52 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
53 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, DecodeError, LightningError};
55 use crate::ln::outbound_payment;
56 use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{OutboundPayments, PaymentAttempts, PendingOutboundPayment, SendAlongPathArgs};
57 use crate::ln::wire::Encode;
58 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, KeysManager, NodeSigner, Recipient, SignerProvider, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
59 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
60 use crate::util::wakers::{Future, Notifier};
61 use crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid;
62 use crate::util::string::UntrustedString;
63 use crate::util::ser::{BigSize, FixedLengthReader, Readable, ReadableArgs, MaybeReadable, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
64 use crate::util::logger::{Level, Logger};
65 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
67 use alloc::collections::BTreeMap;
70 use crate::prelude::*;
72 use core::cell::RefCell;
74 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, RwLockReadGuard, FairRwLock, LockTestExt, LockHeldState};
75 use core::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, AtomicBool, Ordering};
76 use core::time::Duration;
79 // Re-export this for use in the public API.
80 pub use crate::ln::outbound_payment::{PaymentSendFailure, Retry, RetryableSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields};
81 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
83 // We hold various information about HTLC relay in the HTLC objects in Channel itself:
85 // Upon receipt of an HTLC from a peer, we'll give it a PendingHTLCStatus indicating if it should
86 // forward the HTLC with information it will give back to us when it does so, or if it should Fail
87 // the HTLC with the relevant message for the Channel to handle giving to the remote peer.
89 // Once said HTLC is committed in the Channel, if the PendingHTLCStatus indicated Forward, the
90 // Channel will return the PendingHTLCInfo back to us, and we will create an HTLCForwardInfo
91 // with it to track where it came from (in case of onwards-forward error), waiting a random delay
92 // before we forward it.
94 // We will then use HTLCForwardInfo's PendingHTLCInfo to construct an outbound HTLC, with a
95 // relevant HTLCSource::PreviousHopData filled in to indicate where it came from (which we can use
96 // to either fail-backwards or fulfill the HTLC backwards along the relevant path).
97 // Alternatively, we can fill an outbound HTLC with a HTLCSource::OutboundRoute indicating this is
98 // our payment, which we can use to decode errors or inform the user that the payment was sent.
100 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
101 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCRouting {
103 onion_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
104 /// The SCID from the onion that we should forward to. This could be a real SCID or a fake one
105 /// generated using `get_fake_scid` from the scid_utils::fake_scid module.
106 short_channel_id: u64, // This should be NonZero<u64> eventually when we bump MSRV
109 payment_data: msgs::FinalOnionHopData,
110 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
111 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
112 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
113 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
114 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
117 /// This was added in 0.0.116 and will break deserialization on downgrades.
118 payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
119 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
120 payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>,
121 incoming_cltv_expiry: u32, // Used to track when we should expire pending HTLCs that go unclaimed
122 /// See [`RecipientOnionFields::custom_tlvs`] for more info.
123 custom_tlvs: Vec<(u64, Vec<u8>)>,
127 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
128 pub(super) struct PendingHTLCInfo {
129 pub(super) routing: PendingHTLCRouting,
130 pub(super) incoming_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
131 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
133 pub(super) incoming_amt_msat: Option<u64>, // Added in 0.0.113
134 /// Sender intended amount to forward or receive (actual amount received
135 /// may overshoot this in either case)
136 pub(super) outgoing_amt_msat: u64,
137 pub(super) outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
138 /// The fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC. If this is a forward, it'll be the fee we are
139 /// skimming. If we're receiving this HTLC, it's the fee that our counterparty skimmed.
140 pub(super) skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
143 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
144 pub(super) enum HTLCFailureMsg {
145 Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC),
146 Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC),
149 /// Stores whether we can't forward an HTLC or relevant forwarding info
150 #[derive(Clone)] // See Channel::revoke_and_ack for why, tl;dr: Rust bug
151 pub(super) enum PendingHTLCStatus {
152 Forward(PendingHTLCInfo),
153 Fail(HTLCFailureMsg),
156 pub(super) struct PendingAddHTLCInfo {
157 pub(super) forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo,
159 // These fields are produced in `forward_htlcs()` and consumed in
160 // `process_pending_htlc_forwards()` for constructing the
161 // `HTLCSource::PreviousHopData` for failed and forwarded
164 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
165 prev_short_channel_id: u64,
167 prev_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
168 prev_user_channel_id: u128,
171 pub(super) enum HTLCForwardInfo {
172 AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo),
175 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
179 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
180 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq, Eq)]
181 pub(crate) struct HTLCPreviousHopData {
182 // Note that this may be an outbound SCID alias for the associated channel.
183 short_channel_id: u64,
184 user_channel_id: Option<u128>,
186 incoming_packet_shared_secret: [u8; 32],
187 phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>,
189 // This field is consumed by `claim_funds_from_hop()` when updating a force-closed backwards
190 // channel with a preimage provided by the forward channel.
195 /// Indicates this incoming onion payload is for the purpose of paying an invoice.
197 /// This is only here for backwards-compatibility in serialization, in the future it can be
198 /// removed, breaking clients running 0.0.106 and earlier.
199 _legacy_hop_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData>,
201 /// Contains the payer-provided preimage.
202 Spontaneous(PaymentPreimage),
205 /// HTLCs that are to us and can be failed/claimed by the user
206 struct ClaimableHTLC {
207 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData,
209 /// The amount (in msats) of this MPP part
211 /// The amount (in msats) that the sender intended to be sent in this MPP
212 /// part (used for validating total MPP amount)
213 sender_intended_value: u64,
214 onion_payload: OnionPayload,
216 /// The total value received for a payment (sum of all MPP parts if the payment is a MPP).
217 /// Gets set to the amount reported when pushing [`Event::PaymentClaimable`].
218 total_value_received: Option<u64>,
219 /// The sender intended sum total of all MPP parts specified in the onion
221 /// The extra fee our counterparty skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
222 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
225 impl From<&ClaimableHTLC> for events::ClaimedHTLC {
226 fn from(val: &ClaimableHTLC) -> Self {
227 events::ClaimedHTLC {
228 channel_id: val.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
229 user_channel_id: val.prev_hop.user_channel_id.unwrap_or(0),
230 cltv_expiry: val.cltv_expiry,
231 value_msat: val.value,
236 /// A payment identifier used to uniquely identify a payment to LDK.
238 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
239 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
240 pub struct PaymentId(pub [u8; Self::LENGTH]);
243 /// Number of bytes in the id.
244 pub const LENGTH: usize = 32;
247 impl Writeable for PaymentId {
248 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
253 impl Readable for PaymentId {
254 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
255 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
260 impl core::fmt::Display for PaymentId {
261 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter) -> core::fmt::Result {
262 crate::util::logger::DebugBytes(&self.0).fmt(f)
266 /// An identifier used to uniquely identify an intercepted HTLC to LDK.
268 /// This is not exported to bindings users as we just use [u8; 32] directly
269 #[derive(Hash, Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
270 pub struct InterceptId(pub [u8; 32]);
272 impl Writeable for InterceptId {
273 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
278 impl Readable for InterceptId {
279 fn read<R: Read>(r: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
280 let buf: [u8; 32] = Readable::read(r)?;
285 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
286 /// Uniquely describes an HTLC by its source. Just the guaranteed-unique subset of [`HTLCSource`].
287 pub(crate) enum SentHTLCId {
288 PreviousHopData { short_channel_id: u64, htlc_id: u64 },
289 OutboundRoute { session_priv: SecretKey },
292 pub(crate) fn from_source(source: &HTLCSource) -> Self {
294 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => Self::PreviousHopData {
295 short_channel_id: hop_data.short_channel_id,
296 htlc_id: hop_data.htlc_id,
298 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, .. } =>
299 Self::OutboundRoute { session_priv: *session_priv },
303 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(SentHTLCId,
304 (0, PreviousHopData) => {
305 (0, short_channel_id, required),
306 (2, htlc_id, required),
308 (2, OutboundRoute) => {
309 (0, session_priv, required),
314 /// Tracks the inbound corresponding to an outbound HTLC
315 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
316 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
317 pub(crate) enum HTLCSource {
318 PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData),
321 session_priv: SecretKey,
322 /// Technically we can recalculate this from the route, but we cache it here to avoid
323 /// doing a double-pass on route when we get a failure back
324 first_hop_htlc_msat: u64,
325 payment_id: PaymentId,
328 #[allow(clippy::derive_hash_xor_eq)] // Our Hash is faithful to the data, we just don't have SecretKey::hash
329 impl core::hash::Hash for HTLCSource {
330 fn hash<H: core::hash::Hasher>(&self, hasher: &mut H) {
332 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
334 prev_hop_data.hash(hasher);
336 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, session_priv, payment_id, first_hop_htlc_msat } => {
339 session_priv[..].hash(hasher);
340 payment_id.hash(hasher);
341 first_hop_htlc_msat.hash(hasher);
347 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
349 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
350 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
351 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
352 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap(),
353 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
354 payment_id: PaymentId([2; 32]),
358 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
359 /// Checks whether this HTLCSource could possibly match the given HTLC output in a commitment
360 /// transaction. Useful to ensure different datastructures match up.
361 pub(crate) fn possibly_matches_output(&self, htlc: &super::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment) -> bool {
362 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { first_hop_htlc_msat, .. } = self {
363 *first_hop_htlc_msat == htlc.amount_msat
365 // There's nothing we can check for forwarded HTLCs
371 struct InboundOnionErr {
377 /// This enum is used to specify which error data to send to peers when failing back an HTLC
378 /// using [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`].
380 /// For more info on failure codes, see <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/04-onion-routing.md#failure-messages>.
381 #[derive(Clone, Copy)]
382 pub enum FailureCode {
383 /// We had a temporary error processing the payment. Useful if no other error codes fit
384 /// and you want to indicate that the payer may want to retry.
385 TemporaryNodeFailure,
386 /// We have a required feature which was not in this onion. For example, you may require
387 /// some additional metadata that was not provided with this payment.
388 RequiredNodeFeatureMissing,
389 /// You may wish to use this when a `payment_preimage` is unknown, or the CLTV expiry of
390 /// the HTLC is too close to the current block height for safe handling.
391 /// Using this failure code in [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason`] is
392 /// equivalent to calling [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`].
393 IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails,
394 /// We failed to process the payload after the onion was decrypted. You may wish to
395 /// use this when receiving custom HTLC TLVs with even type numbers that you don't recognize.
397 /// If available, the tuple data may include the type number and byte offset in the
398 /// decrypted byte stream where the failure occurred.
399 InvalidOnionPayload(Option<(u64, u16)>),
402 impl Into<u16> for FailureCode {
403 fn into(self) -> u16 {
405 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => 0x2000 | 2,
406 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => 0x4000 | 0x2000 | 3,
407 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => 0x4000 | 15,
408 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(_) => 0x4000 | 22,
413 /// Error type returned across the peer_state mutex boundary. When an Err is generated for a
414 /// Channel, we generally end up with a ChannelError::Close for which we have to close the channel
415 /// immediately (ie with no further calls on it made). Thus, this step happens inside a
416 /// peer_state lock. We then return the set of things that need to be done outside the lock in
417 /// this struct and call handle_error!() on it.
419 struct MsgHandleErrInternal {
420 err: msgs::LightningError,
421 chan_id: Option<(ChannelId, u128)>, // If Some a channel of ours has been closed
422 shutdown_finish: Option<(ShutdownResult, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)>,
423 channel_capacity: Option<u64>,
425 impl MsgHandleErrInternal {
427 fn send_err_msg_no_close(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
429 err: LightningError {
431 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
432 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
439 shutdown_finish: None,
440 channel_capacity: None,
444 fn from_no_close(err: msgs::LightningError) -> Self {
445 Self { err, chan_id: None, shutdown_finish: None, channel_capacity: None }
448 fn from_finish_shutdown(err: String, channel_id: ChannelId, user_channel_id: u128, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult, channel_update: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, channel_capacity: u64) -> Self {
450 err: LightningError {
452 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
453 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
459 chan_id: Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)),
460 shutdown_finish: Some((shutdown_res, channel_update)),
461 channel_capacity: Some(channel_capacity)
465 fn from_chan_no_close(err: ChannelError, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self {
468 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => LightningError {
470 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
471 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
475 log_level: Level::Warn,
478 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => LightningError {
480 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError,
482 ChannelError::Close(msg) => LightningError {
484 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
485 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
493 shutdown_finish: None,
494 channel_capacity: None,
499 /// We hold back HTLCs we intend to relay for a random interval greater than this (see
500 /// Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable for the API guidelines indicating how long should be waited).
501 /// This provides some limited amount of privacy. Ideally this would range from somewhere like one
502 /// second to 30 seconds, but people expect lightning to be, you know, kinda fast, sadly.
503 pub(super) const MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS: u64 = 100;
505 /// For events which result in both a RevokeAndACK and a CommitmentUpdate, by default they should
506 /// be sent in the order they appear in the return value, however sometimes the order needs to be
507 /// variable at runtime (eg Channel::channel_reestablish needs to re-send messages in the order
508 /// they were originally sent). In those cases, this enum is also returned.
509 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
510 pub(super) enum RAACommitmentOrder {
511 /// Send the CommitmentUpdate messages first
513 /// Send the RevokeAndACK message first
517 /// Information about a payment which is currently being claimed.
518 struct ClaimingPayment {
520 payment_purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
521 receiver_node_id: PublicKey,
522 htlcs: Vec<events::ClaimedHTLC>,
523 sender_intended_value: Option<u64>,
525 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ClaimingPayment, {
526 (0, amount_msat, required),
527 (2, payment_purpose, required),
528 (4, receiver_node_id, required),
529 (5, htlcs, optional_vec),
530 (7, sender_intended_value, option),
533 struct ClaimablePayment {
534 purpose: events::PaymentPurpose,
535 onion_fields: Option<RecipientOnionFields>,
536 htlcs: Vec<ClaimableHTLC>,
539 /// Information about claimable or being-claimed payments
540 struct ClaimablePayments {
541 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data and any HTLCs which are to us and can be
542 /// failed/claimed by the user.
544 /// Note that, no consistency guarantees are made about the channels given here actually
545 /// existing anymore by the time you go to read them!
547 /// When adding to the map, [`Self::pending_claiming_payments`] must also be checked to ensure
548 /// we don't get a duplicate payment.
549 claimable_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimablePayment>,
551 /// Map from payment hash to the payment data for HTLCs which we have begun claiming, but which
552 /// are waiting on a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] to complete in order to be surfaced to the user
553 /// as an [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`].
554 pending_claiming_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, ClaimingPayment>,
557 /// Events which we process internally but cannot be processed immediately at the generation site
558 /// usually because we're running pre-full-init. They are handled immediately once we detect we are
559 /// running normally, and specifically must be processed before any other non-background
560 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are applied.
561 enum BackgroundEvent {
562 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which closes the channel or for an already-closed channel.
563 /// This is only separated from [`Self::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`] as the
564 /// maybe-non-closing variant needs a public key to handle channel resumption, whereas if the
565 /// channel has been force-closed we do not need the counterparty node_id.
567 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
568 /// are regenerated on startup.
569 ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)),
570 /// Handle a ChannelMonitorUpdate which may or may not close the channel and may unblock the
571 /// channel to continue normal operation.
573 /// In general this should be used rather than
574 /// [`Self::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`], however in cases where the
575 /// `counterparty_node_id` is not available as the channel has closed from a [`ChannelMonitor`]
576 /// error the other variant is acceptable.
578 /// Note that any such events are lost on shutdown, so in general they must be updates which
579 /// are regenerated on startup.
580 MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
581 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
582 funding_txo: OutPoint,
583 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate
585 /// Some [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (s) completed before we were serialized but we still have
586 /// them marked pending, thus we need to run any [`MonitorUpdateCompletionAction`] (s) pending
588 MonitorUpdatesComplete {
589 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
590 channel_id: ChannelId,
595 pub(crate) enum MonitorUpdateCompletionAction {
596 /// Indicates that a payment ultimately destined for us was claimed and we should emit an
597 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] to the user if we haven't yet generated such an event for
598 /// this payment. Note that this is only best-effort. On restart it's possible such a duplicate
599 /// event can be generated.
600 PaymentClaimed { payment_hash: PaymentHash },
601 /// Indicates an [`events::Event`] should be surfaced to the user and possibly resume the
602 /// operation of another channel.
604 /// This is usually generated when we've forwarded an HTLC and want to block the outbound edge
605 /// from completing a monitor update which removes the payment preimage until the inbound edge
606 /// completes a monitor update containing the payment preimage. In that case, after the inbound
607 /// edge completes, we will surface an [`Event::PaymentForwarded`] as well as unblock the
609 EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
610 event: events::Event,
611 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction)>,
615 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction,
616 (0, PaymentClaimed) => { (0, payment_hash, required) },
617 (2, EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel) => {
618 (0, event, upgradable_required),
619 // LDK prior to 0.0.116 did not have this field as the monitor update application order was
620 // required by clients. If we downgrade to something prior to 0.0.116 this may result in
621 // monitor updates which aren't properly blocked or resumed, however that's fine - we don't
622 // support async monitor updates even in LDK 0.0.116 and once we do we'll require no
623 // downgrades to prior versions.
624 (1, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint, option),
628 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
629 pub(crate) enum EventCompletionAction {
630 ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
631 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
632 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
635 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(EventCompletionAction,
636 (0, ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate) => {
637 (0, channel_funding_outpoint, required),
638 (2, counterparty_node_id, required),
642 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
643 /// If something is blocked on the completion of an RAA-generated [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] we track
644 /// the blocked action here. See enum variants for more info.
645 pub(crate) enum RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
646 /// A forwarded payment was claimed. We block the downstream channel completing its monitor
647 /// update which removes the HTLC preimage until the upstream channel has gotten the preimage
649 ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
650 /// The upstream channel ID (i.e. the inbound edge).
651 channel_id: ChannelId,
652 /// The HTLC ID on the inbound edge.
657 impl RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction {
659 fn from_prev_hop_data(prev_hop: &HTLCPreviousHopData) -> Self {
660 Self::ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim {
661 channel_id: prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id(),
662 htlc_id: prev_hop.htlc_id,
667 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction,
668 (0, ForwardedPaymentInboundClaim) => { (0, channel_id, required), (2, htlc_id, required) }
672 /// State we hold per-peer.
673 pub(super) struct PeerState<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
674 /// `channel_id` -> `ChannelPhase`
676 /// Holds all channels within corresponding `ChannelPhase`s where the peer is the counterparty.
677 pub(super) channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>,
678 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `OutboundV1Channel`.
680 /// Holds all outbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an outbound channel has
681 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
683 pub(super) outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, OutboundV1Channel<SP>>,
684 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundV1Channel`.
686 /// Holds all inbound V1 channels where the peer is the counterparty. Once an inbound channel has
687 /// been assigned a `channel_id`, the entry in this map is removed and one is created in
689 pub(super) inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundV1Channel<SP>>,
690 /// `temporary_channel_id` -> `InboundChannelRequest`.
692 /// When manual channel acceptance is enabled, this holds all unaccepted inbound channels where
693 /// the peer is the counterparty. If the channel is accepted, then the entry in this table is
694 /// removed, and an InboundV1Channel is created and placed in the `inbound_v1_channel_by_id` table. If
695 /// the channel is rejected, then the entry is simply removed.
696 pub(super) inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap<ChannelId, InboundChannelRequest>,
697 /// The latest `InitFeatures` we heard from the peer.
698 latest_features: InitFeatures,
699 /// Messages to send to the peer - pushed to in the same lock that they are generated in (except
700 /// for broadcast messages, where ordering isn't as strict).
701 pub(super) pending_msg_events: Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
702 /// Map from Channel IDs to pending [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s which have been passed to the
703 /// user but which have not yet completed.
705 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example if the channel was closed but we
706 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
707 /// for a missing channel.
708 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<OutPoint, Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>,
709 /// Map from a specific channel to some action(s) that should be taken when all pending
710 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s for the channel complete updating.
712 /// Note that because we generally only have one entry here a HashMap is pretty overkill. A
713 /// BTreeMap currently stores more than ten elements per leaf node, so even up to a few
714 /// channels with a peer this will just be one allocation and will amount to a linear list of
715 /// channels to walk, avoiding the whole hashing rigmarole.
717 /// Note that the channel may no longer exist. For example, if a channel was closed but we
718 /// later needed to claim an HTLC which is pending on-chain, we may generate a monitor update
719 /// for a missing channel. While a malicious peer could construct a second channel with the
720 /// same `temporary_channel_id` (or final `channel_id` in the case of 0conf channels or prior
721 /// to funding appearing on-chain), the downstream `ChannelMonitor` set is required to ensure
722 /// duplicates do not occur, so such channels should fail without a monitor update completing.
723 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>,
724 /// If another channel's [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] needs to complete before a channel we have
725 /// with this peer can complete an RAA [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] (e.g. because the RAA update
726 /// will remove a preimage that needs to be durably in an upstream channel first), we put an
727 /// entry here to note that the channel with the key's ID is blocked on a set of actions.
728 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
729 /// The peer is currently connected (i.e. we've seen a
730 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_connected`] and no corresponding
731 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected`].
735 impl <SP: Deref> PeerState<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
736 /// Indicates that a peer meets the criteria where we're ok to remove it from our storage.
737 /// If true is passed for `require_disconnected`, the function will return false if we haven't
738 /// disconnected from the node already, ie. `PeerState::is_connected` is set to `true`.
739 fn ok_to_remove(&self, require_disconnected: bool) -> bool {
740 if require_disconnected && self.is_connected {
743 self.channel_by_id.is_empty() && self.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty()
744 && self.in_flight_monitor_updates.is_empty()
747 // Returns a count of all channels we have with this peer, including unfunded channels.
748 fn total_channel_count(&self) -> usize {
749 self.channel_by_id.len() +
750 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
751 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.len() +
752 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
755 // Returns a bool indicating if the given `channel_id` matches a channel we have with this peer.
756 fn has_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId) -> bool {
757 self.channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
758 self.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
759 self.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id) ||
760 self.inbound_channel_request_by_id.contains_key(&channel_id)
764 /// A not-yet-accepted inbound (from counterparty) channel. Once
765 /// accepted, the parameters will be used to construct a channel.
766 pub(super) struct InboundChannelRequest {
767 /// The original OpenChannel message.
768 pub open_channel_msg: msgs::OpenChannel,
769 /// The number of ticks remaining before the request expires.
770 pub ticks_remaining: i32,
773 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unaccepted inbound channel to be
774 /// accepted. An unaccepted channel that exceeds this limit will be abandoned.
775 const UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: i32 = 2;
777 /// Stores a PaymentSecret and any other data we may need to validate an inbound payment is
778 /// actually ours and not some duplicate HTLC sent to us by a node along the route.
780 /// For users who don't want to bother doing their own payment preimage storage, we also store that
783 /// Note that this struct will be removed entirely soon, in favor of storing no inbound payment data
784 /// and instead encoding it in the payment secret.
785 struct PendingInboundPayment {
786 /// The payment secret that the sender must use for us to accept this payment
787 payment_secret: PaymentSecret,
788 /// Time at which this HTLC expires - blocks with a header time above this value will result in
789 /// this payment being removed.
791 /// Arbitrary identifier the user specifies (or not)
792 user_payment_id: u64,
793 // Other required attributes of the payment, optionally enforced:
794 payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>,
795 min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
798 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] is useful when you need a [`ChannelManager`] with a static lifetime, e.g.
799 /// when you're using `lightning-net-tokio` (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static
800 /// lifetimes). Other times you can afford a reference, which is more efficient, in which case
801 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is the more appropriate type. Defining these type aliases prevents
802 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the `ChannelManager` can take any type
803 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
804 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
805 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
807 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
808 pub type SimpleArcChannelManager<M, T, F, L> = ChannelManager<
816 Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>,
818 Arc<Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>>>,
819 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
820 ProbabilisticScorer<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<L>>>, Arc<L>>,
825 /// [`SimpleRefChannelManager`] is a type alias for a ChannelManager reference, and is the reference
826 /// counterpart to the [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] type alias. Use this type by default when you don't
827 /// need a ChannelManager with a static lifetime. You'll need a static lifetime in cases such as
828 /// usage of lightning-net-tokio (since `tokio::spawn` requires parameters with static lifetimes).
829 /// But if this is not necessary, using a reference is more efficient. Defining these type aliases
830 /// issues such as overly long function definitions. Note that the ChannelManager can take any type
831 /// that implements [`NodeSigner`], [`EntropySource`], and [`SignerProvider`] for its keys manager,
832 /// or, respectively, [`Router`] for its router, but this type alias chooses the concrete types
833 /// of [`KeysManager`] and [`DefaultRouter`].
835 /// This is not exported to bindings users as Arcs don't make sense in bindings
836 pub type SimpleRefChannelManager<'a, 'b, 'c, 'd, 'e, 'f, 'g, 'h, M, T, F, L> =
845 &'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>,
847 &'h Mutex<ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>>,
848 ProbabilisticScoringFeeParameters,
849 ProbabilisticScorer<&'f NetworkGraph<&'g L>, &'g L>
854 macro_rules! define_test_pub_trait { ($vis: vis) => {
855 /// A trivial trait which describes any [`ChannelManager`] used in testing.
856 $vis trait AChannelManager {
857 type Watch: chain::Watch<Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
858 type M: Deref<Target = Self::Watch>;
859 type Broadcaster: BroadcasterInterface + ?Sized;
860 type T: Deref<Target = Self::Broadcaster>;
861 type EntropySource: EntropySource + ?Sized;
862 type ES: Deref<Target = Self::EntropySource>;
863 type NodeSigner: NodeSigner + ?Sized;
864 type NS: Deref<Target = Self::NodeSigner>;
865 type Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner + Sized;
866 type SignerProvider: SignerProvider<Signer = Self::Signer> + ?Sized;
867 type SP: Deref<Target = Self::SignerProvider>;
868 type FeeEstimator: FeeEstimator + ?Sized;
869 type F: Deref<Target = Self::FeeEstimator>;
870 type Router: Router + ?Sized;
871 type R: Deref<Target = Self::Router>;
872 type Logger: Logger + ?Sized;
873 type L: Deref<Target = Self::Logger>;
874 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<Self::M, Self::T, Self::ES, Self::NS, Self::SP, Self::F, Self::R, Self::L>;
877 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
878 define_test_pub_trait!(pub);
879 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
880 define_test_pub_trait!(pub(crate));
881 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> AChannelManager
882 for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
884 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
885 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
886 ES::Target: EntropySource,
887 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
888 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
889 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
893 type Watch = M::Target;
895 type Broadcaster = T::Target;
897 type EntropySource = ES::Target;
899 type NodeSigner = NS::Target;
901 type Signer = <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer;
902 type SignerProvider = SP::Target;
904 type FeeEstimator = F::Target;
906 type Router = R::Target;
908 type Logger = L::Target;
910 fn get_cm(&self) -> &ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L> { self }
913 /// Manager which keeps track of a number of channels and sends messages to the appropriate
914 /// channel, also tracking HTLC preimages and forwarding onion packets appropriately.
916 /// Implements [`ChannelMessageHandler`], handling the multi-channel parts and passing things through
917 /// to individual Channels.
919 /// Implements [`Writeable`] to write out all channel state to disk. Implies [`peer_disconnected`] for
920 /// all peers during write/read (though does not modify this instance, only the instance being
921 /// serialized). This will result in any channels which have not yet exchanged [`funding_created`] (i.e.,
922 /// called [`funding_transaction_generated`] for outbound channels) being closed.
924 /// Note that you can be a bit lazier about writing out `ChannelManager` than you can be with
925 /// [`ChannelMonitor`]. With [`ChannelMonitor`] you MUST write each monitor update out to disk before
926 /// returning from [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`]/[`update_channel`], with ChannelManagers, writing updates
927 /// happens out-of-band (and will prevent any other `ChannelManager` operations from occurring during
928 /// the serialization process). If the deserialized version is out-of-date compared to the
929 /// [`ChannelMonitor`] passed by reference to [`read`], those channels will be force-closed based on the
930 /// `ChannelMonitor` state and no funds will be lost (mod on-chain transaction fees).
932 /// Note that the deserializer is only implemented for `(`[`BlockHash`]`, `[`ChannelManager`]`)`, which
933 /// tells you the last block hash which was connected. You should get the best block tip before using the manager.
934 /// See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for more details.
936 /// Note that `ChannelManager` is responsible for tracking liveness of its channels and generating
937 /// [`ChannelUpdate`] messages informing peers that the channel is temporarily disabled. To avoid
938 /// spam due to quick disconnection/reconnection, updates are not sent until the channel has been
939 /// offline for a full minute. In order to track this, you must call
940 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`] roughly once per minute, though it doesn't have to be perfect.
942 /// To avoid trivial DoS issues, `ChannelManager` limits the number of inbound connections and
943 /// inbound channels without confirmed funding transactions. This may result in nodes which we do
944 /// not have a channel with being unable to connect to us or open new channels with us if we have
945 /// many peers with unfunded channels.
947 /// Because it is an indication of trust, inbound channels which we've accepted as 0conf are
948 /// exempted from the count of unfunded channels. Similarly, outbound channels and connections are
949 /// never limited. Please ensure you limit the count of such channels yourself.
951 /// Rather than using a plain `ChannelManager`, it is preferable to use either a [`SimpleArcChannelManager`]
952 /// a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], for conciseness. See their documentation for more details, but
953 /// essentially you should default to using a [`SimpleRefChannelManager`], and use a
954 /// [`SimpleArcChannelManager`] when you require a `ChannelManager` with a static lifetime, such as when
955 /// you're using lightning-net-tokio.
957 /// [`peer_disconnected`]: msgs::ChannelMessageHandler::peer_disconnected
958 /// [`funding_created`]: msgs::FundingCreated
959 /// [`funding_transaction_generated`]: Self::funding_transaction_generated
960 /// [`BlockHash`]: bitcoin::hash_types::BlockHash
961 /// [`update_channel`]: chain::Watch::update_channel
962 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
963 /// [`timer_tick_occurred`]: Self::timer_tick_occurred
964 /// [`read`]: ReadableArgs::read
967 // The tree structure below illustrates the lock order requirements for the different locks of the
968 // `ChannelManager`. Locks can be held at the same time if they are on the same branch in the tree,
969 // and should then be taken in the order of the lowest to the highest level in the tree.
970 // Note that locks on different branches shall not be taken at the same time, as doing so will
971 // create a new lock order for those specific locks in the order they were taken.
975 // `total_consistency_lock`
977 // |__`forward_htlcs`
979 // | |__`pending_intercepted_htlcs`
981 // |__`per_peer_state`
983 // | |__`pending_inbound_payments`
985 // | |__`claimable_payments`
987 // | |__`pending_outbound_payments` // This field's struct contains a map of pending outbounds
993 // | |__`short_to_chan_info`
995 // | |__`outbound_scid_aliases`
999 // | |__`pending_events`
1001 // | |__`pending_background_events`
1003 pub struct ChannelManager<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
1005 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
1006 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
1007 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1008 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
1009 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1010 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1014 default_configuration: UserConfig,
1015 genesis_hash: BlockHash,
1016 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1022 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1024 pub(super) best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1026 best_block: RwLock<BestBlock>,
1027 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1029 /// Storage for PaymentSecrets and any requirements on future inbound payments before we will
1030 /// expose them to users via a PaymentClaimable event. HTLCs which do not meet the requirements
1031 /// here are failed when we process them as pending-forwardable-HTLCs, and entries are removed
1032 /// after we generate a PaymentClaimable upon receipt of all MPP parts or when they time out.
1034 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1035 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex<HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment>>,
1037 /// The session_priv bytes and retry metadata of outbound payments which are pending resolution.
1038 /// The authoritative state of these HTLCs resides either within Channels or ChannelMonitors
1039 /// (if the channel has been force-closed), however we track them here to prevent duplicative
1040 /// PaymentSent/PaymentPathFailed events. Specifically, in the case of a duplicative
1041 /// update_fulfill_htlc message after a reconnect, we may "claim" a payment twice.
1042 /// Additionally, because ChannelMonitors are often not re-serialized after connecting block(s)
1043 /// which may generate a claim event, we may receive similar duplicate claim/fail MonitorEvents
1044 /// after reloading from disk while replaying blocks against ChannelMonitors.
1046 /// See `PendingOutboundPayment` documentation for more info.
1048 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1049 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments,
1051 /// SCID/SCID Alias -> forward infos. Key of 0 means payments received.
1053 /// Note that because we may have an SCID Alias as the key we can have two entries per channel,
1054 /// though in practice we probably won't be receiving HTLCs for a channel both via the alias
1055 /// and via the classic SCID.
1057 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a channel with the
1058 /// `short_channel_id` here, nor the `short_channel_id` in the `PendingHTLCInfo`!
1060 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1062 pub(super) forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1064 forward_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<u64, Vec<HTLCForwardInfo>>>,
1065 /// Storage for HTLCs that have been intercepted and bubbled up to the user. We hold them here
1066 /// until the user tells us what we should do with them.
1068 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1069 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>>,
1071 /// The sets of payments which are claimable or currently being claimed. See
1072 /// [`ClaimablePayments`]' individual field docs for more info.
1074 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1075 claimable_payments: Mutex<ClaimablePayments>,
1077 /// The set of outbound SCID aliases across all our channels, including unconfirmed channels
1078 /// and some closed channels which reached a usable state prior to being closed. This is used
1079 /// only to avoid duplicates, and is not persisted explicitly to disk, but rebuilt from the
1080 /// active channel list on load.
1082 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1083 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex<HashSet<u64>>,
1085 /// `channel_id` -> `counterparty_node_id`.
1087 /// Only `channel_id`s are allowed as keys in this map, and not `temporary_channel_id`s. As
1088 /// multiple channels with the same `temporary_channel_id` to different peers can exist,
1089 /// allowing `temporary_channel_id`s in this map would cause collisions for such channels.
1091 /// Note that this map should only be used for `MonitorEvent` handling, to be able to access
1092 /// the corresponding channel for the event, as we only have access to the `channel_id` during
1093 /// the handling of the events.
1095 /// Note that no consistency guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the
1096 /// `counterparty_node_id` in our other maps.
1099 /// The `counterparty_node_id` isn't passed with `MonitorEvent`s currently. To pass it, we need
1100 /// to make `counterparty_node_id`'s a required field in `ChannelMonitor`s, which unfortunately
1101 /// would break backwards compatability.
1102 /// We should add `counterparty_node_id`s to `MonitorEvent`s, and eventually rely on it in the
1103 /// future. That would make this map redundant, as only the `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` is
1104 /// required to access the channel with the `counterparty_node_id`.
1106 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1107 id_to_peer: Mutex<HashMap<ChannelId, PublicKey>>,
1109 /// SCIDs (and outbound SCID aliases) -> `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s.
1111 /// Outbound SCID aliases are added here once the channel is available for normal use, with
1112 /// SCIDs being added once the funding transaction is confirmed at the channel's required
1113 /// confirmation depth.
1115 /// Note that while this holds `counterparty_node_id`s and `channel_id`s, no consistency
1116 /// guarantees are made about the existence of a peer with the `counterparty_node_id` nor a
1117 /// channel with the `channel_id` in our other maps.
1119 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1121 pub(super) short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1123 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock<HashMap<u64, (PublicKey, ChannelId)>>,
1125 our_network_pubkey: PublicKey,
1127 inbound_payment_key: inbound_payment::ExpandedKey,
1129 /// LDK puts the [fake scids] that it generates into namespaces, to identify the type of an
1130 /// incoming payment. To make it harder for a third-party to identify the type of a payment,
1131 /// we encrypt the namespace identifier using these bytes.
1133 /// [fake scids]: crate::util::scid_utils::fake_scid
1134 fake_scid_rand_bytes: [u8; 32],
1136 /// When we send payment probes, we generate the [`PaymentHash`] based on this cookie secret
1137 /// and a random [`PaymentId`]. This allows us to discern probes from real payments, without
1138 /// keeping additional state.
1139 probing_cookie_secret: [u8; 32],
1141 /// The highest block timestamp we've seen, which is usually a good guess at the current time.
1142 /// Assuming most miners are generating blocks with reasonable timestamps, this shouldn't be
1143 /// very far in the past, and can only ever be up to two hours in the future.
1144 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize,
1146 /// The bulk of our storage. Currently the `per_peer_state` stores our channels on a per-peer
1147 /// basis, as well as the peer's latest features.
1149 /// If we are connected to a peer we always at least have an entry here, even if no channels
1150 /// are currently open with that peer.
1152 /// Because adding or removing an entry is rare, we usually take an outer read lock and then
1153 /// operate on the inner value freely. This opens up for parallel per-peer operation for
1156 /// Note that the same thread must never acquire two inner `PeerState` locks at the same time.
1158 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1159 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1160 per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1161 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1162 pub(super) per_peer_state: FairRwLock<HashMap<PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>>>,
1164 /// The set of events which we need to give to the user to handle. In some cases an event may
1165 /// require some further action after the user handles it (currently only blocking a monitor
1166 /// update from being handed to the user to ensure the included changes to the channel state
1167 /// are handled by the user before they're persisted durably to disk). In that case, the second
1168 /// element in the tuple is set to `Some` with further details of the action.
1170 /// Note that events MUST NOT be removed from pending_events after deserialization, as they
1171 /// could be in the middle of being processed without the direct mutex held.
1173 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1174 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1175 pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1176 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1177 pub(crate) pending_events: Mutex<VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>>,
1179 /// A simple atomic flag to ensure only one task at a time can be processing events asynchronously.
1180 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool,
1182 /// If we are running during init (either directly during the deserialization method or in
1183 /// block connection methods which run after deserialization but before normal operation) we
1184 /// cannot provide the user with [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s through the normal update flow -
1185 /// prior to normal operation the user may not have loaded the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into their
1186 /// [`ChainMonitor`] and thus attempting to update it will fail or panic.
1188 /// Thus, we place them here to be handled as soon as possible once we are running normally.
1190 /// See `ChannelManager` struct-level documentation for lock order requirements.
1192 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
1193 pending_background_events: Mutex<Vec<BackgroundEvent>>,
1194 /// Used when we have to take a BIG lock to make sure everything is self-consistent.
1195 /// Essentially just when we're serializing ourselves out.
1196 /// Taken first everywhere where we are making changes before any other locks.
1197 /// When acquiring this lock in read mode, rather than acquiring it directly, call
1198 /// `PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(..)` and pass the lock to it, to ensure the
1199 /// Notifier the lock contains sends out a notification when the lock is released.
1200 total_consistency_lock: RwLock<()>,
1202 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool,
1204 persistence_notifier: Notifier,
1208 signer_provider: SP,
1213 /// Chain-related parameters used to construct a new `ChannelManager`.
1215 /// Typically, the block-specific parameters are derived from the best block hash for the network,
1216 /// as a newly constructed `ChannelManager` will not have created any channels yet. These parameters
1217 /// are not needed when deserializing a previously constructed `ChannelManager`.
1218 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
1219 pub struct ChainParameters {
1220 /// The network for determining the `chain_hash` in Lightning messages.
1221 pub network: Network,
1223 /// The hash and height of the latest block successfully connected.
1225 /// Used to track on-chain channel funding outputs and send payments with reliable timelocks.
1226 pub best_block: BestBlock,
1229 #[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq)]
1236 /// Whenever we release the `ChannelManager`'s `total_consistency_lock`, from read mode, it is
1237 /// desirable to notify any listeners on `await_persistable_update_timeout`/
1238 /// `await_persistable_update` when new updates are available for persistence. Therefore, this
1239 /// struct is responsible for locking the total consistency lock and, upon going out of scope,
1240 /// sending the aforementioned notification (since the lock being released indicates that the
1241 /// updates are ready for persistence).
1243 /// We allow callers to either always notify by constructing with `notify_on_drop` or choose to
1244 /// notify or not based on whether relevant changes have been made, providing a closure to
1245 /// `optionally_notify` which returns a `NotifyOption`.
1246 struct PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1247 persistence_notifier: &'a Notifier,
1249 // We hold onto this result so the lock doesn't get released immediately.
1250 _read_guard: RwLockReadGuard<'a, ()>,
1253 impl<'a> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, fn() -> NotifyOption> { // We don't care what the concrete F is here, it's unused
1254 fn notify_on_drop<C: AChannelManager>(cm: &'a C) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, impl Fn() -> NotifyOption> {
1255 let read_guard = cm.get_cm().total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
1256 let _ = cm.get_cm().process_background_events(); // We always persist
1258 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1259 persistence_notifier: &cm.get_cm().persistence_notifier,
1260 should_persist: || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist },
1261 _read_guard: read_guard,
1266 /// Note that if any [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s are possibly generated,
1267 /// [`ChannelManager::process_background_events`] MUST be called first.
1268 fn optionally_notify<F: Fn() -> NotifyOption>(lock: &'a RwLock<()>, notifier: &'a Notifier, persist_check: F) -> PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1269 let read_guard = lock.read().unwrap();
1271 PersistenceNotifierGuard {
1272 persistence_notifier: notifier,
1273 should_persist: persist_check,
1274 _read_guard: read_guard,
1279 impl<'a, F: Fn() -> NotifyOption> Drop for PersistenceNotifierGuard<'a, F> {
1280 fn drop(&mut self) {
1281 if (self.should_persist)() == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
1282 self.persistence_notifier.notify();
1287 /// The amount of time in blocks we require our counterparty wait to claim their money (ie time
1288 /// between when we, or our watchtower, must check for them having broadcast a theft transaction).
1290 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]
1292 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay
1293 pub const BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 6 * 24;
1294 /// The amount of time in blocks we're willing to wait to claim money back to us. This matches
1295 /// the maximum required amount in lnd as of March 2021.
1296 pub(crate) const MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT: u16 = 2 * 6 * 24 * 7;
1298 /// The minimum number of blocks between an inbound HTLC's CLTV and the corresponding outbound
1299 /// HTLC's CLTV. The current default represents roughly seven hours of blocks at six blocks/hour.
1301 /// This can be increased (but not decreased) through [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]
1303 /// [`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
1304 // This should always be a few blocks greater than channelmonitor::CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER,
1305 // i.e. the node we forwarded the payment on to should always have enough room to reliably time out
1306 // the HTLC via a full update_fail_htlc/commitment_signed dance before we hit the
1307 // CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER point (we static assert that it's at least 3 blocks more).
1308 pub const MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = 6*7;
1309 // This should be long enough to allow a payment path drawn across multiple routing hops with substantial
1310 // `cltv_expiry_delta`. Indeed, the length of those values is the reaction delay offered to a routing node
1311 // in case of HTLC on-chain settlement. While appearing less competitive, a node operator could decide to
1312 // scale them up to suit its security policy. At the network-level, we shouldn't constrain them too much,
1313 // while avoiding to introduce a DoS vector. Further, a low CTLV_FAR_FAR_AWAY could be a source of
1314 // routing failure for any HTLC sender picking up an LDK node among the first hops.
1315 pub(super) const CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY: u32 = 14 * 24 * 6;
1317 /// Minimum CLTV difference between the current block height and received inbound payments.
1318 /// Invoices generated for payment to us must set their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` field to at least
1320 // Note that we fail if exactly HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER + 1 was used, so we need to add one for
1321 // any payments to succeed. Further, we don't want payments to fail if a block was found while
1322 // a payment was being routed, so we add an extra block to be safe.
1323 pub const MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA: u16 = HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u16 + 3;
1325 // Check that our CLTV_EXPIRY is at least CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER + ANTI_REORG_DELAY + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS,
1326 // ie that if the next-hop peer fails the HTLC within
1327 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS then we'll still have CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER left to timeout it onchain,
1328 // then waiting ANTI_REORG_DELAY to be reorg-safe on the outbound HLTC and
1329 // failing the corresponding htlc backward, and us now seeing the last block of ANTI_REORG_DELAY before
1330 // LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS.
1333 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER - ANTI_REORG_DELAY - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
1335 // Check for ability of an attacker to make us fail on-chain by delaying an HTLC claim. See
1336 // ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn for a description of why this is needed.
1339 const CHECK_CLTV_EXPIRY_SANITY_2: u32 = MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u32 - LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS - 2*CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER;
1341 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] until expiry of incomplete MPPs
1342 pub(crate) const MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS: u8 = 3;
1344 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is disconnected
1345 /// until we mark the channel disabled and gossip the update.
1346 pub(crate) const DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 10;
1348 /// The number of ticks of [`ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`] where a peer is connected until
1349 /// we mark the channel enabled and gossip the update.
1350 pub(crate) const ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS: u8 = 5;
1352 /// The maximum number of unfunded channels we can have per-peer before we start rejecting new
1353 /// (inbound) ones. The number of peers with unfunded channels is limited separately in
1354 /// [`MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS`].
1355 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER: usize = 4;
1357 /// The maximum number of peers from which we will allow pending unfunded channels. Once we reach
1358 /// this many peers we reject new (inbound) channels from peers with which we don't have a channel.
1359 const MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 50;
1361 /// The maximum number of peers which we do not have a (funded) channel with. Once we reach this
1362 /// many peers we reject new (inbound) connections.
1363 const MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS: usize = 250;
1365 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
1366 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1367 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
1368 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
1369 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
1370 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
1371 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
1372 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
1373 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
1374 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
1375 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
1378 /// Channel parameters which apply to our counterparty. These are split out from [`ChannelDetails`]
1379 /// to better separate parameters.
1380 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1381 pub struct ChannelCounterparty {
1382 /// The node_id of our counterparty
1383 pub node_id: PublicKey,
1384 /// The Features the channel counterparty provided upon last connection.
1385 /// Useful for routing as it is the most up-to-date copy of the counterparty's features and
1386 /// many routing-relevant features are present in the init context.
1387 pub features: InitFeatures,
1388 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for our counterparty. This
1389 /// value ensures that if our counterparty broadcasts a revoked state, we can punish them by
1390 /// claiming at least this value on chain.
1392 /// This value is not included in [`inbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1394 /// [`inbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::inbound_capacity_msat
1395 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: u64,
1396 /// Information on the fees and requirements that the counterparty requires when forwarding
1397 /// payments to us through this channel.
1398 pub forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1399 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer will accept, for this channel. This field
1400 /// is only `None` before we have received either the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel` message
1401 /// from the remote peer, or for `ChannelCounterparty` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107.
1402 pub outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1403 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) the remote peer currently will accept, for this channel.
1404 pub outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1407 /// Details of a channel, as returned by [`ChannelManager::list_channels`] and [`ChannelManager::list_usable_channels`]
1409 /// Balances of a channel are available through [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`] and
1410 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_claimable_balances`], calculated with respect to the corresponding on-chain
1413 /// [`ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::get_claimable_balances
1414 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
1415 pub struct ChannelDetails {
1416 /// The channel's ID (prior to funding transaction generation, this is a random 32 bytes,
1417 /// thereafter this is the txid of the funding transaction xor the funding transaction output).
1418 /// Note that this means this value is *not* persistent - it can change once during the
1419 /// lifetime of the channel.
1420 pub channel_id: ChannelId,
1421 /// Parameters which apply to our counterparty. See individual fields for more information.
1422 pub counterparty: ChannelCounterparty,
1423 /// The Channel's funding transaction output, if we've negotiated the funding transaction with
1424 /// our counterparty already.
1426 /// Note that, if this has been set, `channel_id` will be equivalent to
1427 /// `funding_txo.unwrap().to_channel_id()`.
1428 pub funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1429 /// The features which this channel operates with. See individual features for more info.
1431 /// `None` until negotiation completes and the channel type is finalized.
1432 pub channel_type: Option<ChannelTypeFeatures>,
1433 /// The position of the funding transaction in the chain. None if the funding transaction has
1434 /// not yet been confirmed and the channel fully opened.
1436 /// Note that if [`inbound_scid_alias`] is set, it must be used for invoices and inbound
1437 /// payments instead of this. See [`get_inbound_payment_scid`].
1439 /// For channels with [`confirmations_required`] set to `Some(0)`, [`outbound_scid_alias`] may
1440 /// be used in place of this in outbound routes. See [`get_outbound_payment_scid`].
1442 /// [`inbound_scid_alias`]: Self::inbound_scid_alias
1443 /// [`outbound_scid_alias`]: Self::outbound_scid_alias
1444 /// [`get_inbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_inbound_payment_scid
1445 /// [`get_outbound_payment_scid`]: Self::get_outbound_payment_scid
1446 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1447 pub short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1448 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by us and
1449 /// usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] to reference the channel in outbound routes when
1450 /// the channel has not yet been confirmed (as long as [`confirmations_required`] is
1453 /// This will be `None` as long as the channel is not available for routing outbound payments.
1455 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1456 /// [`confirmations_required`]: Self::confirmations_required
1457 pub outbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1458 /// An optional [`short_channel_id`] alias for this channel, randomly generated by our
1459 /// counterparty and usable in place of [`short_channel_id`] in invoice route hints. Our
1460 /// counterparty will recognize the alias provided here in place of the [`short_channel_id`]
1461 /// when they see a payment to be routed to us.
1463 /// Our counterparty may choose to rotate this value at any time, though will always recognize
1464 /// previous values for inbound payment forwarding.
1466 /// [`short_channel_id`]: Self::short_channel_id
1467 pub inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1468 /// The value, in satoshis, of this channel as appears in the funding output
1469 pub channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1470 /// The value, in satoshis, that must always be held in the channel for us. This value ensures
1471 /// that if we broadcast a revoked state, our counterparty can punish us by claiming at least
1472 /// this value on chain.
1474 /// This value is not included in [`outbound_capacity_msat`] as it can never be spent.
1476 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1478 /// [`outbound_capacity_msat`]: ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat
1479 pub unspendable_punishment_reserve: Option<u64>,
1480 /// The `user_channel_id` value passed in to [`ChannelManager::create_channel`] for outbound
1481 /// channels, or to [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`] for inbound channels if
1482 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`] config flag is set to true. Otherwise
1483 /// `user_channel_id` will be randomized for an inbound channel. This may be zero for objects
1484 /// serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1486 /// [`ChannelManager::create_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::create_channel
1487 /// [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`]: crate::ln::channelmanager::ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel
1488 /// [`UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels
1489 pub user_channel_id: u128,
1490 /// The currently negotiated fee rate denominated in satoshi per 1000 weight units,
1491 /// which is applied to commitment and HTLC transactions.
1493 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.115.
1494 pub feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>,
1495 /// The available outbound capacity for sending HTLCs to the remote peer. This does not include
1496 /// any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1497 /// available for inclusion in new outbound HTLCs). This further does not include any pending
1498 /// outgoing HTLCs which are awaiting some other resolution to be sent.
1500 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1501 /// conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable. However, we
1502 /// should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1503 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1504 /// The available outbound capacity for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is
1505 /// similar to [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`] but it may be further restricted by
1506 /// the current state and per-HTLC limit(s). This is intended for use when routing, allowing us
1507 /// to use a limit as close as possible to the HTLC limit we can currently send.
1509 /// See also [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat`] and
1510 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_capacity_msat`].
1511 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
1512 /// The minimum value for sending a single HTLC to the remote peer. This is the equivalent of
1513 /// [`ChannelDetails::next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat`] but represents a lower-bound, rather than
1514 /// an upper-bound. This is intended for use when routing, allowing us to ensure we pick a
1515 /// route which is valid.
1516 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1517 /// The available inbound capacity for the remote peer to send HTLCs to us. This does not
1518 /// include any pending HTLCs which are not yet fully resolved (and, thus, whose balance is not
1519 /// available for inclusion in new inbound HTLCs).
1520 /// Note that there are some corner cases not fully handled here, so the actual available
1521 /// inbound capacity may be slightly higher than this.
1523 /// This value is not exact. Due to various in-flight changes, feerate changes, and our
1524 /// counterparty's conflict-avoidance policy, exactly this amount is not likely to be spendable.
1525 /// However, our counterparty should be able to spend nearly this amount.
1526 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
1527 /// The number of required confirmations on the funding transaction before the funding will be
1528 /// considered "locked". This number is selected by the channel fundee (i.e. us if
1529 /// [`is_outbound`] is *not* set), and can be selected for inbound channels with
1530 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`] or limited for outbound channels with
1531 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`].
1533 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1535 /// [`is_outbound`]: ChannelDetails::is_outbound
1536 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::minimum_depth
1537 /// [`ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeLimits::max_minimum_depth
1538 pub confirmations_required: Option<u32>,
1539 /// The current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1541 /// This value will be `None` for objects serialized with LDK versions prior to 0.0.113.
1542 pub confirmations: Option<u32>,
1543 /// The number of blocks (after our commitment transaction confirms) that we will need to wait
1544 /// until we can claim our funds after we force-close the channel. During this time our
1545 /// counterparty is allowed to punish us if we broadcasted a stale state. If our counterparty
1546 /// force-closes the channel and broadcasts a commitment transaction we do not have to wait any
1547 /// time to claim our non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
1549 /// This value will be `None` for outbound channels until the counterparty accepts the channel.
1550 pub force_close_spend_delay: Option<u16>,
1551 /// True if the channel was initiated (and thus funded) by us.
1552 pub is_outbound: bool,
1553 /// True if the channel is confirmed, channel_ready messages have been exchanged, and the
1554 /// channel is not currently being shut down. `channel_ready` message exchange implies the
1555 /// required confirmation count has been reached (and we were connected to the peer at some
1556 /// point after the funding transaction received enough confirmations). The required
1557 /// confirmation count is provided in [`confirmations_required`].
1559 /// [`confirmations_required`]: ChannelDetails::confirmations_required
1560 pub is_channel_ready: bool,
1561 /// The stage of the channel's shutdown.
1562 /// `None` for `ChannelDetails` serialized on LDK versions prior to 0.0.116.
1563 pub channel_shutdown_state: Option<ChannelShutdownState>,
1564 /// True if the channel is (a) confirmed and channel_ready messages have been exchanged, (b)
1565 /// the peer is connected, and (c) the channel is not currently negotiating a shutdown.
1567 /// This is a strict superset of `is_channel_ready`.
1568 pub is_usable: bool,
1569 /// True if this channel is (or will be) publicly-announced.
1570 pub is_public: bool,
1571 /// The smallest value HTLC (in msat) we will accept, for this channel. This field
1572 /// is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.107
1573 pub inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Option<u64>,
1574 /// The largest value HTLC (in msat) we currently will accept, for this channel.
1575 pub inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: Option<u64>,
1576 /// Set of configurable parameters that affect channel operation.
1578 /// This field is only `None` for `ChannelDetails` objects serialized prior to LDK 0.0.109.
1579 pub config: Option<ChannelConfig>,
1582 impl ChannelDetails {
1583 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for inbound payments.
1584 /// This should be used for providing invoice hints or in any other context where our
1585 /// counterparty will forward a payment to us.
1587 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::inbound_scid_alias`], if set, or the
1588 /// [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`]. See those for more information.
1589 pub fn get_inbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1590 self.inbound_scid_alias.or(self.short_channel_id)
1593 /// Gets the current SCID which should be used to identify this channel for outbound payments.
1594 /// This should be used in [`Route`]s to describe the first hop or in other contexts where
1595 /// we're sending or forwarding a payment outbound over this channel.
1597 /// This is either the [`ChannelDetails::short_channel_id`], if set, or the
1598 /// [`ChannelDetails::outbound_scid_alias`]. See those for more information.
1599 pub fn get_outbound_payment_scid(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1600 self.short_channel_id.or(self.outbound_scid_alias)
1603 fn from_channel_context<SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
1604 context: &ChannelContext<SP>, best_block_height: u32, latest_features: InitFeatures,
1605 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
1608 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1609 F::Target: FeeEstimator
1611 let balance = context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
1612 let (to_remote_reserve_satoshis, to_self_reserve_satoshis) =
1613 context.get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis();
1615 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
1616 counterparty: ChannelCounterparty {
1617 node_id: context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1618 features: latest_features,
1619 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_remote_reserve_satoshis,
1620 forwarding_info: context.counterparty_forwarding_info(),
1621 // Ensures that we have actually received the `htlc_minimum_msat` value
1622 // from the counterparty through the `OpenChannel` or `AcceptChannel`
1623 // message (as they are always the first message from the counterparty).
1624 // Else `Channel::get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat` could return the
1625 // default `0` value set by `Channel::new_outbound`.
1626 outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: if context.have_received_message() {
1627 Some(context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat()) } else { None },
1628 outbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1630 funding_txo: context.get_funding_txo(),
1631 // Note that accept_channel (or open_channel) is always the first message, so
1632 // `have_received_message` indicates that type negotiation has completed.
1633 channel_type: if context.have_received_message() { Some(context.get_channel_type().clone()) } else { None },
1634 short_channel_id: context.get_short_channel_id(),
1635 outbound_scid_alias: if context.is_usable() { Some(context.outbound_scid_alias()) } else { None },
1636 inbound_scid_alias: context.latest_inbound_scid_alias(),
1637 channel_value_satoshis: context.get_value_satoshis(),
1638 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: Some(context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight()),
1639 unspendable_punishment_reserve: to_self_reserve_satoshis,
1640 inbound_capacity_msat: balance.inbound_capacity_msat,
1641 outbound_capacity_msat: balance.outbound_capacity_msat,
1642 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat,
1643 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: balance.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1644 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
1645 confirmations_required: context.minimum_depth(),
1646 confirmations: Some(context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height)),
1647 force_close_spend_delay: context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(),
1648 is_outbound: context.is_outbound(),
1649 is_channel_ready: context.is_usable(),
1650 is_usable: context.is_live(),
1651 is_public: context.should_announce(),
1652 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat: Some(context.get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat()),
1653 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat: context.get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(),
1654 config: Some(context.config()),
1655 channel_shutdown_state: Some(context.shutdown_state()),
1660 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
1661 /// Further information on the details of the channel shutdown.
1662 /// Upon channels being forced closed (i.e. commitment transaction confirmation detected
1663 /// by `ChainMonitor`), ChannelShutdownState will be set to `ShutdownComplete` or
1664 /// the channel will be removed shortly.
1665 /// Also note, that in normal operation, peers could disconnect at any of these states
1666 /// and require peer re-connection before making progress onto other states
1667 pub enum ChannelShutdownState {
1668 /// Channel has not sent or received a shutdown message.
1670 /// Local node has sent a shutdown message for this channel.
1672 /// Shutdown message exchanges have concluded and the channels are in the midst of
1673 /// resolving all existing open HTLCs before closing can continue.
1675 /// All HTLCs have been resolved, nodes are currently negotiating channel close onchain fee rates.
1676 NegotiatingClosingFee,
1677 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point `ChannelManager` is about
1678 /// to drop the channel.
1682 /// Used by [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] to express the status of recent payments.
1683 /// These include payments that have yet to find a successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
1684 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)]
1685 pub enum RecentPaymentDetails {
1686 /// When an invoice was requested and thus a payment has not yet been sent.
1688 /// Identifier for the payment to ensure idempotency.
1689 payment_id: PaymentId,
1691 /// When a payment is still being sent and awaiting successful delivery.
1693 /// Hash of the payment that is currently being sent but has yet to be fulfilled or
1695 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1696 /// Total amount (in msat, excluding fees) across all paths for this payment,
1697 /// not just the amount currently inflight.
1700 /// When a pending payment is fulfilled, we continue tracking it until all pending HTLCs have
1701 /// been resolved. Upon receiving [`Event::PaymentSent`], we delay for a few minutes before the
1702 /// payment is removed from tracking.
1704 /// Hash of the payment that was claimed. `None` for serializations of [`ChannelManager`]
1705 /// made before LDK version 0.0.104.
1706 payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
1708 /// After a payment's retries are exhausted per the provided [`Retry`], or it is explicitly
1709 /// abandoned via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], it is marked as abandoned until all
1710 /// pending HTLCs for this payment resolve and an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated.
1712 /// Hash of the payment that we have given up trying to send.
1713 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
1717 /// Route hints used in constructing invoices for [phantom node payents].
1719 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
1721 pub struct PhantomRouteHints {
1722 /// The list of channels to be included in the invoice route hints.
1723 pub channels: Vec<ChannelDetails>,
1724 /// A fake scid used for representing the phantom node's fake channel in generating the invoice
1726 pub phantom_scid: u64,
1727 /// The pubkey of the real backing node that would ultimately receive the payment.
1728 pub real_node_pubkey: PublicKey,
1731 macro_rules! handle_error {
1732 ($self: ident, $internal: expr, $counterparty_node_id: expr) => { {
1733 // In testing, ensure there are no deadlocks where the lock is already held upon
1734 // entering the macro.
1735 debug_assert_ne!($self.pending_events.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1736 debug_assert_ne!($self.per_peer_state.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
1740 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { err, chan_id, shutdown_finish, channel_capacity }) => {
1741 let mut msg_events = Vec::with_capacity(2);
1743 if let Some((shutdown_res, update_option)) = shutdown_finish {
1744 $self.finish_force_close_channel(shutdown_res);
1745 if let Some(update) = update_option {
1746 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
1750 if let Some((channel_id, user_channel_id)) = chan_id {
1751 $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
1752 channel_id, user_channel_id,
1753 reason: ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err.err.clone() },
1754 counterparty_node_id: Some($counterparty_node_id),
1755 channel_capacity_sats: channel_capacity,
1760 log_error!($self.logger, "{}", err.err);
1761 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.action {
1763 msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
1764 node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
1765 action: err.action.clone()
1769 if !msg_events.is_empty() {
1770 let per_peer_state = $self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
1771 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&$counterparty_node_id) {
1772 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
1773 peer_state.pending_msg_events.append(&mut msg_events);
1777 // Return error in case higher-API need one
1782 ($self: ident, $internal: expr) => {
1785 Err((chan, msg_handle_err)) => {
1786 let counterparty_node_id = chan.get_counterparty_node_id();
1787 handle_error!($self, Err(msg_handle_err), counterparty_node_id).map_err(|err| (chan, err))
1793 macro_rules! update_maps_on_chan_removal {
1794 ($self: expr, $channel_context: expr) => {{
1795 $self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.channel_id());
1796 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1797 if let Some(short_id) = $channel_context.get_short_channel_id() {
1798 short_to_chan_info.remove(&short_id);
1800 // If the channel was never confirmed on-chain prior to its closure, remove the
1801 // outbound SCID alias we used for it from the collision-prevention set. While we
1802 // generally want to avoid ever re-using an outbound SCID alias across all channels, we
1803 // also don't want a counterparty to be able to trivially cause a memory leak by simply
1804 // opening a million channels with us which are closed before we ever reach the funding
1806 let alias_removed = $self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1807 debug_assert!(alias_removed);
1809 short_to_chan_info.remove(&$channel_context.outbound_scid_alias());
1813 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1814 macro_rules! convert_unfunded_chan_err {
1815 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1817 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1818 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1820 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1821 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), $channel_id.clone()))
1823 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1824 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", &$channel_id, msg);
1825 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$channel.context);
1826 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1828 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1829 shutdown_res, None, $channel.context.get_value_satoshis()))
1835 /// Returns (boolean indicating if we should remove the Channel object from memory, a mapped error)
1836 macro_rules! convert_chan_phase_err {
1837 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, $channel_update: expr) => {
1839 ChannelError::Warn(msg) => {
1840 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Warn(msg), *$channel_id))
1842 ChannelError::Ignore(msg) => {
1843 (false, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(ChannelError::Ignore(msg), *$channel_id))
1845 ChannelError::Close(msg) => {
1846 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to close-required error: {}", $channel_id, msg);
1847 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, $channel.context);
1848 let shutdown_res = $channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
1849 let user_id = $channel.context.get_user_id();
1850 let channel_capacity_satoshis = $channel.context.get_value_satoshis();
1852 (true, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, *$channel_id, user_id,
1853 shutdown_res, $channel_update, channel_capacity_satoshis))
1857 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, FUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1858 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, { $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast($channel).ok() })
1860 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_id: expr, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL) => {
1861 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, $channel, $channel_id, MANUAL_CHANNEL_UPDATE, None)
1863 ($self: ident, $err: expr, $channel_phase: expr, $channel_id: expr) => {
1864 match $channel_phase {
1865 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
1866 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL)
1868 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(channel) => {
1869 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1871 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(channel) => {
1872 convert_chan_phase_err!($self, $err, channel, $channel_id, UNFUNDED_CHANNEL)
1878 macro_rules! break_chan_phase_entry {
1879 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1883 let key = *$entry.key();
1884 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1886 $entry.remove_entry();
1894 macro_rules! try_chan_phase_entry {
1895 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1899 let key = *$entry.key();
1900 let (drop, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), &key);
1902 $entry.remove_entry();
1910 macro_rules! try_unfunded_chan_entry {
1911 ($self: ident, $res: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1915 let (drop, res) = convert_unfunded_chan_err!($self, e, $entry.get_mut(), $entry.key());
1917 $entry.remove_entry();
1925 macro_rules! remove_channel {
1926 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1928 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1929 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context);
1935 macro_rules! remove_channel_phase {
1936 ($self: expr, $entry: expr) => {
1938 let channel = $entry.remove_entry().1;
1939 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &channel.context());
1945 macro_rules! send_channel_ready {
1946 ($self: ident, $pending_msg_events: expr, $channel: expr, $channel_ready_msg: expr) => {{
1947 $pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady {
1948 node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1949 msg: $channel_ready_msg,
1951 // Note that we may send a `channel_ready` multiple times for a channel if we reconnect, so
1952 // we allow collisions, but we shouldn't ever be updating the channel ID pointed to.
1953 let mut short_to_chan_info = $self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
1954 let outbound_alias_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert($channel.context.outbound_scid_alias(), ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1955 assert!(outbound_alias_insert.is_none() || outbound_alias_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1956 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1957 if let Some(real_scid) = $channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
1958 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()));
1959 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == ($channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), $channel.context.channel_id()),
1960 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind the chain tip by a full month when creating channels");
1965 macro_rules! emit_channel_pending_event {
1966 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1967 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_pending_event() {
1968 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelPending {
1969 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1970 former_temporary_channel_id: $channel.context.temporary_channel_id(),
1971 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1972 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1973 funding_txo: $channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1975 $channel.context.set_channel_pending_event_emitted();
1980 macro_rules! emit_channel_ready_event {
1981 ($locked_events: expr, $channel: expr) => {
1982 if $channel.context.should_emit_channel_ready_event() {
1983 debug_assert!($channel.context.channel_pending_event_emitted());
1984 $locked_events.push_back((events::Event::ChannelReady {
1985 channel_id: $channel.context.channel_id(),
1986 user_channel_id: $channel.context.get_user_id(),
1987 counterparty_node_id: $channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
1988 channel_type: $channel.context.get_channel_type().clone(),
1990 $channel.context.set_channel_ready_event_emitted();
1995 macro_rules! handle_monitor_update_completion {
1996 ($self: ident, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr) => { {
1997 let mut updates = $chan.monitor_updating_restored(&$self.logger,
1998 &$self.node_signer, $self.genesis_hash, &$self.default_configuration,
1999 $self.best_block.read().unwrap().height());
2000 let counterparty_node_id = $chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
2001 let channel_update = if updates.channel_ready.is_some() && $chan.context.is_usable() {
2002 // We only send a channel_update in the case where we are just now sending a
2003 // channel_ready and the channel is in a usable state. We may re-send a
2004 // channel_update later through the announcement_signatures process for public
2005 // channels, but there's no reason not to just inform our counterparty of our fees
2007 if let Ok(msg) = $self.get_channel_update_for_unicast($chan) {
2008 Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
2009 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2015 let update_actions = $peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
2016 .remove(&$chan.context.channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
2018 let htlc_forwards = $self.handle_channel_resumption(
2019 &mut $peer_state.pending_msg_events, $chan, updates.raa,
2020 updates.commitment_update, updates.order, updates.accepted_htlcs,
2021 updates.funding_broadcastable, updates.channel_ready,
2022 updates.announcement_sigs);
2023 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
2024 $peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
2027 let channel_id = $chan.context.channel_id();
2028 core::mem::drop($peer_state_lock);
2029 core::mem::drop($per_peer_state_lock);
2031 $self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
2033 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
2034 $self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
2036 $self.finalize_claims(updates.finalized_claimed_htlcs);
2037 for failure in updates.failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2038 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2039 $self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&failure.0, &failure.1, &failure.2, receiver);
2044 macro_rules! handle_new_monitor_update {
2045 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, _internal, $remove: expr, $completed: expr) => { {
2046 // update_maps_on_chan_removal needs to be able to take id_to_peer, so make sure we can in
2047 // any case so that it won't deadlock.
2048 debug_assert_ne!($self.id_to_peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
2049 debug_assert!($self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire));
2051 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress => {
2052 log_debug!($self.logger, "ChannelMonitor update for {} in flight, holding messages until the update completes.",
2053 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2056 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure => {
2057 log_error!($self.logger, "Closing channel {} due to monitor update ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::PermanentFailure",
2058 &$chan.context.channel_id());
2059 update_maps_on_chan_removal!($self, &$chan.context);
2060 let res = Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(
2061 "ChannelMonitor storage failure".to_owned(), $chan.context.channel_id(),
2062 $chan.context.get_user_id(), $chan.context.force_shutdown(false),
2063 $self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&$chan).ok(), $chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
2067 ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed => {
2073 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, $remove: expr) => {
2074 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2075 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2076 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan))
2078 ($self: ident, $update_res: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr, INITIAL_MONITOR) => {
2079 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2080 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2081 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2083 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2085 debug_assert!(false);
2086 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2087 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2088 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2089 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2090 $chan_entry.remove();
2094 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan: expr, MANUALLY_REMOVING, $remove: expr) => { {
2095 let in_flight_updates = $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.entry($funding_txo)
2096 .or_insert_with(Vec::new);
2097 // During startup, we push monitor updates as background events through to here in
2098 // order to replay updates that were in-flight when we shut down. Thus, we have to
2099 // filter for uniqueness here.
2100 let idx = in_flight_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd == &$update)
2101 .unwrap_or_else(|| {
2102 in_flight_updates.push($update);
2103 in_flight_updates.len() - 1
2105 let update_res = $self.chain_monitor.update_channel($funding_txo, &in_flight_updates[idx]);
2106 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, update_res, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2107 $per_peer_state_lock, $chan, _internal, $remove,
2109 let _ = in_flight_updates.remove(idx);
2110 if in_flight_updates.is_empty() && $chan.blocked_monitor_updates_pending() == 0 {
2111 handle_monitor_update_completion!($self, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state, $per_peer_state_lock, $chan);
2115 ($self: ident, $funding_txo: expr, $update: expr, $peer_state_lock: expr, $peer_state: expr, $per_peer_state_lock: expr, $chan_entry: expr) => {
2116 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = $chan_entry.get_mut() {
2117 handle_new_monitor_update!($self, $funding_txo, $update, $peer_state_lock, $peer_state,
2118 $per_peer_state_lock, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING, { $chan_entry.remove() })
2120 // We're not supposed to handle monitor updates for unfunded channels (they have no monitors to
2122 debug_assert!(false);
2123 let channel_id = *$chan_entry.key();
2124 let (_, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!($self, ChannelError::Close(
2125 "Cannot update monitor for unfunded channels as they don't have monitors yet".into()),
2126 $chan_entry.get_mut(), &channel_id);
2127 $chan_entry.remove();
2133 macro_rules! process_events_body {
2134 ($self: expr, $event_to_handle: expr, $handle_event: expr) => {
2135 let mut processed_all_events = false;
2136 while !processed_all_events {
2137 if $self.pending_events_processor.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::Acquire, Ordering::Relaxed).is_err() {
2141 let mut result = NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
2144 // We'll acquire our total consistency lock so that we can be sure no other
2145 // persists happen while processing monitor events.
2146 let _read_guard = $self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
2148 // Because `handle_post_event_actions` may send `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to the user we must
2149 // ensure any startup-generated background events are handled first.
2150 if $self.process_background_events() == NotifyOption::DoPersist { result = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
2152 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
2153 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
2154 if $self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
2155 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2159 let pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().clone();
2160 let num_events = pending_events.len();
2161 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
2162 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
2165 let mut post_event_actions = Vec::new();
2167 for (event, action_opt) in pending_events {
2168 $event_to_handle = event;
2170 if let Some(action) = action_opt {
2171 post_event_actions.push(action);
2176 let mut pending_events = $self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2177 pending_events.drain(..num_events);
2178 processed_all_events = pending_events.is_empty();
2179 // Note that `push_pending_forwards_ev` relies on `pending_events_processor` being
2180 // updated here with the `pending_events` lock acquired.
2181 $self.pending_events_processor.store(false, Ordering::Release);
2184 if !post_event_actions.is_empty() {
2185 $self.handle_post_event_actions(post_event_actions);
2186 // If we had some actions, go around again as we may have more events now
2187 processed_all_events = false;
2190 if result == NotifyOption::DoPersist {
2191 $self.persistence_notifier.notify();
2197 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
2199 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
2200 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
2201 ES::Target: EntropySource,
2202 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2203 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2204 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2208 /// Constructs a new `ChannelManager` to hold several channels and route between them.
2210 /// The current time or latest block header time can be provided as the `current_timestamp`.
2212 /// This is the main "logic hub" for all channel-related actions, and implements
2213 /// [`ChannelMessageHandler`].
2215 /// Non-proportional fees are fixed according to our risk using the provided fee estimator.
2217 /// Users need to notify the new `ChannelManager` when a new block is connected or
2218 /// disconnected using its [`block_connected`] and [`block_disconnected`] methods, starting
2219 /// from after [`params.best_block.block_hash`]. See [`chain::Listen`] and [`chain::Confirm`] for
2222 /// [`block_connected`]: chain::Listen::block_connected
2223 /// [`block_disconnected`]: chain::Listen::block_disconnected
2224 /// [`params.best_block.block_hash`]: chain::BestBlock::block_hash
2226 fee_est: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, entropy_source: ES,
2227 node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, config: UserConfig, params: ChainParameters,
2228 current_timestamp: u32,
2230 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2231 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2232 let inbound_pmt_key_material = node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
2233 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
2235 default_configuration: config.clone(),
2236 genesis_hash: genesis_block(params.network).header.block_hash(),
2237 fee_estimator: LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(fee_est),
2242 best_block: RwLock::new(params.best_block),
2244 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(HashSet::new()),
2245 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2246 pending_outbound_payments: OutboundPayments::new(),
2247 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2248 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments: HashMap::new(), pending_claiming_payments: HashMap::new() }),
2249 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2250 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
2251 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2253 our_network_pubkey: node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap(),
2256 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
2257 fake_scid_rand_bytes: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2259 probing_cookie_secret: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
2261 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(current_timestamp as usize),
2263 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
2265 pending_events: Mutex::new(VecDeque::new()),
2266 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
2267 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(Vec::new()),
2268 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
2269 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
2270 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
2280 /// Gets the current configuration applied to all new channels.
2281 pub fn get_current_default_configuration(&self) -> &UserConfig {
2282 &self.default_configuration
2285 fn create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2286 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2287 let mut outbound_scid_alias = 0;
2290 if cfg!(fuzzing) { // fuzzing chacha20 doesn't use the key at all so we always get the same alias
2291 outbound_scid_alias += 1;
2293 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias.get_fake_scid(height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
2295 if outbound_scid_alias != 0 && self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().insert(outbound_scid_alias) {
2299 if i > 1_000_000 { panic!("Your RNG is busted or we ran out of possible outbound SCID aliases (which should never happen before we run out of memory to store channels"); }
2304 /// Creates a new outbound channel to the given remote node and with the given value.
2306 /// `user_channel_id` will be provided back as in
2307 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events
2308 /// correspond with which `create_channel` call. Note that the `user_channel_id` defaults to a
2309 /// randomized value for inbound channels. `user_channel_id` has no meaning inside of LDK, it
2310 /// is simply copied to events and otherwise ignored.
2312 /// Raises [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] when `channel_value_satoshis` > 2**24 or `push_msat` is
2313 /// greater than `channel_value_satoshis * 1k` or `channel_value_satoshis < 1000`.
2315 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be opened due to failing to
2316 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2317 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`] or [`SignerProvider::get_destination_script`].
2319 /// Note that we do not check if you are currently connected to the given peer. If no
2320 /// connection is available, the outbound `open_channel` message may fail to send, resulting in
2321 /// the channel eventually being silently forgotten (dropped on reload).
2323 /// Returns the new Channel's temporary `channel_id`. This ID will appear as
2324 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`] and in
2325 /// [`ChannelDetails::channel_id`] until after
2326 /// [`ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated`] is called, swapping the Channel's ID for
2327 /// one derived from the funding transaction's TXID. If the counterparty rejects the channel
2328 /// immediately, this temporary ID will appear in [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`].
2330 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::user_channel_id
2331 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id`]: events::Event::FundingGenerationReady::temporary_channel_id
2332 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::channel_id
2333 pub fn create_channel(&self, their_network_key: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_channel_id: u128, override_config: Option<UserConfig>) -> Result<ChannelId, APIError> {
2334 if channel_value_satoshis < 1000 {
2335 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Channel value must be at least 1000 satoshis. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis) });
2338 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2339 // We want to make sure the lock is actually acquired by PersistenceNotifierGuard.
2340 debug_assert!(&self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
2342 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2344 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&their_network_key)
2345 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Not connected to node: {}", their_network_key) })?;
2347 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2349 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
2350 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2351 let config = if override_config.is_some() { override_config.as_ref().unwrap() } else { &self.default_configuration };
2352 match OutboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider, their_network_key,
2353 their_features, channel_value_satoshis, push_msat, user_channel_id, config,
2354 self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(), outbound_scid_alias)
2358 self.outbound_scid_aliases.lock().unwrap().remove(&outbound_scid_alias);
2363 let res = channel.get_open_channel(self.genesis_hash.clone());
2365 let temporary_channel_id = channel.context.channel_id();
2366 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(temporary_channel_id) {
2367 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
2369 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Fuzzy bad RNG".to_owned() });
2371 panic!("RNG is bad???");
2374 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => { entry.insert(channel); }
2377 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
2378 node_id: their_network_key,
2381 Ok(temporary_channel_id)
2384 fn list_funded_channels_with_filter<Fn: FnMut(&(&ChannelId, &Channel<SP>)) -> bool + Copy>(&self, f: Fn) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2385 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2386 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2387 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2388 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2389 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2390 // the same channel.
2391 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2393 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2394 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2395 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2396 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2397 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2398 res.extend(peer_state.channel_by_id.iter()
2399 .filter_map(|(chan_id, phase)| match phase {
2400 // Only `Channels` in the `ChannelPhase::Funded` phase can be considered funded.
2401 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => Some((chan_id, chan)),
2405 .map(|(_channel_id, channel)| {
2406 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2407 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2415 /// Gets the list of open channels, in random order. See [`ChannelDetails`] field documentation for
2416 /// more information.
2417 pub fn list_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2418 // Allocate our best estimate of the number of channels we have in the `res`
2419 // Vec. Sadly the `short_to_chan_info` map doesn't cover channels without
2420 // a scid or a scid alias, and the `id_to_peer` shouldn't be used outside
2421 // of the ChannelMonitor handling. Therefore reallocations may still occur, but is
2422 // unlikely as the `short_to_chan_info` map often contains 2 entries for
2423 // the same channel.
2424 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
2426 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2427 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2428 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
2429 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2430 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2431 for context in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, phase)| phase.context()) {
2432 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height,
2433 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2436 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2437 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2438 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2441 for (_channel_id, channel) in peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
2442 let details = ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(&channel.context, best_block_height,
2443 peer_state.latest_features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator);
2451 /// Gets the list of usable channels, in random order. Useful as an argument to
2452 /// [`Router::find_route`] to ensure non-announced channels are used.
2454 /// These are guaranteed to have their [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] value set to true, see the
2455 /// documentation for [`ChannelDetails::is_usable`] for more info on exactly what the criteria
2457 pub fn list_usable_channels(&self) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2458 // Note we use is_live here instead of usable which leads to somewhat confused
2459 // internal/external nomenclature, but that's ok cause that's probably what the user
2460 // really wanted anyway.
2461 self.list_funded_channels_with_filter(|&(_, ref channel)| channel.context.is_live())
2464 /// Gets the list of channels we have with a given counterparty, in random order.
2465 pub fn list_channels_with_counterparty(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Vec<ChannelDetails> {
2466 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2467 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2469 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
2470 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2471 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2472 let features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2473 let context_to_details = |context| {
2474 ChannelDetails::from_channel_context(context, best_block_height, features.clone(), &self.fee_estimator)
2476 return peer_state.channel_by_id
2478 .map(|(_, phase)| phase.context())
2479 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2480 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter().map(|(_, channel)| &channel.context))
2481 .map(context_to_details)
2487 /// Returns in an undefined order recent payments that -- if not fulfilled -- have yet to find a
2488 /// successful path, or have unresolved HTLCs.
2490 /// This can be useful for payments that may have been prepared, but ultimately not sent, as a
2491 /// result of a crash. If such a payment exists, is not listed here, and an
2492 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] has not been received, you may consider resending the payment.
2494 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
2495 pub fn list_recent_payments(&self) -> Vec<RecentPaymentDetails> {
2496 self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().iter()
2497 .filter_map(|(payment_id, pending_outbound_payment)| match pending_outbound_payment {
2498 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {
2499 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2501 // InvoiceReceived is an intermediate state and doesn't need to be exposed
2502 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {
2503 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::AwaitingInvoice { payment_id: *payment_id })
2505 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { payment_hash, total_msat, .. } => {
2506 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Pending {
2507 payment_hash: *payment_hash,
2508 total_msat: *total_msat,
2511 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { payment_hash, .. } => {
2512 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Abandoned { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2514 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { payment_hash, .. } => {
2515 Some(RecentPaymentDetails::Fulfilled { payment_hash: *payment_hash })
2517 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { .. } => None
2522 /// Helper function that issues the channel close events
2523 fn issue_channel_close_events(&self, context: &ChannelContext<SP>, closure_reason: ClosureReason) {
2524 let mut pending_events_lock = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
2525 match context.unbroadcasted_funding() {
2526 Some(transaction) => {
2527 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::DiscardFunding {
2528 channel_id: context.channel_id(), transaction
2533 pending_events_lock.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
2534 channel_id: context.channel_id(),
2535 user_channel_id: context.get_user_id(),
2536 reason: closure_reason,
2537 counterparty_node_id: Some(context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
2538 channel_capacity_sats: Some(context.get_value_satoshis()),
2542 fn close_channel_internal(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2543 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2545 let mut failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
2546 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
2548 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2550 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
2551 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
2553 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2554 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2556 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2557 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
2558 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
2559 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
2560 let their_features = &peer_state.latest_features;
2561 let (shutdown_msg, mut monitor_update_opt, htlcs) =
2562 chan.get_shutdown(&self.signer_provider, their_features, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, override_shutdown_script)?;
2563 failed_htlcs = htlcs;
2565 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
2566 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
2567 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
2568 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
2569 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
2573 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
2574 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt.take() {
2575 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
2576 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
2579 if chan.is_shutdown() {
2580 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
2581 if let Ok(channel_update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
2582 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2586 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
2592 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (),
2595 // If we reach this point, it means that the channel_id either refers to an unfunded channel or
2596 // it does not exist for this peer. Either way, we can attempt to force-close it.
2598 // An appropriate error will be returned for non-existence of the channel if that's the case.
2599 return self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, false).map(|_| ())
2602 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2603 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2604 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(*counterparty_node_id), channel_id: *channel_id };
2605 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
2608 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, *counterparty_node_id);
2612 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2613 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2614 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2616 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay between our [`Background`] and
2617 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2619 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will require a channel closing
2620 /// transaction feerate of at least our [`Background`] feerate or the feerate which
2621 /// would appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower. We will allow our
2622 /// counterparty to pay as much fee as they'd like, however.
2624 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2626 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2627 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2628 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2631 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2632 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2633 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2634 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2635 pub fn close_channel(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2636 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, None)
2639 /// Begins the process of closing a channel. After this call (plus some timeout), no new HTLCs
2640 /// will be accepted on the given channel, and after additional timeout/the closing of all
2641 /// pending HTLCs, the channel will be closed on chain.
2643 /// `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` has different meanings depending on if we initiated
2644 /// the channel being closed or not:
2645 /// * If we are the channel initiator, we will pay at least this feerate on the closing
2646 /// transaction. The upper-bound is set by
2647 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`] plus our [`Normal`] fee
2648 /// estimate (or `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`, if it is greater).
2649 /// * If our counterparty is the channel initiator, we will refuse to accept a channel closure
2650 /// transaction feerate below `target_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight` (or the feerate which
2651 /// will appear on a force-closure transaction, whichever is lower).
2653 /// The `shutdown_script` provided will be used as the `scriptPubKey` for the closing transaction.
2654 /// Will fail if a shutdown script has already been set for this channel by
2655 /// ['ChannelHandshakeConfig::commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey`]. The given shutdown script must
2656 /// also be compatible with our and the counterparty's features.
2658 /// May generate a [`SendShutdown`] message event on success, which should be relayed.
2660 /// Raises [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the channel cannot be closed due to failing to
2661 /// generate a shutdown scriptpubkey or destination script set by
2662 /// [`SignerProvider::get_shutdown_scriptpubkey`]. A force-closure may be needed to close the
2665 /// [`ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig::force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis
2666 /// [`Background`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Background
2667 /// [`Normal`]: crate::chain::chaininterface::ConfirmationTarget::Normal
2668 /// [`SendShutdown`]: crate::events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown
2669 pub fn close_channel_with_feerate_and_script(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight: Option<u32>, shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2670 self.close_channel_internal(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, target_feerate_sats_per_1000_weight, shutdown_script)
2674 fn finish_force_close_channel(&self, shutdown_res: ShutdownResult) {
2675 let (monitor_update_option, mut failed_htlcs) = shutdown_res;
2676 log_debug!(self.logger, "Finishing force-closure of channel with {} HTLCs to fail", failed_htlcs.len());
2677 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2678 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
2679 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
2680 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
2681 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
2683 if let Some((_, funding_txo, monitor_update)) = monitor_update_option {
2684 // There isn't anything we can do if we get an update failure - we're already
2685 // force-closing. The monitor update on the required in-memory copy should broadcast
2686 // the latest local state, which is the best we can do anyway. Thus, it is safe to
2687 // ignore the result here.
2688 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &monitor_update);
2692 /// `peer_msg` should be set when we receive a message from a peer, but not set when the
2693 /// user closes, which will be re-exposed as the `ChannelClosed` reason.
2694 fn force_close_channel_with_peer(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, peer_node_id: &PublicKey, peer_msg: Option<&String>, broadcast: bool)
2695 -> Result<PublicKey, APIError> {
2696 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2697 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id)
2698 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", peer_node_id) })?;
2699 let (update_opt, counterparty_node_id) = {
2700 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2701 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
2702 let closure_reason = if let Some(peer_msg) = peer_msg {
2703 ClosureReason::CounterpartyForceClosed { peer_msg: UntrustedString(peer_msg.to_string()) }
2705 ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed
2707 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2708 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", channel_id);
2709 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_phase_entry.get().context(), closure_reason);
2710 let mut chan_phase = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry);
2712 ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) => {
2713 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(broadcast));
2714 (self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan).ok(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2716 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => {
2717 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan_phase.context_mut().force_shutdown(false));
2718 // Unfunded channel has no update
2719 (None, chan_phase.context().get_counterparty_node_id())
2722 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2723 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2724 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2725 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2726 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2727 // Unfunded channel has no update
2728 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2729 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(channel_id.clone()) {
2730 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2731 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.get().context, closure_reason);
2732 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan);
2733 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
2734 // Unfunded channel has no update
2735 (None, chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id())
2736 } else if peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(channel_id).is_some() {
2737 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing channel {}", &channel_id);
2738 // N.B. that we don't send any channel close event here: we
2739 // don't have a user_channel_id, and we never sent any opening
2741 (None, *peer_node_id)
2743 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{ err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}", channel_id, peer_node_id) });
2746 if let Some(update) = update_opt {
2747 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2748 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
2753 Ok(counterparty_node_id)
2756 fn force_close_sending_error(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, broadcast: bool) -> Result<(), APIError> {
2757 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
2758 match self.force_close_channel_with_peer(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, None, broadcast) {
2759 Ok(counterparty_node_id) => {
2760 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
2761 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
2762 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
2763 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
2764 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
2765 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
2766 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
2767 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: *channel_id, data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
2778 /// Force closes a channel, immediately broadcasting the latest local transaction(s) and
2779 /// rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel. Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to
2780 /// the manager, or if the `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding
2782 pub fn force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2783 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2784 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true)
2787 /// Force closes a channel, rejecting new HTLCs on the given channel but skips broadcasting
2788 /// the latest local transaction(s). Fails if `channel_id` is unknown to the manager, or if the
2789 /// `counterparty_node_id` isn't the counterparty of the corresponding channel.
2791 /// You can always get the latest local transaction(s) to broadcast from
2792 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_latest_holder_commitment_txn`].
2793 pub fn force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&self, channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey)
2794 -> Result<(), APIError> {
2795 self.force_close_sending_error(channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false)
2798 /// Force close all channels, immediately broadcasting the latest local commitment transaction
2799 /// for each to the chain and rejecting new HTLCs on each.
2800 pub fn force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn(&self) {
2801 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2802 let _ = self.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2806 /// Force close all channels rejecting new HTLCs on each but without broadcasting the latest
2807 /// local transaction(s).
2808 pub fn force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn(&self) {
2809 for chan in self.list_channels() {
2810 let _ = self.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&chan.channel_id, &chan.counterparty.node_id);
2814 fn construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(
2815 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, hop_hmac: [u8; 32],
2816 new_packet_bytes: [u8; onion_utils::ONION_DATA_LEN], shared_secret: [u8; 32],
2817 next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
2818 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2819 debug_assert!(next_packet_pubkey_opt.is_some());
2820 let outgoing_packet = msgs::OnionPacket {
2822 public_key: next_packet_pubkey_opt.unwrap_or(Err(secp256k1::Error::InvalidPublicKey)),
2823 hop_data: new_packet_bytes,
2827 let (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value) = match hop_data {
2828 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward { short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value } =>
2829 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value),
2830 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. } =>
2831 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2832 msg: "Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node",
2833 err_code: 0x4000 | 22,
2834 err_data: Vec::new(),
2838 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2839 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward {
2840 onion_packet: outgoing_packet,
2843 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2844 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2845 incoming_amt_msat: Some(msg.amount_msat),
2846 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward,
2847 outgoing_cltv_value,
2848 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
2852 fn construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(
2853 &self, hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload, shared_secret: [u8; 32], payment_hash: PaymentHash,
2854 amt_msat: u64, cltv_expiry: u32, phantom_shared_secret: Option<[u8; 32]>, allow_underpay: bool,
2855 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
2856 ) -> Result<PendingHTLCInfo, InboundOnionErr> {
2857 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, onion_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata) = match hop_data {
2858 msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
2859 payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata, ..
2861 (payment_data, keysend_preimage, custom_tlvs, amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, payment_metadata),
2863 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2864 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2865 err_data: Vec::new(),
2866 msg: "Got non final data with an HMAC of 0",
2869 // final_incorrect_cltv_expiry
2870 if outgoing_cltv_value > cltv_expiry {
2871 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2872 msg: "Upstream node set CLTV to less than the CLTV set by the sender",
2874 err_data: cltv_expiry.to_be_bytes().to_vec()
2877 // final_expiry_too_soon
2878 // We have to have some headroom to broadcast on chain if we have the preimage, so make sure
2879 // we have at least HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER blocks to go.
2881 // Also, ensure that, in the case of an unknown preimage for the received payment hash, our
2882 // payment logic has enough time to fail the HTLC backward before our onchain logic triggers a
2883 // channel closure (see HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
2884 let current_height: u32 = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
2885 if (outgoing_cltv_value as u64) <= current_height as u64 + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u64 + 1 {
2886 let mut err_data = Vec::with_capacity(12);
2887 err_data.extend_from_slice(&amt_msat.to_be_bytes());
2888 err_data.extend_from_slice(¤t_height.to_be_bytes());
2889 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2890 err_code: 0x4000 | 15, err_data,
2891 msg: "The final CLTV expiry is too soon to handle",
2894 if (!allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat > amt_msat) ||
2895 (allow_underpay && onion_amt_msat >
2896 amt_msat.saturating_add(counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)))
2898 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2900 err_data: amt_msat.to_be_bytes().to_vec(),
2901 msg: "Upstream node sent less than we were supposed to receive in payment",
2905 let routing = if let Some(payment_preimage) = keysend_preimage {
2906 // We need to check that the sender knows the keysend preimage before processing this
2907 // payment further. Otherwise, an intermediary routing hop forwarding non-keysend-HTLC X
2908 // could discover the final destination of X, by probing the adjacent nodes on the route
2909 // with a keysend payment of identical payment hash to X and observing the processing
2910 // time discrepancies due to a hash collision with X.
2911 let hashed_preimage = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
2912 if hashed_preimage != payment_hash {
2913 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2914 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2915 err_data: Vec::new(),
2916 msg: "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash",
2919 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && payment_data.is_some() {
2920 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2921 err_code: 0x4000|22,
2922 err_data: Vec::new(),
2923 msg: "We don't support MPP keysend payments",
2926 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend {
2930 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2933 } else if let Some(data) = payment_data {
2934 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive {
2937 incoming_cltv_expiry: outgoing_cltv_value,
2938 phantom_shared_secret,
2942 return Err(InboundOnionErr {
2943 err_code: 0x4000|0x2000|3,
2944 err_data: Vec::new(),
2945 msg: "We require payment_secrets",
2948 Ok(PendingHTLCInfo {
2951 incoming_shared_secret: shared_secret,
2952 incoming_amt_msat: Some(amt_msat),
2953 outgoing_amt_msat: onion_amt_msat,
2954 outgoing_cltv_value,
2955 skimmed_fee_msat: counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
2959 fn decode_update_add_htlc_onion(
2960 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC
2961 ) -> Result<(onion_utils::Hop, [u8; 32], Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>), HTLCFailureMsg> {
2962 macro_rules! return_malformed_err {
2963 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr) => {
2965 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2966 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2967 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2968 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2969 sha256_of_onion: Sha256::hash(&msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data).into_inner(),
2970 failure_code: $err_code,
2976 if let Err(_) = msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key {
2977 return_malformed_err!("invalid ephemeral pubkey", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 6);
2980 let shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(
2981 Recipient::Node, &msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None
2982 ).unwrap().secret_bytes();
2984 if msg.onion_routing_packet.version != 0 {
2985 //TODO: Spec doesn't indicate if we should only hash hop_data here (and in other
2986 //sha256_of_onion error data packets), or the entire onion_routing_packet. Either way,
2987 //the hash doesn't really serve any purpose - in the case of hashing all data, the
2988 //receiving node would have to brute force to figure out which version was put in the
2989 //packet by the node that send us the message, in the case of hashing the hop_data, the
2990 //node knows the HMAC matched, so they already know what is there...
2991 return_malformed_err!("Unknown onion packet version", 0x8000 | 0x4000 | 4);
2993 macro_rules! return_err {
2994 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
2996 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
2997 return Err(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2998 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
2999 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3000 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3001 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3007 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(shared_secret, &msg.onion_routing_packet.hop_data[..], msg.onion_routing_packet.hmac, msg.payment_hash) {
3009 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3010 return_malformed_err!(err_msg, err_code);
3012 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
3013 return_err!(err_msg, err_code, &[0; 0]);
3016 let (outgoing_scid, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value, next_packet_pk_opt) = match next_hop {
3017 onion_utils::Hop::Forward {
3018 next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Forward {
3019 short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value
3022 let next_packet_pk = onion_utils::next_hop_pubkey(&self.secp_ctx,
3023 msg.onion_routing_packet.public_key.unwrap(), &shared_secret);
3024 (short_channel_id, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, Some(next_packet_pk))
3026 // We'll do receive checks in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] so we have access to the
3027 // inbound channel's state.
3028 onion_utils::Hop::Receive { .. } => return Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, None)),
3029 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data: msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { .. }, .. } => {
3030 return_err!("Final Node OnionHopData provided for us as an intermediary node", 0x4000 | 22, &[0; 0]);
3034 // Perform outbound checks here instead of in [`Self::construct_pending_htlc_info`] because we
3035 // can't hold the outbound peer state lock at the same time as the inbound peer state lock.
3036 if let Some((err, mut code, chan_update)) = loop {
3037 let id_option = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&outgoing_scid).cloned();
3038 let forwarding_chan_info_opt = match id_option {
3039 None => { // unknown_next_peer
3040 // Note that this is likely a timing oracle for detecting whether an scid is a
3041 // phantom or an intercept.
3042 if (self.default_configuration.accept_intercept_htlcs &&
3043 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)) ||
3044 fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, outgoing_scid, &self.genesis_hash)
3048 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3051 Some((cp_id, id)) => Some((cp_id.clone(), id.clone())),
3053 let chan_update_opt = if let Some((counterparty_node_id, forwarding_id)) = forwarding_chan_info_opt {
3054 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3055 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
3056 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
3057 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3059 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
3060 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3061 let chan = match peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forwarding_id).map(
3062 |chan_phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
3065 // Channel was removed. The short_to_chan_info and channel_by_id maps
3066 // have no consistency guarantees.
3067 break Some(("Don't have available channel for forwarding as requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3071 if !chan.context.should_announce() && !self.default_configuration.accept_forwards_to_priv_channels {
3072 // Note that the behavior here should be identical to the above block - we
3073 // should NOT reveal the existence or non-existence of a private channel if
3074 // we don't allow forwards outbound over them.
3075 break Some(("Refusing to forward to a private channel based on our config.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3077 if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_scid_privacy() && outgoing_scid != chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() {
3078 // `option_scid_alias` (referred to in LDK as `scid_privacy`) means
3079 // "refuse to forward unless the SCID alias was used", so we pretend
3080 // we don't have the channel here.
3081 break Some(("Refusing to forward over real channel SCID as our counterparty requested.", 0x4000 | 10, None));
3083 let chan_update_opt = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(outgoing_scid, chan).ok();
3085 // Note that we could technically not return an error yet here and just hope
3086 // that the connection is reestablished or monitor updated by the time we get
3087 // around to doing the actual forward, but better to fail early if we can and
3088 // hopefully an attacker trying to path-trace payments cannot make this occur
3089 // on a small/per-node/per-channel scale.
3090 if !chan.context.is_live() { // channel_disabled
3091 // If the channel_update we're going to return is disabled (i.e. the
3092 // peer has been disabled for some time), return `channel_disabled`,
3093 // otherwise return `temporary_channel_failure`.
3094 if chan_update_opt.as_ref().map(|u| u.contents.flags & 2 == 2).unwrap_or(false) {
3095 break Some(("Forwarding channel has been disconnected for some time.", 0x1000 | 20, chan_update_opt));
3097 break Some(("Forwarding channel is not in a ready state.", 0x1000 | 7, chan_update_opt));
3100 if outgoing_amt_msat < chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat() { // amount_below_minimum
3101 break Some(("HTLC amount was below the htlc_minimum_msat", 0x1000 | 11, chan_update_opt));
3103 if let Err((err, code)) = chan.htlc_satisfies_config(&msg, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value) {
3104 break Some((err, code, chan_update_opt));
3108 if (msg.cltv_expiry as u64) < (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 + MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA as u64 {
3109 // We really should set `incorrect_cltv_expiry` here but as we're not
3110 // forwarding over a real channel we can't generate a channel_update
3111 // for it. Instead we just return a generic temporary_node_failure.
3113 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
3120 let cur_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height() + 1;
3121 // Theoretically, channel counterparty shouldn't send us a HTLC expiring now,
3122 // but we want to be robust wrt to counterparty packet sanitization (see
3123 // HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER rationale).
3124 if msg.cltv_expiry <= cur_height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER as u32 { // expiry_too_soon
3125 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too close", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3127 if msg.cltv_expiry > cur_height + CLTV_FAR_FAR_AWAY as u32 { // expiry_too_far
3128 break Some(("CLTV expiry is too far in the future", 21, None));
3130 // If the HTLC expires ~now, don't bother trying to forward it to our
3131 // counterparty. They should fail it anyway, but we don't want to bother with
3132 // the round-trips or risk them deciding they definitely want the HTLC and
3133 // force-closing to ensure they get it if we're offline.
3134 // We previously had a much more aggressive check here which tried to ensure
3135 // our counterparty receives an HTLC which has *our* risk threshold met on it,
3136 // but there is no need to do that, and since we're a bit conservative with our
3137 // risk threshold it just results in failing to forward payments.
3138 if (outgoing_cltv_value) as u64 <= (cur_height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS) as u64 {
3139 break Some(("Outgoing CLTV value is too soon", 0x1000 | 14, chan_update_opt));
3145 let mut res = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(chan_update.serialized_length() + 2 + 8 + 2));
3146 if let Some(chan_update) = chan_update {
3147 if code == 0x1000 | 11 || code == 0x1000 | 12 {
3148 msg.amount_msat.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3150 else if code == 0x1000 | 13 {
3151 msg.cltv_expiry.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3153 else if code == 0x1000 | 20 {
3154 // TODO: underspecified, follow https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/791
3155 0u16.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3157 (chan_update.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3158 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3159 chan_update.write(&mut res).expect("Writes cannot fail");
3160 } else if code & 0x1000 == 0x1000 {
3161 // If we're trying to return an error that requires a `channel_update` but
3162 // we're forwarding to a phantom or intercept "channel" (i.e. cannot
3163 // generate an update), just use the generic "temporary_node_failure"
3167 return_err!(err, code, &res.0[..]);
3169 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt))
3172 fn construct_pending_htlc_status<'a>(
3173 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, shared_secret: [u8; 32], decoded_hop: onion_utils::Hop,
3174 allow_underpay: bool, next_packet_pubkey_opt: Option<Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error>>
3175 ) -> PendingHTLCStatus {
3176 macro_rules! return_err {
3177 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $data: expr) => {
3179 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3180 return PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3181 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
3182 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3183 reason: HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $data.to_vec())
3184 .get_encrypted_failure_packet(&shared_secret, &None),
3190 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(next_hop_data) => {
3192 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(next_hop_data, shared_secret, msg.payment_hash,
3193 msg.amount_msat, msg.cltv_expiry, None, allow_underpay, msg.skimmed_fee_msat)
3196 // Note that we could obviously respond immediately with an update_fulfill_htlc
3197 // message, however that would leak that we are the recipient of this payment, so
3198 // instead we stay symmetric with the forwarding case, only responding (after a
3199 // delay) once they've send us a commitment_signed!
3200 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info)
3202 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3205 onion_utils::Hop::Forward { next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac, new_packet_bytes } => {
3206 match self.construct_fwd_pending_htlc_info(msg, next_hop_data, next_hop_hmac,
3207 new_packet_bytes, shared_secret, next_packet_pubkey_opt) {
3208 Ok(info) => PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(info),
3209 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => return_err!(msg, err_code, &err_data)
3215 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This first checks if the channel is
3216 /// public, and thus should be called whenever the result is going to be passed out in a
3217 /// [`MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event.
3219 /// Note that in [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the `peer_state`
3220 /// corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been removed from the
3221 /// storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3223 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3224 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3225 fn get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3226 if !chan.context.should_announce() {
3227 return Err(LightningError {
3228 err: "Cannot broadcast a channel_update for a private channel".to_owned(),
3229 action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
3232 if chan.context.get_short_channel_id().is_none() {
3233 return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
3235 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate broadcast channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3236 self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan)
3239 /// Gets the current [`channel_update`] for the given channel. This does not check if the channel
3240 /// is public (only returning an `Err` if the channel does not yet have an assigned SCID),
3241 /// and thus MUST NOT be called unless the recipient of the resulting message has already
3242 /// provided evidence that they know about the existence of the channel.
3244 /// Note that through [`internal_closing_signed`], this function is called without the
3245 /// `peer_state` corresponding to the channel's counterparty locked, as the channel been
3246 /// removed from the storage and the `peer_state` lock has been dropped.
3248 /// [`channel_update`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3249 /// [`internal_closing_signed`]: Self::internal_closing_signed
3250 fn get_channel_update_for_unicast(&self, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3251 log_trace!(self.logger, "Attempting to generate channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3252 let short_channel_id = match chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias()) {
3253 None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel not yet established".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
3257 self.get_channel_update_for_onion(short_channel_id, chan)
3260 fn get_channel_update_for_onion(&self, short_channel_id: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> Result<msgs::ChannelUpdate, LightningError> {
3261 log_trace!(self.logger, "Generating channel update for channel {}", &chan.context.channel_id());
3262 let were_node_one = self.our_network_pubkey.serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
3264 let enabled = chan.context.is_usable() && match chan.channel_update_status() {
3265 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => true,
3266 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => true,
3267 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => false,
3268 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => false,
3271 let unsigned = msgs::UnsignedChannelUpdate {
3272 chain_hash: self.genesis_hash,
3274 timestamp: chan.context.get_update_time_counter(),
3275 flags: (!were_node_one) as u8 | ((!enabled as u8) << 1),
3276 cltv_expiry_delta: chan.context.get_cltv_expiry_delta(),
3277 htlc_minimum_msat: chan.context.get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(),
3278 htlc_maximum_msat: chan.context.get_announced_htlc_max_msat(),
3279 fee_base_msat: chan.context.get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(),
3280 fee_proportional_millionths: chan.context.get_fee_proportional_millionths(),
3281 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3283 // Panic on failure to signal LDK should be restarted to retry signing the `ChannelUpdate`.
3284 // If we returned an error and the `node_signer` cannot provide a signature for whatever
3285 // reason`, we wouldn't be able to receive inbound payments through the corresponding
3287 let sig = self.node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelUpdate(&unsigned)).unwrap();
3289 Ok(msgs::ChannelUpdate {
3296 pub(crate) fn test_send_payment_along_path(&self, path: &Path, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, total_value: u64, cur_height: u32, payment_id: PaymentId, keysend_preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, session_priv_bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3297 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
3298 self.send_payment_along_path(SendAlongPathArgs {
3299 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3304 fn send_payment_along_path(&self, args: SendAlongPathArgs) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3305 let SendAlongPathArgs {
3306 path, payment_hash, recipient_onion, total_value, cur_height, payment_id, keysend_preimage,
3309 // The top-level caller should hold the total_consistency_lock read lock.
3310 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err());
3312 log_trace!(self.logger,
3313 "Attempting to send payment with payment hash {} along path with next hop {}",
3314 payment_hash, path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id);
3315 let prng_seed = self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
3316 let session_priv = SecretKey::from_slice(&session_priv_bytes[..]).expect("RNG is busted");
3318 let onion_keys = onion_utils::construct_onion_keys(&self.secp_ctx, &path, &session_priv)
3319 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute{err: "Pubkey along hop was maliciously selected".to_owned()})?;
3320 let (onion_payloads, htlc_msat, htlc_cltv) = onion_utils::build_onion_payloads(path, total_value, recipient_onion, cur_height, keysend_preimage)?;
3322 let onion_packet = onion_utils::construct_onion_packet(onion_payloads, onion_keys, prng_seed, payment_hash)
3323 .map_err(|_| APIError::InvalidRoute { err: "Route size too large considering onion data".to_owned()})?;
3325 let err: Result<(), _> = loop {
3326 let (counterparty_node_id, id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&path.hops.first().unwrap().short_channel_id) {
3327 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()}),
3328 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
3331 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3332 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id)
3333 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No peer matching the path's first hop found!".to_owned() })?;
3334 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3335 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3336 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(id) {
3337 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
3338 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
3339 if !chan.context.is_live() {
3340 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Peer for first hop currently disconnected".to_owned()});
3342 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3343 let send_res = chan.send_htlc_and_commit(htlc_msat, payment_hash.clone(),
3344 htlc_cltv, HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
3346 session_priv: session_priv.clone(),
3347 first_hop_htlc_msat: htlc_msat,
3349 }, onion_packet, None, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
3350 match break_chan_phase_entry!(self, send_res, chan_phase_entry) {
3351 Some(monitor_update) => {
3352 match handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry) {
3353 Err(e) => break Err(e),
3355 // Note that MonitorUpdateInProgress here indicates (per function
3356 // docs) that we will resend the commitment update once monitor
3357 // updating completes. Therefore, we must return an error
3358 // indicating that it is unsafe to retry the payment wholesale,
3359 // which we do in the send_payment check for
3360 // MonitorUpdateInProgress, below.
3361 return Err(APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress);
3369 _ => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Channel to first hop is unfunded".to_owned()}),
3372 // The channel was likely removed after we fetched the id from the
3373 // `short_to_chan_info` map, but before we successfully locked the
3374 // `channel_by_id` map.
3375 // This can occur as no consistency guarantees exists between the two maps.
3376 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "No channel available with first hop!".to_owned()});
3381 match handle_error!(self, err, path.hops.first().unwrap().pubkey) {
3382 Ok(_) => unreachable!(),
3384 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.err })
3389 /// Sends a payment along a given route.
3391 /// Value parameters are provided via the last hop in route, see documentation for [`RouteHop`]
3392 /// fields for more info.
3394 /// May generate [`UpdateHTLCs`] message(s) event on success, which should be relayed (e.g. via
3395 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]).
3397 /// # Avoiding Duplicate Payments
3399 /// If a pending payment is currently in-flight with the same [`PaymentId`] provided, this
3400 /// method will error with an [`APIError::InvalidRoute`]. Note, however, that once a payment
3401 /// is no longer pending (either via [`ChannelManager::abandon_payment`], or handling of an
3402 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`] or [`Event::PaymentFailed`]) LDK will not stop you from sending a
3403 /// second payment with the same [`PaymentId`].
3405 /// Thus, in order to ensure duplicate payments are not sent, you should implement your own
3406 /// tracking of payments, including state to indicate once a payment has completed. Because you
3407 /// should also ensure that [`PaymentHash`]es are not re-used, for simplicity, you should
3408 /// consider using the [`PaymentHash`] as the key for tracking payments. In that case, the
3409 /// [`PaymentId`] should be a copy of the [`PaymentHash`] bytes.
3411 /// Additionally, in the scenario where we begin the process of sending a payment, but crash
3412 /// before `send_payment` returns (or prior to [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] persistence if you're
3413 /// using [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]), the payment may be lost on restart. See
3414 /// [`ChannelManager::list_recent_payments`] for more information.
3416 /// # Possible Error States on [`PaymentSendFailure`]
3418 /// Each path may have a different return value, and [`PaymentSendFailure`] may return a `Vec` with
3419 /// each entry matching the corresponding-index entry in the route paths, see
3420 /// [`PaymentSendFailure`] for more info.
3422 /// In general, a path may raise:
3423 /// * [`APIError::InvalidRoute`] when an invalid route or forwarding parameter (cltv_delta, fee,
3424 /// node public key) is specified.
3425 /// * [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if the next-hop channel is not available for updates
3426 /// (including due to previous monitor update failure or new permanent monitor update
3428 /// * [`APIError::MonitorUpdateInProgress`] if a new monitor update failure prevented sending the
3429 /// relevant updates.
3431 /// Note that depending on the type of the [`PaymentSendFailure`] the HTLC may have been
3432 /// irrevocably committed to on our end. In such a case, do NOT retry the payment with a
3433 /// different route unless you intend to pay twice!
3435 /// [`RouteHop`]: crate::routing::router::RouteHop
3436 /// [`Event::PaymentSent`]: events::Event::PaymentSent
3437 /// [`Event::PaymentFailed`]: events::Event::PaymentFailed
3438 /// [`UpdateHTLCs`]: events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs
3439 /// [`PeerManager::process_events`]: crate::ln::peer_handler::PeerManager::process_events
3440 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3441 pub fn send_payment_with_route(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3442 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3443 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3444 self.pending_outbound_payments
3445 .send_payment_with_route(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id,
3446 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3447 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3450 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_payment_with_route`], but will automatically find a route based on
3451 /// `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3452 pub fn send_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<(), RetryableSendFailure> {
3453 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3454 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3455 self.pending_outbound_payments
3456 .send_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params,
3457 &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(), || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(),
3458 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height, &self.logger,
3459 &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3463 pub(super) fn test_send_payment_internal(&self, route: &Route, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, keysend_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, payment_id: PaymentId, recv_value_msat: Option<u64>, onion_session_privs: Vec<[u8; 32]>) -> Result<(), PaymentSendFailure> {
3464 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3465 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3466 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_send_payment_internal(route, payment_hash, recipient_onion,
3467 keysend_preimage, payment_id, recv_value_msat, onion_session_privs, &self.node_signer,
3468 best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3472 pub(crate) fn test_add_new_pending_payment(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route: &Route) -> Result<Vec<[u8; 32]>, PaymentSendFailure> {
3473 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3474 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash, recipient_onion, payment_id, route, None, &self.entropy_source, best_block_height)
3478 pub(crate) fn test_set_payment_metadata(&self, payment_id: PaymentId, new_payment_metadata: Option<Vec<u8>>) {
3479 self.pending_outbound_payments.test_set_payment_metadata(payment_id, new_payment_metadata);
3483 /// Signals that no further attempts for the given payment should occur. Useful if you have a
3484 /// pending outbound payment with retries remaining, but wish to stop retrying the payment before
3485 /// retries are exhausted.
3487 /// # Event Generation
3489 /// If no [`Event::PaymentFailed`] event had been generated before, one will be generated as soon
3490 /// as there are no remaining pending HTLCs for this payment.
3492 /// Note that calling this method does *not* prevent a payment from succeeding. You must still
3493 /// wait until you receive either a [`Event::PaymentFailed`] or [`Event::PaymentSent`] event to
3494 /// determine the ultimate status of a payment.
3496 /// # Requested Invoices
3498 /// In the case of paying a [`Bolt12Invoice`], abandoning the payment prior to receiving the
3499 /// invoice will result in an [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`] and prevent any attempts at paying
3500 /// it once received. The other events may only be generated once the invoice has been received.
3502 /// # Restart Behavior
3504 /// If an [`Event::PaymentFailed`] is generated and we restart without first persisting the
3505 /// [`ChannelManager`], another [`Event::PaymentFailed`] may be generated; likewise for
3506 /// [`Event::InvoiceRequestFailed`].
3508 /// [`Bolt12Invoice`]: crate::offers::invoice::Bolt12Invoice
3509 pub fn abandon_payment(&self, payment_id: PaymentId) {
3510 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3511 self.pending_outbound_payments.abandon_payment(payment_id, PaymentFailureReason::UserAbandoned, &self.pending_events);
3514 /// Send a spontaneous payment, which is a payment that does not require the recipient to have
3515 /// generated an invoice. Optionally, you may specify the preimage. If you do choose to specify
3516 /// the preimage, it must be a cryptographically secure random value that no intermediate node
3517 /// would be able to guess -- otherwise, an intermediate node may claim the payment and it will
3518 /// never reach the recipient.
3520 /// See [`send_payment`] documentation for more details on the return value of this function
3521 /// and idempotency guarantees provided by the [`PaymentId`] key.
3523 /// Similar to regular payments, you MUST NOT reuse a `payment_preimage` value. See
3524 /// [`send_payment`] for more information about the risks of duplicate preimage usage.
3526 /// [`send_payment`]: Self::send_payment
3527 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment(&self, route: &Route, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId) -> Result<PaymentHash, PaymentSendFailure> {
3528 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3529 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3530 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment_with_route(
3531 route, payment_preimage, recipient_onion, payment_id, &self.entropy_source,
3532 &self.node_signer, best_block_height, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3535 /// Similar to [`ChannelManager::send_spontaneous_payment`], but will automatically find a route
3536 /// based on `route_params` and retry failed payment paths based on `retry_strategy`.
3538 /// See [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`] for help in constructing `route_params` for spontaneous
3541 /// [`PaymentParameters::for_keysend`]: crate::routing::router::PaymentParameters::for_keysend
3542 pub fn send_spontaneous_payment_with_retry(&self, payment_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, recipient_onion: RecipientOnionFields, payment_id: PaymentId, route_params: RouteParameters, retry_strategy: Retry) -> Result<PaymentHash, RetryableSendFailure> {
3543 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3544 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3545 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_spontaneous_payment(payment_preimage, recipient_onion,
3546 payment_id, retry_strategy, route_params, &self.router, self.list_usable_channels(),
3547 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3548 &self.logger, &self.pending_events, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3551 /// Send a payment that is probing the given route for liquidity. We calculate the
3552 /// [`PaymentHash`] of probes based on a static secret and a random [`PaymentId`], which allows
3553 /// us to easily discern them from real payments.
3554 pub fn send_probe(&self, path: Path) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentId), PaymentSendFailure> {
3555 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3556 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3557 self.pending_outbound_payments.send_probe(path, self.probing_cookie_secret,
3558 &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
3559 |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args))
3562 /// Returns whether a payment with the given [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentId`] is, in fact, a
3565 pub(crate) fn payment_is_probe(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, payment_id: &PaymentId) -> bool {
3566 outbound_payment::payment_is_probe(payment_hash, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret)
3569 /// Handles the generation of a funding transaction, optionally (for tests) with a function
3570 /// which checks the correctness of the funding transaction given the associated channel.
3571 fn funding_transaction_generated_intern<FundingOutput: Fn(&OutboundV1Channel<SP>, &Transaction) -> Result<OutPoint, APIError>>(
3572 &self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, find_funding_output: FundingOutput
3573 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3574 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3575 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3576 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3578 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3579 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3580 let (chan, msg) = match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&temporary_channel_id) {
3582 let funding_txo = find_funding_output(&chan, &funding_transaction)?;
3584 let funding_res = chan.get_funding_created(funding_transaction, funding_txo, &self.logger)
3585 .map_err(|(mut chan, e)| if let ChannelError::Close(msg) = e {
3586 let channel_id = chan.context.channel_id();
3587 let user_id = chan.context.get_user_id();
3588 let shutdown_res = chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
3589 let channel_capacity = chan.context.get_value_satoshis();
3590 (chan, MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(msg, channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, channel_capacity))
3591 } else { unreachable!(); });
3593 Ok((chan, funding_msg)) => (chan, funding_msg),
3594 Err((chan, err)) => {
3595 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
3596 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
3598 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(err), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
3599 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3600 err: "Signer refused to sign the initial commitment transaction".to_owned()
3606 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3608 "Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}",
3609 temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3614 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated {
3615 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3618 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
3619 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
3620 panic!("Generated duplicate funding txid?");
3622 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
3623 let mut id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
3624 if id_to_peer.insert(chan.context.channel_id(), chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_some() {
3625 panic!("id_to_peer map already contained funding txid, which shouldn't be possible");
3627 e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan));
3634 pub(crate) fn funding_transaction_generated_unchecked(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction, output_index: u16) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3635 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |_, tx| {
3636 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index })
3640 /// Call this upon creation of a funding transaction for the given channel.
3642 /// Returns an [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding_transaction spent non-SegWit outputs
3643 /// or if no output was found which matches the parameters in [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`].
3645 /// Returns [`APIError::APIMisuseError`] if the funding transaction is not final for propagation
3646 /// across the p2p network.
3648 /// Returns [`APIError::ChannelUnavailable`] if a funding transaction has already been provided
3649 /// for the channel or if the channel has been closed as indicated by [`Event::ChannelClosed`].
3651 /// May panic if the output found in the funding transaction is duplicative with some other
3652 /// channel (note that this should be trivially prevented by using unique funding transaction
3653 /// keys per-channel).
3655 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction yourself. When we have safely received our
3656 /// counterparty's signature the funding transaction will automatically be broadcast via the
3657 /// [`BroadcasterInterface`] provided when this `ChannelManager` was constructed.
3659 /// Note that this includes RBF or similar transaction replacement strategies - lightning does
3660 /// not currently support replacing a funding transaction on an existing channel. Instead,
3661 /// create a new channel with a conflicting funding transaction.
3663 /// Note to keep the miner incentives aligned in moving the blockchain forward, we recommend
3664 /// the wallet software generating the funding transaction to apply anti-fee sniping as
3665 /// implemented by Bitcoin Core wallet. See <https://bitcoinops.org/en/topics/fee-sniping/>
3666 /// for more details.
3668 /// [`Event::FundingGenerationReady`]: crate::events::Event::FundingGenerationReady
3669 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed`]: crate::events::Event::ChannelClosed
3670 pub fn funding_transaction_generated(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, funding_transaction: Transaction) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3671 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3673 if !funding_transaction.is_coin_base() {
3674 for inp in funding_transaction.input.iter() {
3675 if inp.witness.is_empty() {
3676 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3677 err: "Funding transaction must be fully signed and spend Segwit outputs".to_owned()
3683 let height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
3684 // Transactions are evaluated as final by network mempools if their locktime is strictly
3685 // lower than the next block height. However, the modules constituting our Lightning
3686 // node might not have perfect sync about their blockchain views. Thus, if the wallet
3687 // module is ahead of LDK, only allow one more block of headroom.
3688 if !funding_transaction.input.iter().all(|input| input.sequence == Sequence::MAX) && LockTime::from(funding_transaction.lock_time).is_block_height() && funding_transaction.lock_time.0 > height + 1 {
3689 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3690 err: "Funding transaction absolute timelock is non-final".to_owned()
3694 self.funding_transaction_generated_intern(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, funding_transaction, |chan, tx| {
3695 if tx.output.len() > u16::max_value() as usize {
3696 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3697 err: "Transaction had more than 2^16 outputs, which is not supported".to_owned()
3701 let mut output_index = None;
3702 let expected_spk = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3703 for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
3704 if outp.script_pubkey == expected_spk && outp.value == chan.context.get_value_satoshis() {
3705 if output_index.is_some() {
3706 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3707 err: "Multiple outputs matched the expected script and value".to_owned()
3710 output_index = Some(idx as u16);
3713 if output_index.is_none() {
3714 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3715 err: "No output matched the script_pubkey and value in the FundingGenerationReady event".to_owned()
3718 Ok(OutPoint { txid: tx.txid(), index: output_index.unwrap() })
3722 /// Atomically applies partial updates to the [`ChannelConfig`] of the given channels.
3724 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3725 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3726 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3727 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3729 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3730 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3732 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3733 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3735 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3737 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3738 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3739 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3740 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3741 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3742 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3743 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3744 pub fn update_partial_channel_config(
3745 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config_update: &ChannelConfigUpdate,
3746 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3747 if config_update.cltv_expiry_delta.map(|delta| delta < MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA).unwrap_or(false) {
3748 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {
3749 err: format!("The chosen CLTV expiry delta is below the minimum of {}", MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA),
3753 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3754 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3755 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
3756 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
3757 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3758 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3759 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3760 if !peer_state.has_channel(channel_id) {
3761 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3762 err: format!("Channel with ID {} was not found for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3766 for channel_id in channel_ids {
3767 if let Some(channel_phase) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3768 let mut config = channel_phase.context().config();
3769 config.apply(config_update);
3770 if !channel_phase.context_mut().update_config(&config) {
3773 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = channel_phase {
3774 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel) {
3775 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { msg });
3776 } else if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
3777 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
3778 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
3786 let context = if let Some(channel) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3787 &mut channel.context
3788 } else if let Some(channel) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(channel_id) {
3789 &mut channel.context
3791 // This should not be reachable as we've already checked for non-existence in the previous channel_id loop.
3792 debug_assert!(false);
3793 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3795 "Channel with ID {} for passed counterparty_node_id {} disappeared after we confirmed its existence - this should not be reachable!",
3796 channel_id, counterparty_node_id),
3799 let mut config = context.config();
3800 config.apply(config_update);
3801 // We update the config, but we MUST NOT broadcast a `channel_update` before `channel_ready`
3802 // which would be the case for pending inbound/outbound channels.
3803 context.update_config(&config);
3808 /// Atomically updates the [`ChannelConfig`] for the given channels.
3810 /// Once the updates are applied, each eligible channel (advertised with a known short channel
3811 /// ID and a change in [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`], [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`],
3812 /// or [`cltv_expiry_delta`]) has a [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`] event message generated
3813 /// containing the new [`ChannelUpdate`] message which should be broadcast to the network.
3815 /// Returns [`ChannelUnavailable`] when a channel is not found or an incorrect
3816 /// `counterparty_node_id` is provided.
3818 /// Returns [`APIMisuseError`] when a [`cltv_expiry_delta`] update is to be applied with a value
3819 /// below [`MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
3821 /// If an error is returned, none of the updates should be considered applied.
3823 /// [`forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3824 /// [`forwarding_fee_base_msat`]: ChannelConfig::forwarding_fee_base_msat
3825 /// [`cltv_expiry_delta`]: ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta
3826 /// [`BroadcastChannelUpdate`]: events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate
3827 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
3828 /// [`ChannelUnavailable`]: APIError::ChannelUnavailable
3829 /// [`APIMisuseError`]: APIError::APIMisuseError
3830 pub fn update_channel_config(
3831 &self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, channel_ids: &[ChannelId], config: &ChannelConfig,
3832 ) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3833 return self.update_partial_channel_config(counterparty_node_id, channel_ids, &(*config).into());
3836 /// Attempts to forward an intercepted HTLC over the provided channel id and with the provided
3837 /// amount to forward. Should only be called in response to an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event.
3839 /// Intercepted HTLCs can be useful for Lightning Service Providers (LSPs) to open a just-in-time
3840 /// channel to a receiving node if the node lacks sufficient inbound liquidity.
3842 /// To make use of intercepted HTLCs, set [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`] and use
3843 /// [`ChannelManager::get_intercept_scid`] to generate short channel id(s) to put in the
3844 /// receiver's invoice route hints. These route hints will signal to LDK to generate an
3845 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`] event when it receives the forwarded HTLC, and this method or
3846 /// [`ChannelManager::fail_intercepted_htlc`] MUST be called in response to the event.
3848 /// Note that LDK does not enforce fee requirements in `amt_to_forward_msat`, and will not stop
3849 /// you from forwarding more than you received. See
3850 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`] for more on forwarding a different amount
3853 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3856 /// [`UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs`]: crate::util::config::UserConfig::accept_intercept_htlcs
3857 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3858 /// [`HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted::expected_outbound_amount_msat
3859 // TODO: when we move to deciding the best outbound channel at forward time, only take
3860 // `next_node_id` and not `next_hop_channel_id`
3861 pub fn forward_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId, next_hop_channel_id: &ChannelId, next_node_id: PublicKey, amt_to_forward_msat: u64) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3862 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3864 let next_hop_scid = {
3865 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
3866 let peer_state_mutex = peer_state_lock.get(&next_node_id)
3867 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", next_node_id) })?;
3868 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
3869 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
3870 match peer_state.channel_by_id.get(next_hop_channel_id) {
3871 Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) => {
3872 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
3873 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3874 err: format!("Channel with id {} not fully established", next_hop_channel_id)
3877 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias())
3879 Some(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3880 err: format!("Channel with id {} for the passed counterparty node_id {} is still opening.",
3881 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3883 None => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable {
3884 err: format!("Channel with id {} not found for the passed counterparty node_id {}.",
3885 next_hop_channel_id, next_node_id)
3890 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3891 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3892 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3895 let routing = match payment.forward_info.routing {
3896 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } => {
3897 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, short_channel_id: next_hop_scid }
3899 _ => unreachable!() // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3901 let skimmed_fee_msat =
3902 payment.forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat.saturating_sub(amt_to_forward_msat);
3903 let pending_htlc_info = PendingHTLCInfo {
3904 skimmed_fee_msat: if skimmed_fee_msat == 0 { None } else { Some(skimmed_fee_msat) },
3905 outgoing_amt_msat: amt_to_forward_msat, routing, ..payment.forward_info
3908 let mut per_source_pending_forward = [(
3909 payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3910 payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3911 payment.prev_user_channel_id,
3912 vec![(pending_htlc_info, payment.prev_htlc_id)]
3914 self.forward_htlcs(&mut per_source_pending_forward);
3918 /// Fails the intercepted HTLC indicated by intercept_id. Should only be called in response to
3919 /// an [`HTLCIntercepted`] event. See [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
3921 /// Errors if the event was not handled in time, in which case the HTLC was automatically failed
3924 /// [`HTLCIntercepted`]: events::Event::HTLCIntercepted
3925 pub fn fail_intercepted_htlc(&self, intercept_id: InterceptId) -> Result<(), APIError> {
3926 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3928 let payment = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap().remove(&intercept_id)
3929 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::APIMisuseError {
3930 err: format!("Payment with intercept id {} not found", log_bytes!(intercept_id.0))
3933 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } = payment.forward_info.routing {
3934 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3935 short_channel_id: payment.prev_short_channel_id,
3936 user_channel_id: Some(payment.prev_user_channel_id),
3937 outpoint: payment.prev_funding_outpoint,
3938 htlc_id: payment.prev_htlc_id,
3939 incoming_packet_shared_secret: payment.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
3940 phantom_shared_secret: None,
3943 let failure_reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10);
3944 let destination = HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_channel_id };
3945 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment.forward_info.payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
3946 } else { unreachable!() } // Only `PendingHTLCRouting::Forward`s are intercepted
3951 /// Processes HTLCs which are pending waiting on random forward delay.
3953 /// Should only really ever be called in response to a PendingHTLCsForwardable event.
3954 /// Will likely generate further events.
3955 pub fn process_pending_htlc_forwards(&self) {
3956 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
3958 let mut new_events = VecDeque::new();
3959 let mut failed_forwards = Vec::new();
3960 let mut phantom_receives: Vec<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> = Vec::new();
3962 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::new();
3963 mem::swap(&mut forward_htlcs, &mut self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap());
3965 for (short_chan_id, mut pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs {
3966 if short_chan_id != 0 {
3967 macro_rules! forwarding_channel_not_found {
3969 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
3970 match forward_info {
3971 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
3972 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
3973 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
3974 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
3975 outgoing_cltv_value, ..
3978 macro_rules! failure_handler {
3979 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr, $next_hop_unknown: expr) => {
3980 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to accept/forward incoming HTLC: {}", $msg);
3982 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
3983 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
3984 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
3985 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
3986 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
3987 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
3988 phantom_shared_secret: $phantom_ss,
3991 let reason = if $next_hop_unknown {
3992 HTLCDestination::UnknownNextHop { requested_forward_scid: short_chan_id }
3994 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment{ payment_hash }
3997 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
3998 HTLCFailReason::reason($err_code, $err_data),
4004 macro_rules! fail_forward {
4005 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4007 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, true);
4011 macro_rules! failed_payment {
4012 ($msg: expr, $err_code: expr, $err_data: expr, $phantom_ss: expr) => {
4014 failure_handler!($msg, $err_code, $err_data, $phantom_ss, false);
4018 if let PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. } = routing {
4019 let phantom_pubkey_res = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode);
4020 if phantom_pubkey_res.is_ok() && fake_scid::is_valid_phantom(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, short_chan_id, &self.genesis_hash) {
4021 let phantom_shared_secret = self.node_signer.ecdh(Recipient::PhantomNode, &onion_packet.public_key.unwrap(), None).unwrap().secret_bytes();
4022 let next_hop = match onion_utils::decode_next_payment_hop(phantom_shared_secret, &onion_packet.hop_data, onion_packet.hmac, payment_hash) {
4024 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Malformed { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4025 let sha256_of_onion = Sha256::hash(&onion_packet.hop_data).into_inner();
4026 // In this scenario, the phantom would have sent us an
4027 // `update_fail_malformed_htlc`, meaning here we encrypt the error as
4028 // if it came from us (the second-to-last hop) but contains the sha256
4030 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, sha256_of_onion.to_vec(), None);
4032 Err(onion_utils::OnionDecodeErr::Relay { err_msg, err_code }) => {
4033 failed_payment!(err_msg, err_code, Vec::new(), Some(phantom_shared_secret));
4037 onion_utils::Hop::Receive(hop_data) => {
4038 match self.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data,
4039 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat,
4040 outgoing_cltv_value, Some(phantom_shared_secret), false, None)
4042 Ok(info) => phantom_receives.push((prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, vec![(info, prev_htlc_id)])),
4043 Err(InboundOnionErr { err_code, err_data, msg }) => failed_payment!(msg, err_code, err_data, Some(phantom_shared_secret))
4049 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4052 fail_forward!(format!("Unknown short channel id {} for forward HTLC", short_chan_id), 0x4000 | 10, Vec::new(), None);
4055 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4056 // Channel went away before we could fail it. This implies
4057 // the channel is now on chain and our counterparty is
4058 // trying to broadcast the HTLC-Timeout, but that's their
4059 // problem, not ours.
4065 let (counterparty_node_id, forward_chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&short_chan_id) {
4066 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
4068 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4072 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4073 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
4074 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
4075 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4078 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
4079 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4080 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&forward_chan_id) {
4081 for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4082 match forward_info {
4083 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4084 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4085 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4086 incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, outgoing_amt_msat, outgoing_cltv_value,
4087 routing: PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { onion_packet, .. }, skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4090 log_trace!(self.logger, "Adding HTLC from short id {} with payment_hash {} to channel with short id {} after delay", prev_short_channel_id, &payment_hash, short_chan_id);
4091 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4092 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4093 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4094 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4095 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4096 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4097 // Phantom payments are only PendingHTLCRouting::Receive.
4098 phantom_shared_secret: None,
4100 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_add_htlc(outgoing_amt_msat,
4101 payment_hash, outgoing_cltv_value, htlc_source.clone(),
4102 onion_packet, skimmed_fee_msat, &self.fee_estimator,
4105 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4106 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to forward HTLC with payment_hash {}: {}", &payment_hash, msg);
4108 panic!("Stated return value requirements in send_htlc() were not met");
4110 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, short_chan_id, chan);
4111 failed_forwards.push((htlc_source, payment_hash,
4112 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
4113 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: forward_chan_id }
4118 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC { .. } => {
4119 panic!("short_channel_id != 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Forward");
4121 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } => {
4122 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC back to channel with short id {} (backward HTLC ID {}) after delay", short_chan_id, htlc_id);
4123 if let Err(e) = chan.queue_fail_htlc(
4124 htlc_id, err_packet, &self.logger
4126 if let ChannelError::Ignore(msg) = e {
4127 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failed to fail HTLC with ID {} backwards to short_id {}: {}", htlc_id, short_chan_id, msg);
4129 panic!("Stated return value requirements in queue_fail_htlc() were not met");
4131 // fail-backs are best-effort, we probably already have one
4132 // pending, and if not that's OK, if not, the channel is on
4133 // the chain and sending the HTLC-Timeout is their problem.
4140 forwarding_channel_not_found!();
4144 'next_forwardable_htlc: for forward_info in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
4145 match forward_info {
4146 HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
4147 prev_short_channel_id, prev_htlc_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id,
4148 forward_info: PendingHTLCInfo {
4149 routing, incoming_shared_secret, payment_hash, incoming_amt_msat, outgoing_amt_msat,
4150 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
4153 let (cltv_expiry, onion_payload, payment_data, phantom_shared_secret, mut onion_fields) = match routing {
4154 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { payment_data, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, phantom_shared_secret, custom_tlvs } => {
4155 let _legacy_hop_data = Some(payment_data.clone());
4156 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields { payment_secret: Some(payment_data.payment_secret),
4157 payment_metadata, custom_tlvs };
4158 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data },
4159 Some(payment_data), phantom_shared_secret, onion_fields)
4161 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { payment_data, payment_preimage, payment_metadata, incoming_cltv_expiry, custom_tlvs } => {
4162 let onion_fields = RecipientOnionFields {
4163 payment_secret: payment_data.as_ref().map(|data| data.payment_secret),
4167 (incoming_cltv_expiry, OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage),
4168 payment_data, None, onion_fields)
4171 panic!("short_channel_id == 0 should imply any pending_forward entries are of type Receive");
4174 let claimable_htlc = ClaimableHTLC {
4175 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData {
4176 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
4177 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4178 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4179 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
4180 incoming_packet_shared_secret: incoming_shared_secret,
4181 phantom_shared_secret,
4183 // We differentiate the received value from the sender intended value
4184 // if possible so that we don't prematurely mark MPP payments complete
4185 // if routing nodes overpay
4186 value: incoming_amt_msat.unwrap_or(outgoing_amt_msat),
4187 sender_intended_value: outgoing_amt_msat,
4189 total_value_received: None,
4190 total_msat: if let Some(data) = &payment_data { data.total_msat } else { outgoing_amt_msat },
4193 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
4196 let mut committed_to_claimable = false;
4198 macro_rules! fail_htlc {
4199 ($htlc: expr, $payment_hash: expr) => {
4200 debug_assert!(!committed_to_claimable);
4201 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = $htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4202 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(
4203 &self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes(),
4205 failed_forwards.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
4206 short_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.short_channel_id,
4207 user_channel_id: $htlc.prev_hop.user_channel_id,
4208 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
4209 htlc_id: $htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id,
4210 incoming_packet_shared_secret: $htlc.prev_hop.incoming_packet_shared_secret,
4211 phantom_shared_secret,
4213 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
4214 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: $payment_hash },
4216 continue 'next_forwardable_htlc;
4219 let phantom_shared_secret = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
4220 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
4221 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
4222 receiver_node_id = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
4223 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
4226 macro_rules! check_total_value {
4227 ($purpose: expr) => {{
4228 let mut payment_claimable_generated = false;
4229 let is_keysend = match $purpose {
4230 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(_) => true,
4231 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment { .. } => false,
4233 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
4234 if claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.contains_key(&payment_hash) {
4235 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4237 let ref mut claimable_payment = claimable_payments.claimable_payments
4238 .entry(payment_hash)
4239 // Note that if we insert here we MUST NOT fail_htlc!()
4240 .or_insert_with(|| {
4241 committed_to_claimable = true;
4243 purpose: $purpose.clone(), htlcs: Vec::new(), onion_fields: None,
4246 if $purpose != claimable_payment.purpose {
4247 let log_keysend = |keysend| if keysend { "keysend" } else { "non-keysend" };
4248 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new {} HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing {} HTLC with the same payment hash", log_keysend(is_keysend), &payment_hash, log_keysend(!is_keysend));
4249 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4251 if !self.default_configuration.accept_mpp_keysend && is_keysend && !claimable_payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4252 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} as we already had an existing keysend HTLC with the same payment hash and our config states we don't accept MPP keysend", &payment_hash);
4253 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4255 if let Some(earlier_fields) = &mut claimable_payment.onion_fields {
4256 if earlier_fields.check_merge(&mut onion_fields).is_err() {
4257 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4260 claimable_payment.onion_fields = Some(onion_fields);
4262 let ref mut htlcs = &mut claimable_payment.htlcs;
4263 let mut total_value = claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value;
4264 let mut earliest_expiry = claimable_htlc.cltv_expiry;
4265 for htlc in htlcs.iter() {
4266 total_value += htlc.sender_intended_value;
4267 earliest_expiry = cmp::min(earliest_expiry, htlc.cltv_expiry);
4268 if htlc.total_msat != claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4269 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLCs with payment_hash {} as the HTLCs had inconsistent total values (eg {} and {})",
4270 &payment_hash, claimable_htlc.total_msat, htlc.total_msat);
4271 total_value = msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT;
4273 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT { break; }
4275 // The condition determining whether an MPP is complete must
4276 // match exactly the condition used in `timer_tick_occurred`
4277 if total_value >= msgs::MAX_VALUE_MSAT {
4278 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4279 } else if total_value - claimable_htlc.sender_intended_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4280 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment is already claimable",
4282 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4283 } else if total_value >= claimable_htlc.total_msat {
4284 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4285 committed_to_claimable = true;
4287 let prev_channel_id = prev_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id();
4288 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4289 let amount_msat = htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| htlc.value).sum();
4290 htlcs.iter_mut().for_each(|htlc| htlc.total_value_received = Some(amount_msat));
4291 let counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat = htlcs.iter()
4292 .map(|htlc| htlc.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat.unwrap_or(0)).sum();
4293 debug_assert!(total_value.saturating_sub(amount_msat) <=
4294 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat);
4295 new_events.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimable {
4296 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
4300 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
4301 via_channel_id: Some(prev_channel_id),
4302 via_user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
4303 claim_deadline: Some(earliest_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER),
4304 onion_fields: claimable_payment.onion_fields.clone(),
4306 payment_claimable_generated = true;
4308 // Nothing to do - we haven't reached the total
4309 // payment value yet, wait until we receive more
4311 htlcs.push(claimable_htlc);
4312 #[allow(unused_assignments)] {
4313 committed_to_claimable = true;
4316 payment_claimable_generated
4320 // Check that the payment hash and secret are known. Note that we
4321 // MUST take care to handle the "unknown payment hash" and
4322 // "incorrect payment secret" cases here identically or we'd expose
4323 // that we are the ultimate recipient of the given payment hash.
4324 // Further, we must not expose whether we have any other HTLCs
4325 // associated with the same payment_hash pending or not.
4326 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
4327 match payment_secrets.entry(payment_hash) {
4328 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
4329 match claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4330 OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } => {
4331 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4332 let (payment_preimage, min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &self.inbound_payment_key, &self.logger) {
4333 Ok(result) => result,
4335 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as payment verification failed", &payment_hash);
4336 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4339 if let Some(min_final_cltv_expiry_delta) = min_final_cltv_expiry_delta {
4340 let expected_min_expiry_height = (self.current_best_block().height() + min_final_cltv_expiry_delta as u32) as u64;
4341 if (cltv_expiry as u64) < expected_min_expiry_height {
4342 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as its CLTV expiry was too soon (had {}, earliest expected {})",
4343 &payment_hash, cltv_expiry, expected_min_expiry_height);
4344 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4347 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4348 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4349 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4351 check_total_value!(purpose);
4353 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => {
4354 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(preimage);
4355 check_total_value!(purpose);
4359 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(inbound_payment) => {
4360 if let OnionPayload::Spontaneous(_) = claimable_htlc.onion_payload {
4361 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new keysend HTLC with payment_hash {} because we already have an inbound payment with the same payment hash", &payment_hash);
4362 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4364 let payment_data = payment_data.unwrap();
4365 if inbound_payment.get().payment_secret != payment_data.payment_secret {
4366 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our expected payment secret.", &payment_hash);
4367 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4368 } else if inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.is_some() && payment_data.total_msat < inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap() {
4369 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing new HTLC with payment_hash {} as it didn't match our minimum value (had {}, needed {}).",
4370 &payment_hash, payment_data.total_msat, inbound_payment.get().min_value_msat.unwrap());
4371 fail_htlc!(claimable_htlc, payment_hash);
4373 let purpose = events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
4374 payment_preimage: inbound_payment.get().payment_preimage,
4375 payment_secret: payment_data.payment_secret,
4377 let payment_claimable_generated = check_total_value!(purpose);
4378 if payment_claimable_generated {
4379 inbound_payment.remove_entry();
4385 HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { .. } => {
4386 panic!("Got pending fail of our own HTLC");
4394 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
4395 self.pending_outbound_payments.check_retry_payments(&self.router, || self.list_usable_channels(),
4396 || self.compute_inflight_htlcs(), &self.entropy_source, &self.node_signer, best_block_height,
4397 &self.pending_events, &self.logger, |args| self.send_payment_along_path(args));
4399 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_forwards.drain(..) {
4400 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
4402 self.forward_htlcs(&mut phantom_receives);
4404 // Freeing the holding cell here is relatively redundant - in practice we'll do it when we
4405 // next get a `get_and_clear_pending_msg_events` call, but some tests rely on it, and it's
4406 // nice to do the work now if we can rather than while we're trying to get messages in the
4408 self.check_free_holding_cells();
4410 if new_events.is_empty() { return }
4411 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4412 events.append(&mut new_events);
4415 /// Free the background events, generally called from [`PersistenceNotifierGuard`] constructors.
4417 /// Expects the caller to have a total_consistency_lock read lock.
4418 fn process_background_events(&self) -> NotifyOption {
4419 debug_assert_ne!(self.total_consistency_lock.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::NotHeldByThread);
4421 self.background_events_processed_since_startup.store(true, Ordering::Release);
4423 let mut background_events = Vec::new();
4424 mem::swap(&mut *self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap(), &mut background_events);
4425 if background_events.is_empty() {
4426 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4429 for event in background_events.drain(..) {
4431 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((funding_txo, update)) => {
4432 // The channel has already been closed, so no use bothering to care about the
4433 // monitor updating completing.
4434 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4436 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup { counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update } => {
4437 let mut updated_chan = false;
4439 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4440 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4441 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4442 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4443 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
4444 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase) => {
4445 updated_chan = true;
4446 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, update.clone(),
4447 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase).map(|_| ())
4449 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => Ok(()),
4454 // TODO: Track this as in-flight even though the channel is closed.
4455 let _ = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(funding_txo, &update);
4457 // TODO: If this channel has since closed, we're likely providing a payment
4458 // preimage update, which we must ensure is durable! We currently don't,
4459 // however, ensure that.
4461 log_error!(self.logger,
4462 "Failed to provide ChannelMonitorUpdate to closed channel! This likely lost us a payment preimage!");
4464 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
4466 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete { counterparty_node_id, channel_id } => {
4467 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4468 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
4469 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4470 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4471 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&channel_id) {
4472 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan);
4474 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
4475 .remove(&channel_id).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
4476 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
4477 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
4478 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
4484 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4487 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
4488 /// Process background events, for functional testing
4489 pub fn test_process_background_events(&self) {
4490 let _lck = self.total_consistency_lock.read().unwrap();
4491 let _ = self.process_background_events();
4494 fn update_channel_fee(&self, chan_id: &ChannelId, chan: &mut Channel<SP>, new_feerate: u32) -> NotifyOption {
4495 if !chan.context.is_outbound() { return NotifyOption::SkipPersist; }
4496 // If the feerate has decreased by less than half, don't bother
4497 if new_feerate <= chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() && new_feerate * 2 > chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight() {
4498 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4499 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4500 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4502 if !chan.context.is_live() {
4503 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} does not qualify for a feerate change from {} to {} as it cannot currently be updated (probably the peer is disconnected).",
4504 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4505 return NotifyOption::SkipPersist;
4507 log_trace!(self.logger, "Channel {} qualifies for a feerate change from {} to {}.",
4508 &chan_id, chan.context.get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(), new_feerate);
4510 chan.queue_update_fee(new_feerate, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
4511 NotifyOption::DoPersist
4515 /// In chanmon_consistency we want to sometimes do the channel fee updates done in
4516 /// timer_tick_occurred, but we can't generate the disabled channel updates as it considers
4517 /// these a fuzz failure (as they usually indicate a channel force-close, which is exactly what
4518 /// it wants to detect). Thus, we have a variant exposed here for its benefit.
4519 pub fn maybe_update_chan_fees(&self) {
4520 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4521 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4523 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4524 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4526 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4527 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4528 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4529 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4530 for (chan_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
4531 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
4533 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4538 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4539 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4547 /// Performs actions which should happen on startup and roughly once per minute thereafter.
4549 /// This currently includes:
4550 /// * Increasing or decreasing the on-chain feerate estimates for our outbound channels,
4551 /// * Broadcasting [`ChannelUpdate`] messages if we've been disconnected from our peer for more
4552 /// than a minute, informing the network that they should no longer attempt to route over
4554 /// * Expiring a channel's previous [`ChannelConfig`] if necessary to only allow forwarding HTLCs
4555 /// with the current [`ChannelConfig`].
4556 /// * Removing peers which have disconnected but and no longer have any channels.
4557 /// * Force-closing and removing channels which have not completed establishment in a timely manner.
4559 /// Note that this may cause reentrancy through [`chain::Watch::update_channel`] calls or feerate
4560 /// estimate fetches.
4562 /// [`ChannelUpdate`]: msgs::ChannelUpdate
4563 /// [`ChannelConfig`]: crate::util::config::ChannelConfig
4564 pub fn timer_tick_occurred(&self) {
4565 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
4566 let mut should_persist = self.process_background_events();
4568 let normal_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4569 let min_mempool_feerate = self.fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum);
4571 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(Result<(), _>, _)> = Vec::new();
4572 let mut timed_out_mpp_htlcs = Vec::new();
4573 let mut pending_peers_awaiting_removal = Vec::new();
4575 let process_unfunded_channel_tick = |
4576 chan_id: &ChannelId,
4577 context: &mut ChannelContext<SP>,
4578 unfunded_context: &mut UnfundedChannelContext,
4579 pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
4580 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
4582 context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4583 if unfunded_context.should_expire_unfunded_channel() {
4584 log_error!(self.logger,
4585 "Force-closing pending channel with ID {} for not establishing in a timely manner", chan_id);
4586 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
4587 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed);
4588 self.finish_force_close_channel(context.force_shutdown(false));
4589 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4590 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4591 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4592 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
4593 channel_id: *chan_id,
4594 data: "Force-closing pending channel due to timeout awaiting establishment handshake".to_owned(),
4605 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4606 for (counterparty_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
4607 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4608 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4609 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
4610 let counterparty_node_id = *counterparty_node_id;
4611 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, phase| {
4613 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
4614 let new_feerate = if chan.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4619 let chan_needs_persist = self.update_channel_fee(chan_id, chan, new_feerate);
4620 if chan_needs_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist; }
4622 if let Err(e) = chan.timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress() {
4623 let (needs_close, err) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, chan_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
4624 handle_errors.push((Err(err), counterparty_node_id));
4625 if needs_close { return false; }
4628 match chan.channel_update_status() {
4629 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled if !chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(0)),
4630 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled if chan.context.is_live() => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(0)),
4631 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) if chan.context.is_live()
4632 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled),
4633 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) if !chan.context.is_live()
4634 => chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled),
4635 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(mut n) if !chan.context.is_live() => {
4637 if n >= DISABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4638 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled);
4639 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4640 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4644 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4646 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(n));
4649 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(mut n) if chan.context.is_live() => {
4651 if n >= ENABLE_GOSSIP_TICKS {
4652 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled);
4653 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
4654 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
4658 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4660 chan.set_channel_update_status(ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(n));
4666 chan.context.maybe_expire_prev_config();
4668 if chan.should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response() {
4669 log_debug!(self.logger, "Disconnecting peer {} due to not making any progress on channel {}",
4670 counterparty_node_id, chan_id);
4671 pending_msg_events.push(MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4672 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4673 action: msgs::ErrorAction::DisconnectPeerWithWarning {
4674 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
4675 channel_id: *chan_id,
4676 data: "Disconnecting due to timeout awaiting response".to_owned(),
4684 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
4685 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4686 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4688 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
4689 process_unfunded_channel_tick(chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context,
4690 pending_msg_events, counterparty_node_id)
4695 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4696 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events,
4697 counterparty_node_id));
4698 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|chan_id, chan| process_unfunded_channel_tick(
4699 chan_id, &mut chan.context, &mut chan.unfunded_context, pending_msg_events,
4700 counterparty_node_id));
4702 for (chan_id, req) in peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.iter_mut() {
4703 if { req.ticks_remaining -= 1 ; req.ticks_remaining } <= 0 {
4704 log_error!(self.logger, "Force-closing unaccepted inbound channel {} for not accepting in a timely manner", &chan_id);
4705 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(
4706 events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
4707 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
4708 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
4709 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan_id.clone(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
4715 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.retain(|_, req| req.ticks_remaining > 0);
4717 if peer_state.ok_to_remove(true) {
4718 pending_peers_awaiting_removal.push(counterparty_node_id);
4723 // When a peer disconnects but still has channels, the peer's `peer_state` entry in the
4724 // `per_peer_state` is not removed by the `peer_disconnected` function. If the channels
4725 // of to that peer is later closed while still being disconnected (i.e. force closed),
4726 // we therefore need to remove the peer from `peer_state` separately.
4727 // To avoid having to take the `per_peer_state` `write` lock once the channels are
4728 // closed, we instead remove such peers awaiting removal here on a timer, to limit the
4729 // negative effects on parallelism as much as possible.
4730 if pending_peers_awaiting_removal.len() > 0 {
4731 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
4732 for counterparty_node_id in pending_peers_awaiting_removal {
4733 match per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_node_id) {
4734 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(entry) => {
4735 // Remove the entry if the peer is still disconnected and we still
4736 // have no channels to the peer.
4737 let remove_entry = {
4738 let peer_state = entry.get().lock().unwrap();
4739 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
4742 entry.remove_entry();
4745 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => { /* The PeerState has already been removed */ }
4750 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
4751 if payment.htlcs.is_empty() {
4752 // This should be unreachable
4753 debug_assert!(false);
4756 if let OnionPayload::Invoice { .. } = payment.htlcs[0].onion_payload {
4757 // Check if we've received all the parts we need for an MPP (the value of the parts adds to total_msat).
4758 // In this case we're not going to handle any timeouts of the parts here.
4759 // This condition determining whether the MPP is complete here must match
4760 // exactly the condition used in `process_pending_htlc_forwards`.
4761 if payment.htlcs[0].total_msat <= payment.htlcs.iter()
4762 .fold(0, |total, htlc| total + htlc.sender_intended_value)
4765 } else if payment.htlcs.iter_mut().any(|htlc| {
4766 htlc.timer_ticks += 1;
4767 return htlc.timer_ticks >= MPP_TIMEOUT_TICKS
4769 timed_out_mpp_htlcs.extend(payment.htlcs.drain(..)
4770 .map(|htlc: ClaimableHTLC| (htlc.prev_hop, *payment_hash)));
4777 for htlc_source in timed_out_mpp_htlcs.drain(..) {
4778 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc_source.0.clone());
4779 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(23);
4780 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: htlc_source.1 };
4781 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
4784 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
4785 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
4788 self.pending_outbound_payments.remove_stale_payments(&self.pending_events);
4790 // Technically we don't need to do this here, but if we have holding cell entries in a
4791 // channel that need freeing, it's better to do that here and block a background task
4792 // than block the message queueing pipeline.
4793 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
4794 should_persist = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
4801 /// Indicates that the preimage for payment_hash is unknown or the received amount is incorrect
4802 /// after a PaymentClaimable event, failing the HTLC back to its origin and freeing resources
4803 /// along the path (including in our own channel on which we received it).
4805 /// Note that in some cases around unclean shutdown, it is possible the payment may have
4806 /// already been claimed by you via [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`] prior to you seeing (a
4807 /// second copy of) the [`events::Event::PaymentClaimable`] event. Alternatively, the payment
4808 /// may have already been failed automatically by LDK if it was nearing its expiration time.
4810 /// While LDK will never claim a payment automatically on your behalf (i.e. without you calling
4811 /// [`ChannelManager::claim_funds`]), you should still monitor for
4812 /// [`events::Event::PaymentClaimed`] events even for payments you intend to fail, especially on
4813 /// startup during which time claims that were in-progress at shutdown may be replayed.
4814 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash) {
4815 self.fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(payment_hash, FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails);
4818 /// This is a variant of [`ChannelManager::fail_htlc_backwards`] that allows you to specify the
4819 /// reason for the failure.
4821 /// See [`FailureCode`] for valid failure codes.
4822 pub fn fail_htlc_backwards_with_reason(&self, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, failure_code: FailureCode) {
4823 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
4825 let removed_source = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.remove(payment_hash);
4826 if let Some(payment) = removed_source {
4827 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
4828 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(failure_code, &htlc);
4829 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
4830 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: *payment_hash };
4831 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4836 /// Gets error data to form an [`HTLCFailReason`] given a [`FailureCode`] and [`ClaimableHTLC`].
4837 fn get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(&self, failure_code: FailureCode, htlc: &ClaimableHTLC) -> HTLCFailReason {
4838 match failure_code {
4839 FailureCode::TemporaryNodeFailure => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4840 FailureCode::RequiredNodeFeatureMissing => HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(failure_code.into()),
4841 FailureCode::IncorrectOrUnknownPaymentDetails => {
4842 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
4843 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
4844 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), htlc_msat_height_data)
4846 FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(data) => {
4847 let fail_data = match data {
4848 Some((typ, offset)) => [BigSize(typ).encode(), offset.encode()].concat(),
4851 HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code.into(), fail_data)
4856 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4857 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4859 /// This is for failures on the channel on which the HTLC was *received*, not failures
4861 fn get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4862 // We can't be sure what SCID was used when relaying inbound towards us, so we have to
4863 // guess somewhat. If its a public channel, we figure best to just use the real SCID (as
4864 // we're not leaking that we have a channel with the counterparty), otherwise we try to use
4865 // an inbound SCID alias before the real SCID.
4866 let scid_pref = if chan.context.should_announce() {
4867 chan.context.get_short_channel_id().or(chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias())
4869 chan.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias().or(chan.context.get_short_channel_id())
4871 if let Some(scid) = scid_pref {
4872 self.get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(desired_err_code, scid, chan)
4874 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4879 /// Gets an HTLC onion failure code and error data for an `UPDATE` error, given the error code
4880 /// that we want to return and a channel.
4881 fn get_htlc_temp_fail_err_and_data(&self, desired_err_code: u16, scid: u64, chan: &Channel<SP>) -> (u16, Vec<u8>) {
4882 debug_assert_eq!(desired_err_code & 0x1000, 0x1000);
4883 if let Ok(upd) = self.get_channel_update_for_onion(scid, chan) {
4884 let mut enc = VecWriter(Vec::with_capacity(upd.serialized_length() + 6));
4885 if desired_err_code == 0x1000 | 20 {
4886 // No flags for `disabled_flags` are currently defined so they're always two zero bytes.
4887 // See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/341ec84/04-onion-routing.md?plain=1#L1008
4888 0u16.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4890 (upd.serialized_length() as u16 + 2).write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4891 msgs::ChannelUpdate::TYPE.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4892 upd.write(&mut enc).expect("Writes cannot fail");
4893 (desired_err_code, enc.0)
4895 // If we fail to get a unicast channel_update, it implies we don't yet have an SCID,
4896 // which means we really shouldn't have gotten a payment to be forwarded over this
4897 // channel yet, or if we did it's from a route hint. Either way, returning an error of
4898 // PERM|no_such_channel should be fine.
4899 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4903 // Fail a list of HTLCs that were just freed from the holding cell. The HTLCs need to be
4904 // failed backwards or, if they were one of our outgoing HTLCs, then their failure needs to
4905 // be surfaced to the user.
4906 fn fail_holding_cell_htlcs(
4907 &self, mut htlcs_to_fail: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, channel_id: ChannelId,
4908 counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey
4910 let (failure_code, onion_failure_data) = {
4911 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
4912 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
4913 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
4914 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
4915 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_id) {
4916 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) => {
4917 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get() {
4918 self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|7, &chan)
4920 // We shouldn't be trying to fail holding cell HTLCs on an unfunded channel.
4921 debug_assert!(false);
4922 (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4925 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => (0x4000|10, Vec::new())
4927 } else { (0x4000|10, Vec::new()) }
4930 for (htlc_src, payment_hash) in htlcs_to_fail.drain(..) {
4931 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, onion_failure_data.clone());
4932 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id };
4933 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_src, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
4937 /// Fails an HTLC backwards to the sender of it to us.
4938 /// Note that we do not assume that channels corresponding to failed HTLCs are still available.
4939 fn fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&self, source: &HTLCSource, payment_hash: &PaymentHash, onion_error: &HTLCFailReason, destination: HTLCDestination) {
4940 // Ensure that no peer state channel storage lock is held when calling this function.
4941 // This ensures that future code doesn't introduce a lock-order requirement for
4942 // `forward_htlcs` to be locked after the `per_peer_state` peer locks, which calling
4943 // this function with any `per_peer_state` peer lock acquired would.
4944 for (_, peer) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
4945 debug_assert_ne!(peer.held_by_thread(), LockHeldState::HeldByThread);
4948 //TODO: There is a timing attack here where if a node fails an HTLC back to us they can
4949 //identify whether we sent it or not based on the (I presume) very different runtime
4950 //between the branches here. We should make this async and move it into the forward HTLCs
4953 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
4954 // from block_connected which may run during initialization prior to the chain_monitor
4955 // being fully configured. See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4957 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref path, ref session_priv, ref payment_id, .. } => {
4958 if self.pending_outbound_payments.fail_htlc(source, payment_hash, onion_error, path,
4959 session_priv, payment_id, self.probing_cookie_secret, &self.secp_ctx,
4960 &self.pending_events, &self.logger)
4961 { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4963 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData { ref short_channel_id, ref htlc_id, ref incoming_packet_shared_secret, ref phantom_shared_secret, ref outpoint, .. }) => {
4964 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with payment_hash {} backwards from us with {:?}", &payment_hash, onion_error);
4965 let err_packet = onion_error.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_packet_shared_secret, phantom_shared_secret);
4967 let mut push_forward_ev = false;
4968 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
4969 if forward_htlcs.is_empty() {
4970 push_forward_ev = true;
4972 match forward_htlcs.entry(*short_channel_id) {
4973 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
4974 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet });
4976 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
4977 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::FailHTLC { htlc_id: *htlc_id, err_packet }));
4980 mem::drop(forward_htlcs);
4981 if push_forward_ev { self.push_pending_forwards_ev(); }
4982 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
4983 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCHandlingFailed {
4984 prev_channel_id: outpoint.to_channel_id(),
4985 failed_next_destination: destination,
4991 /// Provides a payment preimage in response to [`Event::PaymentClaimable`], generating any
4992 /// [`MessageSendEvent`]s needed to claim the payment.
4994 /// This method is guaranteed to ensure the payment has been claimed but only if the current
4995 /// height is strictly below [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]. To avoid race
4996 /// conditions, you should wait for an [`Event::PaymentClaimed`] before considering the payment
4997 /// successful. It will generally be available in the next [`process_pending_events`] call.
4999 /// Note that if you did not set an `amount_msat` when calling [`create_inbound_payment`] or
5000 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] you must check that the amount in the `PaymentClaimable`
5001 /// event matches your expectation. If you fail to do so and call this method, you may provide
5002 /// the sender "proof-of-payment" when they did not fulfill the full expected payment.
5004 /// This function will fail the payment if it has custom TLVs with even type numbers, as we
5005 /// will assume they are unknown. If you intend to accept even custom TLVs, you should use
5006 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`].
5008 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable
5009 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimable::claim_deadline
5010 /// [`Event::PaymentClaimed`]: crate::events::Event::PaymentClaimed
5011 /// [`process_pending_events`]: EventsProvider::process_pending_events
5012 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
5013 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
5014 /// [`claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs`]: Self::claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs
5015 pub fn claim_funds(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5016 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, false);
5019 /// This is a variant of [`claim_funds`] that allows accepting a payment with custom TLVs with
5020 /// even type numbers.
5024 /// You MUST check you've understood all even TLVs before using this to
5025 /// claim, otherwise you may unintentionally agree to some protocol you do not understand.
5027 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
5028 pub fn claim_funds_with_known_custom_tlvs(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) {
5029 self.claim_payment_internal(payment_preimage, true);
5032 fn claim_payment_internal(&self, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, custom_tlvs_known: bool) {
5033 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0).into_inner());
5035 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5038 let mut claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
5039 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
5040 let mut receiver_node_id = self.our_network_pubkey;
5041 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
5042 if htlc.prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
5043 let phantom_pubkey = self.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
5044 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
5045 receiver_node_id = phantom_pubkey;
5050 let htlcs = payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect();
5051 let sender_intended_value = payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat);
5052 let dup_purpose = claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.insert(payment_hash,
5053 ClaimingPayment { amount_msat: payment.htlcs.iter().map(|source| source.value).sum(),
5054 payment_purpose: payment.purpose, receiver_node_id, htlcs, sender_intended_value
5056 if dup_purpose.is_some() {
5057 debug_assert!(false, "Shouldn't get a duplicate pending claim event ever");
5058 log_error!(self.logger, "Got a duplicate pending claimable event on payment hash {}! Please report this bug",
5062 if let Some(RecipientOnionFields { ref custom_tlvs, .. }) = payment.onion_fields {
5063 if !custom_tlvs_known && custom_tlvs.iter().any(|(typ, _)| typ % 2 == 0) {
5064 log_info!(self.logger, "Rejecting payment with payment hash {} as we cannot accept payment with unknown even TLVs: {}",
5065 &payment_hash, log_iter!(custom_tlvs.iter().map(|(typ, _)| typ).filter(|typ| *typ % 2 == 0)));
5066 claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5067 mem::drop(claimable_payments);
5068 for htlc in payment.htlcs {
5069 let reason = self.get_htlc_fail_reason_from_failure_code(FailureCode::InvalidOnionPayload(None), &htlc);
5070 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5071 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5072 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5081 debug_assert!(!sources.is_empty());
5083 // Just in case one HTLC has been failed between when we generated the `PaymentClaimable`
5084 // and when we got here we need to check that the amount we're about to claim matches the
5085 // amount we told the user in the last `PaymentClaimable`. We also do a sanity-check that
5086 // the MPP parts all have the same `total_msat`.
5087 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
5088 let mut prev_total_msat = None;
5089 let mut expected_amt_msat = None;
5090 let mut valid_mpp = true;
5091 let mut errs = Vec::new();
5092 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5093 for htlc in sources.iter() {
5094 if prev_total_msat.is_some() && prev_total_msat != Some(htlc.total_msat) {
5095 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different expected total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5096 debug_assert!(false);
5100 prev_total_msat = Some(htlc.total_msat);
5102 if expected_amt_msat.is_some() && expected_amt_msat != htlc.total_value_received {
5103 log_error!(self.logger, "Somehow ended up with an MPP payment with different received total amounts - this should not be reachable!");
5104 debug_assert!(false);
5108 expected_amt_msat = htlc.total_value_received;
5109 claimable_amt_msat += htlc.value;
5111 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5112 if sources.is_empty() || expected_amt_msat.is_none() {
5113 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5114 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment which no longer had any available HTLCs!");
5117 if claimable_amt_msat != expected_amt_msat.unwrap() {
5118 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5119 log_info!(self.logger, "Attempted to claim an incomplete payment, expected {} msat, had {} available to claim.",
5120 expected_amt_msat.unwrap(), claimable_amt_msat);
5124 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5125 if let Err((pk, err)) = self.claim_funds_from_hop(
5126 htlc.prev_hop, payment_preimage,
5127 |_| Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash }))
5129 if let msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError = err.err.action {
5130 // We got a temporary failure updating monitor, but will claim the
5131 // HTLC when the monitor updating is restored (or on chain).
5132 log_error!(self.logger, "Temporary failure claiming HTLC, treating as success: {}", err.err.err);
5133 } else { errs.push((pk, err)); }
5138 for htlc in sources.drain(..) {
5139 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
5140 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&self.best_block.read().unwrap().height().to_be_bytes());
5141 let source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop);
5142 let reason = HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data);
5143 let receiver = HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash };
5144 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
5146 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5149 // Now we can handle any errors which were generated.
5150 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in errs.drain(..) {
5151 let res: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5152 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
5156 fn claim_funds_from_hop<ComplFunc: FnOnce(Option<u64>) -> Option<MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self,
5157 prev_hop: HTLCPreviousHopData, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, completion_action: ComplFunc)
5158 -> Result<(), (PublicKey, MsgHandleErrInternal)> {
5159 //TODO: Delay the claimed_funds relaying just like we do outbound relay!
5161 // If we haven't yet run background events assume we're still deserializing and shouldn't
5162 // actually pass `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to users yet. Instead, queue them up as
5163 // `BackgroundEvent`s.
5164 let during_init = !self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire);
5167 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5168 let chan_id = prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
5169 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&prev_hop.short_channel_id) {
5170 Some((cp_id, _dup_chan_id)) => Some(cp_id.clone()),
5174 let peer_state_opt = counterparty_node_id_opt.as_ref().map(
5175 |counterparty_node_id| per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5176 .map(|peer_mutex| peer_mutex.lock().unwrap())
5179 if peer_state_opt.is_some() {
5180 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_opt.unwrap();
5181 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5182 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
5183 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5184 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5185 let fulfill_res = chan.get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &self.logger);
5187 if let UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { htlc_value_msat, monitor_update } = fulfill_res {
5188 if let Some(action) = completion_action(Some(htlc_value_msat)) {
5189 log_trace!(self.logger, "Tracking monitor update completion action for channel {}: {:?}",
5191 peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.entry(chan_id).or_insert(Vec::new()).push(action);
5194 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, prev_hop.outpoint, monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
5195 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry);
5196 if let Err(e) = res {
5197 // TODO: This is a *critical* error - we probably updated the outbound edge
5198 // of the HTLC's monitor with a preimage. We should retry this monitor
5199 // update over and over again until morale improves.
5200 log_error!(self.logger, "Failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}", payment_preimage);
5201 return Err((counterparty_node_id, e));
5204 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly -
5205 // they probably haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the
5206 // monitor update as a background event.
5207 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5208 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
5209 counterparty_node_id,
5210 funding_txo: prev_hop.outpoint,
5211 update: monitor_update.clone(),
5220 let preimage_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5221 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
5222 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
5228 // We update the ChannelMonitor on the backward link, after
5229 // receiving an `update_fulfill_htlc` from the forward link.
5230 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.update_channel(prev_hop.outpoint, &preimage_update);
5231 if update_res != ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed {
5232 // TODO: This needs to be handled somehow - if we receive a monitor update
5233 // with a preimage we *must* somehow manage to propagate it to the upstream
5234 // channel, or we must have an ability to receive the same event and try
5235 // again on restart.
5236 log_error!(self.logger, "Critical error: failed to update channel monitor with preimage {:?}: {:?}",
5237 payment_preimage, update_res);
5240 // If we're running during init we cannot update a monitor directly - they probably
5241 // haven't actually been loaded yet. Instead, push the monitor update as a background
5243 // Note that while it's safe to use `ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup` here (the
5244 // channel is already closed) we need to ultimately handle the monitor update
5245 // completion action only after we've completed the monitor update. This is the only
5246 // way to guarantee this update *will* be regenerated on startup (otherwise if this was
5247 // from a forwarded HTLC the downstream preimage may be deleted before we claim
5248 // upstream). Thus, we need to transition to some new `BackgroundEvent` type which will
5249 // complete the monitor update completion action from `completion_action`.
5250 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
5251 BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((
5252 prev_hop.outpoint, preimage_update,
5255 // Note that we do process the completion action here. This totally could be a
5256 // duplicate claim, but we have no way of knowing without interrogating the
5257 // `ChannelMonitor` we've provided the above update to. Instead, note that `Event`s are
5258 // generally always allowed to be duplicative (and it's specifically noted in
5259 // `PaymentForwarded`).
5260 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(completion_action(None));
5264 fn finalize_claims(&self, sources: Vec<HTLCSource>) {
5265 self.pending_outbound_payments.finalize_claims(sources, &self.pending_events);
5268 fn claim_funds_internal(&self, source: HTLCSource, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, forwarded_htlc_value_msat: Option<u64>, from_onchain: bool, next_channel_outpoint: OutPoint) {
5270 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { session_priv, payment_id, path, .. } => {
5271 debug_assert!(self.background_events_processed_since_startup.load(Ordering::Acquire),
5272 "We don't support claim_htlc claims during startup - monitors may not be available yet");
5273 let ev_completion_action = EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
5274 channel_funding_outpoint: next_channel_outpoint,
5275 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
5277 self.pending_outbound_payments.claim_htlc(payment_id, payment_preimage,
5278 session_priv, path, from_onchain, ev_completion_action, &self.pending_events,
5281 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(hop_data) => {
5282 let prev_outpoint = hop_data.outpoint;
5283 let res = self.claim_funds_from_hop(hop_data, payment_preimage,
5284 |htlc_claim_value_msat| {
5285 if let Some(forwarded_htlc_value) = forwarded_htlc_value_msat {
5286 let fee_earned_msat = if let Some(claimed_htlc_value) = htlc_claim_value_msat {
5287 Some(claimed_htlc_value - forwarded_htlc_value)
5290 Some(MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5291 event: events::Event::PaymentForwarded {
5293 claim_from_onchain_tx: from_onchain,
5294 prev_channel_id: Some(prev_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5295 next_channel_id: Some(next_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id()),
5296 outbound_amount_forwarded_msat: forwarded_htlc_value_msat,
5298 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint: None,
5302 if let Err((pk, err)) = res {
5303 let result: Result<(), _> = Err(err);
5304 let _ = handle_error!(self, result, pk);
5310 /// Gets the node_id held by this ChannelManager
5311 pub fn get_our_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
5312 self.our_network_pubkey.clone()
5315 fn handle_monitor_update_completion_actions<I: IntoIterator<Item=MonitorUpdateCompletionAction>>(&self, actions: I) {
5316 for action in actions.into_iter() {
5318 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::PaymentClaimed { payment_hash } => {
5319 let payment = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().pending_claiming_payments.remove(&payment_hash);
5320 if let Some(ClaimingPayment {
5322 payment_purpose: purpose,
5325 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_total_msat,
5327 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
5331 receiver_node_id: Some(receiver_node_id),
5333 sender_intended_total_msat,
5337 MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
5338 event, downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint
5340 self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().push_back((event, None));
5341 if let Some((node_id, funding_outpoint, blocker)) = downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint {
5342 self.handle_monitor_update_release(node_id, funding_outpoint, Some(blocker));
5349 /// Handles a channel reentering a functional state, either due to reconnect or a monitor
5350 /// update completion.
5351 fn handle_channel_resumption(&self, pending_msg_events: &mut Vec<MessageSendEvent>,
5352 channel: &mut Channel<SP>, raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
5353 commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, order: RAACommitmentOrder,
5354 pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
5355 channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>)
5356 -> Option<(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)> {
5357 log_trace!(self.logger, "Handling channel resumption for channel {} with {} RAA, {} commitment update, {} pending forwards, {}broadcasting funding, {} channel ready, {} announcement",
5358 &channel.context.channel_id(),
5359 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5360 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, pending_forwards.len(),
5361 if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "" } else { "not " },
5362 if channel_ready.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" },
5363 if announcement_sigs.is_some() { "sending" } else { "without" });
5365 let mut htlc_forwards = None;
5367 let counterparty_node_id = channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
5368 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
5369 htlc_forwards = Some((channel.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap_or(channel.context.outbound_scid_alias()),
5370 channel.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel.context.get_user_id(), pending_forwards));
5373 if let Some(msg) = channel_ready {
5374 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, msg);
5376 if let Some(msg) = announcement_sigs {
5377 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5378 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5383 macro_rules! handle_cs { () => {
5384 if let Some(update) = commitment_update {
5385 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs {
5386 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5391 macro_rules! handle_raa { () => {
5392 if let Some(revoke_and_ack) = raa {
5393 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK {
5394 node_id: counterparty_node_id,
5395 msg: revoke_and_ack,
5400 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => {
5404 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => {
5410 if let Some(tx) = funding_broadcastable {
5411 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting funding transaction with txid {}", tx.txid());
5412 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
5416 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5417 emit_channel_pending_event!(pending_events, channel);
5418 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
5424 fn channel_monitor_updated(&self, funding_txo: &OutPoint, highest_applied_update_id: u64, counterparty_node_id: Option<&PublicKey>) {
5425 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
5427 let counterparty_node_id = match counterparty_node_id {
5428 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5430 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
5431 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
5432 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
5433 match id_to_peer.get(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5434 Some(cp_id) => cp_id.clone(),
5439 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5440 let mut peer_state_lock;
5441 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id);
5442 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return }
5443 peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
5444 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5446 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()) {
5449 let update_actions = peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions
5450 .remove(&funding_txo.to_channel_id()).unwrap_or(Vec::new());
5451 mem::drop(peer_state_lock);
5452 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
5453 self.handle_monitor_update_completion_actions(update_actions);
5456 let remaining_in_flight =
5457 if let Some(pending) = peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.get_mut(funding_txo) {
5458 pending.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > highest_applied_update_id);
5461 log_trace!(self.logger, "ChannelMonitor updated to {}. Current highest is {}. {} pending in-flight updates.",
5462 highest_applied_update_id, channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
5463 remaining_in_flight);
5464 if !channel.is_awaiting_monitor_update() || channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() != highest_applied_update_id {
5467 handle_monitor_update_completion!(self, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, channel);
5470 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`].
5472 /// The `temporary_channel_id` parameter indicates which inbound channel should be accepted,
5473 /// and the `counterparty_node_id` parameter is the id of the peer which has requested to open
5476 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5477 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5478 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5480 /// Note that this method will return an error and reject the channel, if it requires support
5481 /// for zero confirmations. Instead, `accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` must be
5482 /// used to accept such channels.
5484 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5485 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5486 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5487 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, false, user_channel_id)
5490 /// Accepts a request to open a channel after a [`events::Event::OpenChannelRequest`], treating
5491 /// it as confirmed immediately.
5493 /// The `user_channel_id` parameter will be provided back in
5494 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`] to allow tracking of which events correspond
5495 /// with which `accept_inbound_channel`/`accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf` call.
5497 /// Unlike [`ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`], this method accepts the incoming channel
5498 /// and (if the counterparty agrees), enables forwarding of payments immediately.
5500 /// This fully trusts that the counterparty has honestly and correctly constructed the funding
5501 /// transaction and blindly assumes that it will eventually confirm.
5503 /// If it does not confirm before we decide to close the channel, or if the funding transaction
5504 /// does not pay to the correct script the correct amount, *you will lose funds*.
5506 /// [`Event::OpenChannelRequest`]: events::Event::OpenChannelRequest
5507 /// [`Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id`]: events::Event::ChannelClosed::user_channel_id
5508 pub fn accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5509 self.do_accept_inbound_channel(temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, true, user_channel_id)
5512 fn do_accept_inbound_channel(&self, temporary_channel_id: &ChannelId, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, accept_0conf: bool, user_channel_id: u128) -> Result<(), APIError> {
5513 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
5515 let peers_without_funded_channels =
5516 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|peer| { peer.total_channel_count() > 0 });
5517 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5518 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5519 .ok_or_else(|| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id) })?;
5520 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5521 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5522 let is_only_peer_channel = peer_state.total_channel_count() == 1;
5524 // Find (and remove) the channel in the unaccepted table. If it's not there, something weird is
5525 // happening and return an error. N.B. that we create channel with an outbound SCID of zero so
5526 // that we can delay allocating the SCID until after we're sure that the checks below will
5528 let mut channel = match peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.remove(temporary_channel_id) {
5529 Some(unaccepted_channel) => {
5530 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5531 InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5532 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features,
5533 &unaccepted_channel.open_channel_msg, user_channel_id, &self.default_configuration, best_block_height,
5534 &self.logger, accept_0conf).map_err(|e| APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: e.to_string() })
5536 _ => Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "No such channel awaiting to be accepted.".to_owned() })
5540 // This should have been correctly configured by the call to InboundV1Channel::new.
5541 debug_assert!(channel.context.minimum_depth().unwrap() == 0);
5542 } else if channel.context.get_channel_type().requires_zero_conf() {
5543 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5544 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5545 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5546 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), }
5549 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5550 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Please use accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf to accept channels with zero confirmations.".to_owned() });
5552 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5553 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5554 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5555 if is_only_peer_channel && peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS {
5556 let send_msg_err_event = events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
5557 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5558 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage{
5559 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: temporary_channel_id.clone(), data: "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(), }
5562 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(send_msg_err_event);
5563 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones".to_owned() });
5567 // Now that we know we have a channel, assign an outbound SCID alias.
5568 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5569 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5571 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5572 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
5573 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5576 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(temporary_channel_id.clone(), channel);
5581 /// Gets the number of peers which match the given filter and do not have any funded, outbound,
5582 /// or 0-conf channels.
5584 /// The filter is called for each peer and provided with the number of unfunded, inbound, and
5585 /// non-0-conf channels we have with the peer.
5586 fn peers_without_funded_channels<Filter>(&self, maybe_count_peer: Filter) -> usize
5587 where Filter: Fn(&PeerState<SP>) -> bool {
5588 let mut peers_without_funded_channels = 0;
5589 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5591 let peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5592 for (_, peer_mtx) in peer_state_lock.iter() {
5593 let peer = peer_mtx.lock().unwrap();
5594 if !maybe_count_peer(&*peer) { continue; }
5595 let num_unfunded_channels = Self::unfunded_channel_count(&peer, best_block_height);
5596 if num_unfunded_channels == peer.total_channel_count() {
5597 peers_without_funded_channels += 1;
5601 return peers_without_funded_channels;
5604 fn unfunded_channel_count(
5605 peer: &PeerState<SP>, best_block_height: u32
5607 let mut num_unfunded_channels = 0;
5608 for chan in peer.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
5609 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
5611 // This covers non-zero-conf inbound `Channel`s that we are currently monitoring, but those
5612 // which have not yet had any confirmations on-chain.
5613 if !chan.context.is_outbound() && chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 &&
5614 chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmations(best_block_height) == 0
5616 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5619 for (_, chan) in peer.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.iter() {
5620 if chan.context.minimum_depth().unwrap_or(1) != 0 {
5621 num_unfunded_channels += 1;
5624 num_unfunded_channels + peer.inbound_channel_request_by_id.len()
5627 fn internal_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5628 if msg.chain_hash != self.genesis_hash {
5629 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Unknown genesis block hash".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5632 if !self.default_configuration.accept_inbound_channels {
5633 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No inbound channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5636 // Get the number of peers with channels, but without funded ones. We don't care too much
5637 // about peers that never open a channel, so we filter by peers that have at least one
5638 // channel, and then limit the number of those with unfunded channels.
5639 let channeled_peers_without_funding =
5640 self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.total_channel_count() > 0);
5642 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5643 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5645 debug_assert!(false);
5646 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())
5648 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5649 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5651 // If this peer already has some channels, a new channel won't increase our number of peers
5652 // with unfunded channels, so as long as we aren't over the maximum number of unfunded
5653 // channels per-peer we can accept channels from a peer with existing ones.
5654 if peer_state.total_channel_count() == 0 &&
5655 channeled_peers_without_funding >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS &&
5656 !self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels
5658 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5659 "Have too many peers with unfunded channels, not accepting new ones".to_owned(),
5660 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5663 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
5664 if Self::unfunded_channel_count(peer_state, best_block_height) >= MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
5665 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5666 format!("Refusing more than {} unfunded channels.", MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER),
5667 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5670 let channel_id = msg.temporary_channel_id;
5671 let channel_exists = peer_state.has_channel(&channel_id);
5673 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("temporary_channel_id collision for the same peer!".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5676 // If we're doing manual acceptance checks on the channel, then defer creation until we're sure we want to accept.
5677 if self.default_configuration.manually_accept_inbound_channels {
5678 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5679 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::OpenChannelRequest {
5680 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id.clone(),
5681 counterparty_node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5682 funding_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
5683 push_msat: msg.push_msat,
5684 channel_type: msg.channel_type.clone().unwrap(),
5686 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.insert(channel_id, InboundChannelRequest {
5687 open_channel_msg: msg.clone(),
5688 ticks_remaining: UNACCEPTED_INBOUND_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS,
5693 // Otherwise create the channel right now.
5694 let mut random_bytes = [0u8; 16];
5695 random_bytes.copy_from_slice(&self.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes()[..16]);
5696 let user_channel_id = u128::from_be_bytes(random_bytes);
5697 let mut channel = match InboundV1Channel::new(&self.fee_estimator, &self.entropy_source, &self.signer_provider,
5698 counterparty_node_id.clone(), &self.channel_type_features(), &peer_state.latest_features, msg, user_channel_id,
5699 &self.default_configuration, best_block_height, &self.logger, /*is_0conf=*/false)
5702 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_chan_no_close(e, msg.temporary_channel_id));
5707 let channel_type = channel.context.get_channel_type();
5708 if channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
5709 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No zero confirmation channels accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5711 if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5712 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned(), msg.temporary_channel_id.clone()));
5715 let outbound_scid_alias = self.create_and_insert_outbound_scid_alias();
5716 channel.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
5718 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel {
5719 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5720 msg: channel.accept_inbound_channel(),
5722 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.insert(channel_id, channel);
5726 fn internal_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5727 let (value, output_script, user_id) = {
5728 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5729 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5731 debug_assert!(false);
5732 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5734 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5735 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5736 match peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5737 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan) => {
5738 try_unfunded_chan_entry!(self, chan.get_mut().accept_channel(&msg, &self.default_configuration.channel_handshake_limits, &peer_state.latest_features), chan);
5739 (chan.get().context.get_value_satoshis(), chan.get().context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh(), chan.get().context.get_user_id())
5741 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5744 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5745 pending_events.push_back((events::Event::FundingGenerationReady {
5746 temporary_channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
5747 counterparty_node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5748 channel_value_satoshis: value,
5750 user_channel_id: user_id,
5755 fn internal_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5756 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5758 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5759 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5761 debug_assert!(false);
5762 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id)
5765 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5766 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5767 let (chan, funding_msg, monitor) =
5768 match peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.remove(&msg.temporary_channel_id) {
5769 Some(inbound_chan) => {
5770 match inbound_chan.funding_created(msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger) {
5772 Err((mut inbound_chan, err)) => {
5773 // We've already removed this inbound channel from the map in `PeerState`
5774 // above so at this point we just need to clean up any lingering entries
5775 // concerning this channel as it is safe to do so.
5776 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &inbound_chan.context);
5777 let user_id = inbound_chan.context.get_user_id();
5778 let shutdown_res = inbound_chan.context.force_shutdown(false);
5779 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_finish_shutdown(format!("{}", err),
5780 msg.temporary_channel_id, user_id, shutdown_res, None, inbound_chan.context.get_value_satoshis()));
5784 None => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.temporary_channel_id))
5787 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_msg.channel_id) {
5788 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5789 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Already had channel with the new channel_id".to_owned(), funding_msg.channel_id))
5791 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
5792 match self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().entry(chan.context.channel_id()) {
5793 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
5794 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
5795 "The funding_created message had the same funding_txid as an existing channel - funding is not possible".to_owned(),
5796 funding_msg.channel_id))
5798 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(i_e) => {
5799 i_e.insert(chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5803 // There's no problem signing a counterparty's funding transaction if our monitor
5804 // hasn't persisted to disk yet - we can't lose money on a transaction that we haven't
5805 // accepted payment from yet. We do, however, need to wait to send our channel_ready
5806 // until we have persisted our monitor.
5807 let new_channel_id = funding_msg.channel_id;
5808 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned {
5809 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5813 let monitor_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor);
5815 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = e.insert(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) {
5816 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, monitor_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state,
5817 per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING_INITIAL_MONITOR,
5818 { peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&new_channel_id) });
5820 // Note that we reply with the new channel_id in error messages if we gave up on the
5821 // channel, not the temporary_channel_id. This is compatible with ourselves, but the
5822 // spec is somewhat ambiguous here. Not a huge deal since we'll send error messages for
5823 // any messages referencing a previously-closed channel anyway.
5824 // We do not propagate the monitor update to the user as it would be for a monitor
5825 // that we didn't manage to store (and that we don't care about - we don't respond
5826 // with the funding_signed so the channel can never go on chain).
5827 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { shutdown_finish: Some((res, _)), .. }) = &mut res {
5832 unreachable!("This must be a funded channel as we just inserted it.");
5838 fn internal_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5839 let best_block = *self.best_block.read().unwrap();
5840 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5841 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5843 debug_assert!(false);
5844 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5847 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5848 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5849 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5850 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5851 match chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5852 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => {
5853 let monitor = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5854 chan.funding_signed(&msg, best_block, &self.signer_provider, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5855 let update_res = self.chain_monitor.watch_channel(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), monitor);
5856 let mut res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, update_res, peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry, INITIAL_MONITOR);
5857 if let Err(MsgHandleErrInternal { ref mut shutdown_finish, .. }) = res {
5858 // We weren't able to watch the channel to begin with, so no updates should be made on
5859 // it. Previously, full_stack_target found an (unreachable) panic when the
5860 // monitor update contained within `shutdown_finish` was applied.
5861 if let Some((ref mut shutdown_finish, _)) = shutdown_finish {
5862 shutdown_finish.0.take();
5868 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id));
5872 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Failed to find corresponding channel".to_owned(), msg.channel_id))
5876 fn internal_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5877 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5878 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5880 debug_assert!(false);
5881 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5883 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5884 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5885 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
5886 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
5887 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5888 let announcement_sigs_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_ready(&msg, &self.node_signer,
5889 self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.default_configuration, &self.best_block.read().unwrap(), &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
5890 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs_opt {
5891 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5892 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
5893 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5894 msg: announcement_sigs,
5896 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
5897 // If we're sending an announcement_signatures, we'll send the (public)
5898 // channel_update after sending a channel_announcement when we receive our
5899 // counterparty's announcement_signatures. Thus, we only bother to send a
5900 // channel_update here if the channel is not public, i.e. we're not sending an
5901 // announcement_signatures.
5902 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", chan.context.channel_id());
5903 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
5904 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
5905 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
5912 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
5913 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, chan);
5918 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
5919 "Got a channel_ready message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry)
5922 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => {
5923 Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5928 fn internal_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5929 let mut dropped_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>;
5930 let result: Result<(), _> = loop {
5931 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5932 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
5934 debug_assert!(false);
5935 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
5937 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
5938 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
5939 // TODO(dunxen): Fix this duplication when we switch to a single map with enums as per
5940 // https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/2422
5941 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5942 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
5943 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5944 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5945 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5947 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_entry) = peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5948 log_error!(self.logger, "Immediately closing unfunded channel {} as peer asked to cooperatively shut it down (which is unnecessary)", &msg.channel_id);
5949 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan_entry.get().context, ClosureReason::CounterpartyCoopClosedUnfundedChannel);
5950 let mut chan = remove_channel!(self, chan_entry);
5951 self.finish_force_close_channel(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
5953 } else if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
5954 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
5955 if !chan.received_shutdown() {
5956 log_info!(self.logger, "Received a shutdown message from our counterparty for channel {}{}.",
5958 if chan.sent_shutdown() { " after we initiated shutdown" } else { "" });
5961 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
5962 let (shutdown, monitor_update_opt, htlcs) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
5963 chan.shutdown(&self.signer_provider, &peer_state.latest_features, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
5964 dropped_htlcs = htlcs;
5966 if let Some(msg) = shutdown {
5967 // We can send the `shutdown` message before updating the `ChannelMonitor`
5968 // here as we don't need the monitor update to complete until we send a
5969 // `shutdown_signed`, which we'll delay if we're pending a monitor update.
5970 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
5971 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
5976 // Update the monitor with the shutdown script if necessary.
5977 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
5978 break handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo_opt.unwrap(), monitor_update,
5979 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ());
5984 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
5987 for htlc_source in dropped_htlcs.drain(..) {
5988 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id.clone()), channel_id: msg.channel_id };
5989 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
5990 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source.0, &htlc_source.1, &reason, receiver);
5996 fn internal_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
5997 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
5998 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6000 debug_assert!(false);
6001 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6003 let (tx, chan_option) = {
6004 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6005 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6006 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id.clone()) {
6007 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6008 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6009 let (closing_signed, tx) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &msg), chan_phase_entry);
6010 if let Some(msg) = closing_signed {
6011 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6012 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6017 // We're done with this channel, we've got a signed closing transaction and
6018 // will send the closing_signed back to the remote peer upon return. This
6019 // also implies there are no pending HTLCs left on the channel, so we can
6020 // fully delete it from tracking (the channel monitor is still around to
6021 // watch for old state broadcasts)!
6022 (tx, Some(remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry)))
6023 } else { (tx, None) }
6025 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6026 "Got a closing_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6029 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6032 if let Some(broadcast_tx) = tx {
6033 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(broadcast_tx));
6034 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&broadcast_tx]);
6036 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = chan_option {
6037 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6038 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6039 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6040 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6044 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6049 fn internal_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6050 //TODO: BOLT 4 points out a specific attack where a peer may re-send an onion packet and
6051 //determine the state of the payment based on our response/if we forward anything/the time
6052 //we take to respond. We should take care to avoid allowing such an attack.
6054 //TODO: There exists a further attack where a node may garble the onion data, forward it to
6055 //us repeatedly garbled in different ways, and compare our error messages, which are
6056 //encrypted with the same key. It's not immediately obvious how to usefully exploit that,
6057 //but we should prevent it anyway.
6059 let decoded_hop_res = self.decode_update_add_htlc_onion(msg);
6060 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6061 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6063 debug_assert!(false);
6064 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6066 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6067 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6068 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6069 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6070 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6071 let pending_forward_info = match decoded_hop_res {
6072 Ok((next_hop, shared_secret, next_packet_pk_opt)) =>
6073 self.construct_pending_htlc_status(msg, shared_secret, next_hop,
6074 chan.context.config().accept_underpaying_htlcs, next_packet_pk_opt),
6075 Err(e) => PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(e)
6077 let create_pending_htlc_status = |chan: &Channel<SP>, pending_forward_info: PendingHTLCStatus, error_code: u16| {
6078 // If the update_add is completely bogus, the call will Err and we will close,
6079 // but if we've sent a shutdown and they haven't acknowledged it yet, we just
6080 // want to reject the new HTLC and fail it backwards instead of forwarding.
6081 match pending_forward_info {
6082 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(PendingHTLCInfo { ref incoming_shared_secret, .. }) => {
6083 let reason = if (error_code & 0x1000) != 0 {
6084 let (real_code, error_data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(error_code, chan);
6085 HTLCFailReason::reason(real_code, error_data)
6087 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(error_code)
6088 }.get_encrypted_failure_packet(incoming_shared_secret, &None);
6089 let msg = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
6090 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
6091 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
6094 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg))
6096 _ => pending_forward_info
6099 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_add_htlc(&msg, pending_forward_info, create_pending_htlc_status, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6101 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6102 "Got an update_add_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6105 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6110 fn internal_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6112 let (htlc_source, forwarded_htlc_value) = {
6113 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6114 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6116 debug_assert!(false);
6117 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6119 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6120 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6121 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6122 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6123 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6124 let res = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fulfill_htlc(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6125 funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().expect("We won't accept a fulfill until funded");
6128 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6129 "Got an update_fulfill_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6132 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6135 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_source, msg.payment_preimage.clone(), Some(forwarded_htlc_value), false, funding_txo);
6139 fn internal_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6140 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6141 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6143 debug_assert!(false);
6144 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6146 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6147 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6148 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6149 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6150 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6151 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::from_msg(msg)), chan_phase_entry);
6153 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6154 "Got an update_fail_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6157 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6162 fn internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6163 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6164 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6166 debug_assert!(false);
6167 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6169 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6170 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6171 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6172 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6173 if (msg.failure_code & 0x8000) == 0 {
6174 let chan_err: ChannelError = ChannelError::Close("Got update_fail_malformed_htlc with BADONION not set".to_owned());
6175 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(chan_err), chan_phase_entry);
6177 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6178 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fail_malformed_htlc(&msg, HTLCFailReason::reason(msg.failure_code, msg.sha256_of_onion.to_vec())), chan_phase_entry);
6180 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6181 "Got an update_fail_malformed_htlc message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6185 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6189 fn internal_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6190 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6191 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6193 debug_assert!(false);
6194 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6196 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6197 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6198 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6199 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6200 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6201 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6202 let monitor_update_opt = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.commitment_signed(&msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6203 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6204 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update, peer_state_lock,
6205 peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6208 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6209 "Got a commitment_signed message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6212 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6217 fn forward_htlcs(&self, per_source_pending_forwards: &mut [(u64, OutPoint, u128, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>)]) {
6218 for &mut (prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_user_channel_id, ref mut pending_forwards) in per_source_pending_forwards {
6219 let mut push_forward_event = false;
6220 let mut new_intercept_events = VecDeque::new();
6221 let mut failed_intercept_forwards = Vec::new();
6222 if !pending_forwards.is_empty() {
6223 for (forward_info, prev_htlc_id) in pending_forwards.drain(..) {
6224 let scid = match forward_info.routing {
6225 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
6226 PendingHTLCRouting::Receive { .. } => 0,
6227 PendingHTLCRouting::ReceiveKeysend { .. } => 0,
6229 // Pull this now to avoid introducing a lock order with `forward_htlcs`.
6230 let is_our_scid = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().contains_key(&scid);
6232 let mut forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6233 let forward_htlcs_empty = forward_htlcs.is_empty();
6234 match forward_htlcs.entry(scid) {
6235 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
6236 entry.get_mut().push(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6237 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info }));
6239 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6240 if !is_our_scid && forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.is_some() &&
6241 fake_scid::is_valid_intercept(&self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, scid, &self.genesis_hash)
6243 let intercept_id = InterceptId(Sha256::hash(&forward_info.incoming_shared_secret).into_inner());
6244 let mut pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
6245 match pending_intercepts.entry(intercept_id) {
6246 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
6247 new_intercept_events.push_back((events::Event::HTLCIntercepted {
6248 requested_next_hop_scid: scid,
6249 payment_hash: forward_info.payment_hash,
6250 inbound_amount_msat: forward_info.incoming_amt_msat.unwrap(),
6251 expected_outbound_amount_msat: forward_info.outgoing_amt_msat,
6254 entry.insert(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6255 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info });
6257 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(_) => {
6258 log_info!(self.logger, "Failed to forward incoming HTLC: detected duplicate intercepted payment over short channel id {}", scid);
6259 let htlc_source = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
6260 short_channel_id: prev_short_channel_id,
6261 user_channel_id: Some(prev_user_channel_id),
6262 outpoint: prev_funding_outpoint,
6263 htlc_id: prev_htlc_id,
6264 incoming_packet_shared_secret: forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
6265 phantom_shared_secret: None,
6268 failed_intercept_forwards.push((htlc_source, forward_info.payment_hash,
6269 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 10),
6270 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid: scid },
6275 // We don't want to generate a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if only intercepted
6276 // payments are being processed.
6277 if forward_htlcs_empty {
6278 push_forward_event = true;
6280 entry.insert(vec!(HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(PendingAddHTLCInfo {
6281 prev_short_channel_id, prev_funding_outpoint, prev_htlc_id, prev_user_channel_id, forward_info })));
6288 for (htlc_source, payment_hash, failure_reason, destination) in failed_intercept_forwards.drain(..) {
6289 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_source, &payment_hash, &failure_reason, destination);
6292 if !new_intercept_events.is_empty() {
6293 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6294 events.append(&mut new_intercept_events);
6296 if push_forward_event { self.push_pending_forwards_ev() }
6300 fn push_pending_forwards_ev(&self) {
6301 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6302 let is_processing_events = self.pending_events_processor.load(Ordering::Acquire);
6303 let num_forward_events = pending_events.iter().filter(|(ev, _)|
6304 if let events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable { .. } = ev { true } else { false }
6306 // We only want to push a PendingHTLCsForwardable event if no others are queued. Processing
6307 // events is done in batches and they are not removed until we're done processing each
6308 // batch. Since handling a `PendingHTLCsForwardable` event will call back into the
6309 // `ChannelManager`, we'll still see the original forwarding event not removed. Phantom
6310 // payments will need an additional forwarding event before being claimed to make them look
6311 // real by taking more time.
6312 if (is_processing_events && num_forward_events <= 1) || num_forward_events < 1 {
6313 pending_events.push_back((Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
6314 time_forwardable: Duration::from_millis(MIN_HTLC_RELAY_HOLDING_CELL_MILLIS),
6319 /// Checks whether [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s generated by the receipt of a remote
6320 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] should be held for the given channel until some other action
6321 /// completes. Note that this needs to happen in the same [`PeerState`] mutex as any release of
6322 /// the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in question.
6323 fn raa_monitor_updates_held(&self,
6324 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: &BTreeMap<ChannelId, Vec<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>>,
6325 channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey
6327 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6328 .get(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).map(|v| !v.is_empty()).unwrap_or(false)
6329 || self.pending_events.lock().unwrap().iter().any(|(_, action)| {
6330 action == &Some(EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
6331 channel_funding_outpoint,
6332 counterparty_node_id,
6337 fn internal_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6338 let (htlcs_to_fail, res) = {
6339 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6340 let mut peer_state_lock = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6342 debug_assert!(false);
6343 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6344 }).map(|mtx| mtx.lock().unwrap())?;
6345 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6346 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6347 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6348 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6349 let funding_txo_opt = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6350 let mon_update_blocked = if let Some(funding_txo) = funding_txo_opt {
6351 self.raa_monitor_updates_held(
6352 &peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates, funding_txo,
6353 *counterparty_node_id)
6355 let (htlcs_to_fail, monitor_update_opt) = try_chan_phase_entry!(self,
6356 chan.revoke_and_ack(&msg, &self.fee_estimator, &self.logger, mon_update_blocked), chan_phase_entry);
6357 let res = if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_update_opt {
6358 let funding_txo = funding_txo_opt
6359 .expect("Funding outpoint must have been set for RAA handling to succeed");
6360 handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo, monitor_update,
6361 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry).map(|_| ())
6363 (htlcs_to_fail, res)
6365 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6366 "Got a revoke_and_ack message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6369 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6372 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(htlcs_to_fail, msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id);
6376 fn internal_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6377 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6378 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6380 debug_assert!(false);
6381 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6383 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6384 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6385 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6386 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6387 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6388 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.update_fee(&self.fee_estimator, &msg, &self.logger), chan_phase_entry);
6390 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6391 "Got an update_fee message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6394 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6399 fn internal_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6400 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6401 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6403 debug_assert!(false);
6404 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6406 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6407 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6408 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6409 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6410 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6411 if !chan.context.is_usable() {
6412 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::from_no_close(LightningError{err: "Got an announcement_signatures before we were ready for it".to_owned(), action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError}));
6415 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
6416 msg: try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.announcement_signatures(
6417 &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash.clone(), self.best_block.read().unwrap().height(),
6418 msg, &self.default_configuration
6419 ), chan_phase_entry),
6420 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
6421 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
6422 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(chan).unwrap()),
6425 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6426 "Got an announcement_signatures message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6429 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6434 /// Returns ShouldPersist if anything changed, otherwise either SkipPersist or an Err.
6435 fn internal_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<NotifyOption, MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6436 let (chan_counterparty_node_id, chan_id) = match self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().get(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
6437 Some((cp_id, chan_id)) => (cp_id.clone(), chan_id.clone()),
6439 // It's not a local channel
6440 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6443 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6444 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(&chan_counterparty_node_id);
6445 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() {
6446 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6448 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
6449 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6450 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(chan_id) {
6451 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6452 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6453 if chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id() != *counterparty_node_id {
6454 if chan.context.should_announce() {
6455 // If the announcement is about a channel of ours which is public, some
6456 // other peer may simply be forwarding all its gossip to us. Don't provide
6457 // a scary-looking error message and return Ok instead.
6458 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6460 return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close("Got a channel_update for a channel from the wrong node - it shouldn't know about our private channels!".to_owned(), chan_id));
6462 let were_node_one = self.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id().serialize()[..];
6463 let msg_from_node_one = msg.contents.flags & 1 == 0;
6464 if were_node_one == msg_from_node_one {
6465 return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist);
6467 log_debug!(self.logger, "Received channel_update for channel {}.", chan_id);
6468 try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_update(&msg), chan_phase_entry);
6471 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6472 "Got a channel_update for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6475 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Ok(NotifyOption::SkipPersist)
6477 Ok(NotifyOption::DoPersist)
6480 fn internal_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(), MsgHandleErrInternal> {
6482 let need_lnd_workaround = {
6483 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6485 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id)
6487 debug_assert!(false);
6488 MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id)
6490 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6491 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6492 match peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(msg.channel_id) {
6493 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) => {
6494 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
6495 // Currently, we expect all holding cell update_adds to be dropped on peer
6496 // disconnect, so Channel's reestablish will never hand us any holding cell
6497 // freed HTLCs to fail backwards. If in the future we no longer drop pending
6498 // add-HTLCs on disconnect, we may be handed HTLCs to fail backwards here.
6499 let responses = try_chan_phase_entry!(self, chan.channel_reestablish(
6500 msg, &self.logger, &self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash,
6501 &self.default_configuration, &*self.best_block.read().unwrap()), chan_phase_entry);
6502 let mut channel_update = None;
6503 if let Some(msg) = responses.shutdown_msg {
6504 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
6505 node_id: counterparty_node_id.clone(),
6508 } else if chan.context.is_usable() {
6509 // If the channel is in a usable state (ie the channel is not being shut
6510 // down), send a unicast channel_update to our counterparty to make sure
6511 // they have the latest channel parameters.
6512 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(chan) {
6513 channel_update = Some(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
6514 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6519 let need_lnd_workaround = chan.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006.take();
6520 htlc_forwards = self.handle_channel_resumption(
6521 &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events, chan, responses.raa, responses.commitment_update, responses.order,
6522 Vec::new(), None, responses.channel_ready, responses.announcement_sigs);
6523 if let Some(upd) = channel_update {
6524 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(upd);
6528 return try_chan_phase_entry!(self, Err(ChannelError::Close(
6529 "Got a channel_reestablish message for an unfunded channel!".into())), chan_phase_entry);
6532 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(_) => return Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(format!("Got a message for a channel from the wrong node! No such channel for the passed counterparty_node_id {}", counterparty_node_id), msg.channel_id))
6536 if let Some(forwards) = htlc_forwards {
6537 self.forward_htlcs(&mut [forwards][..]);
6540 if let Some(channel_ready_msg) = need_lnd_workaround {
6541 self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, &channel_ready_msg)?;
6546 /// Process pending events from the [`chain::Watch`], returning whether any events were processed.
6547 fn process_pending_monitor_events(&self) -> bool {
6548 debug_assert!(self.total_consistency_lock.try_write().is_err()); // Caller holds read lock
6550 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
6551 let mut pending_monitor_events = self.chain_monitor.release_pending_monitor_events();
6552 let has_pending_monitor_events = !pending_monitor_events.is_empty();
6553 for (funding_outpoint, mut monitor_events, counterparty_node_id) in pending_monitor_events.drain(..) {
6554 for monitor_event in monitor_events.drain(..) {
6555 match monitor_event {
6556 MonitorEvent::HTLCEvent(htlc_update) => {
6557 if let Some(preimage) = htlc_update.payment_preimage {
6558 log_trace!(self.logger, "Claiming HTLC with preimage {} from our monitor", &preimage);
6559 self.claim_funds_internal(htlc_update.source, preimage, htlc_update.htlc_value_satoshis.map(|v| v * 1000), true, funding_outpoint);
6561 log_trace!(self.logger, "Failing HTLC with hash {} from our monitor", &htlc_update.payment_hash);
6562 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: counterparty_node_id, channel_id: funding_outpoint.to_channel_id() };
6563 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
6564 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&htlc_update.source, &htlc_update.payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
6567 MonitorEvent::CommitmentTxConfirmed(funding_outpoint) |
6568 MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(funding_outpoint) => {
6569 let counterparty_node_id_opt = match counterparty_node_id {
6570 Some(cp_id) => Some(cp_id),
6572 // TODO: Once we can rely on the counterparty_node_id from the
6573 // monitor event, this and the id_to_peer map should be removed.
6574 let id_to_peer = self.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
6575 id_to_peer.get(&funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()).cloned()
6578 if let Some(counterparty_node_id) = counterparty_node_id_opt {
6579 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6580 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6581 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6582 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6583 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6584 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
6585 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(mut chan) = remove_channel_phase!(self, chan_phase_entry) {
6586 failed_channels.push(chan.context.force_shutdown(false));
6587 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6588 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6592 let reason = if let MonitorEvent::UpdateFailed(_) = monitor_event {
6593 ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: "Failed to persist ChannelMonitor update during chain sync".to_string() }
6595 ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed
6597 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, reason);
6598 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
6599 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
6600 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage {
6601 msg: msgs::ErrorMessage { channel_id: chan.context.channel_id(), data: "Channel force-closed".to_owned() }
6609 MonitorEvent::Completed { funding_txo, monitor_update_id } => {
6610 self.channel_monitor_updated(&funding_txo, monitor_update_id, counterparty_node_id.as_ref());
6616 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6617 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6620 has_pending_monitor_events
6623 /// In chanmon_consistency_target, we'd like to be able to restore monitor updating without
6624 /// handling all pending events (i.e. not PendingHTLCsForwardable). Thus, we expose monitor
6625 /// update events as a separate process method here.
6627 pub fn process_monitor_events(&self) {
6628 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
6629 self.process_pending_monitor_events();
6632 /// Check the holding cell in each channel and free any pending HTLCs in them if possible.
6633 /// Returns whether there were any updates such as if pending HTLCs were freed or a monitor
6634 /// update was applied.
6635 fn check_free_holding_cells(&self) -> bool {
6636 let mut has_monitor_update = false;
6637 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
6638 let mut handle_errors = Vec::new();
6640 // Walk our list of channels and find any that need to update. Note that when we do find an
6641 // update, if it includes actions that must be taken afterwards, we have to drop the
6642 // per-peer state lock as well as the top level per_peer_state lock. Thus, we loop until we
6643 // manage to go through all our peers without finding a single channel to update.
6645 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6646 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6648 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6649 let peer_state: &mut PeerState<_> = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6650 for (channel_id, chan) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(
6651 |(chan_id, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some((chan_id, chan)) } else { None }
6653 let counterparty_node_id = chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6654 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo();
6655 let (monitor_opt, holding_cell_failed_htlcs) =
6656 chan.maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger);
6657 if !holding_cell_failed_htlcs.is_empty() {
6658 failed_htlcs.push((holding_cell_failed_htlcs, *channel_id, counterparty_node_id));
6660 if let Some(monitor_update) = monitor_opt {
6661 has_monitor_update = true;
6663 let channel_id: ChannelId = *channel_id;
6664 let res = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, funding_txo.unwrap(), monitor_update,
6665 peer_state_lock, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan, MANUALLY_REMOVING,
6666 peer_state.channel_by_id.remove(&channel_id));
6668 handle_errors.push((counterparty_node_id, res));
6670 continue 'peer_loop;
6679 let has_update = has_monitor_update || !failed_htlcs.is_empty() || !handle_errors.is_empty();
6680 for (failures, channel_id, counterparty_node_id) in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
6681 self.fail_holding_cell_htlcs(failures, channel_id, &counterparty_node_id);
6684 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6685 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6691 /// Check whether any channels have finished removing all pending updates after a shutdown
6692 /// exchange and can now send a closing_signed.
6693 /// Returns whether any closing_signed messages were generated.
6694 fn maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed(&self) -> bool {
6695 let mut handle_errors: Vec<(PublicKey, Result<(), _>)> = Vec::new();
6696 let mut has_update = false;
6698 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6700 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6701 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6702 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6703 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
6704 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|channel_id, phase| {
6706 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
6707 match chan.maybe_propose_closing_signed(&self.fee_estimator, &self.logger) {
6708 Ok((msg_opt, tx_opt)) => {
6709 if let Some(msg) = msg_opt {
6711 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned {
6712 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), msg,
6715 if let Some(tx) = tx_opt {
6716 // We're done with this channel. We got a closing_signed and sent back
6717 // a closing_signed with a closing transaction to broadcast.
6718 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&chan) {
6719 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
6724 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure);
6726 log_info!(self.logger, "Broadcasting {}", log_tx!(tx));
6727 self.tx_broadcaster.broadcast_transactions(&[&tx]);
6728 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
6734 let (close_channel, res) = convert_chan_phase_err!(self, e, chan, channel_id, FUNDED_CHANNEL);
6735 handle_errors.push((chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), Err(res)));
6740 _ => true, // Retain unfunded channels if present.
6746 for (counterparty_node_id, err) in handle_errors.drain(..) {
6747 let _ = handle_error!(self, err, counterparty_node_id);
6753 /// Handle a list of channel failures during a block_connected or block_disconnected call,
6754 /// pushing the channel monitor update (if any) to the background events queue and removing the
6756 fn handle_init_event_channel_failures(&self, mut failed_channels: Vec<ShutdownResult>) {
6757 for mut failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
6758 // Either a commitment transactions has been confirmed on-chain or
6759 // Channel::block_disconnected detected that the funding transaction has been
6760 // reorganized out of the main chain.
6761 // We cannot broadcast our latest local state via monitor update (as
6762 // Channel::force_shutdown tries to make us do) as we may still be in initialization,
6763 // so we track the update internally and handle it when the user next calls
6764 // timer_tick_occurred, guaranteeing we're running normally.
6765 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = failure.0.take() {
6766 assert_eq!(update.updates.len(), 1);
6767 if let ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast } = update.updates[0] {
6768 assert!(should_broadcast);
6769 } else { unreachable!(); }
6770 self.pending_background_events.lock().unwrap().push(
6771 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
6772 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
6775 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
6779 /// Gets a payment secret and payment hash for use in an invoice given to a third party wishing
6782 /// This differs from [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] only in that it generates the
6783 /// [`PaymentHash`] and [`PaymentPreimage`] for you.
6785 /// The [`PaymentPreimage`] will ultimately be returned to you in the [`PaymentClaimable`], which
6786 /// will have the [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`] be [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`] with
6787 /// its [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`] field filled in. That should then be
6788 /// passed directly to [`claim_funds`].
6790 /// See [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`] for detailed documentation on behavior and requirements.
6792 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6793 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6797 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6798 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6800 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6802 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6803 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6805 /// [`claim_funds`]: Self::claim_funds
6806 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6807 /// [`PaymentClaimable::purpose`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable::purpose
6808 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment
6809 /// [`PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage`]: events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment::payment_preimage
6810 /// [`create_inbound_payment_for_hash`]: Self::create_inbound_payment_for_hash
6811 pub fn create_inbound_payment(&self, min_value_msat: Option<u64>, invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32,
6812 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta: Option<u16>) -> Result<(PaymentHash, PaymentSecret), ()> {
6813 inbound_payment::create(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, invoice_expiry_delta_secs,
6814 &self.entropy_source, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6815 min_final_cltv_expiry_delta)
6818 /// Gets a [`PaymentSecret`] for a given [`PaymentHash`], for which the payment preimage is
6819 /// stored external to LDK.
6821 /// A [`PaymentClaimable`] event will only be generated if the [`PaymentSecret`] matches a
6822 /// payment secret fetched via this method or [`create_inbound_payment`], and which is at least
6823 /// the `min_value_msat` provided here, if one is provided.
6825 /// The [`PaymentHash`] (and corresponding [`PaymentPreimage`]) should be globally unique, though
6826 /// note that LDK will not stop you from registering duplicate payment hashes for inbound
6829 /// `min_value_msat` should be set if the invoice being generated contains a value. Any payment
6830 /// received for the returned [`PaymentHash`] will be required to be at least `min_value_msat`
6831 /// before a [`PaymentClaimable`] event will be generated, ensuring that we do not provide the
6832 /// sender "proof-of-payment" unless they have paid the required amount.
6834 /// `invoice_expiry_delta_secs` describes the number of seconds that the invoice is valid for
6835 /// in excess of the current time. This should roughly match the expiry time set in the invoice.
6836 /// After this many seconds, we will remove the inbound payment, resulting in any attempts to
6837 /// pay the invoice failing. The BOLT spec suggests 3,600 secs as a default validity time for
6838 /// invoices when no timeout is set.
6840 /// Note that we use block header time to time-out pending inbound payments (with some margin
6841 /// to compensate for the inaccuracy of block header timestamps). Thus, in practice we will
6842 /// accept a payment and generate a [`PaymentClaimable`] event for some time after the expiry.
6843 /// If you need exact expiry semantics, you should enforce them upon receipt of
6844 /// [`PaymentClaimable`].
6846 /// Note that invoices generated for inbound payments should have their `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta`
6847 /// set to at least [`MIN_FINAL_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA`].
6849 /// Note that a malicious eavesdropper can intuit whether an inbound payment was created by
6850 /// `create_inbound_payment` or `create_inbound_payment_for_hash` based on runtime.
6854 /// If you register an inbound payment with this method, then serialize the `ChannelManager`, then
6855 /// deserialize it with a node running 0.0.103 and earlier, the payment will fail to be received.
6857 /// Errors if `min_value_msat` is greater than total bitcoin supply.
6859 /// If `min_final_cltv_expiry_delta` is set to some value, then the payment will not be receivable
6860 /// on versions of LDK prior to 0.0.114.
6862 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6863 /// [`PaymentClaimable`]: events::Event::PaymentClaimable
6864 pub fn create_inbound_payment_for_hash(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, min_value_msat: Option<u64>,
6865 invoice_expiry_delta_secs: u32, min_final_cltv_expiry: Option<u16>) -> Result<PaymentSecret, ()> {
6866 inbound_payment::create_from_hash(&self.inbound_payment_key, min_value_msat, payment_hash,
6867 invoice_expiry_delta_secs, self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64,
6868 min_final_cltv_expiry)
6871 /// Gets an LDK-generated payment preimage from a payment hash and payment secret that were
6872 /// previously returned from [`create_inbound_payment`].
6874 /// [`create_inbound_payment`]: Self::create_inbound_payment
6875 pub fn get_payment_preimage(&self, payment_hash: PaymentHash, payment_secret: PaymentSecret) -> Result<PaymentPreimage, APIError> {
6876 inbound_payment::get_payment_preimage(payment_hash, payment_secret, &self.inbound_payment_key)
6879 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving [phantom node payments]. These fake scids
6880 /// are used when constructing the phantom invoice's route hints.
6882 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6883 pub fn get_phantom_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6884 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6885 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6887 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Phantom.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6888 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6889 match short_to_chan_info.get(&scid_candidate) {
6890 Some(_) => continue,
6891 None => return scid_candidate
6896 /// Gets route hints for use in receiving [phantom node payments].
6898 /// [phantom node payments]: crate::sign::PhantomKeysManager
6899 pub fn get_phantom_route_hints(&self) -> PhantomRouteHints {
6901 channels: self.list_usable_channels(),
6902 phantom_scid: self.get_phantom_scid(),
6903 real_node_pubkey: self.get_our_node_id(),
6907 /// Gets a fake short channel id for use in receiving intercepted payments. These fake scids are
6908 /// used when constructing the route hints for HTLCs intended to be intercepted. See
6909 /// [`ChannelManager::forward_intercepted_htlc`].
6911 /// Note that this method is not guaranteed to return unique values, you may need to call it a few
6912 /// times to get a unique scid.
6913 pub fn get_intercept_scid(&self) -> u64 {
6914 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
6915 let short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap();
6917 let scid_candidate = fake_scid::Namespace::Intercept.get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &self.genesis_hash, &self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, &self.entropy_source);
6918 // Ensure the generated scid doesn't conflict with a real channel.
6919 if short_to_chan_info.contains_key(&scid_candidate) { continue }
6920 return scid_candidate
6924 /// Gets inflight HTLC information by processing pending outbound payments that are in
6925 /// our channels. May be used during pathfinding to account for in-use channel liquidity.
6926 pub fn compute_inflight_htlcs(&self) -> InFlightHtlcs {
6927 let mut inflight_htlcs = InFlightHtlcs::new();
6929 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6930 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
6931 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
6932 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
6933 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(
6934 |phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }
6936 for (htlc_source, _) in chan.inflight_htlc_sources() {
6937 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { path, .. } = htlc_source {
6938 inflight_htlcs.process_path(path, self.get_our_node_id());
6947 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
6948 pub fn get_and_clear_pending_events(&self) -> Vec<events::Event> {
6949 let events = core::cell::RefCell::new(Vec::new());
6950 let event_handler = |event: events::Event| events.borrow_mut().push(event);
6951 self.process_pending_events(&event_handler);
6955 #[cfg(feature = "_test_utils")]
6956 pub fn push_pending_event(&self, event: events::Event) {
6957 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6958 events.push_back((event, None));
6962 pub fn pop_pending_event(&self) -> Option<events::Event> {
6963 let mut events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
6964 events.pop_front().map(|(e, _)| e)
6968 pub fn has_pending_payments(&self) -> bool {
6969 self.pending_outbound_payments.has_pending_payments()
6973 pub fn clear_pending_payments(&self) {
6974 self.pending_outbound_payments.clear_pending_payments()
6977 /// When something which was blocking a channel from updating its [`ChannelMonitor`] (e.g. an
6978 /// [`Event`] being handled) completes, this should be called to restore the channel to normal
6979 /// operation. It will double-check that nothing *else* is also blocking the same channel from
6980 /// making progress and then let any blocked [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s fly.
6981 fn handle_monitor_update_release(&self, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_funding_outpoint: OutPoint, mut completed_blocker: Option<RAAMonitorUpdateBlockingAction>) {
6982 let mut errors = Vec::new();
6984 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
6985 if let Some(peer_state_mtx) = per_peer_state.get(&counterparty_node_id) {
6986 let mut peer_state_lck = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
6987 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lck;
6989 if let Some(blocker) = completed_blocker.take() {
6990 // Only do this on the first iteration of the loop.
6991 if let Some(blockers) = peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
6992 .get_mut(&channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id())
6994 blockers.retain(|iter| iter != &blocker);
6998 if self.raa_monitor_updates_held(&peer_state.actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates,
6999 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id) {
7000 // Check that, while holding the peer lock, we don't have anything else
7001 // blocking monitor updates for this channel. If we do, release the monitor
7002 // update(s) when those blockers complete.
7003 log_trace!(self.logger, "Delaying monitor unlock for channel {} as another channel's mon update needs to complete first",
7004 &channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7008 if let hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut chan_phase_entry) = peer_state.channel_by_id.entry(channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id()) {
7009 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = chan_phase_entry.get_mut() {
7010 debug_assert_eq!(chan.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap(), channel_funding_outpoint);
7011 if let Some((monitor_update, further_update_exists)) = chan.unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update() {
7012 log_debug!(self.logger, "Unlocking monitor updating for channel {} and updating monitor",
7013 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7014 if let Err(e) = handle_new_monitor_update!(self, channel_funding_outpoint, monitor_update,
7015 peer_state_lck, peer_state, per_peer_state, chan_phase_entry)
7017 errors.push((e, counterparty_node_id));
7019 if further_update_exists {
7020 // If there are more `ChannelMonitorUpdate`s to process, restart at the
7025 log_trace!(self.logger, "Unlocked monitor updating for channel {} without monitors to update",
7026 channel_funding_outpoint.to_channel_id());
7031 log_debug!(self.logger,
7032 "Got a release post-RAA monitor update for peer {} but the channel is gone",
7033 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7037 for (err, counterparty_node_id) in errors {
7038 let res = Err::<(), _>(err);
7039 let _ = handle_error!(self, res, counterparty_node_id);
7043 fn handle_post_event_actions(&self, actions: Vec<EventCompletionAction>) {
7044 for action in actions {
7046 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
7047 channel_funding_outpoint, counterparty_node_id
7049 self.handle_monitor_update_release(counterparty_node_id, channel_funding_outpoint, None);
7055 /// Processes any events asynchronously in the order they were generated since the last call
7056 /// using the given event handler.
7058 /// See the trait-level documentation of [`EventsProvider`] for requirements.
7059 pub async fn process_pending_events_async<Future: core::future::Future, H: Fn(Event) -> Future>(
7063 process_events_body!(self, ev, { handler(ev).await });
7067 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> MessageSendEventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7069 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7070 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7071 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7072 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7073 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7074 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7078 /// Returns `MessageSendEvent`s strictly ordered per-peer, in the order they were generated.
7079 /// The returned array will contain `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers if
7080 /// `MessageSendEvent`s to more than one peer exists, but `MessageSendEvent`s to the same peer
7081 /// is always placed next to each other.
7083 /// Note that that while `MessageSendEvent`s are strictly ordered per-peer, the peer order for
7084 /// the chunks of `MessageSendEvent`s for different peers is random. I.e. if the array contains
7085 /// `MessageSendEvent`s for both `node_a` and `node_b`, the `MessageSendEvent`s for `node_a`
7086 /// will randomly be placed first or last in the returned array.
7088 /// Note that even though `BroadcastChannelAnnouncement` and `BroadcastChannelUpdate`
7089 /// `MessageSendEvent`s are intended to be broadcasted to all peers, they will be pleaced among
7090 /// the `MessageSendEvent`s to the specific peer they were generated under.
7091 fn get_and_clear_pending_msg_events(&self) -> Vec<MessageSendEvent> {
7092 let events = RefCell::new(Vec::new());
7093 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7094 let mut result = self.process_background_events();
7096 // TODO: This behavior should be documented. It's unintuitive that we query
7097 // ChannelMonitors when clearing other events.
7098 if self.process_pending_monitor_events() {
7099 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7102 if self.check_free_holding_cells() {
7103 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7105 if self.maybe_generate_initial_closing_signed() {
7106 result = NotifyOption::DoPersist;
7109 let mut pending_events = Vec::new();
7110 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7111 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7112 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7113 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7114 if peer_state.pending_msg_events.len() > 0 {
7115 pending_events.append(&mut peer_state.pending_msg_events);
7119 if !pending_events.is_empty() {
7120 events.replace(pending_events);
7129 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> EventsProvider for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7131 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7132 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7133 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7134 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7135 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7136 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7140 /// Processes events that must be periodically handled.
7142 /// An [`EventHandler`] may safely call back to the provider in order to handle an event.
7143 /// However, it must not call [`Writeable::write`] as doing so would result in a deadlock.
7144 fn process_pending_events<H: Deref>(&self, handler: H) where H::Target: EventHandler {
7146 process_events_body!(self, ev, handler.handle_event(ev));
7150 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Listen for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7152 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7153 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7154 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7155 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7156 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7157 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7161 fn filtered_block_connected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7163 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
7164 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.prev_blockhash,
7165 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected header must build on the last connected header");
7166 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height - 1,
7167 "Blocks must be connected in chain-order - the connected block height must be one greater than the previous height");
7170 self.transactions_confirmed(header, txdata, height);
7171 self.best_block_updated(header, height);
7174 fn block_disconnected(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7175 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7176 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7177 let new_height = height - 1;
7179 let mut best_block = self.best_block.write().unwrap();
7180 assert_eq!(best_block.block_hash(), header.block_hash(),
7181 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected header must be the last connected header");
7182 assert_eq!(best_block.height(), height,
7183 "Blocks must be disconnected in chain-order - the disconnected block must have the correct height");
7184 *best_block = BestBlock::new(header.prev_blockhash, new_height)
7187 self.do_chain_event(Some(new_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(new_height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7191 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> chain::Confirm for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7193 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7194 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7195 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7196 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7197 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7198 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7202 fn transactions_confirmed(&self, header: &BlockHeader, txdata: &TransactionData, height: u32) {
7203 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7204 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7205 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7207 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7208 log_trace!(self.logger, "{} transactions included in block {} at height {} provided", txdata.len(), block_hash, height);
7210 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7211 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7212 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.transactions_confirmed(&block_hash, height, txdata, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger)
7213 .map(|(a, b)| (a, Vec::new(), b)));
7215 let last_best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7216 if height < last_best_block_height {
7217 let timestamp = self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7218 self.do_chain_event(Some(last_best_block_height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(last_best_block_height, timestamp as u32, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7222 fn best_block_updated(&self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32) {
7223 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7224 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7225 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7227 let block_hash = header.block_hash();
7228 log_trace!(self.logger, "New best block: {} at height {}", block_hash, height);
7230 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7231 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7232 *self.best_block.write().unwrap() = BestBlock::new(block_hash, height);
7234 self.do_chain_event(Some(height), |channel| channel.best_block_updated(height, header.time, self.genesis_hash.clone(), &self.node_signer, &self.default_configuration, &self.logger));
7236 macro_rules! max_time {
7237 ($timestamp: expr) => {
7239 // Update $timestamp to be the max of its current value and the block
7240 // timestamp. This should keep us close to the current time without relying on
7241 // having an explicit local time source.
7242 // Just in case we end up in a race, we loop until we either successfully
7243 // update $timestamp or decide we don't need to.
7244 let old_serial = $timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire);
7245 if old_serial >= header.time as usize { break; }
7246 if $timestamp.compare_exchange(old_serial, header.time as usize, Ordering::AcqRel, Ordering::Relaxed).is_ok() {
7252 max_time!(self.highest_seen_timestamp);
7253 let mut payment_secrets = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
7254 payment_secrets.retain(|_, inbound_payment| {
7255 inbound_payment.expiry_time > header.time as u64
7259 fn get_relevant_txids(&self) -> Vec<(Txid, Option<BlockHash>)> {
7260 let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(self.short_to_chan_info.read().unwrap().len());
7261 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().iter() {
7262 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7263 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7264 for chan in peer_state.channel_by_id.values().filter_map(|phase| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else { None }) {
7265 if let (Some(funding_txo), Some(block_hash)) = (chan.context.get_funding_txo(), chan.context.get_funding_tx_confirmed_in()) {
7266 res.push((funding_txo.txid, Some(block_hash)));
7273 fn transaction_unconfirmed(&self, txid: &Txid) {
7274 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock,
7275 &self.persistence_notifier, || -> NotifyOption { NotifyOption::DoPersist });
7276 self.do_chain_event(None, |channel| {
7277 if let Some(funding_txo) = channel.context.get_funding_txo() {
7278 if funding_txo.txid == *txid {
7279 channel.funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&self.logger).map(|()| (None, Vec::new(), None))
7280 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7281 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new(), None)) }
7286 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7288 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7289 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7290 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7291 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7292 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7293 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7297 /// Calls a function which handles an on-chain event (blocks dis/connected, transactions
7298 /// un/confirmed, etc) on each channel, handling any resulting errors or messages generated by
7300 fn do_chain_event<FN: Fn(&mut Channel<SP>) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>>
7301 (&self, height_opt: Option<u32>, f: FN) {
7302 // Note that we MUST NOT end up calling methods on self.chain_monitor here - we're called
7303 // during initialization prior to the chain_monitor being fully configured in some cases.
7304 // See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
7306 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7307 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
7309 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7310 for (_cp_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
7311 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7312 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7313 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7314 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7316 // Retain unfunded channels.
7317 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(_) | ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(_) => true,
7318 ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) => {
7319 let res = f(channel);
7320 if let Ok((channel_ready_opt, mut timed_out_pending_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) = res {
7321 for (source, payment_hash) in timed_out_pending_htlcs.drain(..) {
7322 let (failure_code, data) = self.get_htlc_inbound_temp_fail_err_and_data(0x1000|14 /* expiry_too_soon */, &channel);
7323 timed_out_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, HTLCFailReason::reason(failure_code, data),
7324 HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()), channel_id: channel.context.channel_id() }));
7326 if let Some(channel_ready) = channel_ready_opt {
7327 send_channel_ready!(self, pending_msg_events, channel, channel_ready);
7328 if channel.context.is_usable() {
7329 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready with private initial channel_update for our counterparty on channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7330 if let Ok(msg) = self.get_channel_update_for_unicast(channel) {
7331 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate {
7332 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7337 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending channel_ready WITHOUT channel_update for {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7342 let mut pending_events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
7343 emit_channel_ready_event!(pending_events, channel);
7346 if let Some(announcement_sigs) = announcement_sigs {
7347 log_trace!(self.logger, "Sending announcement_signatures for channel {}", channel.context.channel_id());
7348 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures {
7349 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7350 msg: announcement_sigs,
7352 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7353 if let Some(announcement) = channel.get_signed_channel_announcement(&self.node_signer, self.genesis_hash, height, &self.default_configuration) {
7354 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement {
7356 // Note that announcement_signatures fails if the channel cannot be announced,
7357 // so get_channel_update_for_broadcast will never fail by the time we get here.
7358 update_msg: Some(self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(channel).unwrap()),
7363 if channel.is_our_channel_ready() {
7364 if let Some(real_scid) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
7365 // If we sent a 0conf channel_ready, and now have an SCID, we add it
7366 // to the short_to_chan_info map here. Note that we check whether we
7367 // can relay using the real SCID at relay-time (i.e.
7368 // enforce option_scid_alias then), and if the funding tx is ever
7369 // un-confirmed we force-close the channel, ensuring short_to_chan_info
7370 // is always consistent.
7371 let mut short_to_chan_info = self.short_to_chan_info.write().unwrap();
7372 let scid_insert = short_to_chan_info.insert(real_scid, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
7373 assert!(scid_insert.is_none() || scid_insert.unwrap() == (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()),
7374 "SCIDs should never collide - ensure you weren't behind by a full {} blocks when creating channels",
7375 fake_scid::MAX_SCID_BLOCKS_FROM_NOW);
7378 } else if let Err(reason) = res {
7379 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &channel.context);
7380 // It looks like our counterparty went on-chain or funding transaction was
7381 // reorged out of the main chain. Close the channel.
7382 failed_channels.push(channel.context.force_shutdown(true));
7383 if let Ok(update) = self.get_channel_update_for_broadcast(&channel) {
7384 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate {
7388 let reason_message = format!("{}", reason);
7389 self.issue_channel_close_events(&channel.context, reason);
7390 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7391 node_id: channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7392 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg: msgs::ErrorMessage {
7393 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
7394 data: reason_message,
7406 if let Some(height) = height_opt {
7407 self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap().claimable_payments.retain(|payment_hash, payment| {
7408 payment.htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
7409 // If height is approaching the number of blocks we think it takes us to get
7410 // our commitment transaction confirmed before the HTLC expires, plus the
7411 // number of blocks we generally consider it to take to do a commitment update,
7412 // just give up on it and fail the HTLC.
7413 if height >= htlc.cltv_expiry - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7414 let mut htlc_msat_height_data = htlc.value.to_be_bytes().to_vec();
7415 htlc_msat_height_data.extend_from_slice(&height.to_be_bytes());
7417 timed_out_htlcs.push((HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(htlc.prev_hop.clone()), payment_hash.clone(),
7418 HTLCFailReason::reason(0x4000 | 15, htlc_msat_height_data),
7419 HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: payment_hash.clone() }));
7423 !payment.htlcs.is_empty() // Only retain this entry if htlcs has at least one entry.
7426 let mut intercepted_htlcs = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
7427 intercepted_htlcs.retain(|_, htlc| {
7428 if height >= htlc.forward_info.outgoing_cltv_value - HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER {
7429 let prev_hop_data = HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(HTLCPreviousHopData {
7430 short_channel_id: htlc.prev_short_channel_id,
7431 user_channel_id: Some(htlc.prev_user_channel_id),
7432 htlc_id: htlc.prev_htlc_id,
7433 incoming_packet_shared_secret: htlc.forward_info.incoming_shared_secret,
7434 phantom_shared_secret: None,
7435 outpoint: htlc.prev_funding_outpoint,
7438 let requested_forward_scid /* intercept scid */ = match htlc.forward_info.routing {
7439 PendingHTLCRouting::Forward { short_channel_id, .. } => short_channel_id,
7440 _ => unreachable!(),
7442 timed_out_htlcs.push((prev_hop_data, htlc.forward_info.payment_hash,
7443 HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x2000 | 2),
7444 HTLCDestination::InvalidForward { requested_forward_scid }));
7445 log_trace!(self.logger, "Timing out intercepted HTLC with requested forward scid {}", requested_forward_scid);
7451 self.handle_init_event_channel_failures(failed_channels);
7453 for (source, payment_hash, reason, destination) in timed_out_htlcs.drain(..) {
7454 self.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, destination);
7458 /// Gets a [`Future`] that completes when this [`ChannelManager`] needs to be persisted.
7460 /// Note that callbacks registered on the [`Future`] MUST NOT call back into this
7461 /// [`ChannelManager`] and should instead register actions to be taken later.
7463 pub fn get_persistable_update_future(&self) -> Future {
7464 self.persistence_notifier.get_future()
7467 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
7468 pub fn get_persistence_condvar_value(&self) -> bool {
7469 self.persistence_notifier.notify_pending()
7472 /// Gets the latest best block which was connected either via the [`chain::Listen`] or
7473 /// [`chain::Confirm`] interfaces.
7474 pub fn current_best_block(&self) -> BestBlock {
7475 self.best_block.read().unwrap().clone()
7478 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7479 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7480 pub fn node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7481 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7484 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7485 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7487 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7488 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7489 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7490 pub fn invoice_features(&self) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7491 provided_invoice_features(&self.default_configuration)
7494 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7495 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7496 pub fn channel_features(&self) -> ChannelFeatures {
7497 provided_channel_features(&self.default_configuration)
7500 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7501 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7502 pub fn channel_type_features(&self) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7503 provided_channel_type_features(&self.default_configuration)
7506 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7507 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7508 pub fn init_features(&self) -> InitFeatures {
7509 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7513 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
7514 ChannelMessageHandler for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
7516 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
7517 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
7518 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7519 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
7520 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
7521 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7525 fn handle_open_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel) {
7526 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7527 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_open_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7530 fn handle_open_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2) {
7531 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7532 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7533 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7536 fn handle_accept_channel(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel) {
7537 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7538 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_accept_channel(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7541 fn handle_accept_channel_v2(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannelV2) {
7542 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7543 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7544 msg.temporary_channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7547 fn handle_funding_created(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) {
7548 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7549 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_created(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7552 fn handle_funding_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) {
7553 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7554 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_funding_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7557 fn handle_channel_ready(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady) {
7558 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7559 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_ready(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7562 fn handle_shutdown(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) {
7563 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7564 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_shutdown(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7567 fn handle_closing_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) {
7568 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7569 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_closing_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7572 fn handle_update_add_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC) {
7573 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7574 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_add_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7577 fn handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) {
7578 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7579 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fulfill_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7582 fn handle_update_fail_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC) {
7583 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7584 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7587 fn handle_update_fail_malformed_htlc(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC) {
7588 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7589 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fail_malformed_htlc(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7592 fn handle_commitment_signed(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned) {
7593 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7594 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_commitment_signed(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7597 fn handle_revoke_and_ack(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK) {
7598 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7599 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_revoke_and_ack(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7602 fn handle_update_fee(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) {
7603 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7604 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_update_fee(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7607 fn handle_announcement_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) {
7608 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7609 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_announcement_signatures(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7612 fn handle_channel_update(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) {
7613 PersistenceNotifierGuard::optionally_notify(&self.total_consistency_lock, &self.persistence_notifier, || {
7614 let force_persist = self.process_background_events();
7615 if let Ok(persist) = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_update(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id) {
7616 if force_persist == NotifyOption::DoPersist { NotifyOption::DoPersist } else { persist }
7618 NotifyOption::SkipPersist
7623 fn handle_channel_reestablish(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) {
7624 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7625 let _ = handle_error!(self, self.internal_channel_reestablish(counterparty_node_id, msg), *counterparty_node_id);
7628 fn peer_disconnected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey) {
7629 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7630 let mut failed_channels = Vec::new();
7631 let mut per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7633 log_debug!(self.logger, "Marking channels with {} disconnected and generating channel_updates.",
7634 log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7635 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7636 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7637 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7638 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7639 peer_state.channel_by_id.retain(|_, phase| {
7640 let context = match phase {
7641 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => {
7642 chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&self.logger);
7643 // We only retain funded channels that are not shutdown.
7644 if !chan.is_shutdown() {
7649 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => {
7652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => {
7657 // Clean up for removal.
7658 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &context);
7659 self.issue_channel_close_events(&context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7662 peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7663 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7664 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7667 peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.retain(|_, chan| {
7668 update_maps_on_chan_removal!(self, &chan.context);
7669 self.issue_channel_close_events(&chan.context, ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer);
7672 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7673 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7674 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7675 pending_msg_events.retain(|msg| {
7677 // V1 Channel Establishment
7678 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel { .. } => false,
7679 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel { .. } => false,
7680 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated { .. } => false,
7681 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned { .. } => false,
7682 // V2 Channel Establishment
7683 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7684 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannelV2 { .. } => false,
7685 // Common Channel Establishment
7686 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { .. } => false,
7687 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendAnnouncementSignatures { .. } => false,
7688 // Interactive Transaction Construction
7689 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddInput { .. } => false,
7690 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAddOutput { .. } => false,
7691 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveInput { .. } => false,
7692 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxRemoveOutput { .. } => false,
7693 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxComplete { .. } => false,
7694 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxSignatures { .. } => false,
7695 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxInitRbf { .. } => false,
7696 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAckRbf { .. } => false,
7697 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendTxAbort { .. } => false,
7698 // Channel Operations
7699 &events::MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { .. } => false,
7700 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK { .. } => false,
7701 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned { .. } => false,
7702 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown { .. } => false,
7703 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish { .. } => false,
7704 &events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError { .. } => false,
7706 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelAnnouncement { .. } => false,
7707 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7708 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => true,
7709 &events::MessageSendEvent::BroadcastNodeAnnouncement { .. } => true,
7710 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => false,
7711 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelRangeQuery { .. } => false,
7712 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendShortIdsQuery { .. } => false,
7713 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendReplyChannelRange { .. } => false,
7714 &events::MessageSendEvent::SendGossipTimestampFilter { .. } => false,
7717 debug_assert!(peer_state.is_connected, "A disconnected peer cannot disconnect");
7718 peer_state.is_connected = false;
7719 peer_state.ok_to_remove(true)
7720 } else { debug_assert!(false, "Unconnected peer disconnected"); true }
7723 per_peer_state.remove(counterparty_node_id);
7725 mem::drop(per_peer_state);
7727 for failure in failed_channels.drain(..) {
7728 self.finish_force_close_channel(failure);
7732 fn peer_connected(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, init_msg: &msgs::Init, inbound: bool) -> Result<(), ()> {
7733 if !init_msg.features.supports_static_remote_key() {
7734 log_debug!(self.logger, "Peer {} does not support static remote key, disconnecting", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7738 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7740 // If we have too many peers connected which don't have funded channels, disconnect the
7741 // peer immediately (as long as it doesn't have funded channels). If we have a bunch of
7742 // unfunded channels taking up space in memory for disconnected peers, we still let new
7743 // peers connect, but we'll reject new channels from them.
7744 let connected_peers_without_funded_channels = self.peers_without_funded_channels(|node| node.is_connected);
7745 let inbound_peer_limited = inbound && connected_peers_without_funded_channels >= MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS;
7748 let mut peer_state_lock = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
7749 match peer_state_lock.entry(counterparty_node_id.clone()) {
7750 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
7751 if inbound_peer_limited {
7754 e.insert(Mutex::new(PeerState {
7755 channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7756 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7757 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7758 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
7759 latest_features: init_msg.features.clone(),
7760 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
7761 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7762 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
7763 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
7767 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(e) => {
7768 let mut peer_state = e.get().lock().unwrap();
7769 peer_state.latest_features = init_msg.features.clone();
7771 let best_block_height = self.best_block.read().unwrap().height();
7772 if inbound_peer_limited &&
7773 Self::unfunded_channel_count(&*peer_state, best_block_height) ==
7774 peer_state.channel_by_id.len()
7779 debug_assert!(!peer_state.is_connected, "A peer shouldn't be connected twice");
7780 peer_state.is_connected = true;
7785 log_debug!(self.logger, "Generating channel_reestablish events for {}", log_pubkey!(counterparty_node_id));
7787 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7788 if let Some(peer_state_mutex) = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id) {
7789 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
7790 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7791 let pending_msg_events = &mut peer_state.pending_msg_events;
7793 peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut().filter_map(|(_, phase)|
7794 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { Some(chan) } else {
7795 // Since unfunded channel maps are cleared upon disconnecting a peer, and they're not persisted
7796 // (so won't be recovered after a crash), they shouldn't exist here and we would never need to
7797 // worry about closing and removing them.
7798 debug_assert!(false);
7802 pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish {
7803 node_id: chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(),
7804 msg: chan.get_channel_reestablish(&self.logger),
7808 //TODO: Also re-broadcast announcement_signatures
7812 fn handle_error(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::ErrorMessage) {
7813 let _persistence_guard = PersistenceNotifierGuard::notify_on_drop(self);
7815 match &msg.data as &str {
7816 "cannot co-op close channel w/ active htlcs"|
7817 "link failed to shutdown" =>
7819 // LND hasn't properly handled shutdown messages ever, and force-closes any time we
7820 // send one while HTLCs are still present. The issue is tracked at
7821 // https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/6039 and has had multiple patches
7822 // to fix it but none so far have managed to land upstream. The issue appears to be
7823 // very low priority for the LND team despite being marked "P1".
7824 // We're not going to bother handling this in a sensible way, instead simply
7825 // repeating the Shutdown message on repeat until morale improves.
7826 if !msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7827 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7828 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7829 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7830 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7831 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(chan)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get(&msg.channel_id) {
7832 if let Some(msg) = chan.get_outbound_shutdown() {
7833 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown {
7834 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7838 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::HandleError {
7839 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7840 action: msgs::ErrorAction::SendWarningMessage {
7841 msg: msgs::WarningMessage {
7842 channel_id: msg.channel_id,
7843 data: "You appear to be exhibiting LND bug 6039, we'll keep sending you shutdown messages until you handle them correctly".to_owned()
7845 log_level: Level::Trace,
7855 if msg.channel_id.is_zero() {
7856 let channel_ids: Vec<ChannelId> = {
7857 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7858 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7859 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7860 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7861 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7862 // Note that we don't bother generating any events for pre-accept channels -
7863 // they're not considered "channels" yet from the PoV of our events interface.
7864 peer_state.inbound_channel_request_by_id.clear();
7865 peer_state.channel_by_id.keys().cloned()
7866 .chain(peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned())
7867 .chain(peer_state.inbound_v1_channel_by_id.keys().cloned()).collect()
7869 for channel_id in channel_ids {
7870 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7871 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7875 // First check if we can advance the channel type and try again.
7876 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
7877 let peer_state_mutex_opt = per_peer_state.get(counterparty_node_id);
7878 if peer_state_mutex_opt.is_none() { return; }
7879 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex_opt.unwrap().lock().unwrap();
7880 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
7881 if let Some(chan) = peer_state.outbound_v1_channel_by_id.get_mut(&msg.channel_id) {
7882 if let Ok(msg) = chan.maybe_handle_error_without_close(self.genesis_hash, &self.fee_estimator) {
7883 peer_state.pending_msg_events.push(events::MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel {
7884 node_id: *counterparty_node_id,
7892 // Untrusted messages from peer, we throw away the error if id points to a non-existent channel
7893 let _ = self.force_close_channel_with_peer(&msg.channel_id, counterparty_node_id, Some(&msg.data), true);
7897 fn provided_node_features(&self) -> NodeFeatures {
7898 provided_node_features(&self.default_configuration)
7901 fn provided_init_features(&self, _their_init_features: &PublicKey) -> InitFeatures {
7902 provided_init_features(&self.default_configuration)
7905 fn get_genesis_hashes(&self) -> Option<Vec<ChainHash>> {
7906 Some(vec![ChainHash::from(&self.genesis_hash[..])])
7909 fn handle_tx_add_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddInput) {
7910 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7911 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7912 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7915 fn handle_tx_add_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAddOutput) {
7916 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7917 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7918 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7921 fn handle_tx_remove_input(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveInput) {
7922 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7923 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7924 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7927 fn handle_tx_remove_output(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxRemoveOutput) {
7928 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7929 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7930 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7933 fn handle_tx_complete(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxComplete) {
7934 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7935 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7936 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7939 fn handle_tx_signatures(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxSignatures) {
7940 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7941 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7942 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7945 fn handle_tx_init_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxInitRbf) {
7946 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7947 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7948 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7951 fn handle_tx_ack_rbf(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAckRbf) {
7952 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7953 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7954 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7957 fn handle_tx_abort(&self, counterparty_node_id: &PublicKey, msg: &msgs::TxAbort) {
7958 let _: Result<(), _> = handle_error!(self, Err(MsgHandleErrInternal::send_err_msg_no_close(
7959 "Dual-funded channels not supported".to_owned(),
7960 msg.channel_id.clone())), *counterparty_node_id);
7964 /// Fetches the set of [`NodeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7965 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7966 pub(crate) fn provided_node_features(config: &UserConfig) -> NodeFeatures {
7967 let mut node_features = provided_init_features(config).to_context();
7968 node_features.set_keysend_optional();
7972 /// Fetches the set of [`Bolt11InvoiceFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7973 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7975 /// Note that the invoice feature flags can vary depending on if the invoice is a "phantom invoice"
7976 /// or not. Thus, this method is not public.
7977 #[cfg(any(feature = "_test_utils", test))]
7978 pub(crate) fn provided_invoice_features(config: &UserConfig) -> Bolt11InvoiceFeatures {
7979 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7982 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7983 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7984 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelFeatures {
7985 provided_init_features(config).to_context()
7988 /// Fetches the set of [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7989 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7990 pub(crate) fn provided_channel_type_features(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
7991 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&provided_init_features(config))
7994 /// Fetches the set of [`InitFeatures`] flags which are provided by or required by
7995 /// [`ChannelManager`].
7996 pub fn provided_init_features(config: &UserConfig) -> InitFeatures {
7997 // Note that if new features are added here which other peers may (eventually) require, we
7998 // should also add the corresponding (optional) bit to the [`ChannelMessageHandler`] impl for
7999 // [`ErroringMessageHandler`].
8000 let mut features = InitFeatures::empty();
8001 features.set_data_loss_protect_required();
8002 features.set_upfront_shutdown_script_optional();
8003 features.set_variable_length_onion_required();
8004 features.set_static_remote_key_required();
8005 features.set_payment_secret_required();
8006 features.set_basic_mpp_optional();
8007 features.set_wumbo_optional();
8008 features.set_shutdown_any_segwit_optional();
8009 features.set_channel_type_optional();
8010 features.set_scid_privacy_optional();
8011 features.set_zero_conf_optional();
8012 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx {
8013 features.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_optional();
8018 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8019 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
8021 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyForwardingInfo, {
8022 (2, fee_base_msat, required),
8023 (4, fee_proportional_millionths, required),
8024 (6, cltv_expiry_delta, required),
8027 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelCounterparty, {
8028 (2, node_id, required),
8029 (4, features, required),
8030 (6, unspendable_punishment_reserve, required),
8031 (8, forwarding_info, option),
8032 (9, outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8033 (11, outbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8036 impl Writeable for ChannelDetails {
8037 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8038 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8039 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8040 let user_channel_id_low = self.user_channel_id as u64;
8041 let user_channel_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_channel_id >> 64) as u64);
8042 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8043 (1, self.inbound_scid_alias, option),
8044 (2, self.channel_id, required),
8045 (3, self.channel_type, option),
8046 (4, self.counterparty, required),
8047 (5, self.outbound_scid_alias, option),
8048 (6, self.funding_txo, option),
8049 (7, self.config, option),
8050 (8, self.short_channel_id, option),
8051 (9, self.confirmations, option),
8052 (10, self.channel_value_satoshis, required),
8053 (12, self.unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8054 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8055 (16, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required), // Forwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8056 (18, self.outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8057 (19, self.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, required),
8058 (20, self.inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8059 (21, self.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, required),
8060 (22, self.confirmations_required, option),
8061 (24, self.force_close_spend_delay, option),
8062 (26, self.is_outbound, required),
8063 (28, self.is_channel_ready, required),
8064 (30, self.is_usable, required),
8065 (32, self.is_public, required),
8066 (33, self.inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8067 (35, self.inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8068 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8069 (39, self.feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8070 (41, self.channel_shutdown_state, option),
8076 impl Readable for ChannelDetails {
8077 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8078 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8079 (1, inbound_scid_alias, option),
8080 (2, channel_id, required),
8081 (3, channel_type, option),
8082 (4, counterparty, required),
8083 (5, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8084 (6, funding_txo, option),
8085 (7, config, option),
8086 (8, short_channel_id, option),
8087 (9, confirmations, option),
8088 (10, channel_value_satoshis, required),
8089 (12, unspendable_punishment_reserve, option),
8090 (14, user_channel_id_low, required),
8091 (16, _balance_msat, option), // Backwards compatibility for removed balance_msat field.
8092 (18, outbound_capacity_msat, required),
8093 // Note that by the time we get past the required read above, outbound_capacity_msat will be
8094 // filled in, so we can safely unwrap it here.
8095 (19, next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat, (default_value, outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap() as u64)),
8096 (20, inbound_capacity_msat, required),
8097 (21, next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, (default_value, 0)),
8098 (22, confirmations_required, option),
8099 (24, force_close_spend_delay, option),
8100 (26, is_outbound, required),
8101 (28, is_channel_ready, required),
8102 (30, is_usable, required),
8103 (32, is_public, required),
8104 (33, inbound_htlc_minimum_msat, option),
8105 (35, inbound_htlc_maximum_msat, option),
8106 (37, user_channel_id_high_opt, option),
8107 (39, feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, option),
8108 (41, channel_shutdown_state, option),
8111 // `user_channel_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8112 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values.
8113 let user_channel_id_low: u64 = user_channel_id_low.0.unwrap();
8114 let user_channel_id = user_channel_id_low as u128 +
8115 ((user_channel_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0 as u64) as u128) << 64);
8117 let _balance_msat: Option<u64> = _balance_msat;
8121 channel_id: channel_id.0.unwrap(),
8123 counterparty: counterparty.0.unwrap(),
8124 outbound_scid_alias,
8128 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis.0.unwrap(),
8129 unspendable_punishment_reserve,
8131 outbound_capacity_msat: outbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8132 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat.0.unwrap(),
8133 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat.0.unwrap(),
8134 inbound_capacity_msat: inbound_capacity_msat.0.unwrap(),
8135 confirmations_required,
8137 force_close_spend_delay,
8138 is_outbound: is_outbound.0.unwrap(),
8139 is_channel_ready: is_channel_ready.0.unwrap(),
8140 is_usable: is_usable.0.unwrap(),
8141 is_public: is_public.0.unwrap(),
8142 inbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
8143 inbound_htlc_maximum_msat,
8144 feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8145 channel_shutdown_state,
8150 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PhantomRouteHints, {
8151 (2, channels, required_vec),
8152 (4, phantom_scid, required),
8153 (6, real_node_pubkey, required),
8156 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCRouting,
8158 (0, onion_packet, required),
8159 (2, short_channel_id, required),
8162 (0, payment_data, required),
8163 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8164 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8165 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8166 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8168 (2, ReceiveKeysend) => {
8169 (0, payment_preimage, required),
8170 (2, incoming_cltv_expiry, required),
8171 (3, payment_metadata, option),
8172 (4, payment_data, option), // Added in 0.0.116
8173 (5, custom_tlvs, optional_vec),
8177 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingHTLCInfo, {
8178 (0, routing, required),
8179 (2, incoming_shared_secret, required),
8180 (4, payment_hash, required),
8181 (6, outgoing_amt_msat, required),
8182 (8, outgoing_cltv_value, required),
8183 (9, incoming_amt_msat, option),
8184 (10, skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8188 impl Writeable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8189 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8191 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { channel_id, htlc_id, reason }) => {
8193 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8194 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8195 reason.write(writer)?;
8197 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8198 channel_id, htlc_id, sha256_of_onion, failure_code
8201 channel_id.write(writer)?;
8202 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8203 sha256_of_onion.write(writer)?;
8204 failure_code.write(writer)?;
8211 impl Readable for HTLCFailureMsg {
8212 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8213 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8216 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
8217 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8218 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8219 reason: Readable::read(reader)?,
8223 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
8224 channel_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8225 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8226 sha256_of_onion: Readable::read(reader)?,
8227 failure_code: Readable::read(reader)?,
8230 // In versions prior to 0.0.101, HTLCFailureMsg objects were written with type 0 or 1 but
8231 // weren't length-prefixed and thus didn't support reading the TLV stream suffix of the network
8232 // messages contained in the variants.
8233 // In version 0.0.101, support for reading the variants with these types was added, and
8234 // we should migrate to writing these variants when UpdateFailHTLC or
8235 // UpdateFailMalformedHTLC get TLV fields.
8237 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8238 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8239 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8240 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8241 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(res))
8244 let length: BigSize = Readable::read(reader)?;
8245 let mut s = FixedLengthReader::new(reader, length.0);
8246 let res = Readable::read(&mut s)?;
8247 s.eat_remaining()?; // Return ShortRead if there's actually not enough bytes
8248 Ok(HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(res))
8250 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8255 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(PendingHTLCStatus, ;
8260 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCPreviousHopData, {
8261 (0, short_channel_id, required),
8262 (1, phantom_shared_secret, option),
8263 (2, outpoint, required),
8264 (4, htlc_id, required),
8265 (6, incoming_packet_shared_secret, required),
8266 (7, user_channel_id, option),
8269 impl Writeable for ClaimableHTLC {
8270 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8271 let (payment_data, keysend_preimage) = match &self.onion_payload {
8272 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => (_legacy_hop_data.as_ref(), None),
8273 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(preimage) => (None, Some(preimage)),
8275 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8276 (0, self.prev_hop, required),
8277 (1, self.total_msat, required),
8278 (2, self.value, required),
8279 (3, self.sender_intended_value, required),
8280 (4, payment_data, option),
8281 (5, self.total_value_received, option),
8282 (6, self.cltv_expiry, required),
8283 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8284 (10, self.counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8290 impl Readable for ClaimableHTLC {
8291 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8292 _init_and_read_len_prefixed_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8293 (0, prev_hop, required),
8294 (1, total_msat, option),
8295 (2, value_ser, required),
8296 (3, sender_intended_value, option),
8297 (4, payment_data_opt, option),
8298 (5, total_value_received, option),
8299 (6, cltv_expiry, required),
8300 (8, keysend_preimage, option),
8301 (10, counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat, option),
8303 let payment_data: Option<msgs::FinalOnionHopData> = payment_data_opt;
8304 let value = value_ser.0.unwrap();
8305 let onion_payload = match keysend_preimage {
8307 if payment_data.is_some() {
8308 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8310 if total_msat.is_none() {
8311 total_msat = Some(value);
8313 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(p)
8316 if total_msat.is_none() {
8317 if payment_data.is_none() {
8318 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
8320 total_msat = Some(payment_data.as_ref().unwrap().total_msat);
8322 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data: payment_data }
8326 prev_hop: prev_hop.0.unwrap(),
8329 sender_intended_value: sender_intended_value.unwrap_or(value),
8330 total_value_received,
8331 total_msat: total_msat.unwrap(),
8333 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry.0.unwrap(),
8334 counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat,
8339 impl Readable for HTLCSource {
8340 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8341 let id: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8344 let mut session_priv: crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper<SecretKey> = crate::util::ser::RequiredWrapper(None);
8345 let mut first_hop_htlc_msat: u64 = 0;
8346 let mut path_hops = Vec::new();
8347 let mut payment_id = None;
8348 let mut payment_params: Option<PaymentParameters> = None;
8349 let mut blinded_tail: Option<BlindedTail> = None;
8350 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8351 (0, session_priv, required),
8352 (1, payment_id, option),
8353 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8354 (4, path_hops, required_vec),
8355 (5, payment_params, (option: ReadableArgs, 0)),
8356 (6, blinded_tail, option),
8358 if payment_id.is_none() {
8359 // For backwards compat, if there was no payment_id written, use the session_priv bytes
8361 payment_id = Some(PaymentId(*session_priv.0.unwrap().as_ref()));
8363 let path = Path { hops: path_hops, blinded_tail };
8364 if path.hops.len() == 0 {
8365 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8367 if let Some(params) = payment_params.as_mut() {
8368 if let Payee::Clear { ref mut final_cltv_expiry_delta, .. } = params.payee {
8369 if final_cltv_expiry_delta == &0 {
8370 *final_cltv_expiry_delta = path.final_cltv_expiry_delta().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8374 Ok(HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8375 session_priv: session_priv.0.unwrap(),
8376 first_hop_htlc_msat,
8378 payment_id: payment_id.unwrap(),
8381 1 => Ok(HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8382 _ => Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature),
8387 impl Writeable for HTLCSource {
8388 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), crate::io::Error> {
8390 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { ref session_priv, ref first_hop_htlc_msat, ref path, payment_id } => {
8392 let payment_id_opt = Some(payment_id);
8393 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8394 (0, session_priv, required),
8395 (1, payment_id_opt, option),
8396 (2, first_hop_htlc_msat, required),
8397 // 3 was previously used to write a PaymentSecret for the payment.
8398 (4, path.hops, required_vec),
8399 (5, None::<PaymentParameters>, option), // payment_params in LDK versions prior to 0.0.115
8400 (6, path.blinded_tail, option),
8403 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(ref field) => {
8405 field.write(writer)?;
8412 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingAddHTLCInfo, {
8413 (0, forward_info, required),
8414 (1, prev_user_channel_id, (default_value, 0)),
8415 (2, prev_short_channel_id, required),
8416 (4, prev_htlc_id, required),
8417 (6, prev_funding_outpoint, required),
8420 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(HTLCForwardInfo,
8422 (0, htlc_id, required),
8423 (2, err_packet, required),
8428 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingInboundPayment, {
8429 (0, payment_secret, required),
8430 (2, expiry_time, required),
8431 (4, user_payment_id, required),
8432 (6, payment_preimage, required),
8433 (8, min_value_msat, required),
8436 impl<M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref> Writeable for ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8438 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8439 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8440 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8441 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8442 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8443 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8447 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8448 let _consistency_lock = self.total_consistency_lock.write().unwrap();
8450 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8452 self.genesis_hash.write(writer)?;
8454 let best_block = self.best_block.read().unwrap();
8455 best_block.height().write(writer)?;
8456 best_block.block_hash().write(writer)?;
8459 let mut serializable_peer_count: u64 = 0;
8461 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
8462 let mut number_of_funded_channels = 0;
8463 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8464 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8465 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8466 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8467 serializable_peer_count += 1;
8470 number_of_funded_channels += peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter(
8471 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase { chan.context.is_funding_initiated() } else { false }
8475 (number_of_funded_channels as u64).write(writer)?;
8477 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8478 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
8479 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
8480 for channel in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter().filter_map(
8481 |(_, phase)| if let ChannelPhase::Funded(channel) = phase {
8482 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() { Some(channel) } else { None }
8485 channel.write(writer)?;
8491 let forward_htlcs = self.forward_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8492 (forward_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8493 for (short_channel_id, pending_forwards) in forward_htlcs.iter() {
8494 short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8495 (pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8496 for forward in pending_forwards {
8497 forward.write(writer)?;
8502 let per_peer_state = self.per_peer_state.write().unwrap();
8504 let pending_inbound_payments = self.pending_inbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8505 let claimable_payments = self.claimable_payments.lock().unwrap();
8506 let pending_outbound_payments = self.pending_outbound_payments.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap();
8508 let mut htlc_purposes: Vec<&events::PaymentPurpose> = Vec::new();
8509 let mut htlc_onion_fields: Vec<&_> = Vec::new();
8510 (claimable_payments.claimable_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8511 for (payment_hash, payment) in claimable_payments.claimable_payments.iter() {
8512 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8513 (payment.htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8514 for htlc in payment.htlcs.iter() {
8515 htlc.write(writer)?;
8517 htlc_purposes.push(&payment.purpose);
8518 htlc_onion_fields.push(&payment.onion_fields);
8521 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer = None;
8522 let mut peer_states = Vec::new();
8523 for (_, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter() {
8524 // Because we're holding the owning `per_peer_state` write lock here there's no chance
8525 // of a lockorder violation deadlock - no other thread can be holding any
8526 // per_peer_state lock at all.
8527 peer_states.push(peer_state_mutex.unsafe_well_ordered_double_lock_self());
8530 (serializable_peer_count).write(writer)?;
8531 for ((peer_pubkey, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8532 // Peers which we have no channels to should be dropped once disconnected. As we
8533 // disconnect all peers when shutting down and serializing the ChannelManager, we
8534 // consider all peers as disconnected here. There's therefore no need write peers with
8536 if !peer_state.ok_to_remove(false) {
8537 peer_pubkey.write(writer)?;
8538 peer_state.latest_features.write(writer)?;
8539 if !peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions.is_empty() {
8540 monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer
8541 .get_or_insert_with(Vec::new)
8542 .push((*peer_pubkey, &peer_state.monitor_update_blocked_actions));
8547 let events = self.pending_events.lock().unwrap();
8548 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.115 don't support post-event actions, thus if there's no
8549 // actions at all, skip writing the required TLV. Otherwise, pre-0.0.115 versions will
8550 // refuse to read the new ChannelManager.
8551 let events_not_backwards_compatible = events.iter().any(|(_, action)| action.is_some());
8552 if events_not_backwards_compatible {
8553 // If we're gonna write a even TLV that will overwrite our events anyway we might as
8554 // well save the space and not write any events here.
8555 0u64.write(writer)?;
8557 (events.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8558 for (event, _) in events.iter() {
8559 event.write(writer)?;
8563 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote the `pending_background_events`
8564 // `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here, however there was never a reason to do so -
8565 // the closing monitor updates were always effectively replayed on startup (either directly
8566 // by calling `broadcast_latest_holder_commitment_txn` on a `ChannelMonitor` during
8567 // deserialization or, in 0.0.115, by regenerating the monitor update itself).
8568 0u64.write(writer)?;
8570 // Prior to 0.0.111 we tracked node_announcement serials here, however that now happens in
8571 // `PeerManager`, and thus we simply write the `highest_seen_timestamp` twice, which is
8572 // likely to be identical.
8573 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8574 (self.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u32).write(writer)?;
8576 (pending_inbound_payments.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8577 for (hash, pending_payment) in pending_inbound_payments.iter() {
8578 hash.write(writer)?;
8579 pending_payment.write(writer)?;
8582 // For backwards compat, write the session privs and their total length.
8583 let mut num_pending_outbounds_compat: u64 = 0;
8584 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8585 if !outbound.is_fulfilled() && !outbound.abandoned() {
8586 num_pending_outbounds_compat += outbound.remaining_parts() as u64;
8589 num_pending_outbounds_compat.write(writer)?;
8590 for (_, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8592 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8593 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8594 for session_priv in session_privs.iter() {
8595 session_priv.write(writer)?;
8598 PendingOutboundPayment::AwaitingInvoice { .. } => {},
8599 PendingOutboundPayment::InvoiceReceived { .. } => {},
8600 PendingOutboundPayment::Fulfilled { .. } => {},
8601 PendingOutboundPayment::Abandoned { .. } => {},
8605 // Encode without retry info for 0.0.101 compatibility.
8606 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>> = HashMap::new();
8607 for (id, outbound) in pending_outbound_payments.iter() {
8609 PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs } |
8610 PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable { session_privs, .. } => {
8611 pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.insert(*id, session_privs.clone());
8617 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs = None;
8618 let our_pending_intercepts = self.pending_intercepted_htlcs.lock().unwrap();
8619 if our_pending_intercepts.len() != 0 {
8620 pending_intercepted_htlcs = Some(our_pending_intercepts);
8623 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(&claimable_payments.pending_claiming_payments);
8624 if pending_claiming_payments.as_ref().unwrap().is_empty() {
8625 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.113 do not know how to read the pending claimed payments
8626 // map. Thus, if there are no entries we skip writing a TLV for it.
8627 pending_claiming_payments = None;
8630 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(&PublicKey, &OutPoint), &Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
8631 for ((counterparty_id, _), peer_state) in per_peer_state.iter().zip(peer_states.iter()) {
8632 for (funding_outpoint, updates) in peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.iter() {
8633 if !updates.is_empty() {
8634 if in_flight_monitor_updates.is_none() { in_flight_monitor_updates = Some(HashMap::new()); }
8635 in_flight_monitor_updates.as_mut().unwrap().insert((counterparty_id, funding_outpoint), updates);
8640 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8641 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, required),
8642 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
8643 (3, pending_outbound_payments, required),
8644 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
8645 (5, self.our_network_pubkey, required),
8646 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
8647 (7, self.fake_scid_rand_bytes, required),
8648 (8, if events_not_backwards_compatible { Some(&*events) } else { None }, option),
8649 (9, htlc_purposes, required_vec),
8650 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
8651 (11, self.probing_cookie_secret, required),
8652 (13, htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
8659 impl Writeable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8660 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, w: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8661 (self.len() as u64).write(w)?;
8662 for (event, action) in self.iter() {
8665 #[cfg(debug_assertions)] {
8666 // Events are MaybeReadable, in some cases indicating that they shouldn't actually
8667 // be persisted and are regenerated on restart. However, if such an event has a
8668 // post-event-handling action we'll write nothing for the event and would have to
8669 // either forget the action or fail on deserialization (which we do below). Thus,
8670 // check that the event is sane here.
8671 let event_encoded = event.encode();
8672 let event_read: Option<Event> =
8673 MaybeReadable::read(&mut &event_encoded[..]).unwrap();
8674 if action.is_some() { assert!(event_read.is_some()); }
8680 impl Readable for VecDeque<(Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> {
8681 fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8682 let len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8683 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 1024 * 16;
8684 let mut events: Self = VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(
8685 MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>() as u64,
8688 let ev_opt = MaybeReadable::read(reader)?;
8689 let action = Readable::read(reader)?;
8690 if let Some(ev) = ev_opt {
8691 events.push_back((ev, action));
8692 } else if action.is_some() {
8693 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8700 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(ChannelShutdownState,
8701 (0, NotShuttingDown) => {},
8702 (2, ShutdownInitiated) => {},
8703 (4, ResolvingHTLCs) => {},
8704 (6, NegotiatingClosingFee) => {},
8705 (8, ShutdownComplete) => {}, ;
8708 /// Arguments for the creation of a ChannelManager that are not deserialized.
8710 /// At a high-level, the process for deserializing a ChannelManager and resuming normal operation
8712 /// 1) Deserialize all stored [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8713 /// 2) Deserialize the [`ChannelManager`] by filling in this struct and calling:
8714 /// `<(BlockHash, ChannelManager)>::read(reader, args)`
8715 /// This may result in closing some channels if the [`ChannelMonitor`] is newer than the stored
8716 /// [`ChannelManager`] state to ensure no loss of funds. Thus, transactions may be broadcasted.
8717 /// 3) If you are not fetching full blocks, register all relevant [`ChannelMonitor`] outpoints the
8718 /// same way you would handle a [`chain::Filter`] call using
8719 /// [`ChannelMonitor::get_outputs_to_watch`] and [`ChannelMonitor::get_funding_txo`].
8720 /// 4) Reconnect blocks on your [`ChannelMonitor`]s.
8721 /// 5) Disconnect/connect blocks on the [`ChannelManager`].
8722 /// 6) Re-persist the [`ChannelMonitor`]s to ensure the latest state is on disk.
8723 /// Note that if you're using a [`ChainMonitor`] for your [`chain::Watch`] implementation, you
8724 /// will likely accomplish this as a side-effect of calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`] in
8726 /// 7) Move the [`ChannelMonitor`]s into your local [`chain::Watch`]. If you're using a
8727 /// [`ChainMonitor`], this is done by calling [`chain::Watch::watch_channel`].
8729 /// Note that the ordering of #4-7 is not of importance, however all four must occur before you
8730 /// call any other methods on the newly-deserialized [`ChannelManager`].
8732 /// Note that because some channels may be closed during deserialization, it is critical that you
8733 /// always deserialize only the latest version of a ChannelManager and ChannelMonitors available to
8734 /// you. If you deserialize an old ChannelManager (during which force-closure transactions may be
8735 /// broadcast), and then later deserialize a newer version of the same ChannelManager (which will
8736 /// not force-close the same channels but consider them live), you may end up revoking a state for
8737 /// which you've already broadcasted the transaction.
8739 /// [`ChainMonitor`]: crate::chain::chainmonitor::ChainMonitor
8740 pub struct ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8742 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8743 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8744 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8745 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8746 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8747 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8751 /// A cryptographically secure source of entropy.
8752 pub entropy_source: ES,
8754 /// A signer that is able to perform node-scoped cryptographic operations.
8755 pub node_signer: NS,
8757 /// The keys provider which will give us relevant keys. Some keys will be loaded during
8758 /// deserialization and KeysInterface::read_chan_signer will be used to read per-Channel
8760 pub signer_provider: SP,
8762 /// The fee_estimator for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8764 /// No calls to the FeeEstimator will be made during deserialization.
8765 pub fee_estimator: F,
8766 /// The chain::Watch for use in the ChannelManager in the future.
8768 /// No calls to the chain::Watch will be made during deserialization. It is assumed that
8769 /// you have deserialized ChannelMonitors separately and will add them to your
8770 /// chain::Watch after deserializing this ChannelManager.
8771 pub chain_monitor: M,
8773 /// The BroadcasterInterface which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future and may be
8774 /// used to broadcast the latest local commitment transactions of channels which must be
8775 /// force-closed during deserialization.
8776 pub tx_broadcaster: T,
8777 /// The router which will be used in the ChannelManager in the future for finding routes
8778 /// on-the-fly for trampoline payments. Absent in private nodes that don't support forwarding.
8780 /// No calls to the router will be made during deserialization.
8782 /// The Logger for use in the ChannelManager and which may be used to log information during
8783 /// deserialization.
8785 /// Default settings used for new channels. Any existing channels will continue to use the
8786 /// runtime settings which were stored when the ChannelManager was serialized.
8787 pub default_config: UserConfig,
8789 /// A map from channel funding outpoints to ChannelMonitors for those channels (ie
8790 /// value.context.get_funding_txo() should be the key).
8792 /// If a monitor is inconsistent with the channel state during deserialization the channel will
8793 /// be force-closed using the data in the ChannelMonitor and the channel will be dropped. This
8794 /// is true for missing channels as well. If there is a monitor missing for which we find
8795 /// channel data Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) will be returned.
8797 /// In such cases the latest local transactions will be sent to the tx_broadcaster included in
8800 /// This is not exported to bindings users because we have no HashMap bindings
8801 pub channel_monitors: HashMap<OutPoint, &'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>,
8804 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8805 ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>
8807 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8808 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8809 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8810 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8811 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8812 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8816 /// Simple utility function to create a ChannelManagerReadArgs which creates the monitor
8817 /// HashMap for you. This is primarily useful for C bindings where it is not practical to
8818 /// populate a HashMap directly from C.
8819 pub fn new(entropy_source: ES, node_signer: NS, signer_provider: SP, fee_estimator: F, chain_monitor: M, tx_broadcaster: T, router: R, logger: L, default_config: UserConfig,
8820 mut channel_monitors: Vec<&'a mut ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>>) -> Self {
8822 entropy_source, node_signer, signer_provider, fee_estimator, chain_monitor, tx_broadcaster, router, logger, default_config,
8823 channel_monitors: channel_monitors.drain(..).map(|monitor| { (monitor.get_funding_txo().0, monitor) }).collect()
8828 // Implement ReadableArgs for an Arc'd ChannelManager to make it a bit easier to work with the
8829 // SipmleArcChannelManager type:
8830 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8831 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, Arc<ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>>)
8833 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8834 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8835 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8836 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8837 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8838 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8842 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8843 let (blockhash, chan_manager) = <(BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)>::read(reader, args)?;
8844 Ok((blockhash, Arc::new(chan_manager)))
8848 impl<'a, M: Deref, T: Deref, ES: Deref, NS: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, R: Deref, L: Deref>
8849 ReadableArgs<ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>> for (BlockHash, ChannelManager<M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>)
8851 M::Target: chain::Watch<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
8852 T::Target: BroadcasterInterface,
8853 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8854 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
8855 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
8856 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8860 fn read<Reader: io::Read>(reader: &mut Reader, mut args: ChannelManagerReadArgs<'a, M, T, ES, NS, SP, F, R, L>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8861 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8863 let genesis_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8864 let best_block_height: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8865 let best_block_hash: BlockHash = Readable::read(reader)?;
8867 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
8869 let channel_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8870 let mut funding_txo_set = HashSet::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8871 let mut funded_peer_channels: HashMap<PublicKey, HashMap<ChannelId, ChannelPhase<SP>>> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8872 let mut id_to_peer = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8873 let mut short_to_chan_info = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(channel_count as usize, 128));
8874 let mut channel_closures = VecDeque::new();
8875 let mut close_background_events = Vec::new();
8876 for _ in 0..channel_count {
8877 let mut channel: Channel<SP> = Channel::read(reader, (
8878 &args.entropy_source, &args.signer_provider, best_block_height, &provided_channel_type_features(&args.default_config)
8880 let funding_txo = channel.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8881 funding_txo_set.insert(funding_txo.clone());
8882 if let Some(ref mut monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get_mut(&funding_txo) {
8883 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() ||
8884 channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() ||
8885 channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() ||
8886 channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8887 // But if the channel is behind of the monitor, close the channel:
8888 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelManager is stale compared to the current ChannelMonitor!");
8889 log_error!(args.logger, " The channel will be force-closed and the latest commitment transaction from the ChannelMonitor broadcast.");
8890 if channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id() < monitor.get_latest_update_id() {
8891 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.",
8892 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id());
8894 if channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number() {
8895 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at holder commitment number {} but the ChannelManager is at holder commitment number {}.",
8896 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_holder_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number());
8898 if channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_min_seen_secret() {
8899 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at revoked counterparty transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at revoked counterparty transaction number {}.",
8900 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), channel.get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8902 if channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number() > monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number() {
8903 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at counterparty commitment transaction number {} but the ChannelManager is at counterparty commitment transaction number {}.",
8904 &channel.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_number(), channel.get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number());
8906 let (monitor_update, mut new_failed_htlcs) = channel.context.force_shutdown(true);
8907 if let Some((counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update)) = monitor_update {
8908 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
8909 counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, update
8912 failed_htlcs.append(&mut new_failed_htlcs);
8913 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8914 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8915 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8916 reason: ClosureReason::OutdatedChannelManager,
8917 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8918 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8920 for (channel_htlc_source, payment_hash) in channel.inflight_htlc_sources() {
8921 let mut found_htlc = false;
8922 for (monitor_htlc_source, _) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
8923 if *channel_htlc_source == monitor_htlc_source { found_htlc = true; break; }
8926 // If we have some HTLCs in the channel which are not present in the newer
8927 // ChannelMonitor, they have been removed and should be failed back to
8928 // ensure we don't forget them entirely. Note that if the missing HTLC(s)
8929 // were actually claimed we'd have generated and ensured the previous-hop
8930 // claim update ChannelMonitor updates were persisted prior to persising
8931 // the ChannelMonitor update for the forward leg, so attempting to fail the
8932 // backwards leg of the HTLC will simply be rejected.
8933 log_info!(args.logger,
8934 "Failing HTLC with hash {} as it is missing in the ChannelMonitor for channel {} but was present in the (stale) ChannelManager",
8935 &channel.context.channel_id(), &payment_hash);
8936 failed_htlcs.push((channel_htlc_source.clone(), *payment_hash, channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8940 log_info!(args.logger, "Successfully loaded channel {} at update_id {} against monitor at update id {}",
8941 &channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(),
8942 monitor.get_latest_update_id());
8943 if let Some(short_channel_id) = channel.context.get_short_channel_id() {
8944 short_to_chan_info.insert(short_channel_id, (channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), channel.context.channel_id()));
8946 if channel.context.is_funding_initiated() {
8947 id_to_peer.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
8949 match funded_peer_channels.entry(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()) {
8950 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
8951 let by_id_map = entry.get_mut();
8952 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
8954 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
8955 let mut by_id_map = HashMap::new();
8956 by_id_map.insert(channel.context.channel_id(), ChannelPhase::Funded(channel));
8957 entry.insert(by_id_map);
8961 } else if channel.is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist() {
8962 // If we were persisted and shut down while the initial ChannelMonitor persistence
8963 // was in-progress, we never broadcasted the funding transaction and can still
8964 // safely discard the channel.
8965 let _ = channel.context.force_shutdown(false);
8966 channel_closures.push_back((events::Event::ChannelClosed {
8967 channel_id: channel.context.channel_id(),
8968 user_channel_id: channel.context.get_user_id(),
8969 reason: ClosureReason::DisconnectedPeer,
8970 counterparty_node_id: Some(channel.context.get_counterparty_node_id()),
8971 channel_capacity_sats: Some(channel.context.get_value_satoshis()),
8974 log_error!(args.logger, "Missing ChannelMonitor for channel {} needed by ChannelManager.", &channel.context.channel_id());
8975 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
8976 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
8977 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
8978 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
8979 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8983 for (funding_txo, _) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
8984 if !funding_txo_set.contains(funding_txo) {
8985 log_info!(args.logger, "Queueing monitor update to ensure missing channel {} is force closed",
8986 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
8987 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
8988 update_id: CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID,
8989 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast: true }],
8991 close_background_events.push(BackgroundEvent::ClosedMonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup((*funding_txo, monitor_update)));
8995 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 1024 * 64;
8996 let forward_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8997 let mut forward_htlcs = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(forward_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
8998 for _ in 0..forward_htlcs_count {
8999 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9000 let pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9001 let mut pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_forwards_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<HTLCForwardInfo>()));
9002 for _ in 0..pending_forwards_count {
9003 pending_forwards.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
9005 forward_htlcs.insert(short_channel_id, pending_forwards);
9008 let claimable_htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9009 let mut claimable_htlcs_list = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(claimable_htlcs_count as usize, 128));
9010 for _ in 0..claimable_htlcs_count {
9011 let payment_hash = Readable::read(reader)?;
9012 let previous_hops_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9013 let mut previous_hops = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(previous_hops_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<ClaimableHTLC>()));
9014 for _ in 0..previous_hops_len {
9015 previous_hops.push(<ClaimableHTLC as Readable>::read(reader)?);
9017 claimable_htlcs_list.push((payment_hash, previous_hops));
9020 let peer_state_from_chans = |channel_by_id| {
9023 outbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9024 inbound_v1_channel_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9025 inbound_channel_request_by_id: HashMap::new(),
9026 latest_features: InitFeatures::empty(),
9027 pending_msg_events: Vec::new(),
9028 in_flight_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9029 monitor_update_blocked_actions: BTreeMap::new(),
9030 actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates: BTreeMap::new(),
9031 is_connected: false,
9035 let peer_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9036 let mut per_peer_state = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(peer_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(PublicKey, Mutex<PeerState<SP>>)>()));
9037 for _ in 0..peer_count {
9038 let peer_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9039 let peer_chans = funded_peer_channels.remove(&peer_pubkey).unwrap_or(HashMap::new());
9040 let mut peer_state = peer_state_from_chans(peer_chans);
9041 peer_state.latest_features = Readable::read(reader)?;
9042 per_peer_state.insert(peer_pubkey, Mutex::new(peer_state));
9045 let event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9046 let mut pending_events_read: VecDeque<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)> =
9047 VecDeque::with_capacity(cmp::min(event_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/mem::size_of::<(events::Event, Option<EventCompletionAction>)>()));
9048 for _ in 0..event_count {
9049 match MaybeReadable::read(reader)? {
9050 Some(event) => pending_events_read.push_back((event, None)),
9055 let background_event_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9056 for _ in 0..background_event_count {
9057 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9059 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.116 wrote pending `MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup`s here,
9060 // however we really don't (and never did) need them - we regenerate all
9061 // on-startup monitor updates.
9062 let _: OutPoint = Readable::read(reader)?;
9063 let _: ChannelMonitorUpdate = Readable::read(reader)?;
9065 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9069 let _last_node_announcement_serial: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?; // Only used < 0.0.111
9070 let highest_seen_timestamp: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9072 let pending_inbound_payment_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9073 let mut pending_inbound_payments: HashMap<PaymentHash, PendingInboundPayment> = HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_payment_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/(3*32)));
9074 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_payment_count {
9075 if pending_inbound_payments.insert(Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?).is_some() {
9076 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9080 let pending_outbound_payments_count_compat: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9081 let mut pending_outbound_payments_compat: HashMap<PaymentId, PendingOutboundPayment> =
9082 HashMap::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_payments_count_compat as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE/32));
9083 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_payments_count_compat {
9084 let session_priv = Readable::read(reader)?;
9085 let payment = PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy {
9086 session_privs: [session_priv].iter().cloned().collect()
9088 if pending_outbound_payments_compat.insert(PaymentId(session_priv), payment).is_some() {
9089 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9093 // pending_outbound_payments_no_retry is for compatibility with 0.0.101 clients.
9094 let mut pending_outbound_payments_no_retry: Option<HashMap<PaymentId, HashSet<[u8; 32]>>> = None;
9095 let mut pending_outbound_payments = None;
9096 let mut pending_intercepted_htlcs: Option<HashMap<InterceptId, PendingAddHTLCInfo>> = Some(HashMap::new());
9097 let mut received_network_pubkey: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9098 let mut fake_scid_rand_bytes: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9099 let mut probing_cookie_secret: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9100 let mut claimable_htlc_purposes = None;
9101 let mut claimable_htlc_onion_fields = None;
9102 let mut pending_claiming_payments = Some(HashMap::new());
9103 let mut monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer: Option<Vec<(_, BTreeMap<_, Vec<_>>)>> = Some(Vec::new());
9104 let mut events_override = None;
9105 let mut in_flight_monitor_updates: Option<HashMap<(PublicKey, OutPoint), Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>>> = None;
9106 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9107 (1, pending_outbound_payments_no_retry, option),
9108 (2, pending_intercepted_htlcs, option),
9109 (3, pending_outbound_payments, option),
9110 (4, pending_claiming_payments, option),
9111 (5, received_network_pubkey, option),
9112 (6, monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer, option),
9113 (7, fake_scid_rand_bytes, option),
9114 (8, events_override, option),
9115 (9, claimable_htlc_purposes, optional_vec),
9116 (10, in_flight_monitor_updates, option),
9117 (11, probing_cookie_secret, option),
9118 (13, claimable_htlc_onion_fields, optional_vec),
9120 if fake_scid_rand_bytes.is_none() {
9121 fake_scid_rand_bytes = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9124 if probing_cookie_secret.is_none() {
9125 probing_cookie_secret = Some(args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9128 if let Some(events) = events_override {
9129 pending_events_read = events;
9132 if !channel_closures.is_empty() {
9133 pending_events_read.append(&mut channel_closures);
9136 if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() && pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.is_none() {
9137 pending_outbound_payments = Some(pending_outbound_payments_compat);
9138 } else if pending_outbound_payments.is_none() {
9139 let mut outbounds = HashMap::new();
9140 for (id, session_privs) in pending_outbound_payments_no_retry.unwrap().drain() {
9141 outbounds.insert(id, PendingOutboundPayment::Legacy { session_privs });
9143 pending_outbound_payments = Some(outbounds);
9145 let pending_outbounds = OutboundPayments {
9146 pending_outbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_outbound_payments.unwrap()),
9147 retry_lock: Mutex::new(())
9150 // We have to replay (or skip, if they were completed after we wrote the `ChannelManager`)
9151 // each `ChannelMonitorUpdate` in `in_flight_monitor_updates`. After doing so, we have to
9152 // check that each channel we have isn't newer than the latest `ChannelMonitorUpdate`(s) we
9153 // replayed, and for each monitor update we have to replay we have to ensure there's a
9154 // `ChannelMonitor` for it.
9156 // In order to do so we first walk all of our live channels (so that we can check their
9157 // state immediately after doing the update replays, when we have the `update_id`s
9158 // available) and then walk any remaining in-flight updates.
9160 // Because the actual handling of the in-flight updates is the same, it's macro'ized here:
9161 let mut pending_background_events = Vec::new();
9162 macro_rules! handle_in_flight_updates {
9163 ($counterparty_node_id: expr, $chan_in_flight_upds: expr, $funding_txo: expr,
9164 $monitor: expr, $peer_state: expr, $channel_info_log: expr
9166 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = 0;
9167 $chan_in_flight_upds.retain(|upd| upd.update_id > $monitor.get_latest_update_id());
9168 for update in $chan_in_flight_upds.iter() {
9169 log_trace!(args.logger, "Replaying ChannelMonitorUpdate {} for {}channel {}",
9170 update.update_id, $channel_info_log, &$funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9171 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id, update.update_id);
9172 pending_background_events.push(
9173 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdateRegeneratedOnStartup {
9174 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9175 funding_txo: $funding_txo,
9176 update: update.clone(),
9179 if $chan_in_flight_upds.is_empty() {
9180 // We had some updates to apply, but it turns out they had completed before we
9181 // were serialized, we just weren't notified of that. Thus, we may have to run
9182 // the completion actions for any monitor updates, but otherwise are done.
9183 pending_background_events.push(
9184 BackgroundEvent::MonitorUpdatesComplete {
9185 counterparty_node_id: $counterparty_node_id,
9186 channel_id: $funding_txo.to_channel_id(),
9189 if $peer_state.in_flight_monitor_updates.insert($funding_txo, $chan_in_flight_upds).is_some() {
9190 log_error!(args.logger, "Duplicate in-flight monitor update set for the same channel!");
9191 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9193 max_in_flight_update_id
9197 for (counterparty_id, peer_state_mtx) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9198 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mtx.lock().unwrap();
9199 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9200 for phase in peer_state.channel_by_id.values() {
9201 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9202 // Channels that were persisted have to be funded, otherwise they should have been
9204 let funding_txo = chan.context.get_funding_txo().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9205 let monitor = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo)
9206 .expect("We already checked for monitor presence when loading channels");
9207 let mut max_in_flight_update_id = monitor.get_latest_update_id();
9208 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = &mut in_flight_monitor_updates {
9209 if let Some(mut chan_in_flight_upds) = in_flight_upds.remove(&(*counterparty_id, funding_txo)) {
9210 max_in_flight_update_id = cmp::max(max_in_flight_update_id,
9211 handle_in_flight_updates!(*counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_upds,
9212 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, ""));
9215 if chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id() > max_in_flight_update_id {
9216 // If the channel is ahead of the monitor, return InvalidValue:
9217 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is stale compared to the current ChannelManager! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9218 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is at update_id {} with update_id through {} in-flight",
9219 chan.context.channel_id(), monitor.get_latest_update_id(), max_in_flight_update_id);
9220 log_error!(args.logger, " but the ChannelManager is at update_id {}.", chan.get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id());
9221 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9222 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9223 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9224 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9225 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9228 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9229 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9230 debug_assert!(false);
9231 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9236 if let Some(in_flight_upds) = in_flight_monitor_updates {
9237 for ((counterparty_id, funding_txo), mut chan_in_flight_updates) in in_flight_upds {
9238 if let Some(monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&funding_txo) {
9239 // Now that we've removed all the in-flight monitor updates for channels that are
9240 // still open, we need to replay any monitor updates that are for closed channels,
9241 // creating the neccessary peer_state entries as we go.
9242 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.entry(counterparty_id).or_insert_with(|| {
9243 Mutex::new(peer_state_from_chans(HashMap::new()))
9245 let mut peer_state = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9246 handle_in_flight_updates!(counterparty_id, chan_in_flight_updates,
9247 funding_txo, monitor, peer_state, "closed ");
9249 log_error!(args.logger, "A ChannelMonitor is missing even though we have in-flight updates for it! This indicates a potentially-critical violation of the chain::Watch API!");
9250 log_error!(args.logger, " The ChannelMonitor for channel {} is missing.",
9251 &funding_txo.to_channel_id());
9252 log_error!(args.logger, " The chain::Watch API *requires* that monitors are persisted durably before returning,");
9253 log_error!(args.logger, " client applications must ensure that ChannelMonitor data is always available and the latest to avoid funds loss!");
9254 log_error!(args.logger, " Without the latest ChannelMonitor we cannot continue without risking funds.");
9255 log_error!(args.logger, " Please ensure the chain::Watch API requirements are met and file a bug report at https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning");
9256 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9261 // Note that we have to do the above replays before we push new monitor updates.
9262 pending_background_events.append(&mut close_background_events);
9264 // If there's any preimages for forwarded HTLCs hanging around in ChannelMonitors we
9265 // should ensure we try them again on the inbound edge. We put them here and do so after we
9266 // have a fully-constructed `ChannelManager` at the end.
9267 let mut pending_claims_to_replay = Vec::new();
9270 // If we're tracking pending payments, ensure we haven't lost any by looking at the
9271 // ChannelMonitor data for any channels for which we do not have authorative state
9272 // (i.e. those for which we just force-closed above or we otherwise don't have a
9273 // corresponding `Channel` at all).
9274 // This avoids several edge-cases where we would otherwise "forget" about pending
9275 // payments which are still in-flight via their on-chain state.
9276 // We only rebuild the pending payments map if we were most recently serialized by
9278 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9279 let counterparty_opt = id_to_peer.get(&monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9280 if counterparty_opt.is_none() {
9281 for (htlc_source, (htlc, _)) in monitor.get_pending_or_resolved_outbound_htlcs() {
9282 if let HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } = htlc_source {
9283 if path.hops.is_empty() {
9284 log_error!(args.logger, "Got an empty path for a pending payment");
9285 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9288 let path_amt = path.final_value_msat();
9289 let mut session_priv_bytes = [0; 32];
9290 session_priv_bytes[..].copy_from_slice(&session_priv[..]);
9291 match pending_outbounds.pending_outbound_payments.lock().unwrap().entry(payment_id) {
9292 hash_map::Entry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
9293 let newly_added = entry.get_mut().insert(session_priv_bytes, &path);
9294 log_info!(args.logger, "{} a pending payment path for {} msat for session priv {} on an existing pending payment with payment hash {}",
9295 if newly_added { "Added" } else { "Had" }, path_amt, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes), &htlc.payment_hash);
9297 hash_map::Entry::Vacant(entry) => {
9298 let path_fee = path.fee_msat();
9299 entry.insert(PendingOutboundPayment::Retryable {
9300 retry_strategy: None,
9301 attempts: PaymentAttempts::new(),
9302 payment_params: None,
9303 session_privs: [session_priv_bytes].iter().map(|a| *a).collect(),
9304 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
9305 payment_secret: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9306 payment_metadata: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9307 keysend_preimage: None, // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9308 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(), // only used for retries, and we'll never retry on startup
9309 pending_amt_msat: path_amt,
9310 pending_fee_msat: Some(path_fee),
9311 total_msat: path_amt,
9312 starting_block_height: best_block_height,
9314 log_info!(args.logger, "Added a pending payment for {} msat with payment hash {} for path with session priv {}",
9315 path_amt, &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(session_priv_bytes));
9320 for (htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt)) in monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs() {
9322 HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(prev_hop_data) => {
9323 let pending_forward_matches_htlc = |info: &PendingAddHTLCInfo| {
9324 info.prev_funding_outpoint == prev_hop_data.outpoint &&
9325 info.prev_htlc_id == prev_hop_data.htlc_id
9327 // The ChannelMonitor is now responsible for this HTLC's
9328 // failure/success and will let us know what its outcome is. If we
9329 // still have an entry for this HTLC in `forward_htlcs` or
9330 // `pending_intercepted_htlcs`, we were apparently not persisted after
9331 // the monitor was when forwarding the payment.
9332 forward_htlcs.retain(|_, forwards| {
9333 forwards.retain(|forward| {
9334 if let HTLCForwardInfo::AddHTLC(htlc_info) = forward {
9335 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9336 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending to-forward HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9337 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9342 !forwards.is_empty()
9344 pending_intercepted_htlcs.as_mut().unwrap().retain(|intercepted_id, htlc_info| {
9345 if pending_forward_matches_htlc(&htlc_info) {
9346 log_info!(args.logger, "Removing pending intercepted HTLC with hash {} as it was forwarded to the closed channel {}",
9347 &htlc.payment_hash, &monitor.get_funding_txo().0.to_channel_id());
9348 pending_events_read.retain(|(event, _)| {
9349 if let Event::HTLCIntercepted { intercept_id: ev_id, .. } = event {
9350 intercepted_id != ev_id
9357 HTLCSource::OutboundRoute { payment_id, session_priv, path, .. } => {
9358 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
9359 let pending_events = Mutex::new(pending_events_read);
9360 // Note that we set `from_onchain` to "false" here,
9361 // deliberately keeping the pending payment around forever.
9362 // Given it should only occur when we have a channel we're
9363 // force-closing for being stale that's okay.
9364 // The alternative would be to wipe the state when claiming,
9365 // generating a `PaymentPathSuccessful` event but regenerating
9366 // it and the `PaymentSent` on every restart until the
9367 // `ChannelMonitor` is removed.
9369 EventCompletionAction::ReleaseRAAChannelMonitorUpdate {
9370 channel_funding_outpoint: monitor.get_funding_txo().0,
9371 counterparty_node_id: path.hops[0].pubkey,
9373 pending_outbounds.claim_htlc(payment_id, preimage, session_priv,
9374 path, false, compl_action, &pending_events, &args.logger);
9375 pending_events_read = pending_events.into_inner().unwrap();
9382 // Whether the downstream channel was closed or not, try to re-apply any payment
9383 // preimages from it which may be needed in upstream channels for forwarded
9385 let outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter = monitor.get_all_current_outbound_htlcs()
9387 .filter_map(|(htlc_source, (htlc, preimage_opt))| {
9388 if let HTLCSource::PreviousHopData(_) = htlc_source {
9389 if let Some(payment_preimage) = preimage_opt {
9390 Some((htlc_source, payment_preimage, htlc.amount_msat,
9391 // Check if `counterparty_opt.is_none()` to see if the
9392 // downstream chan is closed (because we don't have a
9393 // channel_id -> peer map entry).
9394 counterparty_opt.is_none(),
9395 monitor.get_funding_txo().0))
9398 // If it was an outbound payment, we've handled it above - if a preimage
9399 // came in and we persisted the `ChannelManager` we either handled it and
9400 // are good to go or the channel force-closed - we don't have to handle the
9401 // channel still live case here.
9405 for tuple in outbound_claimed_htlcs_iter {
9406 pending_claims_to_replay.push(tuple);
9411 if !forward_htlcs.is_empty() || pending_outbounds.needs_abandon() {
9412 // If we have pending HTLCs to forward, assume we either dropped a
9413 // `PendingHTLCsForwardable` or the user received it but never processed it as they
9414 // shut down before the timer hit. Either way, set the time_forwardable to a small
9415 // constant as enough time has likely passed that we should simply handle the forwards
9416 // now, or at least after the user gets a chance to reconnect to our peers.
9417 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {
9418 time_forwardable: Duration::from_secs(2),
9422 let inbound_pmt_key_material = args.node_signer.get_inbound_payment_key_material();
9423 let expanded_inbound_key = inbound_payment::ExpandedKey::new(&inbound_pmt_key_material);
9425 let mut claimable_payments = HashMap::with_capacity(claimable_htlcs_list.len());
9426 if let Some(purposes) = claimable_htlc_purposes {
9427 if purposes.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9428 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9430 if let Some(onion_fields) = claimable_htlc_onion_fields {
9431 if onion_fields.len() != claimable_htlcs_list.len() {
9432 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9434 for (purpose, (onion, (payment_hash, htlcs))) in
9435 purposes.into_iter().zip(onion_fields.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()))
9437 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9438 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: onion,
9440 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9443 for (purpose, (payment_hash, htlcs)) in purposes.into_iter().zip(claimable_htlcs_list.into_iter()) {
9444 let existing_payment = claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9445 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9447 if existing_payment.is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9451 // LDK versions prior to 0.0.107 did not write a `pending_htlc_purposes`, but do
9452 // include a `_legacy_hop_data` in the `OnionPayload`.
9453 for (payment_hash, htlcs) in claimable_htlcs_list.drain(..) {
9454 if htlcs.is_empty() {
9455 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9457 let purpose = match &htlcs[0].onion_payload {
9458 OnionPayload::Invoice { _legacy_hop_data } => {
9459 if let Some(hop_data) = _legacy_hop_data {
9460 events::PaymentPurpose::InvoicePayment {
9461 payment_preimage: match pending_inbound_payments.get(&payment_hash) {
9462 Some(inbound_payment) => inbound_payment.payment_preimage,
9463 None => match inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &hop_data, 0, &expanded_inbound_key, &args.logger) {
9464 Ok((payment_preimage, _)) => payment_preimage,
9466 log_error!(args.logger, "Failed to read claimable payment data for HTLC with payment hash {} - was not a pending inbound payment and didn't match our payment key", &payment_hash);
9467 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9471 payment_secret: hop_data.payment_secret,
9473 } else { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue); }
9475 OnionPayload::Spontaneous(payment_preimage) =>
9476 events::PaymentPurpose::SpontaneousPayment(*payment_preimage),
9478 claimable_payments.insert(payment_hash, ClaimablePayment {
9479 purpose, htlcs, onion_fields: None,
9484 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9485 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&args.entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9487 let our_network_pubkey = match args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node) {
9489 Err(()) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue)
9491 if let Some(network_pubkey) = received_network_pubkey {
9492 if network_pubkey != our_network_pubkey {
9493 log_error!(args.logger, "Key that was generated does not match the existing key.");
9494 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9498 let mut outbound_scid_aliases = HashSet::new();
9499 for (_peer_node_id, peer_state_mutex) in per_peer_state.iter_mut() {
9500 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9501 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9502 for (chan_id, phase) in peer_state.channel_by_id.iter_mut() {
9503 if let ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) = phase {
9504 if chan.context.outbound_scid_alias() == 0 {
9505 let mut outbound_scid_alias;
9507 outbound_scid_alias = fake_scid::Namespace::OutboundAlias
9508 .get_fake_scid(best_block_height, &genesis_hash, fake_scid_rand_bytes.as_ref().unwrap(), &args.entropy_source);
9509 if outbound_scid_aliases.insert(outbound_scid_alias) { break; }
9511 chan.context.set_outbound_scid_alias(outbound_scid_alias);
9512 } else if !outbound_scid_aliases.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias()) {
9513 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9514 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9515 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9516 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9518 if chan.context.is_usable() {
9519 if short_to_chan_info.insert(chan.context.outbound_scid_alias(), (chan.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), *chan_id)).is_some() {
9520 // Note that in rare cases its possible to hit this while reading an older
9521 // channel if we just happened to pick a colliding outbound alias above.
9522 log_error!(args.logger, "Got duplicate outbound SCID alias; {}", chan.context.outbound_scid_alias());
9523 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9527 // We shouldn't have persisted (or read) any unfunded channel types so none should have been
9528 // created in this `channel_by_id` map.
9529 debug_assert!(false);
9530 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9535 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(args.fee_estimator);
9537 for (_, monitor) in args.channel_monitors.iter() {
9538 for (payment_hash, payment_preimage) in monitor.get_stored_preimages() {
9539 if let Some(payment) = claimable_payments.remove(&payment_hash) {
9540 log_info!(args.logger, "Re-claiming HTLCs with payment hash {} as we've released the preimage to a ChannelMonitor!", &payment_hash);
9541 let mut claimable_amt_msat = 0;
9542 let mut receiver_node_id = Some(our_network_pubkey);
9543 let phantom_shared_secret = payment.htlcs[0].prev_hop.phantom_shared_secret;
9544 if phantom_shared_secret.is_some() {
9545 let phantom_pubkey = args.node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::PhantomNode)
9546 .expect("Failed to get node_id for phantom node recipient");
9547 receiver_node_id = Some(phantom_pubkey)
9549 for claimable_htlc in &payment.htlcs {
9550 claimable_amt_msat += claimable_htlc.value;
9552 // Add a holding-cell claim of the payment to the Channel, which should be
9553 // applied ~immediately on peer reconnection. Because it won't generate a
9554 // new commitment transaction we can just provide the payment preimage to
9555 // the corresponding ChannelMonitor and nothing else.
9557 // We do so directly instead of via the normal ChannelMonitor update
9558 // procedure as the ChainMonitor hasn't yet been initialized, implying
9559 // we're not allowed to call it directly yet. Further, we do the update
9560 // without incrementing the ChannelMonitor update ID as there isn't any
9562 // If we were to generate a new ChannelMonitor update ID here and then
9563 // crash before the user finishes block connect we'd end up force-closing
9564 // this channel as well. On the flip side, there's no harm in restarting
9565 // without the new monitor persisted - we'll end up right back here on
9567 let previous_channel_id = claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint.to_channel_id();
9568 if let Some(peer_node_id) = id_to_peer.get(&previous_channel_id){
9569 let peer_state_mutex = per_peer_state.get(peer_node_id).unwrap();
9570 let mut peer_state_lock = peer_state_mutex.lock().unwrap();
9571 let peer_state = &mut *peer_state_lock;
9572 if let Some(ChannelPhase::Funded(channel)) = peer_state.channel_by_id.get_mut(&previous_channel_id) {
9573 channel.claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update(claimable_htlc.prev_hop.htlc_id, payment_preimage, &args.logger);
9576 if let Some(previous_hop_monitor) = args.channel_monitors.get(&claimable_htlc.prev_hop.outpoint) {
9577 previous_hop_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash, &payment_preimage, &args.tx_broadcaster, &bounded_fee_estimator, &args.logger);
9580 pending_events_read.push_back((events::Event::PaymentClaimed {
9583 purpose: payment.purpose,
9584 amount_msat: claimable_amt_msat,
9585 htlcs: payment.htlcs.iter().map(events::ClaimedHTLC::from).collect(),
9586 sender_intended_total_msat: payment.htlcs.first().map(|htlc| htlc.total_msat),
9592 for (node_id, monitor_update_blocked_actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions_per_peer.unwrap() {
9593 if let Some(peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&node_id) {
9594 for (_, actions) in monitor_update_blocked_actions.iter() {
9595 for action in actions.iter() {
9596 if let MonitorUpdateCompletionAction::EmitEventAndFreeOtherChannel {
9597 downstream_counterparty_and_funding_outpoint:
9598 Some((blocked_node_id, blocked_channel_outpoint, blocking_action)), ..
9600 if let Some(blocked_peer_state) = per_peer_state.get(&blocked_node_id) {
9601 blocked_peer_state.lock().unwrap().actions_blocking_raa_monitor_updates
9602 .entry(blocked_channel_outpoint.to_channel_id())
9603 .or_insert_with(Vec::new).push(blocking_action.clone());
9605 // If the channel we were blocking has closed, we don't need to
9606 // worry about it - the blocked monitor update should never have
9607 // been released from the `Channel` object so it can't have
9608 // completed, and if the channel closed there's no reason to bother
9614 peer_state.lock().unwrap().monitor_update_blocked_actions = monitor_update_blocked_actions;
9616 log_error!(args.logger, "Got blocked actions without a per-peer-state for {}", node_id);
9617 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9621 let channel_manager = ChannelManager {
9623 fee_estimator: bounded_fee_estimator,
9624 chain_monitor: args.chain_monitor,
9625 tx_broadcaster: args.tx_broadcaster,
9626 router: args.router,
9628 best_block: RwLock::new(BestBlock::new(best_block_hash, best_block_height)),
9630 inbound_payment_key: expanded_inbound_key,
9631 pending_inbound_payments: Mutex::new(pending_inbound_payments),
9632 pending_outbound_payments: pending_outbounds,
9633 pending_intercepted_htlcs: Mutex::new(pending_intercepted_htlcs.unwrap()),
9635 forward_htlcs: Mutex::new(forward_htlcs),
9636 claimable_payments: Mutex::new(ClaimablePayments { claimable_payments, pending_claiming_payments: pending_claiming_payments.unwrap() }),
9637 outbound_scid_aliases: Mutex::new(outbound_scid_aliases),
9638 id_to_peer: Mutex::new(id_to_peer),
9639 short_to_chan_info: FairRwLock::new(short_to_chan_info),
9640 fake_scid_rand_bytes: fake_scid_rand_bytes.unwrap(),
9642 probing_cookie_secret: probing_cookie_secret.unwrap(),
9647 highest_seen_timestamp: AtomicUsize::new(highest_seen_timestamp as usize),
9649 per_peer_state: FairRwLock::new(per_peer_state),
9651 pending_events: Mutex::new(pending_events_read),
9652 pending_events_processor: AtomicBool::new(false),
9653 pending_background_events: Mutex::new(pending_background_events),
9654 total_consistency_lock: RwLock::new(()),
9655 background_events_processed_since_startup: AtomicBool::new(false),
9656 persistence_notifier: Notifier::new(),
9658 entropy_source: args.entropy_source,
9659 node_signer: args.node_signer,
9660 signer_provider: args.signer_provider,
9662 logger: args.logger,
9663 default_configuration: args.default_config,
9666 for htlc_source in failed_htlcs.drain(..) {
9667 let (source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, channel_id) = htlc_source;
9668 let receiver = HTLCDestination::NextHopChannel { node_id: Some(counterparty_node_id), channel_id };
9669 let reason = HTLCFailReason::from_failure_code(0x4000 | 8);
9670 channel_manager.fail_htlc_backwards_internal(&source, &payment_hash, &reason, receiver);
9673 for (source, preimage, downstream_value, downstream_closed, downstream_funding) in pending_claims_to_replay {
9674 // We use `downstream_closed` in place of `from_onchain` here just as a guess - we
9675 // don't remember in the `ChannelMonitor` where we got a preimage from, but if the
9676 // channel is closed we just assume that it probably came from an on-chain claim.
9677 channel_manager.claim_funds_internal(source, preimage, Some(downstream_value),
9678 downstream_closed, downstream_funding);
9681 //TODO: Broadcast channel update for closed channels, but only after we've made a
9682 //connection or two.
9684 Ok((best_block_hash.clone(), channel_manager))
9690 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9691 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9692 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, Secp256k1, SecretKey};
9693 use core::sync::atomic::Ordering;
9694 use crate::events::{Event, HTLCDestination, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider, ClosureReason};
9695 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, PaymentSecret};
9696 use crate::ln::ChannelId;
9697 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{inbound_payment, PaymentId, PaymentSendFailure, RecipientOnionFields, InterceptId};
9698 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
9699 use crate::ln::msgs::{self, ErrorAction};
9700 use crate::ln::msgs::ChannelMessageHandler;
9701 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters, find_route};
9702 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9703 use crate::util::test_utils;
9704 use crate::util::config::{ChannelConfig, ChannelConfigUpdate};
9705 use crate::sign::EntropySource;
9708 fn test_notify_limits() {
9709 // Check that a few cases which don't require the persistence of a new ChannelManager,
9710 // indeed, do not cause the persistence of a new ChannelManager.
9711 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
9712 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
9713 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None]);
9714 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9716 // All nodes start with a persistable update pending as `create_network` connects each node
9717 // with all other nodes to make most tests simpler.
9718 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9719 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9720 assert!(nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9722 let mut chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9724 // We check that the channel info nodes have doesn't change too early, even though we try
9725 // to connect messages with new values
9726 chan.0.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9727 chan.1.contents.fee_base_msat *= 2;
9728 let node_a_chan_info = nodes[0].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9729 &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9730 let node_b_chan_info = nodes[1].node.list_channels_with_counterparty(
9731 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).pop().unwrap();
9733 // The first two nodes (which opened a channel) should now require fresh persistence
9734 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9735 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9736 // ... but the last node should not.
9737 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9738 // After persisting the first two nodes they should no longer need fresh persistence.
9739 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9740 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9742 // Node 3, unrelated to the only channel, shouldn't care if it receives a channel_update
9743 // about the channel.
9744 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9745 nodes[2].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9746 assert!(!nodes[2].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9748 // The nodes which are a party to the channel should also ignore messages from unrelated
9750 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9751 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9752 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.0);
9753 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id(), &chan.1);
9754 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9755 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9757 // At this point the channel info given by peers should still be the same.
9758 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9759 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9761 // An earlier version of handle_channel_update didn't check the directionality of the
9762 // update message and would always update the local fee info, even if our peer was
9763 // (spuriously) forwarding us our own channel_update.
9764 let as_node_one = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..] < nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id().serialize()[..];
9765 let as_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.0 } else { &chan.1 };
9766 let bs_update = if as_node_one == (chan.0.contents.flags & 1 == 0 /* chan.0 is from node one */) { &chan.1 } else { &chan.0 };
9768 // First deliver each peers' own message, checking that the node doesn't need to be
9769 // persisted and that its channel info remains the same.
9770 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9771 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9772 assert!(!nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9773 assert!(!nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9774 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9775 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9777 // Finally, deliver the other peers' message, ensuring each node needs to be persisted and
9778 // the channel info has updated.
9779 nodes[0].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_update);
9780 nodes[1].node.handle_channel_update(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_update);
9781 assert!(nodes[0].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9782 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_persistable_update_future().poll_is_complete());
9783 assert_ne!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0], node_a_chan_info);
9784 assert_ne!(nodes[1].node.list_channels()[0], node_b_chan_info);
9788 fn test_keysend_dup_hash_partial_mpp() {
9789 // Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate hash to an existing partial MPP payment fails as
9791 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9792 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9793 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
9794 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9795 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9797 // First, send a partial MPP payment.
9798 let (route, our_payment_hash, payment_preimage, payment_secret) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[1], 100_000);
9799 let mut mpp_route = route.clone();
9800 mpp_route.paths.push(mpp_route.paths[0].clone());
9802 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
9803 // Use the utility function send_payment_along_path to send the payment with MPP data which
9804 // indicates there are more HTLCs coming.
9805 let cur_height = CHAN_CONFIRM_DEPTH + 1; // route_payment calls send_payment, which adds 1 to the current height. So we do the same here to match.
9806 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(our_payment_hash,
9807 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), payment_id, &mpp_route).unwrap();
9808 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[0], &our_payment_hash,
9809 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[0]).unwrap();
9810 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9811 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9812 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9813 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), false, None);
9815 // Next, send a keysend payment with the same payment_hash and make sure it fails.
9816 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9817 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9818 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9819 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9820 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9821 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9822 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9823 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9824 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9825 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9826 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9827 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash: our_payment_hash }]);
9828 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9829 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9830 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9831 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9832 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9833 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9834 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9835 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9836 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9837 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], our_payment_hash, true);
9839 // Send the second half of the original MPP payment.
9840 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_along_path(&mpp_route.paths[1], &our_payment_hash,
9841 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), 200_000, cur_height, payment_id, &None, session_privs[1]).unwrap();
9842 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9843 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9844 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9845 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &[&nodes[1]], 200_000, our_payment_hash, Some(payment_secret), events.drain(..).next().unwrap(), true, None);
9847 // Claim the full MPP payment. Note that we can't use a test utility like
9848 // claim_funds_along_route because the ordering of the messages causes the second half of the
9849 // payment to be put in the holding cell, which confuses the test utilities. So we exchange the
9850 // lightning messages manually.
9851 nodes[1].node.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
9852 expect_payment_claimed!(nodes[1], our_payment_hash, 200_000);
9853 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 2);
9855 let bs_first_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9856 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9857 expect_payment_sent(&nodes[0], payment_preimage, None, false, false);
9858 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_updates.commitment_signed);
9859 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9860 let (as_first_raa, as_first_cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9861 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_raa);
9862 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9863 let bs_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9864 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_first_cs);
9865 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9866 let bs_first_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9867 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
9868 nodes[0].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9869 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9870 let as_second_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9871 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_first_raa);
9872 let as_second_updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
9873 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9874 nodes[1].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_raa);
9875 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9876 nodes[1].node.handle_commitment_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &as_second_updates.commitment_signed);
9877 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9878 let bs_third_raa = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9879 nodes[0].node.handle_revoke_and_ack(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &bs_third_raa);
9880 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9882 // Note that successful MPP payments will generate a single PaymentSent event upon the first
9883 // path's success and a PaymentPathSuccessful event for each path's success.
9884 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
9885 assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
9887 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9888 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9889 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9890 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9892 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9895 Event::PaymentPathSuccessful { payment_id: ref actual_payment_id, ref payment_hash, ref path } => {
9896 assert_eq!(payment_id, *actual_payment_id);
9897 assert_eq!(our_payment_hash, *payment_hash.as_ref().unwrap());
9898 assert_eq!(route.paths[0], *path);
9900 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
9905 fn test_keysend_dup_payment_hash() {
9906 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(false);
9907 do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(true);
9910 fn do_test_keysend_dup_payment_hash(accept_mpp_keysend: bool) {
9911 // (1): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing pending
9912 // outbound regular payment fails as expected.
9913 // (2): Test that a regular payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend payment
9914 // fails as expected.
9915 // (3): Test that a keysend payment with a duplicate payment hash to an existing keysend
9916 // payment fails as expected. When `accept_mpp_keysend` is false, this tests that we
9917 // reject MPP keysend payments, since in this case where the payment has no payment
9918 // secret, a keysend payment with a duplicate hash is basically an MPP keysend. If
9919 // `accept_mpp_keysend` is true, this tests that we only accept MPP keysends with
9920 // payment secrets and reject otherwise.
9921 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
9922 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
9923 let mut mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
9924 mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = accept_mpp_keysend;
9925 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
9926 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
9927 create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
9928 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
9929 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
9931 // To start (1), send a regular payment but don't claim it.
9932 let expected_route = [&nodes[1]];
9933 let (payment_preimage, payment_hash, _) = route_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, 100_000);
9935 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
9936 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
9937 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(),
9938 TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false), 100_000);
9939 let route = find_route(
9940 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9941 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9943 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9944 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9945 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9946 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9947 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9948 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9949 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9950 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9951 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9952 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9953 // We have to forward pending HTLCs twice - once tries to forward the payment forward (and
9954 // fails), the second will process the resulting failure and fail the HTLC backward
9955 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9956 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
9957 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
9958 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
9959 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
9960 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
9961 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
9962 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
9963 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
9964 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
9965 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
9966 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
9968 // Finally, claim the original payment.
9969 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
9971 // To start (2), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
9972 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
9973 let route = find_route(
9974 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
9975 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
9977 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
9978 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_preimage.0)).unwrap();
9979 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9980 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9981 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9982 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
9983 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
9984 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
9986 // Next, attempt a regular payment and make sure it fails.
9987 let payment_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
9988 nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
9989 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)).unwrap();
9990 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
9991 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
9992 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
9993 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
9994 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
9995 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
9996 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
9997 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
9998 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
9999 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10000 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10001 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10002 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10003 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10004 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10005 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10006 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10007 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10008 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10009 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10011 // Finally, succeed the keysend payment.
10012 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10014 // To start (3), send a keysend payment but don't claim it.
10015 let payment_id_1 = PaymentId([44; 32]);
10016 let payment_hash = nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10017 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_1).unwrap();
10018 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10019 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10020 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10021 let event = events.pop().unwrap();
10022 let path = vec![&nodes[1]];
10023 pass_along_path(&nodes[0], &path, 100_000, payment_hash, None, event, true, Some(payment_preimage));
10025 // Next, attempt a keysend payment and make sure it fails.
10026 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10027 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(expected_route.last().unwrap().node.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV, false),
10030 let route = find_route(
10031 &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &route_params, &nodes[0].network_graph,
10032 None, nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10034 let payment_id_2 = PaymentId([45; 32]);
10035 nodes[0].node.send_spontaneous_payment(&route, Some(payment_preimage),
10036 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), payment_id_2).unwrap();
10037 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10038 let mut events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10039 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10040 let ev = events.drain(..).next().unwrap();
10041 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event(ev);
10042 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
10043 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 0);
10044 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[1], nodes[0], payment_event.commitment_msg, false);
10045 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(nodes[1]);
10046 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable_and_htlc_handling_failed!(nodes[1], vec![HTLCDestination::FailedPayment { payment_hash }]);
10047 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10048 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[1], nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10049 assert!(updates.update_add_htlcs.is_empty());
10050 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10051 assert_eq!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.len(), 1);
10052 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10053 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10054 nodes[0].node.handle_update_fail_htlc(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fail_htlcs[0]);
10055 commitment_signed_dance!(nodes[0], nodes[1], updates.commitment_signed, true, true);
10056 expect_payment_failed!(nodes[0], payment_hash, true);
10058 // Finally, claim the original payment.
10059 claim_payment(&nodes[0], &expected_route, payment_preimage);
10063 fn test_keysend_hash_mismatch() {
10064 // Test that if we receive a keysend `update_add_htlc` msg, we fail as expected if the keysend
10065 // preimage doesn't match the msg's payment hash.
10066 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10067 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10068 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10069 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10071 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10072 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10074 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10075 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10076 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10077 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10078 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10079 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10080 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10081 let route = find_route(
10082 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10083 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10086 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10087 let mismatch_payment_hash = PaymentHash([43; 32]);
10088 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(mismatch_payment_hash,
10089 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10090 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, mismatch_payment_hash,
10091 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), Some(test_preimage), PaymentId(mismatch_payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10092 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10094 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10095 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10096 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10097 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10098 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10099 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10100 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10102 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "Payment preimage didn't match payment hash", 1);
10106 fn test_keysend_msg_with_secret_err() {
10107 // Test that we error as expected if we receive a keysend payment that includes a payment
10108 // secret when we don't support MPP keysend.
10109 let mut reject_mpp_keysend_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10110 reject_mpp_keysend_cfg.accept_mpp_keysend = false;
10111 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10112 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10113 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(reject_mpp_keysend_cfg)]);
10114 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10116 let payer_pubkey = nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id();
10117 let payee_pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10119 let _chan = create_chan_between_nodes(&nodes[0], &nodes[1]);
10120 let route_params = RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(
10121 PaymentParameters::for_keysend(payee_pubkey, 40, false), 10_000);
10122 let network_graph = nodes[0].network_graph.clone();
10123 let first_hops = nodes[0].node.list_usable_channels();
10124 let scorer = test_utils::TestScorer::new();
10125 let random_seed_bytes = chanmon_cfgs[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
10126 let route = find_route(
10127 &payer_pubkey, &route_params, &network_graph, Some(&first_hops.iter().collect::<Vec<_>>()),
10128 nodes[0].logger, &scorer, &(), &random_seed_bytes
10131 let test_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10132 let test_secret = PaymentSecret([43; 32]);
10133 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&test_preimage.0).into_inner());
10134 let session_privs = nodes[0].node.test_add_new_pending_payment(payment_hash,
10135 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0), &route).unwrap();
10136 nodes[0].node.test_send_payment_internal(&route, payment_hash,
10137 RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(test_secret), Some(test_preimage),
10138 PaymentId(payment_hash.0), None, session_privs).unwrap();
10139 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10141 let updates = get_htlc_update_msgs!(nodes[0], nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10142 assert_eq!(updates.update_add_htlcs.len(), 1);
10143 assert!(updates.update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty());
10144 assert!(updates.update_fail_htlcs.is_empty());
10145 assert!(updates.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.is_empty());
10146 assert!(updates.update_fee.is_none());
10147 nodes[1].node.handle_update_add_htlc(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_add_htlcs[0]);
10149 nodes[1].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::channelmanager", "We don't support MPP keysend payments", 1);
10153 fn test_multi_hop_missing_secret() {
10154 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(4);
10155 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(4, &chanmon_cfgs);
10156 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(4, &node_cfgs, &[None, None, None, None]);
10157 let nodes = create_network(4, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10159 let chan_1_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10160 let chan_2_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 2).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10161 let chan_3_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 1, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10162 let chan_4_id = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 2, 3).0.contents.short_channel_id;
10164 // Marshall an MPP route.
10165 let (mut route, payment_hash, _, _) = get_route_and_payment_hash!(&nodes[0], nodes[3], 100000);
10166 let path = route.paths[0].clone();
10167 route.paths.push(path);
10168 route.paths[0].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id();
10169 route.paths[0].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_1_id;
10170 route.paths[0].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_3_id;
10171 route.paths[1].hops[0].pubkey = nodes[2].node.get_our_node_id();
10172 route.paths[1].hops[0].short_channel_id = chan_2_id;
10173 route.paths[1].hops[1].short_channel_id = chan_4_id;
10175 match nodes[0].node.send_payment_with_route(&route, payment_hash,
10176 RecipientOnionFields::spontaneous_empty(), PaymentId(payment_hash.0))
10178 PaymentSendFailure::ParameterError(APIError::APIMisuseError { ref err }) => {
10179 assert!(regex::Regex::new(r"Payment secret is required for multi-path payments").unwrap().is_match(err))
10181 _ => panic!("unexpected error")
10186 fn test_drop_disconnected_peers_when_removing_channels() {
10187 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10188 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10189 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10190 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10192 let chan = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10194 nodes[0].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10195 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10197 nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&chan.2, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10198 check_closed_broadcast!(nodes[0], true);
10199 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10200 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::HolderForceClosed, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 100000);
10203 // Assert that nodes[1] is awaiting removal for nodes[0] once nodes[1] has been
10204 // disconnected and the channel between has been force closed.
10205 let nodes_0_per_peer_state = nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap();
10206 // Assert that nodes[1] isn't removed before `timer_tick_occurred` has been executed.
10207 assert_eq!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.len(), 1);
10208 assert!(nodes_0_per_peer_state.get(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).is_some());
10211 nodes[0].node.timer_tick_occurred();
10214 // Assert that nodes[1] has now been removed.
10215 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.per_peer_state.read().unwrap().len(), 0);
10220 fn bad_inbound_payment_hash() {
10221 // Add coverage for checking that a user-provided payment hash matches the payment secret.
10222 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10223 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10224 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10225 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10227 let (_, payment_hash, payment_secret) = get_payment_preimage_hash!(&nodes[0]);
10228 let payment_data = msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10230 total_msat: 100_000,
10233 // Ensure that if the payment hash given to `inbound_payment::verify` differs from the original,
10234 // payment verification fails as expected.
10235 let mut bad_payment_hash = payment_hash.clone();
10236 bad_payment_hash.0[0] += 1;
10237 match inbound_payment::verify(bad_payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger) {
10238 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected ok"),
10240 nodes[0].logger.assert_log_contains("lightning::ln::inbound_payment", "Failing HTLC with user-generated payment_hash", 1);
10244 // Check that using the original payment hash succeeds.
10245 assert!(inbound_payment::verify(payment_hash, &payment_data, nodes[0].node.highest_seen_timestamp.load(Ordering::Acquire) as u64, &nodes[0].node.inbound_payment_key, &nodes[0].logger).is_ok());
10249 fn test_id_to_peer_coverage() {
10250 // Test that the `ChannelManager:id_to_peer` contains channels which have been assigned
10251 // a `channel_id` (i.e. have had the funding tx created), and that they are removed once
10252 // the channel is successfully closed.
10253 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10254 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10255 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10256 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10258 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10259 let open_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10260 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel);
10261 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10262 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10264 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _funding_output) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 1_000_000, 42);
10265 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes(tx.txid().into_inner());
10267 // Ensure that the `id_to_peer` map is empty until either party has received the
10268 // funding transaction, and have the real `channel_id`.
10269 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10270 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10273 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10275 // Assert that `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10276 // as it has the funding transaction.
10277 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10278 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10279 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10282 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10284 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10286 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10288 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10289 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10290 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10292 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10295 // Assert that `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map is populated with the channel as soon as
10296 // as it has the funding transaction.
10297 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10298 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10299 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10301 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10302 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10303 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10304 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10305 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10306 let (channel_ready, _) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_confirm(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &tx);
10307 let (announcement, nodes_0_update, nodes_1_update) = create_chan_between_nodes_with_value_b(&nodes[0], &nodes[1], &channel_ready);
10308 update_nodes_with_chan_announce(&nodes, 0, 1, &announcement, &nodes_0_update, &nodes_1_update);
10310 nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10311 nodes[1].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()));
10312 let nodes_1_shutdown = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendShutdown, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10313 nodes[0].node.handle_shutdown(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &nodes_1_shutdown);
10315 let closing_signed_node_0 = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10316 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0);
10318 // Assert that the channel is kept in the `id_to_peer` map for both nodes until the
10319 // channel can be fully closed by both parties (i.e. no outstanding htlcs exists, the
10320 // fee for the closing transaction has been negotiated and the parties has the other
10321 // party's signature for the fee negotiated closing transaction.)
10322 let nodes_0_lock = nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10323 assert_eq!(nodes_0_lock.len(), 1);
10324 assert!(nodes_0_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10328 // At this stage, `nodes[1]` has proposed a fee for the closing transaction in the
10329 // `handle_closing_signed` call above. As `nodes[1]` has not yet received the signature
10330 // from `nodes[0]` for the closing transaction with the proposed fee, the channel is
10331 // kept in the `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map.
10332 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10333 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10334 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10337 nodes[0].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendClosingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()));
10339 // `nodes[0]` accepts `nodes[1]`'s proposed fee for the closing transaction, and
10340 // therefore has all it needs to fully close the channel (both signatures for the
10341 // closing transaction).
10342 // Assert that the channel is removed from `nodes[0]`'s `id_to_peer` map as it can be
10343 // fully closed by `nodes[0]`.
10344 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10346 // Assert that the channel is still in `nodes[1]`'s `id_to_peer` map, as `nodes[1]`
10347 // doesn't have `nodes[0]`'s signature for the closing transaction yet.
10348 let nodes_1_lock = nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap();
10349 assert_eq!(nodes_1_lock.len(), 1);
10350 assert!(nodes_1_lock.contains_key(&channel_id));
10353 let (_nodes_0_update, closing_signed_node_0) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[0].node, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10355 nodes[1].node.handle_closing_signed(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &closing_signed_node_0.unwrap());
10357 // Assert that the channel has now been removed from both parties `id_to_peer` map once
10358 // they both have everything required to fully close the channel.
10359 assert_eq!(nodes[1].node.id_to_peer.lock().unwrap().len(), 0);
10361 let (_nodes_1_update, _none) = get_closing_signed_broadcast!(nodes[1].node, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10363 check_closed_event!(nodes[0], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10364 check_closed_event!(nodes[1], 1, ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure, [nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()], 1000000);
10367 fn check_not_connected_to_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10368 let expected_message = format!("Not connected to node: {}", expected_public_key);
10369 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10372 fn check_unkown_peer_error<T>(res_err: Result<T, APIError>, expected_public_key: PublicKey) {
10373 let expected_message = format!("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id {}", expected_public_key);
10374 check_api_error_message(expected_message, res_err)
10377 fn check_api_error_message<T>(expected_err_message: String, res_err: Result<T, APIError>) {
10379 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) => {
10380 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10382 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err }) => {
10383 assert_eq!(err, expected_err_message);
10385 Ok(_) => panic!("Unexpected Ok"),
10386 Err(_) => panic!("Unexpected Error"),
10391 fn test_api_calls_with_unkown_counterparty_node() {
10392 // Tests that our API functions that expects a `counterparty_node_id` as input, behaves as
10393 // expected if the `counterparty_node_id` is an unkown peer in the
10394 // `ChannelManager::per_peer_state` map.
10395 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10396 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10397 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[None, None]);
10398 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10401 let channel_id = ChannelId::from_bytes([4; 32]);
10402 let unkown_public_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10403 let intercept_id = InterceptId([0; 32]);
10405 // Test the API functions.
10406 check_not_connected_to_peer_error(nodes[0].node.create_channel(unkown_public_key, 1_000_000, 500_000_000, 42, None), unkown_public_key);
10408 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.accept_inbound_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key, 42), unkown_public_key);
10410 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.close_channel(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10412 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10414 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.force_close_without_broadcasting_txn(&channel_id, &unkown_public_key), unkown_public_key);
10416 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.forward_intercepted_htlc(intercept_id, &channel_id, unkown_public_key, 1_000_000), unkown_public_key);
10418 check_unkown_peer_error(nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&unkown_public_key, &[channel_id], &ChannelConfig::default()), unkown_public_key);
10422 fn test_connection_limiting() {
10423 // Test that we limit un-channel'd peers and un-funded channels properly.
10424 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10425 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10426 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10427 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10429 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10431 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10432 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10434 let mut funding_tx = None;
10435 for idx in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10436 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10437 let accept_channel = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10440 nodes[0].node.handle_accept_channel(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &accept_channel);
10441 let (temporary_channel_id, tx, _) = create_funding_transaction(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 42);
10442 funding_tx = Some(tx.clone());
10443 nodes[0].node.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), tx).unwrap();
10444 let funding_created_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10446 nodes[1].node.handle_funding_created(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_created_msg);
10447 check_added_monitors!(nodes[1], 1);
10448 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10450 let funding_signed = get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10452 nodes[0].node.handle_funding_signed(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &funding_signed);
10453 check_added_monitors!(nodes[0], 1);
10454 expect_channel_pending_event(&nodes[0], &nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10456 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10459 // A MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER + 1 channel will be summarily rejected
10460 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10461 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10462 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10463 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10465 // Further, because all of our channels with nodes[0] are inbound, and none of them funded,
10466 // it doesn't count as a "protected" peer, i.e. it counts towards the MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS
10468 let mut peer_pks = Vec::with_capacity(super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS);
10469 for _ in 1..super::MAX_NO_CHANNEL_PEERS {
10470 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10471 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10472 peer_pks.push(random_pk);
10473 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10474 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10477 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10478 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10479 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10480 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10481 }, true).unwrap_err();
10483 // Also importantly, because nodes[0] isn't "protected", we will refuse a reconnection from
10484 // them if we have too many un-channel'd peers.
10485 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10486 let chan_closed_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10487 assert_eq!(chan_closed_events.len(), super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER - 1);
10488 for ev in chan_closed_events {
10489 if let Event::ChannelClosed { .. } = ev { } else { panic!(); }
10491 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10492 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10494 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10495 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10496 }, true).unwrap_err();
10498 // but of course if the connection is outbound its allowed...
10499 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10500 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10501 }, false).unwrap();
10502 nodes[1].node.peer_disconnected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10504 // Now nodes[0] is disconnected but still has a pending, un-funded channel lying around.
10505 // Even though we accept one more connection from new peers, we won't actually let them
10507 assert!(peer_pks.len() > super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1);
10508 for i in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10509 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&peer_pks[i], &open_channel_msg);
10510 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, peer_pks[i]);
10511 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10513 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10514 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10515 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10517 // Of course, however, outbound channels are always allowed
10518 nodes[1].node.create_channel(last_random_pk, 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10519 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, last_random_pk);
10521 // If we fund the first channel, nodes[0] has a live on-chain channel with us, it is now
10522 // "protected" and can connect again.
10523 mine_transaction(&nodes[1], funding_tx.as_ref().unwrap());
10524 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &msgs::Init {
10525 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10527 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReestablish, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10529 // Further, because the first channel was funded, we can open another channel with
10531 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10532 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10536 fn test_outbound_chans_unlimited() {
10537 // Test that we never refuse an outbound channel even if a peer is unfuned-channel-limited
10538 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10539 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10540 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, None]);
10541 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10543 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10545 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10546 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10548 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER {
10549 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10550 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10551 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10554 // Once we have MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANS_PER_PEER unfunded channels, new inbound channels will be
10556 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10557 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10558 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10560 // but we can still open an outbound channel.
10561 nodes[1].node.create_channel(nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10562 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10564 // but even with such an outbound channel, additional inbound channels will still fail.
10565 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10566 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).channel_id,
10567 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10571 fn test_0conf_limiting() {
10572 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10573 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10574 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10575 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10576 let mut settings = test_default_channel_config();
10577 settings.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10578 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[None, Some(settings)]);
10579 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10581 // Note that create_network connects the nodes together for us
10583 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10584 let mut open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10586 // First, get us up to MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS so we can test at the edge
10587 for _ in 0..super::MAX_UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_PEERS - 1 {
10588 let random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10589 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10590 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10591 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10594 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10595 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10597 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10598 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10600 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10602 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, random_pk);
10603 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(&nodes[0].keys_manager);
10606 // If we try to accept a channel from another peer non-0conf it will fail.
10607 let last_random_pk = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&nodes[0].node.secp_ctx,
10608 &SecretKey::from_slice(&nodes[1].keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes()).unwrap());
10609 nodes[1].node.peer_connected(&last_random_pk, &msgs::Init {
10610 features: nodes[0].node.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10612 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10613 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10615 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10616 match nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23) {
10617 Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err }) =>
10618 assert_eq!(err, "Too many peers with unfunded channels, refusing to accept new ones"),
10622 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10624 assert_eq!(get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &last_random_pk).channel_id,
10625 open_channel_msg.temporary_channel_id);
10627 // ...however if we accept the same channel 0conf it should work just fine.
10628 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&last_random_pk, &open_channel_msg);
10629 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10631 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10632 nodes[1].node.accept_inbound_channel_from_trusted_peer_0conf(&temporary_channel_id, &last_random_pk, 23).unwrap();
10634 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10636 get_event_msg!(nodes[1], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, last_random_pk);
10640 fn reject_excessively_underpaying_htlcs() {
10641 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(1);
10642 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(1, &chanmon_cfg);
10643 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(1, &node_cfg, &[None]);
10644 let node = create_network(1, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10645 let sender_intended_amt_msat = 100;
10646 let extra_fee_msat = 10;
10647 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive {
10649 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10650 payment_metadata: None,
10651 keysend_preimage: None,
10652 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10653 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10655 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10657 // Check that if the amount we received + the penultimate hop extra fee is less than the sender
10658 // intended amount, we fail the payment.
10659 if let Err(crate::ln::channelmanager::InboundOnionErr { err_code, .. }) =
10660 node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10661 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat - 1, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat))
10663 assert_eq!(err_code, 19);
10664 } else { panic!(); }
10666 // If amt_received + extra_fee is equal to the sender intended amount, we're fine.
10667 let hop_data = msgs::InboundOnionPayload::Receive { // This is the same payload as above, InboundOnionPayload doesn't implement Clone
10669 outgoing_cltv_value: 42,
10670 payment_metadata: None,
10671 keysend_preimage: None,
10672 payment_data: Some(msgs::FinalOnionHopData {
10673 payment_secret: PaymentSecret([0; 32]), total_msat: sender_intended_amt_msat,
10675 custom_tlvs: Vec::new(),
10677 assert!(node[0].node.construct_recv_pending_htlc_info(hop_data, [0; 32], PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10678 sender_intended_amt_msat - extra_fee_msat, 42, None, true, Some(extra_fee_msat)).is_ok());
10682 fn test_inbound_anchors_manual_acceptance() {
10683 // Tests that we properly limit inbound channels when we have the manual-channel-acceptance
10684 // flag set and (sometimes) accept channels as 0conf.
10685 let mut anchors_cfg = test_default_channel_config();
10686 anchors_cfg.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10688 let mut anchors_manual_accept_cfg = anchors_cfg.clone();
10689 anchors_manual_accept_cfg.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10691 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(3);
10692 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(3, &chanmon_cfgs);
10693 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(3, &node_cfgs,
10694 &[Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_cfg.clone()), Some(anchors_manual_accept_cfg.clone())]);
10695 let nodes = create_network(3, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10697 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10698 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10700 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10701 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10702 let msg_events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10703 match &msg_events[0] {
10704 MessageSendEvent::HandleError { node_id, action } => {
10705 assert_eq!(*node_id, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10707 ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage { msg } =>
10708 assert_eq!(msg.data, "No channels with anchor outputs accepted".to_owned()),
10709 _ => panic!("Unexpected error action"),
10712 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10715 nodes[2].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10716 let events = nodes[2].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10718 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } =>
10719 nodes[2].node.accept_inbound_channel(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), 23).unwrap(),
10720 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10722 get_event_msg!(nodes[2], MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10726 fn test_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_fallback() {
10727 // Tests that if both nodes support anchors, but the remote node does not want to accept
10728 // anchor channels at the moment, an error it sent to the local node such that it can retry
10729 // the channel without the anchors feature.
10730 let chanmon_cfgs = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10731 let node_cfgs = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfgs);
10732 let mut anchors_config = test_default_channel_config();
10733 anchors_config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10734 anchors_config.manually_accept_inbound_channels = true;
10735 let node_chanmgrs = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfgs, &[Some(anchors_config.clone()), Some(anchors_config.clone())]);
10736 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfgs, &node_chanmgrs);
10738 nodes[0].node.create_channel(nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), 100_000, 0, 0, None).unwrap();
10739 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10740 assert!(open_channel_msg.channel_type.as_ref().unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10742 nodes[1].node.handle_open_channel(&nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id(), &open_channel_msg);
10743 let events = nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10745 Event::OpenChannelRequest { temporary_channel_id, .. } => {
10746 nodes[1].node.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&temporary_channel_id, &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id()).unwrap();
10748 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10751 let error_msg = get_err_msg(&nodes[1], &nodes[0].node.get_our_node_id());
10752 nodes[0].node.handle_error(&nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id(), &error_msg);
10754 let open_channel_msg = get_event_msg!(nodes[0], MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, nodes[1].node.get_our_node_id());
10755 assert!(!open_channel_msg.channel_type.unwrap().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10757 // Since nodes[1] should not have accepted the channel, it should
10758 // not have generated any events.
10759 assert!(nodes[1].node.get_and_clear_pending_events().is_empty());
10763 fn test_update_channel_config() {
10764 let chanmon_cfg = create_chanmon_cfgs(2);
10765 let node_cfg = create_node_cfgs(2, &chanmon_cfg);
10766 let mut user_config = test_default_channel_config();
10767 let node_chanmgr = create_node_chanmgrs(2, &node_cfg, &[Some(user_config), Some(user_config)]);
10768 let nodes = create_network(2, &node_cfg, &node_chanmgr);
10769 let _ = create_announced_chan_between_nodes(&nodes, 0, 1);
10770 let channel = &nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0];
10772 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10773 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10774 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10776 user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat += 10;
10777 nodes[0].node.update_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &user_config.channel_config).unwrap();
10778 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_base_msat, user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_base_msat);
10779 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10780 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10782 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10783 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10786 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate::default()).unwrap();
10787 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10788 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10790 let new_cltv_expiry_delta = user_config.channel_config.cltv_expiry_delta + 6;
10791 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10792 cltv_expiry_delta: Some(new_cltv_expiry_delta),
10793 ..Default::default()
10795 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10796 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10797 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10799 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10800 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10803 let new_fee = user_config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths + 100;
10804 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10805 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10806 ..Default::default()
10808 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, new_cltv_expiry_delta);
10809 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, new_fee);
10810 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10811 assert_eq!(events.len(), 1);
10813 MessageSendEvent::BroadcastChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10814 _ => panic!("expected BroadcastChannelUpdate event"),
10817 // If we provide a channel_id not associated with the peer, we should get an error and no updates
10818 // should be applied to ensure update atomicity as specified in the API docs.
10819 let bad_channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_txid(&[10; 32], 10);
10820 let current_fee = nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
10821 let new_fee = current_fee + 100;
10824 nodes[0].node.update_partial_channel_config(&channel.counterparty.node_id, &[channel.channel_id, bad_channel_id], &ChannelConfigUpdate {
10825 forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths: Some(new_fee),
10826 ..Default::default()
10828 Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: _ }),
10831 // Check that the fee hasn't changed for the channel that exists.
10832 assert_eq!(nodes[0].node.list_channels()[0].config.unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths, current_fee);
10833 let events = nodes[0].node.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10834 assert_eq!(events.len(), 0);
10838 fn test_payment_display() {
10839 let payment_id = PaymentId([42; 32]);
10840 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_id), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10841 let payment_hash = PaymentHash([42; 32]);
10842 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_hash), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10843 let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([42; 32]);
10844 assert_eq!(format!("{}", &payment_preimage), "2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a");
10850 use crate::chain::Listen;
10851 use crate::chain::chainmonitor::{ChainMonitor, Persist};
10852 use crate::sign::{KeysManager, InMemorySigner};
10853 use crate::events::{Event, MessageSendEvent, MessageSendEventsProvider};
10854 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, ChainParameters, ChannelManager, PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentId, RecipientOnionFields, Retry};
10855 use crate::ln::functional_test_utils::*;
10856 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelMessageHandler, Init};
10857 use crate::routing::gossip::NetworkGraph;
10858 use crate::routing::router::{PaymentParameters, RouteParameters};
10859 use crate::util::test_utils;
10860 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
10862 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
10863 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
10864 use bitcoin::{Block, BlockHeader, PackedLockTime, Transaction, TxMerkleNode, TxOut};
10866 use crate::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock};
10868 use criterion::Criterion;
10870 type Manager<'a, P> = ChannelManager<
10871 &'a ChainMonitor<InMemorySigner, &'a test_utils::TestChainSource,
10872 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator,
10873 &'a test_utils::TestLogger, &'a P>,
10874 &'a test_utils::TestBroadcaster, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager, &'a KeysManager,
10875 &'a test_utils::TestFeeEstimator, &'a test_utils::TestRouter<'a>,
10876 &'a test_utils::TestLogger>;
10878 struct ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> {
10879 node: &'node_cfg Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>,
10881 impl<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg: 'node_cfg, P: Persist<InMemorySigner>> NodeHolder for ANodeHolder<'node_cfg, 'chan_mon_cfg, P> {
10882 type CM = Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P>;
10884 fn node(&self) -> &Manager<'chan_mon_cfg, P> { self.node }
10886 fn chain_monitor(&self) -> Option<&test_utils::TestChainMonitor> { None }
10889 pub fn bench_sends(bench: &mut Criterion) {
10890 bench_two_sends(bench, "bench_sends", test_utils::TestPersister::new(), test_utils::TestPersister::new());
10893 pub fn bench_two_sends<P: Persist<InMemorySigner>>(bench: &mut Criterion, bench_name: &str, persister_a: P, persister_b: P) {
10894 // Do a simple benchmark of sending a payment back and forth between two nodes.
10895 // Note that this is unrealistic as each payment send will require at least two fsync
10897 let network = bitcoin::Network::Testnet;
10898 let genesis_block = bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block(network);
10900 let tx_broadcaster = test_utils::TestBroadcaster::new(network);
10901 let fee_estimator = test_utils::TestFeeEstimator { sat_per_kw: Mutex::new(253) };
10902 let logger_a = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10903 let scorer = RwLock::new(test_utils::TestScorer::new());
10904 let router = test_utils::TestRouter::new(Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(network, &logger_a)), &scorer);
10906 let mut config: UserConfig = Default::default();
10907 config.channel_config.max_dust_htlc_exposure = MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(5_000_000 / 253);
10908 config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth = 1;
10910 let chain_monitor_a = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_a);
10911 let seed_a = [1u8; 32];
10912 let keys_manager_a = KeysManager::new(&seed_a, 42, 42);
10913 let node_a = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_a, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, &keys_manager_a, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10915 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10916 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10917 let node_a_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_a };
10919 let logger_b = test_utils::TestLogger::with_id("node a".to_owned());
10920 let chain_monitor_b = ChainMonitor::new(None, &tx_broadcaster, &logger_a, &fee_estimator, &persister_b);
10921 let seed_b = [2u8; 32];
10922 let keys_manager_b = KeysManager::new(&seed_b, 42, 42);
10923 let node_b = ChannelManager::new(&fee_estimator, &chain_monitor_b, &tx_broadcaster, &router, &logger_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, &keys_manager_b, config.clone(), ChainParameters {
10925 best_block: BestBlock::from_network(network),
10926 }, genesis_block.header.time);
10927 let node_b_holder = ANodeHolder { node: &node_b };
10929 node_a.peer_connected(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10930 features: node_b.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10932 node_b.peer_connected(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &Init {
10933 features: node_a.init_features(), networks: None, remote_network_address: None
10934 }, false).unwrap();
10935 node_a.create_channel(node_b.get_our_node_id(), 8_000_000, 100_000_000, 42, None).unwrap();
10936 node_b.handle_open_channel(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendOpenChannel, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10937 node_a.handle_accept_channel(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendAcceptChannel, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10940 if let Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, output_script, .. } = get_event!(node_a_holder, Event::FundingGenerationReady) {
10941 tx = Transaction { version: 2, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10942 value: 8_000_000, script_pubkey: output_script,
10944 node_a.funding_transaction_generated(&temporary_channel_id, &node_b.get_our_node_id(), tx.clone()).unwrap();
10945 } else { panic!(); }
10947 node_b.handle_funding_created(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_a_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingCreated, node_b.get_our_node_id()));
10948 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10949 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10950 match events_b[0] {
10951 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10952 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10954 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10957 node_a.handle_funding_signed(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendFundingSigned, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10958 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10959 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10960 match events_a[0] {
10961 Event::ChannelPending{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10962 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10964 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10967 assert_eq!(&tx_broadcaster.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap()[..], &[tx.clone()]);
10969 let block = create_dummy_block(BestBlock::from_network(network).block_hash(), 42, vec![tx]);
10970 Listen::block_connected(&node_a, &block, 1);
10971 Listen::block_connected(&node_b, &block, 1);
10973 node_a.handle_channel_ready(&node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady, node_a.get_our_node_id()));
10974 let msg_events = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events();
10975 assert_eq!(msg_events.len(), 2);
10976 match msg_events[0] {
10977 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelReady { ref msg, .. } => {
10978 node_b.handle_channel_ready(&node_a.get_our_node_id(), msg);
10979 get_event_msg!(node_b_holder, MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate, node_a.get_our_node_id());
10983 match msg_events[1] {
10984 MessageSendEvent::SendChannelUpdate { .. } => {},
10988 let events_a = node_a.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10989 assert_eq!(events_a.len(), 1);
10990 match events_a[0] {
10991 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
10992 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_b.get_our_node_id());
10994 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
10997 let events_b = node_b.get_and_clear_pending_events();
10998 assert_eq!(events_b.len(), 1);
10999 match events_b[0] {
11000 Event::ChannelReady{ ref counterparty_node_id, .. } => {
11001 assert_eq!(*counterparty_node_id, node_a.get_our_node_id());
11003 _ => panic!("Unexpected event"),
11006 let mut payment_count: u64 = 0;
11007 macro_rules! send_payment {
11008 ($node_a: expr, $node_b: expr) => {
11009 let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id($node_b.get_our_node_id(), TEST_FINAL_CLTV)
11010 .with_bolt11_features($node_b.invoice_features()).unwrap();
11011 let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
11012 payment_preimage.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&payment_count.to_le_bytes());
11013 payment_count += 1;
11014 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
11015 let payment_secret = $node_b.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 7200, None).unwrap();
11017 $node_a.send_payment(payment_hash, RecipientOnionFields::secret_only(payment_secret),
11018 PaymentId(payment_hash.0),
11019 RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value(payment_params, 10_000),
11020 Retry::Attempts(0)).unwrap();
11021 let payment_event = SendEvent::from_event($node_a.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap());
11022 $node_b.handle_update_add_htlc(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.msgs[0]);
11023 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &payment_event.commitment_msg);
11024 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, &$node_a.get_our_node_id());
11025 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11026 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11027 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_b.get_our_node_id()));
11029 expect_pending_htlcs_forwardable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b });
11030 expect_payment_claimable!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, payment_secret, 10_000);
11031 $node_b.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
11032 expect_payment_claimed!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, payment_hash, 10_000);
11034 match $node_b.get_and_clear_pending_msg_events().pop().unwrap() {
11035 MessageSendEvent::UpdateHTLCs { node_id, updates } => {
11036 assert_eq!(node_id, $node_a.get_our_node_id());
11037 $node_a.handle_update_fulfill_htlc(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.update_fulfill_htlcs[0]);
11038 $node_a.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &updates.commitment_signed);
11040 _ => panic!("Failed to generate claim event"),
11043 let (raa, cs) = get_revoke_commit_msgs(&ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, &$node_b.get_our_node_id());
11044 $node_b.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &raa);
11045 $node_b.handle_commitment_signed(&$node_a.get_our_node_id(), &cs);
11046 $node_a.handle_revoke_and_ack(&$node_b.get_our_node_id(), &get_event_msg!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_b }, MessageSendEvent::SendRevokeAndACK, $node_a.get_our_node_id()));
11048 expect_payment_sent!(ANodeHolder { node: &$node_a }, payment_preimage);
11052 bench.bench_function(bench_name, |b| b.iter(|| {
11053 send_payment!(node_a, node_b);
11054 send_payment!(node_b, node_a);